Manila Prince Hotel vs.
GSIS HELD: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the
FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner
and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated
28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: WON the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
are self-executing.
RULING: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right
it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such
a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is
not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is
that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of
laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into
one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino
bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
TAADA v. ANGARA
FACTS: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of
herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said
agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are
the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts
and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino
First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading
intervention.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of
the said WTO agreement.
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with
all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of
our own laws. Pactasuntservanda international agreements must be performed in
good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered
as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such
as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its
sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as auto limitation. What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of
signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal
of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be
viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-
destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make
their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
DOMINO vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani on March 25, 1998. He
indicated in his certificate that he had resided in the place where he seeks to be
elected for 1 yr and 2 months immediately preceding the election. On March 30,
1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito,
Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. Private respondents
alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is
not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he
seeks election. To substantiate their allegations, private respondents presented the
evidences that would prove their allegations.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year
residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January
1997.
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring
DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone
district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC ordered that the votes cast
for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that
the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and
executory.
The result of the election shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes
over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
Domino filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution, which was denied by
the COMELEC en banc.Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final,
conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on
Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition aquo for
the disqualification of petitioner.
HELD:
a. The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the
Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the
COMELEC cannot be sustained. The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided
in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said
jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether
false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of
candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrarwe ruled that:
xxx It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in
question has become final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of
the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an important and
intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with finality in
such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of
persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellants
petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a
Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would still have been
left open to question.
b. Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year
immediately preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his certificate of
candidacy? We hold in the negative.
It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration
of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely:
(1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;
(2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Surand
that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio
St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of representative of the 3 rd District of Quezon City in
the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new
domicile of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not
be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change
of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel,
Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a
house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen
petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that
from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a
new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. While residence simply requires bodily
presence in a given place, domicile requires not only such bodily presence in
that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and
permanent place of abode, ones home.
c. DOMINOs contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the
present petition is bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the
Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues
even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification
is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification
is voted for and receives the highest number of votesand provided
further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken
his oath of office.
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunals sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the
Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives.
Pamatong vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due
course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC, acting
on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other
aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same and declared petitioner
and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions
which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can
afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In
so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional
provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to
choose their leaders.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the petitioners interpretation of the Constitutional provision
under Section 26, Article II gives him a constitutional right to run or hold for public
office?
RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing
in the plain language of the provision, which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason
for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded
as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the
absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined.
Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear
to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations
owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office
are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance
Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for
office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide
candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably
posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the
remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC
remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
FACTS: Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight
steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58)
with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to
go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to
address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the companys
weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to
November 1985.

On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal
weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May
6, 1989 to July 3, 1989.On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It
was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215
pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was
retained.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative
Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given
ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and
submit controverting evidence.
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. Notably, he did not deny
being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already
been condoned by PAL since no action has been taken by the company regarding
his case since 1988. He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because
the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly
situated.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was discriminated when he was dismissed for being
overweight.
HELD: Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient
excuse to discriminate against him. We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise.
We agree with the CA that [t]he element of discrimination came into play in this
case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the
consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed.
There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory
treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed
cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof
must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential
treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other
employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin
attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights;
weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their
being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating
treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately
established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, PAL
really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause
guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the
Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that
the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate
the equal protection guarantee.
Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines
FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act
that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.
But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections with
the ARMM?
HELD: YES. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections. In this case, the
ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987
Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM
elections. The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
PEOPLE vs. EVANGELINE SITON and KRYSTEL SAGARANO
FACTS: On November 14, 2003, the respondents (Evangeline and Krystel) were
found to have wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, Davao
City, without lawful and justifiable purpose nor any visible means to support
themselves. They were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the
RPC, which provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. - The following are vagrants:
xxx
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support;
xxx
Respondents filed Motions to Quash on the ground that Article 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad, but the MTC denied the
motions stating that the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the
crime, since there was evidence provided by the arresting officer, and the defense to
rebut such evidence.
Respondents thus filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Davao City, directly
challenging the constitutionality of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, claiming that the definition
of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results in an
arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime may include
persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed
that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution
because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an
arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
The OSG argued that the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free
speech cases and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be
presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this
presumption.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and declared Article 202 (2) of the RPC as
unconstitutional, stating that it offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations
as to who should be arrested and who should not. To authorize law enforcement
authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the fact that he cannot
find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed a reversible error in declaring unconstitutional
Article 202 (2) of the RPC.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the power to define crimes and prescribe their
corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power
of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. However, in
exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must
conform with the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential element of due process of law."
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination. Thus, the requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable
limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the
search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear by the
respondents that unregulated discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make
an arrest or search is therefore lessened by the constitutional requirement of
probable cause, which is less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or
possibility.
The suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is reasonable when it is based on actual facts. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace
officers making the arrest.
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been
conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On
the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution,
negating the allegation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police
abuse.
Throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous
and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your-car" boys, petty thieves and
robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts
that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and parks
have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened
and battle-scarred criminals. The streets must be protected. Our people should
never dread having to ply them each day, or else we can never say that we have
performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of the
scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs.
These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality
and civility in human society. These laws may be traced all the way back to
ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to
improve the citizens' quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution. This
provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human relations, intended to
embody certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order."
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws
are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for
conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace
or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is
not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally
offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting
themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under
such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would
engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community. The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
Finally, the SC agrees that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed
valid and constitutional. It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution
in the legislature to make reasonable laws not repugnant to the Constitution, as they
shall be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth. As an obvious police power
measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.
DLSU vs. CA
FACTS: Respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente
and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were
expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde
(CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action
causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity. The said respondents who are members of Tau Gamma Phi
mauled the the petitioners in a series of incidents that happened both inside and
outside the campus.
First, one of the petitioners overheard one of the respondents berating their Dominu
Lux frat while in the cafeteria. Later on, after the said petitioner told his brods, they
confronted those Tau Gamma Phi members in the cafeteria who berated their frat.
After this, the differences between the two fraternities were supposedly mediated by
the student council, but members of the Tau Gamma Phi did not follow the peaceful
reconciliation. After the meeting, the said respondents went to the tambayan of the
Dominu Lux and asked for the whereabouts of petitioner James Yap, but he was not
there. Nevertheless, they still attacked the Dominu Lux members who were staying
in that area. A subsequent attack happened when of the petitioners went outside the
campus to buy candies but got ambushed by ten members of the rival Tau Gamma
Phi fraternity.The last of the frat violence incidents happened when the other
petitioners passed by a restaurant wherein Tau Gamma Phi members were staying
then got attacked by said respondents even if the petitioners had already begged for
peace.
The respondents were then issued Notices of Hearing by the DLSU Disciplinary
Board, in which they received, but did not attend such hearing after telling the board
of various alibis with regards to their absence on the hearing. Thereafter, the DLSU
Disciplinary Board issued a resolution finding respondents guilty of the said assaults
and gave them the penalty of automatic expulsion. This was stipulated in the said
Notice that failure to appear is considered as an admission to the said principal act
complained thereof, in which they all failed to appear.
Private respondent Aguilar filed a petition for injunction in the lower court against the
petitioners in which the court ruled by issuing a temporary restraining order to the
implementation of the penalty of automatic expulsion. Despite the said court order,
private respondent Aguilar was still denied for enrolment by respondent DLSU.
Aguilar filed a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the lower
courts TRO on the implementation of the penalty of expulsions. CHED Later on
issued a RESOLUTION summarily disapproving the said expulsions issued by
DLSU for all private respondents. Aguilar, using this CHED Resolution, filed a
motion to dismiss the case in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution rendered the
CA case moot and academic.
ISSUE: Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
HELD: Yes, Private respondents were accorded due process of law. The Due
Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of
rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of
our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our
entire history. 64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. Where a party
was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by
the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against
them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private
respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did.
Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by
all the parties before rendering its resolution.
Petition is partially granted. Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of
completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it
may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol filed a
Complaint-Affidavit with the COMELEC, charging petitioners with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189.
According to respondents, petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113
Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City. In their
sworn applications, petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation
of Section 10 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents
of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still
are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District
IV, Quezon City.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss. They contended
therein that they did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application
for registration. They avowed that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since
the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by
leasing for five (5) years.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC,
Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez and
Erlinda R. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section
10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against
petitioners.
ISSUE: WHETHER COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND
FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION
RULING: NO. The charges contained in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit
and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set
of facts. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the
opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit.
Preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the
opportunity to provide evidence for their defense.
GARCILLANO vs. COMMITTEES
FACTS: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During
the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner
Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president
to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was
recorded and was played during the house of representative investigation. Because
of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing
of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire
tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be
prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there
was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such
investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate
to further proceed with their investigation?
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of
the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the
Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or
tradition followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed
for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as
provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without
observance of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at
stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they
already published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792
or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence
and still does not conforme with what the constitution propounded. In this regard the
high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct such
inquiry in aid of legislation.
PLACIDO vs. NLRC
FACTS: Petitioners Rolando Placido and Edgardo Caragay were employed as cable
splicers by respondent PLDT. PLDT received reports of theft and destruction of
cables. In March 2001, upon hearing that cables were being stripped and burned in
one of the residences, PLDT Duty Inspector Ricardo Mojica and Security
Guard/Driver Mark Anthony Cruto, immediately proceeded to the area where they
saw petitioners stripping and burning cables inside the compound of the house
which turned out to belong to Caragays mother.
PLDT filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against petitioners in the RTC. PLDT
required petitioners to explain within 72 hours why no severe disciplinary action
should be taken against them for Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty. Petitioners
denied the charges against them and claimed that they were on their way back from
the house of Jabenz Quezada from whom they were inquiring about a vehicle when
they were detained by Mojica.
On petitioners request, a formal hearing was scheduled. Their request for a copy of
the Security Investigation was denied on the ground that they were only entitled to
be informed of the charges and they cannot demand for the report as it is still on
the confidential stage. The petitioners counsel was not able to attend due to conflict
of schedule. Petitioners requested for another setting of a hearing but it was denied.
However, they were given time to submit evidence.
PLDT sent notices of termination to petitioners, prompting them to file a complaint
for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter held that petitioners were
illegally dismissed. On appeal, NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision.
Petitioners appealed to CA. Meanwhile, RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. CA
affirmed decision of NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were denied due process when PLDT refused to
furnish them a copy of the Investigation Report and grant them formal hearing in
which they could be represented by counsel of their choice.
RULING: Petition is bereft of merit. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that
the employer shall furnish the workers whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of his representatives is he so desires
Rule I, Sec 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code require a
hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the
opportunity to respond to the charge, present evidence and rebut evidence
presented against him. This does not mean however that holding an actual hearing
or conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process
requirement in case of termination of employment.
The ample opportunity to be heard standard in Art 277(b) of the Labor Cod is
neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the employees right
to be heard toa solitary form narrows down that right.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, an opportunity
to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity
to be heard. A formal or trial type of hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
In the case at bar, petitioners were given several written invitations to submit
themselves to PLDTs Investigation Unit to explain their side but they failed to heed
them. A hearing was scheduled which they attended, but failed to present evidence
on their behalf.
Joselito Mendoza vs. COMELEC and Roberto Pagdanganan
G.R. No. 188308 - October 15, 2009
FACTS: The petitioner and the respondent contested for the position of governor of
the Province of Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was
proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the office of Governor. Pagdanganan
seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC, revision of ballots involving
the protested and counter-protested precints were made. The revision was
conducted and after which, the parties presented their other evidence. The
COMELEC approved the parties' formal offer of evidence and then required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied COMELEC's
order. The case was thereafter submitted for resolution.
The COMELEC's second division denied the petitioner's motion, ruling that the
COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the resolution
of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings after
proper coordination with the SET. These interrelated Resolutions led to the
COMELEC's continued action- specifically, the appreciation of ballots- on the
provincial contest at the SET offices. The basis of such grant is Section 3, Comelec
Resolution NO. 2812.
Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election
contest within the SET premises without notice to him and without his participation,
SET secretary's response trigerred the filing of the petition, stating that the conduct
of proceedings within the tribunal premises were authorized by the acting chairman
of tribunal and upon formal request of the commissioner.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings
without giving due notice to the petitioner.
RULING: NO, COMELEC did not violated due process by conducting proceedings
without giving due notice to the petitioner.
Based on the pleadings filed, they see no factual and legal basis for the petitioner to
complain of denial of his hearing stage rights. In the first place, he does not dispute
that he fully participated in the proceedings of the election protest until the case was
deemed submitted for resolution; he had representation at the revision of the ballots,
duly presented his evidence and summed up his case through a memorandum.
These various phases of the proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the
election contest and the COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity to be
heard. Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to
speak, and neither one can complain of any denial of notice or of right to be heard.
The rights to notice and to be heard are not material consideration in the
COMELEC's handling of the Bulacan provincial election contest after the transfer of
the ballot boxes to the SET; no proceedings at the instance of one party or of
COMELEC has been conducted at the SET that would require notice and hearing
because of the possibility of prejudice to other party. The COMELEC is of no legal
obligation to notify either party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating
on the merits of the provincial election contest.
In conclusion, the court sees no point in discussing any alleged violation of the
deliberative stage rights. First, no illegal proceeding ever took place that would bear
the " poisonous fruits" that the petitioner fears. Secondly, in the absence of the
results of the COMELEC deliberations through its decision on the election protest,
no basis exists to apply the Ang Tibay vs. CIR which is the appropriate due process
standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial
tribunal,; there is nothing for them to test under the standards of due process
deliberative stages rights before the COMELEC renders its decision.
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO) vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC)
FACTS: On February 19, 1997, the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) approved
the petition of SURNECO and 33 other rural electric cooperative in Mindanao,
represented by the Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, to use and
implement the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) formula. This PPA formula is in
compliance with R.A. 7832 which establishes a cap on the recoverable rate of
system losses. Upon giving their approval, they were directed to submit relevant
and pertinent documents for the Boards review, verification, and confirmation.
Meanwhile, the ERB was succeeded by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
therefore all pending cases of the ERB were now transferred to the jurisdiction of the
ERC. In the Order dated June 17, 2003, the ERC clarified ERBs earlier policy
regarding the PPA formula to be used by the electric cooperatives. The Commission
noted that the PPA formula was actually silent on whether the calculation of the cost
of electricity purchased and generated in the formula should be gross or net of
the discounts. This resulted to an over-recovery on the part of SURNECO of the
amount of PhP18,188,794.00 and under-recovery of PhP2,478,045.00 on the part
of Hikdop Island for the period of February 1996 to July 2004.
Since the intention of R.A. 7832 is for recovery only and not income-generation,
SURNECO was thereby directed to refund to its Main Island consumers the over-
recovery and collect from Hidkap Island the under-recovery starting the next billing
cycle from receipt of the Order until such time that the full amount shall have been
refunded and recovered, respectively. Included in the Order, SURNECO was
directed to make the changes needed, make a sworn statement indicating their
compliance, as well as submit a report in accordance with the prescribed format.
SURNECO filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the directive was
issued without giving them the opportunity to be heard. It was denied by the ERC.
Therefore, SURNECO filed a petition for review in the CA, but it was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether SURNECO was denied due process when ERC issued the
directive to refund the over-recovery amount.
RULING: No. The Court ruled that SURNECO was not denied due process.
According to the Court:
Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to explain
ones side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. It means being given the opportunity to be heard before judgment,
and for this purpose, a formal trial-type hearing is not even essential. It
is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable chance to
demonstrate their respective positions and to present evidence in
support thereof.
Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the
electric cooperatives monthly documentary submissions to substantiate
their PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for
other required supporting documents and were allowed to submit them
accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC
conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives
representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss preliminary figures and
to double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In
addition, after the issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives
were allowed to file their respective motions for reconsideration. It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that SURNECO was not denied due
process.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. & ATTY. SOLIMAN
M. SANTOS, JR. vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
G.R. No. 178552; October 5, 2010
FACTS: Before the Court are petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9372, An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007.
Petitioner organizations argue the Act as being intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the the ground of non-submission of the said documents. It further requested
government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth is
not applicable in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech
cases (cases which question whether freedom of speech has been deprived); and
that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
ISSUE: WON the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are applicable to penal
laws.
DECISION: NO. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot successfully mount a
facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds. The application of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners,
a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always
under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
applied to the litigants. The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is
that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation.
Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects
of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties
and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give
way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly.
Additional Notes (not found in the case):
Facial challenge is a challenge to a statute in which the plaintiff alleges that the
legislation is always unconstitutional, and therefore void. It is contrasted with an as-
applied challenge, which alleges that a particular application of a statute is
unconstitutional.
If a facial challenge is successful, a court will declare the statute in question facially
invalid, which has the effect of striking it down entirely. This contrasts with a
successful as-applied challenge, which will result in a court narrowing the
circumstances in which the statute may constitutionally be applied without striking it
down.
Heritage Hotel Manila v. NUWHRAIN
G.R. No. 178296
FACTS: The respondent, NUWHRAIN HHMSC (Union), is a labor organization of
the supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel Manila. The Union filed with the DOLE
a petition for certification election which was granted by the Med-Arbiter. On appeal,
the DOLE Secretary affirmed the Med- Arbiters order and remanded the case for
the holding of the pre-election conference.
The pre-election conference, however, was not held as initially scheduled and was
only resumed three years later.
Heritage Hotel (Company) had discovered that the Union had failed to submit to the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial report for several years and the
list of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995.
Thus, the Company filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of the Union on
the suspension of the certification election proceedings.
Barely a month after, the Company reiterated its request by filing a Motion to
Dismiss or Suspend the Certification Election Proceedings arguing that the
dismissal or suspension is warranted considering that the legitimacy of the Union is
being challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration due to the Unions
non-submission of the mentioned documents..
The certification election, notwithstanding the petitioners protests, pushed through
and the Unions petition was granted.
The Company filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results
and Winner stating that the certification election was an exercise in futility because,
once respondents registration is cancelled, it would no longer be entitled to be
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory employees.
In its Answer, the Union averred that the petition was filed primarily to delay the
conduct of the certification elections and prayed for the dismissal of the petition
because it has already complied with the reportorial requirements.
The Med-Arbiter dismissed the Companys protest and certified the Union as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all supervisory employees. The appeal was later
dismissed by the DOLE Secretary.
Meanwhile, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR denied the Petition for Cancellation
of Registration. Though the Union indeed failed to file the required documents for
several years, the freedom of association and the employees right to self-
organization are more substantive considerations. He considered the belated
submission as sufficient compliance and considered them as having been submitted
on time.
The Company appealed the decision to the BLR but the BLR Director inhibited
himself from the case because he had been a former counsel of the Union. Thus,
the DOLE Sec. took cognizance of the appeal which was later dismissed.
The company filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the DOLE Sec.s
taking cognizance of the appeal.
The CA denied the petition holding that the DOLE Sec. may legally assume
jurisdiction over an appeal from the decision of the Reg. Director in the even the
BLR Director inhibits himself from the case. There was also no grave abuse of
discretion when the DOLE Sec. affirmed the dismissal of the petition for cancellation
of registration.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking Courts previous
ruling which categorically declared that the DOLE Secretary has no authority to
review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition for cancellation of union
registration, and Section 4, Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code.
The CA denied petitioners motion, stating that the BLR Directors inhibition from the
case was a peculiarity not present in the previous ruling, and that such inhibition
justified the assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE Secretary.
The petitioner consequently resorted to this present recourse.
Petitioner insists that the BLR Directors subordinates should have resolved the
appeal, citing the provision under the Administrative Code of 1987 which states, in
case of the absence or disability of the head of a bureau or office, his duties shall be
performed by the assistant head.
ISSUE: Whether The Labor (DOLE) Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction over the
Appeal without notice violated Petitioners right to due process.
RULING: No, the Sec.s assumption over the appeal did not violate the petitioners
right to due process. The provision under Administrative Code 1987 clearly does not
apply considering that the BLR Director was neither absent nor suffering from any
disability; he remained as head of the BLR. Thus, to dispel any suspicion of bias, the
DOLE Secretary opted to resolve the appeal herself.
Petitioner was not denied the right to due process when it was not notified in
advance of the BLR Directors inhibition and the DOLE Secretarys assumption of
the case. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Petitioner had the opportunity to question the
BLR Directors inhibition and the DOLE Secretarys taking cognizance of the case
when it filed a motion for reconsideration of the latters decision. It would be well to
state that a critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, for all the elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased
judge. It was precisely to ensure a fair trial that moved the BLR Director to inhibit
himself from the case and the DOLE Secretary to take over his function. The court
affirmed the CAs decision.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA
TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance Prohibiting Short-
Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments
in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint praying that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that it was
authorized by PD 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours. However, MTDC moved to
withdraw as plaintiff.
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta.
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and
to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
The City contended that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of Police Power.
The RTC ordered the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance stating
that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution." Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
Upon appeal, the City asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of x x x hotels, motels, inns,
x x x and other similar establishments. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18
of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates
the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The CA reversed the RTC decision stating that:
1. the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of
movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
2. the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having
a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of
the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There
is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate.
3. the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of
its constituents in general.
4. liberty is regulated by law.
ISSUE: Whether the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
RULING: No. The Ordinance is NOT a valid exercise of police power, and is
unconstitutional. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash
rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently
sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by
the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare
clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals,
by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police
power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all
means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution,
and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
Due process is guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution. The purpose of
the guarantee is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection
against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even the properties of the partnerships and
corporations are protected by the guaranty.
The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down
as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness
of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
*Note:
Due Process Guarantee:
1. Procedural due process the procedures that the government
must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property;
concern with government action adhering to the established
process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere.
 Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of
formality of a hearing.
2. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by
the due process clause; inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property.
BSP MB vs. ANTONIO VALENZUELA
GR. NO. 184778
602 SCRA 638
FACTS: In September of 2007, the Supervision and Examination Department (SED)
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) conducted examinations of the books of
the following banks: Rural Bank of Paraaque, Inc. (RBPI), Rural Bank of San Jose
(Batangas), Inc., Rural Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc., Pilipino Rural Bank, Inc.,
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, Inc., Rural Bank of Calatagan (Batangas), Inc.
(now Dynamic Rural Bank), Rural Bank of Darbci, Inc., Rural Bank of Kananga
(Leyte), Inc. (now First Interstate Rural Bank), Rural Bank de Bisayas Minglanilla
(now Bank of East Asia), and San Pablo City Development Bank, Inc.
After the examinations, exit conferences were held with the officers or
representatives of the banks wherein the SED examiners provided them with copies
of Lists of Findings/Exceptions containing the deficiencies discovered during the
examinations. These banks were then required to comment and to undertake the
remedial measures stated in these lists within 30 days from their receipt of the lists,
which remedial measures included the infusion of additional capital. Though the
banks claimed that they made the additional capital infusions, petitioner Chuchi
Fonacier, officer-in-charge of the SED, sent separate letters to the Board of
Directors of each bank, informing them that the SED found that the banks failed to
carry out the required remedial measures. The banks requested that they be given
time to obtain BSP approval to amend their Articles of Incorporation, that they have
an opportunity to seek investors. They requested as well that the basis for the
capital infusion figures be disclosed, and noted that none of them had received the
Report of Examination (ROE) which finalizes the audit findings.
RBPI prayed that Fonacier, her subordinates, agents, or any other person acting in
her behalf be enjoined from submitting the ROE or any similar report to the
Monetary Board (MB), or if the ROE had already been submitted, the MB be
enjoined from acting on the basis of said ROE, on the allegation that the failure to
furnish the bank with a copy of the ROE violated its right to due process.
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred in finding that respondents are entitled to
furnished copies of their respective ROEs before the same is submitted to the
Monetary.
HELD: The respondent banks have failed to show that they are entitled to copies of
the ROEs. They can point to no provision of law, no section in the procedures of the
BSP that shows that the BSP is required to give them copies of the ROEs. Sec. 28
of RA 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, which governs examinations of banking
institutions, provides that the ROE shall be submitted to the MB; the bank examined
is not mentioned as a recipient of the ROE.
The respondent banks cannot claim a violation of their right to due process if they
are not provided with copies of the ROEs.
Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR
FACTS: Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened
and took over legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic
Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act
was signed bythe President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent
DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of
E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory
acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.],
through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of
Hacienda Caylaway.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the
reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a
result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the
interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND
THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for
conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the
assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu,Batangas as a
tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application
notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to thefarmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas
including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983
hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an
applicationfor exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order
(AO) No. 6, Series of 19943 which states that all lands already classified as
commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need
conversion clearance from the DAR.
ISSUES: Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-
Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non- agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.s
three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage
RULING: PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL
LANDS IN THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING NASUGBU TO NON-
AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each
constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore,
converted their use to non-agricultural purposes. The perambulatory clauses of PP
1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities
that] have potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies"
and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Which is
why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority(PTA) to identify what those
potential tourism areas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly
converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been no need for the PP to
direct the PTA to identify what those "specific geographic areas" are. In the above-
cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, the the Court made it clear that the "power to
determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural,
hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the [Department of Agrarian
Reform], not with this Court." Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular
No. 7, Series of 2004, came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed
that ....
B. General areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or
peninsulas as tourist zones that merely: (1) recognize certain still unidentified areas
within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangays, slands, or peninsulas to be
with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the
task to identify/delineate specific geographic areas within the zone with potential
tourism value and to coordinate said areas development; or (2) recognize the
potential value of identified spots located within the general area declared as tourist
zone (i.e. x x x x)and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said
areas development; could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification
of the entirety of the land area declared as tourist zone. A proclamation that merely
recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area
declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of
the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said
proclamation direct that otherwise CARP able lands within the zone shall already be
used for purposes other than agricultural. There being no reclassification, it is clear
that said proclamations/issuances, assuming[these] took effect before June 15,
1988, could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced
therein from CARP coverage. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential
tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It
did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. A mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since
there is still that process of conversion before oneis permitted to use it for other
purpose.
2. THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. A-9999-
008-98 SUBJECT OF G.R. No. 179650 TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES
INVOLVING THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN HACIENDA PALICO MUST BE
CANCELLED.
The court held...
. . . [t]he failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in
the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the [CLOAs]
already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit
the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR
must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings. . . . . Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the
rightful owner of the land.
On the procedural question raised by Roxas & Co. on the appellate
court's relaxation of the rules by giving due course to DAMBA-NFSW's appeal in CA
G.R. SP No. 72198, the subject of G.R. No. 167845:
Indeed, the perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is jurisdictional and
failure to do so renders the assailed decision final and executory. A relaxation of the
rules may, however, for meritorious reasons, be allowed in the interest of justice.
The Court finds that in giving due course to DAMBA-NSFW's appeal, the appellate
court committed no reversible error. Consider its ratiocination:
. . . . To deny [DAMBA-NSFW]'s appeal with the PARAD will not only affect their right
over the parcel of land subject of this petition with an area of 103.1436 hectares, but
also that of the whole area covered by CLOA No. 6654 since the PARAD rendered a
Joint Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [DAMBA-NSFW] with
regard to [Roxas & Co.]'s application for partial and total cancellation of the CLOA in
DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001.
There is a pressing need for an extensive discussion of the issues as raised by both
parties as the matter of canceling CLOA No. 6654 is of utmost importance, involving
as it does the probable displacement of hundreds of farmer-beneficiaries and their
families. . . . (underscoring supplied)
OSG vs. AYALA LAND
FACTS: Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate
shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime
constructs, operates, and leases out commercial buildings and other structures,
among which, are SM City, Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM
City, North Avenue, Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Pias.
The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for
all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of parking spaces inside the mall buildings
or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use as
parking spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the
construction of their own parking facilities. Respondent Shangri-la is renting its
parking facilities, consisting of land and building specifically used as parking spaces,
which were constructed for the lessors account.
Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of their respective
parking facilities. They provide security personnel to protect the vehicles parked in
their parking facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn, they collect
parking fees from the persons making use of their parking facilities, regardless of
whether said persons are mall patrons or not.
The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the
stipulation that respondents shall not be responsible for any loss or damage to the
vehicles parked in respondents parking facilities.
The Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a joint investigation for he said practice of the respondents.
After three public hearings the committees found out that the collection of parking
fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code and is therefore
illegal. The Committee believed that the logical interpretation of the Code would be
that the parking spaces are for free. The committee then recommended the OSG to
institute the necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to
enforce the penal sanction provisions of the National Building Code.
Two cases were filed by the parties against each other. The RTC consolidated the
cases of OSG and SM Prime. RTC ruled that the respondents are not obliged to
provide the parking spaces for free because the Building Code does not provide a
directive to make it free. To compel Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM
[Prime] to provide parking spaces for free can be considered as an unlawful taking
of property right without just compensation.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. OSG contends that the trial court
erred in HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE DID NOT INTEND
MALL PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE OF CHARGE.
SM Prime contends trial court erred in failing to dismiss the OSGs petition, and
failing to approve its contentions as well as failing to declare that the OSG is not a
party-in-interest in the case.
CA denied the appeals and affirmed the decision appealed from.
OSG now comes to the SC.
OSG contends that the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the lower court that
respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the
public. OSG states that the provision on parking and loading space requirements
should be read together with section 102 of the National Building Code on declaring
its policy. The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly
contributes to the aim of safeguarding life, health, property, and public welfare,
consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and
control. Adequate parking spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic
congestion when complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of free-
charge parking. Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy,
and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees
and, conversely, to control -- partially or, as in this case, absolutely -- the imposition
of such fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the OSG is tenable
HELD: No. It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and
control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with
it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case,
absolutely, the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this
jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict
rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a
regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the
relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the
political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose
regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the
same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the
imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees
upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons
who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of
parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or
prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the
collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures
or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify
the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials,
of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators
of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds,
however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees from the
public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the
bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate,
however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate
does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking
or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely,
eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees
from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents
devote a portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is
already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are
they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they
are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom
the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking
fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents property without payment of just compensation. The instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED
ORTEGA vs. CEBU City
FACTS: Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega are the registered owners of a
parcel of land situated in Hipodromo, Cebu City. One-half of the above described
land is occupied by squatters. On September 24, 1990, [the Spouses Ortega] filed
an ejectment case against the squatters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Cebu City, which rendered decision in favor of [the spouses Ortega]. The
case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the
MTCC. The decision of the MTCC became final and executory, and a writ of
execution was issued on February 1, 1994.
On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu City] enacted City
Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2)
portion (2,856 square meters) of [the spouses Ortegas] land (which is occupied by
the squatters), and appropriating for that purpose. The amount will be charged
against Continuing Appropriation, repurchase of lots for various projects. The value
of the land was determined by the Cebu City Appraisal Committee in Resolution No.
19,series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994. Pursuant to said ordinance, [Cebu City] filed
a Complaint for Eminent Domain [before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23,
and Cebu City] against [the spouses Ortega].
On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order declaring that [Cebu City] has the
lawful right to take the property subject of the instant case, for public use or purpose
described in the complaint upon payment of just compensation.
Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners (one of whom was
the City Assessor of [Cebu City], the [RTC] issued another Order dated May 21,
1999, fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation at ELEVEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P11, 000.00) per square meter and ordering [Cebu City] today [Spouses
Ortega] the sum of THIRTY ONEMILLION AND FOUR HUNDRED
SIXTEENTHOUSAND PESOS (P31, 416,000.00) as just compensation for the
expropriated portion of Lotto. 310-B.
The Decision of the [RTC] became final and executory because of [Cebu Citys]
failure to perfect an appeal on time, and a Writ of Execution was issued on
September 17, 1999 to
enforce the courts judgment. Upon motion of
[the Spouses Ortega], the [RTC] issued an Order dated March 11, 2002 for
execution or garnishment.
[Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment
and Withdrawal of the Case, contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just
compensation tube paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way beyond the reach of its
intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. The motion was
denied by the [RTC]. [Cebu Citys] Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

By virtue of the Order of the [RTC], dated July2, 2003 Sheriff Benigno B. Reas[,] Jr.
served a Notice of Garnishment to Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario and
Junquera Branch Cebu City, garnishing [Cebu Citys] bank deposit therein.
Cebu City] filed the instant Petition for Certiorari before [the CA]. Cebu City] filed
before the [RTC] a Motion to Dissolve, Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment,
contending that Account No. 101-8918-334 mentioned in Ordinance No. 1519 is not
actually an existing bank account and that the garnishment of [Cebu Citys] bank
account with Philippine Postal Bank was illegal, because government funds and
properties may not be seized under writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgment, on obvious reason of public policy. The [RTC] issued an Order dated
March 8,2004, denying said motion. [Cebu Citys]Motion for Reconsideration was
also denied. The Spouses Ortega] filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the New
Manager of Philippine Postal Bank to Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount,
which was granted by the [RTC].[Cebu City] filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the same was denied.
ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative.
RULING: It is well settle in jurisprudence that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative. The determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, no statue, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
LBP vs. RUFINO
FACTS: Respondents Jose Marie M. Rufino, Nilo M. Resurreccion, Arnel M.
Atanacio and Suzette G. Mateo are the registered owners in equal share of a parcel
of agricultural land in Sorsogon with an area of 239.7113.
In 1989, they voluntarily offered the property to the government for CARP coverage
at P120,000 per hectare. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), petitioner, issued a
Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21, 1996 declaring that out
of the total area indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares was subject to immediate
acquisition at a valuation of P8,736,270.40 based on the assessment of petitioner
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
Respondents found it unacceptable and the matter was referred to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the conduct of summary administrative proceedings
to determine just compensation. DARAB sustained LBPs valuation as respondent
failed to produce evidence to warrant an increase. The certificate of the 138.4018
hectare covered area was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
Republic subdivided the property into 85 lots for distribution to farmer-beneficiaries
under RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).
Respondents filed a complaint for determination of just compensation against
Ernesto Garilao, in his capacity as then DAR Secretary, and LBP. Respondents
contended that LBPs valuation was not the full and fair equivalent of the property at
the time of its taking, the same having been offered in 1989 at P120,000 per
hectare.
LBP countered that the property was acquired by the DAR for CARP coverage in
1993 by compulsory acquisition and not by respondents voluntary offer to sell; and
that it determined the valuation thereof in accordance with RA 6657 and pertinent
DAR regulations.
The trial court appointed the parties respective nominated commissioners to
appraise the property. Commissioner Amando Chua of Cuervo Appraisers,
Inc., respondents nominee, used the market data approach which relies primarily on
sales and listings of comparable lots in the neighborhood. Excluding the secondary
crops planted thereon, he valued the property at P29,925,725.
Commissioner Jesus S. Empleo, LBPs nominee, appraised the property based on,
among other things, the applicable DAR issuances, average gross production, and
prevailing selling prices of the crops planted thereon which included coconut, abaca,
coffee, and rice. He arrived at a valuation of P13,449,579.08.
The trial court found the market data approach to be more realistic and consistent
with law and jurisprudence on the full and fair equivalent of the property. LBP filed a
motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied it. The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial courts valuation of P29,926,000 as just compensation.
LBP maintains that its valuation of the property at P13,449,579.08 was based on the
factors mentioned in RA 6657 and formula prescribed by the DAR; that its
determination should be given weight as it has the expertise to do the same; and
that the taking of private property for agrarian reform is not a traditional exercise of
the power of eminent domain as it also involves the exercise of police power, hence,
part of the loss is not compensable.
ISSUE: Whether the appellate court correctly upheld the valuation by the trial court
of the property on the basis of the market data approach, in disregard of the formula
prescribed by DAR AO 6-92.
RULING: The petitions are partly meritorious. While the determination of just
compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the RTC acting as a
Special Agrarian Court, in the present case, the judge did not fully consider the
factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. In determining just
compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in
Section 17 of R.A. 6657.
In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial court, adopting
the market data approach on which Commissioner Chua relied , merely put premium
on the location of the property and the crops planted thereon which are not among
the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. And the trial court did not apply
the formula provided in DAR AO 6-92, as amended. This is a clear departure from
the settled doctrine regarding the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and
the DAR issuances implementing it.
Not only did Commissioner Chua not consider Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO
6-92, as amended, in his appraisal of the property. His conclusion that the market
data approach conformed with statutory and regulatory requirements is bereft of
basis.
Petitioners maintain that the correct valuation of the property is P13,449,579.08 as
computed by Commissioner Empleo.
Commissioner Empleo, however, used available data within the 12-month period
prior to his ocular inspection in October 1998 for the AGP, and the average selling
price for the period January 1998 to December 1998 for the SP, contrary to DAR AO
6-92.
Commissioner Empleo testified that his computations were based on DAR
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998. This Administrative Order took effect
only on May 11, 1998, however, hence, the applicable valuation rules in this case
remain to be those prescribed by DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94.
Commissioner Empleo did not consider in his computation the secondary crops
planted on the property (coffee, pili, cashew, etc.), contrary to DAR AO 6-92, as
amended, which provides that the [t]otal income shall be computed from
the combination of crops actually produced on the covered land whether seasonal
or permanent.
The valuation asserted by petitioners does not lie. The Court is constrained to
remand the case for determination of the valuation of the property by the trial court,
which is mandated to consider the factors provided under Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, and as translated into the formula prescribed in DAR AO 6-92, as
amended by DAR AO 11-94. The RTC is directed to determine with dispatch the just
compensation due respondents strictly in accordance with the procedures specified.
LBP v. JOCSON
FACTS: Parcels of tenanted rice land registered in the name of J. L. Jocson and
Sons (respondent). The property was placed under the coverage of the
governments Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 27 and awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), which valued the compensation therefor in the total amount
of P250,563.80 following the formula prescribed in P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 228.
The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03 after computing the 6% annual
interest increment due on the property per DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series
of 1994.
Finding the DARs offer of compensation for the property to be grossly inadequate,
respondent filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), against the Land Bank (petitioner), the DAR, and the tenant-
beneficiaries, for Determination and Fixing of Just Compensation for the Acquisition
of Land and Payment of Rentals.
The complaint prayed that petitioner and the DAR be ordered to compute the just
compensation for the property in accordance with the guidelines laid down in
Section 17 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988.
In their respective Answers, petitioner and the DAR claimed that the property was
acquired by the government under its OLT program and their valuation thereof
constituted just compensation, having been made pursuant to the guidelines set by
E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27.
the SAC appointed to receive and evaluate evidence on the amount of
compensation to be paid to respondent, fixed the just compensation
at P2,564,403.58 (inclusive of the P903,637.03 earlier withdraw and hereby
rendered ordering defendant Land Bank of the Philippines to pay plaintiff the total
amount of P1,660,766.55.
Both petitioner and the DAR filed motions for reconsideration of the SAC Decision
but the same were denied. They assailed that the SACs decision is a violation of
P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
ISSUE: Whether P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, as claimed by petitioner, or R.A.
No. 6657, as claimed by respondent, should govern.

HELD: RA No 6657 should govern in determining the value of the property. Citing
the case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Chico, the Court declared in no
uncertain terms that RA No. 6657 is the relevant law in determining just
compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it more
equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the
time of payment.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases involving
lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where payment of just
compensation had not been completed. When in the interim R.A. No. 6657 was
passed before the full payment of just compensation, as in the case at bar, the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation control.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function, and the Court does not find the SAC to have acted capriciously
or arbitrarily in setting the price at P93,657.00 per hectare as the said amount does
not appear to be grossly exorbitant or otherwise unjustified. For the Court notes that
the SAC properly took into account various factors such as the nature of the land,
when it is irrigated, the average harvests per hectare (expressed as AGP based on
three normal crop years) at 117.73 cavans per hectare, and the higher valuation
applied by the DAR.
EUSEBIO vs. LUIS
FACTS: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of
1,586 square meters. Said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig sometime
in 1980 and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay
Palatiw, Pasig City. In Feb. 1, 1993, the Pasig Sanggunian passed a resolution
authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal
Committee of the City of Pasig assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per
square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents requested the Appraisal
Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land.
Respondent also wrote petitioners calling their attention to the fact that property in
the same area, as the land subject of this case, had been paid for by petitioners at
the price of P2,000.00 per square meter when said property was expropriated in the
year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.
The City of Pasig in its reply stated that they it is unable to them more than what is
set by the Appraisal Committee. Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents filed a
Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent finding the petitioners action as ILLEGAL and
UNJUST, Ordering the defendants to jointly RETURN the subject properties to
plaintiffs with payment of reasonable rental for its use. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property
taken by the city government in the 1980s and, in the event that said property can
no longer be returned, how should just compensation to respondents be determined.
RULING: The SC cited Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National
Railways...the lack of expropriation proceedings for a very long period of time
and even negotiated with the PNR as to how much it should be paid as just
compensation, said landowner is deemed to have waived its right and is estopped
from questioning the power of the PNR to expropriate or the public use for which the
power was exercised. It was further declared therein that:
x x x recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be
allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which
imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public.
The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of
the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.
x x x It is settled that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the
private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lot.
Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of
their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990s). It is
likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on
respondents property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in
Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from
recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation.
Now, with regard to the trial courts determination of the amount of just
compensation to which respondents are entitled:
The Court concluded in Forfom that:
The judge should not have made a determination of just compensation without first
having appointed the required commissioners who would initially ascertain and
report the just compensation for the property involved. This being the case, we find
the valuation made by the trial court to be ineffectual, not having been made in
accordance with the procedure provided for by the rules.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled
jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before
the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at
the time of taking that is controlling.
The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that
. . . [w]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings,
the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the
entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or,
there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time
the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private
property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended
that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is
only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that
compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., just not only to the individual whose
property is taken,' 'but to the public, which is to pay for it.
However, in taking respondents property without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and without payment of just compensation, the City of Pasig clearly
acted in utter disregard of respondents proprietary rights. Because of this it shall be
liable for pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual
or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on
the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment.
City of Iloilo vs. Contreras-Besana and Javellana
FACTS: In an expropriation case filed by petitioner against private respondent
(Javellana), the plaintiff was able to take possession of two parcels of land owned by
Javellana for the purpose of making the said lots the site for Lapaz High School. A
writ of possession was issued to plaintiff after it allegedly made a deposit of the
amount of the value of the said lots (Php 40,000). Such was issued by the trial court
in an order dated May 17, 1983.
On April 2000, private respondent found out that the amount of Php 40,000 was not
deposited by the petitioner when he tried to withdraw the said amount (as proved by
a certification issued by the PNB). When no amicable resolution and a negotiated
sale was successful, he (Javellana) filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession,
Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. He alleged that since he was not
compensated for the expropriation of his property, the possession by the plaintiff
was illegal. This argument was opposed by the petitioner, claiming that Javellana
can no longer file an action for the recovery of the possession of the lots since the
same was already utilized for public use, therefore can only demand for the payment
of just compensation.
The RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which nullified the 1983 order, ordering
the petitioner to immediately deposit the 10% of the just compensation after
determining the value of the property at the time the complaint was filed. This was
amended six months later (2004 order), changing the reckoning point from the time
of the filing of the complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner, arguing that there was no legal basis for
its issuance. This was denied by the trial court, ruling that since no deposit was
made, the reckoning point for the determination of the fair market value of the
property should be the date of the issuance of the order.
On April 15, 2004, the commission created for this case submitted a report
determining estimates of the fair market value of the properties in question in
different reckoning points.
Petitioner assailed the aforementioned orders claiming that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in overturning the 1983 order which was already final and
executory, and that the just compensation for the expropriation should be based on
the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking or at the time of the
filing of the complaint. Private respondent argued that there was no error committed
by the trial court, and that the said orders were subject to amendment and
nullification at the courts discretion.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N an expropriation order becomes final (W/N the trial court erred in
overturning the 1983 Order).
(2) W/N the reckoning point of the determination of just compensation is the time of
the taking or the time of the filing of the complaint.
HELD:
(1) YES. The Court, in its ruling, defined the two stages in an expropriation
proceeding. The first stage ends in an order of dismissal or a determination that the
property in question is to be acquired for public use. These orders are deemed final
but appealable by the aggrieved party. The second phase is the determination of just
compensation, which ends in an order fixing the amount to be paid to the landowner.
This order is also a final one, but appealable.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not file an appeal assailing the 1983 order.
Therefore, the said order had become final, and the petitioners right to expropriate
is no longer subject to review. The trial court therefore erred in issuing the orders
which nullified the 1983 Order.
(2) NO. As established in a long line of cases, the Court constantly affirmed that:
x x x just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which
usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where
the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is
to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
It is also provided in Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Procedure that just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In
the case at bar, no exception was found based on the pertinent facts.
The Court also held that since the expropriation proceedings are final, and no
appeal was made, the said legality of the petitioners possession of the lots in
question can no longer be subject to review, hence, private respondent cannot re-
claim the said lots. However, he is still subject to just compensation. Additionally,
since he was not paid for just compensation by the petitioner, he is also entitled to
exemplary damages.
REPUBLIC vs. MANGOTARA (2010)
FACTS:In the early 1900s, the late Dona Demetria applied for the registration of 2
parcels of land in the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province (now called Iligan City,
Lanao Del Norte). Only the Government opposed Doa Demetria's applications for
registration on the ground that the two parcels of land were the property of the
United States and formed part of a military reservation, generally known as Camp
Overton.
The land registration court ruled that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of
the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog only; and
her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied.
Moreover, the applicant should present the corresponding deed from Datto
Darondon on or before the above-mentioned 30th day of March, 1913. Final
decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the
new plan. Dissatisfied, Doa Demetria appealed to the Supreme Court. SC affirmed
the LRC Decision.
83 years later, the Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the
registration of the Lots in the case of Cacho v. CA.
Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doa Demetria's son and sole heir,
filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title
(OCTs). RTC granted Teofilo's petition and ordered the reconstitution and re-
issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The original issuance of these decrees
presupposed a prior judgment that had become final.
CA reversed the RTC Decision. Teofilo appealed to the SC. The SC reversed the
judgment of the CA and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-
issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had
in fact been issued and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting Commissioner,
Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then
Land Registration Commission. MR denied. Hence, the decrees of registration were
re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for 2 parcels of land in Dona
Demetrias name.
THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR
The dispute did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another 4
cases involving the same parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts
during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1)
Expropriation Case (2) Quieting of Title Case (3) Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer
Case and (4) Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case. These cases proceeded
independently of each other in the courts a quo until they reached the SC, that
consolidated the seven Petitions.
Note: Ill just discuss the expropriation issue, the case is very long with lots of
different issues
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed by the Iron and Steel Authority
(ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the
latter's mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB). During the existence of ISA,
Pres. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA a
parcel of land in Iligan City. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land.
When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for
Expropriation.
When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No.
106, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 106.
Alleging that the lots involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped
the parcel of land subject of the case, Republic filed with the RTC a Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental
Complaint, seeking to implead TeofiloCacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective
successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. However, the RTC denied the
Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental Complaint.
RTC agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for execution of the
judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for execution had been
filed within the prescriptive period of 5 years, RTC ruled that its Order dated
November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as
plaintiff in the case, was an honest mistake. MR of the Republic denied because
MCFC (the only defendant left in the case) is NOT a proper party defendant in the
complaint for expropriation. Hence, the case was dismissed. The Republic filed with
the SC the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari
under Rules 45 and 65.
ISSUES:
1. Who are the proper parties in an expropriation proceeding?
2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the Republic with the filing of the
expropriation and reversion complaint
RULING:
First issue:
The court ruled that defendants in an expropriation case are NOT limited to the
owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the
property owner alone. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming
to own the property. In the American jurisdiction, the term 'owner' when employed in
statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made
parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to
compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an
executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in
the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the
land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene
and lay claim to the compensation.
At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation, possessory/occupancy
rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed.
Letter of Instructions No. 1277 expressly recognized that portions of the lands
reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 for the use and immediate
occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and
related facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of Instruction that NSC
shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for
the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject lands. Being
the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very
well be named a defendant in the case. The RTC evidently erred in dismissing
the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party.
Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC of the original Complaint for
Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the
subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is not the
remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.
The owner of the property is not necessarily an indispensable party in an action for
expropriation. According to Rule 67, Section 1, expropriation proceedings may be
instituted even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in
the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same
rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all
persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the
property sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to
belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting
expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint
for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such
an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party.
To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels
of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the
Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights
of MCFC and directed NSC toinstitute expropriation proceedings to determine
the just compensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the
property is not an indispensable party in the original Complaint for
Expropriation.
Moreover, the right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less than this Court in the ISA case. The
failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the
substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to
whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The Order of the RTC should be
deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of this Court,
already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.
Second Issue: The Republic did not commit Forum shopping
Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same
parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Thus,
it exists where the elements of litispendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.
Here, the elements of litispendencia are wanting. There is no identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 (expropriation) and Civil Case
No. 6686 (cancellation of OCTs of Dona Demetria because the certificates exceeded
the areas granted by the LRC reversion).
Expropriation vis--vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation
and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and
reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of
each other. The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of
an action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same
may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for
expropriation even when "the title to any property sought to be condemned appears
to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or
if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy
or certainty specify who are the real owners."
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation
impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an
admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At
most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there
are private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can
still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the
subject parcels of land are part of the public domain.
In sum, the RTC erred in dismissing the original Complaint and disallowing the
Supplemental Complaint. The Court reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the
Republic.
REPUBLIC vs. MENDOZA
FACTS:
This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the
Government for its failure to acquire ownership of a privately owned
property that it had long used as a school site and to pay just
compensation for it.
Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by the
Republic of the Philippines through DepEd. PPS has been using 1,149
sq.m of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school.
However, such property which is a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925 were
registered in the name of Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas).
The Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and
subdivided into four lots. As a result, the Register of Deeds partially
cancelled the original Certificate of Title and issued new titles for Lots 1
and 3; Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas; and no new title for
Lot 4 was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the
City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right
over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision
plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the
City Government and PPS.
The Mendozas on the other hand claim that although PPS sought
permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never
relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the property
since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained
registered in their name under the original title.
The Mendozas wrote PPS demanding that it vacate the disputed
property. When PPS declined to do so, the Mendozas filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer with the MTCC of Lipa City. MTCC dismissed the
complaint on the ground of the Republics immunity.
On appeal to the RTC, it found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered
PPS to vacate the property holding that the Menodzas had the better
right of possession since they were the registered owners.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the
Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public school.
HELD: A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the
Government of the Republic
Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible. No one may acquire it
from the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. The
existence and genuineness of the title of the Mendozas over the property has not
been disputed. The Republic likewise admits that no new title was issued to it for the
portion that PPS had been occupying. The City Government of Lipa likewise could
not defeat the title of the Mendozas by virtue of tax declarations.
The CA erred however in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property that it
had held as government school site for more than 50 years.
The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the property to
the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the
property in its name for tax purposes. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed
that the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government,
whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, way back but never got
around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the
Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas formal
transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation.
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his
property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the
institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Additionally,
the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver
of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas remedy is an action for the
payment of just compensation, not ejectment.
The Court affirmed the RTCs power to award just compensation even in the
absence of a proper expropriation proceedings. It is settled that where the property
was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an
action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
(LBP) vs. LIVIOCO
FACTS: Livioco was the owner of a sugarland. Sometime in 1987 to 1988 he offered
his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform or DAR for acquisition under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) at P 30.00 per square meter,
for a total of P 9,189,870.00.
LBP valuated the 26 hectares of such land for P 827,943.48 at P 3.21 per square
meter. Livioco was promptly informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of
the claim proceeds have been kept in trust pending his submission of the
requirements. LBP did not act upon the notice given to him by both government
agencies.
After 2 years, Livioco then requested for a reevaluation of the compensation on the
ground that its value had already increased from the time it was first offered for sale.
The DAR denied the request for the sale was already perfected. DAR proceeded to
take possession of the property and awarded Certificate of Land Ownership Awards
(CLOAs) to 26 qualified beneficiaries. Livioco then filed a complaint to cancel the
CLOAs and to recover his property and a petition for reconveyance which all led to
futility.
Finally, Livioco filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation
contending that between 1900 and 2000, his property has become predominantly
residential, hence he should be paid his property's value as such. LBP in its answer
averred that they are justified in the P 3.21 per square meter valuation of the
property on the ground that it was made pursuant to the guidelines in RA 6657 and
DAR AO 3, LBP objected that his property should be valued as a residential land for
the same was acquired for agricultural purposes, and not for its potential conversion
to other use.
In the RTC, the decision rendered was that Livioco was able to prove the higher
valuation of his property, hence, the valuation should be P 700.00 per square meter
for the 24.2088 hectares of land and LBP cannot substantiate support its P 3.21
valuation by documentary evidences. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation for respondents property was determined
in accordance with law?
RULING: The Court ruled that, for purposes of just compensation, the fair market
value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking. There are three important concepts in this definition the character of
the property, its price, and the time of actual taking. Did the appellate court properly
consider these three concepts when it affirmed the trial courts decision? The
Supreme Court found that it did not.
APO FRUITS vs. LBP
FACTS: AFC and HPI owned agricultural lands, which they voluntarily offered to sell
to the government. However, they did not agree to the LBPs valuation of the land,
stating that the valuations were unreasonably low and inadequate as just
compensation for the properties.
DAR then requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to the LBP valuations in
the names of both AFC and HPI. The latter both withdrew several millions from the
said accounts. Thereafter, new TCTs over the lands were issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, and COLAs were subsequently issued to farmer-
beneficiaries.
AFC and HPI both filed complaints for determination of just compensation.
ISSUE: W/N LBP may determine the amount of just compensation.
If so, W/N it correctly determined the value of the lands in question.
RULING: No. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court.
No. In the determination of just compensation, all the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, may be shown and
considered in estimating its value.
The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function.
The determination of just compensation cannot be made to the prejudice of the
sellers or of the government.
Requirements for a proper exercise of eminent domain:
1. Public use
2. Just compensation

Abad vs Fil-Homes Realty
FACTS: The respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioners
alleging that through tolerance, herein petitioners had occupied the subject lots
since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate. During the pendency of
the case, The City of Paranaque filed expropriation proceedings covering the subject
lot before the RTC of Paranaque with the intention of establishing a socialized
housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners. A writ
of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the
City government.
Herein petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have
been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than
30 years. They also contended that since the lots are the subject of expropriation
proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a better right of possession; and that
the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings designated
them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to continue staying there.
The MeTc rendered a decision in favor of respondents ordering petitioners to pay an
amount until such time that they vacate the area. It added that the petitioners
cannot claim a right over the subject land only on a basis only of a writ of
possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.
The RTC reversed the decision saying that the MeTc failed to consider the final
judgment of the RTC and the Writ of Possession issued in the expropriation case to
the City of Paranaque 2 years prior to the decision in the unlawful detainer case.
Upon petition for review, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MeTc with
some modifications noting that petitioners did not present evidence to rebut
respondents allegation of possession by tolerance and considering petitioners
admission that they commenced occupation of the property without permission of
the previous owner- Pilipinas Development Corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites and requirements in expropriation
proceedings in the exercise of power or eminent domain are met.
RULING: No. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State
expropriates private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A
socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of
the constitutional provisions on social justice. However, Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 538 enlightens states that when the Government seeks to acquire, through
purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy,
any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be
automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation
proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which
latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the
benefits of the suspension. The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit
is covered by Section 19 of the Local Government Code (LGC) which provides that
local government may, through its chief executive, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws. It also provides that such power may not be
exercised when a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
and such offer was not accepted. Also, a local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon filing of expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of
the property to be expropriated which amount shall be determined by the proper
court based on the fair market value.
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation
proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance
was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial
deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the Citys possession of the
lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC. Respecting petitioners claim that they have
been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of
expropriation proceedings does not state so. Petitioners cannot thus claim any right
over the lots on the basis of the ordinance.
Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983. They
stepped into the shoes of the seller with respect to its relationship with petitioners.
Even if early on respondents made no demand or filed no action against petitioners
to eject them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained the status quo allowed
petitioners possession by tolerance.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
VDA. DE OUANO vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS: In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor
agency, pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its
team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties
situated around the airport.
The landowners claimed that the government negotiating team, assured them that
they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion
project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations
transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the
assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however,
refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below
market.
The Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as
successor agency of the NAC, filed a complaint for the expropriation of lots,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al. On
December 29, 1961, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment
declaring the expropriation of aforementioned lots, included in the Lahug
Airport, Cebu City, justified in and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent
domain.
In view of the adverted buy-back assurance made by the government, the
owners of the lots no longer appealed the decision of the trial court. Following the
finality of the judgment of condemnation, certificates of title for the covered parcels
of land were issued in the name of the Republic which, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6958, were subsequently transferred to MCIAA.
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA,Lahug
Airport completely ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened to
accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights. On the ground, the
expropriated lots were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no
expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development prompted the
former lot owners to formally demand from the government that they be
allowed to exercise their promised right to repurchase. The demands went
unheeded. Civil suits followed.
On February 8, 1996, the Inocians filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint
for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA.
On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC
against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance.
ISSUE: Whether abandonment of Airport Project for the public use for which the
subject properties were expropriated entitles petitioners Ouanos and Inocians to
reacquire them.
RULING: Yes. First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used
the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the
purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and
development of Lahug Airport.
Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of
it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development as a
commercial complex.
Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its
team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would
be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used
for airport purposes.
The Court expressly held that the taking of private property, consequent to the
Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the
condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. Corollary, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by
MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same
token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA
what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective
properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should
run from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation. Petition
granted.
NPC VS. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
FACTS: NPC Constructed an underground tunnel that crossed the property of
Macabangkit Sangkay; the respondents were asking for just compensation for the
NPC's act of inconspicuously constructing the said tunnel and depriving the
respondents of the benefits of the said land due to the impacts of the tunnel, that the
underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that
the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe
place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the
tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to
relocate to safer grounds.
NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under
section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their
land was established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to
compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in
1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement,
any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Heirs awarding them 113,000,000 as just
compensation plus damages and an attorneys fee equivalent to15% of the awarded
claim.

CA affirmed the RTC's decision without any qualification.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation had
prescribed under section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, or, alternatively, under Article
620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code.

HELD: We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation. Five-
year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not
apply to claims for just compensation.

Power of Eminent Domain; action to recover just compensation from the state and
action for damages; distinction. An action to recover just compensation from the
State or its expropriating agency differs from an action for damages. The former,
also known as inverse condemnation, is intended to recover the value of property
taken in fact by the government defendant, even though no formal exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. On the other
hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages. When a
right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held
responsible. The two actions are different in nature and purpose. The action to
recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for damages
is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise
by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use,
but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner
rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature
of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the
constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.