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CONSPIRACY; Obedience to command

People vs Dorico, G.R. No. L-31568. November 29, 1973

Facts: Honorio Dorico (father of Romualdo and Fernando and


uncle of Dionisio Ballonico), Romualdo Dorico, Dionisio Ballonico
and Julio Cerenado, were drinking liquor inside a store. Honorio
told Romualdo, Dionisio and Julio that it was Gervacio Dapulag
who instigated the filing of the criminal charge against Romualdo
for the killing of Patrocinio Megenio. Honorio pointed to Gervacio
who was then approaching the store. Romualdo and Dionisio
came out of said store and and accosted him, Romualdo stabbed
him and again by Dionisio. Gervacio attempted to run but he was
met by Fernando who boxed him. Gervacio died.

Issue: Is there conspiracy between the three?

Ruling: In order for conspiracy to exist there must be unity of


purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective. Here,
they did not act with a unity of purpose. Before the killing, Honorio
told the three accused that it was Gervacio who instigated the
filing of the complaint. the words given by Honorio Dorico to his
children were meant as a command, thus indicating that there
was no previous concert of criminal design among the
perpetrators. So that even assuming that appellants have joined
together in the killing, such circumstance alone does not satisfy
the requirement of a conspiracy because the rule is that neither
joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy.
Obedience to a command does not necessarily show concert of
design, for at any rate it is the acts of the conspirators that show
their common design. In this case, the facts adduced show that
the appellants intended by their separate acts to bring about the
death of the victim.

The contention of the appellants that there was no conspiracy


deserves serious consideration. The record is clear that before
the stabbing incident took place accused Romualdo Dorico and
Dionisio Ballonico, together with the formers father Honorio
Dorico, were inside the store of Estropio Dorico, another son of
Honorio, drinking liquor. It was Honorio Dorico who first saw the
victim Gervacio Dapulag pass by the said store on his way to the
farm. The finding of the lower court as to how the aggression was
committed is as follows: that Alberto Uy and Rosa Dapulag saw
accused Romualdo Dorico and Dionisio Ballonico stab the victim
Gervacio Dapulag and when the latter ran to escape he was met
by appellant Fernando Dorico who boxed him on the ear. This
does not show conspiracy. The meeting of the victim by the
accused was purely casual. No other evidence was presented by
the prosecution to show conspiracy, which, according to the
settled rule, must be proved as clearly and as convincingly as the
commission of the crime itself.

Romualdo and Dionisio were guilty of Murder. Fernando is liable


only for physical injuries.
CONSPIRACY; Mere presence at the Crime Scene

People vs Natividad et al, G.R. No. 151072. September 23, 2003

Facts: During a birthday party, Rolando (A), Suratos (B), and


other guests were having a drinking session. Later, they were
joined by accused Felipe (C), Carmelito (D), Alfredo, and Alvin
(E). Alvin (E) left shortly thereafter. Moments later, two gunshots
were fired. Rolando (A) was hit. It was Alvin who shot Rolando.
Suratos scampered for safety while the three other accused ran
towards the area where Alvin was standing. Suratos, however, did
not see what appellants and their companions did because his
back was turned away from them. Inside the comfort room,
Suratos peeked through the gap between the roof and the wall
and saw accused standing behind Alvin. Thereafter, all of them
ran away towards the National Highway. Rolando died.

Issue: Except for Alvin, are the other accused liable for the death
of Rolando? Was conspiracy established?

SC: To hold one as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must


be shown that he performed an overt act in pursuance of or
furtherance of the conspiracy, although the acts performed might
have been distinct and separate. This overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or
it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting
a moral ascendance over the other co-conspirators by moving
them to execute or implement the criminal plan.

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to satisfy the required


quantum of evidence that would produce the conviction of the
appellants on the basis of conspiracy. The mere fact that Alvin
Brul, the gunman, arrived and left the crime scene together
with appellants does not automatically mean that they shared
a common design and a unity of purpose in killing the
deceased. There is no evidence that appellants performed an
overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy. Neither was it established
that their act of fleeing towards Alvin was an act of giving moral
assistance to the criminal act of the latter. As testified by
prosecution witness, Rolando Suratos, he did not see what
appellants did when they ran towards Alvin.
People vs Mandao, et al, G.R. No. 135048. December 3, 2002

Facts:
According to the witnesses, Lolito, Francisco, Severino and Roque
were conversing when accused Mandao arrived together with a
companion. The companion pulled a gun and began shooting at
Severino and Francisco. While this was happening, accused was
holding a hand grenade and watching the carnage. He threatened
anyone who showed willingness to help the victims, motioning
agitatingly to hurl the hand grenade he was holding. Severino was hit
first, tried to run away to take cover. The companion went after
Severino and finished him off. While the gunman chased Severino,
accused stayed where he was together with the other eyewitnesses.
After the shooting, accused ran in a direction opposite that of his
unidentified companion. It was proven later on that accused was not
holding a hand grenade.

Issue:
Is conspiracy still sufficient if the only circumstances to prove
conspiracy were (1) that accused was present at the crime scene prior
to the killing, and (2) that he fled from the scene of the crime right after
the incident.

Ruling:
Conspiracy has not been sufficiently established. The mere fact
that accused arrived with the unidentified gunman does not
necessarily establish conspiracy. Likewise, the immediate flight of
the former from the scene of the crime might have been for self-
preservation.] In fact, he was seen running in a direction opposite
that taken by the unidentified assailant.
To be held guilty by reason of conspiracy, the accused must
be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. In this case, the prosecution
failed to show that appellant had joined the assailant in pursuing
the victims who were scampering away. As testified to by its
witnesses, appellant just stood there about one armslength away
from the other eyewitnesses without following the assailant in
chasing the victims.1[30] Apparently, the only semblance of overt
act that may be attributed to appellant is that he seemed ready to
assist the assailant. However, this inference is not clearly
supported by the evidence. Be that as it may, this Court has ruled
that conspiracy is not sufficiently proved where the only act
attributable to the other accused is an apparent readiness to
provide assistance, but with no certainty as to its ripening into an
overt act.
Pp vs Gargar et al, G.R. No. 110029-30. December 29, 1998

Facts:
Arsenio was sleeping in his house together with his wife and
children when they were awakened by the barking dogs. A part of
the roof of their house was on fire. Arsenio saw Gamboa fire a
shot while Gargar was beside him with a bolo tucked in his waist.
One of Arsenios children was hit. The two fled to a nearby cliff.

Issue: Is there conspiracy?

Ruling:
Conspiracy is present. Direct evidence not necessary. Conspiracy
may logically be inferred from acts and circumstances showing
the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged.

While mere presence in the crime scene, absent any proof to


support the allegation of conspiracy, cannot be considered as an
indication of their being conspirators, an exception to the rule is
that when circumstances under which the accused was found,
coupled with his conduct, may produce moral conviction that the
accused must have participated in the commission of the offense.
In this case, appellant Gargar was not merely present in the crime
scene, he had a bolo tucked in his waist. Thus, his armed
presence unquestionably lent encouragement and a sense of
security to appellant Gamboa. While there is no evidence that
appellant Gargar used his bolo, the fact that he fled with appellant
Gamboa and three other companions bolstered the finding of a
unity of purpose with appellant Gamboa. Conspiracy was also
demonstrated by appellant Gargars failure to prevent Gamboa
from shooting the Acabo family.

Pp vs Tamayo et al, G.R. No. 138608. September 24, 2002

Facts:
Lilia was having dinner with her husband, Leodegario, and
children, when they heard dogs barking. The three accused
suddenly barged in. Rolando came first, followed by Julio who
was holding a flashlight and Florencio who entered last. Julio
focused the flashlight on Leodegarios face and seconds later,
Rolando shot Leodegario on the chest. After shooting Leodegario,
Rolando fired his gun again, this time hitting Renante, 18-year old
son of Leodegario and Lilia. Thereafter, Rolando, Julio and
Florencio left, dragging Renante out of the house. All three were
convicted. Only Florencio appealed contending that there was no
conspiracy with respect to him

Ruling:
Lilia Fuentes testimony regarding Florencios participation in the
shooting of her husband and son consisted of the following: (1) he
was one of the three men who entered her and (2) he, together
with the two other accused, dragged the body of Leodegario out
of the house after Leodegario was shot by Rolando Tamayo.
Lilias testimony contained nothing that could indicate that
Florencio directly participated in the overt act of shooting the
victims. The fact that Florencio was with the other accused when
the crime was committed is insufficient proof of conspiracy. Mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not amount to
conspiracy. The prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt. He is liable only as accomplice

People vs Lope Maralit and Romy Pasia G.R. No. 71142.


September 19, 1988

Facts:
Together with his two sons (Bienvenido and Danilo), Jaime was
on their way to the farm when shots were fired. Jaime slumped to
the ground, and the brothers saw the Pedro Pacheca, Maning
Mendoza, and Lope Maralit , and Romy Pasia on an elevated
portion where the shots came from. Providing the motive and
reason for the killing of the victim the prosecution disclosed that
all the perpetrators of the crime were workers of the Corporation
where accused-appellant was the foreman and Pacheca, the
overseer; that Pacheca and accused-appellant are "bilas," both of
them being married to the daughters of Generoso Panopio, the
plantation manager; that the area being worked by the victim was
planted to palay and fruit bearing trees and that on one occasion,
Accused Pacheca (deceased), who, was the overseer of the
Corporation, and his companions were forcing the victim to leave
the land or to sell it to the Corporation. When the victim refused,
Pachecas group became angry so that a day after, five (5) huts of
the victim, including the fruit-bearing and banana trees, were
burned by Pacheca, Maning Mendoza, Proso Panopio, and
accused-appellant Maralit. Accused-appellant, together with
Pacheca (deceased) and Mendoza had also threatened to kill the
victim for his refusal to give up the area he was working on
Ruling:

Appellant was in the company of Pedro Pacheca (deceased) and


Maning Mendoza (at-large) on the elevated area from where they
shot the victim. The fact that accused-appellant was not carrying
a firearm does not negate conspiracy. The fact is that, with
Pacheca and Mendoza, Accused-appellant lay in ambush in an
isolated mountain waiting for the victim to pass by. The place
where the crime took place was the usual route where the victim
used to pass on the way to the farm that he was tenanting.
Accused-appellant was also seen by the brothers in a crouching
position, just as Pacheca and Mendoza were, and close to one
another, as the shots were fired. In other words, he was not
merely near the scene of the crime but right thereat. All the
foregoing circumstances coupled with prior antecedents, like
having been with the assailants when they threatened the victim,
closeness of personal association, and concurrence of sentiment,
evidence knowledge of and intentional participation in the
furtherance of the common criminal intent. It cannot be said, as
the defense contends, that accused-appellants presence was
merely "passive." Neither could he have been there out of a
"sense of good fellowship" only. He was there lending, at the very
least, moral if not material aid. He is, therefore, equally liable for
the death of the victim. Each conspirator is said to be the agent of
the other. In contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.

Dissenting Opinion: (SARMIENTO, J.)


I do not believe that there is a sufficient showing of a conspiracy
to warrant the verdict of conviction. It is to be noted that the only
evidence that would link the accused to the killing is the fact that
he "was in the company of" 1 the actual killers at the time of the
carnage in question and that he was "in a crouching position," 2
as the fatal shots were fired. I submit that this is not enough to
establish his part in the supposed conspiracy. I t is likewise
fundamental that mere presence, without more, at the locus
criminis does not give rise to finding of conspiracy. It is true that
the fact that the appellant was unarmed 7 does not negate the
existence of a conspiracy but neither does it clearly establish it.
As I stated, companionship alone will not support a finding of one.
And, while his presence therein might not have been "passive," 8
that alone will not warrant a conclusion of his participation. It is
possible that he "may have accompanied [the assassin] only out
of sense of good fellowship." 9 That" [h]e was there lending at the
very least, moral if not material aid," is plainly and simply, a
conclusion of fact.

SELF-DEFENSE

1. Principles:
-In self-defense, the burden of evidence shift to the accused. He must then show
by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense or in
defense of a relative or a stranger. For that purpose, he must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence
-The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself
-Quantum of Proof: Credible, clear, and convincing evidence.
-The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety
of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat
- three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least,
imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful
-two kinds of unlawful aggression: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression

SELF-DEFENSE; Unlawful Aggression

People vs Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011

Facts: Nugas was waiting for a taxi when Glen, driver of a


Tamarax FX came. Nugas boarded the about four other
passengers were already there. Nugas argued with Glen about
the fare, because Glen was overcharging; that when he was
about to alight, Glen punched him and leaned forward as if to get
something from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard.
Thinking that Glen was reaching for a gun inside the clutch bag,
he stabbed Glen with his left hand from where he was seated in
order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya); and that when
asked why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife
for protection because he was living in a squatters area. It was
found out later on that Glen was not reaching for a gun.

Ruling:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial
element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without
unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of
oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under
the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in
real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending
himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.

Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three


elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault
must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault
must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful


aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or
material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force
or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or
opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of
the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a
revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance,
or like aiming to throw a pot

No self-defense. No unlawful aggression. There is no actual or


imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to prevent or to repel
considering that Glen committed no unlawful aggression towards
him. Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched
him and then reached for his clutch bag on the dashboard,
making Nugas believe that he had a gun there. Also, Glen
punching Nugas was highly improbable. It is also highly
improbable that the victim, in relation to accused-appellant Nugas
position, can launch an attack against the latter. First, the victim
was at the drivers seat and seated between him were his wife and
two children. Second, the victim was driving the FX vehicle. Third,
accused-appellant Nugas was seated directly behind the victim.
All things considered, it is highly improbable, nay risky for the
victims family, for him to launch an attack.

Nemrod Gotis vs People G.R. No. 157201 September 14,


2007

Facts: Upon reaching the gate of Nahoms house, Serafin called


for Nahom and asked him to come out. When Nahom heard the
shouts of Serafin, he immediately called Nemrod for help. Nemrod
came over and advised Serafin to go home, but he refused to
leave. Instead, Serafin attempted to hack Nemrod and tried to
enter the gate of Nahoms house. Thereafter, Nahom struck
Serafin on the head with a bolo. Meanwhile, Nemrod entered his
brothers house to look for a bolo . After being hit, Serafin ran
away. Nemrod, however, pursued him, and hit him several times
on the back and arm.

Ruling: No self-defense.
Unlawful aggression by the victim is a primordial element of
self-defense; without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete. To be appreciated, the unlawful aggression must be a
continuing circumstance or must have been existing at the time
the defense is made. A person making a defense has no more
right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has
ceased. In this case, the trial and appellate courts correctly held
that while Serafin initially attacked Nemrod with a bolo, the
unlawful aggression already ceased when the latter was able to
go inside his brothers house and the former ran away. At this
point, there was no longer any danger on his life; thus, there was
also no necessity to defend himself by pursuing and attacking
Serafin.

SELF-DEFENSE; Lack of Sufficient Provocation

People vs Gutual , G.R. No. 115233. February 22, 1996

Facts: Maglinte was running amuck or berserk chasing their


barangay captain. Drawn by shouts for help from onlookers,
accused Gutual and Nadera (CAFGU) rushed to the scene, with
Gutual firing warning shots into the air. Maglinte stopped pursuing
the barangay captain, turned towards the accused, then started
approaching them. Gutual continued to fire warning shots,
Maglinte kept walking towards him, while Gutual kept retreating to
put some distance between him and the victim. Finally, Gutual
was pinned against the staircase of the barangay hall. Maglinte
was now about one to three meters from Gutual and pressing on,
unceasingly hacking away at Gutual, who, however, managed to
evade the blows. Nadera fired warning shots into the air, but
Maglinte continued his attack. Gutual then fired at the victims
hand to disarm him, but unfortunately the bullet pierced Maglintes
bolo-wielding arm, went through his chest, and came out his back.
Prior to the incident, Maglinte had a predilection for violence.

Issue: Is it self-defense or defense of stranger?

Ruling:
There is no defense of stranger here because the unlawful
aggression towards the barangay captain already ceased.

There was unlawful aggression. Since he was running amuck, he


did not care anymore whom to attack or whether the person to be
attacked was unarmed or armed with a high-powered rifle.
Maglinte was already hacking Gutual with his bolo.

There was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Gutual.

The trial court which convicted Gutual ruled that there was no
reasonable necessity of the means employed. Gutual just have
easily parried the alleged bolo-hacking of Maglinte, if ever such
version was true, with the use of his Garand Rifle, and could have
applied close fighting techniques which he was trained to do as a
CAFGU member, and disarm Maglinte of his bolo instead of
shooting the victim.

The Supreme Court ruled that there was reasonable necessity.


Gutual could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by the
victim who, as inexorably shown by his relentless advance
towards the accused-appellant, was poised to kill the latter. The
danger to the accused-appellants life was clearly imminent. It
would not then be proper nor reasonable to claim that he should
have fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in the
emergency in which, without any reason whatever, he was
placed, there was nothing more natural than to use the weapon
he had to defend himself. In the natural order of things, following
the instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a
proper defense It is settled that reasonable necessity of the
means employed does not imply material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires
is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the
principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the
person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the
reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done,
but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.

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