Aspects and Proceedings

13.1 Uy v. First Metro 503 SCRA 704

Facts: On June 1998, First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation (FMISC) delivered to
Midland Integrated Construction Company (MICC), Robert Uy and petitioner deformed
steel bars valued at P695,811.00. On June 1998, Robert allegedly delivered to FMISC
MetroBank Check , in the amount of P695,811.00 issued by petitioner as payment.
However, the check was dishonored upon presentment and despite demands, MICC, Robert
and petitioner refused to pay, hence the complaint.
On April 2003, petitioner through Atty. Carpio, Jr. filed a Motion for New Trial on
the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearing for the
reception of evidence, thus impairing his rights to due process.

Issue: Whether there is a deprivation of due process of law?

Ruling: No. Finally, petitioner's counsel's inexcusable neglect did not amount to
petitioner's deprivation of due process of law. The right to due process safeguards the
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or
defense. In the instant case, petitioner was given several opportunities to be heard and to
submit evidence but he squandered them. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

13.2 Deutsche Bank v. Chua 481 SCRA 672 , 2006 , G.R. No. 165606

Facts: On January 1998, Deutsche Bank (Manila) filed a complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages against spouses Chua Yok See and et al. at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case.

The complaint alleged that the defendants dealt in U$:P F/X Forwards with and
through the plaintiff. Consequently, the defendants incurred a total loss of P45,812,240.00.
In accordance with the security arrangement between the parties, the plaintiff applied the
defendants deposits in the Hold-Out Accounts to pay for the loss. According to the plaintiff,
there remained an unpaid amount of P11,251,032.47, the defendants failed to pay the said
amount and even denied having made any investments in US$:P F/X Forwards with and
through the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether the presiding judge committed grave abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari in (a) admitting the petitioners documentary exhibits only as part of the
testimonies of the witnesses who respectively testified thereon, and (b) not inhibiting
himself from the case.

Ruling: The petition is without merit. Courts are further mandated to state the reason or
reasons for their ruling if there are two or more objections by the other party. Due process
requires no less.
 In fact, it even partially granted petitioners motion for reconsideration of its
previous order denying some of the documentary exhibits, and admitted all of its
documentary exhibits as part of the testimonies of its witnesses. Even if the ruling may be
erroneous, it is not a sufficient ground to require the presiding judge to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 30, 2004, is AFFIRMED.

13.3 People v. Santos 501 SCRA 325, G.R. No. 172322, September 8, 2006

Facts: For allegedly sexually assaulting 5-year-old AAA, Rene Santos was charged with
Rape in an Information alleging that on or about in the afternoon of July 1999 in
Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, RENE SANTOS, with lewd designs and by means of deceit, force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with AAA, 5 years of age, against her will.

Issue: Whether the Republic Act No. 9346 entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty that should be meted is Reclusion Perpetua,

Ruling: The decision of the court of appeals , finding appellant Rene Santos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and ordering him to indemnify the victim the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is
affirmed with the modification that the award of moral damages is increased to P75,000.00
and that in lieu of the death penalty, appellant Rene Santos is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

13.4 Victoriano v. People 509 SCRA 483

Facts: In Criminal Case Nos. 18868, 18869 and 18870, this Court finds accused Marianito
Victoriano and Raymond Ilustre, both GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of
R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) , and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Issue: Whether the petitioner was properly accorded his right to due process?
Ruling: The consolidated petitions are without merit.
Yes. Records show that petitioner was properly accorded his right to due
process. During the pre-trial held on February 3, 1994, petitioner was present together with
his counsel but the latter waived the conduct of pre-trial. Petitioner did not question the
waiver hence, he is deemed to have impliedly approved the same. We see nothing irregular
in the Sandiganbayans holding of a trial on June 29, 1994. Petitioner was duly notified of
said hearing but he failed to appear.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years
as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office for each count of violation of
Section 3.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

13.5 Santos v. DOJ 543 SCRA 70, January 2008, G.R. No. 175057

Facts: On February 2006, people started to gather in throngs at the Philsports Arena
(formerly Ultra) in Pasig City, the publicized site of the first anniversary episode of
Wowowee, a noontime game show aired by ABS-CBN. Little did they know that in taking a
shot at instant fortune, a number of them would pay the ultimate wager and place their
lives at stake, all in the name of bagging the prizes in store.

This fatal stampede claimed 71 lives, 69 of whom were women, and left hundreds
wounded which necessitated emergency medical support and prompted the cancellation of
the shows episode.

Issue: Whether the petitioners charge respondents to have lost the impartiality to conduct
the preliminary investigation since they had prejudged the case, in support of which they
cite the indecent haste in the conduct of the proceedings.

Ruling: Petitioners eventually concede that they are not asking for a reversal of a ruling on
probable cause. The court censured a fiscal for inexcusably allowing undue publicity in the
conduct of preliminary investigation and appreciated the press for wisely declining an
unusual probing privilege. Agents of the law ought to recognize the buoys and bounds of
prudence in discharging what they may deem as an earnest effort to herald the
governments endeavor in solving a case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

1. Profession
13.6 Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
G.r. no. 111953

Facts: : In issuing administrative order no. 04-92 (ppa-ao no. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. On
August 1992, respondents united harbor pilots association and the Manila pilots
association, through capt. Alberto c. Compas, questioned ppa-ao no. 04-92. On December
1992, the op issued an order directing the ppa to hold in abeyance the implementation of
ppa-ao no. 04-92 on March 1993, the op, through then assistant executive secretary for legal
affairs Renato c. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order
issued earlier Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before branch 6 of
the regional trial court

Issue: Whether ppa-ao was issued in disregard the respondents' right against deprivation
of property without due process of law

Held: Yes. The court is convinced that ppa-ao no. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The supreme
court said that in order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must
concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without
proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply
with the requirements of notice and hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
right. It is readily apparent that ppa-ao no. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots
to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement

Dismissals, Suspension, Reinstatement

1. Dismissals in Government Boards and Commissions

13.7 Abalos c. CSC 196 SCRA 81

13.8 GSIS v. CSC 201 SCRA 661

FACTS: The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities in the
canvassing of supplies. The employees appealed to the Merit Board. Said board found for
the employees and declared the dismissal as illegal because no hearing took place. The
GSIS took the issue to the Civil Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed
illegal. The CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded the
payment of backwages. The replacements of the dismissed employees should then be
released from service.
The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the
Civil Service ruling saying o The CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was
proper o However, the SC modified the requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be
made after the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.
Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service
resolution so that backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the
SC modified that part of the ruling.
CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was
made to pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the SC asking that the
CSC order be nullified. The GSIS contends that the CSC has no power to execute its
judgments.

ISSUE: Whether the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments

Ruling: YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested by the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but
also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too,
sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or
before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear
absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of
its decisions, resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide
cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is
carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority
to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.
Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC.

13.9 Macayayong v. Ople 204 SCRA 372

13.10 Gonzales v. CSC 226 SCRA 66

Facts: Petitioner Jesus R. Gonzales was one of the two Utility Workers II assigned at the
Pharmacy Section of respondent Philippine Childrens Medical Center (PCMC), a
government-owned and controlled corporation created under P.D. No. 1631, as amended. At
PCMC, petitioner served the patients and the public from 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M., seven
days a week.
On March 2, 1998, petitioner started absenting himself without an approved leave
(AWOL) and without explaining the reason for his absence to his superiors. In view of the
exigency of petitioners functions, Ms. Ehera, Human Resources Management Officer III,
wrote a letter-notice dated March 5, 1998 to petitioner directing him to report for work
within three (3) days from receipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be dropped from the
rolls.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the petition by CA on mere technicality is unwarranted
and unjustified since pertinent jurisprudence abounds declaring in no uncertain terms that
dismissals of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
Court is to encourage hearings of appeals based on merits.

Held: In this case, we find no exceptional circumstance and we find no cogent reason to set
aside the factual findings of the CSC in sustaining the action of respondent in the dropping
of petitioner from the rolls on the ground that he was found AWOL (absent without official
leave). Petitioners assertion that he was denied due process is untenable. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
IV. In General

13.11 Nala v. Barroso, GR 153087 Aug. 7, 2003

FACTS: On June 2001, PO3 Alcoser together with his witness applied for the issuance of
a warrant to search the person and residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was
referred to in the application as Rumolo Nala alias Long of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon. The application was filed in connection with petitioners alleged illegal
possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of Illegal Possession
of Firearms. On the same day, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City,
issued Search and Seizure Warrant. The fact that the items seized were not exactly the
items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same because the items seized bear a
direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
(Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant
although his first name was erroneously stated therein as Romulo and not Bernard,
considering that the warrant was couched in terms that would make it enforceable against
the person and residence of petitioner and no other.)
ISSUE: Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?
RULING: YES. the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first
name of petitioner, which is Bernard and not Romulo or Rumolo, does not invalidate
the warrant because the additional description alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing
at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate
and identify the petitioner. . What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party,
and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a description personae that will enable
the officer to identify the accused without difficulty.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. Search and Seizure
Warrant is declared VOID and the articles seized by virtue thereof are declared
inadmissible in evidence.
13.12 Betoy v. Judge AM NO. MJJ-05-1108, Feb 26, 2006

13.13 20th Century Fox v. CA, 162 SCRA 655

G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988

Facts: Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in
conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti-film piracy campaign.
Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law).

The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the
video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search
warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and
seized the items described in the three warrants.
Issue: Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?

Ruling: YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier. This linkage
of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements
of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve
as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and
resolution of the CA.

13.14 Columbia Pictures v. CA, 262 SCRA 219

Facts:In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose
Jinco (Jingco), owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and
owned by Columbia Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to
quash the search warrant but the same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an
Urgent Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC
judge granted the motion. The judge ruled that based on the ruling in the 1988 case of 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation vs CA, before a search warrant could be issued in copyright
cases, the master copy of the films alleged to be pirated must be attached in the application
for warrant.
ISSUE: Whether the 20th Century Fox ruling may be applied retroactively in this case.
HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox was not yet promulgated.
The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from the VRB and
Columbia Pictures in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of
probable cause.
B. Personally Determined by the Judge

13.15 Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463

Facts: Petitioners filed information in the city court and they certified that Preliminary
Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been
found. Upon receipt of said information, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal
cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing,
respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of
prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the information to aid
him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by
petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to
issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals certification in the information of
the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue
warrants of arrest.

Issue: Whether respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest,
compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of probable cause and
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the
judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial
function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate.
Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the
information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification
and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the
conclusion as to existence of probable cause. Petition dismissed.

13.16 Lim v. Judge Fenix, 194 SCRA 292

FACTS: On March 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport
road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of
Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial
Guards were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Mr. Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a
gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a
probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply
relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where
all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined
probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional
requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

13.17 People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788

13.18 People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715

13.18 PEOPLE vs. DELGADO

189 SCRA 715, 1990

Facts: On January 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election
Registrar of Toledo City against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually recommended the filing of
an information against each of the private respondents for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private
respondents as recommended.

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of
arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was
conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC
through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said
cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the
motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may
review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by
the court.

Issue: Whether the (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said
court.

Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from
the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and
administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the
exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election
offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the
COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation
of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the
information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of
the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the
authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.

13.19 Allado v. Diokno 232 SCRA 192

Facts:
On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a discharged Philippine Constabulary named
Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose
Allado and Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado. He accused them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of Eugen
Alexander Van Twest, a German national. Based on that confession of Umbal, a search
warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of the RTC of Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), armed with the
search warrant issued separately raided the dwellings of police officers who were also
pointed by Umbal as the perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and ammunitions
were found in the raid including Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and
their other co-defendants were charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of
authority. Their case was referred by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.
After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto Diokno found probable cause and issued
a warrant of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the issued warrants of arrests.
They claim that Judge Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his
jurisdiction as there is lack of probable cause for him to issue the warrants. They further
contend that the judge did not personally determine the admissibility and sufficiency of the
evidence where the investigation was based from.
Issue: Whether or not a warrant of arrest without bail can be set aside and the case be
dismissed for lack of probable cause even if the accused was not in the custody of the court.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the PACC
from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding in the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. As with other earlier cases
resolved by the high court, the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding such, there is no
requirement that the accused be in the custody of the law. Various reliefs can be granted by
the Supreme Court to accused even if they are not in the custody of the law.
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13.20 Gozos v. Tac-an GR 123191, Dec. 17, 1998