STATES CP UM STARTER

SHELLS AND SPECIFIC SOLVENCY

 1nc [vs generic]
The fifty states and territories should ______. Enforcement should include, at least, equitable state
funding, expanded state education boards and revitalized professional development.

The counterplan solves better than the plan. States alone promote innovation and
accountability---the perms overlapping mandates fail.
Chopin 13 JD, associate in the Labor & Employment Law Department and a member of the Employee
Benefits & Executive Compensation Group, focusing on complex employee benefits litigation (Lindsey,
COMMENT: UNTANGLING PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE: A PROPOSAL TO END MEANINGLESS
FEDERAL REFORM AND STREAMLINE CONTROL IN STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES, 59 Loyola Law Review
399, Lexis)//BB

In abandoning the current system of fad reforms, it must be accepted that "large-scale educational
reform is unlikely in the absence of an institutional center to shape policy, aggregate interests, and
control and channel conflict." 245 This realization begs the question: Where should this institutional
center be placed? Three options exist: (1) the federal government, (2) local schools, or (3) states. This
Comment proposes that the states become centers of education reform that work directly with the local
schools to propel constructive change. History has taught us that extensive local control was fragmented
and unreliable, and the modern failure of increased federal intervention should make us wary of
complete federal control. 246 Furthermore, it has become clear that overlapping governance by
multiple bodies creates a confusing and unaccountable system. 247 With a cooperative of state and
local control, led by strong state institutional centers, this proposal has the potential to create a
balanced system in which real reform can occur. Section IV(A) will outline the proposed changes and
why those changes will create a better chance for useful reform. Section IV(B) will then address and
rebut possible challenges to this proposal, including why the federal government and local schools
should not be centers of reform, and how the federal government will be removed from reform. A. The
Case for the States In 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that Education, perhaps even
more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of "intractable economic, social, and even [*443]
philosophical problems." The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide
public school system suggests that "there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of
solving them,' and that, within the limits of rationality, "the [State] legislature's efforts to tackle the
problems" should be entitled to respect. 248 Despite this sage advice, the federal government persisted
in trying to control education. It is time for the power struggle to come to an end, and for states to take
control of the complex endeavor of regulating public education. Section IV(A)(1) will discuss this
Comment's proposed changes to state education agencies, and Section IV(A)(2) will analyze why this
proposal would succeed. 1. Proposed Changes to State Education Agencies This Section does not suggest
another bureaucratic structure, but rather suggests learning-centric bodies that facilitate the education
process. Under this proposal, systemic changes to the current system would be necessary. State
education agencies would not be mere paper-pushers who dole out funds; they would be involved in the
learning and reform process. This would require a massive expansion of state education boards to
include enough experts to cover all schools. State education agencies would serve a proactive and
reactive regulatory function. Their regulation will be proactive in terms of funding. All funds raised for
education should be deposited into the state agency. The state will then adequately and equitably
disburse these funds to ensure that poorer districts are not short-changed. 249 The reactive regulatory
function of the proposed agency would be charged with monitoring the progress of local schools. As is
currently the case, data would be kept on all schools concerning test scores, dropout rates, suspension
rates, etc. However, rather than using the data to enforce an arbitrary scheme of winners and losers, the
proposed state agency would [*444] simply be there to ensure upward movement and provide support
to those schools that stagnate or decline. This regulation may be achieved, in part, by an overhauled
system of professional development. For many, the notion of professional development conjures images
of overworked teachers, excited to have an afternoon off from teaching, eating Danishes and discussing
new methods of instruction in the school library. 250 The professional development espoused by this
proposal differs in that it does not flatly present new strategies for the curious teacher to try on her
own, but consists of "mutual education for teachers [that serves as] a lever for reorganizing schools and
districts in response to (ever more refined) diagnoses of their shortcomings." 251 This type of
professional development consists of master teachers working with other teachers to determine what
needs to be fixed and how to fix it. 252 Data would be used to inform change instead of to determine
who wins or loses. This proposal maintains that this type of gradual, flexible, and informed change that
is a result of ground-level educators and state-level experts working together is the best method by
which to improve achievement in all schools. 253 For example, imagine the following: in the ABC Local
School District, achievement across schools varies. The lowest performing school has a passing rate of
only thirteen percent on the state exam; the highest performing school enjoys a ninety percent rate.
Two years after working with master teachers to improve both schools, the thirteen percent school has
climbed to fifty percent and the ninety percent school has climbed to ninety-four percent. Under the
restrictive programs with arbitrary cut-offs for "success," both schools could be in trouble. The fifty
percent school would likely still be considered to be failing because only half of its students passed the
state exam. The other school could be in trouble for only gaining four percent on [*445] the exams.
Under this Comment's proposal, neither school would face sanctions. Although it would be ideal to see a
school with a thirteen percent proficiency rate move to 100 percent in two years, it is unlikely. Under
this proposal, so long as the thirteen percent school was moving upwards, towards a goal of 100
percent, its doors would stay open and it would continue to receive funding, perhaps more funding than
other schools. Conversely, the school with the ninety percent proficiency rate would need to progress
differently. Obviously, such a school will not be able to jump five percent a year like a lower achieving
school could because the school will only be doing fine-tuning. As part of their reactive function, the
state education agency would be responsible for tracking this data and making adjustments and
interventions where necessary by collaborating with the school and its teachers. Because upward
movement will be the focus rather than timelines and thresholds for success, the pressure on local
schools can be alleviated and real progress can be made. 2. Why This Structure Will Work Centering
education governance in the states will create a balance that local and federal governance has yet to
find. States are small enough to respond to local needs, yet large enough to have the resources to
respond to those needs. They can respond through a continuation of their current programs, the
innovation of new programs, or by looking to other states for guidance. Further, states are small enough
to oversee their classrooms, and to partner with the teachers in order to get to the root of their local
problems. This Section explores these attributes. Section IV(A)(2)(a) will discuss local solutions for local
problems; Section IV(A)(2)(b) will detail the continuation of successful solutions; Section IV(A)(2)(c) will
introduce the innovation of new solutions; and Section IV(A)(2)(d) will present a combination of Top and
Bottom Down Reform. a. Local Solutions for Local Problems This proposal calls for people to end their
reliance on a "Big Idea." 254 As noted earlier, the same reform that fails on a large [*446] scale may
prove successful on a small scale. Under this proposal, all reforms would be imposed on a fairly small
scale with close monitoring and tailoring. For example, despite the general finding that charter schools
are not the cure-all that many claim them to be, charter schools do have positive effects in some locales.
255 Most notably, in Louisiana, a state whose failures in public education were highlighted nationally
after Hurricane Katrina, charter schools actually showed statistically significant growth in both reading
and math scores. 256 The growth shown by these charters was significantly more promising than in
other states. 257 Thus, Louisiana may want to continue researching this option for reform in some
areas. Conversely, Ohio, which showed statistically significant declines in achievement in charter
schools, may want to consider other avenues. 258 Regardless of the reform, this proposal allows local
solutions. b. Continuation of Successful Solutions As noted earlier, expansive federal oversight can force
states to replace successful programs with non-specialized and un-researched federal reforms. This
would not happen under the proposed system because the federal government is out of the equation.
Rather than scrambling to meet new mandates, states can continue the programs they have and use
funds that would be spent on innovating completely new reforms to tweak current systems that are
doing well or show promise of future success. Such attention to detail and persistence in
implementation is not possible under the federal timeline for reform. c. Innovation of New Solutions As
noted earlier, the federal government does not have the resources to enforce and monitor its reforms in
a meaningful way. 259 Under federal reform, situations like Jane's useless Smartboard in the
hypothetical in the Introduction often arise. The federal government provides money for a certain
purpose, like innovation through technology, and the school must find a way to use that technology
within the confines of the mandate and can make decisions that are forced and illogical, such as [*447]
purchasing Smartboards. Because implementation is lacking and funding is insufficient, the forced
innovations fail, as did the Smartboard innovation, where the boards were purchased but not
integrated. It seems more effective to spend resources on developing successful innovations that are
needed rather than prescribed. Before the federal reforms tied state education agencies up in red tape,
states had begun to innovate their own solutions. 260 Under the most recent federal mandates, this
innovation has been both stifled (in the case of NCLB) and rushed (in the case of RTF). The hallmarks of
federal reform are limited funding and implementation by the carrot and stick approach. 261 Thus,
under the federal system there must be winners and losers, those who pass and those who fail. The
lines that divide these categories are completely arbitrary, and in the case of NCLB, have led schools to
take drastic measures to meet arbitrary goals. 262 Under the proposed system, arbitrary federal goals
would be removed, thus freeing states to innovate at a calm, thoughtful pace. For years, the federal
government has assumed that states have the capacity to innovate, as evidenced by their skeletal
reforms. This proposal allows states the chance to do exactly that.
 ---xt: solvency vs generic
State-led reforms solve
Lips 8 - senior fellow at the Goldwater Institute and the Maryland Public Policy Institute (Dan, A Nation
Still at Risk: The Case for Federalism and School Choice, The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/education/report/nation-still-risk-the-case-federalism-and-school-choice)//BB

LESSON 4: State-level reforms can lead to improvement. Improving academic achievement across the
nation has proven difficult, but there is good reason to believe that comprehensive state-level education
reforms can lead to dramatic improvement in the classroom. Florida represents a promising model of a
state that has implemented aggressive education reforms that have led to improvements in academic
achieve-ment.[46] Over the past decade, Florida policymakers have established a rigorous accountability
system and innovative testing model; have increased the focus on reading, reducing social promotion,
pro-viding new pathways for hiring, and rewarding quality teachers; and have expanded public and
pri-vate school choice. After ten years, Florida's assertive approach to education reform seems to be
working. The state's public-school students have demonstrated signifi-cant improvement on NAEP
reading and math exams compared to students nationally. Black and Hispanic students have been
improving at a faster rate than their white peers-evidence that the state is succeeding in reducing the
ethnic achievement gap. The Sunshine State's experience demonstrates that systemic education reform
is possible. What Federal Policymakers Should Do Although the word "education" is not mentioned in
the Constitution, the federal government has played a growing role in the funding and regulation of
elementary and secondary education since the 1960s. This interventionist policy has hindered rather
than advanced the progress of educational improvement in America. The following principles should
form the basis for full reform in American education. Resist increasing federal authority. Decades of
increased federal intervention have failed to deliver significantly improved student perfor-mance in
long-term measures of academic achievement. No Child Left Behind has once again demonstrated the
limited and potential unintended consequences of increased federal authority.
 1nc [vs desegregation]
The 50 state courts should rule that the states have an affirmative obligation to provide equal and
adequate education, using mandated desegregation as a remedy to education inequality and
inadequacy.

The counterplan solves better than federal policy

Hilbert 17 Associate Professor of Law @ Mitchell Hamline school of law (Jim, Restoring the Promise
of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to Challenge School Segregation, 46 J.L. & Educ. 1, Lexis)//BB

H. Cruz-Guzman v. State of Minnesota: A New Beginning to Remedy the Harms of Brown in State Court

Cruz-Guzman is the most recent in a limited series of educational-adequacy cases committed exclusively
to restoring the promise of Brown. 254 The complaint and legal theories follow closely from the
litigation of the Minneapolis NAACP case in the 1990s. 255 The plaintiffs clearly linked this new case to
that previous Minnesota case from twenty years ago. 256 Like its predecessor, Cruz-Guzman challenges
racial segregation, although this version has expanded its coverage to both Minneapolis and St. Paul.
257 In addition to their complaint, the [*47] plaintiffs published background materials to clarify that the
purpose of Cruz-Guzman is to continue where Minneapolis NAACP left off and promote "metropolitan-
wide desegregation." 258 The conditions in Minneapolis and St. Paul are arguably even worse today
then the situation confronting the previous case. 259 Segregation is more intense, and there are far
more highly segregated schools than in 1995. There are now 36 public schools at 90% or more students
of color in Minneapolis and St. Paul combined. 260 Such a high number of racially isolated schools is
remarkable in a state that is less than 30% students of color. 261 The most recent test scores show that
students of color have proficiency rates in reading, math, and science at less than 1/3 the proficiency
rates of white students. 262 While the case is still in the very early stages, plaintiffs have already
survived the first major barrier. On July 8, 2016, the district court denied the main parts of the
defendants' motion to dismiss. 263 Importantly, the court acknowledged the link between Cruz-Guzman
and previous adequacy cases that established that education clauses contain a "qualitative standard" as
established by Rose and the other progressive adequacy cases. 264 [*48]

V. MERGING BOTH APPROACHES: HOW STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS COULD ADDRESS

SEGREGATION

A. State-based Desegregation Cases: Will Others Follow?

The approach of Cruz-Guzman, along with the earlier decision in Sheff and promising settlement in
Minneapolis NAACP, represent an important step toward merging Brown and its progeny with
educational adequacy litigation in state courts, but the paucity of such cases suggests this approach may
also carry serious drawbacks. On the one hand, it makes sense to use educational adequacy principles to
address the harm of segregation that Brown recognized over sixty years ago. Segregated schools
undermine educational adequacy certainly as much as inadequate funding. 265 State constitutions
include explicit rights to education not recognized in federal constitution. State courts avoid issues that
have derailed the federal courts, namely requirements of intentional discrimination and concerns over
federalism that obstruct effective remedies. The jurisprudence of adequacy litigation has empowered
state courts with remedial flexibility not available to federal courts. On the other hand, no decision
other than Sheff has supported Cruz-Guzman' s theory, and the New York high court in Paynter rejected
a similar approach. Many commenters have suggested that without the specific anti-segregation
language of the Connecticut constitution, such state-based claims may not work. In addition, remedies
in adequacy cases have delivered far less than what plaintiffs originally demanded or, at times, needed,
much as it has been with Sheff and subsequent efforts to desegregate the Hartford schools.

[*49] B. The Benefits of State-Based Educational Adequacy Claims for Desegregation

As a starting point, state courts do not have to worry about two key problems with federal
desegregation jurisprudence. Federal courts were highly restricted by the self-imposed distinction of de
jure versus de facto segregation and the requirement of intentional discrimination on the part of school
districts. This requirement largely prevented federal courts from addressing segregation in the North,
and led to eventual limitations on enforcement and oversight in the South. With Milliken, the Court
imposed another game-changing requirement of restricting the geographic reach of desegregation
remedies, imposing federalism concerns that thwarted metropolitan-wide remedies. State courts have
neither one of these requirements.

1. More expansive rights

Education has a special place in state constitutional law. Education has always been recognized as the
primary responsibility of states, not the federal government. 266 While the word "education" does not
appear in the federal constitution, all fifty states have some form of an education clause. 267 State
constitutions have generally singled out education to receive special protection under the state
constitution. As the Supreme Court of Vermont put it, "[o]nly one governmental service--public
education--has ever been accorded constitutional status in Vermont. " 268

[*50] Many states already consider education a fundamental right. 269 Twenty-two states have
interpreted their education clause to confer an affirmative obligation on the state to provide an
adequate education. 270 Without exception, the right to education under state constitutional law has
always required at least a minimal guarantee of quality of education. 271 Because the federal
Constitution does not contain an education clause, there is no federal constitutional supremacy issue
limiting what states can derive from their state constitutions. 272 State courts can follow their own
interpretation. 273 As a result, state court decisions based on the education clause "create no tension
with federal law." 274

2. More expansive remedies

The affirmative right to education is reflected in how far state courts are willing to go to protect that
right. Educational adequacy jurisprudence has been significantly expansive in its remedial powers. Cases
like Rose, Serrano, Robinson, and Pauley, in particular, reflect "substantial judicial flexibility." 275 State
courts have imposed broad remedial measures in two ways. First, state courts have invalidated large
pieces of state education [*51] systems in light of constitutional violations, 276 including in one instance
invalidating the entire state school system. 277 Second, state courts have imposed stringent guidelines
and measures against which legislatures must enact remedial educational policy. 278 The momentum is
pushing state courts to go even further. 279 The constraints the U.S. Constitution imposes on federal
desegregation cases do not limit state courts in their application of state constitutional principles. 280
The prohibition on metropolitan-wide remedies first articulated in Milliken does not apply to state
courts [*52] enforcing state constitutional principles. 281 Additionally, to the extent the Supreme Court
imposed limitations on what districts can do to address segregation, recently in Parents Involved, the
Court left open plenty of options for districts working under a state court mandate to create
desegregation policies. 282

3. Easier to show a violation -- failure to provide an adequate education vs. intentional discrimination

Limiting federal court intervention to only those school districts with a clear record of de jure
segregation has undermined the promise of Brown as much as any other restriction imposed by the
Supreme Court. 283 The Supreme Court's prohibition against addressing de facto segregation means
most of the segregation in the North and the resegregation of the South is out of the reach of federal
courts. 284

State courts applying educational adequacy principles do not have to worry about the distinction
between de jure and de facto segregation. The state has an affirmative obligation to provide an
adequate [*53] education. Failure to do so, regardless of whether such failure includes intentional
conduct or simple inaction, is irrelevant. 285 As the high court in Connecticut found, "The fact that the
legislature did not affirmatively create or intend to create the conditions that have led to the racial and
ethnic isolation in the Hartford public school system does not, in and of itself, relieve the defendants of
their affirmative obligation to provide the plaintiffs with a more effective remedy for their constitutional
grievances." 286 In other words, an educational-adequacy analysis is interested only in the impact on
students, not the intent of the school district." 287
 ---xt: solvency vs desegregation
State constitutional claims effectively promote desegregation
Hilbert 17 Associate Professor of Law @ Mitchell Hamline school of law (Jim, Restoring the Promise
of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to Challenge School Segregation, 46 J.L. & Educ. 1, Lexis)//BB

On November 5, 2015, seven families filed a class action lawsuit challenging the racial and
socioeconomic segregation in their public schools. 1 This potentially transformative case with national
implications, Cruz-Guzman v. State of Minnesota, alleges that segregated schools deny schoolchildren
their right to receive an adequate education under their state constitution. 2 While the complaint
explicitly references Brown v. Board of Education, 3 Cruz-Guzman represents a major departure from
Brown and its progeny in the federal courts, a departure that reflects the many disappointments that
have followed the Brown decision and left [*2] America's public schools more segregated today than in
generations. 4 It is remarkable enough that such a lawsuit was necessary more than sixty years after the
historic ruling in Brown, which prohibited segregated schools. 5 Equally noteworthy is that unlike Brown,
this lawsuit was filed in state court relying on state constitutional law. Cruz-Guzman represents the
joining of two strands of legal approaches that have spent the last few decades headed in different
directions. 6 For more than forty years, state courts have played a major role and have had varied
success in addressing issues of educational inequality under school finance and educational adequacy
theories. 7 Federal courts, on the other hand, have departed sharply from the initial promise 8 of the
Brown decision and have spent the last few decades undermining desegregation. 9 Both state and
federal court strategies have largely failed to address inequalities and segregation in America's schools.
10 Despite the limited progress in state courts and the long past progress in federal courts, our [*3]
schools remain deeply segregated. 11 Levels of segregation have generally been increasing over the past
thirty years. 12 In both academic and social outcomes, students in these segregated schools lag far
behind their peers. 13 Part I of this article discusses the Brown decision and the federal jurisprudence of
desegregation that has followed in the Supreme Court. While hailed as one of the Supreme Court's
greatest accomplishments, the iconic Brown decision has been largely dismantled. Federal courts have
not only allowed segregation to return; they have also gone so far as to place limits on school districts
that are willing to address segregation on their own. It is no wonder that plaintiffs hoping to address
segregation in their schools, like the ones in Cruz-Guzman, find themselves looking for options other
than the federal courts. Part II discusses the promise of Brown and why addressing segregation in the
courts remains a priority. Segregation has been so pervasive and enduring that by now there are
decades of research on both the harms of segregation and the benefits of desegregation. The research is
fairly clear: segregation impacts not only the educational outcomes of students, but it has long-lasting
negative effects on social aspects as well. Desegregation has clear academic and social benefits, which
remain as important today as they were in the days of the Brown decision. Part III discusses the
divergent jurisprudence in state court, which has largely ignored segregation and focused instead on
funding and educational adequacy to improve educational opportunities. Relying on state constitutions,
which unlike the federal constitution recognize educational rights, plaintiffs in state courts have made
important progress in reforming educational systems, particularly with respect to funding. A few state
court cases have even addressed segregation, with mixed results. [*4] Part IV discusses how state
constitutional claims can bring new life to the promise of Brown and address segregation in the
schools. 14 Cruz-Guzman is in some respects a combination of the best of federal courts and state
courts. While it is certainly too early to tell, the Cruz-Guzman litigation represents the next logical step in
addressing inequality in our schools, combining the many advantages of state court litigation with the
original promise of Brown.

State courts solve---prefer Trump-specific evidence

Kahlenberg 17 - senior fellow at The Century Foundation with expertise in education, civil rights, and
equal opportunity (Richard, The New Champions of School Integration, The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/04/the-new-champions-of-school-
integration/522141/)//BB

By coincidence, as the news of the programs discontinuation broke, proponents of school diversity,
including King, were gathering at the Harvard Graduate School of Education for a strategic-planning
conference on school-diversity efforts. The day-long meeting, sponsored by Harvards Reimagining
Integration program, the National Coalition on School Diversity, and The Century Foundation (where I
work), brought together 50 scholars, civil-rights activists, and educators to plot out new strategies for
school diversity in the age of Trump. The decision by Donald Trumps education secretary, Betsy DeVos,
to kill Opening Doors was a reminder, if any was needed, that proponents of school diversity need to
look beyond the federal government for support during Trumps administration. The decision on
whether to proceed with the Opening Doors program, Philip Tegeler of the Poverty and Race Research
Action Council told Patrick Wall in an Atlantic article last month, was going to be a real test of her
commitment to school integration. And now she had failed. At the conference, King called the decision
a heartbreaking signal on an issue of utmost importance. Students of color represent more than 50
percent of public-school students, King noted, and the fate of the country will be determined by how
well it decides to educate this new majority of students. School integration is also tied to the fate of our
democracy, he suggested, because segregated schools allow politicians to scapegoat minorities, while
integrated schools remind students of what they have in common as Americans. Research finds that
school diversity reduces racial prejudice and improves academic attainment, which, in turn, is tied to
higher voter participation. The death of a small federal school-integration initiative is connected to a
much larger concern that DeVoss primary education-reform ideausing public money for private
school voucherswill produce poor academic results for students, and Balkanize students by religion,
race, and class. As my Century Foundation colleague Halley Potter noted in a new report, voucher
programs on balance are more likely to increase school segregation than to decrease it or leave it at
status quo. King reminded participants, however, that this was not a moment to admire the problem,
but a time to engage in fresh thinking about new approaches. What options do supporters of diversity
have? Could progressives capitalize on DeVoss rhetoric around school choiceparticularly, the
compelling need to liberate kids from struggling, high-poverty schoolsto encourage choice within the
public-school system that is designed to bring children of different backgrounds together? Should
progressives pivot from Washington to focus on progressive states and localities? What is the role of
foundations? What about state courts? Progressives in blue states appear to have a strong appetite for
pushing against Donald Trumps agenda on issues from immigration to climate change. Could this
sentiment provide an important spark for school diversity initiatives? Under the federal Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA), states are required to devote 7 percent of Title I funds to improving the lowest-
performing schools. New York state has a program (begun by King when he was its education
commissioner) to use federal school-improvement funds to turn around struggling schools by
implementing attractive magnet programs. Research suggests that low-income students in mixed-
income schoolssurrounded by peers who expect to go on to college, parents in the school community
who regularly volunteer in class, and strong teachersperform substantially better than comparable
students in high-poverty schools that often lack those ingredients for success. State charter-school laws,
likewise, could set aside a certain proportion of charter-school fundssay, 25 percentfor schools that
are diverse by design, using a weighted lottery to ensure that school choice promotes socioeconomic
diversity. Local school districts, as well, can forge ahead with diversity plans, with or without federal
support. The day after Trump's election, for example, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, school
board voted 9-0 to adopt a socioeconomic-integration plan for its magnet schools, a reminder that
under the United States system of federalism, changes in Washington dont have to spell the end of
education movements. (I worked with the district on this project). What should be the role of courts in
pursuing school-diversity strategies today? Nationally, the Century Foundation has identified 100 school
districts and charter-school chains that voluntarily are pursuing diversity policies that consider student
economic status in their student assignment plans. With philanthropic support, these districts could
form a community of practice to support one another and expand the number of districts pursuing
diversity policies by showing how it can be done in a politically palatable way that is also good for kids.
In growing the movement for integrated schools, participants at the Harvard conference discussed how
various constituenciescivil-rights groups, business leaders, people of faith, students, and teachers
unionsmight support diversity. Sarah Camiscoli, the director of IntegrateNYC4me, a student group that
is seeking school integration in New York City, suggested bringing in new constituencies, such as military
veterans, firefighters, and police officers who are focused on the public good. A message that
integration is the fair choice that works for the common good and personal achievement could
resonate with people in these professions, she said, adding that veterans also have personal experience
working in a diverse institution. David Hinojosa, who works with the education department to provide
school districts the technical support they need to promote civil rights, discussed ways in which low-
income communities and communities of color can be reassured that integration does not suggest that
they possess deficiencies but rather that they bring strengths that will add to a healthy school
environment. Likewise, some participants asked, would framing school integration primarily around
socioeconomic status unite the interests of working-class people of color who supported Hillary Clinton
and working-class, white Trump supporters, thereby scrambling existing political alliances? Finally,
because the school-integration movement famously gained national attention with the landmark 1954
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, it is natural to ask: What should be the role
of courts in pursuing school-diversity strategies today? In recent years, the federal courts have been an
impediment, such as when the Supreme Court struck down voluntary racial-integration plans in
Louisville, Kentucky, and Seattle in 2007. But socioeconomic-integration plans are perfectly legal. And
state courts have an important role to play interpreting state constitutions to foster school integration.
The best example is the Connecticut Supreme Court, which in the 1996 case of Sheff v. ONeill ruled that
segregation between Hartford schools and the surrounding suburbs violated the state constitution,
whether or not the segregation was intentional. James Ryan, the dean of Harvards Education School,
has been writing for decades about the idea of replicating Sheff-type state-level decisions in places
where courts have found a constitutional right to a decent education. Given research suggesting that
socioeconomic school integration is an even more powerful lever for boosting achievement than
funding, he has suggested that state finance litigation be extended to integration. Now, at the
conference, he wondered: Could the time be opportune, given that courts have found their voice in
promoting democratic values in the age of Trump, resisting, for example, the ban on immigration from
majority-Muslim nations? Might the courts be newly open to lawsuits that seek to encourage efforts to
ensure that children of different backgrounds have the opportunity to learn together and from one
another? It may be the worst of times for school integration at the federal level, but could this be the
best time for progressive school boards and state courts, newly energized by the national political
scene, to embrace an education reform that will strengthen American democracy?

The federal government follows-on to state-based desegregation measures

Hilbert 17 Associate Professor of Law @ Mitchell Hamline school of law (Jim, Restoring the Promise
of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to Challenge School Segregation, 46 J.L. & Educ. 1, Lexis)//BB

Ultimately, state court solutions may be insufficient, but they can trigger much greater change and lead
to important, if modest, reforms. The road to more effective state constitutional remedies may need
many building blocks, much as the efforts of the NAACP to eventually bring and win Brown took years to
complete. 296 This is not a reason to wait; on the contrary, the longer the wait, the further away the
solution lies. Perfection may be the enemy of the good, particularly in securing education reform.
Furthermore, even though courts basically just hand it back to legislatures, such deference has, with
court involvement, led to important results. Rose, and even Sheff, while delivering less over time than
plaintiffs had hoped, did play essential roles in important progress. 297 State courts may not provide all
of what is needed, but they can generate reform across the entire political system. 298 The Rose court
"provided the legislature with both the nerve and the rationale to raise taxes, equalize school funding,
and make other necessary changes." 299 Future state court rulings can do the same for school
segregation. [*56] VI. CONCLUSION The recent filing of Cruz-Guzman has restarted the discussion on
whether educational adequacy litigation can address school segregation effectively. The segregation at
issue in Cruz-Guzman is similar to that of many other cities across the country. Deeply segregated
schools, with clearly inadequate educational opportunities, have become largely unreachable by federal
courts. The constitutional violation of segregated education first articulated by the Supreme Court in
Brown goes without a remedy. But educational adequacy litigation, which has transformed numerous
school systems through improved funding and resource allocation, may provide an alternative. Backed
by state constitutional law that provides broad remedial power to enforce an affirmative right to an
adequate education, plaintiffs could adopt the power of educational adequacy litigation to remedy
school segregation, much as they already have done to reform school finance. Because segregated
schools are inadequate, the right to an adequate education surely includes one free from segregation.
 1nc [vs right-to-education]
The 50 state courts should uphold a constitutional right to education, and state legislatures should
provide sufficient resources for effective funding and management of schools.

The counterplan solves---it more effectively fits schools to local needs, and encourages
innovation and experimentation that improve educational experiences
Greenspahn 8 - JD @ GWU School of Law, previously handled issues related to education in New York
City as Legislative Assistant and Legislative Director to U.S. Congressman Anthony D. Weiner, and served
as a research officer for the Institute of International Education, nonprofit administrator of international
exchanges, including the Fulbright program (Daniel, THE ROBERTS COURT AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS: RACE: A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure of Making a
Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 755, Lexis)//BB

Local control over education remains a reality and a touchstone of accountable government that weighs
against a federal right to education. Federal participation in education has increased in recent years, 257
but decisions regarding curriculum, personnel, and school administration are overwhelmingly made at
the community level. 258 The American tradition of decentralized education is viewed as "more
responsive [and] democratic" than an educational system controlled by a distant federal government.
259 A policy of allowing wide-ranging local reforms encourages states, as individual laboratories, to
work toward educational success. 260 State and local governments also provide funding for over 90% of
public school expenditures. 261 Brown I's famous proclamation that "education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments" 262 still reflects modern [*782] practice. Even if
NCLB has imposed federal requirements in the area of education, no single expenditure receives more
state and local support than public schools. 263 There is a certain logic in having state litigation alleging
resource deficiencies track state expenditures, the primary source of funding for education. Despite
growing "federal involvement in education, the tradition of local-state governance has prevailed over
efforts to equalize education resources across state lines through litigation or legislation." 264 The
Supreme Court has been a chief defender of local control. The year following Rodriguez, the Court
declared that "no single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools." 265 Ever since, the Court has reiterated the value of local control in decisions
involving school desegregation, 266 education funding, 267 student assignment, 268 and student
speech. 269 The Court has praised local control because it "affords citizens an opportunity to participate
in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages
"experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.'" 270 The
prominence of community decisionmaking in schooling and the Supreme Court's commitment to this
policy weigh heavily against pursuit of a federal right to education. V. Conclusion A federal right to an
education remains legally possible today, despite general perceptions that Rodriguez foreclosed such a
right. By some measures, renewed federal litigation is the most viable it has been since Rodriguez was
decided. In 1973, advocates and politicians were divided over federal involvement in education, legal
precedent for a right to education was tenuous at best, and few remedies for school funding
inadequacies were available. Thirty-five years later, [*783] elected officials largely support federal
participation in education, numerous state decisions advance a right to education, and manageable
standards for school funding reform abound. Growing frustration with a national regime that demands
accountability without providing adequate resources also makes a federal right to education more
politically feasible. Though a federal right to education may be found in the Constitution, advocates
should not return to the federal courts to try and achieve a quick fix to the country's school funding
problems. Recent Supreme Court decisions, such as ones that limit options for school integration, 271
suggest a federal right to education will not be a welcome next step toward providing every student
with a meaningful chance to learn. Reflecting on three decades of successful state school funding
litigation and the federal judiciary's recent reluctance to become involved in education, reformers
should continue to use state courts to ensure that local community leaders provide the resources
students need. The lure of avoiding piecemeal litigation should not distract advocates from what has
been a successful state-level effort by courts, legislatures, and concerned citizens to improve the
funding and management of our public schools.
 ---xt: solvency vs right-to-education
Using state courts effectively guarantees a right to education
Greenspahn 8 - JD @ GWU School of Law, previously handled issues related to education in New York
City as Legislative Assistant and Legislative Director to U.S. Congressman Anthony D. Weiner, and served
as a research officer for the Institute of International Education, nonprofit administrator of international
exchanges, including the Fulbright program (Daniel, THE ROBERTS COURT AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS: RACE: A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure of Making a
Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 755, Lexis)//BB

For decades, some scholars, reformers, and elected officials have advocated for a federal right to
education. 1 But in light of the Supreme Court's recent rulings, including its decisions invalidating race-
conscious school integration plans 2 and deferring to agency officials on matters of school funding, 3 the
federal courts do not appear to be the best forum for securing every student a quality education.
Instead, advocates should seek reform from state courts, which have been more receptive to
recognizing a right to education, as such a strategy avoids the legal and political pitfalls of making a
federal case out of education. 4 In Brown v. Board of Education 5 (Brown I), the Supreme Court famously
declared that education, "where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." 6 Ever since, there have been fierce debates regarding the best means
to fulfill Brown I's promise that all children must have an equal opportunity to learn. Proponents have
alternatively argued for [*757] class integration or greater resources, 7 urged federal intervention, 8 or
promoted state-level strategies. 9 No matter which school of thought is embraced, scholars must
squarely address the two Supreme Court decisions that have most influenced the debate about Brown
I's legacy and the fight for quality education: San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 10
and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 11 The former, in which the
Court upheld disparities in school funding, 12 has been widely viewed as closing the door on a federal
constitutional right to education. 13 The latter, in which the Court struck down the use of race in local
efforts to integrate schools, 14 suggests that this country is entering the end of the desegregation era.
15 What then is the next step in the movement to ensure a quality education for all children? At an April
2006 conference at the University of California at Berkeley law school, scholars explored various aspects
of pursuing education as a fundamental right. 16 At a November 2007 symposium at Columbia
University, legal reformers reassessed recent federal efforts at school integration and state school
funding litigation. 17 Scholars appraising these developments have predicted that advocates might
begin using the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act 18 and [*758] successful state school funding decisions
19 to "secure a foundation in federal law" for a right to education. 20 This Article addresses these issues
in two ways. First, Part III of this Article aims to correct a deep misunderstanding about Rodriguez, even
among experts, by demonstrating that the Court's decision and subsequent legal and political
developments make a federal constitutional right to an education viable. Unlike recent proponents,
however, Part IV of this Article urges advocates not to pursue a federal right to education at this time.
Because state-level school funding litigation has been successful, and the federal judiciary has
withdrawn from the education arena, and the Supreme Court has placed renewed emphasis on
federalism, now is not the time to make a federal case out of education. Instead, advocates should work
with state courts, legislators, and interested citizens, as they have for the last several decades, to
ensure that public schools receive funding based on student need. To reach these conclusions, Part II of
this Article documents the inequities in school funding, their costs, and efforts in the last fifty years to
remedy the problems in state and federal court.

State courts are comparatively more effective---a federal right does not guarantee
equality
Tractenberg 6 JD, former professor of law @ Rutgers (Paul, THE REFUSAL TO FEDERALIZE THE
QUEST FOR EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, THE ROLE OF STATE COURTS AND THE IMPACT OF
DIFFERENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES: A TALE OF TWO STATES, Rethinking Rodriguez
Symposium, SSRN)//BB

If I am correct about how Californias and New Jerseys current school funding and educational systems
would fare under Rodriguez re-imagined, there is a resounding answer to the question of whether we
would have been better off during these 33 years with a different Rodriguez decision. We would not
have been. If later cases had built upon a federalized version of Serrano rather than on Abbott, our
nations public education system and its students would have been the worse for it. So, too, would our
nation. Might we fruitfully Rethink Rodriguez in a different sense, though? Instead of expressing sour
grapes about how we could have won in Rodriguez if only, or instead 34 of speculating about how the
world would have been different if the Courts 5-4 split had been in the opposite direction, or even
instead of proposing doctrinal refinements in the original approach that might produce a different result
if Rodriguez were re-litigated today, perhaps we should rethink Rodriguez in a more profound way. Is
there a way, however dramatic a departure it might be from Rodriguez, to fashion a single federal
approach, judicial or legislative, that could successfully address the national problem of educational
inequalities? Personally, I remain ready to be persuaded, but dubious. Tempting as it might be to hope
that a single solution could be found to complex nationwide education problems, especially in an
increasingly global world, our experience over the decades with school desegregation should have
warned us of the disappointments and dangers lurking there. The Rodriguez decision might have been a
blessing in disguise by forcing state courts into the breach. NCLBs effort to federalize the elimination of
the achievement gap might lure us away from, not toward, real and abiding solutions. Like Brown v.
Board of Education, NCLB might play a more positive role in highlighting a profound national educational
failing than in directly curing it. Perhaps the framers had it right when they left the primary responsibility
for education to the states.

States solve without dramatically expanding federal judicial intrusion, and violating
stare decisis---theres no federal expertise advantage
Lindseth 17 JD, has built a national reputation representing state and local school authorities in
disputes over school finance and educational adequacy obligations outlined in both state and federal
constitutions. A member of Eversheds Sutherland (US)'s Litigation Practice Group, Al has worked closely
with State Attorney General offices in California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New York and North Dakota to resolve education-based disputes through litigation,
negotiation, legislative action or a combination of all three. (Alfred, et al, Federal Courts Cant Solve
Our Education Ills, EducationNext, 17.2)//BB

In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal Constitution does not establish a fundamental
right to education or to equal school funding. In so doing, the court rejected the argument that
funding disparities across local school districts should be strictly scrutinized under the Fourteenth
Amendments equal protection clause. That decision, in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, has been good law for more than 40 years. Various commentators and two new lawsuits,
however, argue that Rodriguez should be reconsidered. These advocates urge the courts to create a
federal constitutional right to education. Although the word education appears nowhere in the federal
Constitution, advocates for recognizing that such a right is implied typically argue that it would ensure
equal educational opportunity and foster more effective participation in civil society. These advocates
may be well-intentioned, but their arguments rest on shaky legal reasoning and would translate into bad
policy. First, as a matter of constitutional law, Rodriguez was correctly decided. With a nod to Brown v.
Board of Education, the Supreme Courts 1954 decision banning state-imposed racial segregation in
schools, the Rodriguez court recognized the vital role of education in a free society. But the court also
emphasized the restraint inherent in our federal constitutional scheme: The importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes
of examination under the Equal Protection Clause, the court wrote in its opinion, and education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we
find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. And finally, the court noted, it is not the province
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws. This analysis reflects the fact that the federal Constitution protects us from certain kinds of
governmental actionsuch as state-imposed segregation, prohibitions on free speech, or invasions of
personal privacybut does not create expansive positive rights or guarantee governmental assistance.
Federal courts typically refuse to create new substantive rights, and in a 1989 case, DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court recognized that the
[Constitutions] Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even
where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests. Declaring education to be
an implicit fundamental right would raise difficult constitutional questions about essentials such as food,
shelter, and health carenone of which are mentioned in the federal Constitution. More broadly, the
federal government was designed to have limited, enumerated powers, as reflected in the Tenth
Amendment: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Regardless of the incentives
contained in federal laws like the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the federal government may encourage but may not simply commandeer state
governments to implement or enforce federal policies. These constitutional principles are especially
important in the context of education. Historically, responsibility for designing and reforming systems of
public education has rested with the states. Unlike the federal Constitution, all 50 state constitutions
have provisions that explicitly address education. Many of these provisions speak merely in broad terms,
but they still serve as points of reference for state and local governments charged with establishing and
maintaining public schools. Legal challenges to a states legislative and executive policies on public
education necessarily implicate separation-of-powers concerns about the courts abilities to answer
political questions and resolve policy debates. But at least state courts have an education clause to
begin their analysis of any right to education. By contrast, given the lack of an education clause in the
U.S. Constitution, federal courts attempting to define an implicit right to education would need to start
from scratch. Without the benefit of any constitutional text or interpretive history to lend meaning to
the term education, federal courts would be fabricating a new substantive right out of whole cloth.
Misguided Efforts Yet advocates of a federal right to education continue their efforts to overturn or
reinterpret Rodriguez. Within the past year, plaintiffs in Connecticut and Michigan have filed new
lawsuits imploring federal courts to recognize a federal constitutional right to education. The
Connecticut plaintiffs, in Martinez v. Malloy, hope to expand school-choice options and invoke a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education. The Michigan plaintiffs, in Gary B. v. Snyder,
challenge alleged deficiencies in the Detroit public schools and contend that literacy is a fundamental
right. These attempts to revisit Rodriguez are misguided. For one thing, the Michigan plaintiffs rely on
arguments that the Supreme Court has already rejected. Regardless of their contention that literacy is
uniquely significant to American civil life because of its role in a well-functioning democracy, the
Rodriguez court held that the key to discovering whether education is fundamental is not to be found
in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education; the question is whether there is a
right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Creating a federal right to
education would also force federal courts to take on issues they are not well-equipped to address.
School funding cases are complicated enough for state courts, even with state constitutional education
clauses to interpret. Indeed, because of differing language in the various state constitutions, state courts
have reached a variety of conclusions about their ability to adjudicate claims involving the equity or
adequacy of public school systems. If federal courts undertook a similar journey unmoored from any
constitutional text, it would be difficult, as the Supreme Court cautioned in Rodriguez, to imagine a
case having a greater potential impact on our federal system. The Rodriguez court further recognized
that efforts to make education a federal right overlook persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy, another area in which [the federal courts] lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels
against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels. And
despite 40 years of intervening social-science research, the academic and policy debates described in
Rodriguez continue today. Compare the Rodriguez courts references to a questionable correlation
between educational expenditures and the quality of education with the following discussion by the
Supreme Court of Texas in a 2016 adequacy decision: Some amici curiae have filed Brandeis briefs citing
recent studies going both ways on the issue of whether more spending means a better education. . . .
Courts should not sit as a super-legislature. Nor should they assume the role of super-laboratory. They
are not equipped to resolve intractable disagreements on fundamental questions in the social sciences.
Arthur Miller may have referred to a trial as the crucible, but we doubt he saw it as the best place for
reducing scientific truth when the scientific community itself has reached an impasse. The Rodriguez
court anticipated this problem when it held that federal judges should refrain from imposing on the
States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research
and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping
abreast of ever-changing conditions. Rodriguez thus belongs to a long line of federal cases emphasizing
the value of state and local control over public education. Even in the desegregation contextwhere
state actions are subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendmentthe Supreme Court held
in Freeman v. Pitts that returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable
date is essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental system. Hence, the lack of
supporting constitutional text, principles of federalism, and the doctrine of stare decisis (which lends
stability to the law by encouraging courts to stand by their prior decisions) all militate against the
creation of a federal constitutional right to education or to supposedly equal school funding. Plaintiffs
who are unable to achieve their policy goals through state and local political processes should not be
allowed to impose their preferences by federal judicial fiat. Unanswered Questions But even if
Rodriguez had been wrongly decided, defining a federal right to education in a way that guarantees
equal educational opportunity would be no easy task and would raise more questions than it
answered. For example, should equality be gauged by the financial resources made available to public
schools? How far would states have to go to equalize these educational inputs? Would providing greater
base funding suffice, or would states have to go further to prohibit additional unequal spending by
local school districts? Would the federal government have its own affirmative duty to provide additional
federal fundswhich currently make up less than 10 percent of all nationwide funding for K12
education? And would Congress need to equalize spending across states? Arguments to equalize
funding ignore the reality that in many places, schools with concentrations of poor or academically
struggling students already receive at least as much funding per pupil as other schools. Even the
Education Law Center, an advocacy organization that supports plaintiffs seeking fair (that is, more)
public-education funding, recently reported that two-thirds of the states provide equal or progressive
funding for high-poverty school districts. Particularly in large urban districts, funding levels for
disadvantaged or struggling students are often more than equal. Should those targeted funding
differences be held unconstitutional? Or would equal educational opportunity require even more
unequal spending, as Professors Ogletree and Robinson argue in their companion essay? If equalized
funding is not the answer, should states instead be forced to equalize student outcomes? Setting aside
practical and policy questions about how to accomplish that goal, serious questions about the proper
aims of education cited by Ogletree and Robinson remain unsettled. Which outcomes should be
measured, and how equal must they be? Should courts consider test scores, classroom grades, or
graduation rates? If the stubborn achievement gaps that exist in every state could prove a violation of
federal equal-protection rights, would federal courts have to monitor every states education policies
and spending decisions? Asking federal courts to wade into these thickets is a mistake. State officials
and courts have already grappled with many of these issues, and creating a federal right to education
would destabilize policies and decisions that have shaped local school systems for generations. On this
point, the Rodriguez court observed that the school-funding systems in Texas and virtually every other
state [would] not pass muster under strict federal judicial scrutiny. Nor indeed, the court explained,
in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can any system assure equal quality
of education except in the most relative sense. Proponents of a federal right to education presume that
federal judges would succeed where local policymakers have supposedly failed. But the federal judiciary
lacks the capacity and expertise to solve entrenched problems like the achievement gap from the bench.
Federal judges are not school superintendents, education experts, or central planners. What evidence
shows that federal courts would produce better results than the state and local governments that have
been designing and experimenting with education policy for years? And what benchmarks would allow
the federal courts to decide when they had achieved the amorphous goal of equal educational
opportunity? Numerous racial-desegregation cases, in which the goal of integration to remedy
intentional discrimination is relatively clear, have lasted for decades. Adding constitutional equity and
adequacy claims to the federal dockets, in the service of an implicit right to education, could lead to an
era of federal judicial supervision with no end in sight. It may well be the case that additional funds
devoted to particular policies could improve certain facets of American public education. But the
Rodriguez court correctly held that because the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
every social and economic ill, broad educational goals are not values to be implemented by judicial
intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities. Given the substantial risks (and uncertain rewards)
of federal judicial intervention, any acknowledgment of constitutional rights to education should be left
to the states.
 1nc [vs charters]
The fifty states should ________.

The counterplan solves---states have regulatory authority over charter schools

Siegel-Hawley 11 M.Ed. @ Harvard, doctoral student in Urban Schooling at UCLA and a research
associate with the Civil Rights Project (Genevieve, with, Erica Frankenberg (Ed.D., Harvard University),
an assistant professor in the Department of Education Policy Studies in the College of Education at
Pennsylvania State University, Does Law Influence Charter School Diversity? An Analysis of Federal and
State Legislation, 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 321, Lexis)//BB

B. State Charter Legislation and Diversity

While the federal government has lent important financial support and minimal civil rights guidance to
the charter movement, state charter school legislation is fundamental to the creation and
characteristics of charters around the country. Each state determines whether it will permit charter
schools, as well as the regulations under which "charters" (founding contracts) will be granted to
establish new charter schools. Some state legislative language specifically addresses the importance of
fostering racial diversity in charters, while several other dimensions of state charter legislation indirectly
impact diversity efforts. Accordingly, we explored state charter legislation for guidelines related to racial
diversity, as well as transportation to charter schools, school site selection, funding and whether a
charter is considered part of a larger district or operates as its own district. 116 By examining this broad
array of characteristics, we are able to better gauge how laws may affect patterns of segregation within
charter schools, as well as patterns of segregation that exist when charters are compared to nearby
public schools.
 ---xt: solvency vs charters
State oversight of charters effectively shapes student-body demographics
Siegel-Hawley 11 M.Ed. @ Harvard, doctoral student in Urban Schooling at UCLA and a research
associate with the Civil Rights Project (Genevieve, with, Erica Frankenberg (Ed.D., Harvard University),
an assistant professor in the Department of Education Policy Studies in the College of Education at
Pennsylvania State University, Does Law Influence Charter School Diversity? An Analysis of Federal and
State Legislation, 16 Mich. J. Race & L. 321, Lexis)//BB

Greater oversight by state agencies is needed. States, by dint of the legislation they have adopted,
seemingly value diversity in charter schools (a value recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Parents
Involved). A number of states have laws with specific provisions related to diversity guidelines or the
provision of transportation - so as to draw as many eligible students as possible - but there is little
evidence of enforcement. 179 States should also review their charter school legislation to see whether
they are unwittingly incentivizing the creation of charter schools that would attract a homogeneous
student body. Charter schools encompass a variety of schools with different priorities and serve many
communities and students from a range of backgrounds. Within this varied sector, there are outstanding
and diverse charters. This Article suggests that we can better design and implement legislation and
policy to enable these schools - and all public schools - to harness the creativity of communities and
educators to create high-quality integrated schooling options for all students.

States have the authority to regulate charter schools

Martin 5 - Professor and Director of the Center of State and Local Government Law, Seton Hall Law
School: J.D., LL.M., Ed.D.; Visiting Professor at Rutgers School of Law-Camden during the 2004-05
academic year (Robert, Rigid Rules for Charter Schools: New Jersey as a Case Study, 36 Rutgers L. J.
439, Lexis)//BB

One of the major reasons cited for the rapid growth of charter schools has been their legally authorized
privilege to be "exempt from burdensome, stifling, innovation-killing features of the culture of existing
systems." 5 Indeed, the charter concept has been described as "simple but powerful": a method of
offering school choice in public education without the typical micromanagement by government
bureaucracies. 6 The asserted "'genius' of this concept is that it is demanding with respect to results but
relaxed about the means whereby those results are produced." 7 [*443] Yet despite this core concept,
many states - as well as the federal government - have placed substantial restrictions initially and
greater restrictions subsequently on their charter schools, presumably in an effort to hold them
increasingly accountable for student productivity and protection. 8 Due to the expansion of such
restrictions, characterizing charter schools as "schools without rules" is no longer accurate. 9 Moreover,
proponents of charter schools have warned that these "political compromises" and "legislative
concessions" may seriously hamper the effectiveness of charter school programs. 10 Proponents have
cautioned that "independence is vital if charter schools are to serve their educational purposes." 11
Given these concerns, this Article identifies the types of rules - originated at both the state and federal
levels - that have been imposed on New Jersey charter schools. The Article also analyzes which of these
rules have been most burdensome, and describes how they impact individual charter schools and the
charter school movement as a whole. It then makes recommendations for retaining or removing certain
rules. Such an analysis should prove useful to those engaged in decision-making about the future of
[*444] public education. As Frank Kemerer has emphasized, "there is a pressing need to provide state
policymakers with current, comprehensive information so that they, in turn, can design legislation and
implement regulations that are definitive and defensible." 12

Charters are an exclusively state regulatory issue

Komer 7 JD, served as a senior litigation attorney at the Institute for Justice since 1993, expert on
state and federal constitutional law on school (Richard, with Clark Neily, School Choice and State
Constitutions, A joint publication of The Institute for Justice and The American Legislative Exchange
Council, https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/school_choice/50statereport/50stateSCreport.pdf)//BB

School Choice and the Federal Constitution

The U.S. Supreme Court delivered a resounding victory for school choice when it upheld Clevelands
school voucher program in 2002 in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris. Rejecting a challenge under the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Court held that publicly funded K-12 voucher
programs may include both religious and non-religious options, just as college aid programs like Pell
Grants and the GI Bill have always done. The essential characteristics of a constitutional school voucher
program, according to the Supreme Court, are: Religious neutralityproviding aid to a broad group
of recipients identified without reference to religion, and offering a wide array of options, again without
regard to religion. True private choiceparents, not the government, choose the school, and the
government itself does nothing to influence the choice of religious or non-religious options one way or
the other. A program with those two features is constitutional because it aids families seeking a better
education for their children, not the schools they happen to choose. Because the aid flows to individuals
instead of institutions, programs may include both religious and non-religious options without violating
the federal Constitution. School Choice, State Constitutions and Religion After the U.S. Supreme Court
eliminated the federal Establishment Clause as a potential barrier to school choice in 2002, opponents
were left with state constitutions as their only avenue for attacking school choice programs. Primarily,
they rely on the religion and education provisions of state constitutions.
 1nc [vs federal funding]
The fifty states should fully fund public schools and disentangle local property taxes from education
funding.

This dual-pronged strategy solves---any policy that leaves local property taxes in place
ensures unequal education outcomes
Reynolds 9 Professor of Law @ U of Illinois College (Laurie, FULL STATE FUNDING OF EDUCATION
AS A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE, 60 Hastings L.J. 749, Lexis)//BB

In sum, for a court convinced that full state funding of education is the only constitutionally permissible
state of affairs, the experience to date suggests that equality is a superior route to that end. Both the
adequacy and equality versions of full state funding take the important first step to ensure that the
constitutional duty is implemented at the level of government at which the duty has been placed. As a
result, both approaches require a reevaluation of local control and a recognition that in many ways the
tradition of local control is inconsistent with that explicit constitutional mandate. Nevertheless, the two
differ radically in terms of their potential to provide long term sustainability to the state's school finance
laws. In adequacy jurisdictions, the preservation of optional local supplementation guarantees that
education in the state will continue to be available on the basis of property wealth, which will ultimately
neutralize the impact of the initial shift to a full state funding approach. True, the shift will increase the
state's overall contribution, [*790] require a clear separation of funding sources and a delineation of
what an adequate education costs, and demand proof that every district, rich and poor, is receiving all
of that money from the state. The important base point of equality that it creates, however, is likely to
be overpowered by the anti-equalizing force of local supplementation, and the experience of school
funding in a number of states bears this prediction out. 226 Using equality as the basis of full state
funding makes the drift back to the unconstitutional funding system much less likely 227 and makes the
allocation of money for education dependent on the educational needs of the children whose
constitutional right is at stake. Conclusion The proposal for full state funding of education according to
children's needs will undoubtedly find resistance on many fronts. Vested self-interest, a sense of local
entitlement to property tax revenues, and a lack of political will to dismantle the existing statutory
formulas are perhaps the most salient obstacles. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, full state
funding offers advantages for long lasting, systemic reform. The uniformity challenge described here has
an important advantage over existing doctrinal litigation strategies in that it respects increasing judicial
unwillingness to get involved in school finance policy debates. Invalidation of the local property tax and
a judicial mandate of full state funding do not require a court to opine on the essential components of a
constitutional education or to establish how educational outputs will be evaluated against court-
imposed standards. 228 Whatever subsequent judicial involvement may be required will be limited to
ensuring that funding formulas are in fact wealth neutral and reflect only the cost of providing
educational services to different types of children. 229 [*791] Moreover, in terms of the legislative
solution it will trigger, full state funding is far more likely to produce the "enduring reform" 230 courts
hope to get from their legislatures. Because the local property tax forms the base upon which most state
funding is layered, its removal as a possible source of revenue would require the state legislature to
dismantle the existing Byzantine maze of funding statutes and begin anew. 231 This time, the legislative
effort would be forced to identify revenue sources and formulas for allocation that respond solely to its
state constitutional mandate to provide education. In turn, that new focus would eliminate the current
legislative dilemma of navigating the minefields between, on the one hand, preserving privilege and
existing high levels of school spending in affluent communities and, on the other, providing enough
revenue to satisfy courts that the poorest districts have not been totally abandoned. That means that
the school funding debate would focus solely on the establishment of wealth-neutral criteria for
allocation of money to all children in the state. As a policy matter, full state funding would democratize
the "throwing money at schools" 232 argument, an argument that has been used primarily to reject calls
for additional funding for poor districts. Just like their financially disadvantaged counterparts, however,
wealthy school districts should also be called to account for the efficiency of their spending decisions.
The generally accepted claim that the socioeconomic status of students' families and of their peers is the
single most important predictor of educational success 233 suggests that spending nearly $ 17,000 per
student a year, 234 in a district with an median household income of over $ 200,000 a year, 235 might
not be an efficient use of tax dollars. 236 Full [*792] state funding would present that issue squarely and
would pose the accountability challenge to all districts in the state. In a time of increased pressure on
government fiscs and prevalent public hostility to taxes, full state funding would engage the state in a
long overdue statewide discussion of how to best spend all of its education tax dollars, not just those
that are sent to poor districts. In addition, full state funding would go a long way towards breaking the
sense of entitlement to local property wealth and the barrier it presents to systemic reform.
Disconnecting property wealth from education funding without abolishing the local property tax can be
done, but it will require state recapture and redistribution. And, as the experiences of Texas and
Vermont have shown, contentious political battles and strong popular opinion against the "Robin Hood"
system or the "shark pool" are inevitable. 237 There is a tremendous difference between, on the one
hand, a state system that "recaptures" local revenues and redistributes them across the state, and, on
the other, a statewide tax for schools. 238 Moving the level of taxing and distribution of school dollars to
the state level would help change the popular attitude about the ownership of local property wealth
and its relevance to schools. Making the taxing jurisdiction coterminous with the spending jurisdiction is
essential to the dissipation of the sense of ownership of revenues that are, after all, being used to
implement a state duty. In a world in which the alarms about our children's academic performance are
sounded routinely, 239 the full state funding of public [*793] schools would confirm the growing
recognition that the fate of a state's economy and productivity depends on the education received by all
children. 240 So long as funds for schools depend on local property wealth, the fate of the least
advantaged and most vulnerable will continue to depend on the magnanimity of the wealthy. The
importance of public education to our country's future, and state constitutions categorical command
that education is a state and not a local duty suggest that a break with that mentality is essential to the
sustainability of our public schools and to our states' ability to comply with their constitutional mandate.
241 [*794] In terms of political incentives, full state funding would give all districts an equal stake in the
state's school funding statute and would give wealthy districts a greater incentive to work for high levels
of state spending on education. As Professor James Ryan has noted, "the best way to ensure fair
treatment of a minority group is to align that group with the majority in such a way that the majority
cannot help or hurt itself without doing the same to the minority group." 242 Full state funding is the
only way to create that dynamic. With local property taxes removed from the funding equation, all
districts will have the same incentive to seek higher state funding because no district can retreat to its
local property "pot of gold" to take care of itself. Full state funding is still very much a minority judicial
attitude toward school finance statutes, yet its potential should not be underestimated. For one thing,
as the experiences of the last four decades corroborate, alternative approaches have not produced
sustained reform. For another, the strength of the local control defense of local powers to tax and spend
is based on the image of a community of families with children eager to tax themselves to spend money
on their schools. That image, however, is increasingly on the wane, fueled in no small part by changing
demographics, 243 and general antigovernment and antitax sentiment. 244 And as our communities
become increasingly stratified along socioeconomic lines, the standard account of unshakable
widespread public support of local control may be less accurate than the common wisdom would
suggest. 245 In the final analysis, though, full state funding's biggest advantages may be that it offers an
objective, judicially [*795] manageable and enforceable standard for the allocation of school revenues
and that it provides an alternative to the common wisdom that wealth-based public education is a
necessary fact of life in the United States. 246
 ---xt: solvency vs federal funding
Full state funding without local property tax involvement solves
Reynolds 9 Professor of Law @ U of Illinois College (Laurie, FULL STATE FUNDING OF EDUCATION
AS A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE, 60 Hastings L.J. 749, Lexis)//BB

In Part I, this Article surveys two current trends in school finance reform, both of which cast doubt on
the continued viability of lawsuits that challenge the constitutionality of state school funding statutes.
The first of these trends is that plaintiff victories rarely produce a systematic overhaul of the school
funding formulas. In part, that may be because legislators have not always rushed to implement their
court-imposed duty. 17 But even in those states where legislative reform appears [*753] significant,
the long term results have also been disappointing. In the all too frequent sequence of events, new
generations of lawsuits are filed within years of the original court decree, and the plaintiffs discover that
they are challenging funding allocations that are similar to or worse than the ones that prompted the
original lawsuit. 18 A second trend is suggested by a spate of recent judicial opinions revealing
weariness with continued judicial involvement in these seemingly intractable disputes. Over the last six
years, courts in a number of states have used a variety of related legal doctrines to declare that school
funding claims are beyond the scope of the judicial power. 19 The analysis offered here posits that the
two trends are closely related, and that both stem, at least in part, from the failure of school finance
plaintiffs to seek narrowly targeted judicial declarations that identify the fatal flaw of most state school
funding laws. In Part II, I explain how state constitutional guarantees of uniformity of taxation may
provide a solution. I argue that this textual limit on state taxation powers, which is found in every state
constitution, can be the catalyst for an overhaul of the funding formulas. When seen through the prism
of well-established tenets of state and local government law, the uniformity doctrine should invalidate
the use of the local property tax for funding public schools, meaning that the only constitutionally
permissible means of funding public education is a system that is fully funded at the state level. 20
[*754] In Part III, I identify five states that have embraced a full state funding approach to school
finance. I compare their trajectories and note the stark differences between those full state funding
states that remained rooted in basic equality concepts and those that have relied on adequacy as their
doctrinal foundation. I argue that the promise of full state funding is severely undercut by the adequacy
rationale and conclude that the states' experiences confirm the sustainability and superiority of equality.
Though even a radical change in funding sources will not produce a miracle cure to our public education
system's serious shortcomings, I argue that full state funding has the potential to refocus the school
finance debate in important ways, and that it allows courts to insist on a constitutional school funding
formula without entering the difficult, and some would say, essentially legislative, policy debate over
what a public education should provide and how best to implement the state's aspirations for the
education of its children.

Any funding that leaves in place local property tax funding guarantees long-term
inequality
Reynolds 9 Professor of Law @ U of Illinois College (Laurie, FULL STATE FUNDING OF EDUCATION
AS A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE, 60 Hastings L.J. 749, Lexis)//BB

Taken together, the long-term ineffectiveness of the legislative response combines with the recent
evidence of judicial withdrawal to dampen enthusiasm about the future course of school finance
litigation. On the surface, these two phenomena may appear unrelated, but I posit here that both result
in part from plaintiffs' failure to seek a precisely targeted, judicially manageable declaration and remedy.
103 With regard to the lack of legislative sustainability, failing to seek the invalidation of the local
property tax means that judicial decrees leave in place the structure that will once again guarantee a
reemergence of the system declared unconstitutional. No matter how massive the legislative funding
increase, if the local property tax remains a source of school funding, the state legislature will never
move beyond playing catch up. Its efforts will [*767] perhaps smooth out the rough edges of the state's
funding allocation or eliminate the most glaring unfairness produced by its school finance statute, but it
will not correct the structural inequality inherent in the local property tax system.
MULTIPURPOSE SOLVENCY
 Solvency fed regulation fails
Federal reform is not enforced---oversight from the feds is logistically impossible
Chopin 13 JD, associate in the Labor & Employment Law Department and a member of the Employee
Benefits & Executive Compensation Group, focusing on complex employee benefits litigation (Lindsey,
COMMENT: UNTANGLING PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE: A PROPOSAL TO END MEANINGLESS
FEDERAL REFORM AND STREAMLINE CONTROL IN STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES, 59 Loyola Law Review
399, Lexis)//BB

b. Implementation of Innovations

Once the policy has been created and the states accept federal money, the policies must be enforced,
for better or worse. As noted above, however, there is a gap between the policy created and its
implementation. As seen in the aftermath of NCLB, this gap is often filled with perverse incentives and
unenforced promises, or what this Comment will refer to as incompetence. The term incompetence is
not used in the general, negatively connoted sense, but rather refers to the inability of individual schools
and states to enforce the new policies. The competence that a school or teacher or district has to
implement a new policy relies heavily on how far the policy strays from the current policy and practice.
215 The more radical the change, the lower competence falls. 216 Incompetence can be improved, but
that requires an increase in support and training. 217 This is not to say that drastic reforms cannot
succeed, but rather that they cannot succeed without more support. 218 Section III(B)(1)(b)(i) will
explore implementation by schools and teachers, and Section III(B)(1)(b)(ii) will discuss implementation
by funding. i. Implementation by Schools and Teachers The federal government has thus far relied on
schools and teachers to implement reforms; however, in most situations, schools and teachers lack the
capability to do so because the federal reforms are presented from such a high-up and abstract federal
level. 219 Capability, in the context of policy implementation, is comprised of the implementer's
interest, practices, knowledge, values, will, and money. 220 Take the Reading Rocks example from the
Introduction. Reading Rocks was a federal program that was to be implemented in the schools. Jane will
likely not succeed in implementing this reform for [*437] multiple reasons: (1) she was not properly
trained in the program and in teaching reading in general, and so she lacks the skill to do so; and (2) she
lacks interest because she is a French teacher and will want to actually teach French. Ms. Smith will also
fail at implementation because (1) her past experiences of being stuck in an endless barrage of "new
programs" lowered her interest and will to implement the program, and (2) she does not value the
federal program's benefits. 221 This analysis is easily transposed onto real-life reforms handed down to
local practitioners. For example, in the charter school context, transitioning from a traditional school
model to a charter school involves a significant shift in the status quo, and so the shift has the potential
to create a high level of incompetence. Because the task of expanding charter schools is left entirely in
the hands of state and local officials, successful implementation of this reform rests on the interests,
practices, values, skill, will, and money of the local administrators and teachers. Put in this light, it is
easier to see why charter schools have variable results - they are being run by people with different
levels of capability and only the perfect combination of practitioners will succeed. The federal
government can mandate or suggest as many charter schools as they desire, but if the practitioners lack
the capability to make them succeed, the charter school is a useless tool. Thus, it would be more
advantageous to only create charter schools where a state has the manpower to maintain them. In
areas where this reform is not needed and smaller changes can be made, there is no need to waste
resources in creating charter schools. This process applies to every reform that the federal government
is trying to push through. So, when one massive federal bill tries to expand charter schools, train
teachers, increase accountability, and update standards, the weight on the practitioners becomes too
heavy for the fragile school structure to bear. The many variables that exist in enforcing reform must be
overseen very closely and reinforced with strong local support, a task that the federal government is not
currently equipped to handle. Teachers and principals who resist change will have to [*438] be
monitored. Further, the different reforms that are being tried will have to be tested and tweaked
constantly. One agency cannot accomplish this type of oversight for all fifty states.

Federal standards are circumvented, states are not

Mills 12 Professor of Law @ NYU (Robert, EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE LAW: THE CASE
FOR EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM: PROTECTING EDUCATIONAL POLICY FROM THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT'S DISECONOMIES OF SCALE, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1941, Lexis)//BB

The federal government has attempted to solve this problem of unfaithful subnational implementation
by tightening national standards of curriculum and student evaluation. But the federal government
itself is impeded by scale diseconomies that prevent it from controlling errant subnational behavior. The
federal government lacks the fiscal tools available to subnational governments - in particular,
capitalization of educational investments into property values - that could induce local voters to pay less
attention to the fate of grant revenues than own-source revenues. That local voters focus less intensely
on the fate of grant revenues than own-source revenues is a familiar point. 103 By contrast with the
parents and taxpayers of a school district, voters at the national scale pay little attention to federal
reform efforts. 104 Moreover, the federal governments' threats to [*1974] discipline the local school
district for sluggish response to federal mandates are impeded by the small amounts of federal revenue
at stake: threats to pull grants can be empty threats when the realization of the threat would injure the
very constituencies that the feds are trying to aid. 105 Parental social networks that might work at the
local level are less effective at the national level. Ideological gridlock is most intense at the national
level, and such strife has impeded the federal government's ability to impose accountability measures.
The re-authorization of "No Child Left Behind" has languished in legislative limbo since 2007 as Congress
is paralyzed by partisan gridlock, and ethnocultural conflict has prevented the federal government from
using private educational providers to induce greater fidelity from local school districts. 106 The
problem in monitoring federal compensatory education is obviously not exclusively the result of federal
scale diseconomies: the whole point of federal intervention, as noted in Part I.B.2, is to remedy
subnational unresponsiveness to the educational need of low-income households that existed long
before the federal government tried to remedy this inattention. Low-income parents might be expected
to pay less attention to educational politics than more stably governed households because they lack
education, confidence, time, and energy, as noted in Part I.A. The important point is that the federal
government cannot solve the problem of subnational indifference to merely imposing federal
mandates of curricular standards, testing mandates, and the like. Ordering the tide of student ignorance
to recede with a statutory edict declaring high national standards and ordering recalcitrant educators to
comply has Canute-like futility to it. Without some local mechanism to exact compliance, such orders
remain empty rhetoric.
 Solvency international perception
States are perceived as representing the U.S. internationally
Robinson 7 JD @ Yale (Nick, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the
Decentralization of Foreign Policy, Akron Law Review, Lexis)//BB

State and local governments are arguably seen as representing the U.S. government abroad in a more
official capacity than U.S. non-state actors. The governments of these localities are democratically
elected and so it is more likely that they will be seen as acting on behalf of the American people.
Additionally, the federal government generally has a greater ability to control the actions of these
localities than non-state actors. Therefore, there is a greater chance that nonintervention by the federal
government to stop offensive activity will be seen as federal endorsement of such activity. Such logic
though should caution against court intervention in these cases rather than encourage it. If localities'
actions damage U.S. foreign policy interests, the federal government can easily preempt the state or
local policies in question. Further, with the world's increased interconnectedness, it is more likely that if
a foreign government takes offense to a locality's policy it can discriminate between the policy of the
locality and the policy of the federal government. n155

Subnational education decisions are internationally recognized---local

experimentation is valued overseas
Robinson 7 JD @ Yale (Nick, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the
Decentralization of Foreign Policy, Akron Law Review, Lexis)//BB

Even something as seemingly innocuous as the choice of a textbook by a school board can have far
reaching international implications. In April of 2005, thousands of protesters marched in Chinese cities
angered by the Japanese governments approval of textbooks that were perceived by many in China as
glossing over the atrocities Japan committed in China during World War II.251 Although this was a
Japanese national government decision made in the context of deep historical animosity between the
two nations, in the United States this decision would be made on the state and local level. The
traditional domains of localities are becoming of greater international concern. Many of these areas of
regulation are at the heart of state and local governance. Local decisions in these areas allow citizens to
more fully shape their lives, create a nation-wide system of policy experimentation, and provide a check
on federal and international power. The internationalization of trade, human rights, and environmental
commitments means, however, that many of these core functions of localities are coming under new
scrutiny and threat. These state and local policies could be struck down by U.S. courts under the
dormant foreign relations clause, heightened legislative or executive preemption (depending on what
steps the executive or legislative branches have taken to occupy the field), or even the dormant foreign
commerce clause. Such judicial intervention could severely and, quite possibly, unnecessarily constrain
the ability of localities to express core values in the name of a united one voice in foreign policy.
 Solvency state courts
State courts solve---more likely to be followed than federal judicial decisions
Greenspahn 8 - JD, George Washington University School of Law, former associate at the Campaign
for Fiscal Equity, the organization that successfully challenged New York State's system for financing
public schools. He previously handled issues related to education in New York City as Legislative
Assistant and Legislative Director to U.S. Congressman Anthony D. Weiner, and served as a research
officer for the Institute of International Education, nonprofit administrator of international exchanges,
including the Fulbright program (Daniel, THE ROBERTS COURT AND EQUAL PROTECTION: GENDER,
RACE, AND CLASS: RACE: A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case
out of Education, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 755, Lexis)//BB

D. Success of State School Funding Litigation

As a counterpoint to the risks of returning to federal court, there are benefits of continuing to litigate
school funding cases at the state level. State constitutions, unlike the federal Constitution, explicitly
recognize the right to an education. 242 As [*780] a result, courts have been more willing to hold states
accountable in providing the resources necessary to meet state-imposed educational standards. 243
State litigation, by most accounts, has been relatively successful, with plaintiff victories in twenty-eight
states. 244 Elected officials, following state court orders, have increased spending by 11% on schools in
the poorest districts and by 7% in median districts. 245 Increased funding for the neediest districts has
increased student proficiency in states such as Kentucky and Massachusetts and improved school
facilities in others, such as Arizona. 246 Furthermore, studies prompted by litigation in more than thirty
states have resulted in revisions to school funding formulas so that educational resources are delivered
based on actual student need. 247 At the remedial stage, state-generated solutions also make it easier
to tailor reforms to various educational shortcomings and local political realities than would be possible
at the national level. 248 Correcting sharp divides between New York City schools and its suburban
counterparts, for example, raises very different challenges than does fixing the educational inadequacies
facing rural communities in sparsely populated Alaska. 249 Furthermore, judicial activism at the state
level is viewed as more tolerable because state judges, often elected, are accountable to state residents,
and the citizens of the states can more easily amend their state constitutions in response to judicial
decisions they believe are faulty. 250 As a result, decisions of state courts tend to enjoy more legitimacy
and are more likely to reflect community concerns than those of life-tenured federal judges often
perceived as distant. In the last three decades, state-level litigation has made important contributions in
the field of school funding. Such litigation has documented the failures of unnecessarily complex state
funding formulas that distribute resources based on [*781] political motivations rather than student
need. 251 State litigation has spurred the development of innovative legal strategies, such as the shift
from equity to adequacy, as well as the development of basic school funding principles, including
transparency, predictability, and accountability. 252 By coupling accountability and adequacy, state
lawsuits have united liberals and conservatives, and "linked higher standards to increased resources."
253 In addition, state litigation has produced judicially manageable standards, 254 and has brought
courts and legislatures together in fixing school funding inadequacies. 255 State litigation is not a
perfect solution to educational inadequacies, 256 but it has been an effective tool that is preferable to
the uncertainties of seeking redress in federal court.
 Solvency percolation
The counterplan leads to federal follow-on---it will be incorporated into future
comprehensive education reform
McGovern 11 JD @ NYU Law (Shannon, NOTE: A NEW MODEL FOR STATES AS LABORATORIES FOR
REFORM: HOW FEDERALISM INFORMS EDUCATION POLICY, 86 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1519, *1520, Lexis)//BB

Manna observes that federal policy makers can "expand the federal education agenda by borrowing
strength from state governments . Frequently, this borrowing has coalesced with federal education
initiatives designed to build capacity at lower levels of government." 162 Originally, ESEA built up state
education authorities, creating "a continuing source of bureaucratic capacity from which future federal
policy makers could borrow." 163 The history of NCLB lends further support to this processual reading.
President Bush's proposal came on the heels of a decade-long adequacy movement across many states
as well as a law in his home state of Texas that tied accountability to high-stakes testing. 164 To achieve
its twin goals for education reform - global competiveness and equality of opportunity - any federal
program undertaking education reform must recognize the crucial role of states in building up capacity
at both levels of government to develop, test, and implement specific initiatives. Manna's political
science perspective complements and elucidates Schapiro's overarching theory of polyphonic
federalism. Conceived in such terms, the symbiotic, capacity-building relationship between the federal
and state governments is a manifestation of overlapping sources of authority from [*1549] codependent
sovereigns. It also promotes the "innovation and resilience" 165 that is a centerpiece of Schapiro's
normative analysis.
 Solvency AT solvency deficits
Solvency deficits to the counterplan link to the aff---they rely on states for
implementation
McGovern 11 JD @ NYU Law (Shannon, NOTE: A NEW MODEL FOR STATES AS LABORATORIES FOR
REFORM: HOW FEDERALISM INFORMS EDUCATION POLICY, 86 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1519, *1520, Lexis)

It also means that federal policy is constrained by both the DOE's capacity and each state's capacity. In
implementing NCLB, the Bush Administration was forced to make a number of concessions, including
individual waivers from requirements, blanket revisions, and reversals of policy in the face of state
incapacity and its own inability to enforce the law as written. 157 Following the announcement of
President Obama's proposal for NCLB reauthorization, which includes a shift from absolute to growth-
based measurement of student achievement, 158 experts predicted it would take several years for
states to develop the requisite capacity to monitor students' academic growth. 159 The limited capacity
of state education departments justifies a strong federal role in education, but the interdependence of
state and federal bureaucracies in implementing federal policy simultaneously serves to check sudden
expansions of federal power. 160 The federal government simply cannot do it alone.

If there are problems with implementation, only autonomous and innovative states fix
them quickly
Robinson 7 JD @ Yale (Nick, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the
Decentralization of Foreign Policy, Akron Law Review, Lexis)//BB

First, federalism allows for and fosters a greater diversity of policies. Decentralization can allow for a
number of governmental subunits to work on the same problem creating what Jack Walker calls a
national system of emulation and competition169 while also taking into account local conditions and
preferences. In a similar vein, Charles Tiebout famously argued that if consumer-voters are mobile and
have full information they will sort amongst bundles of public goods offered by competing local
governments, thereby leading to the distribution of public goods in an optimal manner.170 Certainly,
not all localities perform equally well at developing and adapting new policies. Research has shown that
wealthier states tend to be more innovative although local political situations are in large part
determinative as well.171 There is also reason to believe localities are best at determining solutions to
middle-level difficulty problems as large problems often require more resources than are at their
disposal while decentralization can often confuse remedies for smaller problems.172 With these
limitations in mind, however, localities are remarkably adaptive, often correctly pinpointing problems
and finding new solutions before the federal government does. Dissenting from New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, Justice Brandeis summarizes the frequently invoked idea that states can be laboratories for
experimentation: To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial
of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.173
 Solvency AT uniformity necessary
Uniformity is unnecessary for successful education reform
McGovern 11 JD @ NYU Law (Shannon, NOTE: A NEW MODEL FOR STATES AS LABORATORIES FOR
REFORM: HOW FEDERALISM INFORMS EDUCATION POLICY, 86 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1519, *1520, Lexis)//BB

Moreover, to be effective, education reforms do not necessarily require nationwide uniformity. The
drinking limitation in South Dakota v. Dole was predicated upon findings that variable state drinking
ages encouraged young people to drive "to border States where the drinking age [was] lower." 118 State
education policies may have some similar "spillover effects." 119 To cite one example, a single state may
impose its educational content preferences upon its sister states because states are served by a
nationwide textbook market. 120 But, for the most part, local and regional conditions present unique
challenges in the implementation of policy, 121 meaning uniformity is not always possible or even
desirable. Nor is education policy analogous to industry regulation, which, unless nationalized, presents
collective action problems. If state participation in the Clean Air Act, for example, were not encouraged
through conditions and sanctions, 122 economic incentives might exist for states to under-or
deregulate. The failure of NCLB, in contrast, is not a manifestation of classic collective action theory but
rather the product of a shortsighted statutory mechanism for federal oversight. While there may be no
legal difference between tying federal funding to the implementation of a statute requiring seatbelts
and tying it to the passage of a statute authorizing charter schools, the [*1541] cooption of state policy
making in the latter example is less justifiable. Education reforms generally do not require uniform
application or collective action and may be difficult to evaluate empirically. In the absence of both a
need for uniform collective action and the ability to predict results, the federal government should not
impose pressure on a state legislature to approve a particular statutory enactment.
ANSWERS TO
 AT links to politics
Our link is based on federal education policy.
Subnational education reform avoids Congressional polarization
Mills 12 Professor of Law @ NYU (Robert, EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE LAW: THE CASE
FOR EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM: PROTECTING EDUCATIONAL POLICY FROM THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT'S DISECONOMIES OF SCALE, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1941, Lexis)//BB---ability edited

2. Capitalization and Subnational Democracy

Caregivers in charge of households with children are a minority of voters. 48 Political institutions that
enable them to acquire allies among the childless, therefore, are important for such households'
political success. Tying the values of residential real estate to the quality of local schools is one way for
these households to acquire such allies. Local school districts funded by ad valorem property taxes
imposed on structures within the district tie together home values and school quality, giving childless
homeowners an incentive to vote for increased school spending. School quality affects home values,
because potential homebuyers are well-informed about local governments' policies to improve local
school quality and shun markets that lack amenities like schools. To avoid driving away potential buyers
from the local market, local "home voters" carefully monitor local governments' decisions even when
those voters do not directly consume the services produced by local governments. Thus, childless
couples are driven by capitalization of educational decisions into home values [*1960] to care about the
quality of local public schools even though they do not care about the welfare of other people's
children. 49 The key to capitalization, however, is decentralization of school finance. The benefits of
improvements financed by extra tax effort must be available only to those home buyers who purchase
structures to which that extra tax liability attaches. If one could attend the schools without buying the
home, then only the cost of the tax effort, not the benefit of the expenditures, would be capitalized into
the value of the homes, significantly eroding the incentive of those homes' owners to lobby for higher
school taxes. That capitalization can induce support for educational expenditures in a decentralized
system of school finance is suggested by the rapid expansion of age-graded schools and high schools
between 1870 and 1925. This expansion represented a massive increase in school expenditures - the
second-largest in the nation's history - because high schools cost far more than one-room mixed-aged
schoolhouses. 50 As William Fischel has demonstrated, voters' willingness to shoulder these costs was
rooted in the desire to protect their property values. Far from being a "top-down" imposition by
professional educators on rural voters, the decision to consolidate school districts required local
referenda controlled by local voters who approved the consolidations out of fear that their jurisdictions
would be bypassed by home buyers migrating to cities in search of better educational opportunity. 51
The need to cater to a mobile population also drove voters to adopt uniform curricular standards so that
the children of new migrants arriving in September could pick up their schooling where they left off in
June. 52 In effect, local action produced national curricular uniformity and massive educational
expenditures, driven by what Fischel calls "the persuasion of property." 53 How willing would the
childless be to pay for other people's children in the absence of capitalization? There has been a fierce
debate over whether capitalization is necessary to induce voters to support [*1961] school spending. 54
There is, however, significant evidence that capitalization can provide important motivation for elderly
voters to cast favorable votes for school spending. 55 In light of the evidence of generational
competition in the allocation of public sector resources, 56 it seems reasonable not to test one's luck
with elderly voters' altruism but instead to provide maximum incentives for the childless to support
educational expenditures. Decentralization of school finance is one such incentive. 3. Ideological sorting
and subnational government Education policy is divisive, touching on ethnoculturally sensitive issues of
language and religion. The ideological "heat" generated by these issues can either paralyze the national
political process in an ethnoculturally heterogeneous nation or result in the marginalization of cultural
minorities. Unsurprisingly, federal regimes with histories of linguistic or religious conflict - Canada,
Switzerland, and Germany - devolve educational issues to subnational governments where each
demographic group constitutes a local majority. 57 Such subnational [*1962] "sorting" of different
groups' favored policies in subnational enclaves has the normative appeal of pluralism: by giving each
group some share of subnational power, ideological sorting satisfies a sense of fair representation of
each point of view that a single national resolution of the divisive issue might offend. 58 This
normatively attractive vision of cultural pluralism helps explain why education and family law were
reserved for subnational decision-making in the United States by the end of the 19th century. There is a
tendency in legal scholarship to implicitly disparage American localism on family matters as the product
of racism and sexism. 59 While this view has substantial historical justification, the explanation ignores
another basis for the nineteenth century ideology of localism on family matters - cultural pluralism.
Within the Democratic Party, a motley coalition of culturally peripheral groups joined the Southerners in
espousing a vision of cultural pluralism against what they took to be a culturally imperialistic agenda of
New England evangelicals to impose moral uniformity on the nation. This coalition included not only
Southern white supremacists but also backswoodsmen who wanted to hunt on Sunday, Catholics who
wanted to send their children to parochial school, Irish city dwellers who wanted to socialize with their
Tammany ward captain at the local saloon, and German Lutherans who liked their beer. 60 The
"Yankee" evangelicals' agenda against which this coalition fought certainly included anti-patriarchal
elements: Evangelicals relied heavily on the mobilization of Christian mothers to purge the household of
male violence and male lack of personal self-control. 61 But the program was also an exceptionally
intrusive and nativist effort to suppress cultural diversity in the name of social control, an effort that
included not only the [*1963] goals of racial equality and women's suffrage but also bans on parochial
education of children, use of foreign language in schools, polygamous marriage, drinking of alcohol,
smoking of tobacco, dueling, gambling, and obscene literature while promoting Sabbath observance. 62
Liberation of the freedmen from Southern oppression was part of a larger agenda for liberating all non-
protestant minorities from the oppression and social isolation allegedly resulting from Catholic
superstition, the German language, gambling, alcohol, and other sins against family values and national
Protestant unity. 63 The various cultural minorities resisting this evangelical program could not be
united by any substantive theory of the household or privacy: white Southerners had no love for
Catholic parochial schools, and German Lutherans in the Midwest were relatively indifferent to Jim
Crow. Instead, the Democratic Party held the coalition together with the rhetoric of decentralizing
"domestic matters" in the name of cultural pluralism. 64 Regarding education in particular, this
Democratic program of decentralization of family matters began in earnest as early as 1842, when
Northern Democrats had used the rhetoric of "local control" in educational matters to pass the 1842
Maclay Act in New York. 65 Decentralization became the standard Democratic method of
accommodating Catholic demands for power over schools, enabling them to satisfy Catholics' desire to
control hiring and curriculum where they were numerically dominant while avoiding the accusation that
Democrats favored "papist" schools. 66 Appealing to this anti-Yankee coalition, the Democratic Party
used this slogan of local control over "domestic affairs" to defeat Republican efforts to promote [*1964]
racial equality in schools, defeating federal bills providing financial aid for schools between 1870 and
1872 67 and stripping Charles Sumner's Civil Rights bill of its provisions barring segregation in education
in 1874. 68 The Southerners returned the Northern Catholics' support on race issues in 1875 by helping
the Catholics defeat Republicans' proposed constitutional amendments that would have barred public
aid to religious schools or societies. 69 Uniting the Democrats was not (merely) white supremacy but
hostility to what was perceived as the Yankees' "aggressive didacticism" in family affairs. 70 As one
Democratic opponent of the Blaine amendment declaimed, his state did not want "New England and
other states to dictate to her what her schools shall be or what her taxes shall be, and least of all what
her religion shall be." 71 Southern Protestants might not have loved Catholics, but both hated the
"Yankee" reformer even more than they disliked each other. Republicans' program of federal regulation
of schools for the sake of racial, religious, and linguistic integration turned out to be a consistent political
loser, destroying the Republican Party in the South, 72 alienating German Lutherans in the Midwest, 73
and galvanizing [*1965] Catholics everywhere to become passionately loyal Democratic voters. By the
1890s, Republican strategists had had enough: William McKinley assiduously avoided any discussion of
culturally divisive racial, ethnic, or religious issues in his 1896 Presidential campaign. 74 Republicans and
Democrats alike accepted the principle so thoroughly that, by 1904, Justice Holmes, a Civil War veteran
and nationalist, could, in dissenting from the majority's broad reading of congressional powers in
Northern Securities v. United States, 75 invoke the prospect of "Congress['s] regulating marriage
and divorce" as the ultimate constitutional absurdum that commerce clause doctrine ought to avoid. 76
In sum, there was more to the nineteenth century rhetoric of local control over family affairs than white
supremacy or patriarchy (although both prejudices motivated Catholics and Southerners deploying such
rhetoric). As with other culturally heterogeneous federal regimes, the United States also adopted
devolution of family matters in the late nineteenth century as a way of fostering cultural pluralism on
issues that were culturally and religiously sensitive to ethnocultural minorities. The normative appeal of
such subnational "ideological sorting" obviously depends on the ideologies being sorted. If the disputed
question is the basic status of a group of persons as equal citizens, [*1966] then devolution will not likely
be regarded as a morally justified settlement: the jurisdictional divisions of subnational borders will not
stop citizens in one jurisdiction from sympathizing with the sufferings of minorities in other regions, and
their outrage will likely overwhelm any legalistic limits on national power. 77 Few would applaud
federalism for the sake of safeguarding pluralism about Jim Crow. Over some range of issues, however,
difference of opinion does not implicate the essential equality of citizens: the Democratic Party's policy
of devolving authority to subnational jurisdictions over the regulation of alcoholic beverages and aid to
parochial schools, for instance, did not lead to an acrimonious culture war, and it extended equal
concern and respect to both sides of the cultural divide. Education and family law present many similar
issues - i.e., matters that are religiously or culturally sensitive enough for devolution to advance
pluralism but sufficiently remote from oppression as to present small risk of affront to democratic
equality. 78 It is natural, then, to preserve subnational jurisdiction over family life as a general matter,
while making exceptions for national intervention when subnational jurisdictions behave oppressively
towards vulnerable groups - in effect, keeping the baby without the bathwater. B. When Should There
Be a Federal Role in Education? Supplying National Public Goods and Removing Barriers to Subnational
Political Participation Given the efficacy of subnational government in supplying education
subnationally, what role should the federal government play? Conventional federalism theory suggests
two national functions - supplying national public goods and removing barriers to subnational political
participation. As I shall suggest in Part II, the former is much easier for the national government to
accomplish than the latter. [*1967] 1. Supplying National Public Goods That the national government
has a role to play in supplying national public educational goods has been recognized at least since the
federal government created the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1802. A national public
good is simply a good the benefits of which transcend subnational boundaries such that no single unit of
subnational government - a household, township, municipality, county, or state - has sufficient incentive
to produce the benefit in sufficient quantity. 79 Military technology like engineering is an obvious
example: fearful that the nation would be dependent on foreign engineers for its military needs,
Jefferson created the West Point Academy despite his general philosophy of limiting federal power. The
private market for engineering services would not likely motivate parents or school districts to finance
human capital in the arcana of civil engineering in sufficient quantity to supply the army's military need,
simply because those needs reflect the non-excludable benefits of domestic defense that no private
market actor can capture. It is easy enough mutatis mutandis to justify many other national educational
programs that subsidize national public goods under-supplied by subnational government. Whenever
the benefits of an educational program exceed the boundaries of a state, there is a theoretical case for a
federal grant program to encourage state production of the program. The boundary-crossing benefits of
a program are not merely the result of the program's inherent characteristics but also the constitutional
ground rules that prohibit state interference with the movement of goods and persons across state
lines. Take, for example, unemployment insurance and aid to indigent households more generally.
Because states are prohibited from excluding or taxing goods manufactured in other states, states
cannot easily charge their own manufacturers with the costs of unemployment insurance for fear that
those businesses will be put out of business by non-resident firms constitutionally immune from such
charges but nevertheless importing cheap goods into the state. Fear of such competition from Southern
states deterred Northern states from offering unemployment insurance programs despite then-
Governor Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to organize cooperative action among the states. 80 Precisely such
worries about the interstate mobility of capital led the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold the Social Security
Act's unemployment insurance program in [*1968] Steward Machine Co. v. Davis. 81 Thus, subsidies for
unemployment insurance are a national public good, because the benefits of income smoothing
transcend the boundaries of any single state. Likewise, redistribution of wealth to insure a national
minimum of income for U.S. citizens constitutes a national public good, because, given the
constitutionally guaranteed mobility of indigent citizens, 82 any single state's efforts to supply such a
national minimum will encourage other states to export their indigent households to the generous state.
83 Subsidizing education is an especially attractive mechanism for redistributing income, because
educational subsidies avoid the perception of moral hazard that dampens well-heeled citizens'
willingness to part with their own cash to insure a national welfare minimum. Federal aid for free school
lunch, Head Start pre-kindergarten childcare, and aid under the ESEA program are all examples of such
federal aid for indigent households, justified by the national scope of redistributive programs' benefits, a
scope insured by interstate mobility of indigency. These familiar general points regarding redistribution
of wealth apply with special force to education: subnational governments are notoriously unreliable
agents of indigent households when providing educational services, because the usual devices that
induce constituents to lobby for educational improvement - capitalization of schools into home values
and school-based social networks of child-rearing households - fail where indigent households are
concerned. Capitalization fails, because attracting indigent homebuyers generally does not improve
"homevoters'" home values. 84 School-based networks fail whenever indigency erodes the bonding
social capital that allows other households to dominate the educational process. It is a familiar point
that such social capital is closely related to educational attainment and reduced by crime. Single parents
are also much less capable of networking to advance their children's interests. Given that crime, single
parenthood, and lack of a high school diploma are [*1969] closely correlated with indigency, it is no
surprise that indigent households do not make superlative monitors of their educational providers. That
the federal government would intervene to supplement and control educational services in jurisdictions
containing a high percentage of indigent households, therefore, would seem to follow naturally from the
logic of educational federalism. This is analogous to the logic described in Part I.B above that leads the
subnational government to intervene when the internal governance of the household itself collapses as
a result of poverty, low educational attainment, divorce, etc. Just as such households are not such
reliable providers of childcare that the state can easily defer to their judgments about education, so too,
jurisdictions dominated by such households are unlikely to be reliable providers of educational services.
2. Democratization of Subnational Governments The national government also has a role to play in
democratizing subnational governments, because the reliability of subnational governments depends
entirely on their responsiveness to popular demand. This is true both broadly as a matter of popular
sovereignty, constitutionally (as a matter of Article IV, section 4), and narrowly as a matter of using
federalism to advance children's welfare. Oligarchical governments - for instance, Alabama's
government between 1901 and 1946, when it was dominated by the "Big Mules" of local industry and
the timberland owners - may tend to under-supply local public goods to protect their interests from
taxation. 85 Likewise, deep ethnocultural hostilities may lead a majority coalition to freeze out a
minority, consequently undersupplying local public goods to that minority because of its lack of political
power. There is a familiar justification for the national government to play in ending such minority
cartels over subnational government: because the national government will be controlled by a different
and more heterogeneous coalition of interests than any single state, the oligarchical state's dominant
group will not be able, in theory, to stymie national legislation democratizing that state's political
process. [*1970] Likewise, there may be certain economies of scale in political participation: national
politics have more developed media, more competitive political parties, and more visible political
figures. These scale economies may allow national leaders to highlight and eliminate political abuses at
the subnational level that could pass unspotted if left to the exclusive attention of subnational officials.
There are numerous familiar and less obvious examples of the federal government's playing such a
democratizing role in subnational government. The obvious examples include the Guarantee Clause of
Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, 86 the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth
Amendments, and the Voting Rights Act 87 and the Motor Voter Act. 88 The less obvious examples
include federal prosecutions of subnational officials' corrupt actions under federal statutes like the Mail
Fraud Act 89 and the Hobbs Act, 90 prosecutions best justified by the low salience of much subnational
politics and consequent need for an outside authority to highlight violations of the subnational
jurisdiction's own ethical standards. 91 The federal role in desegregating schools and insuring equal
access to education for racial minorities is the obvious education-specific example of such
democratization. From Brown v. Board of Education 92 to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 93 the
federal government's major role in education has been in insuring an end to racial isolation, segregation,
and denial of equal educational opportunity, justified implicitly by the subnational governments' lack of
trustworthiness in pursuing these goals. III. Overcoming Diseconomies of Scale in Federal Educational
Reform There is no doubt that, both as a matter of law and political theory, the federal government
appropriately plays some sort of role in educational policy. As explained below in Part III.A, however,
scale diseconomies threaten to stymie federal policy's effectiveness. The size and heterogeneity of
congressional districts make it difficult for [*1971] stably governed households to use their school-based
networks to lobby for adequate school revenue in Congress. Federal investments in education, financed
from nationally uniform taxes, are not capitalized into home values, depriving the federal government of
the power to mobilize childless households on behalf of educational investments. Stripped of these
special advantages of capitalization and social capital, the federal government's policies can also be
paralyzed [stifled] by ideological polarization in Congress resulting from a culturally heterogeneous
nation, polarization that is mitigated by ideological sorting at the subnational level. All of these
diseconomies become exacerbated when the beneficiaries of the federal program already lack the social
networks used by stably governed households to monitor educational providers. For such beneficiaries,
misuse of federal funds is invisible: they are poor enforcers of federal mandates through either politics
or litigation.
 AT theory
Interpretation---the negative gets domestic agent counterplans:
1-Functional limits---prevents small affs with no fed key warrant, focuses the debate
on the largest affirmatives with literature-based agent distinctions. Dont conflate
solvency and legitimacy---if the CP seems perfect, that means they chose a bad
affirmative.
2-Education---the counterplan tests the central question in education debates: feds or
states? And, there is a body of legal scholarship supporting fed-key.
Lawson 13 JD @ U Michigan (Aaron, EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM: A NEW CASE FOR REDUCED
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN K-12 EDUCATION, 2013 BYU Educ. & L. J. 281, Lexis)//BB

A crucial part of the debate over education law and policy asks: Who should be creating education
policy? When education policy is formulated, what is at stake is nothing less than success in life for our
nation's young people. The twenty-first century has seen a pronounced shift in the way education policy
decisions are made, as the educational policy making and regulatory epicenter has begun shifting from
the state to the federal level, particularly with the passage of No Child Left Behind ("NCLB") 1 and Race
to the Top ("RTTT"). 2 NCLB comprehensively reformed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA), the primary federal education law. 3 Among the major changes were requirements (1) that
states establish yearly testing of students in grades three through eight for reading and math and in
three grades for science; 4 (2) that states establish standards for the adequate yearly progress of its
students, incorporating a goal of total proficiency in all subjects by 2013-14; 5 (3) that students be
allowed to transfer out of schools deemed in need of [*282] improvement; 6 and (4) that states develop
a number of new accountability measures to measure the progress of students with limited English
language proficiency. 7 The focus on testing was meant to provide some accountability on the part of
schools to parents and taxpayers and focus schools' efforts towards groups of students in need. 8 RTTT,
on the other hand, was less a legislative program and more a set of spending conditions. 9 In order to
receive money from the RTTT fund, states must submit ambitious plans in four core areas: (1) adoption
of standards geared to workplace preparedness, (2) building systems to measure student success, (3)
increasing teacher effectiveness, and (4) improving the lowest achieving schools. 10 States were
encouraged, as part of their funding applications, to develop budgets reflecting the changes they
proposed, and the Department of Education provided guidance as to the size of these budgets. 11 For
the purpose of this Comment, what is important about these programs is not what they contain, but the
fact that they represent a much larger role for the federal government in education. A growing body of
legal scholarship argues that an increased role for the federal government in education is a normatively
desirable development. One scholar, for instance, argues that limited state bureaucratic capabilities,
which she asserts have developed compliance functions at the expense of true policy expertise, counsel
in favor of an increased federal role. 12 Likewise, Professor Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, who served in
the General Counsel's office at the U.S. Department [*283] of Education, 13 noting the persistence of
interstate educational disparities since Brown v. Board of Education, 14 argues that an increased federal
role in education is necessary because history teaches that states are incapable, on their own, of
addressing disparities in educational opportunity. 15 Another scholar argues that the central role
education has always held in our society necessitates recognition of education as a judicially-enforceable
fundamental right. 16 Similarly, Goodwin Liu, recently appointed to the California Supreme Court,
argues that the very text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the concept of national citizenship at least
authorizes, if not compels, the creation of a "common set of educational expectations for meaningful
national citizenship." 17 However, increased federal involvement in education is worrisome for other
reasons, explored below. This Comment pushes back on scholarship that supports federal solutions for
the nation's education issues and argues that countervailing considerations militate in favor of less
federal involvement in education. Every state constitution, in contrast with the Federal Constitution,
contains some guarantee of education. 18 State [*284] courts split into two groups on how to give effect
to these guarantees: (1) by evaluating education policy under Equal Protection by declaring education a
fundamental right or by treating wealth as a suspect classification, 19 or (2) by evaluating education
policies under a framework of educational adequacy. 20 In either case, these clauses establish
substantive educational guarantees on the state level that do not exist at the federal level and provide
the courts with a role in ensuring the fulfillment of these guarantees. 21 These clauses also help to
create a valuable political dynamic, which has inured to the benefit of children. As part of this political
dynamic, courts define the contours of these affirmative guarantees, and the legislature fulfills its own
constitutional duty by legislating between those boundaries. 22 However, when the federal government
legislates or regulates in a given field, it necessarily constrains the ability of states to legislate in that
same field. 23 In the field of education, the ability of courts to protect the rights of children is dependent
on the ability of legislatures freely to react to courts. As such, anything that constrains state legislatures
also constrains state courts and upsets this valuable political [*285] dynamic created by the interaction
of state legislatures and state courts. An expansive federal role in educational policymaking is
normatively undesirable when it threatens to interfere with this political dynamic. This dynamic receives
scant attention in the literature described above. However, mindfulness of this dynamic is crucial to the
proper placement of the educational policymaking and regulatory epicenter. Constraints on state
legislatures would not be as problematic if the federal government had proven itself adept at
guaranteeing adequate educational opportunity for all students. However, RTTT and NCLB have, in some
cases, proven remarkably unhelpful for poor and minority students. 24 These negative outcomes, of
course, are not guaranteed. However, the fact that federal involvement in education has produced
undesirable outcomes for poor and minority students should cause policymakers to reexamine whether
it is most desirable for the federal government to play such a significant role in education. This
Comment argues that it is not.

This counterplan centers the debate on institutional distinctions---that promotes

pedagogical rigor that translates into effective advocacy
McLendon 15 -Annette and Harold Simmons Endowed Centennial Chair in Education Policy and
Leadership in the Simmons School of Education and Human Development at Southern Methodist
University
Michael K, Lora Cohen-Vogel, and John Wachen, Understanding Education Policy Making and Policy
Change in the American States: Learning from Contemporary Political Theory in Handbook of Education
Politics and Policy, Routledge, p. 111

Public policy for education in the United States today exhibits as much volatility as that at any moment
in the nation's history. Understanding education policy making and policy change in the states may grow
more important still, as the states and the federal government continue rethinking-and redesigning-the
nation's education landscape. Indeed, as we draft our conclusion, President Barack Obama has
announced a historic series of proposals that would fundamentally overhaul the role of the federal
government in higher education, an arena historically dominated by the separate states. Among other
things, the administration's proposals, for the first time, would ( 1) establish a new ratings system for
colleges and universities, whereby campuses would be evaluated based on the performance of their
graduates, (2) link federal student aid allocations to these outcomes at the campus level, and (3)
toughen requirements on students receiving federal student aid. Although, at present, the prospects of
congressional passage of these proposals seem unlikely, the announcement caps years of growing public
frustration over questions around accountability and affordability in higher education, and signals the
lengths to which both federal and state governments in the United States have been willing to go in
altering the nation's educational landscape. As we noted at the chapter's outset, this shift also includes
numerous other recent policy changes in both K-12 and higher education, including new and different
ways of holding education publicly accountable, governing schools and campuses, financing education,
promoting coordination and competition, compensating faculty and leaders, staffing systems and
schools, and measuring learning and the many other outcomes of schooling.

In this context of frenetic change, systematic and rigorous scholarship around education policy
formation in the states can serve at least two valuable purposes. First, theorizing about education policy
making-meaning formulating propositions, empirically assaying relationships, and elaborating extant
understandings-is useful in its own right because doing so is a foundational step in the field's awareness
of how the world it purports to understand, indeed, works. Although scholarship around education
policy change can demonstrate noteworthy advances over the past decade, overall, the knowledge base
remains thin and piecemeal. Much more research is needed. Second, policy theory can and should
improve policy advocacy and practice. Understanding better how policy systems work, and the
conditions under which policy systems change, can enhance advocates' success in affecting change in
desired ways-and in forestalling change in undesired ones. Multiple streams, punctuated equilibrium,
advocacy coalition, and policy innovation and diffusion afford valuable lenses through which to improve
the field's theoretical and applied-policy foundations, at a time when the political, financial, and
symbolic stakes for the nation's K-12 and higher education systems have never been greater.

3-Neg ground outweighs---there are limitless affirmatives, and basically no DAs. That
problems magnified if the neg loses the only topic-guaranteed generic.
4-Reciprocity---the aff fiats multiple actors too.
5-Reject argument not the team.
 AT perm do both
The perm links to the DA---________________.
The perm doesnt solve---regulatory overlap muddles responsibility and weakens
accountability. Only the counterplan alone ensures school-level buy-in
Chopin 13 JD, associate in the Labor & Employment Law Department and a member of the Employee
Benefits & Executive Compensation Group, focusing on complex employee benefits litigation (Lindsey,
COMMENT: UNTANGLING PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE: A PROPOSAL TO END MEANINGLESS
FEDERAL REFORM AND STREAMLINE CONTROL IN STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES, 59 Loyola Law Review
399, Lexis)//BB

Thus, since the mid-twentieth century, the federal government has tossed reform after reform at
schools. 10 When their efforts do not work after a short period of time, officials become frustrated or
crack under societal pressures and try something new. 11 The result of this method is dismal. Reforms
are not researched before they are implemented, nor are they given time to succeed. 12 Federal
reforms create policies, but do not provide for implementation. 13 Compounding this implementation
problem is the fact that educators often lack the interest or the capability to implement the utopic
policies that they had no role in developing. 14 Because federal reforms are often insufficient, local and
state governments also implement reforms, which results in layers of rules and reforms that have been
stacked one [*404] on top of the other, often in conflict with each other. 15 The result is "a vastly
complex enterprise, shaped by many forces, such as state legislatures, governors, chief state school
officers, multiple levels of bureaucracy, various levels of government, the courts, public and private-
interest groups, textbook publishers, testing services, foundations, think tanks, colleges and
universities." 16 Not only does this create considerable tension between all of the varying bodies, but it
also muddles responsibility and weakens accountability. 17 Not surprisingly, this system yields dismal
results. Schools have made minimal progress in both reading and mathematics even though federal
involvement and spending has soared. 18 Reading scores for seventeen-year-old students taking a
nationwide assessment climbed only one point between 1971 and 2008, even though federal spending
on elementary and secondary education more than doubled between 1975 and 2009. 19 A major
deficiency in education reform is not a lack of interest in progress, nor is it a lack of innovation and
policy; the deficiency lies in implementation of policies. As was pointed out fifteen years ago, "in the
midst of the most sustained and intense educational reform effort in [fifty] years, there is much
opposition [*405] to the creation of an infrastructure to achieve its goals." 20 Therefore, a broad
remedy to education reform is the creation of an institutionalized body to properly implement reforms.
This solution begs the question - who should this body be? One option is to continue down the current
path, which would mean an increase in the federal role. Alternatively, there can be an about face,
resulting in a weakened federal role and increased governance by a separate entity. Because the federal
government is not in a position to expand funding and effectively implement reforms, this Comment
proposes the latter option - specifically, the expansion of state education agencies so that they may
implement elementary and secondary education reform.
The counterplan alone preserves state courts as a viable avenue for challenging
education inequality
Lawson 13 JD @ U Michigan (Aaron, EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM: A NEW CASE FOR REDUCED
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN K-12 EDUCATION, 2013 BYU Educ. & L. J. 281, Lexis)//BB

The judiciary is the ultimate defense against the legislative inertia that threatens the ability of poor and
minority students to obtain an adequate education. Educational adequacy litigation began to open new
doors and expand beyond funding precisely at the moment that federal involvement, through NCLB and
RTTT, began to grow to such a level as to threaten to interfere with judicial intervention in education.
173 This potential pitfall is precisely the reason why the federal government should not take such an
active role in education. Courts are important players in education reform not by articulating the
content of educational policy but by setting the rules governing how education reform can proceed.
Educational reform involves an important give and take as interested parties advance their own
solutions, but there are constitutional limits on this give and take that should be defined by state courts.
The experience of educational adequacy lawsuits indicates that there is an important political dynamic
at play here, which involves courts and ultimately inures to the benefit of students, as all education
reform should. To the extent that the federal government is involved, through programs like NCLB and
RTTT, that involvement has the potential to diminish the effectiveness of state legislative [*318]
response to state courts by binding the legislature to the requirements of federal funding programs.
Thus, through NCLB and RTTT, the federal government threatens this valuable political dynamic in which
courts play an important role in vindicating the substantive educational entitlements enjoyed by
students. Although state legislatures may be able to respond to both the federal government and to
state courts simultaneously, the very real possibility that state legislatures may, in some instances, be
placed in an untenable position between federal requirements and state court dictates should counsel
against extensive federal involvement in education. An adequacy framework for educational policy
requires more than that a state legislature commit to a certain level of education funding. It requires
also that a legislature be sensitive to the ways in which educational policies, especially those that go
beyond the funding context, affect student performance and achievement. NCLB and RTTT focus
legislatures in ways that may not actually be helpful. These policies may have any number of
constitutionally relevant consequences, particularly for poor and minority students. There is a role for
courts to play in educational policy, and that role is to make sure that legislatures remain sensitive to
the ways educational policies affect students and especially that they remain sensitive to the unique
challenges posed to racially and socioeconomically isolated students within our educational systems and
society. State constitutional text demands that closing the achievement gap cannot merely be a
legislative priority. State courts cannot effectively play that role in a system riddled with federal
commands. There are reasons for federal involvement in local educational policy, but protection of
student interests counsels in favor of more restrained involvement, rather than the ever-expanding
role the federal government has given itself in the last decade.
Aff Answers
Fed Key
 2AC - Fed Key Laundry List
Federal reforms are necessary to develop coherence, create accountability, help
disadvantaged communities, and for research
Wong 2015 Annenberg Chair for Education Policy and the Director of Urban Education Policy @
Brown U
Kenneth K, Federalism, Equity, and Accountability in in Handbook of Education Politics and Policy,
Routledge, p. 224-226

The implementation experience on NCLB during the Bush and the Obama administrations, as well as
various competing ideas, form a useful basis for rethinking the role of federal government in K-12
education. Despite recommendations by some members of Congress to eliminate the Department of
Education, federal involvement in K-12 is not likely to be phased out entirely. The key challenge lies in
improving policy coherence in the intergovernmental system. This concluding section proposes several
ways to sharpen the federal role that align accountability and equity. First, the federal goal on
accountability can be effectively promoted with a focus on equity. In our federal system, the federal
government is uniquely positioned to ad dress equity issues. As the fiscal federalism literature shows,
competition for economic growth at the local and state levels tends to constrain their focus on
redistribution. There has been bipartisan support for high-need students. About 60 percent of the
federal K-12 dollars were allocated for redistributive purpose during a period when partisan control has
shifted in both the executive and the legislative branches. This bipartisan agreement on the
redistributive role of the federal government is not likely to be significantly diminished in the near
future.

Given federal commitment to redistributive needs, how can the accountability agenda be strengthened?
To align accountability with equity, the federal government needs critically to reassess categorical
federalism, where outdated funding arrangements are constraining local and state action to find new
ways to improve student achievement. Greater regulatory flexibility and other incentives that combine
with clear and transparent outcome measures will allow for a more differentiated approach to support
school improvement. Higher-performing schools and districts must be given more autonomy from
federal and state regulations. Schools that are in the middle can benefit from specific support strategies.
Persistently low-performing schools need to be restructured, closed, or restarted as charter schools. In
this regard, instead of launching charter systems across the nation, as proposed by the market-based
reformers, it may be more appropriate to make available the charter system option to persistently low-
performing districts. The Recovery School District in New Orleans, and similar quasi-state agencies in
other states, seem to provide promising examples for pursuing the choice approach.

Further, presidential leadership can improve policy coherence on issues that affect education and
children. Considering education policies in other advanced industrialized democracies, the United States
may consider a more holistic approach that pertains from cradle to workforce. On economic policy, the
president receives expert advice from the Council of Economic Advisors. In education and affairs related
to children and youth adults, policy coherence is impeded by institutional fragmentation. Currently,
federal appropriations in key education and related services are managed by more than a dozen federal
agencies. In addition to the Department of Education, these agencies include Agriculture, Defense,
Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Interior, Justice, Labor, Veteran Affairs, Appalachian
Regional Commission, National Endowment for the Arts, National Endowment for the Humanities, and
National Science Foundation. To coordinate policy across agencies, the White House can establish a
Council on Education and Children's Affairs to provide timely policy advice and facilitate timely
decisions. The council can enhance federal priorities and mobilize civic support. A "cradle to workforce"
approach may be necessary to improve strategic coordination in an increasingly resource-constrained
policy environment. Strong coordination to support the development of the human capita pipeline has
gained political support at the state level. For example, in Oregon, the governor-appointed education
secretary replaced the elected school superintendent's office with an education investment board
overseeing the education domain. In Rhode Island, the legislature in 2012 approved the consolidation of
the K-12 board and the higher education board into a single governing board.

Finally, school reform will benefit from federal investment to promote long-term research on major
educational challenges. In this regard, a functional division of research support may be considered.
Given their primary responsibility over education, states have the incentives to fund program evaluation
and technical assistance. Findings from these projects can be used promptly to improve strategies to
raise school and student performance. An example is school leadership development initiatives. Because
states, districts, and schools benefit directly from more effective school leaders, they are ready to use
their own resources to support this type of research and development. They can also use firsthand
information to make policy adjustment and reprioritize their resources. In contrast, federal investment
is needed in long-term research in which findings can be generalized to guide policy changes across
states and districts. First, this federal role includes an investment in data infrastructure that is reliable
and sustainable, including the creation and maintenance oflongitudinal student and teacher data
systems across the 50 states. Second, the federal government needs to address issues at scale,
especially those that are consistent with social justice and national security that go beyond a particular
region of the country. For example, federal research is needed to track graduation experience and
postsecondary and workforce outcomes of minority and low-income students who have been exposed
to certain reform initiatives. Another example is the effectiveness of charter schools in inner-city
neighborhoods through an experimental design that controls for student self-selection. Yet another
example is school turnaround initiatives in large cities and rural communities on student learning over
several years. Third, federal investment in long-term research can stimulate matching funds from states
and private foundations. Federal impact on research activities is enhanced when nonfederal sources are
leveraged. In short, the federal agenda on equity and accountability can forge new public-private
partnership in research and development activities.

In the long term, the critical challenges lie in the commitment of our intergovernmental system fully to
address income and racial/ ethnic disparity, particularly in urban and isolated rural communities.
Toward this end, a functional, federally funded policy system will continue to play an instrumental role
in mediating the tension between decentralized governance and social redistribution.
 ---xt: Inequality
Federal action is necessary to resolve inequality in the classroom
Robinson 2015 - Prof of Law @ U of Richmond School of Law
Kimberly Jenkins, "Disrupting Education Federalism," 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 959

5. Education Federalism Should Be Guided by Research Rather than Primarily by Education Politics

A reexamination of education federalism is needed because the expansion of the federal role in
education has largely been guided by politics. n143 Politics, indisputably, will continue to play an
influential role in education reform. Nevertheless, I propose a theory for how the expanding federal role
in education should be guided by rigorous research regarding [*983] the strengths of federal
policymaking, just as research about the importance of educational opportunities for disabled students
informed Congress's passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. n144 Although
federal education law and policy is also influenced by politics, the federal government has demonstrated
a willingness to leverage politics and research to address the needs of the disadvantaged within
American society when politics has prevented effective reform at the state and local levels. n145

II. A Theory for Disrupting Education Federalism

Education federalism should be restructured to embrace greater federal leadership and responsibility
for a national effort to provide equal access to an excellent education. This Part recommends the key
elements for strengthening the federal role in education to accomplish this goal. It identifies new federal
responsibilities that should be undertaken and recommends reforms of existing federal education policy
that would facilitate this goal. Any substantial strengthening and reform of the federal role in education
will transform the nature of education federalism because substantive changes to federal authority over
education directly affect the scope of state and local authority over education. These shifts in education
federalism have occurred throughout U.S. history, including federally mandated school desegregation,
n146 NCLB, n147 and, most recently, waivers to NCLB. n148

In proposing the essential elements for a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent
education, I offer a broad theory to guide future reform by Congress, the executive branch, or both. The
theory could be used to guide development of federal legislation, new initiatives by the [*984]
Department of Education, or - most likely - a combination of the two. This theory is intentionally broad
and does not propose a specific statute or federal initiative because a wide variety of federal statutes
and initiatives could incorporate the elements identified here. Instead, this theory provides research and
ideas that could inform a variety of federal reforms for many years to come. As Part III.B explains, I focus
on future action by Congress and the executive branch, rather than doctrinal reform through the courts,
because the legislative and executive branch enjoy numerous policymaking strengths over courts. n149

The following six policymaking areas identify how the federal government's role in education should be
expanded to ensure equal access to an excellent education:

(1) Prioritizing a national goal of ensuring all children have equal access to an excellent education and
acknowledging that achieving this goal will require disrupting education federalism; n150

(2) Incentivizing development of common opportunity-to-learn standards that identify the education
resources that states must provide; n151
(3) Focusing rigorous research and technical assistance on the most effective approaches to ensuring
equal access to an excellent education; n152

(4) Distributing financial assistance with the goal of closing the opportunity and achievement gaps; n153

(5) Demanding continuous improvement from states to ensure equal access to an excellent education
through federal oversight that utilizes a collaborative enforcement model; n154 and

(6) Establishing the federal government as the final guarantor of equal access to an excellent education
n155 by strengthening the relationship between federal influence and responsibility.

As the analysis below will show, each of these elements either suggests how to leverage existing
strengths of federal policymaking more effectively or fills in important gaps of federal policymaking and
enforcement. n156

Federal education law and policy that encompasses these elements would greatly increase federal
responsibility as part of a national effort to ensure equal access to an excellent education while setting
the foundation for a shoulder-to-shoulder working relationship with the states to achieve this goal. In
contrast to existing federal education policy that too often demands much from the states but gives
them relatively little, n157 my proposed theory would strengthen the relationship between increasing
federal demands for reform and greater federal responsibility for accomplishing those reforms. If federal
education law and policymaking embraced each of these elements, collectively these reforms would
place primary responsibility on the federal government for establishing a national framework for
ensuring equal access to an excellent education.
 ---xt: Econ
Education federalism decks the economy
Robinson 2015 - Prof of Law @ U of Richmond School of Law
Kimberly Jenkins, "Disrupting Education Federalism," 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 959

Education federalism also is supposed to yield an efficient and effective education system. However, the
education system regularly falls [*974] short of achieving these goals. n80 The substantial percentage
of poorly educated students inflicts substantial costs upon the United States, resulting in numerous
inefficiencies. n81 For example, as I have noted in prior scholarship, n82 increasing the high school
graduation rate could save the nation between $ 7.9 and $ 10.8 billion annually in food stamps, housing
assistance and welfare assistance. n83 The nation forfeits $ 156 billion in income and tax revenues
during the life span of each annual cohort of students who do not graduate from high school. n84 This
cohort also costs the public $ 23 billion in health care costs and $ 110 billion in diminished health quality
and longevity. n85 By increasing the high school graduation rate by one percent for men aged twenty to
sixty, the nation could save $ 1.4 billion each year from reduced criminal behavior. n86 Given this
research, ineffective schools inflict high costs upon the nation - costs that it cannot afford as it wrestles
with predicted long-term growth in the deficit and significant, yet declining, unemployment. n87
 ---xt Competitiveness
State initiatives are a key driver of education inequality, gutting US competitiveness
Robinson 2015 - Prof of Law @ U of Richmond School of Law
Kimberly Jenkins, "Disrupting Education Federalism," 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 959

Primary state and local control over education essentially invite inequality in educational opportunity
because of pervasive state insistence that local governments raise education funds and state funding
formulas that do not effectively equalize the resulting disparities in revenue. n121 Although some
influential victories have occurred, n122 school finance litigation has mostly failed to change the basic
organizational structure of school finance systems and their reliance on property taxes to fund schools.
n123 Instead, this litigation at best has obtained limited increases in funding for property-poor districts
while allowing property-rich districts to [*980] maintain the same funding level or to raise their funding
rate at a slower pace. n124

Recent evidence of the persistent inequalities in school funding can be found in two distinct 2013
reports. A report from the Council on Foreign Relations found that in the United States more is spent per
pupil in high-income districts than in low-income districts. n125 This stands in sharp contrast to most
other developed nations where the reverse is true. n126 The Equity and Excellence Commission report
also found that "no other developed nation has inequities nearly as deep or systemic; no other
developed nation has, despite some efforts to the contrary, so thoroughly stacked the odds against so
many of its children." n127 These disparities are due in substantial part to the continued state reliance
on property taxes to fund schools. n128 As a result, state school finance systems in the United States
typically create many predominantly low-income and minority schools that predictably produce poor
outcomes because these schools typically lack both the resources to ensure that their students obtain
an effective education and the capacity to undertake effective reforms even when these reforms are
well conceived. n129

The harms from persistent and pervasive disparities in educational opportunity are not limited to
schoolchildren, their families, and their communities. These disparities also harm nationwide interests in
a strong economy and a just society. The United States needs to maintain international academic
competitiveness to attract businesses and prevent the loss of jobs to other more educated nations. n130
Yet, international assessments reveal that the performance of U.S. students is often average or below
average when compared to other countries, n131 which will make it difficult for U.S. students to
compete successfully against students from many other nations. The Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA), an international assessment of performance in math, reading and [*981] science,
was administered in 2012 to students in sixty-five education systems. n132 The results showed that the
average U.S. student who participated scored average in reading and science literacy and below average
in math literacy when compared to other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. n133 Doctors Eric A. Hanushek, Paul E. Peterson and Ludger Woessman, professors of
education at Stanford University, Harvard University and the University of Munich respectively,
summarized the lackluster performance of U.S. students on international assessments in a 2013 book by
noting that:

The evidence of international comparison is now clear. American students lag badly and pervasively. Our
students lag behind students not just in Asia, but in Europe and other parts of the Americas. It is not just
disadvantaged students or a group of weak students who lag, but also American students from
advantaged backgrounds. Americans are badly underrepresented among the world's highest achievers.
n134

Although some challenge such conclusions from international assessments as overblown and simplistic,
n135 others conclude that these less than stellar outcomes indicate that the U.S.education system is
failing to prepare many of its students to compete successfully for jobs with other students from around
the world. n136

Research reveals that the long-term vigor of the U.S. economy will depend on the advanced skills that
are typically provided in higher education and that are needed for upper-level technical occupations.
n137 Although the U.S. higher education system historically has been considered world-class, the United
States is facing substantial competition from other countries with their fast-growing higher education
systems. n138 [*982] As Thomas Bailey, Teachers College professor of economics and education, has
summarized in his research:

Occupational forecasts, analyses of job content, trends in wages, and changes in international
competition all point to an increasing need in the United States for workers with high-level skills.
Achieving increases in skill levels will be difficult as long as current gaps in educational attainment based
on income, race, and ethnicity remain. n139

In this environment, the U.S. economy and its competitiveness will be increasingly hindered by low
college enrollment and completion rates for Hispanic and African American students who increasingly
will make up a larger share of the workforce. n140 Many U.S. students cannot compete successfully with
students from other developed countries, and the lower achievement of U.S. students could cause
comparatively slow growth for the U.S. economy in the years to come. n141

The nation also has a strong interest in ensuring that entire segments of the American public are not
foreclosed from the American dream due to their family income and racial and ethnic background. The
principle of equal opportunity remains an enduring value within American society n142 even though
that value has never been fully realized. Rather than abandon the interest in equal opportunity, the
nation must explore how this value can become a reality for the nation's schoolchildren. In Part II I
propose some innovative ideas on how to accomplish this goal by restructuring education federalism.
 AT: No federal accountability
States arent held accountable now, only a chance the plan provides another layer of
accountability
Robinson 2015 - Prof of Law @ U of Richmond School of Law
Kimberly Jenkins, "Disrupting Education Federalism," 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 959

[*1016] Federal reform consistent with my theory for disrupting education federalism might diminish
some state and local accountability for education. Once the federal government takes responsibility as
the final guarantor of equal access to an excellent education and thereafter monitors state progress
toward achieving this goal, the public will begin to hold the federal government accountable for
educational disparities. This accountability is more diffuse and less effective than state and local
accountability because federal officials are more removed from state and local electorates and are held
accountable for a wider range of decisions. n336

However, it is important to note two responses to this concern. First, the public has not effectively held
state and local officials accountable for closing opportunity gaps. For that reason, adding an additional
layer of accountability - even a diffuse layer - could facilitate achievement of this objective. Second, as
noted above, this proposed theory would not remove state and local accountability for ensuring equal
access to an excellent education. Instead, state and local officials would be charged with designing and
implementing plans to achieve this goal and thus critical aspects of state and local accountability would
be preserved. n337 Federal officials would be responsible for offering some of the incentives, research,
expertise, and financial support that is needed to accomplish this objective. In these ways, my proposed
theory ultimately would increase total government accountability for achieving this goal. For these
reasons, it would more effectively reap some of the benefits that education federalism is designed to
achieve.
 Fed solves state innovation
The plan incentivizes state innovation
Robinson 2015 - Prof of Law @ U of Richmond School of Law
Kimberly Jenkins, "Disrupting Education Federalism," 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 959

C. How Disrupting Education Federalism Would Empower New Aspects of State and Local Control of and
Accountability for Education and Encourage Innovation

Some may critique my proposed theory for reducing state and local control of and accountability for
education. As analyzed in Part I.B.1, it is important to remember that state and local control of
education has greatly diminished over the last few decades and that scholars have noted that local
control has not characterized the nation's schools for quite some time. n328 In addition, local control is
not typically considered an end in itself. As political scientist Douglas Reed insightfully noted, "Local
control is a good thing to the extent that it improves educational performance and builds strong
communities; to the extent that it isolates, excludes, and homogenizes our schools, rendering them
grossly unequal, localism is a problem." n329 Therefore, my theory seeks to reduce harmful aspects of
state and local control of education while simultaneously empowering beneficial and collaborative
aspects.

Under my proposed theory, states admittedly would lose some control over education because they
would be accountable to the federal government for ending longstanding disparities in educational
opportunity. A hallmark of the American education system has been the freedom that mostly affluent
parents enjoy: to provide their children a better education than the one given to less privileged children.
n330 In addition, some states and localities also may contend that they should retain the ability to focus
their resources on some children rather than spreading them more equitably to all children. n331 I
contend that the loss of this type of state and local control would benefit the nation's education system.

At the same time, other aspects of state and local control of education would remain if my theory was
adopted. Under this theory, states would [*1015] retain authority to control education policymaking
through education governance, the nature and content of a school finance system, state assessments
and graduation standards, and a wide variety of teaching and curricular decisions. n332 Localities would
continue to administer education, manage the daily operation of schools, hire teachers and staff, build
and maintain schools, and transport students. n333 Issues such as class size and governance would
remain within the purview of state and local government. Furthermore, maintaining these functions
under state and local authority fosters continuance of most of the existing levels of state and local
accountability for education.

Most importantly, my proposed theory would foster new types of state and local control over
education. Currently, substantial disparities exist in each state's capacity to offer high-quality
educational opportunities. n334 The absence of federal intervention to address these disparate
capacities leaves many states without the ability to offer their citizens an excellent education. Placing
primary responsibility on the federal government for leading a national effort to close opportunity and
achievement gaps will expand state and local control of education because it will provide state and local
governments both a greater and more equal capacity to offer all children an excellent education. n335
This enhanced capacity will empower states and localities to engage in innovative reforms that were
previously hindered by capacity limitations. In this way, greater equity in the distribution of state and
local control and equal access to an excellent education can co-exist as complementary rather than
competing goals.

Once each state has a more uniform ability to offer equal access to an excellent education, the states
will decide how they want to achieve this goal. By leaving the methods for achieving this goal to the
states, my theory will preserve the states and localities as laboratories of reform. Moreover, these
laboratories would have new federal research, technical expertise, and financial assistance to support
the identification and implementation of effective reforms. Therefore, those who believe that
excellence is best fostered through state and local control may find comfort in the fact that under my
proposed theory, the states ultimately would decide how to ensure equal access to an excellent
education.
 States fail internal politics
Internal politics within the states will corrupt the CP, national standards are necessary
to keep them in check
Louis 2015 - Regents Professor; Robert Holmes Beck Chair of Ideas in Education @ U of Minnesota
Karen Seashore, Karen Febey, and Molly F Gordon, Political Cultures in Education: Emerging
Perspectives in Handbook of Education Politics and Policy, Routledge, p. 122-123
In the United States, individual states bear the responsibility for developing most significant social policies, even when they do so within federal
guidelines (Reeves, 1990). Even the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act acknowledges the central role of the states in setting standards and
designing their own accountability systems (Sunderman, 2003), and the more recent federal initiatives such as Race to the Top also presume
that the states will change policies in areas such as teacher and principal evaluation and school choice. NCLB
foreshadowed a more
formal, national regulatory system, but because school funding is local and state based, federal
influence is likely to remain contested for the foreseeable future. In other words, the state is, historically, the
locus in which educational policy is played out (Timar & Kirp, 1988), and state political acti vism is increasing,
along with vocal resistance among both politicians/policy advocates (Scott, 2012) and scholars (Ravitch, 2012) to
the national standards and accountability move ment. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider how current
debates over national state control will emerge, but there is reason to believe that states may be, at minimum, ambivalent about giving up their
constitutional right to separateness in education (Gass & Stergios, 2013; Strauss, 2013).3 States
exercise both direct and indirect
influences on school districts and schools. Direct influence comes through legitimate rules that are based
on accumulated legislative and court actions (Roch & Howard, 2008); indirect influence emerges as part of
cultural constraints and shared assumptions that have also accumulated over long periods of time
(Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1986; Timar & Kirp, 1988 ). However, although both the cultural and legal/legislative systems are designed for
stability, stakeholders show little agreement on the proper state role in education when confronting a high
demand for reform. States are, for example, expected to lead standard setting for student achievement and
curricular content and monitor school quality, while also simplifying regulations for running schools and
promoting site-based management and citizen participation (Elmore & Fuhrman, 1995; Louis, 1998; Swanson &
Stevenson, 2002), but recent reviews of school reform efforts suggest that states' capacity to carry out the expected role is
variable, as is states' ability to finance significant reform efforts (Gottfried et al., 2011; Mehan, 2013). As states attempt
to enact policies and mechanisms to affect education, political culture will play a role in determining how they balance
conflicting expectations and policies, and whether the development of capacity to exercise leadership in
school reform is a priority. State-specific studies have continued to show that political culture and
accumulated history help to predict both the dynamics and outcomes of legislation (Mazzoni, 1993; Sacken &
Medina, 1990). In addition to political culture, state educational policy making and activism are affected by legislative
politics, structural limitations, economic constraints, and legal context (Roch & Howard, 2008; Wong, 1989). States
have, therefore, struggled to find the appropriate policy mechanisms to influence teaching and learning-the core of educational policy, but also
the most difficult and resistant to change from outside the school. Because
of political and economic pressures, policy
makers often use a narrow range of policy mechanisms (mandates and incentives) because they are
most likely to produce positive, short-term results (Rossman & Wilson, 1996), although they also narrow and constrain
professional flexibility at the school level (Olsen & Sexton, 2009). Lon ger-term strategies such as capacity building and systems change are less
common, partly because they are slow to demonstrate significant impacts (Datnow et al., 2003; Elmore & Fuhrman,1995; Gross, Booker, &
Goldhaber, 2009). Regardless of the type of policy mechanisms that states use to develop and implement educational policy, the primary values
driving policies are efficiency (detailed procedures for school authorities to abide by); equity- redistribution of resources for those lacking
them;quality-standards of excellence (Garms, Guthrie, & Pierce, 1978); and choice the range of options available (Marshall et al., 1986). There
are distinct differences in the ways that those values are manifested in state educational policy makers' actions and school laws (Marshall,
Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989). A recent study of U.S. states (Louis et al., 2008) expanded on the values driving policies by combining frameworks of
political culture dimensions, level and type of stakeholder involvement, and policy levers to analyze differences in states' educational policies
for leadership and accountability. The seven states in this study (Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, and Texas)
differed and were similar in complex ways: Political culture clearly was a factor in all, and accounted for differences as well as similarities. In the
ne xt two sections of this chapter, we explore the impact of political culture on the development of state educational policy and provide
illustrations of schools' responses to policy in two states.