G.R. No.

108946 January 28, 1999

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and BJ PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, GABRIEL ZOSA, WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR., and CASEY FRANCISCO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari. Petitioners seek to annul the resolution of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1992, in Criminal Case No. Q-92-
27854, entitled "Gabriel Zosa, et al. v. City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Francisco Joaquin, Jr.," and its resolution, dated December 3, 1992, denying
petitioner Joaquin's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of Copyright No. M922, dated January 28, 1971, of Rhoda and Me, a dating game
show aired from 1970 to 1977.
On June 28, 1973, petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an addendum to its certificate of copyright specifying the show's format and style of
presentation.
On July 14, 1991, while watching television, petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr., president of BJPI, saw on RPN Channel 9 an episode of It's a Date, which was
produced by IXL Productions, Inc. (IXL). On July 18, 1991, he wrote a letter to private respondent Gabriel M. Zosa, president and general manager of IXL,
informing Zosa that BJPI had a copyright to Rhoda and Me and demanding that IXL discontinue airing It's a Date.
In a letter, dated July 19, 1991, private respondent Zosa apologized to petitioner Joaquin and requested a meeting to discuss a possible settlement. IXL,
however, continued airing It's a Date, prompting petitioner Joaquin to send a second letter on July 25, 1991 in which he reiterated his demand and warned
that, if IXL did not comply, he would endorse the matter to his attorneys for proper legal action.
Meanwhile, private respondent Zosa sought to register IXL's copyright to the first episode of It's a Date for which it was issued by the National Library a
certificate of copyright August 14, 1991.
Upon complaint of petitioners, an information for violation of P.D. No. 49 was filed against private respondent Zosa together with certain officers of RPN
Channel 9, namely, William Esposo, Felipe Medina, and Casey Francisco, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where it was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 92-27854 and assigned to Branch 104 thereof. However, private respondent Zosa sought a review of the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor
before the Department of Justice.
On August 12, 1992, respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Assistant City Prosecutor's findings and directed him to move for the
dismissal of the case against private respondents. 1
Petitioner Joaquin filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion denied by respondent Secretary of Justice on December 3, 1992. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that:
1. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he invoked non-
presentation of the master tape as being fatal to the existence of probable cause to prove infringement, despite the
fact that private respondents never raised the same as a controverted issue.
2. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he arrogated unto
himself the determination of what is copyrightable an issue which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court to assess in a proper proceeding.
Both public and private respondents maintain that petitioners failed to establish the existence of probable cause due to their failure to present the
copyrighted master videotape of Rhoda and Me. They contend that petitioner BJPI's copyright covers only a specific episode of Rhoda and Me and that the
formats or concepts of dating game shows are not covered by copyright protection under P.D. No. 49.
Non-Assignment of Error.
Petitioners claim that their failure to submit the copyrighted master videotape of the television show Rhoda and Me was not raised in issue by private
respondents during the preliminary investigation and, therefore, it was error for the Secretary of Justice to reverse the investigating prosecutor's finding of
probable cause on this ground.
A preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the state prosecutor who is given by law the power to direct and control criminal
actions. 2 He is, however, subject to the control of the Secretary of Justice. Thus, Rule 112, 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
Sec. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal. If the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the
resolution and corresponding information. He shall certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against
him and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend dismissal of the complaint.
In either case, he shall forward the records of the case to the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor within five (5) days from
his resolution. The latter shall take appropriate action thereon ten (10) days from receipt thereof, immediately informing the parties of
said action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
Where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal
or chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information
 against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor,
he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to
dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information.
In reviewing resolutions of prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from considering errors, although unassigned, for the purpose of
determining whether there is probable cause for filing cases in court. He must make his own finding, of probable cause and is not confined to the issues
raised by the parties during preliminary investigation. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.
Opinion of the Secretary of Justice
Petitioners contend, however, that the determination of the question whether the format or mechanics of a show is entitled to copyright protection is for
the court, and not the Secretary of Justice, to make. They assail the following portion of the resolution of the respondent Secretary of Justice:
[T]he essence of copyright infringement is the copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable materials as defined and enumerated in
Section 2 of PD. No. 49. Apart from the manner in which it is actually expressed, however, the idea of a dating game show is, in the
opinion of this Office, a non-copyrightable material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes in their abstract form clearly do not fall within
the class of works or materials susceptible of copyright registration as provided in PD. No. 49. 3 (Emphasis added.)
It is indeed true that the question whether the format or mechanics of petitioners television show is entitled to copyright protection is a legal question for
the court to make. This does not, however, preclude respondent Secretary of Justice from making a preliminary determination of this question in resolving
whether there is probable cause for filing the case in court. In doing so in this case, he did not commit any grave error.
Presentation of Master Tape
Petitioners claim that respondent Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the master videotape should have been predented in order
to determine whether there was probable cause for copyright infringement. They contend that 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 4 on
which respondent Secretary of Justice relied in reversing the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, is inapplicable to the case at bar because in the
present case, the parties presented sufficient evidence which clearly establish "linkage between the copyright show "Rhoda and Me" and the infringing TV
show "It's a Date." 5
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation involved raids conducted on various videotape outlets allegedlly selling or renting out "pirated" videotapes.
The trial court found that the affidavits of NBI agents, given in support of the application for the search warrant, were insufficient without the master tape.
Accordingly, the trial court lifted the search warrants it had previously issued against the defendants. On petition for review, this Court sustained the action
of the trial court and ruled: 6
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and
not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court
cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the
copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence
of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the
existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

This ruling was qualified in the later case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 7 in which it was held:
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted
films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of
probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the printed
copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly
intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. . . 8
In the case at bar during the preliminary investigation, petitioners and private respondents presented written descriptions of the formats of their respective
televisions shows, on the basis of which the investigating prosecutor ruled:
As may [be] gleaned from the evidence on record, the substance of the television productions complainant's "RHODA AND ME" and
Zosa's "IT'S A DATE" is that two matches are made between a male and a female, both single, and the two couples are treated to a night
or two of dining and/or dancing at the expense of the show. The major concepts of both shows is the same. Any difference appear mere
variations of the major concepts.
That there is an infringement on the copyright of the show "RHODA AND ME" both in content and in the execution of the video
presentation are established because respondent's "IT'S A DATE" is practically an exact copy of complainant's "RHODA AND ME"
because of substantial similarities as follows, to wit:

RHODA AND ME "IT'S A DATE"

 Set 1 Set 1

a. Unmarried participant of one gender (searcher) appears on one side a. same

of a divider, while three (3) unmarried participants of the other gender
are on the other side of the divider. This arrangement is done to ensure
that the searcher does not see the searchees.

b. Searcher asks a question to be answered by each of the searchees. b. same

The purpose is to determine who among the searchees is the most
compatible with the searcher.

c. Searcher speculates on the match to the searchee. c. same

d. Selection is made by the use of compute (sic) methods, or by the way d. Selection is based on the answer of the Searchees.
questions are answered, or similar methods.

Set 2 Set 2

Same as above with the genders of the searcher and searchees same
interchanged. 9

Petitioners assert that the format of Rhoda and Me is a product of ingenuity and skill and is thus entitled to copyright protection. It is their position that the
presentation of a point-by-point comparison of the formats of the two shows clearly demonstrates the nexus between the shows and hence establishes the
existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. Such being the case, they did not have to produce the master tape.

To begin with the format of a show is not copyrightable. Section 2 of P.D. No. 49, 10 otherwise known as the DECREE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
enumerates the classes of work entitled to copyright protection, to wit:
Sec. 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following classes of
works:
(A) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories, and gazetteers:
(B) Periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;
(C) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery;
(D) Letters;
(E) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb shows, the acting form of which is
fixed in writing or otherwise;
(F) Musical compositions, with or without words;
(G) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography, and other works of art; models or designs for works of
art;
(H) Reproductions of a work of art;
(I) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not patentable, and other works of applied art;
(J) Maps, plans, sketches, and charts;
(K) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(I) Photographic works and works produced by a process analogous to photography lantern slides;
(M) Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audio-visual
recordings;
(N) Computer programs;
(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations advertising copies, labels tags, and box wraps;
(P) Dramatizations, translations, adaptations, abridgements, arrangements and other alterations of literary, musical or artistic works or
of works of the Philippine government as herein defined, which shall be protected as provided in Section 8 of this Decree.
(Q) Collections of literary, scholarly, or artistic works or of works referred to in Section 9 of this Decree which by reason of the selection
and arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations, the same to be protected as such in accordance with Section 8 of
 this Decree.
(R) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.

This provision is substantially the same as 172 of the INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF PHILIPPINES (R.A. No. 8293). 11 The format or mechanics of a
television show is not included in the list of protected works in 2 of P.D. No. 49. For this reason, the protection afforded by the law cannot be extended to
cover them.
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and not
simply a pre-existing right regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be
obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons and on terms and conditions specified in the statute. 12
Since . . . copyright in published works is purely a statutory creation, a copyright may be obtained only for a work falling within the
statutory enumeration or description. 13
Regardless of the historical viewpoint, it is authoritatively settled in the United States that there is no copyright except that which is
both created and secured by act of Congress . . . . . 14
P.D. No. 49, 2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished works and not to concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work. 15 Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES provides:
Sec. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 172 and 173, no protection shall extend, under this
law, to any idea, procedure, system, method or operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such, even if they are
expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of the day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere
items of press information; or any official text of a legislative, administrative or legal nature, as well as any official translation thereof.
What then is the subject matter of petitioners' copyright? This Court is of the opinion that petitioner BJPI's copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each
episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of works mentioned in P.D. 49, 2(M), to wit:
Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audio-visual
recordings;
The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show. Accordingly, by the very nature of the subject of
petitioner BJPI's copyright, the investigating prosecutor should have the opportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows.
Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is insufficient; the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was
indispensable to the determination of the existence of probable cause. As aptly observed by respondent Secretary of Justice:
A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and
audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright/format of both dating game
shows.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.n
G.R. No. 130360 August 15, 2001
WILSON ONG CHING KlAN CHUAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LORENZO TAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review 1 seeks to annul the decision 2 dated August 27, 1997 of the Court of Appeals which set aside the resolutions 3 dated October 13 and
December 15, 1993 as well as the order dated March 1, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94. 4
Petitioner Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chuan ("Ong"), imports vermicelli from China National Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation, based in
Beijing, China, under the firm name C.K.C. Trading. He repacks it in cellophane wrappers with a design of two-dragons and the TOWER trademark on the
uppermost portion. Ong acquired a Certificate of Copyright Registration from the National Library on June 9, 1993 on the said design.
Ong discovered that private respondent Lorenzo Tan repacked his vermicelli he imports from the same company but based in Qingdao, China in a "nearly"
identical wrapper. On September 16, 1993, Ong filed against Tan a verified complaint for infringement of copyright with damages and prayer for temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City. Ong alleged that he was the holder of a Certificate of
Copyright Registration over the cellophane wrapper with the two-dragon design, and that Tan used an identical wrapper in his business. In his prayer for a
preliminary injunction in addition to damages, he asked that Tan be restrained from using the wrapper. He said he would post a bond to guarantee the
payment of damages resulting from the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.1wphi1.nt
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on the same date the complaint was filed. Tan filed an opposition to Ong's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction with counter-application for the issuance of a similar writ against Ong. Tan alleged that Ong was not entitled to an injunction.
According to Tan, Ong did not have a clear right over the use of the trademark Pagoda and Lungkow v ermicelli as these were registered in the name of
CHINA NATIONAL CEREALS OIL AND FOODSTUFFS IMPORT AND EXPORT CORPORATION, SHANDONG CEREALS AND OILS BRANCH (hereafter Ceroilfood
Shandong), based in Qingdao, China. Further, Tan averred that he was the exclusive distributor in the Philippines of the Pagoda and Lungkow v ermicelli and
was solely authorized to use said trademark. He added that Ong merely copied the two-dragon design from Ceroilfood Shandong which had the Certificates
of Registration issued by different countries. He concluded that Ong's Certificate of Copyright Registration was not valid for lack of originality.
On September 30, 1993, Ong countered Tan's opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

On October 13, 1993, the could issued the writ in Ong's favor upon his filing of a P100,000.00 bond. 5

Tan filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction, but the trial court denied it on December 15, 1993. 6 The motion for reconsideration was
also denied on March 1, 1994.
Tan elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Ong filed an opposition to Tan's prayer for an issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ in his favor.
After oral argument, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on August 8, 1994, setting aside the trial court's order. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, in the petition is GIVEN, DUE COURSE, and, GRANTED. The order dated October 13, 1993 and related orders, as well as the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court, are SET ASIDE as issued with grave abuse of discretion. No costs.

SO ORDERED.7
Ong filed a motion for reconsideration and on January 3, 1995, the Court of Appeals modified its August 8, 1994 order as follows:
WHEREFORE the phrase "the order dated October 13, 1993 and related orders, as well as the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
respondent court, are SET ASIDE as issued with grave abuse of discretion" is hereby deleted in our resolution dated 08 August 1994. In all other
respects, said resolution must be maintained.
However, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the herein respondents and any and all persons acting for and in their behalf from
enforcing and/or implementing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on October 15, 1993 pursuant to the Resolution dated October 13, 1993
of the PUBLIC RESPONDENT in Civil Case No. Q-93-17628 entitled "WILSON ONG CHING KIAN CHUAN, ETC. vs. LORENZO TAN, ETC." upon
petitioner's filing of a bond of P200,000.00.
The Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City is directed to elevate the records of Civil Case No. 293-17128 within TEN (10) DAYS
from notice.
The parties are given THIRTY (30) DAYS from notice to file their memorandum or any pertinent manifestation on the matter, after which the case
shall be considered submitted for decision.

SO ORDERED.8
Pursuant to the Court of Appeals' resolution on January 16, 1996, the parties submitted their memoranda. On August 27, 1997, the appellate court
promulgated its decision, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the resolutions dated October 13, 1993 and December 15, 1993 as well as the order dated March 1, 1994 - all in Civil Case No. Q-93-
17628 are hereby SET ASIDE and our injunction heretofore issued made permanent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.9
On October 17, 1997, Ong filed the instant petition for review, claiming that the Court of Appeals committed grave and serious errors tantamount to acting
with grave abuse of discretion and/or acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction:
I. ...WHEN IT ISSUED A PERMANENT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHEN THE LATTER'S RIGHT TO SUCH A
RELIEF IS NOT CLEAR, DOUBTFUL AND HAS NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS.
A. CERTIFICATE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION UNDER P.D. NO. 49.
B. ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MUST BE BASED ON CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE RIGHT WHICH PETITIONER HAD AND
WHICH RIGHT WAS INVADED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
C. COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION OF AUGUST 8, 1994 AND ITS RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 3, 1995 RESULTS IN CONFUSION.
II. ...BY 'INTERFERING' WITH THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' INTERFERENCE WITH THE DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
III. ...BY ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND DISREGARDING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHOM (SIC), UNDER THE JANUARY 13, 1995 RESOLUTION OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, WAS
JUDICIALLY HELD NOT TO HAVE COMMITTED ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE OCTOBER 13, 1993 AND 'RELATED
ORDERS'.
A. ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
IV. ...WHEN IT MADE ITS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, PRE-EMPTING THE TRIAL COURT AND PRE-JUDGING THE CASE, THUS LEAVING THE
TRIAL COURT WITH NOTHING TO RULE UPON.
"A. COURT OF APPEALS PREJUDGED THE CASE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
The issues for our determination are: Was the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction proper? Was there grave abuse of discretion committed by the
Court of Appeals when it set aside the order of the trial court, then issued a judgment touching on the merits?
Petitioner avers that the CA erred in issuing a preliminary injunction in private respondent's favor. He says, firstly, that he is more entitled to it. He states that
as holder of the Certificate of Copyright Registration of the twin-dragon design, he has the protection of P.D. No. 49. 10 Said law allows an injunction in case
of infringement. Petitioner asserts that private respondent has no registered copyright and merely relies on the trademark of his principal abroad, which
insofar as Philippine laws is concerned, cannot prevail over petitioner's copyright.
Private respondent, for his part, avers that petitioner has no "clear right" over the use of the copyrighted wrapper since the PAGODA trademark and label
were first adopted and used and have been duly registered by Ceroilfood Shandong not only in China but in nearly 20 countries and regions worldwide.
Petitioner was not the original creator of the label, but merely copied the design of Ceroilfood Shandong. Private respondent presented copies of the
certificates of copyright registration in the name of Ceroilfood Shandong issued by at least twenty countries and regions worldwide which although
unauthenticated are, according to him, sufficient to provide a sampling of the evidence needed in the determination of the grant of preliminary
injunction.11 Private respondent alleges, that the trademark PAGODA BRAND was registered in China on October 31, 1979 12 while the trademark
LUNGKOW VERMICELLI WITH TWO-DRAGON DEVICE was registered on August 15, 1985. 13
To resolve this controversy, we have to return to basics. A person to be entitled to a copyright must be the original creator of the work. He must have created
it by his own skill, labor and judgment without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another. 14 The grant of preliminary injunction in a case
rests on the sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made with extreme caution. 15 Its grant depends chiefly on the extent of doubt
on the validity of the copyright, existence of infringement, and the damages sustained by such infringement. 16 In our view, the copies of the certificates of
copyright registered in the name of Ceroilfood Shandong sufficiently raise reasonable doubt. With such a doubt preliminary injunction is unavailing. 17 In
Medina vs. City Sheriff, Manila, 276 SCRA 133, 139 (1997), where the complainant's title was disputed, we held that injunction was not proper.
Petitioner Ong argues that the Court of Appeals erred and contradicted itself in its January 3, 1995 Resolution, where it deleted the phrase "the order dated
October 13, 1993 and related orders, as well as the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court, are SET ASIDE as issued with grave abuse of
discretion" in its August 8, 1994 decision, and at the same time issued a writ of preliminary injunction in Tan's favor.
Ong's claim (that the Court of Appeals In deleting the aforequoted phrase in the August 8, 1994 decision abandoned its earlier finding of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court), however, is without logical basis. The appellate court merely restated In its own words the issue raised in the
petition: from a) whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, to b) whether Tan was entitled to an injunctive relief. Then it clarified that the relief
sought is a prohibition against Ong and his agents from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction. Properly understood, an order enjoining the
enforcement of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court effectively, sets aside the RTC
order for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage. 18 From the above discussion, we find that petitioner's right has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated.
That right is what is in dispute and has yet to be determined. In Developers Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 715, 722-723 (1993), we
held that in the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order of the trial court granting the issuance of an injunctive writ
will be set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Conformably, there was no abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals when it
issued its own order to restrain the enforcement of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Finally, we note that the complaint initially filed with the RTC was for infringement of copyright. The trial court's resolution subject of Tan's petition under
Rule 65 before the CA concerns the correctness of the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction. The only issue brought before the CA involved the grave
abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the trial court in granting the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals in declaring that the wrapper
of petitioner is a copy of Ceroilfood Shandong's wrapper went beyond that issue touched on the merits of the infringement case, which remains to be
decided by the trial court. 19 In our view, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to declare that the design of petitioner's wrapper is a copy of the
wrapper allegedly registered by Ceroilfood Shandong. That matter remains for decision after appropriate proceedings at the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit Tan from using the cellophane wrapper
with two-dragon device is denied, but the finding of the respondent appellate court that Ong's copyrighted wrapper is a copy of that of Ceroilfood Shandong
is SET ASIDE for being premature. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is directed to proceed with the trial to determine the merits of Civil
Case No. 33779 expeditiously. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to said trial court promptly.
No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 161295 June 29, 2005

JESSIE G. CHING, petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM M. SALINAS, SR., WILLIAM M. SALINAS, JR., JOSEPHINE L. SALINAS, JENNIFER Y. SALINAS, ALONTO SOLAIMAN SALLE, JOHN ERIC I. SALINAS,
NOEL M. YABUT (Board of Directors and Officers of WILAWARE PRODUCT CORPORATION), respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70411 affirming the January 3,
2002 and February 14, 2002 Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, which quashed and set aside Search Warrant Nos. 01-2401 and
01-2402 granted in favor of petitioner Jessie G. Ching.
Jessie G. Ching is the owner and general manager of Jeshicris Manufacturing Co., the maker and manufacturer of a Utility Model, described as "Leaf Spring
Eye Bushing for Automobile" made up of plastic.
On September 4, 2001, Ching and Joseph Yu were issued by the National Library Certificates of Copyright Registration and Deposit of the said work described
therein as "Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile." 4
On September 20, 2001, Ching requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for police/investigative assistance for the apprehension and prosecution
of illegal manufacturers, producers and/or distributors of the works. 5
After due investigation, the NBI filed applications for search warrants in the RTC of Manila against William Salinas, Sr. and the officers and members of the
Board of Directors of Wilaware Product Corporation. It was alleged that the respondents therein reproduced and distributed the said models penalized
under Sections 177.1 and 177.3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293. The applications sought the seizure of the following:
a.) Undetermined quantity of Leaf spring eye bushing for automobile that are made up of plastic polypropylene;
b.) Undetermined quantity of Leaf spring eye bushing for automobile that are made up of polyvinyl chloride plastic;
c.) Undetermined quantity of Vehicle bearing cushion that is made up of polyvinyl chloride plastic;
d.) Undetermined quantity of Dies and jigs, patterns and flasks used in the manufacture/fabrication of items a to d;

e.) Evidences of sale which include delivery receipts, invoices and official receipts. 6

The RTC granted the application and issued Search Warrant Nos. 01-2401 and 01-2402 for the seizure of the aforecited articles. 7 In the inventory submitted
by the NBI agent, it appears that the following articles/items were seized based on the search warrants:
Leaf Spring eye bushing
a) Plastic Polypropylene
- C190 27 }
- C240 rear 40 }
- C240 front 41 } BAG 1
b) Polyvinyl Chloride Plastic
- C190 13 }
c) Vehicle bearing cushion
- center bearing cushion 11 }
Budder for C190 mold 8 }
Diesel Mold
a) Mold for spring eye bushing rear 1 set
b) Mold for spring eye bushing front 1 set
c) Mold for spring eye bushing for C190 1 set
d) Mold for C240 rear 1 piece of the set
e) Mold for spring eye bushing for L300 2 sets
f) Mold for leaf spring eye bushing C190 with metal 1 set

g) Mold for vehicle bearing cushion 1 set 8

The respondents filed a motion to quash the search warrants on the following grounds:
2. The copyright registrations were issued in violation of the Intellectual Property Code on the ground that:
a) the subject matter of the registrations are not artistic or literary;
b) the subject matter of the registrations are spare parts of automobiles meaning there ( sic) are original parts that they are designed to replace.
Hence, they are not original.9
The respondents averred that the works covered by the certificates issued by the National Library are not artistic in nature; they are considered automotive
spare parts and pertain to technology. They aver that the models are not original, and as such are the proper subject of a patent, not copyright. 10
In opposing the motion, the petitioner averred that the court which issued the search warrants was not the proper forum in which to articulate the issue of
the validity of the copyrights issued to him. Citing the ruling of the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,11 the petitioner stated that a search warrant is
merely a judicial process designed by the Rules of Court in anticipation of a criminal case. Until his copyright was nullified in a proper proceeding, he enjoys
rights of a registered owner/holder thereof.

On January 3, 2002, the trial court issued an Order 12 granting the motion, and quashed the search warrant on its finding that there was no probable cause
for its issuance. The court ruled that the work covered by the certificates issued to the petitioner pertained to solutions to technical problems, not literary
and artistic as provided in Article 172 of the Intellectual Property Code.
His motion for reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial courts Order of February 14, 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA, contending that the RTC had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the validity of the copyright certificates issued to him by the National Library.
He insisted that his works are covered by Sections 172.1 and 172.2 of the Intellectual Property Code. The petitioner averred that the copyright certificates
are prima facie evidence of its validity, citing the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals in Wildlife Express Corporation v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc.13 The
petitioner asserted that the respondents failed to adduce evidence to support their motion to quash the search warrants. The petitioner noted that
respondent William Salinas, Jr. was not being honest, as he was able to secure a similar copyright registration of a similar product from the National Library
on January 14, 2002.
On September 26, 2003, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition on its finding that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion in
issuing the assailed order, to wit:
It is settled that preliminarily, there must be a finding that a specific offense must have been committed to justify the issuance of a search warrant. In a
number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, the same is explicitly provided, thus:
"The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense, and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavit submitted.
"In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search
warrant."
In the instant case, the petitioner is praying for the reinstatement of the search warrants issued, but subsequently quashed, for the offense of Violation of
Class Designation of Copyrightable Works under Section 177.1 in relation to Section 177.3 of Republic Act 8293, when the objects subject of the same, are
patently not copyrightable.
It is worthy to state that the works protected under the Law on Copyright are: literary or artistic works (Sec. 172) and derivative works (Sec. 173). The Leaf
Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion fall on neither classification. Accordingly, if, in the first place, the item subject of the petition is not entitled
to be protected by the law on copyright, how can there be any violation?14
The petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision suffered the same fate. The petitioner forthwith filed the present petition for review on
certiorari, contending that the revocation of his copyright certificates should be raised in a direct action and not in a search warrant proceeding.
The petitioner posits that even assuming ex argumenti that the trial court may resolve the validity of his copyright in a proceeding to quash a search warrant
for allegedly infringing items, the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it declared that his works are not copyrightable in the first place. He
claims that R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which took effect on January 1, 1998, provides in no
uncertain terms that copyright protection automatically attaches to a work by the sole fact of its creation, irrespective of its mode or form of expression, as
well as of its content, quality or purpose.15 The law gives a non-inclusive definition of "work" as referring to original intellectual creations in the literary and
artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation; and includes original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not
registrable as an industrial design and other works of applied art under Section 172.1(h) of R.A. No. 8293.lawphil.net
As such, the petitioner insists, notwithstanding the classification of the works as either literary and/or artistic, the said law, likewise, encompasses works
which may have a bearing on the utility aspect to which the petitioners utility designs were classified. Moreover, according to the petitioner, what the
Copyright Law protects is the authors intellectual creation, regardless of whether it is one with utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful article
produced on an industrial scale.
The petitioner also maintains that the law does not provide that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for patent bars or invalidates its
registration under the Law on Copyright. The test of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility, but art for the copyright and invention of original
and ornamental design for design patents. 16 In like manner, the fact that his utility designs or models for articles of manufacture have been expressed in the
field of automotive parts, or based on something already in the public domain does not automatically remove them from the protection of the Law on
Copyright.17
The petitioner faults the CA for ignoring Section 218 of R.A. No. 8293 which gives the same presumption to an affidavit executed by an author who claims
copyright ownership of his work.
The petitioner adds that a finding of probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant means merely a reasonable suspicion of the commission of
the offense. It is not equivalent to absolute certainty or a finding of actual and positive cause. 18 He assists that the determination of probable cause does
not concern the issue of whether or not the alleged work is copyrightable. He maintains that to justify a finding of probable cause in the issuance of a search
warrant, it is enough that there exists a reasonable suspicion of the commission of the offense.
The petitioner contends that he has in his favor the benefit of the presumption that his copyright is valid; hence, the burden of overturning this presumption
is on the alleged infringers, the respondents herein. But this burden cannot be carried in a hearing on a proceeding to quash the search warrants, as the
issue therein is whether there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The petitioner concludes that the issue of probable cause should
be resolved without invalidating his copyright.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the work of the petitioner is essentially a technical solution to the problem of wear and tear in
automobiles, the substitution of materials, i.e., from rubber to plastic matter of polyvinyl chloride, an oil resistant soft texture plastic material strong enough
to endure pressure brought about by the vibration of the counter bearing and thus brings bushings. Such work, the respondents assert, is the subject of
copyright under Section 172.1 of R.A. No. 8293. The respondents posit that a technical solution in any field of human activity which is novel may be the
subject of a patent, and not of a copyright. They insist that the certificates issued by the National Library are only certifications that, at a point in time, a
certain work was deposited in the said office. Furthermore, the registration of copyrights does not provide for automatic protection. Citing Section 218.2(b)
of R.A. No. 8293, the respondents aver that no copyright is said to exist if a party categorically questions its existence and legality. Moreover, under Section
2, Rule 7 of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 8293, the registration and deposit of work is not conclusive as to copyright outlay or the time of copyright or
the right of the copyright owner. The respondents maintain that a copyright exists only when the work is covered by the protection of R.A. No. 8293.
The petition has no merit.
The RTC had jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue whether the petitioners utility models are copyrightable and, if so, whether he is the owner of a
copyright over the said models. It bears stressing that upon the filing of the application for search warrant, the RTC was duty-bound to determine whether
probable cause existed, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 4. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and, particularly,
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

In Solid Triangle Sales Corporation v. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Br. 93,19 the Court held that in the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily
resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance of a search warrant or the quashal of one already issued by the court. Indeed, probable cause
is deemed to exist only where facts and circumstances exist which could lead a reasonably cautious and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed or is being committed. Besides, in Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense.
The RTC is mandated under the Constitution and Rules of Criminal Procedure to determine probable cause. The court cannot abdicate its constitutional
obligation by refusing to determine whether an offense has been committed. 20 The absence of probable cause will cause the outright nullification of the
search warrant.21
For the RTC to determine whether the crime for infringement under R.A. No. 8293 as alleged in an application is committed, the petitioner-applicant was
burdened to prove that (a) respondents Jessie Ching and Joseph Yu were the owners of copyrighted material; and (b) the copyrighted material was being
copied and distributed by the respondents. Thus, the ownership of a valid copyright is essential. 22
Ownership of copyrighted material is shown by proof of originality and copyrightability. By originality is meant that the material was not copied, and
evidences at least minimal creativity; that it was independently created by the author and that it possesses at least same minimal degree of creativity. 23
Copying is shown by proof of access to copyrighted material and substantial similarity between the two works. 24 The applicant must thus demonstrate the
existence and the validity of his copyright because in the absence of copyright protection, even original creation may be freely copied. 25
By requesting the NBI to investigate and, if feasible, file an application for a search warrant for infringement under R.A. No. 8293 against the respondents,
the petitioner thereby authorized the RTC (in resolving the application), to delve into and determine the validity of the copyright which he claimed he had
over the utility models. The petitioner cannot seek relief from the RTC based on his claim that he was the copyright owner over the utility models and, at the
same time, repudiate the courts jurisdiction to ascertain the validity of his claim without running afoul to the doctrine of estoppel.

To discharge his burden, the applicant may present the certificate of registration covering the work or, in its absence, other evidence. 26 A copyright
certificate provides prima facie evidence of originality which is one element of copyright validity. It constitutes prima facie evidence of both validity and
ownership27 and the validity of the facts stated in the certificate. 28 The presumption of validity to a certificate of copyright registration merely orders the
burden of proof. The applicant should not ordinarily be forced, in the first instance, to prove all the multiple facts that underline the validity of the copyright
unless the respondent, effectively challenging them, shifts the burden of doing so to the applicant. 29 Indeed, Section 218.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides:
218.2. In an action under this Chapter:
(a) Copyright shall be presumed to subsist in the work or other subject matter to which the action relates if the defendant does not put in issue
the question whether copyright subsists in the work or other subject matter; and
(b) Where the subsistence of the copyright is established, the plaintiff shall be presumed to be the owner of the copyright if he claims to be the
owner of the copyright and the defendant does not put in issue the question of his ownership.
A certificate of registration creates no rebuttable presumption of copyright validity where other evidence in the record casts doubt on the question. In such a
case, validity will not be presumed.30
To discharge his burden of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for violation of R.A. No. 8293, the petitioner-applicant submitted to the RTC
Certificate of Copyright Registration Nos. 2001-197 and 2001-204 dated September 3, 2001 and September 4, 2001, respectively, issued by the National
Library covering work identified as Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile and Vehicle Bearing Cushion both classified under Section 172.1(h) of R.A. No.
8293, to wit:
SEC. 172. Literary and Artistic Works. 172.1. Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as "works," are original intellectual creations in the literary
and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation and shall include in particular:
...
(h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not registrable as an industrial design, and other works of applied art.
Related to the provision is Section 171.10, which provides that a "work of applied art" is an artistic creation with utilitarian functions or incorporated in a
useful article, whether made by hand or produced on an industrial scale.
But, as gleaned from the specifications appended to the application for a copyright certificate filed by the petitioner, the said Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for
Automobile is merely a utility model described as comprising a generally cylindrical body having a co-axial bore that is centrally located and provided with a
perpendicular flange on one of its ends and a cylindrical metal jacket surrounding the peripheral walls of said body, with the bushing made of plastic that is
either polyvinyl chloride or polypropylene. 31 Likewise, the Vehicle Bearing Cushion is illustrated as a bearing cushion comprising a generally semi-circular
body having a central hole to secure a conventional bearing and a plurality of ridges provided therefore, with said cushion bearing being made of the same
plastic materials.32 Plainly, these are not literary or artistic works. They are not intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain, or works of applied
art. They are certainly not ornamental designs or one having decorative quality or value.
It bears stressing that the focus of copyright is the usefulness of the artistic design, and not its marketability. The central inquiry is whether the article is a
work of art.33 Works for applied art include all original pictorials, graphics, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been embodied in useful
article regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection. 34
As gleaned from the description of the models and their objectives, these articles are useful articles which are defined as one having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. Indeed, while works of applied art, original intellectual, literary
and artistic works are copyrightable, useful articles and works of industrial design are not. 35 A useful article may be copyrightable only if and only to the
extent that such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner (citing Section 171.10 of R.A. No. 8293), that the authors intellectual creation, regardless of whether it is a
creation with utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful article produced on an industrial scale, is protected by copyright law. However, the law refers to
a "work of applied art which is an artistic creation." It bears stressing that there is no copyright protection for works of applied art or industrial design which
have aesthetic or artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of the article. 36 Functional components of useful articles,
no matter how artistically designed, have generally been denied copyright protection unless they are separable from the useful article. 37
In this case, the petitioners models are not works of applied art, nor artistic works. They are utility models, useful articles, albeit with no artistic design or
value. Thus, the petitioner described the utility model as follows:
LEAF SPRING EYE BUSHING FOR AUTOMOBILE
Known bushings inserted to leaf-spring eye to hold leaf-springs of automobile are made of hard rubber. These rubber bushings after a time, upon subjecting
them to so much or intermittent pressure would eventually wore (sic) out that would cause the wobbling of the leaf spring.
The primary object of this utility model, therefore, is to provide a leaf-spring eye bushing for automobile that is made up of plastic.
Another object of this utility model is to provide a leaf-spring eye bushing for automobiles made of polyvinyl chloride, an oil resistant soft texture plastic or
polypropylene, a hard plastic, yet both causes cushion to the leaf spring, yet strong enough to endure pressure brought about by the up and down
movement of said leaf spring.
Yet, an object of this utility model is to provide a leaf-spring eye bushing for automobiles that has a much longer life span than the rubber bushings.
Still an object of this utility model is to provide a leaf-spring eye bushing for automobiles that has a very simple construction and can be made using simple
and ordinary molding equipment.
A further object of this utility model is to provide a leaf-spring eye bushing for automobile that is supplied with a metal jacket to reinforce the plastic eye
bushing when in engaged with the steel material of the leaf spring.
These and other objects and advantages will come to view and be understood upon a reading of the detailed description when taken in conjunction with the
accompanying drawings.
Figure 1 is an exploded perspective of a leaf-spring eye bushing according to the present utility model;
Figure 2 is a sectional view taken along line 2-2 of Fig. 1;
Figure 3 is a longitudinal sectional view of another embodiment of this utility model;
Figure 4 is a perspective view of a third embodiment; and
Figure 5 is a sectional view thereof.
Referring now to the several views of the drawings wherein like reference numerals designated same parts throughout, there is shown a utility model for a
leaf-spring eye bushing for automobile generally designated as reference numeral 10.
Said leaf-spring eye bushing 10 comprises a generally cylindrical body 11 having a co-axial bore 12 centrally provided thereof.
As shown in Figs. 1 and 2, said leaf-spring eye bushing 10 is provided with a perpendicular flange 13 on one of its ends and a cylindrical metal jacket 14
surrounding the peripheral walls 15 of said body 11. When said leaf-spring bushing 10 is installed, the metal jacket 14 acts with the leaf-spring eye (not
shown), which is also made of steel or cast steel. In effect, the bushing 10 will not be directly in contact with steel, but rather the metal jacket, making the
life of the bushing 10 longer than those without the metal jacket.
In Figure 2, the bushing 10 as shown is made of plastic, preferably polyvinyl chloride, an oil resistant soft texture plastic or a hard polypropylene plastic, both
are capable to endure the pressure applied thereto, and, in effect, would lengthen the life and replacement therefor.
Figure 3, on the other hand, shows the walls 16 of the co-axial bore 12 of said bushing 10 is insertably provided with a steel tube 17 to reinforce the inner
portion thereof. This steel tube 17 accommodates or engages with the leaf-spring bolt (not shown) connecting the leaf spring and the automobiles chassis.
Figures 4 and 5 show another embodiment wherein the leaf eye bushing 10 is elongated and cylindrical as to its construction. Said another embodiment is
also made of polypropylene or polyvinyl chloride plastic material. The steel tube 17 and metal jacket 14 may also be applied to this embodiment as an
option thereof.38
 VEHICLE BEARING CUSHION
Known bearing cushions inserted to bearing housings for vehicle propeller shafts are made of hard rubber. These rubber bushings after a time, upon
subjecting them to so much or intermittent pressure would eventually be worn out that would cause the wobbling of the center bearing.
The primary object of this utility model therefore is to provide a vehicle-bearing cushion that is made up of plastic.
Another object of this utility model is to provide a vehicle bearing cushion made of polyvinyl chloride, an oil resistant soft texture plastic material which
causes cushion to the propellers center bearing, yet strong enough to endure pressure brought about by the vibration of the center bearing.
Yet, an object of this utility model is to provide a vehicle-bearing cushion that has a much longer life span than rubber bushings.
Still an object of this utility model is to provide a vehicle bearing cushion that has a very simple construction and can be made using simple and ordinary
molding equipment.
These and other objects and advantages will come to view and be understood upon a reading of the detailed description when taken in conjunction with the
accompanying drawings.
Figure 1 is a perspective view of the present utility model for a vehicle-bearing cushion; and
Figure 2 is a sectional view thereof.
Referring now to the several views of the drawing, wherein like reference numeral designate same parts throughout, there is shown a utility model for a
vehicle-bearing cushion generally designated as reference numeral 10.
Said bearing cushion 10 comprises of a generally semi-circular body 11, having central hole 12 to house a conventional bearing (not shown). As shown in
Figure 1, said body 11 is provided with a plurality of ridges 13 which serves reinforcing means thereof.
The subject bearing cushion 10 is made of polyvinyl chloride, a soft texture oil and chemical resistant plastic material which is strong, durable and capable of
enduring severe pressure from the center bearing brought about by the rotating movement of the propeller shaft of the vehicle. 39
A utility model is a technical solution to a problem in any field of human activity which is new and industrially applicable. It may be, or may relate to, a
product, or process, or an improvement of any of the aforesaid. 40 Essentially, a utility model refers to an invention in the mechanical field. This is the reason
why its object is sometimes described as a device or useful object. 41 A utility model varies from an invention, for which a patent for invention is, likewise,
available, on at least three aspects: first, the requisite of "inventive step" 42 in a patent for invention is not required; second, the maximum term of
protection is only seven years 43 compared to a patent which is twenty years, 44 both reckoned from the date of the application; and third, the provisions on
utility model dispense with its substantive examination 45 and prefer for a less complicated system.
Being plain automotive spare parts that must conform to the original structural design of the components they seek to replace, the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing
and Vehicle Bearing Cushion are not ornamental. They lack the decorative quality or value that must characterize authentic works of applied art. They are
not even artistic creations with incidental utilitarian functions or works incorporated in a useful article. In actuality, the personal properties described in the
search warrants are mechanical works, the principal function of which is utility sans any aesthetic embellishment.
Neither are we to regard the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion as included in the catch-all phrase "other literary, scholarly, scientific and
artistic works" in Section 172.1(a) of R.A. No. 8293. Applying the principle of ejusdem generis which states that "where a statute describes things of a
particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those
particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the state which would repel such inference," 46 the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle
Bearing Cushion are not copyrightable, being not of the same kind and nature as the works enumerated in Section 172 of R.A. No. 8293.
No copyright granted by law can be said to arise in favor of the petitioner despite the issuance of the certificates of copyright registration and the deposit of
the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion. Indeed, in Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon47 and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart,
Incorporated,48 the Court ruled that:
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing
right regulated by it. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the
subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute. Accordingly, it can cover only the works falling within the statutory
enumeration or description.
That the works of the petitioner may be the proper subject of a patent does not entitle him to the issuance of a search warrant for violation of copyright
laws. In Kho v. Court of Appeals 49 and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated,50 the Court ruled that "these copyright and patent
rights are completely distinct and separate from one another, and the protection afforded by one cannot be used interchangeably to cover items or works
that exclusively pertain to the others." The Court expounded further, thus:
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign
capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In
relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to
literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentable
inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is
industrially applicable.

The petitioner cannot find solace in the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein51 to buttress his petition. In that case, the artifacts
involved in that case were statuettes of dancing male and female figures made of semi-vitreous china. The controversy therein centered on the fact that
although copyrighted as "works of art," the statuettes were intended for use and used as bases for table lamps, with electric wiring, sockets and lampshades
 attached. The issue raised was whether the statuettes were copyright protected in the United States, considering that the copyright applicant intended
primarily to use them as lamp bases to be made and sold in quantity, and carried such intentions into effect. At that time, the Copyright Office interpreted
the 1909 Copyright Act to cover works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form, but not the utilitarian aspects, were concerned. After reviewing the
history and intent of the US Congress on its copyright legislation and the interpretation of the copyright office, the US Supreme Court declared that the
statuettes were held copyrightable works of art or models or designs for works of art. The High Court ruled that:
"Works of art (Class G) (a) In General. This class includes works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian
aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as all works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings
and sculpture. "
So we have a contemporaneous and long-continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them that would allow the registration
of such a statuette as is in question here.52
The High Court went on to state that "[t]he dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of
original and ornamental design for design patents." Significantly, the copyright office promulgated a rule to implement Mazer to wit:
[I]f "the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the work is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art."
In this case, the bushing and cushion are not works of art. They are, as the petitioner himself admitted, utility models which may be the subject of a patent.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70411 are AFFIRMED. Search Warrant Nos. 01-2401 and 01-2402 issued on October 15, 2001 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST

02 SCRA 225 Mercantile Law Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Game Show Ideas and Concepts Not Covered by Copyright Presentation of the
Master Tape
BJ Productions Inc. (BJPI) was the holder of copyright over the show Rhoda and Me. It holds rights over the shows format and style of presentation. In 1991,
BJPIs president Francisco Joaquin saw on TV RPN 9s show Its a Date, a show which is basically the same as Rhoda and Me. He eventually sued Gabriel
Zosa, the manager of the show Its a Date. The investigating prosecutor found probable cause against Zosa. Zosa later sought a review of the prosecutors
resolution before the Secretary of Justice (Franklin Drilon). Drilon reversed the findings of the fiscal and directed him to dismiss the case against Zosa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of Drilon finding no probable cause is valid.
HELD: Yes. The essence of copyright infringement is the copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable materials as defined and enumerated in Section 2 of
PD. No. 49 (Copyright Law). Apart from the manner in which it is actually expressed, however, the idea of a dating game show is a non-copyrightable
material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes in their abstract form clearly do not fall within the class of works or materials susceptible of copyright
registration as provided in PD. No. 49. What is covered by BJPIs copyright is the specific episodes of the show Rhoda and Me.
Further, BJPI should have presented the master videotape of the show in order to show the linkage between the copyright show (Rhoda and Me) and the
infringing show (Its a Date). This is based on the ruling in 20th Century Fox vs CA (though this has been qualified by Columbia Pictures vs CA, this is still good
law). Though BJPI did provide a lot of written evidence and description to show the linkage between the shows, the same were not enough. A television
show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or
dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright/format of both dating game shows.

Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chuan v CA

[G.R. No. 130360. August 15, 2001]
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner imports vermicelli from China National Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs, based in Beijing, China, under the firm name C.K.C. Trading. He repacks it in
cellophane wrappers with a design of two-dragons and the TOWER trademark on the uppermost portion.
Ong acquired a Certificate of Copyright Registration from the National Library on June 9, 1993 on the said design.
Ong filed against Tan a verified complaint for infringement of copyright with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction with the RTC-QC.
o Ong alleged that he was the holder of a Certificate of Copyright Registration over the cellophane wrapper with the two-dragon design,
and that Tan used an identical wrapper in his business. In his prayer for a preliminary injunction in addition to damages, he asked that
Tan be restrained from using the wrapper.
Tan filed an opposition alleging that Ong was not entitled to an injunction.
o According to Tan, Ong did not have a clear right over the use of the trademark Pagoda and Lungkow vermicelli as these were registered in
 the name of Ceroilfood Shandong, based in Qingdao, China.
o Further, Tan averred that he was the exclusive distributor in the Philippines of the Pagoda and Lungkow vermicelli and was solely
authorized to use said trademark.
o He added that Ong merely copied the two-dragon design from Ceroilfood Shandong which had the Certificates of Registration issued by
different countries.
o Private respondent alleges that the trademark PAGODA BRAND was registered in China on October 31, 1979 while the trademark
LUNGKOW VERMICELLI WITH TWO-DRAGON DEVICE was registered on August 15, 1985.
Trial Court issued a temporary restraining order on the same date the complaint was filed. It likewise issued the writ in Ongs favor upon his filing of a
P100,000.00 bond.
CA gave due course and granted the petition. The lower courts orders, as well as the writ of preliminary injunction, were set aside. Ong filed a MR from
which CA modified its decision and made the injunction permanent.

ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent was proper?

HELD: Petition is partially granted. The prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit Tan from using the cellophane wrapper with two-dragon
device is denied, but the finding of the respondent appellate court that Ongs copyrighted wrapper is a copy of that of Ceroilfood Shandong is SET ASIDE for
being premature. Case was remanded to RTC.

RATIO:
A person to be entitled to a copyright must be the original creator of the work. He must have created it by his own skill, labor and judgment without
directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another. The copies of the certificates of copyright registered in the name of Ceroilfood Shandong
sufficiently raise reasonable doubt. With such a doubt, the preliminary injunction asked by Ong against Tan is unavailing.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage. In this case, the Court found that petitioners right has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated.
The Court added it was premature for the CA to declare that the design of petitioners wrapper is a copy of the wrapper allegedly registered by Ceroilfood
Shandong. The only issue brought before the CA involved the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the trial court in granting the writ of
preliminary injunction, and not on the merits of the infringement case. That matter remains for decision after appropriate proceedings at the trial court.

Ching v. Salinas, Sr. (G.R. No. 161295)

Facts:
Petitioner Ching is a maker and manufacturer of a utility model, Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile, for which he holds certificates of copyright
registration. Petitioners request to the NBI to apprehend and prosecute illegal manufacturers of his work led to the issuance of search warrants against
respondent Salinas, alleged to be reproducing and distributing said models in violation of the IP Code. Respondent moved to quash the warrants on the
ground that petitioners work is not artistic in nature and is a proper subject of a patent, not copyright. Petitioner insists that the IP Code protects a work
from the moment of its creation regardless of its nature or purpose. The trial court quashed the warrants. Petitioner argues that the copyright certificates
over the model are prima facie evidence of its validity. CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners model is an artistic work subject to copyright protection.
(2) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to copyright protection on the basis of the certificates of registration issued to it.
Ruling:
(1) NO. As gleaned from the specifications appended to the application for a copyright certificate filed by the petitioner, the said Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for
Automobile and Vehicle Bearing Cushion are merely utility models. As gleaned from the description of the models and their objectives, these articles are
useful articles which are defined as one having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information. Plainly, these are not literary or artistic works. They are not intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain, or works of applied art.
They are certainly not ornamental designs or one having decorative quality or value. Indeed, while works of applied art, original intellectual, literary and
artistic works are copyrightable, useful articles and works of industrial design are not. A useful article may be copyrightable only if and only to the extent
that such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of
the utilitarian aspects of the article. In this case, the bushing and cushion are not works of art. They are, as the petitioner himself admitted, utility models
which may be the subject of a patent.
(2) NO. No copyright granted by law can be said to arise in favor of the petitioner despite the issuance of the certificates of copyright registration and the
deposit of the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion. Indeed, in Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart,
Incorporated, the Court ruled that:
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing
right regulated by it. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the
subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute. Accordingly, it can cover only the works falling within the statutory
enumeration or description.
Ownership of copyrighted material is shown by proof of originality and copyrightability. To discharge his burden, the applicant may present the certificate of
registration covering the work or, in its absence, other evidence. A copyright certificate provides prima facie evidence of originality which is one element of
copyright validity. It constitutes prima facie evidence of both validity and ownership and the validity of the facts stated in the certificate.