AGRARIAN REFORM LAW AND OTHER SOCIAL LEGISLATION offer of LBP before under this Code, the land
nder this Code, the land owner can actually go to
MIDTERM TRANSCRIPT 2016
Atty. Glenn Capanas
Agra June 25 First Minutes
If CARP is important in Agrarian reform, RA 3844 equally shares the
same importance.
1. This law is still applicable. Not all farmers are considered as
owners of the land they tilled, some may have chosen to
remain or to stay as farmers of the landowner under Sec. 6 of
CARP.
2. CARP was silent as to the leasehold provision then you should
apply RA 3844
3. There is only one section that was expressly repealed by the
CARP. (repeals on implication is not favored).
Sec. 35 of RA 3844 was repealed because in this law it says that
shared tenancy was abolished and leasehold relation was instituted in
place of shared tenancy. Leasehold will governed all the existing
contracts between land owners, farmers, lessor, lessee.
There is a portion of Sec. 35 of RA 3844 which states that
notwithstanding the abolition of shared tenancy and leasehold to be
considered as the relation between the lessor and the lessee, this law
will not apply to certain Agri products such as durian, coffee and cacao.
There were, in short, Agri products which were not covered under this
law. It was expressly repealed because CARP covers all kinds of Agri
products, no more reference to durian, coffee and cacao.
Although there are other ways of distributing lands in CARP that
even if CARP covers all kinds of Agri products, the government
provided other ways for the farmers to acquire lands like for example
through STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION.
Just to show us that there are lands covered under this law (check
the law). Except that the public area which are covered under this law
are those devoted for settlement purposes whereas under CARP,
regardless of whether it was for settlement purposes, all public lands
which are agricultural in nature are supposed to be(ming jump ug
other topic si Atty. Haha).
Beneficiaries
When you read the law, you will found that there are 9
components:
1. Share tenancy is abolished and the law institutionalized
leasehold relation
2. There is a declaration of rights for agricultural labor. The
word labor is actually granting rights in favor of agricultural
lessee like for example minimum wage, right to participate in
certain activities, right to self-organization.
3. An authority for the acquisition and equitable distribution of
Agri land. The authority referred to here is the Land Authority
which the former name of Department of Agrarian Reform.
4. An institution to finance the acquisition and distribution of
the Agri land. The institution referred to is the Land Bank of
the Philippines.
LBP comes in, insofar as acquisition is concerned, when the Land
Authority send a notice to the owner-your land is covered by the
agrarian reform- they will conduct a meeting with the LBP so that LBP
can show you how much is the valuation of the property the
government intends to pay you. When the land owner accepts the offer,
they will execute the sale then thats it. If the landowner rejects the
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
the judiciary which the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). CAR under
this code has the power to decide issues arising in this code and other
related laws in relations including among others the task of fixing just
compensation.
The task of LBP is not only on the acquisition, it is also tasked
regarding distribution. When the government wants to acquire the agri
land, the government has to pay the landowner just compensation, the
valuation of the land is supposed to be just.
Once the government is now in possession of the Agri land, the
government will now inform the Registry of Deeds, by process we have
now deposited the valuation of the land pertaining to land owner A,
deposited the money to LBP, so now we have certification form LBP
that there is a deposit of money so cancel now the title of the
landowner and issue a new title in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Once the title is now under the name of the republic of the
Philippines, then the government will now distribute the land to the
qualified farmer beneficiaries. But these lands to be given to the farmer
beneficiaries are not for free, the farmer beneficiaries will have to have
to pay 36 under CARP annual amortizations plus 6% interest based on
the valuation of the LBP.
So once the beneficiaries are identified, the title of the Republic
will be transferred in favor of the different beneficiaries, others are
individual and others are cooperative-in the back of the title, there is a
list of the names. Because it is not for free, they will have to pay LBP.
LBP is assured that Republic will not lose the property through the title
bearing the annotation of the mortgage to be signed by the farmer
beneficiary-mortgagee in favor of the LBP. If farmer defaulted, LBP can
get it back, thus the farmer beneficiary cannot anymore be qualified for
future beneficiary since he defaulted.
5, 6, 7, and 8. These are internal procedure for the effective
implementation of the program. So if the land was to be surveyed if
there is discrepancy or there is a need to classify or to register.
9. It mentions the CAR
Even if this code will still apply but with respect to No. 3 there
is a qualification. DAR now has two arms: (1) Implementation-
thats why we have Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases,
Secretary down to MARO; (2) Quasi-Judicial Functions- DARAB to
PARAB.
Since DAR has two arms, this judicial system has been abolished.
There is no more CAR now. The SOLE jurisdiction to determine the
just compensation is given to RTC. It does not depend on the
jurisdictional amount, there is no amount deposited because the
law says that it is RTC which has jurisdiction for as long as the
subject matter, the nature of the action is just compensation
The power of CAR before also covers the determination of
whether the parties are landlord-tenant or landlord-farmer, RTC has no
jurisdiction over that as of now. It is the other arm of DAR that
determines this, the DARAB.
WHY SHARED TENANCY WAS ABOLISHED
In labor law the employee has security of tenure, in Agra law, the
agricultural lessee has security of tenure under RA 3844. Shared
tenancy depends on the agreement between the landowner and the
tenant. What is important in shared tenancy is sharing but previous
laws have not focus on the tenurial status or the continuity of relation
or the guarantee of the physical possession and enjoyment and
management of the party. So right now, if farmer covered under RA
3844, the law says under Sec. 10, in case of sale or alienation of the legal
possession, transferee shall will be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligation of the lessee.
For example, if you have a landowner who wants to remove a
farmer from the agri land and you have no leasehold relation, you have
no law like this but probably there were few laws before that provide
safety measures before a farmer or tenant can be ejected. However the
law is silent before whether what will happen to the Agri-lessor will sell
the property to another person. So if you want to eject the tenant you
can ask the dummy to eject the tenant.
This cannot be done now because there is an assurance of the
status. This kind of relation is physical agreement, landowner and
farmer agree, okay landowner ako ang yuta, farmer ikaw maoy service.
They have a term in contract. Lets say we have 10 years in the
agreement. Do you think after 10 years, you can eject the tenant or
farmer? NO, not anymore. Notwithstanding of the expiration of the
term or period of the contract, the farmer is guaranteed of tenurial
status.
Sec. 9 of the law, in case of death or physical incapacity of the
Agri-lessee the relation will continue. In Sec. 9 there are three
persons who can succeed-that is where continuity of relation
comes in- (1)Surviving spouse; (2) Eldest direct descendant by
consanguinity and; (3) Direct descendant in the order of age
priority.
June 29, 2016
You know how it is to redeem in a foreclosure in civil law: One
year after the foreclosure. In Agra, under RA 3844, it is 180 days.
In ordinary civil law foreclosure, 1 year after the registration
of the property to the Register of Deeds. The Certificate of Sale will be
registered at the Register of Deeds. That is where the reckoning point of
the one year period.
It is different in Agrarian Law, in Section 12 of the RA 3844,
you have lessees right of redemption (Agricultural lessees), its
redemption period is 180 days from notice in writing to be served by
the vendees on all lessee affected and the DAR. Vendee in the auction is
the one who will serve the notice. Who are to be notified: all lessees
affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Po vs Dampal
Petitioner who is the highest bidder in an auction conducted
when the farmlands were foreclosed by the bank. Now, this one is very
important: After the foreclosure with Po as the highest bidder, the
previous owner (mortgagor) and the tenant filed a civil case against
the bank for annulment of mortgage. Meanwhile the tenant filed a
complaint for legal redemption made in DARAB. And that agency has
the different interpretation on the complaint for legal redemption. The
Adjudicator is allowed. It was a prescription and that the requirement
of notice was complied when the tenant filed the civil case. Remember:
Civil case was filed ahead for legal redemption.
Now, with the DARAB central office reversed the lack of notice
of sale of the tenant and the DAR. The basis is Section 12. Section 12
requires a notice in writing. That was not complied. However, since the
tenant was partly a plaintiff in the civil case that was filed ahead of the
complaint for legal redemption, then there must be substantial
compliance of the law.
But the SC did not agree with that argument. SC said that
there was an express requirement of the law. Notice of writing is
indispensable. Thus, the period to redeem has not begun to run. So the
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
legal redemption should be granted because it was denied because of
prescription by the Regional Adjudicator because it was filed beyond
the 180 days.
Extinguishment:
1. Abandonment
2. Voluntary Surrender
3. Absence of first ____ in Section 9 (di ko kagets kay sir kani na part)
Extinguishment - normally is voluntary, depends on the lessee
Dispossession dispossess is similar to eject; based on an offense
committed by the lessee.
Section 36 listed this grounds for dispossession under RA 3844:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or
other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections
twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned
and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than
five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced
notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That
should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for
three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and
the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of
the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by
him because of said dispossessions.
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with
any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of
the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm
practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section
twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement
thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or
negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when
it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of
seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event,
the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession,
although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
 (7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in
violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-
seven.
We will have to focus on number 6 because this is subject on
several cases.
Sta. Ana vs. Carpo
If truly there is no leasehold relation between parties, then the remedy
is a civil law case. But if there is leasehold relations, agrarian court is
the one who has jurisdiction.
Go directly to the ruling of the SC:
1) Burden of Proof: The lessor because of the principle of security of
tenure of lessee
2) Failure to pay means wilful and deliberate
Comment of Atty: The law does not say wilful and deliberate (just
mentioned non-payment of rental) but the SC qualified in this case.
Facts:
Evidence was an affidavit executed by the lessee stating the Leon, the
lessor, refused to receive. If there is refusal, how can there be wilful and
deliberate intent? Plus, there were two letters informing him of the
_____ base rentals. If a mere affidavit is sufficient is Agra Law?
(Compared to Civil Law System, an affidavit generally is not enough
unless he testifies. But there is an exception: Ejectment and other cases
that are summary in nature)
What about agra? No. Judicial affidavit applies only to all court and
other quasijudicial agencies under the administrative supervision of
the Supreme Court. DARAB is not. So a mere affidavit will suffice.
Depending of course of the contents of the affidavit.
Natividad vs. Mariano
Facts: Non-payment of rentals and Petition for Ejectment.
Now, here is this Ernesto who allege that he purchased the property in
an auction. He filed the ejectment case. After the purchase according to
him, he verbally demanded for respondents to pay the rentals. And
respondents refused to pay
You have another principle here. (Take note Sta Ana) Only for the
specifically enumerated causes of dispossession. You cannot add
another cause under Section 36.
Three points discussed by SC:
1) Was there demand?
2) Was there deliberate and wilful failure to payment of rentals?
3) Whether the lease rentals paid to Corazon and Laureano was valid?
(They were former owners of the land) T/N: Ernesto was a
purchaser of an auction.
So according to the facts, the lessees were paying the rentals
continuously to the previous owners. They do not know that
Ernesto was the new owner of the land.
Ernesto did not present proof that he demanded the lessees. Thus,
there was no demand.
--------
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
So the principles (discussed)
1 Wilful and deliberate non-payment is needed
2. It must have lasted for at least two years of non-payment (another
principle)
What was the basis as to why the Supreme Court held that the non-
payment must have lasted for at least two years?
The Supreme Court cited a decree, PD 816. This law says. Continued
that refusal or continued refusal to the lease rental by the agri
lessee, shall upon hearing the judgment result in the cancellation of
the CLT issued in the agri lessees name.
Presidential Decree 816
Section 1. That the continuing and deliberate refusal of the agricultural
lessees to pay their leasehold rentals to the landowners/agricultural
lessors cannot be countenanced and shall not remain unchecked or
unpunished;
Section 2. That any agricultural lessee of a rice or corn land under
Presidential Decree No. 27 who deliberately refuses and/or continues
to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments when they fall
due for a period of two (2) years shall, upon hearing and final
judgment, forfeit the Certificate of Land Transfer issued in his favor, if
his farmholding is already covered by such Certificate of Land Transfer,
and his farmholding;
Section 3. That any agricultural lessee whose landholding is not yet
covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer and who shall continue not
to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall
due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner/agricultural
lessor shall, upon proper hearing and judgment, lose his right to be
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No.
27 and his farmholding;
Section 4. That landholdings subject of forfeiture under the preceding
Section shall be turned over to the Samahang Nayon with which the
agricultural lessee is affiliated for assignment to a qualified member or
members of the association whose landholding/s is/are of uneconomic
size in accordance with the policies laid down by the Department of
Agrarian Reform;
Section 5. That any action for violation of the provisions of the
preceding Sections 2 and 3 shall be cognizable by the Court of Agrarian
Relations which is hereby vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction to try and decide the same;
Section 6. All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, and rules and
regulations which are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
----
CLT (Certificate of Land Title) is the ticket of land transfer. It is the term
used under PD 27. It is a document to be given to a tenant or a farmer
preparatory to an issuance of an emancipation patent.
It would seem that based on PD 816, the Supreme Court is making an
analogy when they used this principle that lasted for at least two
years. Meaning, if we had this under PD 816 and the period of non-
payment is two years will result to the cancellation of CLT then might
as well as dubbed it as a minimum period for non-payment of rental for
ground to disposes the lessee under section 36. Because I think you will
all agree that this one, PD 816, has nothing to do with dispossession. It
talks about cancellation of title but not dispossession. So I submit that
the Supreme Court is adapting the law by analogy. Applying it to non-
payment of rental as ground to dispossess based on this.
Now this bothers me, the Supreme Court clarified what is the meaning
of deliberate to be absolute aside from defining the Sta. Ana case. It
must be non-payment of lease rentals to be absolute. Kailangan wla
gyuy bayad! To be considered deliberate or wilful. The example like,
marked by the complete absence of any payment. Dli ba illogical?
Because probably in the past months, the tenant was paying but now if
I refuse to pay, I cannot be held to be considered as wilful and
deliberate non-payment? That should not be the case. Because here.
There were payments for 2 years. So if there were payments. This
principle will apply. Now, you must take note that this are my
observations dli nani sa Supreme Court.
Now, my question is this:
1. Why did the Supreme Court applied PD 816? Considering PD
816 applies only to rice and corn. Thats why the word CLT is
there in PD 816
2. Why did the y question the applicability of PD 816? Because
there is nothing in the facts that will show you whether the
land is rice or corn.
RA 3844 is silent on the non-payment of rental. Because non-payment
of rental is a ground to dispossess. There was no period and you cant
find the words wilful and deliberate.
Ako nalang mag-question, ako nalang say mu-answer para mahuman
(Corny mani si Sir oi. HAHAHA) and this is my answer:
1. Why did the Court applied PD 816? I made an assumption.
The assumption being that the words crop appeared in the
case. Crop here applies to rice. This CLT appeared also in the
case. You can find CLT in PD 27 and this applies to rice and
corn. Mao tingale ang reason sa supreme court it applied PD
816 in the Case of Natividad.
Nieves v. Duldulao
Facts:
You have an owner who filed a case to eject a tenant. The
tenant invoke fortuitous event such as the flooding and typhoons as a
defense for the non-payment of rentals.
Issue:
Is it a valid defense?
Held:
No. Under Paragraph 6 of Sec. 36 provides The agricultural
lessee does not pay the lease rentals when it falls due: Provided, That if
the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent
of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished.
Antonio v. Manahan SC held that the records show that the landowner
actually rejected the rentals tendered by the tenants therein due to
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
their supposed poor quality. This circumstance was taken by the Court
together with the fact that said tenants even exerted efforts to make up
for the rejected rentals through the payments made for the other year
Roxas v. Cabatuando SC held that the tenants therein did not wilfully
and deliberately fail to pay their leasehold rentals since they had
serious doubts as to the legality of their contract with respect to their
non-sharing in the coconut produce, which thus prompted them to
withhold their remittances in good faith.
In contrast to Antonio and Roxas, the landowner in this case never
rejected any rental payment duly tendered by respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest. Neither was the legality of their agricultural
leasehold contract with the landowner ever put into issue so as to
intimate that they merely withheld their remittances in good faith.
Thus, with the fortuitous event defense taken out of the equation, and
considering the wilfulness and deliberateness were not found to have
been established, the Court is impelled to agree with the DARAB that
respondents herein wilfully and deliberately chose not to pay their
leasehold rentals to the landowner when they fell due.
Atty Comments:
Sa Ato pa, if you do not fall between Roxas or Antonio then
wla kay depensa, there is deliberate failure to pay. And I dont think
that is right. Why? Because who has the burden? It is the land owner.
What was admitted was the non-payment of rental but in Sta. v. Carpo
the SC said non-payment means wilful and deliberate. And who is
suppose to prove that? The land owner! You dont render a judgment
based on logic or simple deduction based on Antonio or Roxas.
But for me, it would have been better if the Supreme Court would have
concluded that anyway that this is Rice land, so why not adopt PD 816?
PD 816 said that non-payment should have lasted for at least 2 years
diba? In this case the non-payment lasted for more than 20 years.
Based on the case of Natividad, that is considered as wilful and
deliberate. Ngano man? More than 2 years naman.
Section 34 for RA 3844 - Liabilities of lessor if he ejects tenant
without authorization
Fine or Imprisonment
Damages suffered
Attorneys fees
Remuneration for last income
Lease Rental Shall not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the
average normal harvest during the 3 agricultural years immediately
preceding amount used for seeds and costs of harvesting, threshing,
loading, hauling and processing.
Atty Comments:
Authorization here means, DARAB or PARAB. This also presupposes a
real leasehold relation because the word used is tenant.
Remember, this leasehold relation. Somebody is furnishing the land,
somebody cultivates and the produce is shared. Naay magbayad ug
lease rental sa land owner, the law fixed the lease rental. Ngano man?
Luoy kaayo ang lessee if there is no cap. Basin i-take advantage sa land
owner. You have to take note, Agri years is different from a calendar
years. Agri years depends upon a commodity. There are certain
commodity who have 2 or more Agri years in 1 calendar year. If Im not
mistaken there are 2 agri years in 1 calendar year.

Suppletory Application
Reyes v. Reyes
This confers that RA 3844 has suppletory application and you
will find here the confirmation made by the Supreme Court that only
Section 35 was repealed by CARL The Supreme Court emphasize that
there are 2 modes that provided for in the establishment of an
agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance
with Section 4 of the said act or (2) by oral or written agreement either
express or implied.
Atty Comment:
I submit there is a third mode. What is that? Katong there is a
retained area and the farmer chooses to retain. It falls under leasehold
but it does not fall under these two. Ngano man? Operation of law,
those under staring 1963, shared tenancy convert into by operation of
the law into leaseholds. What about oral or written agreement? The
word is agreement. However even if the land owner doesnt want to, he
has no choice since the choice is given to the farmer whether to remain
or not to remain. Pero ato-ato rana kay wla mana diri (LOL).
Agra Transcript July 2, 2016
P.D. 27 effectivity date: oct. 21, 1972
-lands acquired starting oct 21, 1972, if landowners
are not yet paid just compensation, CARL took effect
on june 10, 1988. Just compensation will now be
based on CARL, not on PD 27.
What are covered under P.D. 27?
-only those private agri land devoted to rice and
corn
-Lands under the public domain are not included
Differences of PD 27 and CARL
o Under PD 27, what is included is only private agri
land devoted to rice and corn. CARL includes all
other agri land regardless of the commodity
produced.
o Under PD 27, there are limitations on the number of
hectares a farmer may own. Theres a distinction
between judicated and non judicated. Under CARL,
there is no more distinction, and the number of
areas also differs.
Can lands acquired under PD 27 be transferred by DAR to
another qualified beneficiary?
Estolas vs. Mabalot , G.R. No. 133706, May 7, 2002
Facts:
A Certificate of Land Transfer (hereinafter referred to as CLT) was
issued in favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot
(hereinafter referred to as subject land). Needing money for medical
treatment, respondent passed on the subject land to the petitioner.
According to respondent, there was only a verbal mortgage; while
according to petitioner, a sale had taken place.
Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner before the
Barangay
Lupon in Pangasinan for the purpose of redeeming the subject land.
When no amicable settlement was reached, the case was referred to the
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
DAR regional office. DARs District Office found that respondent merely
gave the subject land to petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a
loan he had incurred from the latter; and recommending that the CLT
remain in the name of respondent and that the money loan be returned
to petitioner. Petitioner insisted that the subject land had been sold to
him by respondent and requested the DAR to cancel the CLT in
respondents name. Another investigation was conducted on the matter
which led to the issuance of an Order issued by DAR Regional Director.
In the said Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering
the subject land in favor of petitioner as constituting abandonment
thereof, and denied respondents prayer for redemption of the subject
land. Respondents request for reinvestigation was denied in a
Resolution. Thus, respondent appealed the case to the DAR Central
Office which an order was issued reversing the assailed Order of DAR
Regional Director and ordering the petitioner to return the subject land
to respondent. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
A. Whether or not there is a valid abandonment made by Respondent
Mabalot.
B. Whether the act of Respondent Mabalot in conveying to petitioner
the right to possess and cultivate the disputed parcel of land constitutes
a valid abandonment thereby rendering the property available for
transfer to other bona fide farmers.
C. Whether the issuance of an emancipation patent and thereafter a
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner has validated and
legitimized possession and ownership over the disputed property."
Held:
Main Issue:
Abandonment
The subject property was awarded to respondent by virtue of PD 27. A
CLT was issued in his favor. PD 27 specifically provides that when
private agricultural land -- whether classified as landed estate or not
is primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or
lease tenancy, the tenant farmers thereof shall be deemed owners of a
portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not
irrigated, and three (3) hectares if irrigated. Petitioner avers that
respondent neither protested when the former had the subject land
surveyed and planted with 40 mango trees, nor attempted to return the
money he had borrowed from petitioner in 1976. Because the lot has
been abandoned by respondent, the beneficiary, and because PD 27
does not prohibit the transfer of properties acquired under it,
petitioner theorizes that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
may award the land to another qualified farmer-grantee.
Non-transferability of Land Awarded Under PD 27
We do not agree. PD 27 specifically provides that title to land acquired
pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the
government shall not be transferable except to the grantees heirs by
hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal means.
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Upon the
promulgation of PD 27, their emancipation gave them the rights to
possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for themselves. These
rights were granted by the government to them as the tillers and to no
other. Thus, to insure their continuous possession and enjoyment of the
property, they could not, under the law, effect any transfer except back
to the government or, by hereditary succession, to their successors.
Furthermore, this Court has always ruled that agrarian laws must be
interpreted liberally in favor of the grantees in order to give full force
and effect to the clear intent of such laws: "to achieve a dignified
existence for the small farmers"; and to make them "more independent,
self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in
our democratic society." Neither are we convinced that an award under
PD 27 may be transferred to another in case the grantee abandons it.
The law is explicit.
No Abandonment
For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a)
a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a
right or property and (b) an external act by which that intention is
expressed or carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely a
projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated
or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by another. In
the present case, no such "wilful failure" has been demonstrated. Quite
the contrary, respondent has continued to claim dominion over the
land.
No Valid Reallocation
Furthermore, even if respondent did indeed abandon his right to
possess and cultivate the subject land, any transfer of the property may
only be made in favor of the government. In Corpuz v. Grospe, the Court
held that there was a valid transfer of the land after the farmer-grantee
had signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolution
surrendering his possession of the landholding. This voluntary
surrender to the Samahang Nayon constituted a surrender or transfer
to the government itself.
In the present case, there was no valid transfer in favor of the
government. It was petitioner himself who requested the DAR to cancel
respondents CLT and to issue another one in his favor.21 Unlike in the
above-cited case, respondents land was not turned over to the
government or to any entity authorized by the government to
reallocate the farm holdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become
beneficiaries of PD 27. Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a
farmer-beneficiarys landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was
abandoned. The proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to
ensure that there was indeed abandonment, and that the subsequent
beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED
Estolas v. Mabalot: Land may only be transferred either by succession
or to government (landbank-in case of non-payment of amortization,
landbank can foreclose the property [even if 10 years pa]). DAR cannot
transfer directly to a qualified beneficiary.
PD 27 applies suppletory on just compensation (no express
repeal by RA 6657)
Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, G.R. No. 175175,
September 29, 2008
Facts:
Case is regarding the valuation to the land of the respondents of which
the area was placed by the government under the coverage of the
operation land transfer program under PD 27. The LBP, petitioners
herein, valued the land in accordance with the guidelines set forth
under PD 27 and EO No. 228 and pegged the value of the land
amounting to P106,935.76 per hectare. Respondents rejected
petitioners valuation and insist on claiming that the said land is worth
between P150,00 to P200,000 per hectare. The Cagayan Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) however valued the land at
P80,000 following the factors set under RA 6557 (CARL) and of which
such value, as just compensation to the respondent, was approve by the
lower court (RTC) setting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Issue:
Whether or not PD 27 or RA 6557 is the applicable law in determining
the value of the land which was taken under PD 27 or before RA 6557
was enacted.
Held:
The Court laid down in Paris v. Alfeche the applicability of P.D. No. 27
and E.O. No. 228 in relation to R.A. No. 6657 in the matter of the
payment of just compensation. There the Court explained that while
under P.D. No. 27 tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land before
the title is transferred to them and that pending the payment of just
compensation, actual title to the tenanted land remains with the
landowner.
In Paris, the application of the process of agrarian reform was still
incomplete thus, the Court held therein that with the passage of R.A.
No. 6657 before its completion, the process should now be
completed under R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228
applying only suppletorily. It would certainly be inequitable to
determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD
No. 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation
should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or
EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full
and ample.
The land therefore should be valued under RA 6657 following the
guidelines set in DAR AO no. 5, series of 1998 and not under PD 27.
Land Bank v. Heirs of Cruz:
-The determination of just compensation should be based on RA 6657
for lands covered under PD 27. PD 27 applies only suppletory.
IV. RA 6657 (as amended by RA Nos. 7881, 7905, 8532, and 9700)
Is industrialization a component of Agrarian Reform?Yes.
Sec.2 (RA 6657)
sound rural development and industrialization
to promote industrialization
Industrial inputs necessary to agriculture(fertilizers,
insecticides, hybrid seeds, irrigation systems, tractors)
Can Private Corporation acquire ownership of alienable lands
of public domain?
Chavez v. PEA: No, only through lease not exceeding 25 yrs. Renewable
not more than 25yrs. And not to exceed 1,000 hectares
(CONST., Art. XII, Sec.3)
Sec. 3 (b) Agriculture or Agricultural Activity
- Means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing
of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities
and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by person whether natural or
juridical.
Luz Farms v. Sec. Sec.3 (b) unconstitutional
(Raising of livestock, poultry and swine per SC)
- use of land is incidental and not the principal
factor
RA 7881 (effective May 1995)
- amended Sec.3 (b) and removed the raising of livestock, poultry or
fish
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. (no land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and
poultry farming, livestock and poultry do not sprout from the land,
there are neither tenants or landlords, only employees)
Industrial, not agricultural activity.
Great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of
industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feed mill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities
for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and
digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deep wells,
elevated water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and other technological
appurtenances.
DAR Admin. Order No. 03-95 (rules and regulations governing the
exemption/exclusion of fishpond and prawn farms from the
coverage of the CARL, pursuant to RA 6657, as amended by RA
7881)
Policies:
a. In general, private agri lands owned by individuals or entities
actually, directly, and exclusively used for prawn farms and
fishponds as of march 12, 1995 shall be exempt from the
coverage of CARP
b. Lands devoted to prawn or fishponds which have already
been distributed to ARBs with the corresponding CLOAs
issued, being a consummated transaction, shall no longer be
exempt from the coverage under the CARP
c. Fishpond or prawn farms which are already been subjected to
the CARL by voluntary offer to sell (VOS) or are under
Commercial Farm Development (CFD) or for with notices of
acquisition (NA) have already been issued to the landowner
under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme, shall be exempt
from CARP coverage only upon the consent of a simple and
absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants
within 1 year from March 12,1995
In case said workers object to the exemption, the subject
fishpond or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to
the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a
cooperative or association to manage the same. The land bank
of the Philippines shall extend financial assistance to aid the
said cooperatives through its countryside loan assistance
program.
In the event the 1 year period has elapsed and the required
consent has not been obtained, the property becomes subject
to CARL.
d. Xxxx
e. Fishpond or prawn farms workers affected by exemption have
the option to remain as workers or become beneficiaries in
other agri lands. Workers who opt to choose to be a
beneficiary may be awarded other lands covered by the CARP.
DAR Admin. Order No. 01, S. 2004 (RULES & REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE EXCLUSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS USED FOR
CATTLE RAISING FROM THE COVERAGE OF CARP)
Objective: To prevent circumvention of CARP and to protect the
rights of ARBs due to unauthorized change/conversion or fraudulent
declaration of areas used for cattle purposes.
Coverage: All applications for exclusion from CARP of private
agricultural lands actually, exclusively and directly used for cattle
raising as of 15 June 1988.
Types of animal: cattle (of bovine family), bull, calf, cow.
Policies:
(1) Those ADE used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be
excluded (exclusion to be granted only upon proof and continuously
utilized up to time of application);
(2) Any change in use shall be subject to policies on land conversion
(3) Only the grazing/pasture area and for infrastructure necessary for
cattle raising shall be excluded; all other areas shall be covered.
(4) Encourage growth of cattle industry
(5) If filing of exclusion is in response to notice of CARP coverage, DAR
shall deny due course if application is filed 60 days after date of receipt
of notice.
(6) Only exclusion applications fully supported by documents shall be
accepted
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Need to file an application with DAR, not automatic exempt from the
coverage. So that DAR can verify.
DAR v. Sutton: Masbate land -cattle-breeding capital of Phil
(VOS - due to Luz Farms - withdraw VOS)
- Constitutionality of AO No. 9, S. 1993 (prescribing a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising);
- SC nullified AO; RA 7881 changed definition of agricultural
activity by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. Congress clearly
sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms
from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Admin. Order No. 07, S. 2008
Policy guidelines:
Lands ADE used for livestock purposes as of 15 June 1988 and
continuously used shall be excluded; conversely, those not ADE are
subject to CARP if one or more of the following conditions apply: (1)
there is agricultural activity in the area (i.e., cultivation of soil, planting
of crops, growing of trees including harvesting); (2) land is suitable for
agriculture and occupied and tilled by farmers.
In line with principle of regularity in the performance of official
functions, all processes by DAR per AO No. 9 are valid.
Sec. 3 (c) Agricultural land land devoted to agricultural activity &
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land.
Republic vs Salvador Lopez Agri-business
Facts
Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate
area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez
Agri-Business Corporation.
On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro
C. Salga issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to
the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed
under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law).
On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office (PARO), Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of
the lots covered by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from CARP coverage.
It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said
parcels of land are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land
with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat
of petitioner's 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos,11 horses, 9 heads of
goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an
onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence
of the livestock as enumerated.
On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines under RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through
its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter-affidavit
addressed to the respondent-Secretary requesting for the exclusion
from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that they
needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28,
1995, petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an
application for the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and
1296 stating that it has been operating grazing lands even prior to June
15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its
grazing land.

The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an
Order dated March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of
Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that
the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock
raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs
the lots for additional grazing area. The application for exemption,
however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.
Issue:
Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL
Held:
In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted
to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from
CARP coverage.
In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the
inspection found that the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts
(41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the
denial of the application for exemption. 30 Verily, the Limot lands were
actually, directly and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact
that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of the
inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional Director
who denied the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by
the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals.
In the 07 February 1994 Letter-Affidavit addressed to the DAR
Secretary,
SNLABC requested the exemption of the Limot lands on the ground that
the
corporation needed the additional area for its livestock business. As
pointed out by the DAR Regional Director, this Letter-Affidavit is a clear
indication that the Limot lands were not directly, actually and
exclusively used for livestock raising. SNLABC casually dismisses the
clear import of their Letter-Affidavit as a "poor choice of words."
Unfortunately, the semantics of the declarations of SNLABC in its
application for exemption are corroborated by the other attendant
factual circumstances and indicate its treatment of the subject
properties as non-livestock.
Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than
SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands
sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR
Secretary even described SNLABC's use of the area as a "seasonal
extension of the applicant's 'grazing lands' during the summer."
Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually,
directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's livestock business,
especially since these were only intermittently and secondarily used as
grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable and are in fact
actually, directly and exclusively being used for agricultural
purposes.
Tax declaration classified as agricultural land (one way to prove) - it is
not conclusive.
Milestone Farms, Inc. vs. Office of the President
Facts:
Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960. 4 Among its
pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle,
pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which
may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of
said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable
and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to
purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies,
stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-
products of said business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs,
and other livestock as may be authorized by law. 5
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and
swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting
en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform 6 that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or
swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of
its 316.0422-hectare property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. (T-
410434) M-15750, (T-486101) M-7307, (T-486102) M-7308, (T-
274129) M-15751, (T-486103) M-7309, (T-486104) M-7310, (T-
332694) M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311, (T-486106) M-7312, M-8791,
(T-486107) M-7313, (T-486108) M-7314, M-8796, (T-486109) M-
7315, (T-486110) M-9508, and M-6013, and located in Pinugay, Baras,
Rizal, from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned
ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No.
9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of
agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from
CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented
its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9. 7
Acting on the said application, the DAR's Land Use Conversion and
Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular
inspection on petitioner's property and arrived at the following
findings:
[T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry is
258.8422 hectares; the area which served as infrastructure is 42.0000
hectares; ten (10) hectares are planted to corn and the remaining five
(5) hectares are devoted to fish culture; that the livestock population
are 371 heads of cow, 20 heads of horses, 5,678 heads of swine and 788
heads of cocks; that the area being applied for exclusion is far below the
required or ideal area which is 563 hectares for the total livestock
population; that the approximate area not directly used for livestock
purposes with an area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below
the allowable 10% variance; and, though not directly used for livestock
purposes, the ten (10) hectares planted to sweet corn and the five (5)
hectares devoted to fishpond could be considered supportive to
livestock production.
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary
Garilao) issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares
of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug,
and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.
14
Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be
excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock,
poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took
effect. He found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle
submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were
registered in the name of petitioner's president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior
to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204
were registered from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more
weight to the certificates rather than to the headcount because "the
same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned by petitioner as
of June 15, 1988.
Issue:
Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL
Held:
With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioner's
arguments fail to persuade. Its invocation of Sutton is unavailing. In
Sutton, we held:
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock
farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear
intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case
that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do
not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity."
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion
of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage,
waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors,
exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and
other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester
plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated
water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological
appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which
have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian
reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
Petitioner's admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its
own livestock is fatal to its cause. 64 While petitioner advances a
defense that it leased this ranch because the occupants of the subject
property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we find it surprising that not
even a single police and/or barangay report was filed by petitioner to
amplify its indignation over these alleged illegal acts. Moreover, we
accord respect to the CA's keen observation that the assailed MARO
reports and the Investigating Team's Report do not actually contradict
one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were
actually pastured outside the subject property.
Adjacent property is not covered.
Definitions
o agriculture, agricultural enterprise or agricultural
activity (sec 3 [b])
o Used among others, in:
sec 4. Scope. The CARL of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No 131 and EO 229,
including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
When lands are no longer suitable for agriculture, they are
supposed not to be covered by CARL. The law looks into the
nature of the land.
Agra transcript july 9, 2016
Agricultural Land (Section 3[c])
Most important element! Not classified as mineral, residential, forest,
commercial, or industrial
-who makes the classification?
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Atty Capanas believes that DAR is not competent to say land is
not suitable for agriculture. It should be the department of
agriculture
DAR should respect the classification made by competent
authorities
If mineral or forest, it is the DENR (executive)
If residential, commercial or industrial, it is the LGUs
(legislative act) by means of ordinance (went to a process,
public hearing) or a Presidential Proclamation
-when is classification done?
Must be done prior to June 15, 1988
If you believe that your land should be exempt even if there is
agricultural activity but it is already classified as resident
prior to June 15, 1988, it is supposed to be exempt but there is
a process
If the classification is made by LGUs, it needs an approval
from the HLURB. Approval from the predecessor of HLURB, is
valid.
Natalia Realty v. DAR 1979
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land
located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as
town site areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis
which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The
NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as town
site reservation. NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision. Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.
NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the Notice of Coverage
SC:
They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of the reservation.
Lands previously converted by government agencies, other than DAR,
to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL were
outside the coverage of reservations, but applied also to real estate
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL.
NOTE:
DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and the case of Natalia Realty, Inc
opine that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered
by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the DAR to
approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its
effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified
as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15, 1988 no longer
need any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not
operate to divest tenant-farmers of their rights over lands covered by
PD 27, which have been vested prior to June 15, 1988.
In order to implement the intent and purpose of the provisions of the
aforecited laws, the DAR has issued guidelines through AO No. 4, Series
of 2003.
(Please refer to the attached files together with this reviewer The
important provisions there are only the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION,
APPROVING AUTHORITIES, EFFECT ON PRE-EXISTING CARP COVERAGE
and PROTESTS).
DAR AO No. 4 (Rules on exemption) - all lands already classified as
commercial, industrial or residential before June 15,1988 no longer
need conversion clearance
Requirements: Sworn application, copy of title, certification from
HLURB (zoning or classification, citing zoning ordinance), among
others. Public notice and Disturbance compensation (in case there are
farmers there, to inform them)
Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999
Facts:
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by
petitioner Roxas & Co., Inc and the validity of the acquisition of these
haciendas by the government under RA No. 6657.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner with
TCTs andTax Declarations of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners landholdings are subject to coverage
under the CARL, in view of the undisputed fact that petitioners
landholdings have been converted to non-agricultural uses by
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which declared the Municipality of
Nasugbu as a tourist zone, and the zoning ordinance of the said
Municipality re-classifying certain portions of the petitioners
landholdings as non-agricultural or at the very least entitle the
petitioner to apply for conversion as conceded by respondent DAR.
Held:
Respondent DARs failure to observe due process in the acquisition of
petitioners landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power
to adjudicate over petitioners application for conversion of its
haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged for
conversion is the DAR.
The petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the
three haciendas are nullified for respondent DARs failure to observe
due process therein. In and the applicable administrative procedure,
the case is hereby remanded to the respondent DAR for proper
acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioners application
for conversion.
Notice of coverage was wrongfully sent
SC: . DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of
petitioners' landholdings does not ipso facto give the Supreme Court
the power to adjudicate over petitioner's application for conversion of
its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to
determine whether Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-
agricultural which exempts from the coverage of the CARL lies with the
DAR, not with the Supreme Court. Case was remanded to DAR for
proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's
application for conversion
NHA vs. Allarde, G.R. No. 106593, November 16, 1999
Facts:
Lots 836 and 839, registered in the of the Republic of the Philippines,
and covered by the TCT No. 34624 and No. 34627, respectively, were
acquired b the Republic on April 2, 1938 from Philippine Trust
Company. They form part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan
City, which, on April 26, 1971, was reserved by Proclamation No. 843
for, among others, the housing programs of the National housing
Authority.
According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the
disputed lots since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and
working on six hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his father
who had cultivated a 13 hectare portion of the same lots.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
In 1989, Mateo filed with the DAR the petition for the award to them of
subject disputed lots under CARP.
On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses Mateo, relying on their
claim that the subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of
the CARP, brought
before the respondent RTC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the NHA from bulldozing
further and making constructions on the lots under controversy.
RTC Judge Allarde issued the injunction against NHA.
Held:
As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (included the disputed lots)
was
reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the
housing program of the NHA, the same has been categorized as not
being devoted to the agricultural activity
SC: As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed
lots) was reserved under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the
housing program of the National Housing Authority, the same has been
categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity
contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore,
outside the coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the
respondent Court declaring the lots under controversy as "agricultural
land" and restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its
housing project thereon, are evidently bereft of any sustainable basis
Advincula-Velasquez vs. CA,et al., G.R. No. 111387, June 8,2004
The petitioners were the agricultural lessees of a Riceland located in
Paraaque Metro Manila.
In 1978, Sps. Nery and the Lorenzo sold the property to the Delta
Motors Corporation (DMC). Petitioner Velasquez, in his capacity as
leaseholder agricultural tenant, filed an action for the redemption of
the said property before the Court of Agrarian Relation. The CAR
dismiss the petition for lack on the part of the petitioner to redeem the
property in its acquisition price in the amount of 2,319,210 pesos but
directing the defendant to maintain the petitioner as agricultural lessee
to the land in question.
Petitioner Velasquez and the defendants appealed the decision of the
CAR to the Intermediate Appellate Court who affirmed the decision of
the CAR. Petitioner Velasquez filed a petition for review to the Supreme
Court who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the CARs
decision pending the outcome of the petition.
In 1981, the land in question was reclassified as residential zone under
the ordinance issued by the city of Manila. Later, the land in question
was mortgage by the DMC to the PNB as a security for its obligation
who later foreclose it because of the failure of the DMC to pay its
account. The PNB in 1986 executed a deed of sale of the said land in
favor of the Remman Enterprise Inc. who decided to develop it in to a
residential subdivision.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court issue a decision on the petition for
review filed by the petitioner Velasquez affirming the decision of the
IAC stating that the case had become moot and academic with regards
the claim of the petitioner against the DMC considering that the
property had been foreclose by the PNB declaring however that the
petitioner may redeem the property from the PNB and its transferee.
The record was remanded to the PARAD or the Provincial Agrarian
Adjudication for the petitioner to exercise their right of redemption but
since the case had become moot and academic, the PARAD denied the
action of the petitioner to recover the property against the DMC since
the land in question is now a residential land. The right of the petitioner
as an agricultural lessee was terminated and the property was now in
the possession of the Remman Enterprise, Inc. The petitioner filed a
motion before the DARAB or the Department of Agrarian Adjudication
Board who reverses the decision of the PARAD stating that the land in
question is an agricultural land and uphold the right of the petitioner as
an agricultural lessee to recover the said land .The Remman Enterprise
filed an appeal before the CA who reverses the decision of the DARAB
because the land in question was already reclassified as residential land
as early as 1981 converting it from agricultural land in to non-
agricultural land. The petitioner filed a motion to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the land was an agricultural land or a residential land.
Held:
According to the Supreme Court, agricultural land was defined under
RA. 6657 as those lands devoted to agricultural activities and not
classified as forest, minerals, residential and industrial land.
The records show that as early as 1981, the landholding was
reclassified as a low density zone under Metro Manila Zoning
Ordinance No. 81-01, Series of 1981 before Rep. Act No. 6657 took
effect on June 15, 1998. It has been considered as early as that time for
residential purposes thus not within the ambit of CAR.
SC: Since the property was already reclassified as residential by the
Metro Manila Commission and the HSRC before the effectivity of Rep.
Act
No. 6657, there was no need for the private respondent to secure any
post facto approval thereof from the DAR
DAR vs. Berenguer
Facts:
The respondents were the registered owners of several residential and
industrial lands with a total area of 58.0649 hectares located in
Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon.
In April 1998, the respondents received from the DAR notices of
coverage of their said landholdings by the Government's
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6657(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL). They
protested the notices of coverage, filing on October 5, 1998, in the office
of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Regional Director
Dalugdug) in Legaspi City, their application for exclusion of their
landholdings from CARP coverage, and praying for the lifting of the
notices of coverage.
In October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on
the respondents' application for exclusion, cancelled their titles and
issued certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs), covering their
landholdings, to the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (Baribag), not to the
respondents' workers on the landholdings, although Baribag was not
impleaded in the respondents' application for exclusion.
In support of their claim that their landholdings were already classified
as residential and industrial, the respondents submitted the following
documents, namely:
a. The certification dated May 18, 1999 issued by HLURB, stating,
among others, that the Town Plan/Zoning Ordinance of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon (classifying Barangay Bibincalan, * where the respondents'
properties were located, as a residential and commercial area), was
approved by HLURB (then Human Settlements Commission/Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission);
b. An excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan of the
Municipality of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showing that Barangay Bibincalan
* was part of the CentralBusiness District; hence, the respondents'
landholdings in Bibincalan * were classified as residential and
industrial;
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
c. Resolution No. 5 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, series of
1981, expanding the area of the poblacion to include Barangay
Bibincalan, * among others;
d. The certification dated August 27, 1997 issued by the Office of the
Zoning
Administrator, Office of the Mayor, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, signed by
Deputized Zoning Administrator Raul Jalmanzar, declaring that the
respondents' landholdings were situated in Barangay Bibincalan *
within the Poblacion area of the Municipality of Sorsogon; and
e. Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, stating that a
parcel of land was considered non-agricultural, and, therefore, beyond
the coverage of the CARP, if it had been classified as residential,
commercial, or industrial in the City or Municipality Land Use Plan or
Zoning Ordinance approved by HLURB before the effectivity of R.A. No.
6657 on June 15, 1988.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is covered under RA 6657
Held:
In ruling that the respondents' landholdings were not devoted to cattle
raising, the DAR relied on DAR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9,
series of 1993, which required that properties should be considered
excluded from the coverage of the CARL only if it was established that
as of June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the law, there existed the
minimum ratio of one head of cattle to one hectare of land, and one
head of cattle to 1.7815 hectares of infrastructure.
According to the DAR, only 15 heads of cattle were found within the 58
hectares sought to be excluded based on the semestral survey
conducted in Sorsogon by the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics in the
period from 1988 to 1992, which was in contravention of DAO No. 9,
series of 1993.
The CA found, however, that heads of cattle were really being raised in
thelandholdings of the respondents. This finding was not disputed by
the DAR. In view of the finding of the CA, we cannot now hold
differently, for we are bound by the finding of fact of the CA. Verily, the
insufficiency of the number of heads of cattle found during the
semestral survey did not automatically mean that the landholdings
were not devoted to the raising of livestock. We concur with the CA that
there could be several reasons to explain why the number of cattle was
below the ratio prescribed under DAO No. 9 at the time of the survey,
including pestilence, cattle rustling, or sale of the cattle.
Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the limits of the poblacion area of
the municipality included Barangay Bibincahan, where the
respondents' landholdings were situated.
There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondents' landholdings
have been part of the poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consistent with
Hilario and Natalia, holding that the respondents' landholdings were
non-agricultural, and, consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL,
was fully warranted. In fact, the excerpt from the Comprehensive
Development Plan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay
Bibincahan was within the Central Business District of the municipality.
Alangilan v. Office of President
SC: It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as
agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as
residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the
term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land
from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR
Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended
land use. It does not denote that the property has already been
reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential
is not a land classification category. Indubitably, at the time of the
effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still
agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the
landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already
been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then
there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994
Ordinance.
Heirs of Deleste vs Leviste
Facts:
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin
(Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in
Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property).
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as
the "Zoning Regulation of Iligan City," reclassifying the subject property
as commercial/residential. Petitioners claim that the land is outside the
coverage because of ordinance while DAR contended that there is no
evidence that the ordinance was approved by HLURB
Issue:
Coverage of subject property under CARP
Held:
Sc:
Accompanying the certification dated Oct. 8, 1999 issued by Gil R.
Balondo, Deputy Zoning Administrator of the city planning and
development office, iligan city, and the letter dated Oct 8, 1999 issued
by Ayunan B. Rajah, regional officer of the HLURB, is the certificate of
approval issued by Imela Marcos, then minister of human settlements
and chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the local zoning ordinance
was, indeed approved on Sept 21, 1978. This leads to no other
conclusion than that city ordinance no. 1313 enacted by the city of
Iligan was approved by the HSRC, predecessor of HLURB.
Rom vs Roxas & co.
Facts:
On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels
of land located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an
aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.
Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
covers only agricultural land 5 which is defined under Section 3 (c)
thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent
claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the
lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the
Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning
ordinance was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983. Respondent
cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already
classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or
residential use, which ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity
of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
In its Order 11 of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Application for Exemption
Clearance from CARP coverage filed by Roxas & Company, Inc.,
involving twenty-seven (27) parcels of land, specifically described in
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
pages 1 and 2 of this Order,[12] being portions of TCT No. T-44664,
with an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares located [in] Barangay Aga,
Nasugbu, Batangas is hereby GRANTED, subject to the following
conditions:
1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be
maintained in their peaceful possession and cultivation of their
respective areas of tillage until a final determination has been made on
the amount of disturbance compensation due and entitlement of such
farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas.
2. No development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of
land until the appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to
the farmer occupants who are determined by the PARAD to be entitled
thereto. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation shall be
submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment; and
3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer beneficiaries shall
be subject of a separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas.
ISSUE:
Whether the land is covered under CARL.
Held:
Having established through said documents that the 27 parcels of land
are within the coverage of the said (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, the DAR declared as well that respondent
substantially complied with the requirements of DAR AO No. 6, series of
1994 in DAR ADM Case No. A 9999-014-98. The DAR thus granted the
application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the same tenor.
The Court recognized the power of a local government unit to classify
and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the
effectivity of the CARL and thus upheld the validity of said zoning
ordinance.
Davao New Town vs Sps. Saliga
-land involved are in Davao City
-private respondent filed a complaint for injunction, cancellation of title
and damages against petitioner before PARAD
-private respondents alleged that they are their parents are tenants and
that the transfer of lands to petitioner is fraudulent
-petitioner answered that it is buyer in good faith and that the lands are
classified as urban/urabnizing zone per 1979-2000 Comprehensive
land use plan for Davao City that was duly adopted by the city council
of Davao City and approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission, now HLURB
SC:
The May 2, 1996 HLURB certification (issued in relation to another case
that involved in a different parcel of land) is not without value. The
clear-cut declaration of the HLURB in the certification, which the
DARAB and the CA should have considered and which we find
sufficiently convincing, show that Catalunan Pequeno (where the
property lies) is classified as within the urbanizing district centers of
Davao City. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the May 2, 1996 HLURB
certification satisfied the purpose of this requirement, which is to
establish by sufficient evidence the propertys reclassification as non-
agri land prior to June 15, 1988.
GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC.vs RUBEN ALCAIDE
Facts:
Petitioner Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of 14
parcels of land.
On April 14, 1998, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
issued a Notice of Coverage over the subject landholding informing
petitioner that the subject properties were being considered for
distribution under the government's agrarian reform program. 4
Thereafter, on November 15, 1998, the corresponding Notice of
Valuation and Acquisition 5 was issued informing petitioner that a
37.7353-hectare portion of its property is subject to immediate
acquisition and distribution to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries
and that the government is offering P7,071,988.80 as compensation for
the said property.
Petitioner then filed a Petition 6 before the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), wherein it argued that the properties were bought from
their previous owners in good faith; that the same remains
uncultivated, unoccupied, and untenanted up to the present; and, that
the subject landholdings were classified as industrial, thus, exempt
from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Petitioner prayed, among other things, that the Notice of
Coverage and Notice of Acquisition be lifted and that the properties be
declared exempt from the coverage of CARP.
Respondents 8 on their part countered, among other things, that the
classification of the land as industrial did not exempt it from the
coverage of the CARP considering that it was made only in 1997; the
HLURB 9 certification that the Municipality of Bian, Laguna does not
have any approved plan/zoning ordinance to date; that they are not
among those farmer-beneficiaries who executed the waivers or
voluntary surrender; and, that the subject landholdings were planted
with palay.
On June 8, 2001, then DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza, issued an
Order 11 in favor of the respondent declaring that the subject
properties are agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is exempted.
Held:
As aptly found by the Office of the President, the importance of
conducting an ocular inspection cannot be understated, since it is one
of the steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process.
In other words, before the MARO sends a Notice of Coverage to the
landowner concerned, he must first conduct a preliminary ocular
inspection to determine whether or not the property may be covered
under CARP. The foregoing undertaking is reiterated in the latest DAR
AO No. 01, s. of 2003, entitled "2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice
of Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands under RA 6657."
Section 1 [1.1] thereof provides that:
"1.1Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) after determining that a landholding is coverable
under the CARP and upon accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular
Inspection Report, the MARO shall prepare the NOC (CARP
Form No. 5-1)." (NOC stands for Notice of Coverage) Found on
the records of this case is a ready-made form Preliminary
Ocular Inspection Report (undated) signed by the concerned
MARO. Interestingly, however, the check box allotted for the
all-important items "Land Condition/Suitability to
Agriculture" and "Land Use" was not filled up. There is no
separate report on the record detailing the result of the ocular
inspection conducted. These circumstances cast serious
doubts on whether the MARO actually conducted an on-site
ocular inspection of the subject land. Without an ocular
inspection, there is no factual basis for the MARO to declare
that the subject land is devoted to or suitable for agricultural
purposes, more so, issue Notice of Coverage and Notice of
Acquisition. The importance of conducting an ocular
inspection cannot be understated. In the event that a piece of
land sought to be placed from CARP coverage is later found
unsuitable for agricultural purposes, the landowner
concerned is entitled to, and the DAR is duty bound to issue, a
certificate of exemption pursuant to DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 34, s. of 1997, entitled "Issuance of Certificate of
Exemption for Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Found Unsuitable for
Agricultural Purposes."
More importantly, the need to conduct ocular inspection to determine
initially whether or not the property may be covered under the CARP is
one of the steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process. The CARP was not intended to take away
property without due process of law (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245. [1996]). The exercise of
the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in
the taking of private property. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
321 SCRA 106 [1999], the Supreme Court nullified the CARP acquisition
proceedings because of the DAR's failure to comply with administrative
due process of sending Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition of
the landowner concerned.
Considering the claim of appellant that the subject land is not
agricultural because it is unoccupied and uncultivated, and no
agricultural activity is being undertaken thereon, there is a need for the
DAR to ascertain whether or not the same may be placed under CARP
coverage. 47**
Thus, the question of whether or not petitioner's properties could be
covered by the CARP has not yet been resolved. Until such
determination, it follows that petitioner's landholdings cannot be the
proper subject of acquisition and eventual distribution to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries. However, these involve factual controversies,
which are clearly beyond the ambit of this Court.
Verily, the review of factual matters is not the province of this Court.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum
for the ventilation and substantiation of factual issues.
Agrarian dispute (section 3[d])
any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements (leasehold,
tenancy,
stewardship) over lands devoted to agriculture
any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
CARL
and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership.
tenancy relationship
-used, among others, in:
Sec 47. Functions of BARC in addition to those provided
under EO 229, the BARC shall have the following functions
a. Mediate and conciliate between parties involved in an
agrarian dispute including matters related to tenurial and
financial arrangements
Sec 53. Certification of BARC the DAR shall not take
cognizance of any agrarian dispute of controversy unless a
certification from the BARC that the dispute has been
submitted to it for mediation and conciliation without any
success of settlement is presented.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITIES: PSC-PPS
1) Parties (landowner & tenants)
2) Subject matter is agricultural land
3) Consent of parties
4) Purpose is agricultural production
5) Personal cultivation by tenant
6) Sharing of harvest between parties (receipt coming from the
landowner)
All requisites must concur, absence of one does not make one a
tenant.
July 13, 2016
Agricultural Law
 RA 9700
Section 50 A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. No
court or prosecutors office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to
the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section
57 of RA 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the
parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a
farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred
by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and
certify within 15 days from the referral whether an agrarian dispute
exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved
party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal
trial court and the prosecutors office, the appeal shall be with the
proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the RTC, the appeal
shall be to the CA.
Atty Comment:
I believe you would remember, that if there is an allegation or
a case is filed with a tenant farmer before the court or a city
prosecutors office. The court or prosecutor has to refer the matter to
DAR. And DAR referring to PARO. The PARO has to certify within 15
days and return the case to the judge or prosecutor for the filing of the
case. So there is an admin order, implementing the Circular
amendment. There are section 2 which mentions the Cases covered.
DA No. 03-11
Section 2. Cases Covered these guidelines shall apply to the procedure
on the referral of cases which are agrarian in nature to the DAR by the
Prosecutors Office, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court and the Regional Trial Court, (MCTC, MTC, MeTC, and RTC
respectively), whether it be criminal or civil in nature, except those
involving issues of just compensation or the prosecution of criminal
offenses as provided for by Section 57 of RA No. 6657, as amended by
RA 9700.
Atty Comments:
First level courts because of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer are cases proper for determination. RTC referring to accion
publiciana, when the assessed value of the property exceeds 20,000
DOJ Circular No. 40
When a complaint for a felony or criminal offense is filed before the
Office or Provincial Prosecutor, the investigating prosecutor shall refer
the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who has
jurisdiction over the place of the incident when:
a. There is an allegation by any of the parties that the case is
agrarian in nature or an agrarian dispute and one of the
parties is a tenant, lessee, farmer-beneficiary, farmer, or
farmworker; or
b. The case pertains to the implementation of the CARP except
those provided under Section 57 of RA 6657 as amended.
Atty Comments:
This is a circular mandating the prosecutors in relation to the
Section 50-A. This circular talks about a criminal complaint that is
being processed in a regular procedure. Meaning the accused or
respondent has not been arrested that it has to go through a
preliminary investigation. So you will find there the word investigating
prosecutor who will also refer the case to PARO. Now, DOJ circular
(parehas ra ug number sa iyang powerpoint. DOJ Circular 40) is about
inquest. Inquest as we normally know is when an accused is arrested
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
without a warrant. The one who will refer is the case to PARO is the
inquest prosecutor.
OCA Circular No. 62-2010
directs all courts and judges concerned to refer all cases before it
alleged to involve an agrarian dispute to DAR
Atty Comments:
This came from the office of the court administrator. It
referred that all judges and courts to refer the case before it alleged to
involve an agrarian dispute to the DAR. So now, you have a complete
administrative aspect insofar as the Section 50 is concerned.
Section 5. Issues to Be Determined Upon referred the PARO may only
give a ruling as to two issues:
1. Whether or not the cause of action of the pending case with
the referring Court or Office of the Public Prosecutor is
agrarian in nature, the jurisdiction of which is lodged
exclusively with the DAR; or
2. Whether or not a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the DAR is a prejudicial question to the issue pending with the
referring Court or Office of the Public Prosecutor..
No other issue may be adjudicated or determined by the PARO
Atty Comment:
There are only 2 issues that PARO can give a ruling. And the
word only is very apparent in there. The reason why there are only 2
reasons that can be resolve by the PARO is because the PARO can
certify with dispatch. Remember, the PARO is given a 15 days to certify
whether the case is an agrarian case. Because the moment the period is
not stated in the law or the PARO is given a limited discretion, it is
highly possible that land owners would like to harass the legitimate
farmers or tenants. Then file any motion or whatsoever before PARO to
be able to prolong the procedure. So it is very specific that the PARO
can only resolve 2 issues and all other issues the PARO cannot!
Section 8. Prima Facie Presumption of an Evidence of Agrarian Dispute
or that the Case is Agrarian in Nature The presence of any of the
following facts or circumstances shall automatically give rise to a prima
facie presumption that an agrarian dispute exist or that the case is
agrarian in nature:
a. A previous determination by the DAR that an agrarian dispute
exists or that the case is agrarian in nature or the existence of
a pending action with the DAR, whether an Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI) case or a case before the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), which involves the same
landholding;
b. A previous determination by the National Labor Relation
Commission or its Labor Arbiters that the farmworker is/was
an employee of the complainant;
c. A notice of coverage (NOC) was issued or a petition for
coverage under any agrarian reform program was filed on the
subject landholding; or
d. Other analogous circumstances.
If there is a prima facie presumption that an agrarian dispute exist or
that the case is agrarian in nature, the burden of proving the contrary
shall be on the party alleging the same.
Atty Comments:
These are the situations in which it would give rise to a prima
facie presumption that it is an agrarian dispute.
Section 9. Facts Tending to Prove that a Case is Agrarian. In addition
to the instances mentioned in Section 7 hereof, the Chief of the Legal
Division, or the DAR Lawyer or legal officer assigned, in determining
whether the case is agrarian in nature, shall be guided by the following
facts and circumstances:
1. Existence of tenancy relationship
2. The land subject of the case is agricultural
3. Cause of action involves ejectment or removal of a farmer,
farmworker, or tenant;
4. The crime alleged arose out of or is in connection with an
agrarian dispute, Provided that the prosecution of criminal
offenses penalized by RA 6657 as amended shall be within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian
Courts;
5. The Land subject of the case is covered by the Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA), Emancipation Patent (EP), or
other title issued under the agrarian reform program, and that
the case involves the right of possession, use, and ownership
thereof; or
6. The civil case filed before the court of origin concerns the
ejectment of farmers/tenants/farmworkers, enforcement or
rescission of contracts arising from, connected with, or
pertaining to an Agribusiness Ventures Agreement (AWA),
and the like.
The existence of one or more of the foregoing circumstances may be
sufficient to justify a conclusion that the case is agrarian in nature. The
Chief of the Legal Division, or the DAR lawyer or legal officer assigned
shall accordingly conclude that the case is agrarian in nature cognizable
by the DAR, and thus recommend that the case is not proper for trial.
The admin order has already stated the examples of these crimes that
arose out or in connection with agrarian.
Section 12. The Recommendation of the PARO is final. The
recommendation of the PARO is final and non-appealable. Any Party
who may disagree with the recommendation of the PARO has judicial
recourse by submitting his/her/its position to the referring Court or
Office of the Public Prosecutor in accordance with the latters rules.
Atty Comments:
For example, the PARO would now return or submit his
certification to the Public Prosecutor investigating. The prosecutor will
now resolve the case, weighing the evidence including the certification
of the PARO. If the prosecutor dismisses the case and approved by the
reviewing fiscal and city prosecutor then the recourse is through an MR
(Motion for Reconsideration) appeal to the Regional Prosecutor in
which the jurisdiction of the case lies or appeal to the Secretary of
Justice. If the case is with the MTCC and dismisses the case then the
appeal is with the RTC. If the case is with RTC then appeal is with CA.
Isidro v. CA (requisites not present)
Facts:
Private respondent filed an unlawful detainer with the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the case because the land is agricultural and so
agrarian.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
SC:
The case involving agri land does not automatically make such
case agrarian. Because there are requisites to be followed for it to be an
agrarian dispute.
Supplico v. CA (requisites present)
Facts:
Suplico is a lessee of a land. Respondent was allowed by
suplico to till the land and the shares are divided between him and
Suplico. A year later, Suplico threatened respondent with ejectment.
Respondent filed an action for damages in CAR.
SC:
No reason to disturb the findings.
Atty: Comment:
The SC found that the requisites are present however it did
not discuss the requisites one by one. What was discussed instead was
the actual possession of the land, personal cultivation and sharing of
the harvest. Consent was not mentioned in the case. I believe if there
was consent then it could have another been decided otherwise
because consent is so powerful. Do you agree?
Bejesa v. CA (tenancy not established)
Facts:
Candelaria leased a land to Malabanan. Malabanan hired the
Bejasas to till the land. Bejasas did not give any consideration for the
use of the land in the form of rent or shared harvest. The Bejasas filed a
complaint against Candelaria for confirmation of leasehold and home
lot with damages
SC:
There was no tenancy relationship between the parties. There
was no proof of share of harvest.
Atty Comment:
What was the proof submitted by Bejasa? Self-serving
statements. Whose statements? Bejasas. The court needed a receipt or
any other similar evidence. Insofar as the word receipt is concerned,
the court is consistent however with the phrase and other similar
evidences the court is not. Naay uban case, nga other evidence. Nawala
ang word nga similar. Naa poy uban nga concrete eveidence or
other concrete evidence. Though the court did not discuss what this
receipt is, it has to be a receipt coming from the land owner. Because it
would be self-serving if the receipt would be coming from the tenant.
Monsanto v. Zerna (tenancy relationship established)
Facts:
 Sps. Zerna was charged with qualified theft for taking
coconuts owned by Monsanto.
SC:
The court dismissed the case however ordered Sps. To return
the amount of 1,100 on the ground of non-consent to harvest of the
coconut. Tenancy relationship may be established verbally or writing,
expressly or impliedly.
Atty Comment:
Ngano gipa-uli man ang kwarta? Because the amount was the
proceed of the harvest. The RTC was reminded by the Supreme Court
that it did not have jurisdiction because the case was agrarian and
should have been decided by the DARAB.
Valencia v. CA (tenancy not established)
Facts:
Same facts with Suplico and Bejasa. Velancia as the owner and
Fr. Flores the lessee but there is a prohibition against subleasing or
encumbering the land without Valencias written consent.
SC:
An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in
question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. A tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed.
Atty Comment:
Can you reconciled, the principle of a tenancy relation cannot
be presumed and implied contract of tenancy? Duna bay conflict nila?
When you allege that there is an implied contract of tenancy, you still
have to prove the six requisites. So, I think that this principle that a
tenancy relation cannot be presumed can still be applied to an implied
contract of tenancy.
Almuete v. Andres (Ownership)
Facts:
Almuete is in possession of the land. However, Amdres was
awarded homestead patent due to investigation report that Almuete
was unknown and waived his rights. Almuete filed for recovery of
possession and reconveyance before the trial court.
SC:
The Supreme Court, held that this is not an agrarian dispute.
There is no juridical tie of the landowner and tenant as alleged between
petitioners and respondents thus the RTC was competent to try the
case.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Pasong Bayabas v. CA (tenancy not established)
Facts:
Its about a development of a land. Prior to the development,
the land was converted from agricultural to residential as approved by
DAR. Petitioners claim that there was surreptitious conversion of the
land so they filed a case before the RTC.
SC:
No tenancy. There is even no allegation in the complain that
petitioners-members are tenants plus there were waiver of rights
which constitutes abandonment. No concrete evidence of cultivation
and no proof presented except for their self-serving statements.
Atty Comments:
Under what law gani ang emancipation patent? PD 27, Marcos
time. At the time of Marcos, the name of the title is emancipation
patent. Under CARL the name of the title is CLOA. Although before,
before you are issued emancipation patent, you are issued CLT
(certificate of land transfer) preparatory to the issuance of
emancipation patent.
Nicorp Management and Devt Corp v. De Leon (tenancy
not shown)
Facts:
No substantial evidence to support the CA conclusion that
respondent is bona fide tenant of the property. The only evidence
presented was a letter in which the word kasama is used to refer to
the respondent.
Issue: where kasama is tenant
SC:
The word kasama could be taken in varying context and not
necessarily in relation to an agricultural leasehold agreement.
Sps. Fajardo v. Flores (tenancy established)
Facts:
Sps. Fajardo are legitimate tenants. There was an agreement
of a termination of their relationship but Fajardo is given a share of the
land of Flores so they executed an agreement. However the problem
arises when the agreement did not specify the land on which the
tenants are to be given. Flores taught the land in which the house of
Fajardo is situated is not the portion to be given by Fajardo so he wants
the house removed. Fajardo argues that the land in which his house
stood was the land given to him.
SC:
If the dispute originates from the relationship even if there is
an agreement then the dispute is agrarian. The severance of the
tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an
agrarian dispute.
Adriano v. Tanco (tenancy not established)
Facts:
Same facts.
Issue: whether there is a proof of sharing
SC:
There is no proof of sharing. Mere occupation does not
automatically convert a tiller into an agricultural tenant. He who alleges
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof.
Atty Comments:
In the previous cases, the Supreme Court is looking for an
independent evidence. What evidence? To prove sharing of the harvest.
This evidence is already required to prove consent. Sharing of the
harvest is an independent evidence such as receipts.
Estate of Pastor Samson v. Susano
Facts:
There were affidavits made by the neighbors to serve as an
evidence.
Issue:
Are they self-serving?
SC:
No. they are not self-serving. However they cannot be
admissible because they lack details on their personal knowledge as to
how the crop-sharing agreement was implemented.
Galope v. Bugarin (tenancy established)
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Fact:
Bugarin is the owner. He complained in the barangay because
the share he receives from the tenant are just small compared from
what he expects. So he wanted to be the one who will personally farm
the land.
SC:
There is tenancy relation because it was even admitted by the
owner himself.
Atty Comment:
Unsay gigamit sa SC, the admission of the landowner when he
complained in the brgy. The admission confirms that indeed rentals are
being paid.
Six Requisites:
1. Respondent is the landowner and Petitioner is the tenant
2. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a
farm land
3. They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by
petitioner and share in the harvest.
4. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about
agricultural production
5. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or
its equivalent in cash
6. Personal cultivation of the land by the tenant
Ladano v. Neri (tenancy not established)
Atty Comment (wla siya nisutli sa facts):
In this case there was no allegation of relationship. Is the allegation
important? Yes. Because the allegation determines the jurisdiction of
the case. What will you prove if you have alleged.
Heirs of Florentino Quilo v. DBP (tenancy not established)
Facts:
Petioners are heirs of Florentino who claimed to be a tenant
of the land. DBP was the mortgagee of the subject land that was
mortgaged by previous owners and sold to private respondents. The
proceedings started at RARAD with Florentino (later substituted by his
heirs after he died) claiming a right to redeem for being a tenant.
RARAD and DARAB ruled for the heirs while CA reversed as tenancy
relationship was not established.
SC:
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie and relationship cannot
be presumed. To prove consent, there has to be an independent and
concrete evidence.
July 16 2016

Davao New Town v. Sps Saliga (tenancy not established)
Private respondents filed before PARAD a complaint for
injunction and collation of titles of petitioners alleging that
they and their parents are tenants
Petitioners answered that it is a purchaser in good faith and
that there was no tenancy
PARAD and DARAB held that tenancy exist
CA affirmed
Atty Comments:
The land was already reclassified to residential thus the
element of subject matter that it is agricultural is lacking.
Jopson v. Mendez Jr. (tenancy not established)
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that he is a bone fide tenant-farmer of the
parcel of land subject of the sale between respondent DBP and
respondent Mendez
His father Melchor Jopson was the original tenant of subject
landholding appointed as such by the spouses Laura and Jose
in 1947 (Sps are the original owners which conveyed to DBP
by way of dacion en pago)
SC:
There was no concrete proof submitted and the land is no
longer agricultural because there was a zoning ordinance that the land
is already a commercial zone. The requisites are lacking thus the
tenancy was not established.
Reyes v. Heirs of Pablo Floro (tenancy not established)
Facts:
There is a tenant (Reyes) who has two pieces of evidence. One
is a certification from Carmen Bautista, the previous owner of the land.
Second is that there is a MARO certification that Reyes is an agricultural
lessee or tenant.
SC:
MARO certification (certified as agricultural lessee) is merely
a preliminary and does not bind the courts as conclusive evidence that
Reyes is a lessee who cultivates the land for purposes of agricultural
production. Petitioner failed to submit any proof that he personally
cultivated the land. He only had a picture of a hut erected on the land.
Thus is not enough to prove that a leasehold relationship exists. The
certification from Bautista has little evidentiary value, without any
corroborative evidence. The certification was not notarized and
Bautista was not even presented as a witness.
Atty Comments:
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
It is not law students that commits errors like this, even
lawyers commit errors like this. If you say like Agricultural lessee, that
is not a factual circumstance but a conclusion of law. If you are a MARO,
you cannot certify that a person is an agricultural lessee or tenant.
Why? Because MARO is not a judicial entity neither a Quasi-Judicial
entity. You cannot say that there was a fraudulent transfer of land, you
must collaborate it with other evidences. If you have a picture of a hut
in land does not prove anything but that there is a hut in the land. It
does not prove there is personal cultivation, unless ug mag-selfie cguro
or naay picture nga nagcultivate. Do you know the significance of
notarization of a document? In the admissibility of the document, you
do not need to let the witness who executed the document to verify. It
would be admitted immediately by the Court.
Quintos v. DARAB (tenancy not established)
Facts:
KAMIFCI filed an action for the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the subject property against Quintos before
PARAD asserting its rights under an agricultural leasehold
tenancy agreement it purportedly entered into the Lacuesta
(APT OIC). In his answer, Quintos denied the personality of
KAMIFCI as a registered cooperative as well as the existence
of any tenancy agreement covering the subject property.
PARAD, DARAB and CA ruled in favour private respondent,
holding the existence of tenancy relationship.
SC:
Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of
particular facts as required by law
The burden of proof rests on the one claiming to be a tenant to
prove his affirmative allegation by substantial evidence. His
failure to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which
he bases his claim would put the opposite party under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense. The rule applies
to civil and administrative cases.
The right to hire tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by law. Hence the
consent of the landowner should be secured prior to the
installation of tenants.
In the present case, the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA all held
that a tenancy relationship exist between GCFI and the
KAMIFCI members who were allegedly installed as tenants by
APT, the legal possessor of the mango orchard at the time.
Records are, however, bereft of any showing that APT was
authorized by the propertys landowner, GCFI, to install
tenants thereon.
Atty Comments:
N/A
Automat Realty v. Sps. Cruz
Facts:
Automat is a corporation. Ofelia voluntarily offered her
services to Lim who is representing Automat. She became a caretaker.
Her reason being to prevent informal settlers. Later on, she and her
family was the one who occupied the land and they were paying rents.
The problem with Automat is that they received the rents from Ofelia.
Mr. Lim agreed with a condition that Ofelia would vacate the premises
once Automat will be using the property. When the time came that the
Automat will use the property, Sps. Dela Cruz refused to vacate and
demanded that they will be paid for compensation and they claimed
that they were agricultural tenants who enojoyed security of tenure
under the law.
SC:
This court has held that a MARO certification (that Sps Dela
Cruz are the actual tillers of the land) concerning the
presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, is considered merely preliminary or
provisional, hence, such certification does not bind the
judiciary.
The amended cetification does not bind the court. Several
elements must be present before the courts can conclude that
a tenancy relationship exist. MARO certification are limited to
factual determination such as the presence of actual tillers. It
cannot make legal conclusion on the existence of a tenancy
agreement.
Land is non-agricultural because of classification (zoning
ordinance with approval from HLRUB)
SC found presence of consent (Automat never denied giving
consent to installing respondent spouses as caretakers of the
land. Automat never denied receipt of the rentals.
Atty Comments:
N/A
Coverage (Sec. 4)
RA 9700, Sec. 3
Section. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No.
131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the of the
public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of
landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be
covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries
Schedule of implementation (Sec. 5)
Sec. 5 The distribution xxx shall be implemented immediately and
completed within 10 years from effectivity hereof.
Sec.63 The initial amount needed to implement this Act for the period
of ten years upon approval hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian
Reform Fund created under Section 20 and Section 21 of EO No. 299.
xxx
Atty Comment:
Section 5 talks about the implementation while 63 talks about
the funding.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
When did CARL took effect? *deep silence. Kalimot namo?! Ako
kaha ni pangutana sa exam noh? Ako ni ask kay kalimtanon kaayo mo.
CARL took effect on June 15 1988 up to June 15 1998 that is pursuant
to Sec 5. In Section 63. The government set asides an amount to be used
for the implementation of the law in a period of 10 years. 1998 came
and there is an amended by law (RA 8542). What was the section that
was amended? Section 63. what was not amended was section 5. And
for your information, Section 5 was never amended.
RA 8532: amended Sec. 63 as follows: The amount needed to
implement this Act until 2008 shall be funded from Agrarian Reform
Fund.
Interpreted up to December 31, 2008
Joint Resolution No. 19 of the Senate and House extending
implementation upon to June 30, 2009.
After the lapsed of June 30, 2009. There was no amendment for the
extension of the law. Congress are confused on to who to favour
whether it is the landowner or the farmers. So what Congress did,
extended June 30, 2009. Can the mere resolution amend the land? Was
it valid that Congress amended Sec. 63 and not Sec. 5? My Question are
answered not by DAR by by a case. The case of DAR v. Woodland.
DAR v. Woodland
Facts:
NOC (Notice of Coverage) dated December 11 2003 and NOA
(Notice of Acquisition) dated October 5 2004 were issued over the
portion of respondents land
Issue:
Can petitioner still issue NOC and NOA after June 15, 1998?
SC:
For us to sustain Woodlands theory that the DAR can no
longer issue those notices after June 15, 1998 despite the
enactment of RA 8532 would thwart the CARPs purpose.
Clearly, Section 63 refers to the implementation of the CARL
in its entirety, not just the funding source. Indeed, RA 8542
specifically amended Section 63 of RA 6657 but it does not
follow that only Section 63 had been affected by the
amendment. The fact that Section 63 falls under the chapter
on Financing only emphasizes its general applicability.
Hence, the phrase until the year 2008 used in RA 8532
unmistakably extends the DARs authority to issue NOCs for
purpose of acquiring and distributing private agricultural
lands
Finally RA 9700 extended the acquisition and distribution of
all agricultural lands until June 30 2014. The title alone of RA
9700 An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and
Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary
Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of
Republic Act. 6657, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, As amended, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor reveals that the CARP was
 indeed extended from 1998 to 2008 via RA 8532. Had there
been no prior extension from 1998 to 2008, how else could
CARP have been extended by RA 9700 until June 30 2014?
There could have been an extension only if the program
sought to be extended had not
expired.
RA 9700
Approved August 7, 2009
Section 34. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take effect on July 1, 2009
and it shall be published in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Section 21: Section 63. Funding Source. The amount needed to
further implement the CARP as provided in this Act, until June 30, 2014,
upon expiration of funding under RA 8532 and other pertinent laws,
shall be funded from Agrarian Reform Fund and other funding sources
in the amount of at least One hundred fifty billion pesos
(150,000,000,000,000)
Atty Comments:
It was given a retroactive effect. And the Congress was
consistent in amending the Section 63 instead of Section 5
What happens after June 30, 2014?
DARs management reiterated that it will be business as usual
for the agrarian reform agency come July 1, 2014. The
agencys official clarified that DAR can still distribute land
even after June 30, 2014
Section 30 permits DAR to complete the acquisition and
distribution of landholding for which there are pending cases
or proceedings. And since a Notice of Coverage initiates land
distribution proceedings for lands subject to compulsory
acquisition, then all landholdings with NOCs can still be
distributed after June 2014 DAR Undersecretary for Legal
Affairs Anthony Parungao
Parungao added that the Department of Justice, through DOJ
Opinion No. 59 and 60 Series of 2013 concurs with this
position.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 2 of the 2014 General
Appropriation Act (GAA) explicitly states that all lands which
have been issued notices of coverage and with pending cases
and/or proceedings as of June 30, 2014 shall continue to be
processed until issuance of the duly registered certificate of
land ownership award to the individual agrarian reform
beneficiaries in accordance with Section 30 of RA 9700 and
Item IV (A.I) of DAR A.O No. 2 Series of 2009, as amended.
July 20, 2016
Refreshing your memory:
Section 63 of CARL was amended by RA 8532 extending the
implementation of CARL from 1998 up to 2008. And then in the case
DAR v Woodland, notices were sent during 2003 and 2004, Woodland
questioned these notices contending that it should be Section 5 that
should have been amended not Section 63.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Extensions CARP
June 15, 1988 effective for 10 years until 1998
RA 8532 extended CARP until 2008 (valid until Dec 31 2008)
Resolution by Senate Up to June 30, 2009
RA 9700 until June 30 2014.
Since the start, up to June 30, 2014, there is no gap as to the
implementation of CARP. Of course, Congress was also consistent in
amending Section 63. Section 5 already expired in 1998, so cannot be
amended anymore.
If NOC and NOA were issued prior to June 30, 2014, DAR can
continue its acquisition and distribution. What about if there were no
NOC and NOA issued after June 30, 2014, DAR cannot issue those
notices in the absence of law. As of now, no law extending CARP.
Neither is a new law setting again a new schedule of implantation of
CARP. If there will be another extension, I really think, that there will be
a retroactive effect.
SECTION 6. HOMESTEAD GRANTEES
SECTION 6.Retention Limits. Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural
land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as
determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall
retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.
Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years
of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally
retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That
original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of
the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be
compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner:
Provided, however, That in case the area selected for
retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall
have the option to choose whether to remain therein or
be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant
chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be
considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a
beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to
be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his
right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the
landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a
period of one (1) year from the time the landowner
manifests his choice of the area for retention.
Qualifications under Sec. 6 (Take note):
1. original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs
2. who still own the homestead
3. as long as they continue to cultivate
 Purpose of Homestead:
To give home and cultivation.
You have original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs, they
still own the homestead at the time of the approval of the law and they
will retain these areas as long as they continue to cultivate the said
homestead.
Based on Section 6, none of the granted land will be covered by CARP if
it is continuously cultivated by the original grantee or the compulsory
heirs.
ALMERO V PACQUING
According to the dissent Justice Leonen, Section 6 was
unconstitutional considering that there is no phrase continuous
cultivation found in the Consitution.
Just to give you an overview, these are the requirements regarding to
homestead patents. The original grantee shall retain the same areas
(whether 12 or 24 hectares granted).
Observation: The law used the word retain. Section 6 also with
respect to the retention of the land owner, it also used retain. With
respect to the land in favour of farmer beneficiaries, award is used.
With respect to the child, award also was used.
What reason that the constitution does not qualify continuous
cultivation?
ATTYS OPINION: If there is a requirement of continuous cultivation,
DAR does not have jurisdiction. It is CENROs jurisdiction. Why?
Because CENRO is the one who gave the land, it is CENRO that should
examine and verify the grant or the reward.
CONTINUOUS CULTIVATION (JURISPRUDENCE)
ALITA v CA
Private respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest have
acquired a land through homestead patent. And they are desirous of
personally cultivating the land. While petitioner tenants refused to
vacate.
ATTY: Why am I underlining desirous? This is in connection with Paris
v Alfeche. But I believe that this case of Alita has nothing to do with the
condition as long as they continue to cultivate. But why underline? This
phrase was cited in Paris v Alfeche.
Private respondents desired to cultivate so they want tenants to vacate.
Petitioner argues PD27.
In my opinion, issue is not whether the desire to cultivate is sufficient
element of the continuous cultivation of the land. SC did not say that
this is the issue. (OPINION RA NI)
ISSUE:
Is a homestead patent covered by PD27?
RULING:
Private respondents argue that they are tenants under PD 27. However,
the SC ruled that PD 27 cannot be invoked as against Homestead
Patent. The latter is a superior right than PD 27.
PARIS V ALFECHE
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Paris is the owner of 23 hectares. Dinhi nabunggo si Paris, she
admitted that the land was fully tenanted. It implies that Paris is not
actually and continuously cultivating the land because other people is
cultivating the land.
Actually, what happened here was the lands of Paris, they
were already titles issued to the tenant farmers and Paris wants these
to be cancelled. Paris claimed that she is entitled to retention and that
as original homestead grantee, she is entitled to retain the lands to the
exclusion of tenants.
RULING:
Contention of petition is without basis.
PD applies to all tenanted private agriculture lands primarily devoted
to rice and corn. Nowhere does it appear that lots obtained by
homestead patents are exempted from its operation. Under RA 6657,
rights of homestead grantee are provided but with condition: only for
as long as they continue to cultivate them.
That parcels of land are covered by homestead will not automatically
exempt them from operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued
cultivation by original grantees or direct compulsory heirs that shall
exempt their lands.
As compared to Alita?
Paris cited the case of Alita vs CA. According to the SC, as compared to
Alita, owner was desirous to cultivate thus, the court upheld the right of
homestead owners.
Observations: It is alright to compared Paris and Alfeche. But not based
on desire to cultivate. Because there was no issue on the desire to
cultivate in the case of Alita. Naa lang sa facts! The only issue on the
Alita case was whether homestead patent is covered in PD27. Dinhi
nabunggo ang Supreme Court with due respect. (OPINION RA NI)
In the case of Almero v Pacquing, ang gigamit na argumaent sa Office of
the President is about the desire to cultivate in Paris v Alfeche.
Supreme Court said that it was not there ruling in Paris. Our ruling was
there has to be a condition and it has to be complied with.
So in the case of Alemero, the Supreme Court was strict, there was a
condition and the condition was to be complied with.
In you practive later on, if there are cases cited by the other party.
Please discuss whether those cases apply to your case or not. Of course,
you do not want those cases to apply, you have to finds ways to win.
You need to point out whether the issues are the same and the
principles of law used.
So comparing Aleta, petitioner did not cultivate and they have no also
expressed their desire.
The heirs are also not entitled to 3 hectares because Paris has 23
hectares. He is saying covered by homestead, therefore I have to retain
all of these. SC said you do not have the right because you are not
cultivating and you have not expressed your desire, but since you are a
land owner, you are entitle to 5 hectares. How about the children?
Nagcultivate ba? Wala, kay fully tenanted man. Nagmanage ba ang mga
anak? Wala kay fully tenanted man.
Thus, Paris will retain 5 out of 23 hectares only.
DAR Memorandum Circular 05-14
In relation to homestead, DAR came up with a Memo Circular
*If the grantee will voluntary offered the land for sale to the
government. Does it need requirements? No! Voluntary man.
*How about mandatory? Requirements are needed. For verification by
DAR kun tinuod ba gyud ang mga conditions:
- If the land owner is alive, affidavit by the landowner is
needed.
- If not, Brgy Chairperson certification
- If deceased ang daghan na landowners, joint affidavit by
farmers or certification
Take note: Original grantee ang land owner. Only the original grantee
and the compulsory heirs benefit this homestead patent provision. Not
third person who bought the land from original grantees.
ALMERO v PACQUING
The subject of the issue here before SC is the interpretation of the Office
of the President. According to it, the ruling of the SC in Paris v Alfeche,
Lindas mere expression of her desire to continue or start anew with
the cultivation of the land would suffice the condition of continuous
cultivation
This means that Linda was not in actual cultivation.
SC said that the condition must be complied. It did not mention the
desire to cultivate. There was no express pronouncement of the court
what was really the intention of comparing the case of Alita and Paris
on the desire to cultivate.
The continuous cultivation condition should be within the province or
jurisdiction of CENRO of DENR, not CARL of DAR.
Now, kadtong mga minyu na, take note that in Section 6, it talks about
landowners right to retain, di pwede musobra sa 5. If you are married,
you are covered under this rule. So if under the ka Family Code, and
your property regime is Absolute, both spouses -- total not to exceed 5
hectare because two become one.
Tip from Atty: change the classification of the agricultural land to
residential land. This is safer.
Look at the first part of section 6, there are two parts of the retention
limits. One is the right to retain the agricultural land. Meanign the
excess will be acquired by the government. Number two is ownership
ceiling, it means that if at present you already own 5 hectares of
agricultural land, you cannot anymore acquire additional agri land
because ou will exceed your ownership ceiling.
Basis: no person may own or retain of section 6
o Own means the ownership ceiling
o Retain means the retention limit.
Another! It says person. It did not qualify natural or juridical.
Therefore, apil both natural ang juridical.
According to section 6 also, the compulsory heirs may be awarded 3
hectares with qualifications:
1. Actually tilling or directly managing the farm
2. Age of 15
ATTY: In practice, naa dinhi ang gray area. Gray area in a sense, either
dili kacomply if imong subayon ang balaud or nay possible corruption
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
kung dili makasubaya unya gibutang gyud nga tagaan or awardan ang
child.
***Atty. told his experience on this.
JULY 23, 2016
So just to summarize, you have section 6 two retention:
1. Landowners retention
2. Homestead Grantees retention
It was also mentioned reward to each child of the landowner subject to
qualifications.
SECTION 6. RETENTION RIGHTS of Land Owners
SECTION 6.Retention Limits. Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural
land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as
determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall
retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.
Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years
of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally
retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That
original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of
the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained,
which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the
landowner: Provided, however, That in case the area
selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the
tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain
therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In
case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he
shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right
to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant
chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land,
he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by
the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option
within a period of one (1) year from the time the
landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
The term award is also being used there. There are similarities between
the award to a child and the award to the farmer beneficiaries. The
number of hectares to be awarded is the same. The name of the title is
also the same CLOA. And also prohibition is the same 10 year
prohibited period.
The difference between the two is that child does not pay the govt
while farmer beneficiary pays.
Direct Management
 o Shall refer to the cultivation of the land thru personal
supervision under the system of labor administration. It
shall be interpreted along the lines of farm management
as an actual major activity being performed by the
landowners child from which he/she derives his/her
primary source of income. (2006 AO No. 06, s. 2006)
To emphasize that the right of the land owner of retention is given
importance.
DAEZ v CA
SC said that if it turned that the retained area of the landowner, title has
been issued in favour of the farmer beneficiary, EP or CLOA the court
is saying that it can be cancelled.
Question is if truly there are really farmers in the retained area, and
these farmers has titles, even if there title is cancelled, the leasehold
relationship will continue.
Titles may be cancelled but leasehold will still continue.
DAR Admin Order No. 2, Series of 2003
o who may apply the retention
o period of exercise right of retention
o where to file
o instance where owner is considered to have waived his
right of retention
o Operating procedure: MARO PARO Reg Director Sec
(Appeal)
There are provisions on who may apply, period to exercise the right of
retention. For example, if the landowner availed the voluntary offer to
sell, it should be manifested at the time of the offer.
What about if DAR issue a NOA? (no voluntary offer)
The period of exercise is 60 days from receipt of the notice of
coverage That means if he did not exercise this right within the period,
it is considered as one of the instances that the owner has waived his
right of retention.
Meaning?
It does not mean that he will not be able to retain 5 hectares. I
means that he will not be able to choose the land to retain.
Other examples:
o o
o land is still entitled to an award of his parents
o VOS does not present to DAR to exercise the right of
retention, considered waiver
o Failure to manifest within 60 days
o Landowner executes a waiver
o If the landowner execute another document and effect
that he is not exercising his right of retention
considered waiver.
DAR v Carriedo
In this case, SC said that sale of the property is not one of the
instances that the landowner waived his right of retention.
In the case of DAR v Carriedo, there was a sale and the issue
was whether the sale made by Carriedo is a waiver of his right of
rentention.
SC said no, because sale is not mentioned as an instance in the
DAR Admin Order. The list is exclusive.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
So you have the procedure: the MARO, the PARO, the Director. An in
case of appeal, go to Secretary of DAR.
DAR Admin Order 05-06
Policies:
1. It is the policy of the DAR to acquire and distribute all lands covered
under RA 5567 including thos subject of illegal transfers/ sales.
2. The DAR shall as a matter of policy, cover all lands, in excess of the
five hectare retention limit or land ownership ceiling.
3. Where the transfer/ sale involves a total aggregate of more than five
hectares, the transfer is legal and proper. However, a DAR clearance is
needed.
ATTY: in case in you practice, if land involve in sale is agricultural land,
it is always best to pay.
4. if the sale involve more than 5 hectare retention, the transfer is
violative.
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five hectares
sold without DAR clearance and corresponding titles issues by the
Register of Deeds in the name of the transferee shall, under the
principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be trated as the
transferor/s retained area but in no case shall the transferee exceed
the 5 hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to section6, 70 ad 73. The
excess will be covered that the transferor has no right of disposition
since CARP coverage has been vested as of June 15, 1988.
DAR AO No 06-06
Coverage: all children of landowners who ae qualified to be awarded
with portion of agri land of their parent-land owners covered under the
CARP.
Atty: The child is given preference in the distribution; provided he or
she meets qualifications provided further, only untenanted portions
may be subject for transfer.
From ppt:
o In all cases, the aggregate award to a qualified child shall
not exceed the limit of 3 hectares.
A qualified child who owns less than 5 hectares of agri
landholding provided that his or her total area, including
the area to be awarded under Carp shall not exceed the
five hectare ownership ceiling.
o CLOA duly registered with ROD concerned shall be issued
to qualified child of landowners.
Its the same name of the title to farmer beneficiaries
o A qualified child cannot enter into Voluntary Land
Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme agreement with
his/her parent-landower unless he/she is tenant in his
own right prior to June 15, 1988.
o The land awarded to a qualified child shall be utilized for
agricultural production and shall be subject to the usual
restrictions and conditions governing CLOAs as provided
in RA 6657 and pertinent implementing guidelines.
 o The landowner shall nominate his/her qualified
child/rewardee within 30 days from receipt of NOC or
upon the filing of Voluntary Offier to Sell. Failure to do so
within the said period shall constitute a waiver of the
landowners privilege to nominate children who may
qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
o Children who were not nominated by their parent-
landowner and children of landowners who did not avail
the retention rights shall be precluded from filing an
application to be awarded a portion of the agricultural
land owned by their parent-landowner.
Qualifications:
1. Filipino Citizen
2. At least 15yo
3. Actual tillers or one directly managing the farm as of June 15,
1988 up to the time of the conduct of field investigation of the
landholding under CARP.
DAR AO No 02-09
------ this one should be your new bible (ana si sir)
o Rules and Procedures Governing the Acquisition and
Distribution of Agricultural Lands under RA No 6657, as
amended by RA No. 9700
Governing Principles:
o RA 9700 provides for, among others, the continuing
acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands covered
under CARP for a period of five years under various
phases and the simultaneous provision of support
services and the delivery of Agrarian justice to ARBs.
o After June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be
limited to Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory
Acquisition and that VLT shall be allowed only for
landholdings submitted for VLT as of June 30, 2009.
If NOC, were issued prior to June 30 2009, DAR can still continue the
process of acquisition and distribution.
Mode of acquisition can only be limited to voluntary offer and CA and
that VLT shall be allowed only for landholdings submitted for VLT as of
June 30, 2009.
Coverage:
Acquisition and Distributionof all agri lands yet to be acquired and or to
be distributed under CARP.
Policies:
Notice of Coverage
- The acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands
under CARP shall be completed by June 30, 2014.
However, the process of acquisition and distribution for
landholdings which were issued with NOCs on or before
June 30, 2014 shall continue even after June 30, 2014
until said lands will be awarded to qualified beneficiaries.
Other notable provisions:
-modes of service of NOC
- Landowners retention
- Land Acquisition
- Land Valuation and Land Compensation
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
- Farmer Beneficiary Identification, screening and selection
- Land Distribution
SEC. 6-A. Exception to Retention Limits. - Provincial, city and
municipal government, units acquiring private agricultural lands by
expropriation or other modes of acquisition to be used for actual,
direct and exclusive public purposes, such as roads and bridges,
public markets, school sites, resettlement sites, local government
facilities, public parks and barangay plazas or squares, consistent with
the approved local comprehensive land use plan, shall not be
subject to the five (5)-hectare retention limit under this Section xxx.
(RA 9700, Sec. 4)
ATTY: That means if you have an agricultural land, the landowner will
choose an area which the LGU will use for public purposes, the
landowner cannot use his right of retention to prevent the LGU from
exercising its right to expropriate.
REASON: Public purposes such as road, bridges, public market, school
sites, resettlement sites, local government facilities, public parks and
barangay plazas or squares
- So what the landowner can do is choose another area. That is if it is
consistent with the comprehensive land use of the LGU.
Do not be misled, the title still speaks about retention limits. You will
have to take note again, the opening phrase no person may own or
retain.
SECTION 10 (EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS)
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions from coverage of CARL
(a) Lands ADE used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation,
fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves
(exempt);
- You will note, jurisdiction here lies with DENR
- Example: agricultural lands all the way to balamban (watershed area),
exempted from CARP because it is for a different purpose
(b) private lands ADE used for prawn farms and fishponds (exempt)
- You have RA 7881, that exempts it from the coverage during the time
of Ramos
(c) lands ADE used and found to be necessary for national defense,
school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations,
seeds and seedlings research, church sites and convents, mosque
sites, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies
and farms and all lands with 18% slope and over (exempt)
- Very interesting (daw), Why? (a) and (b), you have the qualifying
words ADE, which is used under letter (b) and which is also used under
letter (c) BUT, there is an additional phrase: found to be necessary. And
this was tested in the case of Central Mindanao. WHY? (go to Central
Mindanao Case)
- experimental farm stations, seeds and seedlings research why
exempted? For agricultural production
- church sites and convents, mosque sites freedom of religion
Lands which have been classified or proclaimed , and actually, directly,
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds and water shed
and mangroves shall be exempted from the coverage of CARP until
Congress, taking into account ecological developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of
public domain.
What about reforestation?
Also excluded from the coverage of CARP, provided that the
areas or portions thereof occupied by qualified forest occupants shall
be included in the Integrated Social Forestry program of the DENR.
And then, if your land has a slop of 18% and over EXEMPTED. But if
already developed for agricultural pruposes as of June 15, 1988 shall be
allocated to qualified occupants.
And then another guideline:
In all cases, the DAR shall conduct a continuing review and
verification of exempted lands to ascertain which of the areas
declared exempt or which portions thereof are no longer actually,
directly and exclusively used and found necessary for said purpose. If
the purpose for the grant of exemption no longer exists, the area or
portion involved shall be covered under CARP pursuant to the
guidelines on land acquisition and distribution.
Why?
Lets say you have 5 hectares of agriland, and it turned out that after
exemption, 2 hectare are not actually, directly and exclusively used, it
will be acquired by the govt to beneficiaries.
Admin Order No. 13-90
- Process to be followed
File petition with MARO to be reviewed by PARO and to be approve by
regnl director if the number of hectare is below 5.
If 5 and above it goes to Bureau of Agrarian legal affairs to be reviewed
by Usec. For Legal Affair - Secretary
CENTRAL MINDANAO v. DARAB
Atty: I would like to stress that according to this case there
was a Presidential Proclamation reserving this for school purposes. 3k
hectares of agricultural land is involve.
The subject lands are exempted because they are actually,
directly & exclusively used and found necessary for school site and
campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes
and for establishing seed and seeding research
The construction of DARAB in Section 10 restricting the land
area of CMU to its present needs overlooked the significant factor it
growth of a university in years to come. By the nature of CMU, which is
a school established to promote agriculture & industry, the need for
vast tract of agriculture land for future programs of expansion is
obvious.
While portion of CMU land was leased by Phil. Packing
Corp.(now Del Monte), the agreement was prior to CARL & was directly
connected to the purpose & objectives of CMU as educational
institution.
As to determination of when and what lands are found to be
necessary for use of CMU, school is in best position to resolve & answer
the question. DARAB & CA have no right to substitute unless it is
manifest that CMU has no real need for land.
SC:
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Did not use the phrase found to be necessary, but impliedly
it was referring to it. Because even if that portion of land was not used,
if it was found to be necessary for future expansion, it is to be exempted
from coverage.
I like what SC said here: who will determine/decide when and what
lands are found to be necessary?
SC: it is the school and the only exception is if it is manifest that CMU
has no real need for the land. (wala ko kagets ano diri tbh)
DAR v DECS
Facts:
1921, subject lands were donated by the late Esteban
Jalandoni to respondents DECS and titles thereto were transferred in
the name of respondent DECS.
DECS leased the lands to AAC for 10 Agri crop years,
commencing from 1984-1985 to 1993-1994. The lease was
subsequently renewed for another 10 years.
1993: Alpar and several others claiming to be permanent and
regular farm workers of the subject lands filed a petition for
Compulsory Agra Reform Program coverage with the MARO.
After investigation, MARO sent a Notice of Coverage to DECS,
stating that the lands are now covered by CARP.
In this case, the land was previously privately owned until it
was donated to DECS.
Ruling:
The records of the case show that the subject properties were
formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban
Jalandoni, and were donated to DECS. From that time until they were
leased to ACC, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted
to sugarcane.
Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act before and
after the enactment of RA 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Indubitable, the subject
lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain devoted
to or suitable for agriculture.
Compare with CMU case:
In the CMU case, the land was ade used and found to be
necessary for school site and campuses. Although a portion of it was
being used by the Del Monte under a Mgt and Devt Agreement, the
undertaking was that the land shall be used by Del Monte as part of the
CMU research program with direct participation of faculty and
students. Hence, the retention of the land was found to be necessary for
the present and future educational purposes.
On the other hand, the lands in the case of DECS were not
actually, and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses as they
were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation (ACC), not for
educational purposes. The income from the lease was for repairs and
renovations not educational purpose.
This one is one of the factors that SC considered which is
different with CMU v DARAB
Atlas Fertilizer v Secretary (Aquaculture)
 Atlas is engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing
fishponds and prawn farms; challenger RA 6657 which coverage lands
devoted to the aqua culture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn
farms.
Ruling:
Section 10 and RA No 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn
farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL.
Sanchez v Marin (fishpond)
Issue:
Whether the subject fishpond is exempted from CARP of the
govt by virtue of amendments introduced by RA 7881 to RA6657
Ruling:
Section 2 of RA 7881 amended Section 10 of RA 6657 by
expressly exempting/excluding private lands actually, directly and
exclusively used for prawn farms, fishponds from the coverage of the
CARL.
Republic v CA (slope)
o Tax declaration classified subject land as agricultural. So
there was a clash on the evidences.
o DAR issued Notice of Coverage and owner applied for
exemption
o Application was denied and on appeal the CA created a
commission to conduct ocular inspection and survey the
land. Later, based on the report submitted, the CA
reversed the Order of DAR and exempted the lands from
CARL.
Now, Republic contends the tax declaration classified it as agri
alnd and which cannot be altered by mere ocular inspection.
Ruling:
There is no law or jurisprudence that land classification in tax
declaration is conclusive; tax dec is clearly not sole basis of
classification of land.
Based on their report by the commsission, it was found that
the land use map submitted by private respondents was an appropriate
document consistent with the existing land use. It was confirmed that
the lands are not wholly agricultural as they consist of mountainous are
with an average of 28% slope;
The CARL has further provided that all lands 18% and over
except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of
CARL.
Sta. Rosa v CA
*(non-agricultural and slope)
Facts:
Parcels of land registered in the name of petitioner and later
declared as watershed area by DENR were placed by DAR under
compulsory acquisition after service of the requisite notice of coverage
and letter of invitation and NOA. Petitioners claim that the land is not
agri and has a slop of more than 18%.
SC:
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Watershed is not to be included under subpar 1 of Section 10
plus the slop is more than 18 percent.
Roxas v DAMBA
Presidential Proclamation 1520:
DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN
CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS
PROVINCE AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of
Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas
have potential tourism value after being developed into resort complexes
for the foreign and domestic market; and
WHEREAS, it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and to
segregate specific geographic areas for concentrated efforts of both the
government and private sectors in developing their tourism potential;
SC said that the Presidential did not automatically convert the
land into non-agri land because the Proclamation itself mentioned the
word potential so it was not yet sure if it has really a tourism value.
Moreover, there was also a need for necessary studies.
Milestone v Office of the President
Do you remember the case?
Kadtong naa syay cattle maexempt siya during sa inspection anf iyang
cattle naa sa adjacent property.
There was an argument here of Milestone:
When the land is declared exempt kinahanglan kuno
ang DAR di na mahinlabot if the land is declared as exempt. It
is entirely and forever be beyond DARs jurisdiction.
SC:
The court said that this is dangerous suggestive of self-
regulation. Precisely, it is DAR Secretary who is vested with scuh
jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from
CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in
accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence.
DAR Memo Circular 02-15
RA 9458 declared the following towns of Northern Samar,
namely:
1) Biri
2) Capul
3) San Antonio
4) San Vicente
As national tourism zones and, from the time of the effectivity
of the said Act, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.
ATTY: According to these memo circular, these lands are exempt from
the coverage of CARP. Do you know where these places are?
(Sec. 11) : COMMERCIAL FARMS
Commercial farms private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds,
fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms and cacao,
coffee and rubber plantations. They are subject to compulsory
acquisition and distribution after 10 years from effectivity.
**There are actually different treatments under CARL.
GENERAL RULE:
You have private agricultural land which is acquired by
the government irrespective of the commodity produced. There is
also commercial farming and corporate land owners.
**Hacienda Luisita falls under corporate land ownership. Banana
Plantation in Davao and Pineapples in Bukidnon is under commercial
farming.
Atty. Cs opinion: There is a different treatment of the law based on
this types or kinds of land because the law would not immediately
acquire them upon the effectivity of the law, June 15, 1988. They are
given a deferment of 10 years. After the lapse of 10 years then the
government is compelled to acquire them.
There are specific commodities, products and crops in this section,
to wit:
1. saltbeds,
2. fruit farms (i.e. pineapple and banana)
3. orchards
4. vegetable
5. cut-flower farms
6. cacao
7. coffee
8. rubber plantations
TN: Rice, corn sugarcane and coconut are not covered.
**If your type of land is planted in any of the enumerated above,
the government will give you alternatives.
ALTERNATIVE
This private agricultural lands (COMMERCIAL FARMS)
will have to remain intact.
o If these lands will be distributed to farmer
beneficiaries it is based on individual basis.
Lands like this are to be awarded in favor of a
cooperative
Dont believe that if you have lands devoted to
commercial farming then there is no transfer of
ownership from the land owner to the farmer. Because
there means that there can be a transfer of
ownership as well as title of the land in favor farmers
cooperative.
Have to remain intact
Because if you have 100-hectares of banana
plantation and it is acquired by the government and
to be distributed to individual farmer beneficiaries,
the government cannot imposed on the individual
farmer beneficiaries that they can continue to plant
bananas on the lands awarded. It is because the
farmer beneficiary will be at liberty to choose what
kind of commodity will be planted there.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Luz Farms vs. Dar
Sec. 11 which includes private agricultural land devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry & swine raising in definition of
commercial farms is invalid.
Adm. Order #01 (2004): rules & regulations governing exclusion of
agricultural land used for cattle raising from CARP. Citing Luz Farms
case private agricultural land or portions thereof actually, exclusively
&directly used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be excluded.
Exclusion shall be granted only upon proof of AED prior to 15 June
1988 & continuously utilized for such purpose up to application. Any
act to change or convert; w/ intent to avoid CARP, shall be invalid. Only
the grazing area & portions of property required for infrastructure
necessary for cattle raising shall be considered for exclusion
Alternative methods available to commercial farms other than
distribution of lands.
DAR A.O #9, S of 1998 allows commercial farms certain options,
subject to approval of DAR & workers: (aside from voluntary &
compulsory coverage). Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA).
CLOAs are issued - joint venture
in name of cooperative - growership agreement
of workers - lease back
- direct payment
TN: In any of these methods, ownership of the land is still
transferred to the farmer beneficiaries but it is not distributed.
The land remains intact but the former landowner can participate
in this method.
1. Joint Venture
Kinsa ang mag.joint venture? Ang farmer
beneficiary and former landowner
Beneficiaries will contribute the use of the land,
the investor furnishing the capital and
technology. It assumes that the beneficiaries are the
owners of the land. The investor may be the
person of the previous landowner. Under DAR
regulation, the land owner is always given the
priority. Even if you might observed certain
hectares of land still planted with the same crops
then you check who owns the parcel of land, is it still
the land owner or the farmer beneficiary.
TN: There has to be approval from DAR
2. Lease-back
An owner of the land will now rent his own land from the
farmer beneficiary
Lease may not exceed 10 years. There is a least rental. It
needs approval of DAR
3. Growership arrangements
You have workers who will continue to farm the land
and then the produce/ harvest based on the
 agreement of the previous owner that he will be the
one to buy it.
To be approved by DAR
4. Direct payment scheme
If they can agree that the property will have to be transferred
to the farmer beneficiary and the farmer beneficiaries will be
paying the landowner for the land.
To be approved by DAR
According to DAR, it requires that CLOA be issued collectively
or under co-ownership under the direct payment scheme
TN: Former landowner shall be given priority with respect to these
methods. Contracts are reviewed by DAR Support Services to be
submitted to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating
Committee (PARCCOM) and to be endorsed to PARC. PARC is the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council headed by the President of the
Philippines.
**There are cases when a land owner does not want to avail of these
methods. Like for example the Sumilao Farmers in which they used to
fight the San Miguel Corp. when San Miguel challenged the acquisition.
Thus these are not the only options or methods under CARP.
OTHER METHODS UNDER CARP
Stock distribution option
o referring to hacienda Luisita
o For how many years, the SDO was perfectly
managed; it was a good method until when the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council headed by
GMA revoked the SDO on the ground that among
others, it failed to alleviate the conditions of the
farmer beneficiaries. And which revocation was
upheld by the SC.
o Right now, the lands are being distributed to farmer
beneficiaries consistent with the ruling of the Court.
Chapter III (IMPROVEMENT OF TENURIAL & LABOR RELATION)
WHAT ARE THE WAYS IN DISTRIBUTING LANDS TO QUALIFIED
FARMERS?
1. Compulsory acquisition (Sec.16)
2. Voluntary offer to sell/voluntary land transfer (Sec.20)
3. Non-land transfer schemes stock distribution option(SDO);
production & profit sharing (PPS)- Sec. 13/32; leasehold
operation(Sec.12)
a. No actual transfer of the land of the landowner in
favor of the farmer.
i. Stock distribution option.
ii. Production and Profit Sharing
**There can be an agreement that the
farmer beneficiary can be given a profit on
the production
iii. Leasehold Operation
Voluntary offer to sell (VOS) vs. Voluntary land transfer (VLT)
VOS you have a transfer of the land from landowner to the
government and government to farm beneficiaries while in VLT, there
is no intervention of the government, so landowner to farm
beneficiaries.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
TN: NO MORE VLT UNDER RA 9700. So now we are only limited to
two ways: VOS and Compulsory Acquisition
Under Sec 12, DAR is mandated to determine and fix the lease
rentals within the retained areas and areas not yet acquired. And
this is shown in Admin Order No. 02-06.
**Even in RA 3844, we know that there is security of tenure, continuity
of relations, there may be farmers who may wish to execute a contract
of lease so that the executed contract of lease can be annotated at the
back of the title of the land to have full protection for the farmer
beneficiary. If there is a contract of lease between the farmers and
the landowner, it can be registered in the Register of Deeds and it
is free of charge.
DAR Adm. Order No. 02-06
RA 6389 automatically converted share tenancy throughout
the country into agricultural leasehold relationship
1. Abolition of share tenancy now covers all agricultural
landholdings without exceptions
2. The conversion of share tenancy into leasehold is mandated
by law.
3. All share-crop tenants were automatically converted into
agricultural lessees as of June 15, 1988 whether or not a
leasehold agreement has been executed
4. Leaseholders security of tenure shall be respected and
guaranteed.
Cancellation of Leasehold Contract
**DARAB has jurisdiction on the cancellation of the
leasehold contract. It is because DARAB has power to determine the
rights and obligations of the parties in the contract. So if there are
stipulations in the contract, when one party commits violation the
other party can ask for adjudication for it.
Cancellation of Leasehold Contract vs. Cancellation of CLOA
The cancellation to cancel CLOA is given by the Secretary
of DAR. It is the Secretary of DAR who issues the title and the
restrictions and conditions stated in the title is part of the Agrarian
Law Implementation or ALI cases. The cancellation of leasehold
contract, the adjudicating arm of DAR will be the one to adjudicate
whereas in CLOA, where the parties are the government and the
farmers is done by the Sec. of DAR. CLOA is not a contract, it is a
privilege which is subject to restrictions and conditions.
CHAPTER IV REGISTRATION
Sec. 14 & 15 require the registration of landowners &
beneficiaries w/ DAR specifically the MARO because it is about
implementation. Registration is an implementation of CARP. Purpose
of which is to establish databank & identify actual famer-
beneficiaries.
Insofar as beneficiaries are concerned, registration will determine if
you have a standing to intervene in a case. Enunciated in the case of
Fortich vs. Corona
Fortich, et al. vs. Corona, et al., G.R. 131457, August 19, 1999
This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente,
Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr.
Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the
petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
 In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the
Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years
under the Crop Producer and Grower's Agreement duly annotated in
the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare
property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at
P2.38 million.
NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it
sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB),
through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB
Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which
ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing
any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further
orders."
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the
strikers' protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned
by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the
petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue
the said resolution "after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake
farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or
politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this
purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and
modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final
and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.
ISSUE:
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory
Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially modified by
the "Win-Win" Resolution.
RULING:
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of
the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order
No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special
laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall
be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court
shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June
23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory,
as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the
said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify
its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has
no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the
basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative
Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be
taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion
for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally
meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of
AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to
lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
Fortich vs. Corona: intervenors claimed that they are farm workers &
so intervened in case.
SC: There is no ruling yet from DAR whether intervenors are
beneficiaries, so they have no standing yet to intervene in the case.
1. DAR safeguards the list of ARB & provide IDs as proof of
being bonafide beneficiaries
2. DARAB has jurisdiction to disqualify an ARB.
Concha vs. Rubio:
Not a dispute between Land owner and tenant. It is a fight
among tenants. They were name as beneficiaries by MARO. Concha was
named as the beneficiaries by MARO. Rubio et al. would also want to be
named as beneficiaries but the MARO rejected it. So Rubio and the
others file a complaint for tenancy as beneficiaries and they want to
Concha et al. to be disqualified.
ISSUE:
Who among them should be considered qualified to become
beneficiaries over a portion of land?
Who determines who is qualified?
RULING:
It is DAR specifically MARO who determined who is qualifies
as beneficiaries. The identification and selection involve administrative
implementation so it lies with the Secretary of DAR and not with
DARAB. The findings of MARO showed that the respondent were not
considered qualified because according to the MARO they:
refused to sign the form
already given disturbance compensation
Respondents claimed that they already returned the money to the
landowners but MARO found that they used the money in building their
houses in the lot given to them in other lots. MARO also found out that
they executed the document sinumpaang salaysay that they already
abandoned the landholding in question. MARO decide to eject them. As
a matter of principle, the finding of the MARO is to be accorded respect
unless there is a showing of abuse of authority.
CHAPTER V LAND ACQUISITION
Landlessness is acknowledged as the core problem in the
rural areas and the root cause of peasant unrest.
In order to hasten the implementation of the program, the
Department of Agrarian Reform has made compulsory
acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition. To the same
end, the law provides for the steps in acquiring private lands
through administrative instead of judicial proceedings. This
procedure is allowed provided the requirements of due
process as to notice and hearing is complied with.
Compulsory acquisition may be defined as the mandatory
acquisition of agricultural lands including facilities and
improvements necessary for agricultural production, as may
be appropriate, for distribution to qualified beneficiaries upon
payment of just compensation.
 The Notice of Coverage (NOC) commences the compulsory
acquisition of private agricultural lands coverable under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Along the
various phases of the CARP proceedings, the process stalls
because of Land Owner (LO) resistance, most of whom invoke
the ground of lack of notice or non-observance of due process
in attacking the proceedings.
SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.- For purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be
followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land
to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail,
and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal
building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a
corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth
in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written
notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner,
his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay
the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30)
days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of
the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and
other muniments of title.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP
and other interested parties to summit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period,
the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon
the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation
TN: Sec. 16 outlines the procedure for acquisition of private land.
There are aspects of procedure that is mandatory.
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the
land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place
in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place
where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the
offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in
accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18,
and other pertinent provisions hereof.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
In this Subsection, you cannot find the NOC or the Notice of
Coverage what you will see is the Notice to acquire. The Notice of
Coverage is covered in this phrase but it was not included in the
section. SC claims that the identification of the land presupposes a
Notice of Coverage issued by DAR and Pursuant to DAR order,
Notice of Coverage is a mandatory requirement.
But it was not clear in the law about how identification is
determined. This was filled up by DAR through an Admin Order.
Subsection A, talks about notice to acquire: In the case of CONFED
vs. DAR, SC talks about two notices
1. Notice of coverage: More or less Preliminary: WHY?
Because while it notifies that the property shall be placed
under CARP, the landowner is entitled to retention.
Notifies the landowner about the public hearing about
the results of field investigation, land evaluation and
other pertinent matters
The landowner will be informed that the field
investigation of his landholding shall be conducted. After
that comes the notice of acquisition.
2. Notice of acquisition:
The area subject of compulsory acquisition has
to be stated. WHY? It is based already on the
field investigation
Plus the amount of just compensation offered
by DAR
How is the notice to be done? Personal delivery, registered mail and
posting
Note in the case of CONFED: Notice shall contain the offer of DAR
OFFER: offer of the government to the landowner as to
how much the government will pay the landowner
corresponding to the land to be acquired.
Discuss this in relation to par. (e): It is the deposit that is
the key to the immediate possession and issuance of a
title
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written
notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall
inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
Within 30 days from the date of the receipt the owner shall
inform DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
TN: Do not be misled by the word administrator here because, in so far
as the owner who answers to the offer, the administrator has no
authority to receive the notice.
Roxas Co. vs. Ca
Roxas, the person who received the notice of coverage was
and administrator. SC held that it was not a valid service of the notice.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay
the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30)
days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of
the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and
other muniments of title.
If the landowner accepts the owner, he shall execute a deed of
transfer and correspondingly the landowner shall be paid just
compensation

(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP
and other interested parties to summit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period,
the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
TN: Even if DAR conducts Summary Administrative proceeding for
determination of just compensation. SC explained in CONFED vs.
DAR that determination by DAR is merely preliminary
because in sub-paragraph (F), it is the RT who has jurisdiction
on determination of just compensation.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon
the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
In normal dealings (voluntary dealings), if you have a sale of
land, the seller will execute the Deed of Sale and give the
original copy (owners duplicate copy) to the buyer, so that
the buyer can go to RD, and be issued a new title in favor of
the purchaser. But here it is different because there is no deed
to be executed by the landowner because this is compulsory.
There is also no surrender of the owners copy of the title.
There are two copies of a title: (1) with the Registry of Deeds
and; (2) the owners copy of the title.
1. Under par. (e), Registry of Deeds can cancel the title
of the LO on the basis of the deposit, certification
from land bank which will be annotated to the title
and RD will issue a new title in favor of the Republic
of the Philippines.
2. The title is cancelled even without the surrender of
the owners copy
3. RDs copy of the LOs title is cancelled even if the
owners copy is subsisting
i. Probable in case LO rejects offer or does
not reply, he is still in possession of the
title
ii. Advise: do not simply rely on the owners
copy, you get a certified true copy from the
RD.
4. RD can cancel and issue under CARL even if there is
no payment of taxes and transfer fees (provided in
Sec 66 and 67 below)
Sec. 66 (Exemptions from taxes &fees of land transfer)
Sec. 67 (Free Registration of patents, titles & documents required for
implementation of CARP)
Sec. (e): Once DAR request and LBP makes deposit of initial valuation,
DAR can request RD to cancel title & transfer it to Republic of Phil. So
even if landowners protests valuation, distribution of land will proceed.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
CLOAs are issued upon land acquisition: so cancellation of title of
landowner can simultaneously go w/ issuance of CLOA.
LBP vs. Heirs of Trinidad
What is the amount deposited? Does sub-paragraph E follows
after subparagraph D? NO, because E may also follow after sub-
paragraph B.
It means that if the owner does not file a reply within 30
days or if he rejects it, two things will happen: (1) it can be
conducted through summary administrative proceedings and;
(2) deposit.
By mere deposit and having in possession a certification that
there was deposit made in the bank in the name of the landowner,
DAR can request the Registry of Deeds to cancel the title of the
landowner and issue a new title under the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Under the amendments of RA9700, the Registry of Deeds has
no discretion because it is a ministerial function. ROD can only
transfer the name of the title once the DAR issues a certification on
the deposit.
TN: Sub-paragraph A, B, C, and E is related to administrative
implementation so it is under MARO. D is not under MARO, it is
under PARAD or RARAD depending on the amount involved- not
more than 5M, PARAD; if more than 5M RARAD.
Summary Administrative Proceeding is not under the
administrative implementation because it is quasi-judicial. There is a
need for an adjudicatory arm because in determining the just
compensation, disputes may arise and it must be settled.
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation
The decision referred to is based on the Summary
Administrative Proceeding. If it reaches DARAB, any party
(referring not only to the landowner, LBP can also file a case
in RTC) can go to RTC.
FINAL
Determination of the DAR is merely preliminary; the final say is
with the RTC.
PAYMENT
In cash (if hectares involved are small hectares receives more
cash while those who have bigger hectares receives less cash
so that they can pursue on agricultural undertaking.)
LBP bonds (expires in 10 years but it can be use to buy
property)
Compulsory Acquisition is also an eminent domain.
Expropriation in Consti Law: two limitations:
Public use
Payment of just compensation
SC: In this case (CONFED VS. DAR), there is no more need to
prove public use because this has been settled in the Constitution
when it called for Agrarian Reform. So there is only one limitation
remaining: just compensation.
JUST COMPENSATION
 1.What are the factors which the court must rely upon to be
able to determine just compensation? (Sec. 17)
2. When shall we reckon the payment of the determination of
just compensation? Time of ACTUAL taking
But it is different in this case, while the SC has mentioned
about date of taking, but it has been interpreted at the time of
the issuance of the title which may different.
Actual scenario: actual taking may precede issuance or vice
versa
TN: This is the section that provides the Special Agrarian Courts
(SAC) original and exclusive jurisdiction. SAC refer to RTC. Agrarian
Cases like any other case has rules and procedure which is Rule 67
which is about expropriation.
Sec. 58 and rule 67 talks about appointment of
commissioners. When the case is filed in the RTC: in the law itself, it
says MAY appoint, under rule 67, court SHALL appoint Commissioners
for the determination of just compensation.
Who normally opposes commissioners? BIR, city assessor,
provincial assessor, treasure and if parties cannot agree on the
third member, the court appoints the clerk of court (they are more
or less knowledgeable on the aspect of just compensation). It does
not preclude other person to be appointed as commissioners. The
purpose is to receive evidence as far as just compensation is concerned
and based on the evidence submit recommendation to RTC.
Recommendation of the commissioners is not binding upon
the them.
LBP vs .Heirs of Trinidad
Deposit under sub-paragraph (E), question is what is the
amount to be deposited? Is it the amount of the offer the DAR in sub-
paragraph A which is supposed to be contained in the notice of
acquisition? Or is it the amount based on par. (d) after the conduct of
summary proceedings?
CA claimed that the amount to be deposited under sub-
paragraph E is the sum awarded under sub-paragraph D because while
sub-par. A talks about the offer sub-par. E talks about deposit. You can
only find the word deposit in sub-par. E and it follows sub-par. E and
because it follows sub-par. D so the word deposit must be referring to
the sum awarded by DARAB after the conduct of Summary
Administrative Proceeding.
SC did not agree. SC ruled that E should be related to subpar
(a), (b), and (c) considering that the taking of possession by the state is
the next step after DAR, and LBP supplied with the notice
requirements.
In effect the SC is saying: it is the offer of the LBP that will
determine that that is the correct amount to be deposited not the
amount after the determination of just compensation in a summary
administrative proceeding. SC claimed that to construe subpar (A)
would hamper the land redistribution process because the government
has to wait for the termination of the Summary Administrative
proceeding.
TN: par (a) precedes over par. (d) on the determination of the correct
amount to be deposited.
Compensation in cash or in LBP bonds (Section 16)
Payment of cash and bonds otherwise the government will go
bankrupt if all in cash.
Bonds: to give the government time to appropriate in the
future when the bonds will mature VOS (Voluntary offer to
sell): under the law, if you make VOS, landowner is entitled to
5% payment in cash, additional than that provided by law.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
Land Bank v. CA
Private respondent challenged the admin order issued by DAR
permitting the opening of trust account by LBP, in lieu of depositing in
cash or in LBP bonds.
SC:
Sec. 16 (e) is explicit that deposit be in cash or in LBP
bonds;
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit
can be made in any other form like a trust account;
There was no basis for issuance of order.
WHY? Because the trust account is under the control of the trustee. The
beneficiary-landowner cannot properly use or control the funds when
the funds is supposed to be given due for land owner. not sanctioned
by law
Service of the NOC
General rule The NOC shall be addressed to and received by the
Landonwer.
EXCEPTIONS:
Service upon co-owners In case of co-ownership, the NOC
shall be served upon each and every co-owner, unless one is
specifically authorized to receive for the other co-owners.
AHEDaI
Service upon minors or incompetents When the LO is a
minor, insane or otherwise incompetent, service shall be
made upon him personally and to his legal guardian if he has
one, or if none, upon his guardian ad litem whose
appointment shall be applied for by the DLR. In the case of a
minor, service may also be made on his father and/or mother.
Service upon entity without juridical personality When
the LOs who are persons associated in an entity without
juridical personality are sued under the name by which they
are generally or commonly known, service may be effected
upon all the LOs by serving upon any one of them, or upon the
person in charge of the Office or place of business maintained
in such name. Such service shall not bind individually any
person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice,
been severed before the proceeding was brought.
Service upon domestic private juridical entity When the
LO is a corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, in-house
counsel or administrator. Branch manager is not included
Service upon LO whose identity or whereabouts is
unknown In any proceeding where the LO is designated as
an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the DLR may order.
Extraterritorial service When the LO does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines, or when the LO ordinarily
resides within the Philippines but is temporarily out of the
country, service may be made by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
DLR may order.
ROXAS CO. vs. CA
 There are two notices that is mandatory: Notice of Coverag
and Notice of Acquisition.
QUERY: how does DAR know the name of the landowner?
ANS: DAR will get a Certified True Copy of the Title from Registry of
Deeds or true copy of the Tax Declaration from the assessor in case of
untitled land. If there is no certified true copy. Present any of these four
documents, to wit:
1. Photocopy of Title
2. Tax Declaration
3. Certification from Registry of Deed that OCT/TCT is missing
but there is a technical description and the last known
registered owner is indicated.
4. Public Documents
If based on these documents, there are several landowners then
send NOCs to all of them. For just compensation, let DAR settle it for as
long as service of the NOC is complied. DAR also preferred that NOCs
should be published in the national newspaper of general circulation.
Heirs of Deleste vs LBP
HELD:
On the violation of petitioners' right to due process of law
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is
subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian
reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated.
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice
in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be
underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the
essential requirements of administrative due process of law.
It was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the
landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of
sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole
world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue
of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the
registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the
Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person
who may subsequently deal with the same property.
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify
other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the
property has been entered into." 64 There was, therefore, no reason for
DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject
property.
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste,
and not to the Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the tax
declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one
issued in the name of Deleste. Although tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they
are nonetheless "good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession."
Petitioners' right to due process of law was, indeed, violated
when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject
property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Failure to notify owners violating section 16.
Spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, childless. But the husband had a
son name Virgilio by another woman but was raised by the
couple. Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and
Caridad by still another woman. Gregorio died. Hilaria and
Virgilio sold the land to Jose Deleste. Sale was notarized,
registered, declaration was cancelled and tax declaration was
issued in the name of Deleste.
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
DAR notified the heirs of Gregorio meaning that Deleste was
not notified.
SC: it was incumbent upon DAR to notify Deleste, he was the
landowner, sale was registered and tax declaration was already in the
name of Deleste. Petitioners right to due process was indeed violated,
DAR failed to notify them. There can be no valid transfer of title should
the CLTs are void, cancellation of TCTs and OCTs are clearly warranted.
ROXAS CO. VS. CA
The landowner is a domestic corporation; the NOC was served
to an administrator. After the service of the NOC, the government
acquired the landholding and after that, causes the cancellation of the
land title of the land owner and issued a new title in favor of the
Republic. Then CLOAs were given to the farmers.
SC ruled that the service of the NOC to the administrator is
invalid because he is not authorized to receive such (Admin. Order 7-
11).
If the service is invalid, is it a ground to nullify the CLOA. SC
said NO, let DAR validate the proceedings. SC has no power to cancel
the CLOA; it is DAR ho has the power. It would seem that the
proceedings would be ratified.
Fortich Case
CLOA was illegal because there was a violation of the process
and should it be cancelled? Fortich is the governor. This case is
originally a case an application for conversion. Quisumbing Corporation
applied for the conversion of the 144 hectare-land from Agri to Agro
industrial. Application was supported by the government and Fortich
filed the case.
DAR did not listen. The application was denied and the denial
of the application was passed to the Office of the President. OP reversed
the decision of the DAR. OP decided to approve the application for
conversion of the 144 hectares. DAR filed a MR but it was denied
because of the lapse of time in filing. The decision of the OP becomes
final ad executor.
Under the Ramos Administration, new executive secretary
who is Corona, there were strikes by the farmer in QC so the OP came
up with a win-win resolution. Win-Win resolution says that 100
hectares should be given to the farmers and the 44 is for conversion.
Fortich then filed a case and he won in SC because OPs decision which
granted the application of conversion is already final and executory. So
the Win-Win resolution was issued in abuse of discretion thus it is
invalid. CLOAs given are invalidated.
Meaning of Just Compensation
- That is how it is defined. (sir points to the slide huhuhu)
LBP v Dumlao
Facts:
Respondents are owners of agri lands covered under PD 27;
determination of just compensation remained pending with DAR, so
they filed complaint with RTC for determination
SC:
If just compensation was not settled prior to the passafe of RA
6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although
property was acquired under PD 27. The determination made by the
trial court, which relied solely on the formula prescribed by PD 27 and
EO No 228, is grossly erroneous. The amount does not come close to a
full and fair equivalent of the property.
 It cannot be overemphasied that the just compensation to be
given to the owner be assumed and must be determined with certainty.
FORMULA:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x .03) + (MV x 0.1)
where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
ATTY:
The principle in just compensation is the court will receive
evidence in relation to the factors, the court is supposed to come up
with a decision base on the factors. So the court cannot simply choose
any value without basing it from the factors.
Here the RTC simply chose the lower of the two value and the
court said that cannot be done. Formula must be followed.
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are
present, relevant and applicable.
The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of
computing just compensation should be reckoned from the issuance
dates of the emancipation patents. (Sir: I will not ask this because there
is a conflicting issue - wala na nako giapil ang explanation ni sir sa
conflict the date upon full payment or date of taking)
Why? EP constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance
of a TCT in the name of the grantee. It is from the issuance of an
emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of
ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just
compensation to the landowner.
However, their issuance dates are not shown. As such, the trial
court should determine the date os issuance of these EP in order to
ascertain the date of taking and proceed to compute the just
compensation due to respondents.
ATTY:
- If just compensation was not settled prior to CARP but
the property was acquired under PD 27, the governing
law is CARP
- To summarize:
o SC said that it CARP will govern because PD 27
applies suppletorily only.
o CARL is the latter enactment also
- In this case there were Two Values specified by the
commissioner. What the court did was simply to choose
the lower of the two values.
- Actually in matters regarding just compensation, what is
important is: we know what are the factors in Section 17
and which according to RA 9700, these factors are now
translated into a formula.
- In another case, SC said that it is inequitable to base it on
PD 27, but the SC did not elaborate why.
SECTION 17 (FACTORS)
1) Cost of Acquisition
2) Current Value of like properties
Proof of this could be a deed of sale but please take
note that if you are a landowner, you cannot simply present
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
any deed of sale. It should be the recorded deed of sale. It is
one that is bared with stamp by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
3) Actual use and income and nature
It can be proven also by zoning, inspection or
testimony of the appraiser
4. Sworn valuation by owner
5. Tax Declaration
6. Assessment made by Government assessors.
The last three can found in the tax declaration itself.
So the assessed value made by the landowner. It is the part
where some landowners will not state the true value of the
property because they do not want to pay higher real
property taxes.
Opinion of Atty:
Why CARL should be the governing law in computing just
compensation?
1) PD 27: uses average crop harvest as a consideration;
RA 6657: several factors for consideration in determining just
compensation.
2) RA 6657 for lands covered by PD 27 and just compensation
has not been determined at the time of passage of RA 6657
applies because PD 27 and EO 228 have onlt suppletory effect.
In fact in the amendment in the RA 9700, the crop harvest was included
as an additional factors.
Amendment of Section 17 (RA9700):
- Two additional factors were added
o The value of the standing crop
o 70% of the zonal valuation of the BIR
Spouse Lee vs LBP
In this case, there was admission by the party that the
valuation was not based on the factors. So the valuation was not valid
because it was not based on the factors. So normally the court will
remand the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence
LBP vs Heirs of Cruz
Decision of PARAD point to no evidence. So naay valuation,
but it was not mentioned in the decision what was the evidence relied
upon in coming up with the valuation. So it was invalid.
If valuation is not based on any evidence, it is without basis, so
determination be remanded.
It was remanded to the trial court
LBP v Jocson and Sons
- About the date of taking as compared to Dumlao case.
- Seizure of the land holding did not take place on the date
of effectivity of PD 27. LBP would normally argue that the
date of taking should be reckoned October 21, 1972.
SC said NO! It is on the payment of just compensation.
ATTY: But it is difficult considering that the decision can still be
appealed. And the payment can still not happen because there was an
appeal.
**Remember the decision is subject of an appeal.
LBP vs Livioco
The land is agricultural but the landowner tried to prove that
the land is now residential. He submitted different evidence like
certification form the MPD and others. But none of the plans was
approved. Based on these evidence SC ruled that they cannot accept
those evidences because the land was classified as agricultural but you
did not present a conversion clearance approval coming from DAR. The
land owner should have presented this. The best way to value the
property is to classify it as agricultural and if there are
improvements then you include those improvements as part of the
factors to be able to be included in actual valuation.
Respondent's evidence of the value of his land as residential
property (which the lower courts found to be preponderant) could, at
most, refer to the potential use of the property. While the potential use
of an expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases where
there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated
property, it should never control the determination of just
compensation (which appears to be what the lower courts have
erroneously done). The potential use of a property should not be the
principal criterion for determining just compensation for this will be
contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at
the time of taking, not its potential uses. If at all, the potential use of the
property or its "adaptability for conversion in the future is a factor, not
the ultimate in determining just compensation."
The proper approach should have been to value respondent's
property as an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of
the improvements in the Municipality of Mabalacat. This is because the
farmer beneficiaries are made to pay for lands valued as residential.
LBP vs Honeycomb
HELD: We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the
applicable DAR administrative regulations in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Lim, 24 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio
Cruz, 25 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barrido. 26 In Barrido, we
were explicit in stating that: While the determination of just
compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting
as a Special Agrarian Court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by
not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified by
law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty
to disregard the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998,
because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have
no option but to apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without violating
the agrarian law, the formula provided by the DAR for the
determination of just compensation.
RTC based it valuation when it took judicial notice that a
portion of the land is commercial land, just a few kilometers away from
a commercial district. It is not right of the RTC to base it in their
observation by taking judicial notice. SC ruled that you CANNOT RELY
BASED ON YOUR OBSERVATION, you should follow the factors. CA
which affirmed the RTCs decision acted in grave error when they were
not able to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject
land.
LBP vs. Yatco
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
There is RTC STC where the determination of the just
compensation was the issue. There are two branches here: Branch 35
and Branch 36. In these two braches there was a determination of Just
compensation. RTC STC got the valuation of the two branches and use it
as the basis in the case involving agrarian reform. It did not consider
the market value of the land, the formula because it simply rely on the
valuation of the two branches. SC distinguished the difference of the
expropriation of the agra and the NAPOCOR.
SC says that these are two different entities, their objective is
different. It is not wrong to rely on the valuation of another court FOR
AS LONG AS the RTC-STC CAN JUSTIFY SUCH VALUATION BASED ON
THE REQUISITES and not mere reliance without explaining and
considering the factors.
QUERY: Whether prior reports to DARAB is necessary before
determination of just compensation can be filed.
ANSWER: NO. There are two grounds and under sec. 57 RTC-SEC has
original and exclusive jurisdiction.
There are cases where owner file petitions in PARAD, if there
is adverse decision it will not elevate to DARAB, you can go directly to
RTC and there is no such thing as appeal from DARAB to RTC because
they are the same level.
LBP vs. Nable
The court mention about the farming experience and method
of conversion test but did not discuss it. This test would actually prove
the nature and the actual use of the income of the landowner. Even we
dont find this test in Sec. 17, DARAB was not mean that it was omitted.
You can conclude that the farmers have this way of computing how
many sacks of crops can we harvest.
August 3, 2016 22-33 minutes
LBP v. Nable
SC:
Court finds nothing objectionable or irregular in the use by
the RTC of the assailed the farming experience and the thumb
method of conversion tests. Such test are not inconsistent or
incompatible with the factors listed in Section 17 of the RA
6657
Although Section 17 of the RA 6657 has not explicitly
mentioned the farming experience and the thumb method of
conversion as methods in the determination of just
compensation, LBO cannot deny that such methods were
direcly relevant to the factors listed in Section 17, particularly
those on the nature, actual use and income of the landholding.
Atty Comment:
The farmers there has their own way of computing the
compensation like How many sacks to be produced out of the entire
hectare? that is farming experience. That was declared by the court as
relevant.
Valuation and payment (Section 18)
LBP v. PARAB
Issue:
If there is still a case pending on appeal, can the landowner
withdraw any amount deposited to the government with the bank?
SC:
The court answered in affirmative. If you deny the
landowners opportunity to withdraw the amount already deposited
then that is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain.
Atty Comment:
While the case is pending in RTC, the landowner can
withdraw the amount. Is it possible that there is a double
compensation? Well, that is the responsibility of landbank. If the
amount is withdrawn then Landbank should attest in court that the
landowner has already withdrawn the amount. So that the withdrawn
amount can already be deducted to the award to be given to the
landowner.
Heirs of Lorenzo v. LBP
Facts:
The petitioners challenged the personality of LBP. They
argues that Landbank cannot file a case of just compensation without
DAR.
Issue:
What is the personality of Landbank in a case of
determination of just compensation.
SC:
Section 18. clearly states there has to be consensus between
the landowner, DAR and LBP. LBP is not a nominal party in the
determination of just compensation thus LBP can act independently of
DAR.
Atty Comments:
You would note that there are several cases in which the party
to a case is Landbank and only Landbank, without DAR.
DAR v. Heirs of Domingo
SC:
Just compensation should be full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.
Atty Comment:
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
This is a case in which the SC justified why it is CARL in the
determination of just compensation. For land acquired, PD 27. However
the just compensation was not settled. It ruled however that it is
inequitable. But why? The Supreme court did not elaborate. The
meaning of just compensation.
Content and Manner (Section 18)
Sec. 18 speaks of cash or shares of stocks, tax credits or LBP
bond
Is this a violation of usual way of payment in cash?
o No, because revolutionary kind.
Parties (Sec. 18)
Who are the parties in a case of just compensation?
LBP v. CA
It is DAR, Landowner and LBP. The law does not mention the
participation of farmer-beneficiary
Atty Comment:
You would not here consent of farmer-beneficiary is not
required in establishing proper compensation.
Payment if Interest
Apo Fruits v. CA
Facts:
RTC rendered a judgement ordering LBO/DAR to pay interest
at the rate of 12% per annum on the above-fixed amount from the time
the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. After the
decision becomes final and executory, the rate of 12% per annum shall
be additionally imposed on the total obligation until payment thereof is
satisfied. CA nullified the RTC order.
SC:
The interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in
case of delay in its payment, which facts must be sufficiently
established.
Aug 3. Last 11 min.
Si sir nag teach daw transpo
-in so far as agra is concerned, the government is supposed to pay
money to the land owner, that is forbearance of money
-once there is already a final decision, the obligation becomes a
forbearance of money
-the reckoning point of interest as a form of damages is from the time of
demand until finality of the decision (decision will become final after
the lapse of the reglementary period, no party appealed to the decision)
-once the decision has become final and executory, there is again an
interest on a forbearance of money which is to be computed from
finality until payment.
-rate is the same-12%
Apo Fruits corp. vs CA
Facts:
On October 12, 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the lands
subject of this case pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL). The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) referred their voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) applications to Land
Bank for initial valuation. LandBank fixed the just compensation at
P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and
P164,478,178.14, for HPI. The valuation was rejected, however,
prompting Land Bank, upon the advice of DAR, to open deposit
accounts in the names of the petitioners, and to credit in said accounts
the sums of P26,409,549.86 (AFC) and P45,481,706.76 (HPI). Both
petitioners withdrew the amounts in cash from the accounts, but
afterwards, on February 14, 1997, they filed separate complaints for
determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
When DARAB did not act on their complaints for determination of just
compensation after more than three years, the petitioners filed
complaints for determination of just compensation with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Tagum
City, Branch 2, acting as a special agrarian court (SAC), docketed as
Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000. Summonses were served
on May 23, 2000 to Land Bank and DAR, which respectively filed their
answers on July 26, 2000 and August 18, 2000. The RTC conducted a
pre-trial, and appointed persons it considered competent, qualified and
disinterested as commissioners to determine the proper valuation of
the properties.
The RTC rendered its decision:
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally
the Commissioners' fees herein taxed as part of the costs pursuant to
Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, equivalent to,
and computed at Two and One-Half (2 1/2) percent of the determined
and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of
plaintiffs' land and standing crops plus interest equivalent to the
interest of the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until full
payment;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the interest was validly imposed.
HELD:
a notice of appeal; and that Land Bank filed in March 2003 its petition
for certiorari in the CA only because the RTC did not give due course to
its appeal. Any intervening delay thereby entailed could not be
attributed to Land Bank, however, considering that assailing an
erroneous order before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law to
every losing party, who cannot thus be considered to act in bad faith or
in an unreasonable manner as to make such party guilty of unjustified
delay. As stated in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation:
University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)
The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the RTC and the Court
of Appeals does not mean that it deliberately delayed the payment of
just compensation to KPCI. It may disagree with DAR and the
landowner as to the amount of just compensation to be paid to the
latter and may also disagree with them and bring the matter to court
for judicial determination. This makes LBP an indispensable party in
cases involving just compensation for lands taken under the Agrarian
Reform Program, with a right to appeal decisions in such cases that are
unfavorable to it. Having only exercised its right to appeal in this case,
LBP cannot be penalized by making it pay for interest.
It is explicit from LBP v. Wycoco that interest on the just compensation
is imposed only in case of delay in the payment thereof which must be
sufficiently established. Given the foregoing, we find that the imposition
of interest on the award of just compensation is not justified and should
therefore be deleted.
It must be emphasized that "pertinent amounts were deposited in favor
of AFC and HPI within fourteen months after the filing by the latter of
the Complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC".
It is likewise true that AFC and HPI already collected P149.6 and P262
million, respectively, representing just compensation for the subject
properties. Clearly, there is no unreasonable delay in the payment of
just compensation which should warrant the award of 12% interest per
annum in AFC and HPI's favor.
LBP vs Rivera
Facts:
The respondents are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land
embraced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-082, and later
transferred in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
95690 that was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 in 1972. Only 18.8704 hectares
of the total area of 20.5254 hectares were subject of the coverage. After
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) directed payment, LBP
approved the payment of P265, 494.20, exclusive of the advance
payments made in the form of lease rental amounting to P75,415.88
but inclusive of 6% increment of P191,876.99 pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994.
On 1 December 1994, the respondents instituted Civil Case No. 94-03
for determination and payment of just compensation before the
Regional Trial Court.
LBP filed its answer, stating that rice and corn lands placed under the
coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 7 were governed and valued in
accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 228 8 as
implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1987 and
other statutes and administrative issuances; that the administrative
valuation of lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive
Order No. 228 rested solely in DAR and LBP was the only financing
arm; that the funds that LBP would use to pay compensation were
public funds to be disbursed only in accordance with existing laws and
regulations; that the supporting documents were not yet received by
LBP; and that the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27 and
Executive Order No. 228 was already settled.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we affirmed the award of 12% interest
on just compensation due to the landowner. The court decreed: The
constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the
sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described
to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the
property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, if
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if
property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited
with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interest on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good
as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interest on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the
time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount
found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should
help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the
value of the currency over time.
-look at the pronouncement of the SC, there is 12% interest on just
compensation but the reckoning point. From the finality of this
decision until its satisfaction. The question now is, what is the
meaning of finality of decision? what happened to Oct. 7, 2004?
-g.change sa SC and reckoning point
Case of Gallego
Interest from the taking to full payment
SC found that there was delay.
1. Deprivation of income. Landbank took 4 decades and 3
generations of the Gallegos before they received the just
compensation.
2. Gross in valuation. Landbank valued the compensation 97%
lower than the RTC

Voluntary Offer for Sale (Section 19)

SEC. 19. Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sale. - Landowners other
than banks and other financial institutions who voluntarily offer their
lands for sale shall be entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash
payment.

Voluntary Transfer (Section 20 and 21)

SEC. 20. Voluntary Land Transfer. - Landowners of agricultural lands

subject to acquisition under this Act may enter into a voluntary
arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries
subject to the following guidelines:

(a) All notices for voluntary land transfer must be submitted to the DAR
within the first year of the implementation of the CARP. Negotiations
between the landowners and qualified beneficiaries covering any
voluntary land transfer which remain unresolved after one (1) year
shall not be recognized and such land shall instead be acquired by the
government and transferred pursuant to this Act.

(b) The terms and conditions of such transfer shall not be less favorable
to the transferee than those of the government's standing offer to
purchase from the landowner and to resell to the beneficiaries, if such
offers have been made and are fully known to both parties.

(c) The voluntary agreement shall include sanctions for non-

compliance by either party and shall be duly recorded and its
implementation monitored by the DAR. SEC. 21. Payment of
Compensation by Beneficiaries Under Voluntary Land Transfer.- Direct
payment in cash or in kind may be made by the farmer beneficiary to
the landowner under terms to be mutually agreed upon by both parties,
which shall be binding upon them, upon registration with and approval
by the DAR. Said approval shall be considered given, unless notice of
disapproval is received by the farmer-beneficiary within 30 days from
the date of registration. In the event they cannot agree on the price of
the land, the procedure for compulsory acquisition as provided in
Section 16 shall apply. The LBP shall extend financing to the
beneficiaries for purposes of acquiring the land.

Other style:

RTC decision in Rivera

-OCT 6, 2004 date when the decision was rendered

-You know why I put that date there? Because based on the dispositive
portion, the interest was reckoned, Oct 7, 2004. Are you not surprised?
Sir cannot imagine the decision.
-The oct 7, 2004 went to the CA and was affirmed. It went to SC
affirmed the decision of the CA with modifications. G.modify sa SC ang
just compensation, diri 500, diri 1.2M, but the reckoning is the same
(i.e., Oct. 7)

University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)