ELIZA ABUAN v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 168773, October 27, 2006

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726 and Resolution[2]denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The CA affirmed
the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-
D, convicting Eliza T. Abuan of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The Antecedents

A criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan charging Abuan
with violating R.A. No. 6425, as amended. On May 8, 1998, she filed a motion to quash the criminal complaint,
praying that pending the resolution of her motion, she be allowed to post bail without waiving her right to
question her arrest and assail Search Warrant No. 98-62.[4] The public prosecutor conformed to the
motion. Thus, the motion was granted and bail was fixed at P60,000.00.[5]

The MTC found probable cause against Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended, and recommended the filing of an Information against her. It ordered the elevation of the records
to the RTC for further proceedings.

On November 12, 1998, an Amended Information was filed in the RTC of Dagupan City, charging Abuan with
violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The inculpatory portion of the Information
reads:

That on or about 8:45 oclock in the morning of May 6, 1998 at Brgy, Lasip, [M]unicipality of
Calasiao, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has
in her possession, custody and control of the following to wit:

Fifty seven (57) small heat-sealed plastic sachets of met[h]aphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
weighing 5.67 grams.

one (1) roll aluminum foil and assorted plastic (luminous) sachets.

without authority to possess the same.

CONTRARY to Art. III, Section 16 of R.A. 6425, as amended.[6]

During the arraignment on November 12, 1998, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the charge.[7] During the pre-trial on November 19, 1998, Abuan rejected the prosecutions proposal for her
to admit the validity of Search Warrant No. 98-62, and that, in the enforcement thereof, 57 sachets
of shabu were found in her house and later confiscated by the policemen.[8] She maintained that the warrant
was invalid and that any material allegedly confiscated from her house was inadmissible in evidence.

The court set the initial presentation of evidence by the prosecution on December 3, 1998. However,
on said date, accused filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, alleging that there was no probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62; the applicant, Cesar Ramos, had no personal knowledge of his claim
that she had in her possession methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and other drug paraphernalia;
Marissa Gorospe was a fictitious person, and her testimony was fabricated to convince the Executive Judge
to make a finding of probable cause required for the issuance of a search warrant; and the Executive Judge
failed to ask searching questions and elicit from Gorospe the particularity of the alleged paraphernalia in
Abuans possession. Abuan asserted that since the search warrant is void, whatever evidence was
discovered as a result of the search conducted based on the warrant was inadmissible in evidence.[9]

Instead of allowing the accused to present her evidence in support of her motion, the court declared that any
such evidence may be adduced at the trial.[10]

The Case for the Prosecution

At around 8:30 a.m. on May 5, 1998, SPO2 Marcelino Gamboa and SPO2 Beliguer de Vera of the
Calasiao Police Station received information from a confidential informant that Abuan was conducting illegal
drug activities in her house at Barangay Lasip, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Acting on the said information,
Gamboa and de Vera conducted surveillance-monitoring operations on her residence, three times for more
than an hour. They saw more or less 20 people who were coming in and out of Abuans house. According to
the informant, these people were drug addicts,[11]and Abuan was a known drug pusher.[12] On the same day,
the officers, through SPO3 Cesar Ramos, applied for a warrant [13] with Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos
of the RTC in Lingayen, Pangasinan, to search the house of Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), weighing scale,
aluminum foil, and burner.

The application was docketed as Search Warrant No. 98-62. To establish probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, Ramos presented their informant, Marissa Gorospe, who was subjected to
searching questions by the Executive Judge.[14]

Gorospe testified that she was a resident of Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan. She knew Abuan
because they were employed as dealers of Avon Cosmetics. Abuan was a prominent personality
in Barangay Lasip.[15] Her unnumbered house is a green bungalow-type, cemented and decorated with
ornamental plants up front. She visited Abuan in her house at least three to four times a week. [16] She first
came upon the drugs in Abuans house when the latter invited her to a jamming and drinking session. She
refused because she had to go home to Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan, a place of considerable
distance from Calasiao.[17] Abuan then suggested that they use the shabu that she kept
inside her bedroom instead. Abuan kept a substantial amount of shabu in her house and sold it.[18] The
informant further narrated that several people, including teenagers, arrived in the house of Abuan and bought
the substance.[19] During her visits, she observed that Abuan placed shabu inside plastic bags. She also saw
weighing scales and paraphernalias used in sniffing shabu. Being a mother herself, she did not want
teenagers and her children to become drug addicts.[20]Gorospe identified and affirmed the truth of the
contents of her deposition.[21]
The Executive Judge found probable cause and issued Search Warrant No. 98-62 which reads:

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath thru searching
questions on the applicant, SPO3 Cesar A. Ramos, PNP, and his witnesses that there is
probable cause to believe that the respondent is in possession without any authority to do so
in violation of R.A. 6425 of the following:

Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)

Tooter
Weighing Scale
Aluminum Foil
Burner

which she keeps and conceals in her house premises at Brgy. Lasip, Calasiao, Pangasinan,
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to make an immediate search at any time of the day or
night and take possession of the above-described properties and bring them to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

This Search Warrant shall be valid only for ten (10) days from its issuance, thereafter, the
same shall be void.[22]

On May 6, 1998, police operatives composed of Col. Fidel Posadas, Major Froilan Perez, SPO2
Gamboa, SPO2 Madrid, SPO2 de Vera, PO2 Tomelden, PO2 Rosario, PO3 Ubando, PO1 Moyano and PO3
Vallo went to Barangay Lasip to enforce the search warrant. However, before proceeding to Abuans
residence, the policemen invited Barangay Captain Bernardo Mangaliag and Kagawad Miguel Garcia
of Barangay Lasip to witness the search.

Upon arriving at the premises, Officers De Vera, Gamboa and Garcia and Mangaliag entered the
house; the rest of the policemen remained outside.Mangaliag introduced the police officers to Abuan who
presented Search Warrant No. 98-62 to her. Abuan read the warrant and permitted the officers to conduct
the search.[23]

De Vera, Mangaliag, Gamboa and Garcia entered the bedroom and found 57 sachets of
suspected shabu, one roll of aluminum foil and assorted luminous plastic sachets in the drawer just beside
Abuans bed.[24] The police officers confiscated all these and brought them, along with Abuan, to the police
station where an inventory of the items was made. Mangaliag and Garcia affixed their signatures on the
inventory/receipt,[25] but Abuan refused to sign it.[26]

The police officers prepared a certification of orderly search which Garcia and Mangaliag also
signed. Abuan likewise refused to sign the certification.[27]The police officers requested the PNP Crime
Laboratory Unit of Lingayen, Pangasinan to conduct a laboratory examination on the confiscated
substance.[28]According to the laboratory examination conducted by P/Supt. Theresa Ann Bugayong CID,
Regional Chief Chemist, the 57 sachets of the suspected shabuweighing 5.67 grams gave positive results for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.[29]

After presenting its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence Search Warrant No. 98-62, the Receipt of
the Property Seized, the Physical Science Report and the articles confiscated from Abuans
house.[30] However, Abuan objected to the admission of the search warrant and the articles confiscated based
thereon on the ground that the warrant was issued without probable cause.[31] The court admitted the
documentary evidence of the prosecution subject to the comment or objection interposed by accused and
the eventual determination of their probative weight.[32]

The Case for the Accused

Abuan testified that she was jobless in 1998. Her parents and her sister Corazon Bernadette sent her money
from Canada once or twice a month to support her and her daughters. It was her father who spent for the
education of her daughters.[33] She was married to Crispin Abuan, a policeman, but they separated in
1997.[34] She did not know any person by the name of Marissa Gorospe. She did not work for Avon Cosmetics
nor used any of its products.[35]
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 6, 1998, she was with her two daughters, 21-year old Ediliza Go and 9-
year old Mae Liza Abuan.[36] They were still in bed inside their room. Suddenly, four armed men barged into
their house and declared a raid.[37] About eight to ten others were outside her house. She inquired if they had
a search warrant but she was not shown any.[38] The men searched her house for about 10 to 15 minutes
and turned up with nothing.[39] Some of the men went out of the house and boarded a jeepney. The men
outside again went into the bedroom and came out with powder placed in a plastic. [40] At this
instance, Barangay Captain Bernardo Mangaliag was brought to the scene and was shown the powder
substance recovered from her bedroom. She refused to sign the inventory and receipt of the property seized
and the certification of orderly search. However, Mangaliag signed the same.[41]

She declared that the sachets/substances which the policemen claimed to have found in her house were
merely planted to implicate her. The raid as well as the charge against her were instigated by her brother
Arsenio Tana, who was enraged when she refused his demand to entrust the properties of the family to the
care of his son. It appears that Tana carried out his threat to have her house raided since the policemen did
come to her house on May 6, 1998.[42] Her brother was by the gate of her house at the time of the raid.

Abuan also testified that, during the raid, she saw Tana talking to the police officers who arrested
her. Abuan also declared that the money kept inside a box in her room amounting to P25,000.00
(US$1,100.00) given by her sister Corazon Bernardino had gone missing after the raid.[43] She did not file
any charge for the loss of her money because she was scared. She did not know who took it.

Barangay Captain Robert Calachan of Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan and Mercedes
Carvajal, an employee of Avon Cosmetics in Dagupan holding the position of team leader, testified for
accused.
 Calachan declared that he was born in Barangay Sapang and never left the place. He was familiar
with the residents of the small barangay.[44] He issued a certification[45] stating that as per record of
this barangay, a certain Marissa Gorospe is not a resident of this barangay. Before he signed the certification,
he inquired from the barangay members if they knew a Marissa Gorospe, and he was told that no one by that
name was a transient.[46]

Carvajal, for her part, testified that, based on the certification dated November 12, 1998 of Dagupan
City Avon Branch Manager Gigi dela Rosa, Marissa Gorospe is not a registered dealer of Avon Dagupan
Branch based on our records. She did not know any Avon Cosmetics employee or dealer named Marissa
Gorospe in Pangasinan. She further testified that she had been a team leader/dealer of Avon Cosmetics for
21 years already, and that Abuan was not such a dealer/employee. On cross-examination, she declared that
she was a team leader of Avon Cosmetics (Dagupan Branch), and thus had no participation in the preparation
of the certification of Gigi dela Rosa and was not in a position to know if the certification was correct.

On March 28, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused guilty of the charge. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of

Section 15 (sic), Article 6425, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
of PRISION CORRECTIONAL.

The prohibited drug and paraphernalia seized from the accused are hereby
confiscated in favor of the government and should be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for disposition in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.[47]

The trial court declared that the testimonies of police officers Gamboa and de Vera should be
accorded great weight and credence as they testified positively regarding what transpired during the raid. In
contrast, the testimony of accused was self-serving, negative and feeble. She failed to prove that it was her
brother who manipulated the unfortunate events. Neither was she able to prove ill motive on the part of the
police officers who conducted a search in her house; hence, the presumption is that they regularly performed
their duties. The failure of the accused to present her two daughters as witnesses amounted to suppression
of evidence, giving rise to the presumption that if they had been presented, their testimonies would be adverse
to her.

On the issue of the validity of the search warrant, the court ruled that there was probable cause for its
issuance. The proceedings conducted by the Execute Judge relative to the application of the police for a
search warrant, its issuance and implementation were valid, regular, and in accordance with the requirements
of the law and Constitution.[48] The trial court declared that Gorospe may have lied about her address and
being a dealer of Avon Cosmetics; however, it does not necessarily mean that she was a fictitious person. It
explained that Gorospe may have lied a little in order to conceal herself for her protection, but the rest of her
testimony constituted sufficient evidence of probable cause.
 Abuan filed her motion for reconsideration dated April 16, 2001, which the court denied in an
Order[49] dated May 10, 2001. She appealed the decision to the CA, where she averred that:

I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE ALLEGED SHABU
AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
THEREBY DISREGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHOBITION AGAINST FRUITS OF
THE POISONOUS TREE.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE GLARING DISCREPANCIES IN
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE SUPPOSED EYEWITNESSES.

Abuan insisted that the applicant failed to show probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-
62. Marissa Gorospe is a fictitious person whose alleged testimony is fabricated and was used by the police
officers to convince the Executive Judge that there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant
when, in fact, there was none. The Executive Judge failed to ask Gorospe searching
questions. Consequently, Search Warrant No. 98-62 is void and the substances and paraphernalia
confiscated by the policemen are inadmissible in evidence. She further claimed that the testimonies of De
Vera and Gamboa were pockmarked with inconsistencies and as such, the trial court should not have given
them probative weight.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that the trial court merely confirmed Executive
Judge Ramos finding of probable cause. Besides, appellant failed to file a motion to quash Search Warrant
No. 98-62, hence, was estopped from assailing it and the search and seizure conducted thereafter. The OSG
cited the ruling of this Court in Demaisip v. Court of Appeals.[50] It likewise claimed that the inconsistencies
adverted to by appellant pertained merely to collateral matters and were not determinative of her guilt or
innocence. As gleaned from the evidence of the prosecution, her defenses could not prevail over the
evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC decision. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
March 28, 1001 in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Dagupan City convicting Eliza T. Abuan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[51]

The appellate court ruled that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of Abuans guilt for
the crime charged. The alleged discrepancies in the testimonies of Gamboa and de Vera were peripheral
matters. Moreover, Abuans failure to assail the legality of the search and seizure conducted by the policemen
before her arraignment was equivalent to a waiver of her right to assail the search warrant. The CA cited the
ruling of this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals.[52]
 Abuan filed a motion for reconsideration,[53] reiterating her argument that the search warrant is not
valid. She also argued that she did not waive her right to assail the validity of the search warrant at her
arraignment and during the trial. She maintained that the CA should not rely on the evaluation by the RTC of
the witnesses credibility, and that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
on material relevant details.

The appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution[54] dated May 26, 2005 on its finding that no
new and substantial matter was presented to warrant reconsideration thereof.[55]

In the instant petition, Abuan, now petitioner, asserts that

I
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID DESPITE
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.

II
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS DEEMED WAIVED AFTER ARRAIGNMENT.

III
THE CA ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE SHABU AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA
ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM THE PETITIONER AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

IV
THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER.[56]

Petitioner avers that the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge was void because the circumstances
leading to its issuance were not based on probable cause but on mere fabrications. She points out that
according to Gorospe, she became acquainted with petitioner and visited her in her house because of their
employment with Avon Cosmetics. However, considering that she and Gorospe were never employed by
Avon Cosmetics and were not even acquainted, such testimony is false. Thus, the search warrant should be
declared invalid as it is based on the testimony of a fictitious person, a planted witness with a fabricated
testimony and, consequently, any evidence discovered on the basis thereof should be suppressed and
excluded in accordance with Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner points out that with the
inadmissibility of the shabu and other paraphernalia, the appellate court should have acquitted her of the
charges by reason of the prosecutions failure to prove the commission of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioner insists that, based on the records, she sought to suppress the search warrant throughout the entire
proceedings in the trial court. She rejected the prosecutions offer to admit the validity of the search warrant
and even filed a motion to suppress the search. She was thus not proscribed from filing her motion to
suppress the search warrant even after the arraignment.

In its Comment,[57] the OSG maintains that the search warrant is valid. It insists that the CA correctly ruled
that the requisites of a valid search warrant were present, noting that the Executive Judge conducted
searching questions and answers on the person of Marissa Gorospe. It asserts that, in applying for a search
warrant, a police officer need not possess personal knowledge regarding an illegal activity; it is the witness
who should possess such personal knowledge, and upon whose testimony under oath probable cause may
be established. In this case, it was Gorospe who narrated, under oath and before the judge, her personal
knowledge of (petitioners) criminal activities.[58]

The OSG maintains that petitioner in effect waived whatever objections she had regarding the validity of the
search warrant. It points out that she never questioned the warrant before the court which issued the same,
never questioned nor moved for the quashal of the warrant before her arraignment. And while petitioner was
allowed to present evidence on the alleged invalidity of the search warrant, this did not cure her omission or
inaction in raising the issue at the proper time.

In her Reply,[59] petitioner declares that a close scrutiny of the judges investigation of Gorospe would reveal
that her personal circumstances are pivotal in her acquisition of personal knowledge regarding the alleged
possession of shabu by petitioner. If these personal circumstances are fabricated, then such personal
knowledge regarding the possession bears no credit.

Petitioner likewise maintains that contrary to the allegations of the OSG, she did not waive her right
to question the validity of the warrant. She could not have done any better under the circumstances at that
time because all the evidence against Gorospe was made known and available to her only after her
arraignment.
The Court is tasked to resolve the following threshold issues: (a) whether petitioner waived her right to
question Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the admissibility of the substances and paraphernalia and other
articles confiscated from her house based on said warrant; and (b) whether the prosecution adduced
evidence to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioner Did not Waive

Her Right to File a Motion
To Quash Search Warrant
No. 98-62 and for the
Suppression of the Evidence
Seized by the Police Officers
Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to
quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and
acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has
been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search
warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

The Court ruled in the Malaloan case that the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may
file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent
or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress the resolution of the court not on the motion to quash the search warrant and to suppress evidence
shall be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.[60] A motion to quash a search warrant
may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property
seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant.[61] Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the court may hear
the motion, as follows:

When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on
affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.

In the present case, petitioner reserved her right to question Search Warrant No. 98-62 when she filed her
motion for bail in the RTC. The public prosecutor conformed to the motion. During pre-trial in the RTC,
petitioner rejected the prosecutions proposal for her to admit the validity of Search Warrant No. 98-62,
insisting that it was void. In her motion to suppress, petitioner averred that the search warrant is void for the
following reasons: lack of probable cause; failure of the Executive Judge to ask searching questions on
Gorospe; and the evidence seized by the police officers on the basis of the search warrant are inadmissible
in evidence. She likewise prayed that the search warrant be nullified, and that the evidence seized by the
policemen on the basis of said warrant be suppressed.[62]

Petitioner was ready to adduce evidence in support of her motion, but the court declared that this should be
done during the trial. Petitioner thus no longer assailed the ruling of the trial court and opted to adduce her
evidence at the trial. She likewise objected to the admission of the search warrant and the evidence
confiscated by the police officers after the search was conducted. It bears stressing that the trial court
admitted the same and she objected thereto. It cannot, therefore, be said that petitioner waived her right to
assail the search warrant and object to the admissibility of the regulated drugs found in her house.

On the second issue, the trial courts ruling (which the appellate court affirmed) that the prosecution adduced
evidence to prove petitioners guilt of crime charged beyond reasonable doubt is correct.

Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 reads:

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

The elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are as follows: (a) the accused was in
possession of the regulated drugs; (b) the accused was fully and consciously aware of being in possession
of the regulated drug; and (c) the accused had no legal authority to possess the regulated drug.[63] Possession
may be actual or constructive. In order to establish constructive possession, the People must prove that
petitioner had dominion or control on either the substance or the premises where found. [64] The State must
prove adequate nexus between the accused and the prohibited substance.[65] Possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or aminus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence is shifted to petitioner to explain the
absence of aminus possidendi.[66]

We agree with the trial courts finding that, indeed, petitioner had in her possession and control 57 small, heat-
sealed sachets of shabu weighing 5.67 gm when Search Warrant No. 98-62 was served on her. As testified
to by the witnesses of the prosecution, the police officers, in the presence of Garcia and Mangaliag, found
the said substances in a drawer in her bedroom. Petitioner likewise failed to present any legal authority to
justify her possession of the regulated drug found in her bedroom.

The mere denial by petitioner of the crime charged and her bare claim of being the victim of a frame-up by
de Vera and Gamboa cannot prevail over the positive and steadfast testimonies of the police officers. Their
testimonies were corroborated by the inventory/receipt of property, stating that, indeed, 57 small heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 5.67 grams were found in a
drawer in petitioners bedroom. The police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in good faith,
in accordance with law. Absent any clear and convincing evidence that such officers had ill or improper motive
or were not performing their duties, their testimonies with respect to the surveillance operation, the
implementation of search warrant, and the seizure of the regulated drug in the house of petitioner must be
accorded full faith and credence.[67] Like alibi, the defense of denial and frame-up had been invariably viewed
by the courts with disfavor. Denial is a negative of self-serving defense, while frame-up is as easily concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended.[68] For the defense of frame-up to prosper, the evidence must be clear and convincing.[69]

It bears stressing that the policemen saw to it that the search of petitioners house was conducted with the
assistance and in the presence of Barangay Captain Mangaliag and Kagawad Garcia. They testified that the
regulated drugs confiscated by the policemen were found in the searched premises. Petitioner failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the policemen and the barangay officials had any improper motive
to frame her and falsely ascribe to her the crime of violating R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

Except for her bare testimony, petitioner failed to prove that her brother Arsenio Tana instigated the
policemen to secure Search Warrant No. 98-62, conducted a search in her house, planted the drugs in her
bedroom and stole money from her. Petitioner failed to make such a claim when she was arrested and
brought to the MTC for preliminary investigation. She also failed to file any criminal complaint against the
policemen and her brother Arsenio Tana for filing the fabricated charge against her and for planting evidence
in her house. It was only when she testified in her defense in the trial court that she alleged, for the first time,
that the charge against her was instigated by her brother, in cahoots with the policemen. We quote with
approval the disquisitions of the OSG on this matter:

SECOND: The police officers who testified had not proven bad or ill motive to testify against
accused.

The suspicion of accused that it was her brother who manipulated the events in her life is
unsubstantiated and too far-fetched to happen and is, therefore, unbelievable.
 The presumption, therefore, is that said police officers performed their official duties regularly
(People v. Cuachon, 238 SCRA 540).

THIRD: The testimony of accused is too self-serving. It is uncorroborated.

According to her, the intrusion into her house by the police was witnessed by her two daughter
(sic). However, she did not present them as witnesses.

In the case of her daughter Ediliza, she was already twenty years old at the time so that she
was already mature for all legal intents and purposes. In the case of her daughter Mae Liza,
who was nine years old, there was no reason why she could not articulate what she personally
saw and experienced, if what she would be made to state was true.

The inability of the said accused, therefore, to present her two daughters is tantamount to a
suppression of evidence, thus raising the presumption that if they were presented, their
testimonies would have been adverse to her.

Furthermore, it has been [the] consistent ruling of the Supreme Court that a plain denial or
negative testimony, if unsubstantiated by a clear and convincing testimony, cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 155).

FOURTH: The other defense of accused is that it was unlikely for her to have engaged in
pushing or peddling drugs for a living because she had to set a good example of decent living
for the sake of her two beautiful daughters and good neighbors. Furthermore, she did not have
financial problems which could have pushed her into the drug business because her sister
Corazon Bernardino had been regularly sending her money.

The aforecited unlikelihood perceived by accused could not prevail over the affirmative
testimonies of policemen Gamboa and de Vera who positively declared that they found 57
sachets of shabu in her room.[70]

Search Warrant No. 98-62

Is Valid; the Articles,
Paraphernalia and Regulated
Drugs Found in Petitioners Bedroom
and Confiscated
by the Police Officers are
Admissible in Evidence

We agree with the ruling of the CA affirming, on appeal, the findings of the trial court that based on the
deposition and testimony of Gorospe, there was probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-
62 for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Thus, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[71]
 Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerate the requisites for
the issuance of a search warrant, thus:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant, record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.[72]

Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a particular affidavit/deposition or
testimony of the affiant/deponent establishes probable cause. However, great deference is to be accorded
to the Judges determination.[73] The affidavit/deposition supporting an application for a search warrant is
presumed to be valid.[74]

Affidavits/depositions for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by Judges in a common-
sense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation. Technical requisites of elaborate specificity have no place in this area. [75] The Judge in
determining probable cause is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a
fixed and rigid formula,[76] and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.[77] Probable
cause exists if a practical, common-sense evaluation of the facts and circumstances show a fair possibility
that dangerous drugs will be found in the asserted location.[78] There must be a factual showing sufficient to
comprise probable cause of particular facts and circumstances so as to allow the Judge to make an
independent evaluation of the matter. It is sufficient if the information put forth in the affidavit/deposition or
testimony of the affiant/deponent are believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant/deponent as
true.[79] Sufficient information must be presented to allow a Judge to determine probable cause; his action
cannot be a mere ratification of the bare/unsubstantiated contention of others.

The general rule is that the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable
cause but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the records supporting the Judges
decision to issue the search warrant.[80] The reviewing court is simply to ensure that the Judge had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed,[81] and once ascertained that the Judge had
substantial basis for concluding that a search would unearth evidence of a wrongdoing, the determination of
probable cause must be upheld. In the absence of any showing that the Judge was recreant of his duties in
connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants/deponent before him, there is no
basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.[82]

However, the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him
based on his finding may be quashed; the evidence seized by the police officers based on said search warrant
may be suppressed if the accused presents clear and convincing evidence that the police officers and/or a
government informant made a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in said
affidavit/deposition or testimony which is essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. Such
evidence must focus on the state of mind of the affiants/deponents that he was conscious of the falsity of his
assertion or representation.[83] The requirement that a search warrant not issue but upon probable cause
would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer and his informant are able to use deliberately falsehood
allegations to demonstrate probable cause and, having misled the Judge, was able to remain confident that
the ploy succeeded.[84] However, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of a police officer or
government informant will not invalidate a search warrant. And even if the police officer or government
informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in his or her
affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof are sufficient to establish probable cause, the search
warrant will not be quashed for lack of probable cause.[85]
The evidence presented by petitioner that Gorospe was not a resident or transient of Barangay Sapang, even
if true and credible, is not at all material or necessary to the determination of probable cause. Whether
petitioner and Gorospe were dealers of Avon Cosmetics as of May 5, 1998 may be relevant to the issue of
whether there was factual basis for the finding of probable cause by the Executive Judge against petitioner;
however, petitioners evidence to prove his claim is tenuous and does not warrant the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 98-62 and the suppression of the evidence seized after the enforcement of the search warrant.

The evidence petitioner presented to disprove the testimony of Gorospe that they were dealers of Avon
Cosmetics are her (petitioners) testimony and that of Carvajal. The certification purportedly signed by
dela Rosa, the Branch Manager of Avon Cosmetics Dagupan Branch, is hearsay because she did not
testify.Carvajal admitted that she was not in a position to confirm the veracity of the contents of the
certification:

PROSECUTOR JAIME DOJILLO

ON CROSS-EXAMINATION

q What is your position at Dagupan Avon Cosmetics?

a Team Leader, Sir.

q Do you have any participation in the preparation of this certification?

a None, Sir.

q So, you had not in position to know the truth of this certification, hence, you were not the
one who prepared the same?
a Yes, Sir.[86]
 Carvajal was merely one of many team leaders of Avon Cosmetics in Dagupan City. She did not
testify nor did petitioner adduce evidence that Gorospe was not such a dealer in places other
than Dagupan City or Pangasinan for that matter. In fine, petitioner failed to adduce competent and credible
evidence that Gorospe was not a dealer of Avon products in the branches of Avon Cosmetics other than
Pangasinan. Other than the denial of
petitioner and the testimony of Carvajal, petitioner failed to present evidence that she was not a dealer of
Avon Cosmetics. On the other hand, the testimony of Gorospe before the Executive Judge was corroborated
by the testimonies of police officers Gamboa and de Vera.

In the present case, the Executive Judge found probable cause after conducting the requisite searching
questions on Gorospe for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The trial court
reviewed the testimony of Gorospe before the Executive Judge[87] and confirmed that, indeed, there was
probable cause against petitioner for violation of said crime. The finding of the Executive Judge was
corroborated by the testimony of police officers de Vera and Gamboa, who, in their surveillance operation,
partially confirmed Gorospes claim that, indeed, people had been going to the house of petitioner to
buy shabu.The findings of the trial court were, in turn, affirmed by the CA.

The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are
accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the
tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered,
the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. In this case, petitioner failed to
establish any such circumstance.

The trial and appellate courts ruled that petitioner possessed 5.67 gm of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. The penalty imposed by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA is incorrect. As the Court ruled in People v. Tira:[88]

Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty
of possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua

Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellants is only
1.001 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional.Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum, to
three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum, for violation of
Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.[89]
The penalty imposed in the Tira case is the correct penalty, which should likewise be imposed against
petitioner herein.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 25726 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to penalty. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as
minimum to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212196 January 12, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RAMIL DORIA DAHIL and ROMMEL CASTRO y CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the September 27, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05707, which affirmed the July 17, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City
(RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. DC 02-376, DC 02-377 and DC 02-378, finding accused Ramil Doria Dahil
(Dahil) and Rommel Castro (Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate Informations before the RTC. In
Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and Castro were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 for the sale of 26.8098 grams of marijuana in the Information which reads:

That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to a poseur
buyer six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY SIX GRAMS AND EIGHT
THOUSAND NINETY EIGHT TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (26.8098), which is a dangerous drug,
without authority whatsoever.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with possession of 20.6642 grams of marijuana in
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information which reads: That on or about the 29th
day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and custody and control Five (5) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY
GRAMS AND SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY TWO TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM
(20.6642), which is a dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro was charged with possession of 130.8286 grams of marijuana in
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information which reads: That on or about the 29th
day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and custody and control One (1) brick in form wrapped in masking tape of dried marijuana
fruiting tops weighing ONE HUNDRED THIRTY GRAMS and EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (130.8286), which is a dangerous drug, without authority
whatsoever.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

On November 14, 2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Dahil, on the other hand, filed a
motion for reinvestigation and his arraignment was deferred. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented
PO2 Arieltino Corpuz (PO2 Corpuz)and SPO1 Eliseo Licu (SPO1 Licu), as witnesses.

On August 6, 2009, the RTC discovered that Dahil was never arraigned through inadvertence.6 The RTC
informed the parties of the situation and the defense counsel did not interpose any objection to the
reopening of the case and the arraignment of Dahil. The latter was then arraigned and he pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, the public prosecutor manifested that he was adopting all the evidence already adduced.

Version of the Prosecution

Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the agents of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3, conducted surveillance and casing operations relative to the
information they received that a certain alias "Buddy" and alias "Mel" were trafficking dried marijuana in TB
Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of
PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of four (4) police officers,
namely, Sergeant Juanito dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as team leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Licu
and PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2 Corpuz was designated as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Licu was
assigned as his back-up.

The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 oclock in the evening. Upon arriving, PO2 Corpuz
together with the informant went to the house of Dahil which was within the TB Pavillon compound. When
PO2 Corpuz and the informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant then
introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he be buying
and the latter answered that he would buy P200.00 worth of marijuana. At this juncture, Dahil took out from
his pocket six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After checking the items,
PO2 Corpuz handed two (2) P100.00 marked bills to Castro.

Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had been consummated. The rest
of the buy-bust team then rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil
and recovered from his possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu
searched the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1) brick of suspected marijuana.

Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were then brought by the buy-bust team to the
PDEA office. There, the seized items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1Licu. First, the six (6) plastic
sachets of marijuana which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked with "A-1" to "A-6" and with
letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Second, the five (5) plastic sachets recovered from Dahil were marked
with "B-1" to "B-5" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Finally, the marijuana brick confiscated
from Castro was marked "C-RDRC." Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared the request for laboratory
examination, affidavits of arrest and other pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized items7 was also
prepared which was signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz brought the confiscated
drugs to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, which subsequently
yielded positive results for marijuana.

The prosecution and defense entered into stipulation as to the essential contents of the prospective
testimony of the forensic chemist, to wit:

1. That a laboratory examination request was prepared by PO3 Dela Cruz;

2. That said letter request for laboratory examination was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory,Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga;

3. That Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran David is a forensic chemist;

4. That said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance subject of the letter
request with qualification that said request was not subscribedor under oath and that the forensic
chemist has no personal knowledge as from whom and where said substance was taken;

5. That the result of the laboratory examination is embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002;
and

6. The findings and conclusion thereof.8

The prosecution was ordered to formally offer its evidence on March 7, 2007.9 After much delay, the public
prosecutor was finally able to orally submit his formal offer of exhibits after almost two years, or on January
6, 2009.10 He offered the following documentary evidence: (1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial
Investigation Report, (3) Photocopy of the marked money, (4) Brown envelope containing the subject illegal
drugs, (5) Inventory of Property Seized, (6) Laboratory Examination Request, and (7) Chemistry Report No.
D-0518-2002.

Version of the Defense

In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver came looking for him after he
had arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver with another man already waiting for him. He was then asked
by the unknown man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered that there were many
persons named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from the vehicles parked in front of his house and
dragged him into one of the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal selling
and possession of marijuana.

For his part, Castro testified thaton September 29, 2002, he was on 4th Street of Marisol, Barangay Ninoy
Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of chess when he was approached by some men who asked if he
knew a certain Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not know the said person and
then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought him to Clark Air Base where he was charged
withillegal possession of marijuana.

RTC Ruling

In its Decision,11 dated July 17, 2012, the RTC found both accused liable for violating Sections 5 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9165, and imposed upon them the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 each for
the crime of illegal sale of marijuana;Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14)
Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P300,000.00 each for the crime of illegal
possession of marijuana.

The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the case of selling and possession of illegal
drugs against the accused. All the elements of the crimes were established. To the trial court, the evidence
proved that PO2 Corpuz bought marijuana from Dahil. The latter examined the marijuana purchased and
then handed the marked money to Castro.

The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers, but the RTC ruled that the same was not
fatal considering that a photocopy of the marked money was presented and identified by the arresting
officers.12 It did not give credence to the defense of frame-up by Dahil and Castro explaining that it could
easily be concocted with no supporting proof.

CA Ruling

The accused then appealed to the CA. In their Brief for the Accused-Appellants,13 they argued that there
were irregularities on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal items seized from
them. The prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards which generated
clouds of doubts as tothe identity of the seized items presented in evidence.14

In its Brief for the Appellee,15 the OSG contended that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
the crime of illegal sale and possession of marijuana. As to the chain of custody procedure, it insists that
the prosecution witnesses were able to account for the series of events that transpired, from the time the
buy-bust operation was conducted until the time the items were presented in court.

The CA denied the appeal in its Decision, dated September 27, 2013. In its view, the prosecution was able
to establish that the illegal sale of marijuana actually took place. As could be gleaned from the testimony of
PO2 Corpuz, there was an actual exchange as Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) sachets containing
marijuana, while PO2 Corpuz handled out the two (2) P100.00 marked bills, after they agreed to
transact P200.00 worth of the illegal drug.16 The charge of illegal possession of marijuana, was also thus
established by the prosecution.17Another five (5) plastic sachets of marijuana were recovered from Dahils
possession while one (1) brick of marijuana from Castros possession.18
It was likewise proven that the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused during the buy-bust operation were
the same drugs presented before the RTC. As testified to by PO2 Corpuz, the six (6) plastic sachets of
marijuana, which were sold by Dahil toPO2 Corpuz were marked "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters "RDRC,"
"ADGC"and "EML," the five (5) plastic sachets recovered in the possession of Dahil were marked "B-1" to
"B-5" and with the initials "ADGC" and "EML," while the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was
marked "C-RDRC."19

It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1
Licu testified that the said drugs were marked at the police station. An inventory of the seized items was
made as shown by the Inventory Report of Property Seized, duly signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. The
Request for Laboratory Examination revealed that the confiscated drugs were the same items submitted to
the PNP crime laboratory for examination. On the other hand, Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002 showed
that the specimen gave positive results to the test of marijuana. The accused failed to show that the
confiscated marijuana items were tampered with, or switched, before they were delivered to the crime
laboratory for examination.20

Hence, this appeal.

This appeal involves the sole issue of whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied
with the chain of custody procedure required by R.A. No. 9165.

The Courts Ruling

Let it be underscored that appeal incriminal cases throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty
of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned.21 Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused,
this Court has meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and finds that
there is merit in the appeal. The Court holds that that there was no unbroken chain of custody and that the
prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the crime charged.

A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to be an
effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-
bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is
susceptible topolice abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion.22

The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous
drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were the same
substances boughtduring the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under R.A. No. 9165 as
the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring thatunnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.23 In People v. Catalan,24 the Court said:

To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the
Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti.That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand,
the Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gapsin
the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court.

Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody, Section 1(b) of Dangerous
DrugsBoard Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, explains the said term as
follows:

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature
of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies
that:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photographthe same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)of R.A. No. 9165
enumeratesthe procedures to be observed by the apprehending officers toconfirm the chain of custody, to
wit:

xxx

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrantis served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items;

xxx

The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with.

Although the prosecution offered inevidence the Inventory of the Property Seized signed by the arresting
officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
observed. The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to
immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required
tosign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

First,the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and confiscation as it was
only done at the police station. Notably, Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the inventory to be done
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures. In this case, however, the prosecution did not even claim that the PDEA
Office Region 3 was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the drugs were seized. The prosecution also
failed to give sufficient justification for the delayed conduct of the inventory. PO2 Corpuz testified, to wit:

Q: What documents did you ask Kgd. Abel Pamintuan to sign?

A: The inventory of the property seized, sir.

Q: And did he sign that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where was he when he signed that?

A: In our office, sir.

Q: Already in your office?

 A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who prepared the inventory of the property seized?

A: Our investigator, sir.

Q: And that was prepared while you were already at your office?

A: Yes, sir, because we did not bring with us the material or equipment for the preparation of the
documents so, we invited him to our office.25

PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excusethat they failed to immediately conduct an inventory because they did
not bring with them the material or equipment for the preparation of the documents. Such explanation is
unacceptable considering that they conducted a surveillance on the target for a couple of weeks.26 They
should have been prepared with their equipment even before the buy-bust operation took place.

Second,there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized.
According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruzwho prepared the said document.27 PO2 Cruz on
the other hand, testified that it was their investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1 Licus
testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator.28

Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed in the presence of the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official. During the cross-examination, PO2 Corpuz testified: Q: After you arrested Ramil
Dahil,did you conduct the inventory of the alleged seized items?

A: Yes, sir (sic).

Q: Where did you conduct the inventory?

A: In our office, maam

Q: Were pictures takenon the alleged seized items together with Ramil Dahil?

A: No, maam.29

[Emphases supplied]

SPO1 Licu when cross-examined on the same point, testified this was:

Q: After you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation, did you conduct an inventory of the alleged
seized items?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Were the accused assisted by counsel at the time you conduct the inventory?

A: No, maam.

Q: Were pictures taken on them including the alleged seized items?

A: Pictures were takenon the accused, maam.

[Emphasis supplied]

In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2 Corpuz testified that no pictures of
the seized items were taken while SPO1 Licu said that pictures of the accused were taken. From the vague
statements of the police officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the alleged drugs were indeed
taken. The records are bereft of any document showing the photos of the seized items. The Court notes
that SPO1 Licu could have misunderstood the question because he answered that "pictures were taken on
the accused" when the question referred to photographs of the drugs and not of the accused.

The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved.

Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the rigorous requirements of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165, jurisprudence dictates that substantial compliance is sufficient. Failure to strictly comply with the
law does not necessarily render the arrestof the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible.30The issue of non-compliance with the said section is not of admissibility, but of weight to be
given on the evidence.31 Moreover, Section 21 of the IRR requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence," as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.32

To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, the proper chain of
custody of the seized items must be shown. The Court explained in People v. Malillin33 how the chain of
custody or movement of the seized evidence should be maintained and why this must be shown by
evidence, viz:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.

In People v. Kamad,34 the Court identified the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, ifpracticable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized bythe apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.

First link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused by the Apprehending Officer

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately
after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting
point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markingsas reference. The marking of the evidence
serves to separate the markedevidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.35

It must be noted that marking isnot found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking and
photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this
Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.36

In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their initials on the seized
items. They, however, gave little information on how they actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless,
that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were only placed at
the police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, to wit: Q: So, after recovering all those marijuana
bricks and plastic sachets of marijuana and the marked money from the accused, what else did you do?
A: We brought the two (2) suspects and the evidence and marked money to our office, sir.

Q: So, in your office, what happened there?

A: Our investigator prepared the necessary documents, sir, the request for crime lab examination, joint
affidavit of arrest, booking sheet, and all other documents necessary for the filing of the case against the
two (2), sir.

xxx

Q: What about the marijuana, subject of the deal, and the one which you confiscated from the accused,
what did you do with those?

A: Before sending them to Olivas, we placed our markings, sir.37

Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized items were not marked. It
could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs were handled. The Court must conduct
guesswork on how the seized drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in transit.
Evidently, the alteration of the seized items was a possibility absent their immediate marking thereof.

Still, there are cases whenthe chain of a custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the seized
items is allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is
done in the presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases.38 Even a less stringent application of the
requirement, however, will not suffice to sustain the conviction of the accused in this case. Aside from the
fact that the police officers did not immediately place their markings on the seized marijuana upon their
arrival at the PDEA Office, there was also no showing that the markings were made in the presence of the
accused.

PO2 Corpuz testified that they only placed their markings on the drugs when they were about to send them
to Camp Olivas for forensic examination. This damaging testimony was corroborated by the documentary
evidence offered by the prosecution. The following documents were made at the PDEA Office: (1) Joint
Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Inventory of Property Seized, and (4) Laboratory
Examination Request. Glaringly, only the Laboratory Examination Request cited the markings on the seized
drugs. Thus, it could only mean that when the other documents were being prepared, the seized drugs had
not been marked and the police officers did not have basis for identifying them. Considering that the seized
drugs wereto be used for different criminal charges, it was imperative for the police officers to properly mark
them at the earliest possible opportunity. Here, they failed in such a simple and critical task. The seized
drugs were prone to mix-up at the PDEA Office itself because of the delayed markings.

Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. As noted by the RTC, Exhibit B-3 RC
RD,39 Exhibit A-5 RC RD and Exhibit A-6 RD RC40 did not have the initials of the apprehending officers on
the back. Bearing in mind the importance of marking the seized items, these lapses in the procedure are
too conspicuous and cannot be ignored. They placed uncertainty as to the identity of the corpus delicti from
the moment of seizure until it was belatedly marked at the PDEA Office.

Similarly, in People v. Garcia,41 the Court considered the belated marking of the seized drug by the
apprehending officer in acquitting the accused in the case. The officer testified that he marked the
confiscated items only after he had returned tothe police station. Such admission showed that the marking
was not done immediately after the seizure of the items, but after the lapse of a significant intervening time.

Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the Apprehending Officer to the Investigating Officer

The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a
supervising officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. 42 This is a
necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall conduct the
proper investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the
investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents.
The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly, there was no testimony from
the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an
investigator in a drug-related case toeffectively perform his work without having custody of the seized
items. Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to resort to guesswork as to whether PO2
Corpuz and SPO1 Licu gave the seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they had
custody of the marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting his investigation on the same
items.

In People v. Remigio,44 the Court noted the failure of the police officers to establish the chain of custody as
the apprehending officer did not transfer the seized items to the investigating officer. The apprehending
officer kept the alleged shabu from the time of confiscation until the time he transferred them to the forensic
chemist. The deviation from the links in the chain of custody led to the acquittal of the accused in the said
case.

Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal Drugs to the Forensic Chemist

From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs
arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the
substance. In this case, it was only during his cross-examination that PO2 Corpuz provided some
information on the delivery of the seized drugs to Camp Olivas, to wit:

Q: How about the alleged marijuana, you stated that the same was brought to the crime laboratory, who
brought the same to the crime lab?

A: Me and my back-up, maam.

Q: When did you bring the marijuana to the crime lab for examination?

A: I think it was the following day, maam.45

As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little detail was offered on how the seized
marijuana was handled and transferred from the PDEA Office in Angeles City to the crime laboratory in
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. PO2 Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs overnight
without giving detailson the safekeeping of the items. The most palpable deficiency of the testimony would
be the lack of information as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.

Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted the tests on the subject drugs, did not
appear in court despite the numerous subpoenas sent to her.46 Instead, the prosecution and the defense
agreed to stipulate on the essential points of her proffered testimony. Regrettably, the stipulated testimony
of the forensic chemist failed to shed light as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas. One of the
stipulations was "that said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance of the letter-
request with qualification that said request was not subscribed or under oath and that forensic chemist has
no personalknowledge as from whom and where said substance was taken."47 This bolsters the fact that
the forensic chemist had no knowledge as to who received the seized marijuana at the crime laboratory.

The recent case of People v. Beran48 involved irregularities in the third link. The police officer, who both
served as apprehending and investigating officer, claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory
for testing, but there was no showing who received the drug from him. The records also showed that he
submitted the sachet to the laboratory only on the next day, without explaining how he preserved his
exclusive custody thereof overnight. All those facts raised serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item have not been fatally compromised. Hence, the accused inthe said case was also
acquitted.

Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic Chemist to the Court.

The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when
presented as evidence in the criminal case. No testimonial or documentary evidence was given whatsoever
as to how the drugs were kept while in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was transferred to the
court. The forensic chemist should have personally testified on the safekeeping of the drugs but the parties
resorted to a general stipulation of her testimony. Although several subpoenae were sent to the forensic
chemist, only a brown envelope containing the seized drugs arrived in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on
the essential links in the chain of custody, the prosecutor propounded questions concerning the location of
the misplaced marked money, which was not even indispensable in the criminal case.

The case of People v. Gutierrez50 also had inadequate stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic
chemist. No explanation was given regarding the custody of the seized drug in the interim - from the time it
was turned over to the investigator up to its turnover for laboratory examination. The records of the said
case did not show what happened to the allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the investigator to
the chemist and its presentation in court. Thus, since there was no showing that precautions were taken to
ensure that there was no change in the condition of that object and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession thereof, the accused therein was likewise acquitted.

In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that, indeed, there was no compliance with the
procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because of the inadequate physical inventory and
the lack of photography of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil and Castro. No explanation was
offered for the non-observance of the rule. The prosecution cannot apply the saving mechanism of Section
21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 because it miserably failed to prove that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items were preserved. The four links required to establish the proper chain of custody
were breached with irregularity and lapses.

The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary rule involving the presumption of regularity
of the performance of official duties could apply in favor of the police officers. The regularity of the
performance of duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the police officers because the records
were replete with indicia of their serious lapses.51 The presumption stands when no reason exists in the
records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the
presumption of regularity will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused to be
presumed innocent.52

Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized marijuana that the
prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the
elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.53

For said reason, there is no need to discuss the specific defenses raised by the accused. WHEREFORE,
the appeal is GRANTED. The September 27, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05707 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Ramil Doria Dahil and Rommel Castro y
Carlos, are ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them and ordered immediately RELEASED from
custody, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision and to inform this Court
of the date of the actual release from confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of copy.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORMAN SITCO and RAYMUNDO BAGTAS (deceased)
G.R. No. 178202, May 14, 2010

This is an appeal from the October 19, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00038 entitled People of the Philippines v. Norman Sitco y De Jesus and Raymundo Bagtas y Caparas, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 in Malabon, in Criminal Case Nos. 19456-
MN to 19459-MN for violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. The affirmed RTC decision adjudged accused-appellants Raymundo Bagtas and Norman Sitco
guilty in Crim. Case No. 19456-MN for drug pushing and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. For illegal
possession of drugs, Bagtas was sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one year and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, in Crim. Case No. 19458-MN, and reclusion
perpetua in Crim. Case No. 19459-MN. While the RTC convicted Sitco in Crim. Case No. 19457-MN, the CA
would later overturn his conviction in this case.

The Facts

In Crim. Case No. 19456-MN, Sitco and Bagtas were charged with drug pushing in an information reading:

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being private persons and without
authority of law, conspiring[,] confederating and mutually helping with one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver, in consideration of the sum of
P2,000.00+, most of which were boodle or fake money to a poseur buyer[,] two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with net weight of 108.40
grams and 105.84 grams respectively, which substance when subjected to chemistry
examination gave positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as
Shabu, a regulated [drug].[1]

The other informations for illegal possession of drugs that were separately filed against either Sitco or Bagtas
read as follows:

Crim. Case No. 19457-MN against Sitco (illegal possession)

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in [his] possession,
custody and control One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag, containing white crystalline
substance with net weight of 20.29 grams, which substance when subjected to chemistry
examination gave positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as
Shabu, a regulated drug.[2]

Crim. Case No. 19458-MN against Bagtas (illegal possession)

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag, containing white crystalline
substance with net weight of 1.31 grams, which substance when subjected to chemistry
examination gave positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as
Shabu, a regulated drug.
Crim. Case No. 19459-MN against Bagtas (illegal possession)
 That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control One (1) brick of suspected marijuana with net weight of 887.01 grams,
which is a regulated drug.[3]

During the arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a not guilty plea to all the charges. A joint
trial then ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

From the testimony of the prosecution witness, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Buan, the following version is
gathered:

Acting on a tip from an informant, Senior Inspector Gatlet of the Navotas Police Station ordered the
conduct of a buy-bust operation against accused-appellants, who were allegedly selling illegal drugs
on Espina St. in Navotas, Metro Manila. The team consisted of Buan, as poseur-buyer, a confidential
informant, and several police operatives as back-up. Marked money, consisting of four (4) PhP 500 bills for
a total of PhP 2,000 and boodles or fake money amounting to PhP 196,000, was prepared.

On May 11, 1998 at 11:15 in the evening, the team proceeded to a house in the target place where
Bagtas answered the knocking of the door. Thereupon, the confidential informant introduced him to Buan
who, then and there, expressed his desire to buy shabu. Bagtas replied that he did not have enough supply
of shabu, but manifested that marijuana was available. Buan, however, insisted on buying only shabu.[4]

Bagtas informed Buan that someone would be delivering more shabu. After waiting for a few minutes, a man,
who turned out to be Sitco, arrived. After the usual introductions, Sitco told Buan to follow him to his
motorcycle. He asked for the payment and took out a bag with two plastic bags of shabu inside. Buan
examined the contents, then identified himself as a police officer, and arrested Sitco. The back-up officers
joined the scene and frisked Sitco and Bagtas. Sitco was found to have in his possession a loaded caliber
.38 paltik revolver, the buy-bust money, and more shabu. Bagtas had in his possession marijuana
and shabu.[5]

The seized items were sent to Forensic Chemist Grace N. Eustaquio for laboratory examination and were
found positive for shabu and marijuana per Physical Science No. D-411-98.

During trial, Buan identified accused-appellants, the four (4) PhP 500-bill marked money used,
the shabu confiscated from both accused-appellants, and the marijuana seized from Bagtas. Buan explained
during his testimony that the boodle money placed in-between the genuine marked money the buy-bust team
used was unavailable as it had been confiscated by a policeman named Barlin when he himself (Buan) was
arrested for violating Sec. 27 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[6]

Version of the Defense

The evidence for the defense consists of the testimonies of Sitco and Bagtas.

Bagtas branded as fabricated the accusations against him and Sitco. According to him, on the day of the
alleged buy-bust operation, he was busy cleaning his motorcycle when, all of a sudden, policemen, led by
Buan, entered his house. Buan came armed with an armalite rifle and a .45 caliber pistol, but did not show
any document to justifying the police officers entry into his (Bagtas) home. The intruders pointed guns at
Bagtas, his common-law wife, his nephew, a certain Boy Macapagal, a certain Malou, a helper in his store,
a girl applying for work as a househelper, and Sitco, who was visiting Buan at the time. They were ordered
to lie face down as Bagtas house was being searched. He was told that he was a suspect in the killing of a
Navotas policeman named Ira. After the search was done, no illegal drugs were found. Yet the police officers
took his camera, tape recorder, and the cash from his stores sales. The pieces of jewelry they were wearing,
including his ring and necklace, were also confiscated. Afterwards, all of them were handcuffed and asked
to board the police officers vehicles. Two motorcycles belonging to Sitco and Bagtas were also seized.[7]
At the police headquarters, Buan and the other police officers demanded payment for the release of Bagtas
group. After some haggling, the group relented and paid some amount for their freedom. Sitco and Bagtas,
however, were detained. Instead, they were handcuffed to a steel post after being blindfolded by the
police.[8] Bagtas overheard the police officers dividing the jewelry among them. He was then beaten along
with Sitco to extort money for their release. The police officers eventually told them to pay a reduced amount,
which they still could not afford to give. Complaints were thus filed against them, with the police officers
manufacturing the evidence used by the prosecution. Bagtas ended his testimony with a declaration that he
was filing complaints against the police officers once he was released from detention.[9]
Sitco corroborated Bagtas testimony, adding that Buan had already been dismissed from the service. [10] He
testified that the police officers frisked him and confiscated his wallet, watch, ring, and motorbike. He was
told that they were suspects in the killing of a Navotas policeman. At the headquarters, he claimed being
tortured. Eventually, he fell asleep. When he woke up, he saw Buan with two others sniffing shabu. He
declined Buans invitation to join the session. The police officer likewise instructed him to produce PhP
100,000 for his release. Sitco informed Buan that he could not afford the amount. The next day, May 12,
Buan took some shabu from the cabinet and told Sitco that the charge against him would push through if he
did not pay. Sitco was also warned about the difficulty of posting bail once charged. Since he could not raise
the money, the police officers brought him to the prosecutors office for inquest where manufactured evidence
allegedly taken from him and Bagtas were shown to the fiscal.[11] On cross-examination, he admitted to having
been previously arrested for possession of shabu and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.[12]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of Buan and, mainly on that basis, convicted Bagtas and Sitco
of the crimes charged.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision[13] reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two accused,
namely Norman Sitco y de Jesus and Raymundo Bagtas y Caparas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offenses charged against them in these cases. In the absence of any mitigating
 or aggravating circumstances and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(where applicable), the two accused are hereby sentenced as follows:

1) In Crim. Case No. 19456-MN: for drug pushing under Section 15, Article III, RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659, involving more than 200 grams of shabu, for each of them to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and for each of them to pay a fine in the amount of
Php500,000.00;

2) In Crim. Case No. 19457-MN against Sitco only for illegal possession of 20.29 grams
of shabu under Section 16, Article III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, to a prison term
ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum, to SIX (6) years of prision
correccional, as maximum;

3) In Crim. Case No. 19458-MN against Bagtas only for illegal possession of 1.31 grams
of shabu under Section 16, Article III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, to a prison term
ranging from TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, as minimum, to ONE (1)
YEAR and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as maximum;

4) In Crim. Case No. 19459-MN against Bagtas only for illegal possession of 887.01 grams of
marijuana under Section 8, Article II, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, said accused is
sentenced to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

Since the death penalty was imposed, the case came to this Court on automatic review. In accordance
with People v. Mateo,[14] however, we ordered the transfer of the case to the CA for intermediate review.

Pending CA review of the case, or on May 5, 2006, Bagtas died at

the National Bilibid Prison Hospital.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

Before the CA, Sitco argued against the credibility of Buan as witness, the latter having been involved in
drug-related activities and was in fact dismissed from the service in March 1999. He also claimed that the
alleged drug sale involving him was improbable as no one would sell drugs to a stranger.

On October 19, 2006, the CA acquitted Sitco of illegal possession of drugs but affirmed his conviction of the
other offenses charged. It reasoned that Buans testimony was focused only on the two (2) plastic bags
of shabu which were the object of the buy-bust; no attempt was made to make a distinction between the said
bags and the additional bag of shabu supposedly recovered from Sitco when he was frisked. The quantum
of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for illegal possession of shabu was, thus, not met. However, as to
the other charges, the CA ruled that the factual findings of the trial court on Buans credibility must be
respected and upheld.

The fallo of the CAs Decision[15] reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision dated August 26,
1999 of the RTC of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72 in Criminal Case Nos. 19456-MN to
19459 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification ACQUITTING accused-appellant Norman
Sitco y De Jesus in Criminal Case No. 19457-MN for violation of Sec. 16, Art. II of RA 6425,
as amended by RA 7659, on the basis of reasonable doubt. The rest of the Joint Decision
stand[s].
 SO ORDERED.
On November 14, 2006, Sitco filed his Notice of Appeal of the appellate courts Decision.

On September 24, 2007, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The
People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested that it was submitting the case for
decision based on the records previously submitted. In his Supplemental Brief, Sitco submits that PO3 Buan
is not a credible witness given his arrest on drug charges and dismissal from the service.

The Issue

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF AN UNRELIABLE WITNESS.

The Ruling of the Court

We find sufficient compelling reasons to acquit the surviving accused-appellant Sitco.

Credibility of Buan as Witness

We start with the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Buan, whose testimony Sitco has assailed at
every turn. Sitco insists and with reason that Buan cannot competently make a plausible account of
something of which he himself was equally culpable.
Sitcos assault on the credibility of Buan is well-taken. As it were, Buans involvement as a police officer
in illegal drug activities makes him a polluted source and renders his testimony against Sitco and Bagtas
suspect, at best. It is like a pot calling a kettle black.

To be believed, testimonial evidence should come only from the mouth of a credible witness.[16] Given
his service record, Buan can hardly qualify as a witness worthy, under the limited confines of this case, of full
faith and credit. And lest it be overlooked, Buan is a rogue cop, having, per his own admission, been arrested
for indulging in a pot session, eventually charged and dismissed from the police service. [17] It would appear,
thus, that Buans had been a user. His arrest for joining a pot session only confirms this undesirable habit.

The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the well-settled rule that prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend
largely on the credibility of police buy-bust operators, and that the trial courts finding on the police-witness
credibility deserves respect. Juxtaposed with this rule, however, is the postulate that when confronted with
circumstances that would support a reasonable doubt in favor of the accused, then acquittal or the least
liability is in order. Buans involvement in drugs and his alleged attempt to extort money from appellant Sitco
in exchange for his freedom has put his credibility under a heavy cloud.

The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the
accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his conviction will leave
a permanent stain on his reputation and name.[18] As articulated in Rabanal v. People:

Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person
may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right
of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take a
more than casual consideration of every circumstances or doubt proving the innocence
of petitioner.[19] (Emphasis added.)

Chain of Custody

But over and above the credibility of the prosecutions lone witness as ground for acquittal looms the matter
of the custodial chain, a term which has gained traction in the prosecution of drug-related cases.

In prosecutions involving narcotics and other illegal substances, the substance itself constitutes part of the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[20] Of chief concern in drug cases then is the requirement that the prosecution prove that what was
seized by police officers is the same item presented in court. This identification, as we have held in the past,
must be established with moral certainty[21] and is a function of the rule on chain of custody. The chain of
custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed
through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police,
to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[22]

The procedure to be followed in adhering to the chain of custody requirements is found in Sec. 21 of RA
9165:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.
The trial court summarized the chain of custody over the evidence as follows:

x x x [Sitco] asked for the money and then took from a covered part of the motorcycle
a plastic bag inside [of] which were two plastic bags with shabu which Sitco gave to Buan.
Buan examined the same and upon being satisfied that it was really shabu, identified himself
 as a policeman and arrested Sitco. Buans companions then approached and Sitco and Bagtas
were frisked. Found from Sitco was a caliber .38 paltik revolver with six bullets, the buy-bust
money and additional shabu. The marijuana earlier shown to Buan by Bagtas was also
recovered along with the additional shabu found in the motorcycle of Bagtas which was parked
nearby.

The buy-bust shabu, the marijuana and the confiscated additional shabu from Sitco and
Bagtas were sent to a Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination (Exhibit A) and were found
to be positive for being shabu and marijuana, respectively, by examining PNP Forensic
Chemist Grace N. Eustaquio under an initial laboratory report (Exhibit B) and a final report
(Physical Science No. D-411-98) marked as Exhibit C.[23]

From this narration and an examination of the records, a number of disturbing questions arise as to the
identification and handling of the prohibited drugs seized. It is unclear at the outset whether Buan himself
made the inventory of the seized items. There is no detail as to who brought the specimens to the forensic
laboratory and who received it prior to the examination by the forensic chemist. It is also uncertain who took
custody of the specimens before they were presented as evidence in court. There are, thus, glaring gaps or
missing links in the chain of custody of evidence, raising doubt as to the identity of the seized items and
necessarily their evidentiary value. This broken chain of custody is especially significant given that what are
involved are fungible items that may be easily altered or tampered with.[24]

It cannot be over-emphasized that pertinent provisions of RA 9165 require that the seized illegal items shall,
after their inventory, be photographed in the presence of the drug dealer, representatives of media, the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation. The records do not
yield an indication that this particular requirement has been complied with.

The Court reiterates that, on account of the built-in danger of abuse that it carries, a buy-bust operation is
governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from the general law
procedures geared to ensure that the rights of persons under criminal investigation and of the accused facing
a criminal charge are safeguarded.[25] To reiterate, the chain of custody requirement is necessary in order to
remove doubts as to the identity of the evidence, by monitoring and tracking custody of the seized drugs from
the accused, until they reach the court. We find that the procedure and statutory safeguards prescribed for
compliance by drug enforcement agencies have not been followed in this case. A failure to comply with the
aforequoted Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165 implies a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish
the identity of the seized illegal items as part of the corpus delicti.[26]

Although the non-presentation of some of the witnesses who can attest to an unbroken chain of custody of
evidence may, in some instances, be excused, there should be a justifying factor for the prosecution to
dispense with their testimonies.[27] In People v. Denoman,[28] the Court discussed the saving mechanism
provided by Sec. 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
9165.[29] Denoman explains that the aforementioned provision contains a saving mechanism to ensure that
not every case of non-compliance will permanently prejudice the prosecutions case. The saving mechanism
applies when the prosecution recognizes and explains the lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures.[30] In
this case, the prosecution did not even acknowledge and discuss the reasons for the missing links in the
chain.
To reiterate, in prosecutions involving dangerous drugs, the substance itself constitutes the key part of
the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[31] Taken with the uncorroborated testimony of Buan, the broken chain of custody over
the marijuana and shabu in the instant case creates reasonable doubt on accused-appellants guilt.

In a string of cases,[32] we declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses
to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which
characterized the handling of the evidence before it was finally offered in court, fatally conflicts with every
proposition relative to the culpability of the accused.

As in People v. Partoza,[33] this case suffers from the failure of the prosecution witness to provide the details
establishing an unbroken chain of custody. In Partoza, the police officer testifying did not relate to whom the
custody of the drugs was turned over. The evidence of the prosecution likewise did not disclose the identity
of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending
presentation in court.

Given the prosecutions failure to abide by the rules on the chain of custody, the evidentiary presumption that
official duties have been regularly performed cannot apply to this case. This presumption, it must be
emphasized, is not conclusive. Not only is it rebutted by contrary proof, as here, but it is also inferior to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.[34] On this score, we have held that while an accuseds defense
engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not sufficient for a conviction that
the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to
overcome the presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. [35] This quantum
of evidence has not been met in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00038 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Norman Sitco y De Jesus is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONALYN CERVANTES y SOLAR
G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009

This is an appeal from the Decision dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00476 which affirmed the April 23, 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-181929 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 53 in Manila. The RTC found accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended.

The records show the following facts:

In an Information dated April 7, 2000, accused-appellant and three others were charged with violation
of Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425 (selling or distributing a regulated drug), allegedly committed as follows:

That, on or about April 5, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ISIDRO ARGUSON y ARENDELA, @ Tisoy,
MONALYN [CERVANTES] y SOLAR @ Mona, WILSON DEL MONTE @ Wilson and
RICHARD REQUIZ @ Richard, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for the
amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, sell,
deliver and give away to a poseur-buyer, FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE POINT
SEVENTY SIX (473.76) GRAMS OF METHAMPHETAMINE [HYDROCHLORIDE], commonly
known as shabu, a regulated drug, without authority of law or the corresponding license
therefor.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

Accused-appellant and her co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of William Todavia, PO3 Reynaldo Ramos of the
Philippine National Police Regional Office IV (PNP R-IV), and P/Sr. Inspector Lorna Tria, a forensic
chemical officer of the same regional office.

The Peoples version of the incident, as summarized by the CA in the decision now on appeal, is as
follows:

On April 5, 2000, the Regional Special Operations Group IV (RSOG-IV), based at Camp Vicente Lim
in Calamba, Laguna, received a tip from a deep penetration agent (DPA) about a group of drug traffickers
led by Isidro Arguson operating in Cavite. Acting on this bit of information, a team led by SPO2 Geronimo
Pastrana, PO3 Ramos, and PO2 Emerson Balosbalos arranged a buy-bust operation to be conducted at
Argusons rest house in Barangay Lambingan, Tanza, Cavite.[2] Upon arriving at the rest house, PO3 Ramos
and PO2 Balosbalos, acting as poseur-buyers, were introduced by the DPA to Arguson as the buyers of PhP
500,000 worth of shabu, simultaneously showing him a bundle of money. Since Arguson did not have enough
supply of shabu in the premises, he instructed the would-be-buyers to follow him to Pasay City. For the
purpose, he hired a vehicle owned by Todavia.

At about three oclock in the afternoon of that day, in front of the McDonalds branch
in P. Ocampo St., Pasay City,[3] Arguson instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for someone who will come
out from the nearby Estrella St. Very much later, accused-appellant emerged from Estrella St. and
approached PO3 Ramos to check if he still had the money. After being shown the money bundle, accused-
appellant left, only to return a few minutes later this time with Arguson, Wilson Del Monte, who was holding
a black plastic bag, and Richard Requiz. Arguson then took from Del Monte the bag, later found to contain
473.76 grams of shabu packed in six small self-sealing transparent bags, and handed it to PO2 Balosbalos,
who in turn gave him the bundle of boodle money. Finally, PO3 Ramos gave the pre-arranged signal to
indicate the consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. Accused-appellant and her
scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim.

The black plastic bag containing the six small self-sealing bags of white crystalline substance was
likewise taken to Camp Vicente Lim where PO3 Ramos prepared the booking sheets and arrest reports and
the request for a qualitative analysis of the seized items. Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief Inspector
(C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the standard physical and chemical examinations on the specimen
referred to her.

On April 6, 2000, C/I Geronimo prepared and completed Chemistry Report No. D-115800 on the
crystalline substance. Per her report, the substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.

Apart from the witnesses affidavits and other documents, the prosecution, in the hearing of March 4,
2002, offered in evidence the following exhibits,[4]inclusive of its sub markings, which, as may be expected,
were objected to by the defense: (a) Exhibit B Chemistry Report No. D-115800 prepared by C/I Geronimo;
(b) Exhibit C Memorandum of RSOG-IV dated April 5, 2000 to the Chief, Laboratory Service, requesting for
qualitative analysis of the contents of the six transparent plastic bags; (c) Exhibits D and D-1 to D-6 Black
plastic bag with markings; and six (6) self-sealing transparent bags allegedly containing the
confiscated shabu; and (d) Exhibit F Receipt of property seized signed by PO2 Balosbalos and by Todavia
and PO3 Ramos as witnesses.

The CA decision likewise summarized the defenses account of what purportedly transpired, to wit:

Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house in Estrella
Street near F.B. Harrison on April 4, 2000, her youngest child asked her to go to [McDonalds],
Vito Cruz branch, to buy ice cream. When they arrived thereat at about 4:30 in the afternoon,
there was a commotion going on in front of the restaurant. She then saw a woman who alighted
from a nearby van and pointed her out to her companions, one of whom [was] an old man
 boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold of her child. Thereafter, two (2) younger
male persons, whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and REQUIZ, were also boarded
into the same van. They were taken to a cemetery where another vehicle came and took them
to Camp Vicente Lim, where she allegedly met ARGUSON for the first time.

On the other hand, accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking boy around
Vito Cruz and that on the day in question, while he was watching a vehicle near [McDonalds],
Vito Cruz branch, a commotion happened near his post. As he moved backward from where
he stood, he was suddenly approached by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him
inside a vehicle together with CERVANTES and REQUIZ, whom he did not know prior to that
incident.

For his part, accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in question, he was
riding a borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center, passing by F.B. Harrison St., when
he bumped a parked van, wherefrom a man alighted and cursed him, saying pulis ako wag
kang aalis dyan[!] The man left and when he returned, accused CERVANTES was with him.
Thereafter, he was boarded into the van together with the other accused.[5]

While not stated in the CA decision, Del Monte testified, like accused-appellant, that he was taken to
a cemetery somewhere in Cavite where the arresting officers lingered for an hour before bringing him
to Camp Vicente Lim.[6] These testimonies remained uncontroverted. Arguson died during the course of the
trial resulting in the dismissal of the case against him.[7]

On April 23, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and Requiz but finding accused-
appellant guilty as charged and meting upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fallo of the RTC
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Finding accused MONALYN CERVANTES Y SOLAR GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended, and is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine in the amount
of Php500,000.00; and

2. Finding the prosecutions evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of accused

WILSON DEL MONTE and RICHARD REQUIZ beyond reasonable doubt, and who
are hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.[8]

On May 18, 2004, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, pursuant to which the RTC forwarded
the records of the case to this Court.
 Conformably with People v. Mateo,[9] the Court directed the transfer of the case to the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476. Before the appellate court, accused-appellant urged her
acquittal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, particularly stating that the forensic chemist who actually
conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens allegedly recovered from the accused was not
presented in court x x x [and] hence, there was no clear identification of the contents of the confiscated
sachets.[10]

By its Decision[11] dated July 19, 2007, the CA, finding the elements necessary for the prosecution of
illegal sale of drugs[12] to have sufficiently been satisfied and the identification of accused-appellant having
been established, affirmed her conviction.

The CA rejected accused-appellants lament about one Inspector Tria testifying on the chemistry report she
did not prepare. As the appellate court stressed, C/I Geronimos forensic report carries the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions [and] the entries thereon x x x are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. The CA added the observation that absent any evidence overturning the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions, the probative value and admissibility of the forensic report
prepared by C/I Geronimo, who had resigned from the service, must be upheld even if she did not personally
testify in court.

On August 17, 2007, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the CA affirmatory decision.

On March 24, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The
parties manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already submitted, thus
veritably reiterating their principal arguments raised in the CA, which on the part of accused-appellant would
be:

THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF

THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION.
For its part, the People, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that the prosecution has
established that the buy-bust transaction took place, has identified accused-appellant and her complicity in
Argusons illegal trade, and has presented the corpus delicti, as evidence.

The Courts Ruling

After a circumspect study, the Court resolves to acquit accused-appellant, considering certain
circumstances engendering reasonable doubt as to her guilt.
 We start off with the most basic, the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness, PO3 Ramos,
who identified accused-appellant and described her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. In the witness box,
PO3 testified that, after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who will come out from the street whence
Arguson would enter, accused-appellant emerged from said street, checked on the purchase money, asked
the operatives to wait, and later re-appeared. What happened next is captured by the following answers of
PO3 Ramos to the prosecutors questions:

Q: What did you see when Cervantes already returned? A: When Monalyn return the one
holding the plastic bag was Wilson, sir.

Q: Wilson? A: Yes, sir, together with Richard, Wilson, Arguson, they were four (4).

Atty. Cruz: Your honor, may we move to strike that out x x x.

Fiscal Formoso: Thats part of the answer x x x now, when all these accused here return with
Monalyn Cervantes, what happen[ed]?

A: Arguson took the plastic bag from Wilson, sir and handed it to Balosbalos, Balosbalos gave
Arguson the boodle money while I flash the signal x x x then we apprehended them.[13]
As may be noted, PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte was among the four who emerged
with Arguson from a street. Without hesitation, PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one holding the
plastic bag allegedly containing the prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and handed it over to
PO2 Balosbalos. There is no suggestion that accused-appellant, while at the crime scene, ever handled the
merchandise or its container. Yet, the trial court acquitted Requiz and Del Monte, but convicted accused-
appellant, stating: Clearly, accused Monalyn Cervantes complicity with accused Isidro Arguson in the sale
of shabu has been established by the testimony of PO3 Ramos.[14] But two paragraphs later, the RTC went
on to write:

x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was initially held by accused Del Monte
and then taken from him by accused Arguson, there is no other evidence which can support
the charge of conspiracy with Arguson and Cervantes x x x. The court does not find the
evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as
charged. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag for Arguson, it could have been
possible that he was merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag.[15]

Before us then is a situation where two personsaccused-appellant, a laundry woman; and Del
Monte, a car park boy, in the company of the ostensible pusher, Arguson, during the actual buy bustare
being indicted, on the basis alone of the testimony of a witness, with confederating with each and several
others to sell shabu. The overt acts performed by accused-appellant, as indicia of conspiracy, consisted of
allegedly verifying whether the poseur-buyer still had the purchase money, disappearing from the scene and
then coming back with the principal player. On the other hand, Del Monte came accompanying Arguson
carrying the drug-containing plastic bag no less. As between the two acts performed, carrying the bag would
relatively have the more serious implication being in itself a punishable act of possession of regulated
drugs. Both offered the defenses of denial and instigation, each testifying that they just happened to be near
or passing by McDonalds at about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4, 2000 when they were apprehended. But
the trial court, in its observation that it could have been possible that [Del Monte] was merely asked by x x x
Arguson to carry the bag, extended to Del Monte the benefit of the doubt, a benevolence denied to accused-
appellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. Any reasonable mind might ask: Why the contrasting
treatment? Why consider PO3 Ramos as a highly credible eyewitness as against accused-appellant, but an
unreliable one as against Del Monte, when both accused are complete strangers to the policeman?

To paraphrase an unyielding rule, if the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations,
one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.[16]

But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule, a reversal of the appealed decision is
indicated on another but more compelling ground. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution, having failed
to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance, is deemed to have also
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants guilt. We shall explain.

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and
seller, the object and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment for it. Implicit in these
cases is first and foremost the identity and existence, coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded
prohibited substance, this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus[17] delicti[18] of the crime of
possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug.[19] There can be no such crime when nagging doubts
persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was what was recovered
from, or sold by, the accused.[20] Essential, therefore, in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty. This means that on top of the key elements of possession or sale,
the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in
court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict. And as we stressed in Malillin v. People, the chain of custody requirement performs this function
in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[21] So it is
that in a slew of cases the Court has considered the prosecutions failure to adequately prove that the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one supposedly seized from the offending
seller or possessor as ground for acquittal.[22]

Sec. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, or the Guidelines on the
Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and
Laboratory Equipment, defines chain of custody, thusly:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody [was] made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.[23]
 As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to
it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain.[24] The need for the punctilious observance of the chain-of-custody
process in drug-related cases is explained in Malillin in the following wise:

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really
identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness
has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence
is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In
other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout
regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule.

xxxx

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable
as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any
of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration
or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar
evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence,
in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving
objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a
chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that
the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with.[25] (Emphasis added.)

As the Court distinctly notes in this case, of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had
physical custody of the seized regulated items, only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of
identifying the evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not indicate how he and his companions, right
after the buy bust, handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. He did not name the duty desk officer at
Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording.
What is on record is Exhibit C, which, as earlier described, is a memorandum [26] PO3 Ramos
prepared[27]dated April 5, 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief, PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory Service,
submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust group.
Needless to stress, the unnamed person who delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the
laboratory were no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which they handled the specimen or
whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual testing. And C/I Geronimo, the analyzing
forensic chemist, was not also presented. Then, too, no one testified on how the specimen was cared after
following the chemical analysis. As the Court observed aptly in People v. Ong, [T]hese questions should be
answered satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way.
Otherwise, the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable
doubt.[28]

It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the custodial chain. And she
did not as she could not, even if she wanted to, testify on whether or not the specimen turned over for analysis
and eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same substance received from Arguson.

Given the foregoing perspective, it is fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with the procedures
in the custody of seized prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation, as embodied in Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA
9165, i.e., the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall:

immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the [drug] in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.[29]

In this case, no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the
seized articles at the crime scene. PO3 Ramos admitted as much, thus:

Q. Now, you were able to arrest all the accused here, after their arrest, what did you
do? A. After informing their rights and the reason why we arrest them we brought them
immediately to our office in Canlubang.

xxxx

Q. Now, what about this Shabu, who was in possession of this Shabu x x x when you
left the place and proceeded to Canlubang? A. PO2 Balosbalos, sir.

xxxx

Q. Now, when you reach your office, what did you do there? A. I made the booking
sheet and I requested for their medical/physical examination x x x.[30]

Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. Withal, there is no
reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the time the police seized the black
bag in P. Ocampo St. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the PNP R-IV headquarters
in Canlubang, Laguna. In net effect, a heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the integrity and necessarily the
evidentiary value of the seized items. The prosecution cannot, thus, rightfully assert that the six sachets
seized from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in court in proving
the corpus delicti.

Adding a negative dimension to the prosecutions case is the non-presentation of C/I Geronimo and
the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared. While
Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the regular
course of her duties, she, Inspector Tria, was incompetent to state that the specimen her former colleague
analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis.

To be sure, the Court, notably in People v. Bandang, has held that the non-presentation of the forensic
chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. In it, the accused persons were convicted
of illegal sale of shabu even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory report was
not presented. Thus, we wrote:

x x x In People vs. Uy, we ruled that a forensic chemist is a public officer and as such,
his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and
duties. Corollarily, under Section 44 of Rule 130, x x x entries in official records made in the
performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Omeros
reports that the seven sachets of white crystalline substance were positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu are, therefore, conclusive in the absence of
evidence proving the contrary, as in this case.

Second, it must be stressed that Atty. Enriquez raises his objection to the Initial
Laboratory Report and Chemistry Report No. D-1585-00 only now. He should have objected
to their admissibility at the time they were being offered. Otherwise, the objection shall be
considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent
and admissible evidence. The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the admissibility of certain
documents x x x cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[31] (Emphasis added.)

It should be pointed out, however, that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different backdrop
where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and tested positive for shabu and
presented in court, implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout, a
circumstance not obtaining in this case; (2) there was a compelling reason for not presenting the examining
forensic chemist, i.e., the parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been identified and
examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu. In this case, C/I
Geronimos resignation from the service is not, standing alone, a justifying factor for the prosecution to
dispense with her testimony; and (3) accused Bandang, et al. did not raise any objection to the chemical
report during trial, unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Trias competency to testify on
the Geronimo chemical report.
 At any rate, Inspector Trias testimony on, and the presentation of, the chemistry report in question
only established, at best, the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the results of the chemistry
analysis.[32] It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated substance
from the time of seizure of the evidence. In this regard, the Court in effect stated in Malillin that unless the
state can show by records or testimony that the integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by
accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into the
possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory,[33] then the prosecution cannot maintain
that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. So it was that in People v.
Kimura the Court said that in establishing the corpus delicti, proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that
unwavering exactitude[34] be observed, a demand which may be addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody
rule. Evidently, the prosecution has not proved that the substance seized in front of the McDonalds was the
same substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime, which failure
produces a serious doubt as to accused-appellants guilt.[35]

Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP personnel at Camp Vicente
Lim. To a point, the reliance on the presumptive regularity is tenable. This presumption is, however,
disputable and may be overturned by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty; [36] any
taint of irregularity vitiates the performance and negates the presumption. And as earlier discussed, the buy
bust team committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its operation,
the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. The Court need not belabor this matter anew.

Lest it be overlooked, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty always yields
to the presumption of innocence and does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.[37] We held in one
case:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for
affirming accused-appellants conviction because, [f]irst, the presumption is precisely just thata
mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded
as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.[38]

For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt, she must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability. The facts and the law of the case call for this
kind of disposition.

But a final consideration. The Court is cognizant of the campaign of the police and other drug
enforcement agencies against the growing drug menace in the country. Unfortunately, their best efforts,
particularly successful honest-to-goodness buy-bust operations, sometimes still end up in the acquittal of
illegal drug manufacturers, distributors, pushers and/or lesser players, even when nabbed in flagrante, simply
because drug enforcement operatives tend to compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized
illegal items. This aberration is oftentimes in turn attributable to the unfamiliarity of police operatives of extant
rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs. This is, thus, an
opportune time to remind all concerned about these rules and procedures and the guiding jurisprudence. And
to put things in the proper perspective, non-compliance with the legal prescriptions of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, is, as we made abundantly clear in People v. Sanchez, not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution of drug-related cases; that police procedures may still have some lapses. These lapses,
however, must be recognized, addressed, and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved by the apprehending
officer or team.

To be forewarned is to be forearmed.

WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476, affirming that of the
RTC, Branch 53 in Manila which found her guilty of violating Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425 and imposed upon
her the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of PhP 500,000, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes y Solar is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt
and is accordingly immediately RELEASED from custody unless she is being lawfully held for some lawful
cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court
the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JHON-JHON ALEJANDRO y DELA CRUZ @ NOGNOG
G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011

We resolve in this appeal the challenge to the May 31, 2006 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01251. The CA affirmed the May 14, 2004 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 231, Pasay City, finding appellant Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y dela Cruz (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and imposing on him the penalty of life imprisonment.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC,
under an Information that states:

That on or about the 1st day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver
0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), adangerous drug.[3] (emphases in
the original)

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4] During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on the following:

PRE-TRIAL ORDER

xxxx

III. Evidence of the Prosecution:

A. Testimonial (witnesses) -

xxxx

B. Documentary

Exhibit A - Affidavit of Arrest

Exhibit B - Buy-bust Money
Exhibit C - Booking and Information Sheet
Exhibit D - Request for Laboratory Examination
Exhibit E - Physical Science Report
No. D-1331-02

C. Real Evidence x x x

Exhibit F - subject specimen

xxxx

VI. Stipulation of Facts (Including those admitted or undisputed): The accused with counsel
and the Trial Prosecutor have agreed on the following:

Exhibits C, D, & E admitted their existence only but not as to the source

xxxx
 This pre-trial order shall control the course of the trial in this case, unless modified by the
Court to prevent manifest injustice. The trial prosecutor as well as the accused and counsel
have signed this pre-trial order to attest to the correctness thereof and their conformity thereto
which may accordingly be used in evidence in this case.[5][emphases ours]

Thus, the defense admitted the existence of Exhibits C (Booking and Information Sheet), D (Request
for Laboratory Examination) and E (Physical Science Report No. D-1331-02). The parties also agreed, during
the pre-trial, to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Lourdeliza M.
Gural.

The prosecution presented, as its witnesses, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Jesus Tan and Police
Officer 1 (PO1) Timothy Mengote. The appellant and Reggie Morilla took the witness stand for the defense.

The evidence for the prosecution established that in the afternoon of September 1, 2002, SPO1 Tan was in
the office of the District Drug Enforcement Group, Southern Police District, Taguig, Metro Manila, when a
confidential informant called and told him about the illegal drug activities of the appellant, alias Nog-nog.
Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Mariano Fegarido conducted a briefing, and then dispatched Senior Police
Officer 2 (SPO2) Nilo Banzuela, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)Alberto Sangalang, Police Officer 3 (PO3)
Carlos Cachapero, SPO1 Tan, and PO1 Mengote, to meet with the informant.[6]

At around 5:00 p.m., the police met with the informant at the Pio Del Pilar Elementary School. Thereafter,
SPO1 Tan, PO1 Mengote and the informant went to M. Dela Cruz Street in Pasay City to conduct a
surveillance.[7] There, the informant pointed to a person standing at the corner of Mary Luz Street and M.
Dela Cruz Street, and identified him as the appellant.[8] They observed the appellant for about half an hour,
and saw that there were people approaching him. They also observed that there was an exchange of goods
between the appellant and the people who approached him.[9] The police thereafter returned to the station
where they underwent another briefing and planned an entrapment operation. Under the plan, PO1 Mengote
was designated as the poseur-buyer.[10]

SPO2 Banzuela, SPO1 Tan, SPO1 Sangalang, PO1 Mengote, PO3 Cachapero and the informant
returned to M. Dela Cruz Street to conduct the buy-bust operation. When they arrived at the place at
around 6:00 p.m., they saw the appellant sitting in front of a sari-sari store. The informant introduced PO1
Mengote to the appellant as a buyer (i.e., a shabu scorer). The appellant asked, Magkano ba? PO1 Mengote
answered, Halagang piso. PO1 Mengote then gave the one hundred peso marked money to the appellant.
The appellant, in turn, pulled out a plastic sachet from his right pocket and handed it to PO1 Mengote. Upon
receiving the plastic sachet, PO1 Mengote made the pre-arranged signal (i.e., wiped his face with a towel) to
his companions. Immediately, the other members of the buy-bust team approached the appellant. They
introduced themselves as police officers, recovered the buy-bust money from the appellant, and arrested
him. They then brought him and the confiscated items to the police station.[11] At the police station, they
forwarded the seized items to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory where they were
examined by P/Insp. Gural.[12]
The laboratory examination, conducted by P/Insp. Gural on the confiscated specimen, yielded the following
result:

PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. D-1331-02

xxxx

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

A One (1) small brown staple wire-sealed evidence envelope with signature markings
containing one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings TM-1-010902
containing 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance and marked as A-1.

xxxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE

result to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A-1 contains Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[13]

In his defense, the appellant submitted a different version of events. He testified that at around 6:00
p.m. of September 1, 2002, he was in front of his grandmothers store on Mary Luz Street, Pasay City, when
eight (8) policemen arrived. PO1 Mengote and SPO1 Tan approached and asked him about the whereabouts
of a certain Terio. When he replied that he did not know where Terio was, the police brought him to the Pio
Del Pilar Elementary School in MakatiCity[14] from where the police apparently received a text message
informing them that Terio was in Pasay City. The police and the appellant returned to Mary Luz Street, and
entered a house owned by Terio. Inside, they saw its occupant, Enrico Yatco. The police searched the house
for about half an hour. Afterwards, they brought the appellant and Enrico to the Sothern Police District. [15] At
the police station, PO1 Mengote and SPO1 Tan showed six (6) pieces of plastic sachets to the appellant and
forced him to admit ownership.[16]

Reggies testimony was summarized by the RTC as follows:

REGGIE MORILLA, the caretaker of the store owned by the accuseds grandmother,
testified that he has been living with the family of the accused for three (3) years already. The
family of the accused is located at 51 Mary Luz St., M. dela Cruz, Pasay City. On September
1, 2002, he was inside the store while the accused was standing outside when suddenly he
heard a commotion. So he peeped through a hole in the store and saw two policemen in
civilian attire handcuffing the accused. He asked assistance from his neighbors. Then he saw
the accused being taken out of Mary Luz St. Later, they returned the accused and they led the
accused inside a house and then after thirty minutes, he was brought out and was boarded
inside an owner type jeep.[17]

The RTC, in its decision of May 14, 2004, found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. The RTC also ordered the appellant
to pay a P500,000.00 fine.[18]
The records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to our ruling in People
v. Efren Mateo y Garcia,[19] we endorsed the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision.[20] The CA held that the appellant and his counsel entered into a
stipulation of facts whereby they agreed on the admissibility of the request for laboratory examination of the
submitted specimen and on the findings of P/Insp. Gural. Hence, they cannot be allowed to question, on
appeal, the identity and integrity of the plastic sachet of shabu seized from the appellant by members of the
entrapment team. The CA added that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the
person who handed the plastic sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer.[21]

The CA further held that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
in the absence of any evidence of improper motive on their part. It, likewise, disregarded the appellants
defense of denial, as it was unsupported by reliable corroborative evidence.[22]

In his brief, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite
the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the integrity of the seized
item had been compromised due to the failure of the apprehending police to mark it.[23]

The Office of the Solicitor General counters with the argument that the appellant cannot now question the
identity and integrity of the specimen confiscated from him as he already entered into a stipulation
regarding the admissibility of the request for laboratory examination and on the result of this examination. In
addition, the appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely testify against
him.[24]

THE COURTS RULING

We resolve to ACQUIT the appellant, for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence
by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In doing so, the prosecution must rest its case on its own
merits and cannot merely rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required
quantum of evidence, the defense does not even need to present any evidence in its behalf; the presumption
of innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted.[25]

Reasonable Doubt on the Corpus Delicti

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165
are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been
committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.[26] In prosecutions involving narcotics,
the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and proof of its existence is vital to
sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[27] To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the seized drug, the evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in
court is the very same illicit drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for drug
pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.[28]

a. The Chain of Custody Rule and the Marking Requirement

Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, defines
chain of custody as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.

In Junie Malillin y Lopez v. People,[29] we explained the importance of establishing the chain of
custody of the confiscated drugs, in this wise:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or
when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In
other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering - without
regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in
the application of the chain of custody rule.[30]

Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking means the placing by the apprehending
officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized.[31] Long before Congress
passed R.A. No. 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the
seized drugs casts reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.[32] Marking after seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal
proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.[33]
 In the present case, the records do not show that the apprehending team marked the seized items
with their initials immediately upon confiscation. In Sanchez,[34] we explained that consistency with the chain
of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. We clarified in People v. Manuel Resurreccion[35] that
[m]arking upon immediate confiscation does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police
station or office of the apprehending team. In the present case, the testimonies of the apprehending officers
do not indicate that they ever marked the seized items, either at the place of seizure or at the police station.
How the police could have omitted such a basic and vital procedure in the initial handling of the seized drugs
truly baffles us. Going back to what we earlier discussed, succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the
markings as reference. If at the first instance or opportunity, the apprehending team did not mark the seized
item/s, then there is nothing to identify it later on as it passes from one hand to another.

Curiously, the seized item already bore the markings TM-1-010902 when it was examined by the
forensic chemist. In the absence, however, of specifics on how, when and where this marking was done, and
who witnessed the marking procedure, we cannot accept this marking as compliance with the chain of
custody requirement required by the law. In People v. Ranilo Dela Cruz y Lizing,[36] the Court reversed the
accuseds conviction for the failure of the police to mark the plastic sachet in the presence of the accused or
his representatives. People v. Zaida Kamad y Ambing,[37] likewise, resulted in an acquittal for the failure of
the prosecution to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked.

The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the confiscated drug from PO1 Mengote to
the police station. To recall, after PO1 Mengote allegedly received the plastic sachet from the appellant, he
made the pre-arranged signal to his companions. The other members of the buy-bust team approached the
appellant, introduced themselves as police officers, and arrested him. Thereafter, they brought him and the
confiscated item to the police station.

Notably, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person who took custody
of the seized item at the police station. Although the request for laboratory examination was signed by P/Supt.
Fegarido, the Chief of the District Drug Enforcement Group, we cannot assume that he was the person who
received the seized item from PO1 Mengote, in the absence of any testimony proving such fact.

For the succeeding links in the chain of custody, the evidence shows that the confiscated item was
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory by one SPO2 Pepano, and then received by a certain Relos. P/Insp.
Gural examined the submitted specimen, and found it positive for the presence of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. As previously discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the confiscated item after
it left the possession of PO1 Mengote. The police did not only fail to mark the specimen immediately upon
seizure; it likewise failed to identify the police officer to whose custody the confiscated item was given at the
police station. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that the item seized from the appellant was the same
as that presented for laboratory examination and, later on, presented in court.
 That the defense admitted the existence of the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. C), the Request
for Laboratory Examination (Exh. D) and Physical Science Report No. D-1331-02 (Exh. E) during the pre-
trial did not amount to an admission of the identity of the seized specimen. What the admissions proved were
merely the existence and authenticity of the request for laboratory examination and the result of this
examination, not the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of evidence. Simply put, the admission
regarding the existence of Exhibits C, D and E has no bearing on the question of whether the specimen
submitted for chemical analysis was the same as that seized from the appellant. [38] To interpret the
stipulations as an admission that the appellant was the source of the specimen would be contrary to the pre-
trial order (stating that Exhibits C, D and E were admitted as to their existence only and not as to the source);
it would also bind the appellant to an unceremonious withdrawal of his plea of not guilty.

In like manner, the stipulation during the pre-trial regarding the non-presentation of the forensic
chemist, P/Insp. Gural, merely covers the handling of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and the result
of the examination, but not the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the
forensic chemist and after it left his possession.[39]

b. Non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph 1,

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165 give us the procedures that the apprehending team should
observe in the handling of seized illegal drugs in order to preserve their identity and integrity as evidence.As
indicated by their mandatory terms, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is essential and the
prosecution must show compliance in every case.[40]

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reads:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

This provision is further elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
 The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the apprehending or buy-bust
team followed the outlined procedure of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. PO1 Mengote narrated the
police operation as follows:

PROSECUTOR BERNABE SOLIS:

Q: So [were] you able to locate him afterwards?

PO1 TIMOTHY MENGOTE:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where was he at that time?

A: At that time, he was in front of a sari-sari store or M. dela Cruz St., sir.

Q: What was he doing at that time?

A: He was just sitting there at that time, sir.

xxxx

Q: What did you do next?

A: When we saw him, our asset introduced me to him as a shabu scorer sir.

xxxx

Q: So what was the reply of the accused?

A: He said, Magkano ba? and I answered, Halagang piso sir.

Q: What does Piso mean?

A: P100.00 worth, sir.

Q: After having conveyed your intention to buy P100.00 worth of shabu, what did the
accused do, if any?

A: When I had given him the buy bust money, he pulled x x x the shabu out of his right
pocket pants, sir.

xxxx

Q: What did he do with the shabu which he pulled out of his right pocket?

A: He handed over the stuff to me, sir.

Q: And after this exchange of goods, what did you do if any?

A: I executed the pre-arranged signal by wiping my face with a face towel, sir.

xxxx

Q: And did your colleagues respond to the pre-arranged signal?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

 A: I properly introduced myself to Jhon Jhon as a police officer, sir.

xxxx

Q: Upon the arrival of your back-up team, what happened next?

A: They likewise introduced themselves as police officers and we recovered the buy
bust money which was taken from his right hand sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next?

A: We apprised him of his rights, arrested him and brought him to our office sir. [41]

From these exchanges, clearly it appears that the apprehending team did not photograph or conduct
a physical inventory of the item seized, whether at the place of seizure or at the police station. The non-
compliance by the apprehending team with the photograph and physical inventory requirements under R.A.
No. 9165 and its IRR was also evident in the testimony of another member of the buy-bust teams, PO1 Tan,
who corroborated PO1 Mengotes testimony on material points. Notably, even the Joint Affidavit of Arrest[42] of
the members of the entrapment team made no mention of any inventory or photograph.

Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974. [43] Section 1 of
this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to
immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives,
who shall be required to sign and be given copies of the inventory.

After the passage of R.A. No. 9165, the Court did not waver in ensuring that the prescribed procedures
in the handling of the seized drugs were observed. In People v. Rosemarie R. Salonga,[44] we acquitted the
accused for the failure of the police to inventory and photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed the
accuseds conviction in Gutierrez,[45] for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and photograph the
seized items without justifiable grounds. People v. Cantalejo[46] also resulted in an acquittal because no
inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.

We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v. Erlinda Capuno y Tison,[47] People
v. Jay Lorena y Labag,[48] and People v. ArnoldMartinez y Angeles, et al.[49]

Lest the chain of custody rule be misunderstood, we clarify that non-compliance with the prescribed
procedural requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid;
the seizure may still be held to be valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-
compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly
preserved. These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not even
attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the police to follow the prescribed procedures in the
handling of the seized items. As we held in People v. Ronaldo De Guzman y Danzil,[50] the failure to follow
the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. The justifiable
ground for the non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The Court cannot presume what these grounds are
or that they even exist.

No Presumption of Regularity in
the Performance of Official Duties

In convicting the appellant of the crime charged, both the RTC and the CA relied on the evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. However, this presumption is not conclusive
and cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The presumption of regularity,
it must be emphasized, obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. Where
the official act in question is irregular on its face, no presumption of regularity can arise. [51] Our declaration
in People v. Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta[52] is particularly instructive:

It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official

duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The
presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the
fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as
provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an
adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. There is indeed merit in the contention that
where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members of the
buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed
their duty, but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the conduct of police
duty was irregular. People v. Dulay and People v. Ganenas in fact both suggest that the
presumption of regularity is disputed where there is deviation from the regular performance of
duty. Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police
duty is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.[53]

In the present case, the procedural lapses by the apprehending team in the handling of the seized items from
their failure to mark it immediately upon confiscation, to their failure to inventory and photograph it in the
presence of the accused, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official, without offering any justifiable ground effectively negated the presumption of
regularity.

Conclusion

In fine, the totality of evidence presented in the present case does not support the appellant's
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. The prosecutions failure to comply with Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act compromised the identity of the item
seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. In accordance with
the constitutional mandate that the guilt of the appellant must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, we hold
for failure to establish the required quantum of evidence that the presumption of innocence must prevail and
acquittal should follow as a matter of right.[54]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 31, 2006 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01251. Appellant Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y dela Cruz is
hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has
taken to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.