ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|1

A.C. No. 7062 September 26, 2006 backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355] computed as follows:

RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS,

and FREDILYN BACULBAS, complainants,
3. CRISANTO CONOS
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, respondent.

DECISION Backwages:

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Basic Wage:
Complainants, via a complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing
(respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.
P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104, 504.40
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No.
00-0403180-98, "Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its
Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or
Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and 10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos.
Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69, 732.00
respondents. Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-
03161-98, "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al.," for Illegal
Strike.
11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos.
3
By Decision of August 29, 2001, Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos P250.00 x 26 days x 10 = 65,000.00
dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the employer-clients
of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed:
P239,236.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal
strike is dismissed for lack of merit.

Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil 13th Month Pay:
are hereby declared guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for union 1/12 of P239,236.40 = 19,936.36
busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants
are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-
04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate all
the complainants to their former position with full SILP
 ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|2

Total Backwages P2,370,674.38

2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos. Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-
P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22 mentioned backwages including the various monetary claims
stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except
payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney's fees of
all sums owing to complainants. 4 (Emphasis and underscoring
1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos. supplied)
P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.50
The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter
issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution. 5

1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.
P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33
In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and
4,053.05 Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to
by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case
before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were
P263,225.81
concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004. 6

Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed

xxxx the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn
to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received
the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative
complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with
7. RONALD SAMBAJON his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, "frustrated" the implementation
(same as Conos) 263,225.81 of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the
spurious documents.

In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for

8.FREDELYN BACULBAS Falsification against respondent, together with his clients Johnny and
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City where it
was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203.7

9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON In his Report and Recommendation 8 dated September 27, 2005, IBP
(same as Conos) 263,225.81 Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation
of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that
 ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|3
respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded
therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be
disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged
RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants
who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and
falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By
doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on
whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the
courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration
of justice.
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on
the one hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress against a
member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged,
either through malice or negligence, while in the performance
of his duties as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of
that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his good
name and reputation, we have again gone over and
considered [the] aspects of the case.
All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness,
veracity and due execution of the questioned RELEASE
WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING resolution in
their respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who
was supposed to know the identities of the herein
complainants is not impleaded by the complainants when it
was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real
identities of person executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty
there is that presumption of regularity unless proven
otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005
clarificatory questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not
respondent actually committed the despicable act would
seem to be fairly debatable under the
circumstances.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226,
approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar Discipline of the
IBP10 transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend the
Resolution No. XVII-2005-22611 filed by respondent.
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by
Petition12 filed before the OBC, assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The
Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the IBP
Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the
Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he
visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he
(Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the
3-day delay in filing the present petition, in the interest of justice,
this Court gives his petition due course.
In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does
not deny that those whom he met face to face before Commissioner
Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor
Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. 13 He hastens to add though
that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not
attending the hearings before Arbiter Santos.14 Complainants15 and
their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan 16 claim otherwise,
however. And the Minutes17 of the proceedings before the National
Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-
081-98, "Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute," which minutes bear
respondent's and complainants' signatures, belie respondent's claim
that he had not met complainants before.
 ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|4
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor
Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the request of his clients who "told
him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the
office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and
waivers," heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of
ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the Release
Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same
responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients' interest,
especially given the amount allegedly given by them in
consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers to the
clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however,
show that he discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask..
that the money of your client would go to the
deserving employee?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there
was already as you call it before a precedent in
February of 1998 when my client directly made
settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen
original complainants, Your Honor, and I did not
participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang
usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your
Honor, to have a dispute settled between the parties is
that we let them do the discussion, we'll let them do
the settlement because sometimes you know, Your
Honor, sad to say, when lawyers are involved in a
matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not
terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on said date and time
before Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter
Santos, number one, to witness the signing of the
documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that
according to them someone as a lawyer will represent
them in that proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG:
My query, did it not surprise you that no money was
given to you and yet there would be a signing of
Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and
there were no complaints, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Just because it happened before you did not bother to
see to it that there is a voucher so you just rely on
your precedent, is that what you mean?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the
parties who are talking and it is my client who knows
them better than I do, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
So, you just followed the instruction of your client to
be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos office because
 ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|5

there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt and ATTY. SUING:

Release, it that clear?
I'm referring to my client, Your Honor.
ATTY. SUING:
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes, Your Honor.
They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a
COMM. HABABAG: document of Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple
[sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I made
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is one but this document, Your Honor, is only a single
the money intended for the payment of these document where all the signatories named are present
workers? because my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that
so that each of them will be there together and they
ATTY. SUING: will identify themselves, see each other para ho
siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama at
magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing took
I did not ask. place in February of 2004 it was made for any [ sic]
individual, Your Honor, no longer the document
COMM. HABABAG: that I prepared when all of the seven will be
signing in one document.
You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the
documents? COMM. HABABAG:

ATTY. SUING: Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic]
made the changes?
As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.
ATTY. SUING:
COMM. HABABAG:
I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time
The Quitclaim Receipt and Release? when I was there, there are already people there, the
seven complainants plus another woman.18 (Emphasis
ATTY. SUING: and underscoring supplied)

Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me
before February of 1998.
COMM. HABABAG:
When you say they whom are you referring to?
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
 ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|6

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes
entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
xxxx defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the
shall render him liable. price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.

To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did not request him to The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence
go to the Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and
witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he caution which persons of unusual prudence and
was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert circumspection use for securing and preserving their
vigilance to protect his clients' interest. This he conceded when he rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or
acknowledged the purpose of his presence at the Office of Labor that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x
Arbiter Santos, thus: x x21 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

ATTY. SUING: And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the
answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before
Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see
that these document[s] are properly signed and that
these people are properly identified and verified COMM. HABABAG:
them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente
Santos.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and
Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong Receipt
That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of Waiver and Quitclaim?
complainants entered into a compromise agreement with his clients
in which he "did not participate" and from which no problem arose MR. RODIL:
did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going
to the Labor Arbiter's office "that [the complainants] are properly Sila po.
identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter."
COMM. HABABAG:
Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was
entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed the Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant
Release Waiver and Quitclaims.20 That should have alerted him to o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and
especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients' Quitclaim?
interest. But he was not and he did not.
MR. RODIL:
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a
given situation and is the opposite of negligence." A lawyer
 ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|7

Si Atty. Suing po. Si attorney po.

ATTY. SUING: ATTY. SUING:

In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner
yong mga dokumentong ito or what? is asking kung sino ang nagdala ng mga dokumento?

COMM. HABABAG: MR. RODIL:

Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha Yong mga tao.
hindi na English. Ito bang Release Waiver and
Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang xxxx
nagmakinilya nito?
COMM. HABABAG:
MR. RODIL:
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan. mo inabot ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release
waiver and Quitclaim?
COMM. HABABAG:
MR. RODIL:
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa
inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang gumawa Kay attorney po.
nito?
COMM. HABABAG:
MR. RODIL:
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong
Matagal na ho yan eh. attorney?

xxxx ATTY. SUING:

COMM. HABABAG: Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang

tanong.
Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang
naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente Santos para pirmahan COMM. HABABAG:
ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong
MR. RODIL: hindi ang abogado mo.
 ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|8

MR. RODIL: COMM. HABABAG:

Opo. Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano kung

iyong natatandaan ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?
COMM. HABABAG:
MR. RODIL:
Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious tayo
dito. Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.

MR. RODIL: x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Opo serious po. Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him
to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him
COMM. HABABAG: (respondent). His client contradicted respondent's claim that the
Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera? not the one presented at the Arbiter's Office, as well as his implied
claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the
money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents.
MR. RODIL:
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the
Opo. administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause.
Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the
COMM. HABABAG: administration of justice constitutes misconduct.23 While the
Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein
Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action
tinutukoy mo? being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of
its officers or an examination into his character.24
MR. RODIL:
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty of
Atty. Suing po. gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court
COMM. HABABAG: found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was
enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the
virtuous path of the legal profession."
Okay.
While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and
ATTY. SUING: circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is
reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that
Your Honor, respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in
order.
 ETHICS (Canon 19 Representation with Zeal )|9
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of
negligence and gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7298 June 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of
Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened
complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and
falsification of documents.
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for
Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005,
complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company,
Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the Conciliation and Mediation
Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the
conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for
separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal.
Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant
thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her
absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice,
respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client's claim
for separation pay. The letter also contained the following threat to
the company:
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be
constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral
damages to the tune of millions under established
precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple
charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not
reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay
the above amounts as settlements in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).1
Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted
ethical standards, complainant filed an administrative
complaint2 with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with
Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims) 3 claiming that Atty.
Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainant's legal counsel, also played an
important part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated
charges against him. Respondent also pointed out that the complaint
had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated only
to confuse the issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter. By way
of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the
disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 10
the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions 4 and
for violation of the Notarial Law.5
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but
respondent failed to appear.6 Both parties were thereafter required to
submit their position papers.
The Report and Recommendation7 of Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan found that complainant, failed to file his position
paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring
a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended
the dismissal of the complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.8 On 10 July
2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the
Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the records of the
case.9 Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a
Motion for Reconsideration (for Modification of Decision) 10 reiterating
his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four
hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars,
for filing the "false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal
fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a
groundless and false suit."11
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the
Resolution of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline)12alleging that he
personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position paper, after
serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered mail. He further
alleges that he was deprived of his right to due process when the IBP
dismissed his complaint without considering his position paper and
without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of
the 26 May 2006 Resolution 13 of the IBP Board of Governors and the
remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for
proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.
Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that
he filed his position paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a
copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of
said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21
December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the same
document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to
respondent on the same date. 14
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his
petition before this Court for his failure to attach a certification
against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was
originally required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994,
issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the
Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective
on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to include
cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and
the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1)
and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5,
Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 Said rule states that a violation
thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the
summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. 16
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took
against complainant his failure to attach the certification against
forum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed his
complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants
the petition. However, a remand of the case to the IBP would unduly
prolong its adjudication.
The Court's determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of
disbarment proceedings, the reasons for the certification against
forum shopping requirement, complainant's subsequent compliance
with the requirement, and the merit of complainant's complaint
against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,17 dwelt on the sui
generis character of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 11
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence,
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.18 [Emphasis supplied]
In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification
against forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is
required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another
administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same
respondent, because such other proceedings or "action" is one that
necessarily involves "the same issues" as the one posed in the
disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be
attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against
forum shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another
action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum
shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes
abuse of court processes,19 which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.20 Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum
shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers
and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to
promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue
inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of
the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two
or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or
decisions upon the same issue.21
It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of
attaching a certification against forum shopping to a disbarment
complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e.,
the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions,
rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said
proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person."22 Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment
case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the
pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent
may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the
rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every
initiatory pleading, "should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible."23
At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the
requirement cured the supposed defect in the original complaint. The
records show that complainant submitted the required certification
against forum shopping on 6 December 2006 when he filed his
Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss the present
petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent
justifies the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny
authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly
contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law," reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 12
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 24 In particular,
Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any
case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases
against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to
compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against
the lawyer's client.25
In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its
Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that
should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement,
he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as
well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of
documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating
Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of
accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining
of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an
accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to
operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in general
acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the
exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the
prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not
infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or
the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the
weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.26
In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,27 we held that "[a]n accusation for
blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly
substantiated, would entail not only respondent's disbarment from
the practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution." 28 While
the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack of evidence, the
same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he
admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote,
dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive
violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting
that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the
government commission of offenses punishable by the State." 29 He
further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard
practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the
settlement of disputes.
Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite
obvious that respondent's threat to file the cases against
complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the
latter to give in to his client's demands. It was not respondent's
intention to point out complainant's violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied
promise to "keep silent" about the said violations if payment of the
claim is made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and
tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to
the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the
principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer
may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps
necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case
contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a
threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have
nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. The letter was
obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to
yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged
communication rule under which a private communication executed
in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged
nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to
blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with
the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical
standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 13
imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of
his overzealousness to protect his client's interests. Accordingly, the
more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26
May 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is
hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the
penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014
CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency1 filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who
seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the
respondent from the practice of law on the following grounds: abuse
of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and
forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood
and deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow
lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed
various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up
to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar.
We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither
should we limit ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of
suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as
previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows
the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for
the orderly administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the
appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep
him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing
risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his
ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client
can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else,
particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly
administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the
respondents first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized
him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for
misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from
his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of
incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondents professional
legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest
of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No.
XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-
2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 14
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03,
Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21
and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the
penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be
DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency
and Compassion3 praying that his license to practice law be restored
based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En
Bancresolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal
for Grace, Succor, and Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look
at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that Conrado N.
Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that he committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the
severe penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame
on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of
Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from liability by
claiming that one of the charges leading to his disbarment was not of
his own doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the
appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating
his pleas for the Courts compassion and mercy. 6 He sought the
Courts forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson; but at the
same time, questioning the Courts finding for lackof factual support.
He appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP
membership dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop
of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a
Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the
Members of the Court En Banc once again reiterating his prayer to
lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for more
than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he
has never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has
devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted
regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of
Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial contributor to
Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no
longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose.
The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his
reinstatement professing repentance and remorse for what he
did.13 He pleaded for the Courts consideration, and vowed that he
will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his
time and energy for its proper observance and implementation. He
also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred from the
practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful,
dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all
times a high degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair
dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance
with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition
for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013
a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his previousrequests for
reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the
resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012,
the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality. 16 On July
18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed that
the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he
has now become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed
with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis
thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been
excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian
and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 15
regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church,
Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to
practice law again, but to be made whole, to recover from being
shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his
sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for
his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and
that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of
his petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18evidencing his
diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification 19 from St.
Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he
and his family are dedicated parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. 20 It is
not a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone
who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness
inintellectual attainment and in moral character. 21 The same
reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court
should see to it that only those who establish their present moral
fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus,
though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed
on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal
profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors
are opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law
is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself
in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant shall be reinstated
in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or
her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or
her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the
respondent had demonstrated an active involvement and
participation in community and church activities by joining Youth For
Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon
admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney
in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his
townmates who were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the
respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had
continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various
community projects, through the Marinduque Jaycees, where he
served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member,
Director, and President from 1982 to 1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent
acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to have taken full
responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no
longerquestioned the Courts decision. According to him, he has long
expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment
gave him sufficient time to reflect on his professional conduct, to
show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his
mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending
assistance, and deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and
religious work that significantly contributed to his character
reformation.He professed that during his almost five (5) years of
disbarment, he has been an active member of the Couples for Christ,
Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through his
affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs in
his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a
lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage

Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently
lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct prior to his
disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved
moral reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, 26 the Court, in
deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15
years had already elapsed from the time hewas disbarred, which
gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to
repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais
already of advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough.
The Court also notedthat he had made a significant contribution by
putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social
writings; and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement
and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the
Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions
since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 27 the Court granted
the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered the
period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and
to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court
took into consideration the disbarred lawyers sincere admission of
guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who
was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale
and subsequently introducing the document in court) after
considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The
Court considered that during Atty. Antiniws disbarment, he has been
persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged
inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished
record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of
the numerous civic and professional organizations, government
institutions, and members of the judiciary.
E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 16
in In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred
attorney before and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed
from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and more
importantly, the disbarred attorneys sincere realization and
acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of
more than four (4) years is sufficient to enable the respondent to
reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was
accused and was found guilty of gross misconduct.1wphi1 The
respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for
committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court;
misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of
law mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated
December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we
granted the respondents motion for reconsideration and reduced the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2) years to
six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondents earlier disbarment case(and
subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as an act of clemency),
and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the
Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent
has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not
considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the
respondents misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court
to consider the respondents reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in
acknowledging his guilt.1wphi1 While he expressly stated in his
appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his
previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke
self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his
assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily
showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 17
profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent
had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's
unfortunate physical condition, we stress that in considering his
application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the
Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation
and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely
at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the
respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely
rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the
Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5655 January 23, 2006
VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22,
2005 finding Atty. Melanio "Batas" Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of
malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.
A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:
On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged
respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled
"Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana,
respondent," pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1,
Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and
attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant,
respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she
terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return
of her money and documents, but respondent refused.
On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, found that "for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the
complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any
pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged
conferences and opinions rendered when complainant
frequented his law office." She recommended that respondent be
required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and
surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed.
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner
Navarros Report and Recommendation.
On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.
Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the
MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No.
00-044. There, he learned of the trial courts Decision dated
December 6, 2001 holding that "the tax declarations and title"
submitted by complainant "are not official records of the Municipal
Assessor and the Registry of Deed." Thereupon, respondent filed a
Sworn Affidavit Complaint1 against complainant charging her with
violations of Article 1712 and 172,3 and/or Article 1824 of the Revised
Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.
In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following
arguments:
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 18
First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil
Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new
petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for
review of a decree.
Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was "considered submitted for
decision" as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior
to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence,
"he could not have done anything anymore" about it.
Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related
to the case, preventing him from doing his job.
And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case
No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.
In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends
that: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between
a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against
her; (2) respondent should have returned her
money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her
documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified;
and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive
constitutes contempt.
We deny respondents motion for reconsideration.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He
has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money
from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving
rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. 5 From then on, he is
expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion.6
Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount
of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No.
00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his
duties. As we have ruled earlier, "there is nothing in the records
to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as
counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044."
Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that
he initiated new petitions.
With ingenuity, respondent now claims that "complainant did not
engage his services for Civil Case No. 00-044" but, instead, she
engaged him for the filing of two new petitions. This is obviously a
last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. Respondent knows very well
that if he can successfully disassociate himself as complainants
counsel in Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any
dereliction of duties.
But respondents current assertion came too late in the day. He is
already bound by his previous statements. In his Verified Comment
on the Affidavit-Complaint,7 he categorically stated that complainant
engaged his services in Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by
Atty. Oliver Lozano, thus:
4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty.
Oliver Lozano.
4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply
because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a bright lawyer and is very
much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044.
4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano did
not inquire the reason for the referral. But he was made to
understand that he was being referred because Atty. Oliver
Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better
position to prosecute and/or defend the Complainant in Civil
Case No. 00-044.
xxxxxx
5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October
13, 2001 and demanded that he provides her with free legal service.
xxxxxx
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 19
5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case
(Civil Case No. 00-044) would not entitle her to a free legal
service and advised her to just re-engage the services of
Atty. Oliver Lozano.
5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case
and how she and her lawyer should go prosecuting and/or defending
her position therein.
5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer
represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044 at that time,
Respondent gave his professional opinion on the factual and
legal matters surrounding the said case.
5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the
Respondent, Complainant became even more adamant in
asking the former to represent her in Civil Case No. 00-044.
5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as
a regular client is she insists in retaining his services.
5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about
his fees.
5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent
told Complainant that he will have to charge her with an
acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), aside form being charged for
papers/pleadings that may have to be prepared and filed in
court in connection with the aforesaid case.
xxxxxx
5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano.
The said Atty. Oliver Lozano interceded for and in behalf of
Complainant and asked that the acceptance fee that Respondent
was charging the Complainant be reduced.
xxxxxx
5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on
October 20, 2001. The latter then informed the former of his
conversation with Atty. Oliver Lozano and his (respondents) decision
to reduce the acceptance fee.
5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even
shedding a tear or two simply because Respondent had
agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced acceptance
fee.
Statements of similar tenor can also be found in
respondents Memorandum8 filed with the IBP.
Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure
from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party
should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of
theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due
to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary
to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.9 The present
administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of
respondents previous admission that complainant engaged his legal
services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from
such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has
been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his
dishonesty to this Court.
At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged
respondents services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of
Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is
nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics
of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should
immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Parias v.
Paguinto,10 we held that "a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a
lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not
used for failure to file the case must immediately be
returned to the client on demand." Per records, complainant
made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 20
Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact
that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already "submitted for decision" does
not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-
044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly,
he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned
complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for
doing nothing.
In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility
by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to
provide him with documents vital to the case. He further claims that
he would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by
handling a case without adequate preparation. This is preposterous.
When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied
representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning,
skill and ability to handle the case.11 As a lawyer, respondent knew
where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact,
he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the
authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that
respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been
paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his
duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.
Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of
complainant. In his fourth argument,respondent accuses her of
offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004,
prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies
his inability to render legal services to complainant.
Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary
evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate
respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure
in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal
proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law,
Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:
Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients
has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify
the same, and failing which he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of
inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to
rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he
should terminate his relationship with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule.
This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render
legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary
evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to
the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The
pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after
complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was
a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in
Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he
verified the authenticity of complainants title only after the "news
of his suspension spread in the legal community." To our mind,
there is absurdity in invoking subsequent knowledge of a fact as
justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli.
Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant,
respondent was motivated by vindictiveness.
In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with
his or her retainer.12 It gives rise to a relationship between an
attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very
delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high
degree of fidelity and good faith. 13 If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client;
he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.14 Indeed, law is an exacting goddess demanding of her
votaries not only intellectual but also moral discipline.
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 21
WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration.
Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory.
Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar
Confidant his compliance with our Decision.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and
copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel
O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant")
stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification
of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A.
Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-
charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-
complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was
prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a
real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San
Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen
and thereby disqualified to own real property in his
name agreed that the property be transferred in the name
of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to
prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition
of him being the actual owner of the property despite the
transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and
undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied
up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the
Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign
national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes
serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier
to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out
a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that
complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the
instigation of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 22
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent
admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy
Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part
in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan
recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for
two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to
the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 8 of the Rules
of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before
the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and
would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending
cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of
support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for
reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case
as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client
which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold
and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen,
was disqualified from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer
of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however,
aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the
title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents,13including the
Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as
the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants
name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing
the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands 14 by
preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated
his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of
lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for
which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended
from the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that
virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the
practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared
the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and
allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 23
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8158 February 24, 2010
ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In a verified complaint1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline), Atty. Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon) sought the
disbarment of Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations
of Rule 16.01,2 Rule 18.03,3 and Rule 18.044 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility involving negligence in handling a case.
The Facts
Atty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office 8,
Tacloban City. Although he is in public service, the DENR Secretary
has given him the authority to engage in the practice of law.
While on official visit to Eastern Samar in October 2005, Atty.
Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon by a mutual acquaintance,
Flordeliz Cabo-Borata (Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked Atty.
Macalalad to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in
Borongan, Eastern Samar and owned by Atty. Solidons relatives. For
a consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), Atty.
Macalalad accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight
(8) months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining balance of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was to be paid when Atty. Solidon
received the certificate of title to the property.
Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the
property sought to be titled up to the present time.
In the Complaint, Position Papers 5 and documentary evidence
submitted, Atty. Solidon claimed that he tried to contact Atty.
Macalalad to follow-up on the status of the case six (6) months after
he paid the initial legal fees. He did this through phone calls and text
messages to their known acquaintances and relatives, and, finally,
through a letter sent by courier to Atty. Macalalad. However, he did
not receive any communication from Atty. Macalalad.
In the Answer,6 Position Paper,7 and affidavits of witnesses, Atty.
Macalalad posited that the delay in the filing of the petition for the
titling of the property was caused by his clients failure to
communicate with him. He also explained that he had no intention of
reneging on his obligation, as he had already prepared the draft of
the petition. He failed to file the petition simply because he still
lacked the needed documentary evidence that his clients should
have furnished him. Lastly, Atty. Macalalad denied that Atty. Solidon
tried to communicate with him.
The Findings of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2008,
Investigating Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong made the
following finding of negligence against Atty. Macalalad:
complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of
Flordeliz Cabo-Borata, the mutual acquaintance of both complainant
and respondent. In the said affidavit, Mrs. Cabo-Borata described
how she repeatedly followed-up the matter with respondent and how
respondent turned a deaf ear towards the same. There is nothing on
record which would prompt this Office to view the allegations therein
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 24
with caution. In fact, considering that the allegations corroborate the
undisputed facts of the instant case...
As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for
the non-filing of the application despite the lapse of about a year
from the time his services were engaged, it is plain that his
negligence in filing the application remains uncontroverted. And
such negligence is contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a
lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. In fact, Rule
18.03 even provides that his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Acting on this recommendation, the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336
dated July 17, 2008, holding that:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Ramil E.
Macalalad is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months and Ordered to Return the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000) with 12% interest per annum to complainant
The case is now before this Court for our final action pursuant to
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, considering that the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline imposed the penalty of suspension
on Atty. Macalalad.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs factual findings and legal conclusions.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof
required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has
the burden to discharge.8 We fully considered the evidence
presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainants evidence,
as outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of proof in
proving Atty. Macalalads negligence.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides for the rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the
mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client
is considered per se a violation.
Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez, 9 we held that a lawyer is negligent if he
failed to do anything to protect his clients interest after receiving his
acceptance fee. In In Re: Atty. Briones, 10 we ruled that the failure of
the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary
period (to the prejudice of his client who languished in jail for more
than a year) is an offense that warrants disciplinary action. In Garcia
v. Atty. Manuel, we penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the
client of the status of the case, among other matters.11
Subsequently, in Reyes v. Vitan, 12 we reiterated that the act of
receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the
complainants case and, subsequently, in failing to render the
services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We made the same conclusion in Canoy v.
Ortiz13 where we emphatically stated that the lawyers failure to file
the position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate
a lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case. In Canoy,
we accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the blame to his
client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyers
duty to inform his client of the status of the case.14 Our rulings
in Macarilay v. Seria,15 in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,16 and in
Villaflores v. Limos17 were of the same tenor. In Villaflores, we opined
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 25
that even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of
communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer to
inquire and know the best means to acquire the required
information. We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the
latter has more control in handling the case.
All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyers duty to
his client once an engagement for legal services is accepted. A
lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of
protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence.18 The lawyer
bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence,
and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law,
the interest of his or her client.19 Accordingly, competence, not only
in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by
giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is
expected from a lawyer.201avvphi1
The records in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he
committed when he failed to file the required petition. He cannot
now shift the blame to his clients since it was his duty as a lawyer to
communicate with them. At any rate, we reject Atty. Macalalads
defense that it was his clients who failed to contact him. Although no
previous communication transpired between Atty. Macalalad and his
clients, the records nevertheless show that Atty. Solidon, who
contracted Atty. Macalalads services in behalf of his relatives, tried
his best to reach him prior to the filing of the present disbarment
case. Atty. Solidon even enlisted the aid of Ms. Cabo-Borata to follow-
up on the status of the registration application with Atty. Macalalad.
As narrated by Ms. Cabo-Borata in her affidavit, 21 she succeeded
several times in getting in touch with Atty. Macalalad and on those
occasions asked him about the progress of the case. To use Ms.
Cabo-Boratas own words, she received "no clear-cut answers from
him"; he just informed her that everything was "on process." We give
credence to these narrations considering Atty. Macalalads failure to
contradict them or deny their veracity, in marked contrast with his
vigorous denial of Atty. Solidons allegations.
We consider, too, that other motivating factors specifically, the
monetary consideration and the fixed period of performance should
have made it more imperative for Atty. Macalalad to promptly take
action and initiate communication with his clients. He had been
given initial payment and should have at least undertaken initial
delivery of his part of the engagement.
We further find that Atty. Macalalads conduct refutes his claim of
willingness to perform his obligations. If Atty. Macalalad truly wanted
to file the petition, he could have acquired the necessary information
from Atty. Solidon to enable him to file the petition even pending the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline investigation. As matters now
stand, he did not take any action to initiate communication. These
omissions unequivocally point to Atty. Macalalads lack of due care
that now warrants disciplinary action.
In addition to the above finding of negligence, we also find Atty.
Macalalad guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all the money
received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not
immediately account for and promptly return the money he received
from Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render any legal service
within the contracted time of the engagement. 22
The Penalty
Based on these considerations, we modify the IBP Commission on
Bar Disciplines recommended penalty by increasing the period of
Atty. Macalalads suspension from the practice of law from three (3)
months, to six (6) months.23 In this regard, we follow the Courts lead
in Parias v. Paguinto24 where we imposed on the respondent lawyer
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law for violations of
Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008
of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
We impose on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad the penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS SUSPENSION from the practice of law for violations of Rule
16.03 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
effective upon finality of this Decision. Atty. Macalalad is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
 E T H I C S ( C a n o n 1 9 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h Z e a l ) | 26

Atty. Macalalad is also ORDERED to RETURN to Atty. Elmer C. Solidon

the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of
this Decision until the full amount is returned.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant and noted in Atty. Macalalads record as a member of the
Bar.

SO ORDERED.