REGO vs. COMELEC Case Digest GREGO vs.

COMELEC 274 SCRA 481, 1997 Facts: On

October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, private
respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than
the Supreme Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila
in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and assumed office. He was successfully re-
elected in 1992 and 1995. It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition
on the ground that he is disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said section,
those removed from office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified to run for any
elective local position. Issue: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992? Held: The
Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section
40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reason for the Court to depart
therefrom. That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates
removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from
applying the law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage.

MECANO vs.COA G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992 FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the
NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization
expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. In a memorandum to the NBI
Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is
entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty.
When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or
municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any
period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months,
and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance,
necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case
contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be. xxx xxx xxx In case of
sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the
Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioners
illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of
Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioners claim. However, then Undersecretary
of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements
of the Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987. Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy
of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter. Director Lim transmitted
anew Mecanos claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon
forwarded petitioners claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA
Chairman however, denied petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had
been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however,
that the claim may be filed with the Employees Compensation Commission, considering that the
illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director
Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires.
Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the RAC HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition;
respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to petitioners claim for benefits NO The
question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing
provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof,
that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all
others are implied repeals In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with
the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This
provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of
1987 which reads: Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The
question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended
to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal. There
are two categories of repeal by implication. 1. Where provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. 2. 2. If the later act covers the whole subject of
the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover
the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which
are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the
public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and
still others. According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear
is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration,
organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the
government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. Moreover, the COA
failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are
in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on
sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the
Administrative Code of 1987. Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to
have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. NOTES: 1. the COA would have Us consider
that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the
same section had been repealed. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the
1987 Code, which states: WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by
a new Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and xxx xxx xxx It argues, in
effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of 1987. This
contention is untenable. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as
that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since
the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is
a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 2. Regarding COA contention that recovery
under this subject section (699) shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees
Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter
II, Title II (dealing on Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the
Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that the payment of compensation
under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS
or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.

Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992) 16 Apr ANTONIO A. MECANO,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. Ponente: CAMPOS, JR. FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on
Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No.
292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.
Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by
Secretary Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand,
strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or
supplant in its entirety the RAC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987
repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. HELD: NO.
Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioners claim for benefits.
RATIO: Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing
on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one.
The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later
act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue
so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. It is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws
on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should
be read in pari materia.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 83896 194 SCRA 317 February 22, 1991
Petitioner: Civil Liberties Union Respondent: Executive Secretary FACTS: Consolidated
petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July
25, 1987. EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant
Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in addition to their primary positions.
Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive officials
of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two (2)
positions in the government and government corporations and receive corresponding
compensation thereof. Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no
case shall any officer hold not more than two (2) positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary. Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's
unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President
may be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of
Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.
Constitutional provisions: Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet and their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, directly or
indirectly, during their tenure, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office. Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. ISSUE: Whether or not EO
No. 284 is constitutional. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. It has been held that in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed. The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to
prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self
enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust. The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned
are in direct contradiction to the express mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec
13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall reign
supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest
law of the land. Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result,
DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo
Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their
offices and employment. WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set
aside. Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: 1987 Constitution; Supremacy of the Constitution (Textbook:
Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita) Statutory Construction: CH 11: Constitutional Construction
(Textbook: Agpalo, Professor: Atty. Bathan)