Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journ

European Journal of
Communication
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Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journalism in the Age of the War

Against Terrorism: A Historical Perspective
Greg Simons and Dmitry Strovsky
European Journal of Communication 2006; 21; 189
DOI: 10.1177/0267323105064045
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Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journalism
in the Age of the War Against Terrorism
A Historical Perspective
Greg Simons and Dmitry Strovsky
A B S T R A C T
The Russian mass media system has experienced tremendous change

since the Soviet era. It has been argued that some similarities still exist
between the old Soviet system and the new post-Soviet media, such as the
practice of self-censorship. Pressure has been mounting on the mass
medias level of editorial freedom since the late Yeltsin era, beginning with
a raft of new laws introduced under the guise of keeping the media
honest. One contemporary influence constraining and shaping media de-
velopment is Russias war on terrorism. Ever since the infamous
apartment bombings of August 1999, over 1000 people have been killed
and scores more physically and emotionally scarred by acts of terrorism on
Russian soil. The political, social and economic costs have been
considerable. Russias war on terrorism has provided the authorities with
ample excuses to curtail media reporting, such as protecting the work of
the security forces in combating terrorist activity, stopping the spread of
terrorist propaganda and protecting victims of terrorist acts. Numerous
bills have been debated in the Duma on prohibiting activity by the mass
media during an incident. Senior representatives from the mass media have
Greg Simons is researcher at Crismart at the Department of Eurasian Studies,

Uppsala University, Flogstavagen 93 A-111, SE-752 72 Uppsala, Sweden.
[email: Greg.simons@east.uu.se]
Dmitry Strovsky is professor of journalism history at the Journalism Department
of the Ural State University, Lenin Street, 51, Ekaterinburg, 620083, Russia.
[email: strovsky@post.usu.ru]
European Journal of Communication Copyright 2006 SAGE Publications

(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com,
Vol 21(2): 189211. [10.1177/0267323105064045]
189
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 21(2)
been involved in talks with the authorities on the issue and in drawing up
industry guidelines for reporting on a terrorist act.
Key Words censorship, journalism, President Putin, Russian media,
terrorism
Introduction
Since the Soviet period, the Russian mass media system has undergone,
and is still undergoing, tremendous change. Some academics have argued
that there are still similarities and continuities between the old Soviet
system and the new post-Soviet media. Since the late Yeltsin era, there
has been mounting pressure on the level of editorial freedom the mass
media enjoy. A mixture or interplay between censorship and the cultural
traditions of society have become imprinted in real politics. The main
problem for the Russian press has always been that its content is affected
by certain cultural traditions.
Journalistic censorship and self-censorship can be regarded as an
embodiment of these traditions. Although censorship can be mostly
understood as a political phenomenon, it also has cultural origins and can
be traced back through the history of the country. Both censorship and
self-censorship are the reflections of the morality of a country elaborated
historically over a long period of time. This aspect is examined in this
article because it leads to a more precise understanding of the relationship
between real politics and the media.
One contemporary influence constraining and shaping media devel-
opment is Russias war on terrorism. In the aftermath of the infamous
apartment bombings in August 1999 over 1000 people have been killed
and many more physically and emotionally scarred by the spectre of
terrorism on Russian soil, not to mention the destruction of property and
the disruption caused to the normal functioning of society. The political,
social and economic costs have been considerable so far.
Russias war on terrorism has provided the authorities with ample
excuse to limit what is reported; such excuses though not necessarily an
exhaustive list include: protecting the work of the security forces in
combating terrorist activity, prohibiting the spread of terrorist propa-
ganda and protecting the victims of terrorist acts (and their families).
Numerous bills have been debated in the Duma on the issue of limiting
the activities of and the reporting by the mass media during an incident.
Senior representatives from the mass media have joined in talks with the
authorities on the issue and have been involved in drawing up industry
guidelines for reporting on a terrorist act.
190
SIMONS AND STROVSKY: CENSORSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
Censorship: a theoretical framework

An expectation of many modern societies around the world is that the
mass media inform the public (and decision-makers) about what is
happening at a local, national and international level. In some countries
there exists a deep rooted tradition where the freedom of the press serves
to regulate the level of state control.
Central to this article is the notion of the term censorship. It has
come to mean many different things for various interest groups. For the
purposes of this article, however, censorship is taken to mean an external
person or agency removing offensive or sensitive material (considered to
be unsuitable by the censor) from the mass media. This should be
differentiated from the issue of self-censorship. This occurs when the
censorship is conducted internally by the media in order to avoid
annoying or offending someone (and thus avoid a possible sanction or
punishment), without being specifically told or ordered to do so officially
by an external censor. Larry Kilman, director of communications at the
World Association of Newspapers (WAN), replying to a question on the
relationship between censorship and self-censorship, stated, yes of course
censorship leads to self-censorship because it causes reporters to question
what is allowed and what is not (pers. comm., 29 September 2005). It
should be borne in mind that censorship is not only a political
phenomenon, but a cultural one too. Freedom of the press is an
expression that has also come to mean different things to various actors in
the government, media industry or public arena. In this article, freedom
of the press means the desire and the ability of the press to determine its
own actions (publication), without undue external pressure on its
activities influencing the process of decision-making.
Both the Moscow Media Law and Policy Institute and the Russian
mass media statute define censorship in the same way:
No provision shall be made for the censorship of mass information, that is,
the demand made by officials, state organizations, institutions or public
associations that an editor should get advance agreement on content and
materials (except in the case when the official is an auditor or interviewee)
and nor for the suppression of the dissemination of messages and materials
and separate parts thereof.
No provision shall be made for the creation and financing of organizations,
institutions, or offices whose functions include the censorship of mass
information. (Law of the Russian Federation, 2005: Ch.1, Article 3)
Asked how he would define censorship, Russian journalist Dmitry
Babich replied: a situation where you are prevented from writing or
191
showing what you think or telling what you know (pers. comm., 12
October 2005). Dmitry identified three forms of censorship. The first
type is the classical form, where someone from outside your newspaper or
electronic media reviews your text before publication [this practice] was
dead in Russia long before the Soviet times ended, although officially
Glavlit1 was only shut down in 1990. . . . It is impossible to check the
80100 pages of every modern newspaper before it goes to print. No
office in the world can do it, so this censorship was only effective until the
middle of the 20th century.
The second type Dmitry referred to is editor censorship:
Some authors might argue this is the most common and sometimes the
worst kind of censorship, because it is active. Not only can you not write
what you think or what you know, you HAVE to write what your editor
wants. Your professional achievement is measured by your ability to satisfy
the editors tastes and sometimes preconceived notions. For example, in one
of the newspapers where I worked once we had to drop all work and write
nasty things about an airport where our editor-in-chief did not like the
service. When the newspaper is bought by some company, the editor
usually comes to his senses, but then their kind of censorship sets in.
The third type of censorship he coined institutionalized indirect
censorship:
If you write a certain thing, you wont be put in jail, but you will be
expelled from the Union of Journalists (Soviet or western), or you will be
denied accreditation at the presidents office. You may have problems
keeping your job or finding another one. This kind of censorship I
remember in Soviet times and see a lot of it in the West now. When two
German journalists were castigated by their colleagues for calling the
bombing of Yugoslavia a senseless crime, that was a good example. What
remain are difficulties getting accredited and problems for the publisher.
Under Putin, this third kind of censorship has become more widespread in
Russia, but it has not got any worse than in most western countries.
Self-censorship in the mass media, as a result of the threat of state
intervention, is neither a new nor solely Russian problem. Elliott et al.
(1983) noted that the constant threat of state intervention has realised
within the BBC an internal form of self-censorship, which acts as a
deterrent to the production of critical perspectives on Northern Ireland.
On 19 October 1988, the then home secretary, Douglas Hurd, announced
that the direct broadcasting of terrorist groups was to be prohibited; this
ban was lifted in 1994 (Elliott et al., 1983, cited in Stevenson, 1997: 61).
Scottish academic Brian McNair (1998) refers to this form of censorship
as moral-political censorship: it occurs when a government bans the
192
expression of views that it may find offensive even though, in this

particular case, the ban did not specifically relate to national security and
was of no military value in the fight against the IRA (McNair, 1998: 96).
Some of these actions and events have a similar ring to the situation in
contemporary Russia, which is fighting its own war against terrorism.
However, can self-censorship as a result of threatened or perceived
possible state intervention really be classified as self-censorship, or should
it be labelled as censorship? It can be difficult to make the distinction,
especially during a period of heightened social and political tension.
A broader definition of public interest and how it is applied to the
mass media is necessary to helping understand the culture of self-
censorship in journalism. The media carry out a number of important and
at times essential tasks in society. These must be performed and
performed well. This implies that the media system should adhere to the
same basic principles governing the rest of society fairness, justice,
democracy and notions of social and cultural values. It is in the public
interest that the media do not cause social problems or extreme offence
(McQuail, 2000: 142). One of the points of concern in this case is
ascertaining who exactly determines the nature of public interest
in Russia.
A problem that results from acting in the so-called national interest
is that sometimes the national interest is not in the public interest. It
seems as though the patriotic duty of a journalist under such conditions,
if acting in the national interest, involves self-censorship and a
propaganda role. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, quoting
Winston Churchill, stated: Sometimes the truth is so precious it must be
accompanied by a bodyguard of lies (Pittman and Weekly, 2001). These
measures are often justified by the authorities as being necessary in order
to maintain calm and order in society. To what extent does Churchills
philosophy on the truth exist in Russia today in the complex and very
sensitive context of the war against terrorism?
Given the current situation in Russia regarding acts of terrorism,
the concepts of national interest and national security merge. According
to American academic Murray Edelman, national security is one of the
most evocative and politically charged terms. It is a term able to generate
the fear of an enemy of the state and the fear that this enemy may act in
some hostile manner that could bring harm to the people of a given
nation. According to Edelman, such anxieties are easily aroused and
because they can easily be directed against any domestic or foreign group
that is labelled a threat, worries about national security are constantly
evoked (Edelman, 2001: 7). In these circumstances, it can be difficult for
193
the media to cover sensitive subjects, such as terrorism, as the journalists

themselves can become the objects of loathing or hate for the authorities
and/or those caught up in acts of violence and perhaps be labelled as
unpatriotic or as vultures feeding off victims misery.
The notion of patriotism has been used as another mechanism for
controlling what the mass media are permitted to say, although this
strategy has by no means been the sole preserve of the Russian
authorities. Recent reassessments of news reporting concerning the
situation in Iraq by some segments of the media industry bear testimony
to the problem of mixing patriotism and news reporting. In the wake of
11 September 2001, George W. Bush used the logic of if you are not
with us then you are against us to reaffirm the US foreign policy agenda.
This seems to have been applied with some measure of success within the
media industry too. It seems, not only in Russia, but the West too, that
the issue of the war on terrorism brings with it the issue of the patriotic
duty of journalists. In reference to the ongoing war in Iraq, then BBC
director general, Greg Dyke, spoke of gung-ho patriotism and the issue
of mixing patriotism and journalism (BBC, 2003):
If Iraq proved anything, it was that the BBC cannot afford to mix
patriotism and journalism. This is happening in the United States and if it
continues will undermine the credibility of the US electronic news
media.
There have been some in the media industry who believe that the
worst censors are the media themselves. Pavel Gutiontov of Russias
Union of Journalists highlighted another way to understand the pressure
facing journalists; he describes them as having an inner slave mentality:
The sad thing is that it is the press that is readily guessing what the
authorities would want it to print. . . . The internal censor is once again
becoming the main censor. . . . We have to do a lot of work in eradicating
our inner slave from ourselves, from our editing rooms, from television
(Gutiontov, 2004).
The cultural origins of modern Russian censorship

The socialization of journalists in any national culture, Russian in
particular, should be viewed through the lens of the countrys historic
background. This framework traces the development of traditions that
define the make up of the nation. Historic background can be delineated
through various characteristics, of which the sociocultural aspects are
paramount. However, culture as a term for investigation is problematic
in itself; it is, according to OConnor and Downing (1995: 5), one of the
194
most complex words in the English language. . . . Culture is everything

we do in our lives. More palpable and therefore more observable is a
countrys political culture as this reflects cultural priorities in the political
sphere and fundamentally focuses on the relationship between the
authorities and the people. This relationship is inevitably reflected in the
media. Therefore the analysis of the existence of censorship and self-
censorship in the media develops an understanding of the pivotal political
and cultural principles of that society. The concept of politics as a
consequence of cultural phenomena is very often underestimated in
humanity studies, and politics and culture are visualized by some scholars
as separate entities. Indeed, even Siebert et al. (1984), in their well-
known Four Theories of the Press, a book that for almost 50 years has been
a pivotal text for scholars of media and society, failed to investigate the
interdependence between politics and the cultural priorities of society.
Today, a huge number of publications pursuing a political agenda do
not even mention the word culture, despite it being a crucial term for
any socially oriented research. In this article, on the contrary, we envisage
these notions culture and politics as very much overlapping and both
affecting journalistic motivation and behaviour. Both, in turn, are
imprinted on the priorities of censorship and, in turn, self-censorship.
Thomas wisely comments: The relevant question at any stage of human
history is not Does censorship exist? but rather, Under what sort of
censorship do we now live? (Thomas, 1969: 7). This once again evokes
the idea of censorship existing not on its own but basically originating in
the nations historic and social background. So in order to better
understand the priorities of self-censorship in the contemporary Russian
press one should reflect on the historic evolution of Russian society.
Pre-revolutionary development
An examination of Russian media history shows that journalistic
censorship and self-censorship have always existed. Compared to other
European countries, one peculiarity of Russia is its deep rooted
authoritarian tradition, which permeated all strata of the Russian
population through different customs and everyday routines. The
authoritarian tradition evolved, partly at least, as a consequence of the
extremely harsh living conditions people had to endure, which meant
that rather than survive independently, they had to rely upon a strong
leader. Furthermore, Russias immense territory, historically forced to
defend itself from incessant attacks from its numerous enemies, inevitably
led to a hierarchical political structure. The superior being at the apex of
195
this structure took control and responsibility for everything and,

accordingly, tried to maintain a strong and inflexible subordination of the
Russian people.
Choldin (1985) argues that one of the reasons why Russian society
took a different view to the West of the phenomenon of the power
masses relationship can be traced to the countrys experience of foreign
countries and ideas. Russian rulers, she argues, have shown a consistently
ambivalent attitude towards things foreign. They coveted western
technology and know-how, but were uneasy with western values and
ideas, and because the two always seemed to infiltrate culture together,
the government constantly confronted the problem of these troublesome
foreign intruders. Ideas of any kind are elusive, Choldin notes, but the
[Russian] government has always taken the position that control of at
least their written expression must be attempted nonetheless (Choldin,
1985: 1).
Under these conditions the press developed in a specific way; it was
used to giving way to political priorities. Unlike in the West, where the
press was initiated by economic competition and functioned within a
growing system of private interests, Russian media operated in a
completely different context. They evolved as a political instrument
originally established by Tsar Peter the Great in 1702 and perpetuated by
his descendants. When he decreed the creation of the newspaper
Vedomosti,2 Peters conception of it was essentially as a tool to promote his
own will and the priorities of the state. Public interests, i.e. the interests
of the majority of the Russian people, were never taken into account. So,
from the very beginning, the press fulfilled a politically oriented role
rather than expressing ideas of plurality. Sanctioning plurality from
above, as was probated under Russian rule, resulted in strict control over
the content of the press and its journalists.
In 1728, Vedomosti was replaced by the twice-weekly Saint Petersburg
Vedomosti and later, after almost 30 years, the first issue of the Moscow
Vedomosti was published. Ambler (1972) notes that thanks to brilliant
Russian minds such as Mikhail Lomonosov and Nikolai Novikov, who
contributed to this press, these two titles:
did much to establish certain enduring characteristics of Russian journal-
ism: its strongly literary nature; its comparatively great importance to
national cultural life; its strong sense of mission to enlighten and elevate;
its preference for analysis and interpretation rather than for news properly
speaking; and its close informed attention to political, social, and cultural
developments in western European countries. (Ambler, 1972: 1314)
196
These publications were strongly dependent on the Russian author-

ities for their existence and their content comprised almost totally of
official information. These early broadsheets were the mouthpieces of the
monarchy and strictly defended its position, and offered a restricted
analysis of the political situation, domestic and international. No view
was expressed that strayed from the editorial line. Accordingly, any
discussion of major political issues was either restricted or absent from
this press. Despite the insipid nature of much of the content, editorial
staff were reluctant to show any creative initiative, eager instead to work
within the adopted standard of official news gathering. Furthermore, the
pre-revolutionary mass media adhered closely to the authoritarian ideal
cultivated in Russia, where no grey areas existed: the news reported
things very much as either pros or cons, good or bad.
The idea of a public journalism was undermined in Russia from the
very beginning. In theory, this journalism is centred around the free
exchange of information between editorial staff and their audience and is
interested in putting politically important issues into the public arena.
This interdependence between the political and the social fosters an
important relationship and encourages feedback from the audience; this is
one of the fundamental principles of journalistic self-sustainability and
independence from political institutions. Public journalism in Russia,
however, was substituted by a different sort of journalistic creativity,
whose purpose was to encourage peoples interest in the state. True, by
the early 19th century some magazines such as Vestnik of Europe (Herald
of Europe) or Otechestvennie zapiski (Native Notes) were offering serious
discussion on political and social issues, initiated by Russian liberals. But
these people represented a very small fraction of the Russian population
and therefore the debates did not touch most of the population.
Before 1804, the press was regulated by a series of individual laws,
but then a special statute brought all of these media laws together.
Twenty-two years later a new document, nicknamed the cast-iron
statute, five times longer than its predecessor, was adopted. At the same
time, the Supreme Censorship Committee was set up as an enforcing
agent to control press content by punishing journalists, confiscating
newspapers and firing editors. Choldin notes that since then:
Censorship became part of the Ministry of Education, where it was to
remain until 1862 when it was moved to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Before 1863 the administrative layer between the ministry and the
committees was the Chief Censorship Administration, from 1865 it was
called the Chief Administration for Press Affairs. (Choldin, 1985: 29)
197
It was compulsory for all newspapers before going to press to be

checked by censors for signs of criticism against the monarch, which, if
found, was punished as slander and blasphemy. This routine censorship
inevitably affected the freedom of expression of those who cooperated
with the press. Whereas in the West abolition of censorship had been in
effect since the end of the 18th century (after the French Revolution of
1789), Russia pursued a different path. Although so-called temporary
regulations created in 1865 had liberated some types of printed material,
including official publications and those of academies, universities and
other enlightening organizations, from pre-press censorship, all satirical
and most illustrated periodicals, and the entire output of provincial
presses (subject to extraordinary ministerial benevolence in special cases)
remained subject to preliminary censorship (Ambler, 1972: 23). The
measures put in place by the governors of Russia in the 19th century were
all aimed at reinforcing an authoritarian hierarchy, and the level of press
censorship is of huge significance for understanding their priorities.
Despite the more liberal approach of Tsar Alexander II (181881)
compared to his predecessor Nikolas I, the cultural tradition of
undermining press freedom was maintained. Pre-publication censorship
of printed and all other information materials was not abolished legally
until the 1905 revolution. However, Pozner remarks that:
Sometime around the last quarter of the eighteenth century in Russia, a
tradition was born and continued to develop that a writer either fought the
system or served it. The revolution of 1917 did not change this tradition.
(Pozner, 1990: 133)
This dichotomy of positions among intellectuals, including journal-
ists, did not facilitate objective observation. Thus, the intolerance
existing in todays Russian press, as we discuss later, is deeply rooted in
the strong authoritarian division within Russian society. There was one
point when the monarchy tried to reconcile the two positions. In 1905,
as referred to earlier, Tsar Nikolas II called for an end to censorship. This
stimulated a plurality of expression within the media, even on political
issues. However, it was a brief respite for the press: when the First World
War broke out in 1914 media content became subject to military
censorship, and once again free expression was curtailed.
The Soviet period: modifying the tradition

The Soviet period was marked by an even more rigid censorship of the
press. After 1917, the country was still subject to authoritarian rule, but
this time even stricter and reinforced by the ideology embracing Soviet
198
society. Of course, there was a prevailing authoritarian ideology in the

pre-revolutionary monarchic system, i.e. the benign right of the monarch
to reign. The Soviet ideology, however, was universal, all encompassing,
permeating not only formal but also informal, private relationships. Far
more significantly, furthermore, this ideology was personified in the
priorities of the Communist Party: the dictatorship of the Party [held
sway over all] classes of society, [creating a] transmission-belt system of
implementing dictatorship . . . [effecting] the transformation of the
authority of ideas into the authority of the power (Wolfe, 1967: 138).
The role of the media was reduced to a multiple role of not only a
collective propagandist and a collective agitator but also a collective
organizer, as Lenin proclaimed as early as 1901 in his minor text S chego
nachat (Where to Begin). Declaring that newspapers cemented the whole
propaganda network, Lenin added:
In this last respect [a newspaper] may be likened to the scaffolding round
a building under construction, which marks the contours of the structure
and facilitates communication between the builders, enabling them to
distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their
organized labour. With the aid of the newspaper, and through it, a
permanent organization will naturally take shape. (Lenin, 1961: 22)
Lenins observations are fundamental to understanding the role of the

media in Soviet society and the part played by censorship and self-
censorship. A Soviet newspaper became an informer and educator in
many fields but was indisputably following political correctness, ever
reinforcing the dominance of the Communist Party and the working
class over all aspects of life. The press became the main bearer of
revolutionary values, which inevitably led to a media content dominated
by the Party and the lives of its workers. Columns headed Party life and
Inside worker organizations were a common feature of the newspapers of
the era.
Journalists wrote not about individual but common views, and
rarely offered any personal commentary. They spoke on behalf of many
millions of readers thereby creating the perception that the media
themselves were closely affiliated to the minds and souls of the Soviet
people. Criticism, in turn, was restricted and never touched on the system
itself since the majority of the people could not deny the advantages of
the regime. This does not mean that Soviet journalism was dull and
uncreative, however. To the contrary, for many decades the Soviet media
were preoccupied with the idea of being close to the so-called average
person. The media were obsessed with printing stories of ordinary people
199
overcoming difficult circumstances and serving as brilliant role models to

their comrades through their bravery and endurance.
Meanwhile, however, the fundamental principles underlying the
presss existence and its political role in the Soviet Union remained
unchanged. And it is important to know the background to understand
the limitations affecting the Soviet press. They originated from the ideas
of party dominance and class consciousness, which, in turn, were
instrumental for enlightening the masses and thereby undermining the
ability of editorial staff to think independently. Censorship and self-
censorship among journalists was the inevitable response to the rigid
control exercised by the party hierarchy. As Siebert et al. write:
The media are [the] swiftest instruments for achieving unity of knowledge
within their country. That is why the leaders have gone to such great
troubles to establish controls and censorship over their own publications,
broadcasts, and films out of the country. That is why the sameness of the
Soviet media are regarded in the Soviets as a sign of health. (Siebert et al.,
1984: 123)
The key Soviet idea was, as secretary general of the CPSU
Khrushchev said in his paper on the All-Soviet Congress of Journalists in
1959, to make journalists assistant to the Party, whereas the Americans
and Western Europeans treated the press as necessarily privatized and
therefore quite independent from the state and administrative hierarchy.
Analysing this difference, Sparks notes:
What the communist system praised as the loyalty and political acuteness
of its noble proletarian media workers, the Western commentators regarded
as the servility and craven self-censorship of downtrodden party hacks.
What the communist system praised as brilliantly dialectical analysis, the
Western commentators dismissed as distorted propaganda. Both, however,
agreed that the media in communist regimes were fundamentally different
to those in capitalist democracies. (Sparks, 1998: 45)
Towards present priorities

Space prevents a detailed description of the state of the press during the
Gorbachev years, but the media, having gained a degree of freedom from
the previous political yoke, were still very much dependent on the power
elite and tended therefore to give one-sided evaluations of the political
situation. The situation in the Soviet Union may have changed since
1991 and market reforms have been put into effect, but the media,
although seemingly transformed and integrated into new private enter-
prises, offer very little in the way of innovative news coverage. They
200
continue to produce a similar level of biased reporting, apparently unable

to break with the tradition that has dogged the entire history of Russian
journalism. Sparks comments:
At first sight . . . there have been many new foundations, both of news-
papers and magazines. The old party- and state-owned newspapers have
everywhere passed into private hands. [But] the titles, and indeed many
journalists, display a remarkable continuity from the communist epoch. . . .
The press remains highly politicized and partisan. (Sparks, 1998: 175)
Having allegedly provided Russian society with its political

freedom, the press has been put under a new pressure by its economic
dependence on its proprietors, and has not demonstrated the ability to
provide more objective information. So the influence of censorship has
shifted from the strongly hierarchical and predictable position of old to a
much more personal form created by a particular institution or its owner.
Accordingly, self-censorship is no longer politically oriented but tends to
depend on the individual case in hand. Furthermore, the weight of self-
censorship seems to have got even heavier with the growth in the number
of media outlets in the last decade or so.
Despite their change in form over the historic development of the
country, censorship and self-censorship are ingrained in Russian media.
They stem from a strong cultural tradition forged by political circum-
stances not easily overcome, if at all. We have to understand the present
relationship between the authorities and the media as a deep-seated
legacy affecting modern life. The influence of Russian President Putin on
the media clearly illustrates this.
Censorship in the contemporary war against terror

Since Putin first assumed the acting presidency and then was elected to
the office of president, political rhetoric has mostly framed the mass
media as the protectors of democracy and that the need to cherish and
protect the freedom of the press is paramount. The actions of the
authorities against private television, especially, seem to contradict
Putins words. As the saying goes, actions speak louder than words. The
media have come in for criticism from Putin and on 4 March 2000, for
example, Putins campaign headquarters threatened an asymmetric
response to acts of provocation by the mass media (Sakwa, 2004: 103).
On another occasion, on being pressed Putin snapped that: If one strictly
follows the letter of the law, we would have shut you [the media] all
down a long time ago (Sakwa, 2004: 106). These incidences could
201
indicate that the mass media are now being viewed as a potential threat
to the authorities.
To return to the subject of this article, how would this relate to mass
media reporting during Russias war on terrorism? Is it a case of the
authorities being worried about reports frightening or panicking the
Russian public? Could such reporting be construed as being provoca-
tion? Or is it, as some say, an attempt by the authorities to accumulate
further power via a legitimate excuse? Do these statements signify that
the state considers the pen to be mightier than the sword, or is it a case
of creating a legitimate pretext to crack down on the mass media
in Russia?
The Doctrine of Information Security was passed in 2000 and is an
important indication of how the new regime viewed information.
Although it was not a law, its importance lay in the fact that it hinted to
the public and the media industry the probable direction relations were
taking between the government and the mass media. It outlines the new
state thinking concerning the problem of information security from the
states point of view. In the preamble to the document, it states: The
doctrine of information security of the Russian Federation is the sum
total of official views concerning goals, tasks, principles and guidelines
for ensuring the information security of the Russian Federation (cited in
Nordenstreng et al., 2001: 251). These words, together with statements
on issues such as the preservation of spiritual values and patriotism, sent
a very clear message to the media industry. And the message seemed to be
that the state was going to be calling the shots in a new relationship
that demanded a media that would bend to the will of the authorities in
order to preserve Russias informational integrity.
Another incident had occurred, which also sent a clear signal to the
mass media as to the expectations of the authorities towards media
coverage of key events or issues. Putin appointed a key and trusted
Yeltsin aid to a critical PR post: Sergei Yastrzhembsky was put in charge
of managing all government information regarding the Chechen cam-
paign. Upon taking up his position, Yastrzhembsky made his expecta-
tions of the media very clear. In an interview he stated: when the nation
mobilises its forces to solve some task, [this] imposes obligations on
everyone, including the media (Belin, 2001: 336).
These two different approaches to the informational problem faced
by the authorities represent the dual aspects that exist in Russian society
the official and the unofficial sides. The official side is represented by
the Doctrine of Information Security: it offers a certain legitimacy as a
policy document, written down for all to see. It requires no special skills
202
to interpret the meaning; it is implied that laws will be made on the basis
of its observations and assumptions. On the other hand, Yastrzhembskys
implied threat is representative of the unofficial aspect that exists. His
threat is levelled at uncooperative journalists, hinting that they will face
consequences, although there is no legal basis to impose such sanctions.
These two events signalled the beginning of a new approach to the
relationship between the mass media and the authorities.
Threatening the use of new laws to gain cooperation

Over time, there has been discussion regarding the possibility of limiting
media reporting of terrorist events, such as the taking of hostages and
bombings. The debate, ongoing for a number of years in the Duma, takes
on a greater sense of urgency in the parliament when an actual terrorist
event occurs, such as the hostage taking at the Dubrovka Theatre in
October 2002. The siege raised the sensitive issues of citing terrorist
sources and showing the images of bodies. An interview with one of the
terrorists was published on the website of the radio station Ekho Moskvy.
In reaction, the authorities threatened to close the website down, which
Ekho Moskvy managed to avert by voluntarily removing the offending
information. Two other media outlets, a newspaper and the television
channel Moskovia TV, were also warned about showing the bodies of
hostages. The television channel paid the penalty of being switched off
for 15 hours (International Press Institute, 2002).
A seemingly natural reaction for the authorities in the aftermath of
a terrorist incident is to attempt to prevent as much damaging
information and images reaching the domestic audience as possible.
Various measures have been passed through the Duma and the Federation
Council (the process required for the measure to become law), but have
been rejected by the president after what seems to be a public discussion/
consultation process between Putin and media industry representatives. A
focus of the proposed legislation seems to be aimed especially at images
(photographs and film) taken during a terrorist emergency. Some of the
explanations that are offered for the necessity of legislation that restricts
images revolve around the premise of protecting the hostages, their
families and the work of the security services.
One of these legislative initiatives, causing considerable debate, was
a suggested amendment in February 2004 to the 1991 Mass Media Law,
which included media requirements when covering terrorist acts. The
amendment included the sentence: For the purpose of preventing
information terrorism and psychological impact on citizens, the showing
203
of bodies of people killed in terrorist acts and body parts on television

programmes is prohibited. On 19 February, the Duma chairman, Boris
Gryzlov, told reporters that it is necessary to protect our viewers and very
carefully show the consequences of terrorist acts. On 20 February, Duma
deputy chair Lubov stated that she believed that the mass media should
inform people about terrorist acts, but information regarding the number
of victims and body parts should be restricted (Centre for Journalism in
Extreme Situations, 2004a).
On 25 November 2004, the Federation Councils Commission on
Information Policy rejected the Dumas suggested changes to Article 4 of
the Law on Mass Media (which prohibits the use of mass media for
fuelling ethnic, social, class or religious feud/strife). The Duma had
suggested adding the following sentence to Article 4: It is prohibited
to air dead bodies of people, scenes of killings, battery, infliction of
harm to ones health, rape and other sexual violence in television and
video programmes and television movies between 07.00 and 22.00.
Senators described the legislation as being badly thought out and
would be unworkable for normal television programming, such as the
screening of classic war movies (Centre for Journalism in Extreme
Situations, 2004b). President Putin dealt the final blow to the proposed
amendments to Article 4 when he made similar observations to the
senators in the Federation Council. According to a source in the Duma,
Putin had objected to the ban as it would affect many childrens films
and films about the heroism and courage of our compatriots (RIA
Novosti, 2004).
Although the Bill never became law, it displays an underlying
philosophy in the state structures (more so in some areas than others). Its
defeat does not signal the end of such ideas or goals either. A clear
message has been sent to the mass media industry about the expectations
and rules that will govern such situations in the future. To ignore such
signals can potentially place, at the very minimum, ones career in
jeopardy.
Izvestia ran a special edition that was devoted to the Beslan tragedy
on the day after the drama began (3 September 2004). This included a
full front-page photo of a child hostage being rescued, and questioned
official casualty figures. The newspaper is majority owned by Prof-Media,
part of the Interros group owned by the oligarch Vladimir Potanin, who
is loyal to the Kremlin. According to a staff member interviewed at the
time by The Moscow Times, Raf Shakirov, the then editor of the newspaper,
was forced to resign after the owners of Izvestia received an angry phone
call from the Kremlin. Shakirovs resignation sparked a raft of speculation
204
in the mass media as to who was going to be his replacement, though it

was generally assumed that the replacement would be closely linked to
the Kremlin and the Cabinet (Medetsky, 2004; BBC, 2004). By placing
a loyal editor in charge of Izvestia, the mechanisms of censorship would
become internalized in a move that would both reduce conflict and shift
the content of the newspaper more in line with the wishes of the
Kremlin.
Th re-emergence of self-censorship
A new age of self-censorship in Russian journalism has been gradually
emerging. The traditional form of self-censorship in the early post-
Soviet era was often founded upon journalists motivation to avoid
negative physical repercussions of their professional activities, such as
beatings and death threats (not to mention the cultural constraints). On
26 June 2001, the president of the International Press Institute, Johann
Fritz, spoke at the World Congress for Information Cooperation in
Moscow. In the course of his speech, Fritz raised the issue of self-
censorship in the Russian media. Self-censorship is widespread in the
regions as a result of physical attacks and threats against journalists, this
is an intolerable situation, and one that needs to be addressed in a serious
and constructive manner (International Press Institute, 2001).
A relatively new threat to the freedom of speech in the media has
appeared in Russia as a result of the so-called rule of law. A raft of legal
proposals and laws has been appearing in the Duma and Federation
Council, aimed at regulating news content. This has had a knock-on
effect and there is growing discussion of drawing up self-imposed
industry guidelines for the mass media on how to cover stories concerning
terrorism in a responsible manner. This may stem from a belief that it
is better to relinquish some rights voluntarily than to have them ripped
from your hands by someone else. The underlying reason may be a case of
damage control and survival on the part of the journalists, who may at
least have some measure of control over the process.
Some six months after the hostage taking at the Dubrovka Theatre,
the Convention on Counter-Terrorism appeared. The basis of this
convention was to lay down rules of conduct for journalists covering acts
of terrorism. It was a compromise, forced in an effort to prevent some
proposed harsh amendments to the Mass Media Law. An article from the
Convention on Counter-Terrorism asks journalists to pledge to be:
Mindful of the danger of terrorism and aware of the responsibility of
handling information in these conditions, [to] thereby voluntarily adopt
205
the following set of rules of conduct and pledge to follow them in [their]
work. The document also states: The mass media must be aware that
hostages taken by terrorists are also hostages to the situation, which at a
certain stage turns into an instrument of pressure on public opinion
(Vyzhutovich, 2005).
During the Beslan siege, on 2 September 2004 members of the
Industrial Committee (which includes managers from 24 media outlets,
many of which are closely tied to the government) issued a press release
that reminded the media of their obligations under the Convention on
Counter-Terrorism. Many journalists did not agree or support the
agreement as they believed it to be a way to curtail the medias freedom
of speech. The address from the Industrial Committee read thus:
While elaborating and discussing this document, we proceeded from our
belief that the threat of terrorism should be used as grounds and
justification for imposing limits with regards to freedom of opinion and
freedom of the media. At the same time, being aware of the measure of
responsibility in working with information in these conditions, we propose
a range of acceptable restrictions and rules that we would willingly accept
stipulating that in extreme situations the rescue of people and the human
right to live are primary and take precedence over any other rights and
freedoms. (Haraszti, 2004: 5)
During his speech to a congress of information agencies in Moscow
on 24 September 2004, Putin endorsed the concept of self-regulation in
the media covering acts of terrorism: The information community itself
should develop such a model of work that will make the media an
effective instrument in the fight against terrorism and will rule out any,
even unintentional forms of assistance to terrorism. Information provided
by journalists should by no means harm victims of terrorist acts (Centre
for Journalism in Extreme Situations, 2004c). The notion of protecting
the rights and the psychological and physical welfare of the victims of
terrorism becomes linked to the idea that the media should become
actively involved in the fight against terrorism. Putin suggests that the
participation of the mass media be partly guided by and embodied in
the concept of self-regulation.
The state channels TV 1 and RTR followed a strict routine of self-
imposed guidelines in their coverage of the events at Beslan and the
aftermath. The explosions signalling the beginning of the battle in which
over 300 people were to die happened at 13:00 hours on 3 September
2004. NTV was the first channel, at 13:30, to start broadcasting events
live as they unfolded. TV 1 and RTR began to broadcast from 14:00.
Viktoria Arutyunova, adviser to the chairman of the All-Russian State
206
Television and Radio Company (VGTRK), explained the delay in the

beginning of coverage by the state channels:
We did not want to show the events unfolding the same way as NTV did:
someone is shooting from somewhere. We wanted to understand what was
really happening. We waited until we had all the information in order not
to create a panic. (Haraszti, 2004: 6)
An anonymous RTR staff member stated that the channels

administration had circulated guidelines for commentaries and reports
not long after the siege had begun at the school in Beslan. One of the
guidelines was that the state channels should never mention President
Putin in their reports from North Ossetia (Haraszti, 2004: 6). A plausible
reason for omitting the presidents name from these reports would be to
avoid creating an association between the events at Beslan and Putin. In
all probability, there were going to be a lot of negative consequences and
PR in the aftermath of the rescue attempt. By removing Putins name
from the news it could conceivably be easier to pass the blame onto
someone else. The role of the state media in Beslan became that of
damage limitation for the Moscow administration. Although the guide-
lines were imposed from within these organizations, several points
should be noted: there is a very close connection between the political
structures and state media structures (especially in terms of key staffing
positions) and had the state media gone against the wishes of the
government, the management of the offending outlet would have
suffered the consequences.
Conclusion
Something that must be borne in mind when judging a sensitive topic

such as media coverage of a war against terrorists and terrorism is a
blurring of the distinction between the terms public interest and national
interest. In times of crisis, the public interest can be absorbed into the
concept of national interest, the two become inseparable. It is the
political interest groups that conflate them. In times of crisis and
instability it seems a convincing argument that the national interest is in
the publics interest.
A trend shown by the adoption of the Doctrine of Information
Security in September 2000 is the emerging use of ideological principles
in guiding the mass media, which tend to be somewhat lacking a clear
definition. This takes the place of an impartial legal framework that
207
would clearly define and set out each partys obligations and responsibil-
ities (both the mass media industry and the authorities). Ideological
guidance is very much open to interpretation and abuse and under such
an administrative regime the media industry become responsible, but
only to the authorities. Under such uncertain circumstances, it is very
difficult for the mass media to achieve independent reporting. It
demands a certain level of self-censorship to ensure the survival of both
the individual journalist (for fear of their job security and to avoid
economic sanctions or physical punishment) and the media organization
(who wants to avoid being closed down for violation of the regulations or
being heavily fined).
Initially, stories that were fed to the media by the security services
seem to serve to create moral panic in Russian society. The enemy was
defined as being ruthless, Islamic and probably originating somewhere
from the Caucasus region. The enemy could strike anywhere and at any
time against any target, civilian or military. This strategy seemed to
create more harm than good for the authorities: it created the desired fear
factor in society against the terrorist threat, but introduced the
unpredictable element of human behaviour that is induced in a situation
when one has nothing to lose. Now stories seem to be more oriented to
settling societys frayed nerves with good news stories that give the
impression of progress in winning the war against terror.
The politics of self-censorship in the contemporary Russian mass
media seem to be closely aligned with the politics of ownership. Mass
media outlets have been considered more as a vehicle through which to
acquire political capital rather than a profit-making enterprise in its own
right. What appears and does not appear in the various mass media
outlets is an extension of this philosophy. Editorial loyalty of the
media staff to their owner is expected, and when it is not followed staff
can be forced to resign or accept the new rules. Media outlets that are
owned or under the influence of the state accept that there some issues
and subject matter that cannot be reported on. On the other hand, media
outlets that are positioned in the opposition camp (to the government)
will tackle issues that are potentially damaging for the governments
credibility and legitimacy. This is evident at times in the Moscow News,
which is owned by the besieged Yukos chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky and
where, unlike media under the sway of the state, he can make his voice
heard, and in newspapers that are still under the control of the oligarch
in exile Boris Berezovsky, such as Noviye Izvestia, Kommersant and
Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
208
Notes
Dmitry Strovsky would like to express his gratitude to Charles McKenzie, a

doctoral student from the School of Journalism and Mass Communications at the
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, for polishing up his text. Greg
Simon would like to thank Dmitry Babich, Andrei Richter and Larry Kilman for
their help and the Helge Axson Johnsons Stiftelse in Stockholm.
1. Glavlit (Glavnoe Literaturnoe Upravlenie Main Literary Headquarters) was
the department set up in 1922 in charge of all censorship functions in Russia
and later the Soviet Union. It censored all printing, photography materials
and books. In the model of Central Military Censorship Headquarters set up
in 1918, Glavlit was the embodiment of moral suppression of the press and
had a special list of the materials that were forbidden.
2. The title of the newspaper Vedomosti is inherited from rather antiquated
Russian and can be translated into English either as Bulletins (publishing, in
fact, all the most important decrees and orders signed by the Russian tsars
and governments) or Notices.
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Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journalism in the Age of the War

The online version of this article can be found at:

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The Russian mass media system has experienced tremendous change

Greg Simons is researcher at Crismart at the Department of Eurasian Studies,

European Journal of Communication Copyright 2006 SAGE Publications

Censorship: a theoretical framework

expression of views that it may find offensive even though, in this

the media to cover sensitive subjects, such as terrorism, as the journalists

The cultural origins of modern Russian censorship

most complex words in the English language. . . . Culture is everything

this structure took control and responsibility for everything and,

These publications were strongly dependent on the Russian author-

It was compulsory for all newspapers before going to press to be

The Soviet period: modifying the tradition

society. Of course, there was a prevailing authoritarian ideology in the

Lenins observations are fundamental to understanding the role of the

overcoming difficult circumstances and serving as brilliant role models to

Towards present priorities

continue to produce a similar level of biased reporting, apparently unable

Having allegedly provided Russian society with its political

Censorship in the contemporary war against terror

Threatening the use of new laws to gain cooperation

of bodies of people killed in terrorist acts and body parts on television

in the mass media as to who was going to be his replacement, though it

Television and Radio Company (VGTRK), explained the delay in the

An anonymous RTR staff member stated that the channels

Something that must be borne in mind when judging a sensitive topic

Dmitry Strovsky would like to express his gratitude to Charles McKenzie, a

Ambler, E. (1972) Russian Journalism and Politics: 18611881. Detroit, MI:

Elliott, P., G. Murdock and P. Schlesinger (1983) Televising Terrorism: Political

Vyzhutovich, V. (2005) Hostages of Self-Censorship, The Moscow News 5 March;

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