J Value Inquiry (2015) 49:567595

DOI 10.1007/s10790-015-9528-3

Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval

Brahmanism (6001000): Activity, Speech and Desire

Hugo David1

Published online: 28 September 2015

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

The aim of this essay is to introduce a few concepts and hypotheses debated by
medieval Indian thinkers dealing with human action and its relation to the vast body
of ritual, social and ethical norms referred to by the Sanskrit word dharma. The
nature and historical constitution of these norms, as well as their relationship to
actual legal, religious and social practice in medieval India, have already been
explored in a number of excellent studies by scholars of Indian ritual and law. My
purpose here is thus different, and more specific. In the following pages I wish to
draw attention to a little-studied trend of reflection within Brahmanism, dealing with
the various processes at stake in the appropriation of norms by rational agents. By
rational agent I mean here what is referred to by the word prekvant, a person
possessing foresight (prek), capable of evaluating his/her own action as good or
bad, worthy or unworthy.1 How does such an individual behave when confronted

1
The word prekvant, a close equivalent of which is the compound prekprvakrin (a [person] who
acts [only] after a rational evaluation [of his/her act and its consequences]), is generally translated into
English as judicious person (McClintock) or rational agent (Eltschinger). The prekvant thus
represents, in a very general way, a model of practical rationality, a person capable of judging his own
action with regard to a set of purposes (prayojana/artha), especially (though not exclusively) in relation
to an expected result or fruit (phala) for which it constitutes the means (upya/abhyupya). This
concept is widespread, with identical connotations, throughout medieval Indian philosophical literature,

This article is the partial outcome of the project Speech and action in early Brahmanism carried out at
the University of Cambridge with the generous support of the Royal Society of Great Britain (Newton
International Fellowship). I thank Emilie Aussant, Jonathan Duquette, Elisa Ganser, Philipp Maas and
Vincenzo Vergiani for their valuable comments on a previous version of this essay. Unless otherwise
specified all translations from the Sanskrit are mine.

& Hugo David

hugo.david@voila.fr
1
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

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568 H. David

with a set of explicit or implicit rules? By what kind of rational or emotional

mechanism does he appropriate the norms they represent? Is it possible for someone
to feel an act as compulsory without considering it useful, desirable, or even good?
These and similar problems were the focus of an extensive though precisely
delimited corpus of Sanskrit philosophical texts (independent treatises, commen-
taries, etc.) dealing with the cause(s) of [human] activity (pravttihetu or vidhi).
Stemming back to the 6th/7th centuries, this tradition flourished in the second half of
the first millennium. Still productive in the 18th century, it survives until this day in
India, where human action is still a regular topic of enquiry for traditional scholars.
The first theoreticians to introduce these problems to Indian philosophical debate
were specialists of ritual exegesis (Mmamsa), primarily concerned with the

classification, hierarchical organization and linguistic analysis of the various ritual
instructions scattered throughout the Veda, the most ancient and authoritative body
of Scriptures of classical Brahmanism. At a later date (roughly from the beginning
of the 9th century), scholars in other fields of knowledge such as epistemology and
dialectics (Nyaya), Sanskrit grammar (Vyakarana) and Brahmanical law (Dharma-

sastra) also began to take part in what is traditionally known as the vidhivda, the
discussion of the cause(s) of human activities.
My study will proceed in two parts. The first part is devoted to an outline of the
ideological background against which Indian theories of action and injunction were
developed. I shall try to show, in particular, how early Mmamsa authors, at least

from a certain point in the history of the school, shared a more widely-spread
conception of dharma conceived as a transcendent moral, social and religious norm,
external to the individual agents and formulated in the form of injunctions (vidhi,
again) found either in the Veda itself or in other sources claiming to be rooted in
the Veda (vedamla). The second part of this essay considers injunction as a
philosophical problem in Brahmanism, and isolates two kinds of attitude towards
these transcendent norms, articulating them either with the idea of man as an
essentially desirous being, or with the idea of obligation as the primary incitement
of human behaviour. Our main focus of attention will be the work of two
philosophers, Mandana Misra (660720) and Salikanatha Misra (around 900), in

whose work these two tendencies, present in a loose way in older juridical literature,
found their first fully-fledged formulation, thus giving to the Indian debate on
human action its definitive shape.

Footnote 1 continued
both Buddhist and Brahmanical, at least from the 6th century onwards. See Sara McClintock, Omniscience
and the Rhetoric of Reason. ntarakita and Kamalala on Rationality, Argumentation and Religious
Authority (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2010), pp. 5862, Vincent Eltschinger, Turning Hermeneutics
into Apologetics. Reasoning and Rationality under Changing Circumstances, in Vincent Eltschinger &
Helmut Krasser, eds., Scriptural Authority, Reason and Action. Proceedings of a Panel at the 14th World
Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, September 1st5th 2009 (Vienna: Verlag der osterreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, 2013), pp. 103134, Madeleine Biardeau, La philosophie de Maana Mira vue partir
de la Brahmasiddhi (Paris: Ecole francaise dExtreme-Orient, 1969), pp. 8385, and Hugo David, Action
Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedanta (1): Mandana Misra on upadea and iasd-
hanat, in Eltschinger & Krasser, eds., op. cit., p. 274.

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Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 569

1 Sources of Dharma: On a Univocal Concept of the Norm in Hindu

Ritual and Law

If regulation of activities by norms is common to all human societies, the ways in

which individuals conceive these norms and understand their authority vary in
infinite ways. Essential to the medieval Hindu conception of the norm is the concept
of dharma.2 The word dharma, reputedly untranslatable, is etymologically derived
from the verbal root dh (to support, to sustain): dharma is what maintains the
cosmic order through the preservation of ritual and social rules, and at the same time
that which is maintained through the observance of these rules.3 While the archaic
nominal form dhrman (neuter or masculine), characteristic of the older Vedic
corpus, sometimes occurs in the plural,4 its equivalent in classical Sanskrit, the word
dharma/dhrma (masculine, appearing for the first time in this form in the
Atharvaveda),5 is generally used in the singular.6 This change in usage, along with
the morphological transformation from a simple nomen agentis to a more abstract
form, led many scholars to postulate a semantic evolution perhaps initiated in the
Veda itself from a conception of dharma(n) as a cosmic support possibly, as a
plurality of (predominantly sacrificial) acts or ritual supports7 to the idea of a

2
Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1988), pp. 310333, remains a fundamental study of the concept of dharma in Hinduism. See
also the classical essay by Paul Hacker, Dharma in Hinduismus, Zeitschrift fr Missionskunde und
Religionswissenschaften 49 (1965): 93106, the recent collective volume on Dharma edited by Patrick
Olivelle in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 32, Nos. 45 (2004), and Emilie Aussants contribution to
this volume.
3
See Robert Lingat, Les sources du droit dans le systme traditionnel de lInde (Paris/La Haye: Mouton
& Co., 1967), p. 17: Le dharma, cest ce qui est ferme et durable, ce qui soutient et maintient, ce qui
empeche de defaillir et de choir. Cp. Halbfass, op. cit., pp. 31516: [dharma] is the continuous
maintaining of the social and cosmic order and [the] norm which is achieved by the Aryan through the
performance of his Vedic rites and traditional duties. The link with the root dh is acknowledged by the
Indian tradition itself. See for instance Mahbhrata 12.110.11.
4
Famously ksahit 1.164.50: yajna yajm ayajanta devs, tni dhrmi prathamy san
(translation by Karl Friedrich Geldner, Der Rig-Veda (Cambridge, Mass./London/Leipzig: Harvard
University Press, 1951), p. 236: Mit Opfer opferten die Gotter dem Opfer. Dies waren die ersten
Brauche). Other references are given in Halbfass, op. cit., p. 550, n. 22. The use of the plural
distinguishes dhrman from another fundamental Vedic concept, that of ta, the cosmic order. On the
problematic relationship between these two concepts, see Halbfass, op. cit., pp. 314315. On the rich
mythological associations of dhrma(n) in the ksahit, see the quite exhaustive studies by Paul
Horsch, From Creation Myth to World Law, and Joel Brereton, Dharman in the Rgveda, both in
Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 32 (2004): 42348 and 44989 respectively.
5
See Horsch, op. cit., p. 432. The Atharvaveda is the most recent of the four Vedas.
6
There are a good number of exceptions to this rule, though. See for instance the use of the plural
dharm (the dharmas) in the pastambadharmastra (see below), and even, as noted by Halbfass, op.
cit., p. 315, in the Bhagavadgt (1.40 and 18.66) and Yjavalkyasmti (1.1). Equally significant is the
choice of the plural in the 7th-century lokavrttika by the Mmamsa philosopher Kumarila Bhatta
(codan k. 285). The question whether this persistance of the plural well into the first millennium CE
should be interpreted as a deliberate archaism, or rather as a sign that the alternance between plural and
singular is in fact constitutive of the use of dharma(n) in Vedic and classical Sanskrit likewise, cannot be
addressed here.
7
Horsch, op. cit., p. 432.

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570 H. David

transcendent social, moral and ritual norm.8 The semantic field of dharma in the
classical period is wider, though, as the word can refer, according to the context, to
the act itself, to its result (merit), or to the law to which it owes its social, ethical
and religious significance.9
In its most common presentations, dharma lies at the top of a group of three
goals of men (pururtha) the so-called trivarga, group of three supposedly
encompassing all possible reasons for a rational agent to prefer action (karman) over
non-action (naikarmya). These are pleasure (with a definite stress on sexual
pleasure) (kma), wealth or political power (artha) and religious or secular duty
(dharma). The ideology of renunciation (sanysa), introduced at an early date into
Hinduism (though by no means universally advocated), supplements this threefold
list by a fourth goal, namely liberation (moka) from rebirth. Each of these goals is
thought to overcome the preceding one(s) (although different arrangements are
possible), and the first three at least gave rise to a particular category of prescriptive
literature or science (stra), the Kma-, Artha- and Dharma-stras, very
different in nature and purpose. While literature on kma and artha seeks to inform
and discipline a spontaneous practice of enjoyment and power in order to allow it
better to reach its ends, the literature on dharma introduces norms considered
transcendent and inaccessible to ordinary means of human knowledge.
Unlike in the case of Kma- and Arthastra, two distinct intellectual disciplines
or sciences claim absolute authority in matters of dharma in medieval India: the
tradition of medieval Hindu jurisprudence known as Dharmasastra (The science of
dharma) and ritual or prior exegesis (Purva-Mmamsa),10 the latter presenting

itself, without further specification, as an enquiry into dharma (dharmajijs
[Mmsstra 1.1.1]). While the former is constituted by a number of codes of
law (Olivelle), commentaries and compendia (nibandha) dealing with both
religious and civil law, Mmamsa (a term literally meaning exegesis or enquiry

into the Vedic text) is mostly concerned with the correct performance of the great
Vedic sacrifices. Its role, however, is not so much to prescribe the correct
performance of those rituals11 as to formulate the exegetical rules and reasoning
8
See especially Halbfass, op. cit., pp. 314315, and Horsch, op. cit., p. 432.
9
On the possibility that the word dharma may refer both to the act and its result, see the exceptionally
clear statement by Medhatithi, the 8th/9th-century Kashmiri commentator on the Mnavadharmastra (ad
Manu 2.6): The authors of the traditional texts use the word dharma sometimes in the sense of the action
which forms the subject of injunctions and prohibitions and sometimes in the sense of the thing that arises
from the performance of this action and persists until it has given its reward (dharmaabdoya
smtikrai kad cid vidhiniedhaviayabhty kriyy prayujyate. kad cit tadanuhnajanya
phalapradnvasthyini kasmi cid arthe). Text and translation (slightly modified): Donald R. Davis,
Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 17.
10
The denomination prior distinguishes Purva-Mmamsa, dealing with Vedic passages having a direct
effect on the liturgical procedure, from latter exegesis (Uttara-Mmamsa) or Vedanta, focused on the
speculative teachings enclosed in the end of the Veda (vednta), i.e. the Upanisads.
11

The rules prescribing the correct execution of Vedic rites, centered on the event of the sacrifice
(yaja), were systematized during the early post-Vedic period (400200 BC, according to Louis Renou &
Jean Filliozat, LInde Classique. Manuel des tudes indiennes, Tome Premier, Avec le concours de
P. Demieville, O. Lacombe et P. Meile (Paris: Librairie dAmerique et dOrient Jean Maisonneuve,
1985), p. 302) in a group of manuals or set of aphoristic rules called the Kalpastras (Aphorisms on
ritual). Although the Kalpastras and Mmamsa share a preoccupation with Vedic ritual and a similar

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 571

allowing the learned Brahmin to extract a non-equivocal and homogeneous

procedure from the abundant and sometimes apparently incoherent scriptural
datum of the Veda. Understandably, the main focus of attention of this peculiar form
of textual exegesis is the prescriptive parts of the Veda, the injunctions (vidhi)
directly teaching the countless operations of Vedic rituals (kindling fires, sprinkling
substances with water, etc.). Non-injunctive parts of the text formulae (mantra) or
hymns to the deities recited or sung during the ceremonies, explanatory or
descriptive passages (arthavdas) of a mythological, etymological or speculative
nature, etc. are understood, in their turn, as a mere complement to the injunctions,
with no independent import, and whose function is in direct relation to the
performance of the rites (the praise of the sacrifice, the recalling of its elements to
those who take part in it, etc.).
The relationship between these two sciences of dharma is tight and complex, and
was rarely addressed as such by Indologists. Authors of commentaries on legal
treatises of Dharmasastra, available from the 7th century onwards,12 often
acknowledge their debt to Purva-Mmamsa, from which they borrow many a rule

of textual interpretation, and recognize it as their basic methodology and ideology.13
Modern scholars thus tended to assume the same kind of one-way relationship for
the earlier period as well.14 Consider, for instance, the following statement by a
leading expert of Hindu law:
The reception of Mmamsa into the scholastic tradition of Dharmasastra

occurred from the very beginning and clear reliance on Mmamsa principles is

attested in all of the early Dharmasutra, especially that of Apastamba.
Dharmasastra adopted the Vedic ethos of Mmamsa, its epistemology, and its

hermeneutics. However, Dharmasastra also translated these core elements of
Mmamsa into the mundane world of human society.15

Footnote 11 continued
conceptual framework, the two kinds of literature have fundamentally distinct forms and purposes, which
probably reflect their composition in different periods of Indian literary history.
12
Although Lingat (op. cit., p. 132) still considers Medhatithi (8th/9th c.) to be the oldest commentator on
Manu, we have at our disposal the work of at least one earlier commentator, Bharuci, for whom a date as
early as 600650 was sometimes proposed. See J. Duncan M. Derrett, Bhrucis commentary on the
Manusmti (the Manustravivaraa, books 612). Text, translation and notes, vol. 1: the text
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975). Derretts dating of Bharuci has been criticized, however, by
Patrick Olivelle, Dharmasastra: A Textual History, in Timothy Lubin, Donald R. Davis Jr. and Jayanth
K. Krishnan (eds.), Hinduism and Law. An introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
2857, p. 52, n. 30.
13
On the extensive use of Mmamsa rules by commentators on Dharmasastra works, see in particular the
S.G. Moghe, Studies in Applied Prva-Mms (Delhi: Ajanta
important collection of essays by
Publications, 1998).
14
See, however, the important remarks by Pandurang Vaman Kane, History of Dharmastra: Ancient
and Medival Religious and Civil Law, Vol. 5, Pt. 2 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 2.
ed. 1977), pp. 117879 on the possibility of an influence of Dharmasastra on Mmamsa at the various
stages of its history.
15
Donald R. Davis, Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
pp. 5455. Similarly Lingat : La methode dinterpretation quelle [= Mmamsa] preconise a ete adoptee

par les auteurs des lepoque des sutra, et elle sera par la suite constamment suivie par les commentateurs.
On peut dire quelle deviendra le mode indien par excellence du raisonnement juridique (op. cit., 23).

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572 H. David

That Dharmasastra does not deal principally with the details of Vedic sacrifices, but
rather regulates a wide range of worldly human activities (from marriage and
inheritance to the way one should eat or address a salutation to an elder) further led
some scholars to postulate a distinction between Vedic dharma, identified with the
Vedic sacrifice, and dharma of the Dharmasastras, characterized by its regulation
of the life of the Hindus according to social classes (vara) and stages of life
(rama).16 According to this widespread view, Mmamsa and Dharmasastra would

thus be two distinct disciplines, dealing with two heterogeneous objects (Vedic
sacrifice and the institution of the law), nonetheless sharing a number of
methodological and ideological features, transferred from the former into the latter.17
This attractive view nevertheless raises a number of difficulties, the most
immediate concerning chronology. The date of the earliest preserved work belonging
to the tradition of Mmamsa, the Aphorisms on Exegesis (Mmsstra) attributed

to Jaimini, is still unsettled but, despite occasional similarities to the early ritual stra-
collections,18 there is no reason to think that it existed long before the first centuries of
the Common Era. The oldest preserved commentary on these stras, Sabaras
Mmsbhya, is generally dated to the 4th century CE or later.19 Hence, although
Sabara certainly had predecessors, and even though Mmamsa as an exegetical

activity must have existed much before his time,20 this need not be the case for its most
influential exegetical and epistemological theses.21 Moreover, although this is by no
16
Albrecht Wezler, for instance, claims in a recent article that Vedic dharma and the dharma of the
Dharmasastra originally constitute two completely separate strands (Wezler, Dharma in the Veda and
the Dharmasastras, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 32 (2004): 62954, p. 633).
17
Although the idea of a borrowing from Mmamsa into Dharmasastra is clearly predominant in modern
scholarship on medieval Indian law, some scholars nevertheless held the contrary view. See in particular
Wezler: () the Mmamsa in a certain sense usurped the concept of dharma in order to label dharma

as Vedic only secondarily. () I assume that the Mmamsa was stimulated to apply this term to the
content of the Vedic prescription only by the Dharmasastra (ibid., p. 633). A full discussion of Wezlers
arguments lies beyond the scope of the present study.
18
For a few examples of aphorisms found both in the Mmsstras and in collections of ritual dating
back to the immediately post-Vedic period, see Jean-Marie Verpoorten, Mms Literature (Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1987), p. 3.
19
See for instance Verpoorten, op. cit., p. 8. No consensus has been reached so far concerning Sabaras date.
Some recent chronologies even consider, following a suggestion by Erich Frauwallner, that Sabara could have
lived as late as the 6th century (see for instance Kei Kataoka, Kumrila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part
2: An Annotated Translation of Mmamsaslokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (codanasutra) (Wien: Osterreichische
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011), p.20). Although this date seems to me less probable especially in
consideration of Sabaras relationship to Bhartrhari, this is not the place to discuss that point in detail.
20

Early grammarians like Panini (4th c. BC) and Patanjali (around 200 BC) apparently had some acquaintance

with Mmamsa. See Louis Renou & Jean Filliozat, LInde classique. Manuel des tudes indiennes, Tome
Second, Avec le concours de P. Demieville, O. Lacombe et P. Meile (Paris: Ecole francaise dExtreme-Orient,
2001, reprint from the 2nd edition, 1953), Kane, op. cit., pp. 115354, and Verpoorten, op. cit., p. 3. The
Vrhaghyastra (6.32), possibly from the 1st century BC, also mentions mms, along with kalpa
(sacrificial procedure), among the various sciences to be learnt by an expert in sacrifice (yajika). The
mention of Mmamsa is, interestingly enough, one of the most commonly advanced arguments in favour of the
of this collection of domestic ritual aphorisms (see Jan Gonda, The Ritual Stras, Vol.
relatively late dating
1.2 of A History of Indian Literature (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), pp. 479, 600).
21
Similar difficulties arise with the following claim by Olivelle: The tradition of Vedic exegesis and
hermeneutics known as Mmamsa exerted a strong influence on the Dharmasastric tradition, and
dominance of the Veda as the principal if not the single source of
gradually that influence led to the

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Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 573

means the rule, Mmamsa authors sometimes discuss even purely worldly matters, a

fact which strongly suggests a specialization of Mmamsa on topics related to Vedic

sacrifices within a common realm of dharma rather than a strict separation of two
exclusive fields. Already Sabara discusses practices like the building of tanks and
fountains, the arrangement of ones hair into one or several tufts,22 and even gives, on
one occasion, an authorized opinion in the matter of marriage.23 Kumarila Bhatta (7th

c.), one of the earliest commentators on Sabaras Mmsbhya, firmly condemns
as a transgression of dharma (dharmavyatikrama) a Brahmins conduct e.g. in
giving, receiving, selling and buying certain categories of animal (lions, horses,
mules, etc.), eating together with ones wife and children, and many other practices of
no direct (or even, in most cases, indirect) relevance for the actual performance of
Vedic sacrifices.24 Thus it might be more accurate to say that early Mmamsa and

Dharmasastra influenced each other reciprocally in varied ways in different periods,
and shared from their very beginnings certain concepts and presuppositions
constituting a common world-view, including a common concept of dharma.25 I
shall now put in evidence some of the most salient traits of this shared conception of
the norm, by considering side by side textual sources belonging to the legal tradition
of Dharmasastra and to the Mmamsa tradition of Vedic exegesis.

Several hypotheses have been proposed concerning the historical origins of the
legal concept of dharma and of the set of rules comprised in this concept, codified
in the Dharmasastras. Modern historians rightly contest the traditional claim that all
dharma has its source in the Veda, by drawing attention to the fact that the Veda
does not generally refer to norms of conduct of legal value, and indeed contains
relatively few occurrences of the word dharma.26 They consequently tend to

Footnote 21 continued
dharma within the theological understanding of the term (Dharmasastra: a textual history, p. 32).
There is actually no strong evidence against the assumption that the idea of the Veda as the only source of
dharma might have been initiated in the Dharmasastra tradition itself, and later adopted by Mmamsa. In

the same way, the significant statement that the lost readings [in Brahmana passages] [] are inferred
from usage (utsann ph prayogd anumyante), found in Apastambas Dharmastra (1.12.10), is
interpreted by Olivelle as exemplifying the Mmamsa concept of anumitaruti (ibid,. p. 33). One does

not find this principle voiced before Jaiminis Mmsstra 1.3.2 (in Sabaras interpretation). Thus,
unless one proposes to date the latter before the 3rd century BC, I can see no reason to admit that this
principle is directly borrowed from Mmamsa.

22
See barabhya ad Mmsstra 1.3.1 (vol. 2 p. 70.271.1).
23
See barabhya ad Mmsstra 6.1.15, where Sabara criticizes the practice of selling ones
daughter, even though such a practice is considered traditional (smrta), on the ground that it
contradicts revealed texts prescribing the gift (dna) of a daughter. On this passage, see Kane, op. cit.,
p. 1178.
24
See Tantravrttika ad Mmsstra 1.3.7 (text: Kunio Harikai, Sanskrit text of the Tantravarttika.
Adhyaya 1, Pada 3, Adhikarana 46. Collated with six Manuscripts, South Asian Classical Studies 4

(2009): 359396; tr. Ganganatha Jha, Kumrila Bhaa, Tantravarttika, a Commentary on abaras
Bhasya on the Purvammamsa Sutras of Jaimini, translated into English. Volume 1 (Calcutta: Baptist

Mission Press, 1924)).
25
On some striking similarities of early Dharmastras (especially that of Apastamba, the earliest Hindu
juridical text that has come down to us) with Mmamsa, see already Kane, op. cit., pp. 115455.
26

See already Lingat: En fait, les textes vediques contiennent fort peu de regles de dharma (op. cit.,
p. 22). The scarcity of references to dharma in later Vedic literature was stressed, at a more recent date,
by Patrick Olivelle, who proposed to link the renewed interest in the concept of dharma in the 4th/5th

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574 H. David

revaluate the importance of custom (including local custom) against the fog of
fictional Vedic source.27 This view, however, is not shared by most medieval
authors, who tend in their turn to emphasise the non-human origin of all rules of
dharma. This point is particularly stressed by Mmamsa authors, who repeatedly

urge that dharma lies beyond the realm of the senses (atndriya) and is thus
something that should be known only by means of Vedic injunctions, inaccessible as
it is to all other means of human knowledge.
This overwhelming importance given to the Vedic injunction is somewhat
tempered by the acceptance both by Dharmasastra and by Mmamsa of a definite

number of non-Vedic sources of dharma. A famous verse (2.6) of the
Mnavadharmastra (Manus treatise on dharma, better known as the Laws
of Manu 2d c. CE?) establishes a canonical list of four sources [literally: roots]
of dharma (dharmamla), of decreasing importance and authority: The root of the
Law is the entire Veda; the tradition and practice of those who know the Veda; the
conduct of good people; and what is pleasing to oneself.28 The principle underlying
this classification, that all sources of dharma are rooted in the Veda (vedamla), is
clearly stated by Manu in the next verse (2.7): Whatever Law Manu has
proclaimed with respect to anyone, all that has been taught in the Veda, for it
contains all knowledge.29
A similar list of sources of dharma (significantly omitting the last) is already
found in the most ancient texts on Dharmasastra, the four collections of
Dharmastras (Aphorisms on dharma), dating back to the first three centuries
BC.30 Exemplary in this regard is the collection of Dharmastras ascribed to
Gautama (early 2d c. BC), which is most probably paraphrased by Manu.31 Similar

Footnote 26 continued
century BC within Brahmanism with the appropriation of this concept around the same time by ascetic
religions, especially by Buddhism. See his Power of Words: The Ascetic Appropriation and the
Semantic Evolution of Dharma, in Language, Texts, and Society: Explorations in Ancient Indian Culture
and Religion (Florence: University of Firenze Press, 2005), p. 121135 and Dharmasastra: A Textual
History, op. cit., p. 31.
27
See Richard W. Lariviere, Dharmasastra, Custom, Real Law and Apocryphal Smrtis, Journal of
view of the
Indian Philosophy Vol. 32 (2004): 61127, p. 616. Larivieres article offers a well balanced
dialectics of custom and Vedic standards in the constitution of Dharmasastra. It convincingly describes
how the integration of local customs can be seen as a way to Sanskritise these customs, and integrate
them in the general Brahmanical world-view. Hence, in Larivieres view, Dharmasastra can present at the
same time a record of local social norms and traditional standards of behaviour (p. 612) and harmonize
it without contradiction with the view that all dharma is in accordance with the Veda.
28
Manu 2.6: vedokhilo dharmamla smtile ca tadvidm | cra caiva sdhnm tmanas tuir eva
ca ||. Tr.: Patrick Olivelle, The Law Code of Manu. A New Translation Based on the Critical Edition
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 23.
29
Manu 2.7: ya ka cit kasya cid dharmo manun parikrtita | sa sarvobhihito vede sarvajnamayo hi
sa ||. Tr.: Olivelle, op. cit.
30
For a recent account of their chronology, see Olivelle, Dharmasastra: A Textual History, op. cit.,
p. 57.
31
See GDhSu 1.12: vedo dharmamlam | tadvid ca smtile; The source of dharma is the Veda, as
well as the tradition and practice of those who know the Veda (tr. Patrick Olivelle, Dharmastras. The
Law Codes of pastamba, Gautama, Baudhyana and Vasiha, Annotated Text and Translation (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 2000), p. 121).

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 575

statements are found at the beginning of the slightly later collections ascribed to
Baudhayana and Vasistha.32 The introduction of a fourfold list of sources of

dharma into Mmamsa is probably later. Older sources repeatedly urge that the

whole Veda is a means of knowledge (ktsnasya vedasya prmyam),33 and also
agree on the overall authority of smti and good conduct (sadcra).34 What is
pleasing to oneself (tmatui, literally self-contentment) seems, in its turn, to
have been introduced as an independent source of dharma only by the time of
Kumarila, perhaps under the direct influence of Manus list.35 This remarkable
convergence on the various sources of our knowledge of dharma does not mean, of
course, that all authors of normative treatises had exactly the same understanding of
the nature of these sources. An important divergence concerns the second source,
namely tradition (smti), literally translated as memory. As convincingly argued
by David Brick, this term probably referred, in the most ancient legal literature, to the
memory of righteous people, with no reference to a literary form. It is only later that
it came to be understood as a specific category of normative text, to be finally
identified, at least from the time of Manu onwards, with the tradition of Dharmasastra
taken globally.36 Most authors nevertheless agree that all sources of dharma should
refer, in one way or another, to the ultimate source that is the Veda.
The oldest collection of Dharmastras, ascribed to Apastamba (3rd c. BC),
constitutes an interesting exception to this otherwise overwhelming agreement of the

32
See BDhSu 1.14: upadio dharma prativedam | tasynu vykhysyma | smrto dvitya | ttya
igama; The Law is taught in each Veda, in accordance with which we will explain it. What is given
in the tradition is the second, and the conventions of cultured people are the third; VDhSu 1.46:
rutismtivihito dharma | tadalbhe icra pramam; The Law is set forth in the Vedas and the
Traditional Texts. When these do not address an issue, the practice of cultured people becomes
authoritative (tr. Olivelle, op. cit., pp. 197 and 351). This tripartite classification of sources of dharma is
also found in other literary sources, not directly related to the Dharmastras or even to the wider field of
Dharmasastra. See for instance Mahbhrata 13.129.5 and 3.198.78.
33
barabhya ad Mmsstra 1.3.1 (vol. 2 p. 69.11).
34
See Mmsstra 1.3.12/1.3.1523 and barabhya thereon. See also Sabaras unambiguous
statement at the beginning of the Chapter on Holi (holkdhikaraa ad Mmsstra 1.3.15):
anumnt smter cr ca prmyam iyate; We accept, on the basis of the inference [of a Vedic
source], that traditional texts and customs are a means of knowing [dharma] (vol. 2 p. 171.6).
35
See Tantravrttika ad Mmsstra 1.3.7 (discourse of an opponent): sadcrapramatva
manvdibhir api smtam | tmatui smtny tair dharme (); Even Manu and other [authors of
Smrtis] teach that good conduct is a means of knowing dharma, and still another [means of knowledge] is

taught, [namely] self-contentment. It is still uncertain whether Sabara, probably writing in the 4th
century, had any knowledge of the Mnavadharmastra. The centrality of Manus code seems, in any
case, to be a novelty of Kumarilas thought. On this point, see Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Kumarila and
Medhatithi on the Authority of Codified Sources of dharma, in Francois Voegeli, Vincent Eltschinger,
Danielle Feller, Maria Piera Candotti, Bogdan Diaconescu & Malhar Kulkarni (eds.), Devadattyam.
Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 64381, pp. 65458.
36
See Manu 2.10ab: rutis tu vedo vijeyo dharmastra tu vai smti; Scripture should be
recognized as Veda, and tradition as Law Treatise (tr. Olivelle, op. cit., p. 23). Brick explains in the
following way the distinction between smti and cra in the older Dharmastras, in particular that of
Apastamba: () one might interpret smti as the standards of right conduct that people remember from
the past and become conscious of as the occasion arises. () It would denote what people articulate as the
time-honored norm, whereas cra would denote what people actually practice (David Brick,
Transforming Tradition into Texts: the Early Development of smti, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol.
34 (2006): 287302, p. 293).

123
576 H. David

legal and exegetical sources. Unlike most other authors, Apastamba chooses to place
on the same level the Veda and convention (samaya) or custom of various groups,
without subordinating one to the other, and also without explicitly advocating custom
as the custom of those people who are learned in the Veda: And now we shall
explain the accepted customary Laws, the authority for which rests on their
acceptance by those who know the Law and on the Vedas.37 Without denying the
authority of custom (cra/la/gama) in itself, later legal treatises tend to restrict it
(in theory, at least) to the custom of a certain group of people, the cultured people
(ia) or Brahmanical lite, whose conduct constitutes the norm. Although such
people should present moral qualities such as the absence of envy (matsara), egoism
(ahakra), hypocrisy (dambha), etc., it is their knowledge of the Vedic lore that
qualifies them, above all, as ias.38 There is certainly some logic behind this
limitation of the group of the ias to those who are well-versed in the Veda, for how
could we otherwise know who the ias are? In the words of Kumarila:
[Objection:] who are the ias? People of good deeds. But what are good deeds?
Those which are done by the [ias]! Because the ascertainment [of the ias
and good deeds] is mutually dependent, there is no such ascertainment. ()
[Answer:] their quality of being ias cannot, verily, be caused by their good
deeds; [rather,] their words are [a means of knowledge] because they are ias,
[and this they are] because they do what is explicitly prescribed [in the Veda].39

37
ApDhSu 1.13: athta smaycrikn dharmn vykhysyma | dharmajasamaya pramam |
ved ca (tr. Olivelle, Dharmastras, op. cit., p. 25). See also ApDhSu 1.20.67: na dharmdharmau
carata va sva iti | na devagandharv na pitara ity cakate ya dharma iti | yat tv ry kriyamna
praasanti, sa dharma, yad garhante, sodharma; Dharma and adharma do not go around saying,
Here we are! Nor do gods, Gandharvas, or ancestors declare, This is dharma and that is adharma. An
activity that Aryas praise is righteous, and what they deplore is unrighteous (tr.: ibid., p. 57). See also the
similar statement in the collection of Ghyastras (aphorisms of the domestic ritual) ascribed to the same
Apastamba (1.1). Apastambas conception of Dharma apparently forms the basis for P. Hackers classical
understanding of this concept: Der Dharma, seinem Inhalt nach auf die Kasten und Lebensstande
bezogen, den ganzen Bereich von Moral, Kultus, Recht und Sitte umgreifend, durch seinen Vollzug
jenseitiges Heil wirkend, ist nicht aus einem philosophischen Prinzip oder einem religiosen Ursprung
ableitbar, sondern nur empirisch feststellbar, sei es aus dem Veda, sei es aus dem Consensus der Guten
mit Rucksicht auf den geographischen Ort (Hacker, op. cit., p. 503). Apastamba does not stand alone in
this revaluation of custom against the Vedic framework. A similar attitude is reflected, for instance, in the
following verse from the Mahbhrata: crasabhavo dharmo dharmd ved samutthit | vedair
yaj samutpann yajair dev pratihit || Dharma has its origin in custom; the Vedas are
established from dharma; sacrifices are produced by the Vedas; the gods are established by the sacrifices
(3.149.28; quoted in Timothy Lubin, Indic conceptions of authority, in Lubin, Davis Jr. and Krishnan
(eds.), op. cit., 13753, p. 141).
38
The classical definition of a ia is found in the Dharmastra of Baudhayana. See BDhSu 1.56:
i khalu vigatamatsar nirahakr kumbhdhany alolup dambhadarpalobhamohakrodhavivar-
jit dharmedhigato ye veda saparibhaa | is tadanumnaj rutipratyakahetava;
Now, cultured people are those who are free from envy and pride, possess just a jarful of grain, and are
free from covetousness, hypocrisy, arrogance, greed, folly, and anger. As it is said: Cultured people are
those who have studied the Veda together with its supplements in accordance with the Law, know how to
draw inferences from them, and are able to adduce as proofs express Vedic texts. (tr. Olivelle, op. cit.,
p. 197). Compare this description to similar ones given by Apastamba (ApDhSu 1.20.6sq.).
39
Tantravrttika ad Mmsstra 1.3.7: ke i ye sadcr, sadcr ca tatkt | ittare-
tardhnanirayatvd aniraya || () naiva te sadcranimitt iat mat | skd vihitakritvc
chiatve sati tadvaca || (text: Harikai, op. cit., pp. 371373).

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 577

Some authors, beginning with Vasistha, add geographical restrictions to the

definition of the ias. According to him, what should be recognized as
authoritative are the laws and practices of the region east of where the Sarasvat
disappears, west of Kalaka forest, north of Pariyatra mountains, and south of the
Himalayas, or North of the Vindhya mountains, a territory he defines as the
Aryavarta, the land of the Aryas.40 The same kind of restriction is found in
Manus treatise (2.1724), and is also mentioned in Mmamsa texts, though

probably not before the time of Kumarila.41
There is some disagreement among modern authors as to the nature of the fourth
source of dharma mentioned by Manu, namely tmatui (self-contentment),
found in a slightly different form in the later Yjavalkyasmti (1.7). The
understanding of the expression itself remains a matter of debate, some specialists
interpreting it simply as what pleases oneself or personal preference (Olivelle/
Donald R. Davis),42 others as the assent of conscience (Lingat), with a stronger
moral connotation.43 Moreover, the internal character of tmatui (contrasted with
the essentially extrinsic character of the first three sources mentioned by Manu),
along with its not being mentioned in any text prior to the Mnavadharmastra, led
some scholars to consider it an oddity of its system44 or, on the contrary, a highly
significant innovation, introducing an independent (and potentially universal)
principle of morality into the sphere of dharma. Recent studies have shown,
however, that most (if not all) medieval commentators on Manu and Yajnavalkya
ascribe to tmatui a very limited scope.45 All agree, first of all, on a severe
restriction of the recourse to this criterion to cases where no other authoritative
source is available. Then, perhaps more importantly, all of them consider that it is
not everybodys contentment that can claim authority, but only the inner feeling
of people with definite moral qualities (lack of selfishness, etc.) and, above all,
extensive Vedic learning. It is only when caused by a repeated impregnation by the
Vedic text that the activity of the mind (antakaraapravtti) defining tmatui
can become an authoritative source of dharma. The prototype of this idea which
one should not too hastily ascribe to the authors of the Smrti-texts themselves is

already found a few centuries earlier in Kumarilas Tantravrttika:

40
VDhSu 1.810: prg dart pratyak klakavand udak priytrd dakiena himavata | uttarea
vindhyasya | ye dharm ye ccrs te sarve pratyetavy | (tr. Olivelle, op. cit., p. 351).
41
The fact of residing in the Aryavarta (ryvartanivs[a]) is mentioned by Kumarila as a limitation of
the quality of being a ia in the section of his Tantravrttika dealing with good conduct (sadcra) (ad
Mmsstra 1.3.7 Harikai, op. cit., p. 373). The only indication given by Kumarila on the
delimitation of the Aryavarta, the disappearance of the Sarasvat (sarasvatvina) in the West, is closer
to Vasisthas description of the Aryavarta, since Manu describes the latter as extending from the eastern

to the western sea (2.22). No mention of an Aryavarta is found, as far as I know, in Sabaras Bhya.
42
Davis, The Spirit of Hindu Law, p. 32. See also Olivelles translation of Manu 2.6 (quoted above).
43
Lingat, op. cit., p. 20: le contentement interieur, nous dirions plutot lassentiment de la conscience.
44
Ibid.: Mais le contentement interieur (), si cest bien une source du dharma, ne nous parat pas tout
a fait a sa place ici, a la suite de sources dont lautorite est exterieure a lhomme.
45
This point was made especially clear by Donald R. Davis, Jr., On tmatui as a Source of Dharma,
Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 127, No. 3 (2007): 279296. See also Davis, The Spirit of
Hindu Law, op. cit., pp. 3133.

123
578 H. David

Self-contentment (tmatui) is considered a means of knowing [dharma], to

ensure dharmas purity, when it belongs to someone whose self (tman) has
been well prepared by his knowledge of the endless dharma as it is taught in
the Veda. To explain: when someone has received due preparation through a
knowledge of the Veda and of its meaning resulting from a long practice, [so
that] his intuitions (pratibh) follow the path fixed in the Veda, he can never
have an intuition (pratibhna) which deviates [from this path]. () Just like in
the salt mines of Ruma, or on the splendid golden slopes of [Mount] Meru,
what is born [from a certain thing] participates to the nature of this thing. Such
is also the self-contentment of those who know the Veda.46
Inner feeling in matters of dharma cannot be trusted as such, but only insofar as
the person is prepared (saskta) by his long study of the Veda to discriminate
right from wrong, dharma from adharma. Hence, far from isolating tmatui as
an autonomous source of moral judgement, Kumarila, followed in this by the later
Hindu juridical tradition, rather claims that right judgement in a doubtful case can
only come from a trace (vsan) left in the mind by repeated recitation and a
deep understanding of the Scriptures. Just as a piece of wood extracted from a
salt-mine retains the taste of salt, judgements made by someone whose mind is
thus pervaded (vypta) by the Veda remain Vedic even when they bear on
matters not explicitly dealt with in the Veda as it stands: Since it is born from the
traces left by [the recitation of] the Veda, such a [judgement] is itself Veda.47
Self-contentment is thus no exception to the general principle that there is no
other source for [our] knowledge of dharma and adharma than what is prescribed
and what is forbidden [in the Veda] (vihitapratiiddhatve muktvnyan na ()
kraa dharmdharmvabodhasya).48 The same principle of vedamlatva
(rootedness in the Veda) we saw at work in the case of tradition (smti)
and custom (cra) equally applies here, and the internal form of tmatui
remains secondary with respect to its foundation in what remains an essentially
extrinsic norm.

46
Tantravrttika ad Mmsstra 1.3.7: etena vaidiknantadharmadhsaskttmanm | tmatue
pramatva prasiddha dharmauddhaye || tathaiva bahuklbhyastavedatadarthajnhi-
tasaskr vedaniyatamrgnusripratibhn nonmrgea pratibhna sabhavati (). yath
rmy lavakareu meror yath vojjvalarukmabhmau | yaj jyate tanmayam eva tat syt tath
bhaved vedavidtmatui || (text: Harikai, op. cit., p. 374 I do not translate etena in the first sentence).
47
Tantravrttika ad Mmsstra 1.3.7: vaidikavsanjanitatvd veda eva sa bhavati (text: Harikai, op.
cit., p. 374). It is interesting to note that the same image of a piece of wood extracted from a salt-mine is
used by Kumarila to define the relationship of Mmamsa with the Veda in an oft-quoted fragment of his
now lost Bhak: mmssajakas tarka sarvavedasamudbhava | so to vedo
rumprptakhdilavatmavat ||; The rational system known by the name exegesis (mms) is
entirely born from the Veda; therefore, it is Veda, just as a piece of wood extracted from [the salt-mines
of] Ruma is [itself] salty (as quoted in Vacaspati Misras Nyyavrttikattparyak p. 52).
48
Kumarila, lokavrttika (codan) 242cd243ab.

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 579

2 Vedic Injunction as a Philosophical Problem in Medieval

Brahmanism

This conception of all social and religious rules as being ultimately rooted in the
Veda (vedamla) conferred on the Vedic injunction an absolute priority in the
Brahmanical conception of the norm. As famously stated by Jaimini, dharma is
something good, known through the [Vedic] injunction (codanlakaortho
dharma Mmsstra 1.1.2). This might at least partially explain why a
systematic reflection on human action developed in Brahmanical India from a
consideration of the linguistic and psychological mechanisms involved in the
operation of Vedic injunctions. As theorized in Mmamsa texts, an injunction (vidhi/

codan) is a sentence (vkya) prescribing part or whole of a Vedic sacrifice
49
(karman) or, in Sabaras term, a statement provoking a [certain] action
(kriyy pravartaka vacanam).50 It is often marked by the presence of typical
morphemes such as the optative or imperative endings (li and lo respectively, in
the terms of Paninis grammar), or endings characteristic of the gerundives (ktya),

as in the case of a Vedic (or pseudo-Vedic) sentence like darapramsbhy
svargakmo yajeta (He who desires Heaven should perform [opt.] the New- and
Full-Moon offerings) (P1).51 This, however, need not be the case, since a purely
indicative Vedic sentence like vrhn prokati (He sprinkles [pres. ind.] the rice-
grains) (P2) can also be interpreted as an injunction, depending on its content and
on the context of its enunciation. The category of injunction, one might say, is
thus functional rather than purely descriptive.
The main concept used by Indian theoreticians to designate the subjective
response to such a statement on the part of a rational agent is the concept of
adhikrin (person in charge [of a certain act]). An adhikrin is, first of all,
someone who is entitled to be the possessor (svmin) or enjoyer of the fruit of a

49
The Sanskit word karman, meaning action or movement in general, is also a very common
designation for the sacrifice (otherwise referred to as yga/yaja), which, according to its most common
description, is nothing but a certain type of movement consisting of the abandonment (tyga) of a certain
substance (dravya) into the sacrificial fire, addressed to a particular deity (devat).
50
barabhya ad Mmsstra 1.1.2: codan iti kriyy pravartaka vacanam hu; They say
that an injunction is a statement provoking a [certain] action (text: Erich Frauwallner, Materialen zur
ltesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamms (Wien: Hermann Bohlaus Nachf., 1968), p. 16); lokavrt-
tika (codan) 3cd: pravartaka vkya stre smin codanocyate; In this science (stra), a sentence
provoking [a certain action] is called an injunction (codan) (text: Kei Kataoka, Kumrila on Truth,
Omniscience, and Killing. Part 1: A Critical Edition of Mmamsaslokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (codanasutra).
(Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011), p. 1); lokavrttika (vkya) 275ab:
anuheye hi viaye vidhi pus pravartaka; for an injunction is what provokes the peoples [action]
towards an object that has to be undertaken (p. 921).
51
Exact identification of the various Vedic sentences quoted as examples by Brahmanical exegetes is
often problematic, and many of them cannot be found in their exact form in the text of the Veda as it has
come down to us. All sentences quoted here are found either in the work of Sabara or of his
commentators. For an (often tentative) identification of their sources, see Damodar Vishnu Garge,
Citations in bara-bhya: a Study (Poona: Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, 1952)
and James Benson (ed. and trans.), Mahdeva Vedntin. Mmamsanyayasamgraha. A Compendium of the
Principles of Mms (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010).

123
580 H. David

certain act.52 However, as convincingly argued by Lariviere, to say that a certain

agent has adhikra to perform a given action does not only signify that this agent
has the right or privilege to perform this act (in other words, that he is eligible to
perform this act), but also that he is obliged to perform this act (it is his
responsibility to perform it).53 This status of being an adhikrin has three correlates:
knowledge (vidy) understand: knowledge of the Vedic text, as well as of its
meaning , the possession of fires (agnimattva) having undergone proper installation
rites, and the capacity (smarthya) to perform the rite along with its auxiliaries. The
main problem posed in the understanding of injunctions is thus to determine the
relation between a certain prescription and the listeners qualification (adhikra)
to perform the corresponding act.
But what is it exactly that makes any given sentence prescriptive? Is it a quality
of the sentence taken as a whole, or rather a property of some of its parts (the finite
verb, the verbal suffix, etc.)? By which process does the listener understand that this
sentence does not (or not only) describe a certain thing or event of the world, but
also prompts him to undertake something in the world? And what is the source of
the potential sacrificers personal concern with such a sentence?

2.1 Desire and its Means: Maana Miras Reductionism

The first Indian philosopher to ask these questions in such clear terms was Mandana

Misra (66072054), himself a specialist of Vedic hermeneutics and Kumarilas most
immediate successor. Mandana devoted to these topics a whole treatise, the

Vidhiviveka (An enquiry into vidhi, henceforth ViV), probably the first Brahman-
ical work to be entirely devoted to a philosophical investigation of human action.55
As we have just seen, the term vidhi, which appears in the title of this lengthy treatise
(42 stanzas with an extensive prose auto-commentary [svavtti]), is one of the most
52
See for instance Apadevas Mmsnyyasagraha 22526 (translated in Franklin Edgerton, The
Mms Nyya Praka or padev: A treatise on the Mms system by padeva (Delhi: Sri Satguru
Publications, 1986)).
53
Richard W. Lariviere, Adhikara Right and Responsibility, in Mohammad Ali Jazayery and Werner
Winter (eds.), Language and Cultures: Studies in Honor of E.C. Polom (Berlin/New York/Amsterdam:
Mouton de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 359364. Larivieres argument certainly goes too far, though, in
unilaterally excluding optionality from adhikra in the ritual domain. In fact, if permanent (nitya) and
occasional (naimittika) rites are indeed mandatory, no sacrificer (unless he has already started it) is forced
to undertake (i.e. incurs loss of status if he does not undertake) those rites belonging to the category of
optional (kmya) rites. Hence, it seems to me excessive to say that there was nothing optional about any
ritual for which one was an adhikrin (p. 363).
54
See Kataoka, Kumrila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part 2, p. 20. For a discussion of
Mandanas date, see also Hugo David, Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-

Vedanta, p. 273, n. 5.
55
The only study specifically devoted to the Vidhiviveka that has appeared to date is the very short and
schematic monograph by Kanchana Natarajan, The Vidhiviveka of Maana Mira: Understanding Vedic
Injunctions (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1995). See also Elliot M. Stern, Vidhivivekah of Maana

Mira, with commentary Nyayakanika of Vcaspatimira and supercommentaries Jusadhvankaran and
Svaditankaran of Paramevara. Critical and annotated edition: the purvapaksah [Sanskrit text]
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1988) and David, op. cit. Mandanas text has not
yet been translated in any language. Many topics dealt with in the Vidhiviveka find an echo in the second
book of Mandanas later Brahmasiddhi, the Section on Commandment (Niyogaka).

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 581

common terms used to refer to an injunction (especially a Vedic injunction, but not
exclusively; there are also vidhis pertaining to civil law, grammar, dramaturgy, etc.).
In this context it is an exact synonym of the word codan used by Jaimini in
Mmsstra 1.1.2 (quoted above). By Mandanas time, however, although it is

still common to speak of a certain category of sentences as vidhis, the term also
assumed a more technical meaning to designate the cause of an activity
(pravttihetu), especially (but not only) when it is the result of an utterance, be it
an impersonal commandment as found in the Scriptures (Perform the sacrifice!),
the command or invitation made by a speaker (Close the door!, Would you come
tomorrow?), or any similar speech-act.56 As understood by Mmamsa authors, vidhi

should always be understood as the content of a certain knowledge-event (jna), in
other words as something that can be cognized. Thus the most common description
of an action found in Mmamsa texts can be schematized as follows:

vidhi (?) pravtti karman
Cause of an activity (?) (= knowledge) activity/effort (mental)
movement (physical)
Essential to the correct understanding of this process is the distinction between
activity/effort (pravtti) an exact synonym of which, in Mandanas system, is

effectuation (bhvan)57 and movement (karman), two concepts often
confused by translators, who tend to render them indifferently by the English word
action. This distinction is borrowed from the philosophical school specialized in
the classification of entities (padrtha, categories as the term is often translated),
the Vaisesika (ontology or categoriology), within whose conceptual framework

activity is understood as a certain quality of the self (tman), while movements
form by themselves a separate category, distinct from substances (dravya) and
qualities (gua). If free will has apparently no role to play in this strictly causal
framework leading from knowledge to movement, the place for a certain spontaneity
on the part of the agent can still be traced at the level of activity, but certainly not at
the level of movement, which is common to any moving entity like a dog running,
a stone falling, etc. The crucial problem is now to determine the exact nature of vidhi:
what is it that, when cognized, makes us undertake an activity without being forced
to? This question is found on the threshold of Mandanas treatise:

Sure enough, this [= vidhi], considered to be the cause of [an agents] activity
(pravttihetu) is either a particular speech-[unit] (abda), [namely] li [= the
56
On the various meanings of the word vidhi in use by Mandanas time, see David, op. cit., pp. 273274.
57

The concept of bhvan, though already in use in Sabaras Bhya, received its definitive shape in
Kumarilas Tantravrttika. Mandana himself devoted a whole treatise, the Bhvanviveka (An enquiry
into effectuation) to a precise definition of effectuation, partially disagreeing with Kumarilas
understanding of this concept. See Erich Frauwallner, Bhavana und Vidhih bei Mandanamisra, Wiener
Zeitschrift fr die Kunde des Morgenlandes 45 (1938), 21252, Kei Kataoka,
Scripture, Men and
Heaven. Causal structure in Kumarilas action-theory of bhvan, Journal of Indian and Buddhist
Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2001): 1013, and Hugo David, A Contribution of Vedanta to the History of
Mmamsa. Prakasatmans Interpretation of Verbal Effectuation (abdabhvan), in Nina Mirnig,

Peter-Daniel Szanto and Michael Williams (eds.), Pupik: Tracing Ancient India through Texts and
Traditions. Contributions to Current Research in Indology, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2013), 79105.

123
582 H. David

optative suffix], etc., a specific operation (vypra) of that [speech-unit], or a

particular object (artha), by the expression of which the [corresponding]
speech-[unit] also deserves to be called [vidhi].58
In this passage, Mandana is simply enumerating three possible answers to the

question I have just raised. While doing so, he certainly has in mind a Vedic
sentence like that quoted above (P1), but the same question could actually be asked
for any worldly injunctive or prohibitive sentence, like Close the door! or Stop
writing!, a number of which are in fact analysed later on in Mandanas work. It

should also be noted at the outset that, if the first two hypotheses (speech in itself or
its specific operation as the causes of human activity) explain human action only in
a context of interlocution, this is not the case for the third, which potentially extends
to any situation where a rational agent is in a position to take a decision: if what
prompts an agent to activity when responding to a command is nothing but the
knowledge of a certain object (artha) existing in the world and referred to by
language, then the knowledge of this object should prompt his activity in all cases,
regardless of its being known through a sentence or from any other source.59 We
may now consider in greater detail the first and the last of these three possibilities.60
The first hypothesis amounts to saying that speech, or a particular element of
speech or speech-unit (abda), has in itself the property directly to prompt an
agent to activity, without any consideration of its meaning.61 This, of course, is not
to say that language would possess some kind of occult, magical power enabling it
to set human beings in motion. Rather, things might happen as in the following
examples: when a bell chimes to indicate that it is time to go to the church, or when
we hear somebody knocking on the door or clapping his hands asking for silence,
we may mechanically respond to such signals without any obvious process of
expression or signification, and also without any reflection on our motives and
purposes, simply because we have learned in the past that this is the right way to
behave in such situations, just as a horse starts to run when hearing its masters

58
ViV 2 (svavtti introduction): sa khalu abdabhedo v lidis tadvyprtiayo v pravttihetur
upeyate rthabhedo v, yadabhidhnc chabdopi tath vyapadeya (S 66.170.1 [ G 4.12]).
59
Later texts tend to concentrate exclusively on this third hypothesis, and also generally take the problem
the other way round, explaining the functioning of injunctive language on the basis of a preexisting theory
of action, elaborated independently. This might explain the paradigmatic role played, in later
Brahmanical texts on action, by the child (bla) who has not yet learnt how to speak, as in the
following passage of the Vkyrthamtk (2.4 cd svavtti) by the 9th/10th-century philosopher
Salikanatha: avyutpannena \corr: vyutpannena Ed[ blena yad tmani pravttikraatay
prattam \corr: pratt Ed[ , tad eva vyutpannasypti kalpyate, nnyat; A child who cannot use
language understands that what he perceives in his own self as the cause of his activity is also [the cause
of the activity] of an [adult] who can use language (S 419.79). It is on the basis of this inference based
on an analogy between his inner states and those of the person he observes in a situation of interlocution
(vyavahra) that the child is able, according to Indian theoreticians, to determine the object (artha)
referred to by injunctive suffixes (lidi).
60
On the specific difficulties entailed by the second hypothesis, see David, A contribution of Vedanta,
op. cit..
61
In technical terms this means that speech functions as an efficient cause (krakahetu), just as fire
causes smoke, and not as a cause leading to knowledge (jpakahetu) or means of knowledge
(prama), as smoke (to keep the same example) is the cause of our knowledge of a fire we cannot see.

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 583

whip. Mandana temporarily proposes, through the words of an objector,62 to

understand the functioning of injunctions on this model. Building on the work of
previous exegetes and on their location of the specifically inciting element
(pravartaka) in an injunction like P1 in the optative verbal suffix (li) (whose
function is more or less equivalent to that of the modal auxiliary should in
English),63 he proposes to analyse its operation in purely mechanistic terms: the
activity occurs automatically while hearing such a suffix, regardless of any
particular meaning of this suffix or of any process of expression on its part. The
verbal ending (which might as well be the imperative or any equivalent nominal
suffix) is thus considered totally meaningless, though by no means ineffective, since
we learn through habit (abhysa) how to react to such stimuli64:
But, things happen like in the case of the sound (dhvani) of a conch horn! To
explain: just as, while hearing the sound (abda) of a conch horn, only those
who make use of their knowledge [of the relation between the sound and the
activity] undertake [this] activity, thinking I should act and not the others
, [so it happens when they hear a speech-unit like li]. And the sound of the
conch horn does not express (abhi-dh) the activity, nor [does it express] any
other cause of [this] activity. If it did, only then would it be a cause leading to
knowledge (jpakahetu),65 [but not otherwise].66
The difference between an injunction and a simple signal like the bell ringing, etc.
remains since, in the first case, a process of expression does take place in the other
lexical elements forming the sentence (the verbal root, the inflected nouns,
adjectives, etc.). This process gives to an otherwise undifferentiated incitement
(pravartan) its specific content, subject and direction.
Whether or not any philosopher before Mandana sustained such a position is

uncertain.67 What is sure, though, is that it fell into complete desuetude immediately

62
The device consisting in developing the position of an objector or preliminary thesis (prvapaka)
before introducing the final thesis (siddhnta) of the author is one of the most common ways of
proceeding in Sanskrit philosophical texts. The preliminary thesis can, of course, represent the actual
position of a contemporary or past philosopher, but this need not be the case.
63
This restriction of the injunctive force or verbal efficiency (abdabhvan) to the verbal suffix
(khyta) alone is one of the great achievements of Kumarilas theory of injunction. See Frauwallner, op.
cit., Kataoka, op. cit., Elisa Freschi, Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prbhkara Mms (including an
Edition and Translation of Ramanujacaryas Tantrarahasya, Sastraprameyapariccheda) (Leiden/Boston:
Brill, 2012), and David, op. cit..
64
Interestingly enough, the concept of habit (abhysa) is not introduced by Mandana directly, but only
through a quote from the 5th-century grammarian Bhartrhari (Vkyapadya 2.117). See
ViV 2 (svavtti) S
118.119.1 (= G 8.45). An analysis of the possible connections between the present hypothesis and
Bhartrharis own theory of language lies beyond the scope of the present study.
65

On the concept of cause leading to knowledge (jpakahetu), see above n. 61.
66
ViV 2 (svavtti): nanu akhadhvanivad etat syt. yath hi akhaabdt pravartitavyam ity
upayuktasavida eva pravartante, netare. na ca akhaabda pravtter abhidhyaka, anyasya v kasya
cit pravttiheto, yena jpaka syt (S 87.188.2 [ G 6.13]).
67
Although no philosopher has so far been identified holding a similar position, this does not mean that
such a thinker never existed, as this might only be a symptom of our still very insufficient knowledge of
early Mmamsa.

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584 H. David

after his time. Salikanatha, writing probably little more than a century later,68 still
mentions it en passant, but only to despise it and deem it unworthy of a proper
refutation.69 Mandanas own objections to this theory in the Vidhiviveka (k. 2 and

svavtti) are too numerous to be described here at length. Two arguments are
particularly central to his refutation, the first linguistic and the other moral/juridical.
Both are directed toward the same controversial idea, namely the essentially non-
expressive nature of the injunctive verbal ending. This implies first of all that one
could react to an injunction (or, at least, could identify its injunctive character)
without understanding its language, which is obviously contrary to our experience:
And only a [cause] leading to knowledge (jpaka) requires knowledge [of a
relation] (jna);70 but the own [= phonic] form of injunctive suffixes is[,
according to you,] the efficient [cause] (kraka) of an activity; the undesired
consequence [of your hypothesis] is thus that even someone who does not
make use of [his] knowledge [of the relation with a meaning] should undertake
an activity! () For the sound of a conch horn is not the cause of an activity
through a relation (sagati) which would be used for [this] activity.71
Mandanas moral argument develops along the same lines. If an agents activity can

be understood as a mere reaction, not necessarily preceded by any reflection or
deliberation, then that agent cannot really be held responsible for what (s)he does,
just as a leaf blown by the wind cannot be held guilty of going the wrong way. This
excludes moral judgement and also, on a juridical/religious level, the possibility of
punishment (daa) and penance (pryacitta) as prescribed in the Dharmasastra:
If speech was independent [as a cause of human activity], the activity would
take place with necessity (niyogata); thus there would be no point in saying
[as Manu does] that When a man fails to carry out prescribed acts [() he is
subject to a penance]72, for then, even desire (icch) would not be central to
68
On Salikanathas date, see below 2.2.
69
See Vkyrthamtk 4cd (svavtti): tena abda eva pravttihetubhto vidhi, tadvypro veti nirasta
bhavati (). atimandatay cemau pakau na skd upanyasya nirastau; By the preceding [argument],
we [also] refute [the idea that] vidhi, the cause of an activity, is nothing but the speech-unit [in itself] or its
operation (). And these two theses are not exposed and refuted directly, because of their excessive
weakness. (S 419.1012). The same hypothesis is found, at a much later date, in a passage of
Ramanujacaryas Tantrarahasya (15th17th c.?). See Freschi, op. cit., pp. 3031 and 164167. Freschis
tentative identification of this thesis as the common sense view of the yajikas, the performers of the
sacrifice (ibid., p. 30) is attractive, but not entirely convincing. I find it more plausible that Ramanuja,
who generally relies on Salikanathas Vkyrthamtk, does so in that case also, and borrows this idea
directly from his predecessor who himself relies on its (first?) formulation in Mandanas Vidhiviveka.
70

This principle can be illustrated as follows: an efficient cause (kraka) like fire produces its effect (say,
smoke) even without any knowledge of its relation to something else. On the contrary, smoke, a cause
leading to knowledge (jpaka) when it is used as an inferential sign, produces its effect (the knowledge
of an unseen fire) only when its relation to fire is known. In the same way, a speech-unit (abda) normally
produces its effect only after its relation (sagati/sabandha) with an object (artha) has been learnt.
71
ViV 2 (svavtti): jpaka ca jnam apekate, lidisvarpa ca pravtte krakam ity
anupayuktasavidopi pravttiprasaga () na hi akhadhvani pravttyupayuktasagatitay
pravttikraam (S 82.191.1 [ G 5.56.4]).
72
Manu 11.44. The full verse, which opens the section on penances of the Mnavadharmastra, reads
as follows: akurvan vihita karma nindita ca samcaran | prasaja cendriyrtheu pryacittyate

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 585

man (puruasya tantram), [who would behave] as if [he was] pushed by a

strong wind or by the flow of water.73
This last remark, affirming the centrality of desire in human behaviour, leads us
directly to the heart of Mandanas own position, exposed in ViV 28, at the end of a

long critical investigation (ViV 525, especially ViV 514) of all objects (artha)
which, when they are known, become potential candidates to the rank of a cause of
(virtually all) human activities.74 Unlike in the preceding case, Mandanas thesis is

grounded in an anthropological (rather than purely linguistic) reflection on the
omnipresence of desire: activity, consisting of an effort (prayatna), is in itself painful
(dukha/klearpa); thus nobody would undertake it unless he expects a certain result
or fruit (phala) corresponding to his desire (icch)75 and consisting in a form of
pleasure (sukha).76 By this, Mandana is simply rooting in a rational argument an older,

non-philosophical analysis already found in the Mnavadharmastra (2.2/4), which
is indeed quoted in a crucial passage of Mandanas Brahmasiddhi (1.1 svavtti):

To be motivated by desire is not commended, but it is impossible here to be
free from desire; for it is desire that prompts Vedic study and the performance
of Vedic rites () Nowhere in this world do we see any activity done by a
man free from desire; for whatever at all that a man do, it is the work of
someone who desired it.77
Mandanas conception of the norm is in accordance with this absolute priority

conferred on desire in human psychology: if external rules of dharma should have

Footnote 72 continued
narah ||; When a man fails to carry out prescribed acts, performs disapproved acts, and is attached to the
objects, he is subject to a penance (tr. Olivelle, The Law Code of Manu, op. cit., p. 193).
sensory
73
ViV 2 (svavtti): abdasvtantrye ca niyogata pravtti syt. tath ca akurvan vihita karma ity
aviaya syt. na hi balavadanilasalilaughanudyamnasyevecchpi tantra puruasya (S 78.182.1 [ G
5.25]).
74
On the structure of this section, see the brief summary given in Stern, op. cit., pp. 1745. Seven
categories of objects (artha) are examined in ViV 514 (ViV 1525 is a digression in Mandanas
course of argument). These are: 1. three so-called properties of the speaker (prayoktdharma):
command, request and permission (k. 5); 2. incitement (pravartan), understood as their common
denominator (k. 5); 3. the fruit (phala) of the prescribed action (k. 6); 4. the act (karman) in itself, (k.
7); 5. effectuation, provided that [its] particular [relationship to] time is not acknowledged (bhvan
[] aparmaklabhed) (k. 8); 6. ones own relationship with the action, whose relationship [with an
agent] has not been obtained (aprptasabandhay kriyaytmana sabandha[]) (k. 911); 7.
commandment (niyoga), in the specific sense given to this term by the 7th-century Mmamsaka
Prabhakara (k. 1214).
75
On Mandanas conception of desire (icch) as opposed to passion (rga), born from an excessive
attachment to
illusory qualities of an object, see the excellent remarks by Biardeau (La philosophie de
Maana Mira, op. cit., pp. 1415).
76
I do not dwell here on this idea and its development by the 10th-century commentator Vacaspati Misra
(9501000), as I have dealt with this topic in greater detail elsewhere. See Hugo David, Action Theory
and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedanta, pp. 304305.
77
Manu 2.2/4: kmtmat na praast na caivehsty akmat | kmyo hi veddhigama karmayoga ca
vaidika || () akmasya kriy k cid dyate neha karhi cit | yad yad dhi kurute ki cit tat tat kmasya
ceitam || Tr.: Olivelle, op. cit., p. 23. See Brahmasiddhi 1.1 (svavtti): tath coktam kmtmat na
praast na caivehsty akmat (p. 3.2425).

123
586 H. David

any authority over human beings, this can only be because they teach (upa-di) the
means (sdhana/upya/abhyupya) to obtaining something desired (ia). In the
sphere of ritual, the relation between desire and means is particularly evident in the
case of optional (kmya) rites, so defined because one performs them, precisely,
when one feels desire (kma) for their fruit. But this is no less the case, in
Mandanas view, with permanent (nitya) rites, as already implied by Manus

passage: no Brahmin would respond, for instance, to the injunction of performing
his daily oblation to the fire (Agnihotra) without expecting, at least, the fruit
consisting of the avoidance of a fault (ppaparihra), which would supposedly
cause pain either in this or the next life. Renunciation (sanysa) itself is not
conceived in Mandanas system (unlike in Sankaras, for instance) as a complete

detachment from all objects of desire, but rather as the distancing from all [desires]
which differ from the attachment to the supreme pleasure (uttamasukhargd
itarasmd [] nivtti) found in the state of liberation (moka).78 Hence even the
religious practice of ascetics does not consist in simply turning away from all
desires, but in concentrating their activity (pravtti) on what is a proper means to
achieve their real goal.79 The following causal chain thus holds as a general model
of human action:
icch (phala)sdhanat-jna (= vidhi/pravttihetu) pravtti
karman phala
Desire knowledge of a means (= cause of an activity) activity/effort
(mental) movement (physical) fruit
The reason for which a rational agent obeys an impersonal Vedic injunction is
therefore not different from the reason for which he takes any other independent
decision. He does so because he understands the existence of a necessary causal link
between a certain class of actions (a kind of offering, for instance) and a desired
fruit (phala/ia) for which it is a means [of realization] (sdhana). It is thus the
very existence of desire which allows the potential agent to conciliate an essentially
painful activity with his own motivational complex, and it is through this device that
norms are integrated to his behaviour. In this framework a Vedic injunction such as
P1 (He who desires Heaven should perform the New- and Full-Moon offerings) is
better understood as The New- and Full-Moon offerings are a means (sdhana) to
realizing Heaven (svarga), the desired fruit (phala/ia). This view is famously
summed up by Mandana himself in ViV 28:

For a human being, there is no other incitement towards actions (kriy) than
[their] being a means for realizing what he desires (ibhyupya), and what
[people] call impelling (pravartan) is [nothing but this same] property [of
an action], which is the cause of [their] activity.80

78
See Brahmasiddhi 1.1 (svavtti) p. 3.23.
79
See Brahmasiddhi 1.1 (svavtti) p. 3.1725. Tr. Biardeau (op. cit. p. 144).
80
ViV 28: puso nebhyupyatvt kriysv anya pravartaka | pravttihetu dharma ca pravadanti
pravartanm || (G 173.23 (see also Stern, op. cit., p. 1628)).

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 587

Mandanas theory thus appears as operating a twofold reduction: 1. reduction of all

kinds of action to a single model, regardless of whether they take place in a situation
of interlocution or, at least, of verbal understanding; 2. reduction of practical
knowledge to a kind of theoretical knowledge, bearing on a relation of causality
between a means (sdhana) and its expected result (sdhya).

2.2 Feeling an Obligation: likanthas Critique

Although Mandanas conception of desire as a universal principle of action can

claim alignment, as we saw, with the venerable opinion of Manu, probably as
central an authority for him as he was to Kumarila, there were other voices among
ancient authors holding quite a different view. Most characteristic in this respect is
the following passage from the already quoted collection of Dharmastras ascribed
to Apastamba, our earliest document on the tradition of Dharmasastra:
Let him not perform lawful deeds (dharm [pl.]) for the sake of a worldly
benefit (laukikam artham), for then these deeds produce no fruit at harvest
time (abhyudaye). To explain: a man plants a mango tree to get fruits, but in
addition (anu[]) he obtains shade and fragrance. In like manner, when a man
performs a lawful deed (dharma [sing.]), he obtains benefits (artha) in
addition (anu[]). Even if he does not obtain them in addition (anu[]), [at
least] he does not neglect [to perform] a lawful deed (dharma [sing.]).81
As shown by the example of the mango tree, that a lawful act has a positive result
cannot enter into consideration in its positive or negative evaluation from the point
of view of dharma. Quite the contrary, in Apastambas view, the consideration of
the benefit potentially ensuing from an act prescribed by the law withdraws from
this act its righteous or lawful character: the law should be honoured for no
other motive than because it is the law, all benefits occurring only in addition (anu
[]).82 In fact, if respect for a legal or moral norm were considered nothing but a
means to achieving a desired goal, then such a norm would lose its specificity as an
unconditional principle of action, and would become similar to the advice (upadea)
of a teacher, a doctor, a friend, etc. which is, by the way, precisely what Mandana

explicitly claims it is.83
The influence of Apastambas conception of the law on medieval debates on action
is much less conspicuous than in the case of Manu. Nevertheless, we can find a trace of
the opposition between a weak conception of the law as a particular case of teaching

81
ApDhSu 1.20.14: nema laukikam artha purasktya dharm caret | niphal hy abhyudaye
bhavanti | tad yathmre phalrthe nirmite chy gandha ity antpadyete | eva dharma caryamam
arth antpadyante | no ced antpadyante, na dharmahnir bhavati | Tr.: Olivelle, Dharmastras, op. cit.,
p. 57 (modified).
82
This aspect of Apastambas thought is well seized by Paul Hacker in his already mentioned article on
the meaning of dharma (Hacker, op. cit., p. 97). It would, however, be a mistake to consider, as Hacker
leads one to think, that this opinion would be representative of ancient Hindu conceptions of dharma
generally.
83
See ViV 26 and svavtti (G 169.23). Translation from Hugo David, Action Theory and Scriptural
Exegesis, op. cit., 294295.

123
588 H. David

on the means to achieving certain goals and a strong conception of the law as
unconditionally prescriptive in the discussion on the possibility of desireless action.
The idea that an action could be undertaken without any desire for a fruit at all was
taken very seriously by Brahmanical authors from an early date and in a variety of
contexts.84 It found a powerful advocate, in the philosophical field, in the figure of
Salikanatha Misra (9th/10th c.?85), one of the main thinkers of the Prabhakara school
of Mmamsa, and certainly one of Mandanas most uncompromising opponents.86

The question of human action and its causes is examined by Salikanatha at various
points in his work (consisting of both commentaries and independent treatises), but
more especially in the second part of his Vkyrthamtk (Basic principles of [a
theory of the] sentence-meaning). This treatise, in verse with a substantial auto-
commentary, is principally devoted to establishing the main thesis of Salikanathas
sub-school in matters of sentence semantics, following which all sentences ultimately
refer to an obligation (krya), literally to something that must be done.87
The distinction between Vedic injunctions prescribing optional (kmya) rites
and those prescribing permanent/occasional (nitya/naimittika) rites88 offers
Salikanatha an occasion for reflection on the various ways in which a person
receives adhikra, entitlement/responsibility for a certain ritual.89 Understandably,
many injunctions prescribing optional rites contain an explicit mention of the result
or fruit (phala) that may be expected from their performance. This is, for instance,
the case of P1 (He who desires Heaven should perform the New- and Full-Moon
offerings), where Heaven (svarga) is apparently mentioned as the expected result
justifying the undertaking of the offerings. This, however, is not always the case,
especially not for injunctions belonging to the second set. Consider, for instance, a
84
Mention must be made here of the famous Bhagavadgt (see e.g. 2.71), where the god Krsna, the
main protagonist, repeatedly urges his interlocutor Arjuna to act having renounced all desires(sarvn

kmn vihya), without attachment (nispha), etc. For a modern defence of desireless action based on
the Gt and other, later Sanskrit texts, see Christopher Framarin, Desire and Motivation in Indian
Philosophy (London/New York: Routledge, 2009), who does not, however, take into account the
materials here under consideration. For a recent critique of Framarins ideas, see Simon Brodbeck,
Review of Framarin, Religious Studies, Vol. 46 (2010): 13540.
85
Salikanathas date is still unsettled. Verpoorten proposes to date him between 800 and 950 (op. cit.,
p. 38), while the more recent chronology of Mmamsa in Kataoka, Kumrila on Truth, Omniscience, and
Killing. Part 2 places him around 900 (p. 20).
86
The Prabhakara school of Mmamsa, which derives its name from that of its founder, Prabhakara

Misra (7th c.), is one of the two main sub-schools of classical Brahmanical exegesis after Sabara, the other
being the Bhatta school named after Kumarila Bhatta, likely to be Prabhakaras contemporary.
Although Mandanas affiliation to Bhatta Mmamsa is overall
problematic, he is no doubt closer to

Kumarilas ideas than to those of Prabhakara, one of his most regular targets in the Vidhiviveka and
Brahmasiddhi.
87
A very clear exposition of Salikanathas and later Prabhakaras theory of the unprecedented
obligation (aprvakrya) can be found in Freschi, op. cit., pp. 4562. Unfortunately, no reliable
translation of Salikanathas treatise in a European language has yet been published.
88
The distinction between permanent (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) rites, mentioned by
Salikanatha in the passage quoted below, is of little relevance to the present discussion. Unlike a daily rite
like the Agnihotra, that must be performed again and again, an occasional rite is, for instance, the
particular ritual performed on the birth of a son, which should be performed only on that occasion.
89
On the notion of adhikra (qualification, duty) and its correlate, the adhikrin (qualified
[person], person in charge [of a certain act]), see above ( 2 introduction).

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 589

Vedic sentence typically prescribing a permanent rite (nityakarman), like He

should perform the [daily] oblation to the fire (Agnihotra) as long as he lives
(yvajjvam agnihotra juhoti) (P3). Here, no explicit mention is made of any fruit,
but only of a condition for performing the sacrifice, namely being alive (jvana).
Should we then infer the existence of an implicit desired fruit, like the avoidance of
a fault (ppaparihra), for which the daily performance of the Agnihotra would be
the means (sdhana)? Or should we imagine, by the principle of [the sacrifice
named] Visvajit (vivajinnyya), that Heaven (svarga), supposedly desired by
everyone, is the fruit of the sacrifice90? Or shall we rather accept that the injunction
generates in that case an unconditional obligation, operating without consideration
of the agents desires or expectations, and constitutes in itself a sufficient motive
(prayojana) to undertake the action? Here is Salikanathas answer to these
important questions91:
[Objection:] but, let injunctive suffixes express an unprecedented obligation
(aprvakrya)92 in the case of optional [rites]; how about duties (adhikra)
such as permanent and occasional [rites], or interdictions? [Answer:] in fact, in
such cases, Prabhakaras do not admit the production of a fruit. For the fruit
[mentioned in an injunction prescribing an optional rite] is not related [to the
main meaning of the sentence] as a fruit (phalatay), but rather as a

90
On the principle of [the sacrifice named] Visvajit (vivajinnyya), see Mmsnyyapraka 117
(translated in Edgerton, The Mms Nyya Praka or padev).
91
There has been some scholarly debate on this topic since the publication, in 1926, of a significant
article by the Russian scholar Theodor Stcherbatsky, boldly comparing Prabhakaras (in reality,
Salikanathas) conception of an unprecedented obligation (aprvakrya) with Kants categorical
imperative: Wir konnen in Anlehnung an die ethischen Richtungen in der modernen Philosophie die
Richtung Kumarilas als die Lehre vom problematischen Imperativ und die Schule Prabhakaras als die des
kategorischen Imperativs charakterisieren (Stcherbatsky, Uber die Nyayakanika des Vacaspatimisra
und die indische Lehre vom kategorischen Imperativ, in W. Kirfel (ed.), Beitrge zur Literaturwis-
senschaft und Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festgabe Hermann Jacobi zum 75. Geburtstag (Bonn: F. Klopp,
1926), 369380, p. 373; partial English translation in Hajime Nakamura, Problem of categorical
imperative in the philosophy of Prabhakara school: a brief note, in R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in
Mms. Dr Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994), 16983). A
radically different view has been put forward recently by E. Freschi, who claims precisely the opposite,
considering (mostly on the basis of a late rendering of Salikanathas ideas) that desire is as central to the
Prabhakara conception of the norm as it is to other Mmamsakas: desire is the motive of (ritual) action.

Indeed, there cannot be (ritual) action without desire (Freschi, op. cit., p. 118). Non-optional rites are no
exception to this general rule, for fixed rituals [nityakarman HD] are to be performed throughout ones
life because their agent is identified as The One who is desirous of heaven (ibid., p. 119). Although I
generally agree with Freschis analysis of the Prabhakara concept of a specification of the person
qualified [for the act] (adhikrivieaa) (see below), which indeed rules out any plausible comparison
with Kants categorical imperative understood as a universal principle of morality, I cannot follow her in
that last conclusion, which seems to be directly refuted by Salikanathas own explicit statements, as we
shall see. This, of course, does not mean that Salikanathas position should be extended to the
Prabhakara school taken globally, nor that it should necessarily be held fairly to represent the opinion
of Prabhakara himself. For an extensive discussion of this topic in Prabhakaras work, see Kiyotaka
Yoshimizu, Der Organismus des urheberlosen Veda. Eine Studie der Niyoga-Lehre Prabhkaras mit
ausgewhlten bersetzungen der Brhat (Vienna: University of Vienna, 1997), pp. 17380.
92

In using the adjective unprecedented (aprva), Salikanatha means to say that the obligation (krya)
conveyed by a Vedic injunction cannot be known (logically preceded) by any other means of
knowledge, like perception, inference, or even non-Vedic speech. See Vkyrthamtk 2.25 (S 441.34).

123
590 H. David

specification of the [person] qualified [for this act] (adhikrivieaatay).

Now, if an[other] specification of the [person] qualified [for the act] has
[already] been obtained, why should we look for a fruit? And it is not true that
an activity cannot take place without [the expectation of] a fruit, for an activity
merely depends on the comprehension [by the potential agent] of an obligation
related to himself. [And] the comprehension of an obligation related to oneself
does take place even in the absence of a fruit, [when it stems] from an
independent speech-unit (anapekc chabdt), for we understand from the
world that this [= the obligation] is the cause of an activity (pravttihetu). The
fruit is mentioned [in some injunctions], as we said, in order to generate the
comprehension of the obligation, and for no other purpose.93
Salikanathas analysis evolves, in this crucial passage, around the idea of a peculiar
feeling of being obliged to perform a certain action at a given moment, in other
words around the intimate certitude that I am bound [to perform this act]
(niyuktosmi),94 that this is what I should do (kryam iti / kartavyam iti) in a given
situation. This feeling, possessing the same kind of immediacy and evidence as the
experience of pleasure,95 might arise for a number of reasons, the most common in
ordinary life being perhaps the conviction that the action is useful in achieving a
certain aim and becomes, for this reason, the right thing for me to do at that
moment. In fact the abstract consideration of the various means to realizing a goal is
not always sufficient to put an agent in motion: I may think it would be good for me
to exercise more often without actually doing so. Thus even ordinary, goal-oriented
actions need to be sustained by the kind of impelling certitude that an injunction has
for its specific function to provoke in the hearer, and which is also characteristic of
the condition of adhikrin.
But how does an injunction give rise to such a feeling if it does not at least
present the action to be undertaken as a means to reaching a desired end?
Salikanathas solution to this problem, which is indeed quite subtle, lies in the
concept of a specification of the person qualified [for a certain act]
(adhikrivieaa). Consider, first of all, the case of P1, explicitly appealing to
the listeners desire (kma) for Heaven (svarga). No lexical item in this sentence
explicitly states that Heaven should be taken as a fruit or an effect (sdhya)
resulting from the prescribed action. Rather, desire for Heaven may also function as
a mere sign allowing a desirous person to identify himself as the one who is
addressed by the injunction. Heaven, of course, might be (incidentally, so to say) the
result of the prescribed action but, after all, there is no need for it to be such.
93
See Vkyrthamtk 2.30 (svavtti): nanv eva bhavatu kmyev aprvakrybhidhna lidnm.
nityanaimittikaniedhdhikreu katham? na hi teu \katham? na hi tesu S: katham tesu M

[ phalodaya prbhkar anumanyante. na hi phala phalataynvyate, ki tv adhikrivieaatay.

labdhe tu jvandv adhikrivieae ki phalnveaena? na ca phalam antarea pravttyasabhava,
svasabandhikryvagamamtryattatvt pravtte. nirapekc \nirapeksac S: nirapeksah M[ chabdt

phalam antarepi svasabandhikryvagama, tvanmtrasya loke pravttihetutvvagamt. kryva-
gamotpdanyaiva phalam upayujyata ity uktam (S 445.17/M 191.1221).
94
I borrow this formulation, not found in Salikanathas work, from a passage of Mandana Misras
35.78).
Vidhiviveka proposing a rendering of Prabhakaras ideas. See ViV 12 (svavtti) S 299.1 (G
95
See ViV 12 (svavtti) S 299.1 (G 35.8).

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Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 591

Suppose a person, who happens to be wearing a blue shirt, speaks about his desire to
buy a new house. We may identify that person, indifferently, by mentioning his blue
shirt or his desire to buy a house, or even address him by referring to either of these
two characteristics in order to make him perform a certain act (stand up, for
instance). Now, obviously enough, there is no relation whatsoever between the act
of standing up and that of buying a house: desire functions here as a mere sign, just
as would any other distinctive trait, or a proper name. The purpose of using such a
sign is only to create in the listener a feeling of personal concern with the act,
sufficient to provoke in him a feeling of obligation. A similar example is given by
the 10th-century Brahmanical philosopher Prakasatman to explain the functioning of
optional injunctions in Salikanathas system in his independent treatise on verbal
knowledge called bdaniraya (An enquiry into verbal knowledge):
[Objection:] but, the instruction [leading] someone who is desirous [of a
certain result] (kmin) to an activity is [always] about the means [for realizing]
what he desires! [Answer:] no, for even if [the action] is not the means [for
realizing what he desires], we observe that the desire for a fruit (phalakman)
is still used as a specification of the [person] qualified [for a certain act]
(adhikrivieaa). For instance: suppose several people, desirous of [obtain-
ing] a village, etc. stand near the entrance [of a building].96 Somebody, whose
function is to distribute food, specifies the person who is in charge [of the
action of entering the building], in order to eliminate the others, by saying:
You, who are desirous of a village, enter! [However,] the act of entering [the
building] is not the means [for obtaining] a village[, but only to obtain food].97
By contrast with Mandanas theory, we may now summarize Salikanathas

explanation of human activity in a ritual context as follows:
adhikrivieaa kryat-(jna) (= vidhi/pravttihetu) pravtti
karman ( phala)
Specification of the person qualified [for a certain act] feeling of
obligation (= cause of an activity) activity/effort (mental) movement
(physical) ( fruit)
Coming now to the case of injunctions prescribing non-optional rites, we can
assume that their functioning will be identical with those prescribing optional rites:
what the listener needs to know in order to feel obliged to perform a certain action
is not its potential fruit (which, as we have seen, does not function as a fruit even

96
Although Prakasatman does not say so explicitly, it seems necessary, in order to preserve the
coherence of his reasoning, to suppose that only some of the people standing in front of the door are
desirous of a village, not all of them.
97
bdaniraya 59 (svavtti): nanu kmina pravttyupadea kmopye bhavati. na, atatsdhanepi
phalakmany niyojyavieaatvadarant, yath grmdikmev anekeu dvra pratysanneu ka
cid bhojayit vijtenaiva vieaena niyojya viinay anye nivttaye: grmakma, gaccha! iti.
na tatrgamana grmasdhana. Text: Hugo David, La parole comme moyen de connaissance.
Recherches sur lpistmologie de la connaissance verbale et la thorie de lexgse dans lAdvaita
Vednta (Unpublished PhD thesis, Ecole pratique des hautes etudes (Section des Sciences Religieuses),
Paris, 2012) ( GS 58.1520).

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592 H. David

in the case of optional rites), but any property that would allow him to identify
himself as the person addressed by the injunction. Such is the function, in P3, of the
property of being alive (jvana): provided conditions of purity, caste, capacity,
etc. are assembled, anybody should perform his daily rites as long as he lives
(yvajjvam). Thus, unless an obvious defect (ignorance, malign intention, etc.) is
detected in the source of an injunction and this is avoided, in the case of the Veda,
by its supposed independence from any human or divine author , the mere form of
the commandment, joined with a property allowing identification of the person
qualified to accomplish it, is enough to provoke the listeners activity, without the
expectation of any result. Similarly, when a child is asked by his master to bring
water, to take a classical Indian example, he understands immediately: I am to do
as the master ordered me (cryacodita karomi).98 Of course, this is not to say
that the child never considers the benefit he could gain from such an action (pleasing
his master, rewards for a good deed, etc.), but this need not happen before the
activity takes place, so that it cannot be claimed to be the immediate cause of his
activity.

3 Conclusion

In a significant outline of the early ideological history of Mmamsa, Francis X.

Clooney proposed, on the basis of a retrieval of what he considers to be the
Purva Mmamsa of Jaimini, to distinguish between two attitudes toward dharma in

early Mmamsa. The first, which he attributes to Jaimini himself, would consider the

human perspective on the sacrifice (in terms of fruits and means to achieve them) to
be integrated into a wider perspective, the Dharma of the sacrifice:
By knowing how he [= the performer] fits into the larger whole, and especially
how his desire for happiness plays a part in the whole, he takes his place in the
sacrifice. By seeing himself as only one element in the web of relationships, he
transcends his self-centredness, even as he admits it, and lets it lead him to the
sacrifice.99
This conception of the sacrifice would be superseded, according to Clooney, by
Sabaras turn to the individual (p. 255), especially visible in his treatment of the
unprecedented (aprva) result of the sacrifice, focussing on the problem of a link
between the action and its fruit. While Kumarilas conception of the aprva
solidifies Sabaras anthropocentric viewpoint () by locating it in the self of the
performer (p. 239), Prabhakara, on the contrary, would operate a return to
Jaiminis original conception of dharma in so far as he separates the question of
aprva from the question of the efficacy of actions and the time lapse between
sacrifice and heaven (p. 248).
98
See Bhat (Prabhakara) 1.1.25: tata ca krybhidhyit loke niyogasyvagat cryacodita
karomi iti; And this is why we perceive in our worldly experience (loke) that a command (niyoga)
expresses an obligation, [as when a child thinks] I am to do as the master ordered me (p. 386.2387.1).
99
Francis X. Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Prva Mms of Jaimini (Vienna:
University of Vienna, 1990), p. 16061.

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 593

It is not the place here to discuss in detail Clooneys hypothesis and

arguments.100 However, it seems that the two tendencies he underlines closely
correspond to the two conceptions of the norm we saw at work, in the few centuries
following Kumarila and Prabhakara, in the treatises of Mandana and Salikanatha:

pre-eminence of desire on the one hand, for which dharma constitutes a means; pre-
eminence of the commandment and the obligation it generates on the other, desire
being only a mark (quite contingent, at that) allowing the agent to relate himself to
what would otherwise be a purely external and indifferent norm. The persistence of
this opposition, already visible in older Brahmanical sources, is remarkable, and
might be one of the reasons for the considerable polarisation of the Indian debate on
action after the time of Salikanatha. As prominent a thinker as Gangesa, the founder
of New Logic (Navya-Nyaya), who gave to these discussions a decisive impulse in
the 14th century, still builds the Vidhivda (Discussion on vidhi) section of his
Tattvacintmai around the question whether the cognition provoking an agents
activity (pravartakajna) is the knowledge of the quality of being a means [for
realizing] what is desired (iasdhanat) or of the quality of being an obligation
(kryatva).101 This, of course, is not to say that later authors do not bring anything
new with respect to the achievements of their predecessors. It seems nonetheless
that, by the end of the 9th century, Brahmanical theories of action evolved within a
conceptual framework and a set of presuppositions which would remain virtually
unchanged throughout their later history, a history that remains, for the most part,
still to be written.

References to Primary Sources and Abbreviations

Abbreviations

ApDhSu = pastambadharmastra.
GDhSu = Gautamadharmastra.
BDhSu = Baudhyanadharmastra.
Manu = Mnavadharmastra.
ViV = Vidhiviveka.
VDhSu = Vasihadharmastra.

Sanskrit Texts

pastambadharmastra [= ApDhSu]. See Patrick Olivelle, Dharmastras. The Law

Codes of pastamba, Gautama, Baudhyana and Vasiha, Annotated Text and
Translation (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000).
Gautamadharmastra [= GDhSu]. See Olivelle, Dharmastras, op. cit.

100
For a relatively detailed discussion of Clooneys ideas focussing on Prabhakaras conception of the
aprva, see Yoshimizu, op. cit., pp. 55100, which basically adheres to Clooneys reading of Prabhakara.
101
See Tattvacintmai vol. 4.2 (p. 118).

123
594 H. David

Tattvacintmai of Gangesa Upadhyaya:

Kamakhyanatha Tarkavagsa, ed., Tattvacintamani of Gagea Updhyya, 6

vol. (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, The Vrajajivan Prachyabharati
Granthamala 47, 1990), Reprint of the 1st ed. (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal,
18881901).
Tantravrttika of Kumarila Bhatta. See Mmsstra and Kunio Harikai,

Sanskrit text of the Tantravarttika. Adhyaya 1, Pada 3, Adhikarana 46. Collated

with six Manuscripts, South Asian Classical Studies 4 (2009): 359396.
Nyyavrttikattparyak of Vacaspati Misra:
Anantalal Thakur, ed., Nyayavarttikatatparyatka of Vcaspati Mira (New Delhi:

Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Nyayacaturgranthika Vol. 3, 1996).
Bhat of Prabhakara Misra:
S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, ed., Brhat of Prabhkara Mira [on the Mmamsasu-

trabhasya of abarasvmin] with the Rjuvimalapancika of likantha [Tarkapada].

(Madras: The University of Madras, Madras University Sanskrit Series 3.1, 1934).
Baudhyanadharmastra [= BDhSu]. See Olivelle, Dharmastras, op. cit.
Brahmasiddhi of Mandana Misra:

S. Kuppuswami Sastri, ed., Brahmasiddhi by crya Maanamira with
Commentary by akhapi (Madras: Government Press, 1937).
Mnavadharmastra [= Manu]. See Patrick Olivelle, Manus Code of Law. A
critical Edition and Translation of the Manava-Dharmasastra (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
Mmsnyyasagraha (= padev) of Apadeva. See Franklin Edgerton, The
Mms Nyya Praka or padev: A treatise on the Mms system by padeva
(Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986).
Mmsstra, attributed to Jaimini:
Subbasastr, Kasnatha Vasudeva Abhyamkara and Ganesasastr Ambadasa Jos,

eds., srmajjaiminiprante mmamsadarsane (). 7 vol. (Poona: Anandasrama Press,

Anandasramasamskrtagranthavali 97.17, 19761984).

Vasihadharmastra [= VDhSu]. See Olivelle, Dharmastras, op. cit.
Vkyrthamtk of Salikanatha Misra:
S = A. Subrahmanya Sastri, ed., Prakaranapancika of likantha Mira, with

Nyayasiddhi of Jaipuri Nryaa Bhaa. (Benares: Banaras Hindu University, B.H.
U. Darsana Series, 1961).
M = Mukunda Shastri, ed., Prakaranapancika. A Treatise on Mms Philosophy

by () likantha Mira.(Benares: Vidya Vilasa Press, Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series, 1903/04).
Vidhiviveka [= ViV] of Mandana Misra:

S = Elliot M. Stern, Vidhivivekah of Maana Mira, with commentary

Nyayakanika of Vcaspatimira and supercommentaries Jusadhvankaran and

Svaditankaran of Paramevara. Critical and annotated edition: the purvapaksah

[Sanskrit text] (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1988).
G = Mahaprabhu Lal Goswam, ed., Vidhivivekah of r Maana Mira, with

the Commentary Nyayakanika of Vcaspati Mira (Benares: Tara Printing Works,

1978).

123
Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism 595

barabhya [= Mmsbhya] of Sabara(svamin). See Mmsstra and

Erich Frauwallner, Materialen zur ltesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamms
(Wien: Hermann Bohlaus Nachf., 1968).
bdaniraya of Prakasatman:
See Hugo David, La parole comme moyen de connaissance. Recherches sur
lpistmologie de la connaissance verbale et la thorie de lexgse dans lAdvaita
Vednta (unpublished PhD thesis, Ecole pratique des hautes etudes, Section des
Sciences Religieuses, 2012).
GS = T. Ganapati Sastr, ed., The Sabdanirnaya by Praktmayatndra.

(Trivandrum, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 53, 1917).
lokavrttika of Kumarila Bhatta:

Manavallyupahvatailangaramasastr, ed., Mmamsaslokavarttikam srmatkumari-

labhattapadaviracitam ()srmatparthasarathimisraprantaya nyayaratnakarakhyaya

vyakhyayanugatam. (Benares (Kas): Caukhambasamskrtagranthamala 3, 1898).

See also Kei Kataoka, Kumrila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part 1: A
Critical Edition of Mmamsaslokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (codanasutra). (Wien: Osterre-

ichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011).

123