DECISIONS AND

OPINIONS DECIDED BY
JUSTICE LUCAS
BERSAMIN
(2009 2015)
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit

BAR OPERATIONS 2017

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2009
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE
EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF
THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
(AM. No. 09-6-9-SC | 19 August 2009)
FACTS: In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to
the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator
of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote :
The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for
your 1rst. Indorsement to pay a nominal fee of Php
5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection action of 10
million pesos, thus giving us access to the Justice
System previously denied by an up-front excessive court
fee.
The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to
the need of complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005
and Rule 141 that reserves this "privilege" to indigent
persons. While judges are appointed to interpret the law,
this type of law seems to be extremely detailed with
requirements that do not leave much room for
interpretations.
In addition, this law deals mainly with "individual
indigent" and it does not include Foundations or
Associations that work with and for the most
indigent persons. As seen in our Article of Incorporation,
since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-
out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly born
and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the
smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a
few pesos to pay for "common prescriptions", to broken
families who returned to a normal life. In other words,
we have been working hard for the very Filipino people,
that the Government and the society cannot reach to, or
have rejected or abandoned them.
ISSUE: Can the Courts grant to the Foundation who
works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same
option granted to indigent people?
RULING: To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the
Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from
payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if
the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is
the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the
1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
to any person by reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts
and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal
assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the
provision on free access from the Constitution on the
ground that it was already covered by the equal
protection clause was defeated by the desire to give
constitutional stature to such specific protection of the
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We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
poor.
In implementation of the right of free access under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules,
specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19,
Rule 141, Rules of Court, which respectively state thus:
Sec. 21. Indigent party. -- A party may be authorized to
litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the
court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment
of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other
lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the
case favorable to the indigent, unless the court
otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such
authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the
trial court. If the court should determine after hearing
that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person
with sufficient income or property, the proper docket
and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by
the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time
fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment
thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the
court may impose. (22a)
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal
fees. - Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that
of their immediate family do not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and
(b) who do not own real property with a fair market
value as stated in the current tax declaration of more
than three hundred thousand (P300, 000.00) pesos shall
be exempt from payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered
in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the
court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the
litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property
with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth
of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if
any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested
person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint
or action or to strike out the pleading of that party,
without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may
have been incurred.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted
provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only
a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent
litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of its
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members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the
power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as
well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal
actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it
cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing
fees granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for
indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment.
Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free
access clause on a person's poverty, a condition that only
a natural person can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the
request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For
one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the
ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged
people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition
of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by
corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule
on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance
with the documentation requirements may prove too
time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
In view of the foregoing, the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from
legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and
underprivileged people.
DUCO VS. COMELEC
(G. R. No. 183366, August 19, 2009)
FACTS: On October 29, 2007,
simultaneous barangay and sangguniang kabataan (SK)
elections were held all over the country. In Barangay
Ibabao, Loay, Bohol, the petitioner was proclaimed as
the elected Punong Barangay. His opponent, respondent
Narciso Avelino, initiated an election protest in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), seeking a recount
of the ballots in four precincts upon his allegation that
the election results for the position of Punong
Barangay were spurious and fraudulent and did not
reflect the true will of the electorate.
The MCTC ultimately ruled in favor of respondent
Avelino. Duco filed his notice of appeal on January 25,
2008 and paid as appeal fees the amounts of P820.00
under Official Receipt (OR) No. 3879928; P530.00 under
OR No. 8054003; and P50.00 under OR No. 0207223. On
April 30, 2008, however, the COMELEC dismissed Duco's
appeal.
Duco moved for reconsideration, but the COMELEC
denied his motion on May 22, 2008
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in strictly applying the COMELEC rules
of procedure, as amended;
(2) Whether or not the COMELEC again committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction to strictly apply COMELEC
Resolution No. 02-0130 dated 18 September 2002
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when there is no showing on the part of the public
respondent that item number 3 of the same was
complied with.
RULING 1: The action of the First Division was patently
contrary to Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or
in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
In this connection, Sections 5 and 6, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, outline the correct steps
to be taken in the event motions for reconsideration are
filed, to wit:
Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.--
Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of
Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24)
hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding
Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en
banc.
Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar
Motion for Reconsideration.--The Clerk of Court
concerned shall calendar the motion for
reconsideration for the resolution of the
Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the
certification thereof.
The outlined steps were obviously not followed. There is
no showing that the clerk of court of the First Division
notified the Presiding Commissioner of the motion for
reconsideration within 24 hours from its filing; or that
the Presiding Commissioner certified the case to the
COMELEC en banc; or that the clerk of court of the
COMELEC en banc calendared the motion for
reconsideration within 10 days from its certification.
Lest it be supposed that the Court overlooks the
violation of the Constitution, we set aside the second
assailed resolution (dated May 22, 2008) for being
contrary to the Constitution and in disregard of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. For sure, the First
Division could not issue the resolution because the
Constitution has lodged the authority to do so in the
COMELEC en banc.
RULING 2: Nonetheless, we do not remand the motion
for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc for its
proper resolution. As we have done in Aguilar v.
COMELEC, we are going to resolve herein the propriety
of the dismissal of the appeal "considering the urgent
need for the resolution of election cases, and considering
that the issue has, after all, been raised in this petition."
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the notice of
appeal must be filed within five days after the
promulgation of the decision. In filing the appeal, the
appellant is required to pay the appeal fees imposed by
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Sec. 3, Rule 40, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No.
02-0130. Pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the fees "shall be paid to, and
deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission
within the period to file the notice of appeal."
The petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal on
January 25, 2008, that is, within five days after the
promulgation of the MCTC decision on January 22, 2008.
On the same day, he paid P1, 400.00 as appeal fee to the
Clerk of Court of the MCTC. His payment was, however,
short by P1, 800.00, based on Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution
No. 02-0130. Moreover, he paid the appeal fee to the
MCTC cashier, contrary to the mandate of Sec. 4, Rule 40
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the payment be
made to the Cash Division of the COMELEC.
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
The dismissal of the appeal was in accordance with Sec.
9 (a), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which
pertinently states:
Sec. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal.- The appeal may
be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the
instance of the Commission on any of the following
grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee;
xxx
The payment of the deficiency beyond the five-day
reglementary period did not cure the defect, because the
date of the payment of the appeal fee is deemed the
actual date of the filing of the notice of
appeal. Accordingly, his appeal, filed already beyond the
five-day reglementary period, rendered the decision of
the MCTC final and immutable.
Still, the petitioner contends that the COMELEC should
have liberally applied its procedural rules in order not to
override substantial justice. He claims that he honestly
believed in good faith that his appeal fees were
sufficient. He alleges that he paid the appeal fees
required under A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, which took effect
May 15, 2007, per the certification dated May 19, 2008
of the Clerk of Court II of the MCTC. He submits that the
COMELEC should have accepted the postal money order
for P3,000.00 remitted with the motion for
reconsideration and given him ample time to come up
with any deficiency which he was more than willing to
pay.
We cannot heed the petitioner's plea.
At any rate, the plea for a liberal application of technical
rules of procedure to promote the ends of justice is
undeserving of any sympathy from us. Time and again,
we have ruled that the payment of the full amount of
docket fee within the period to appeal is a sine qua
non requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Such
payment is not a mere technicality of law or procedure,
but an essential requirement, without which the decision
or final order appealed from becomes final and
executory, as if no appeal was filed.
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The petitioner ought to be reminded that appeal is not a
right but a mere statutory privilege that must be
exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions set
by law.
Lastly, the petitioner's claim that the MCTC was not
furnished a copy of Resolution No. 02-0130 lacks
substance. The resolution was not unknown to the MCTC
and to his counsel, because it had already been issued on
September 18, 2002. His counsel cannot feign ignorance
of the resolution for, as a lawyer, he had the duty to keep
himself abreast of legal developments and prevailing or
pertinent laws, rules and legal principles.
Having determined that the petitioner's appeal was
properly dismissed, the COMELEC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In a special civil action for certiorari, the
petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of
the public respondent for his issuance of the impugned
order. Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there
is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law." In other words,
the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the
assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious or
despotic manner. Alas, the petitioner did not discharge
his burden. The petition for certiorari is dismissed for
lack of merit.
ISMUNLATIP H. SUHURI vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 181869 | 2 October 2009)
FACTS: Suhuri ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of
Patikul, Sulu during the May 14, 2007 national and local
elections. He was opposed by Hayudini and a third
candidate, Datu Jun Tarsum. During the canvassing held
on May 17, 2007 within the Sulu State College in Jolo,
Sulu, Suhuri orally objected to the inclusion of the
election returns from the complained 25 precincts. The
affected precincts carried a total of 4,686 votes. He later
filed with the MBC written petitions regarding such
exclusion on May 17, 18 and 19, 2007. He asserted that
the 25 election returns were "(1) [o]bviously
manufactured; (2) [t]ampered with or falsified; (3)
[p]repared under duress; and (4) [characterized by]
[s]tatistical improbability."
The MBC ruled against Suhuri in the evening of May 19,
2007 by rejecting his objections to the 25 election
returns. Then and there, he manifested his intent to
appeal vis--vis the ruling. He filed his notice of appeal
shortly thereafter. In the same evening, the MBC
proclaimed Hayudini as the duly elected Mayor for
having obtained 7,578 votes as against Suhuri's 6,803
votes based on a complete canvass of the election
returns, for a margin of 775 votes in favor of Hayudini.
On May 23, 2007, Suhuri filed a petition-appeal with the
COMELEC, docketed as S.P.C. No. 07-118. The petition-
appeal was assigned to the Second Division.
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On May 25, 2007, Suhuri likewise filed an election
protest ad cautelam dated May 21, 2007 in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Patikul, Sulu to contest the results of
the elections for Municipal Mayor of Patikul, Sulu. On
June 28, 2007, however, the RTC held the election
protest in abeyance upon Suhuri's own motion due to his
pending pre-proclamation controversy in S.P.C. 07-118.
In a further move, Suhuri brought a so-called petition to
declare a failure of election with urgent motion to suspend
and/or annul the canvass of the election returns dated
May 18, 2007, referring to the results from the 25
precincts in Barangays Anuling, Bongkaung, Langhub,
Latih, and Maligay, all within Patikul, Sulu. However, the
COMELEC en banc denied the petition for insufficiency of
evidence on October 9, 2007.
On June 12, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, gave
due course to Suhuri's petition-appeal.
On July 24, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, ruling
on Suhuri's petition-appeal, excluded the 25 questioned
electoral returns from the canvass for the position of
Mayor of Patikul, Sulu; and voided the proclamation of
Hayudini as the duly elected Mayor.
In due course, Hayudini moved for the reconsideration
of the July 24, 2007 ruling of the Second Division.
Initially resolving Hayudini's motion for reconsideration,
Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Nicodemo
Ferrer voted in favor of the resolution of the Second
Division, while Acting Chairman Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner and Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. Due to the fact that the
required majority vote necessary to reverse the
resolution of the Second Division was not reached, the
COMELEC en banc conducted a re-hearing on November
22, 2007 pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. At the re-hearing, Suhuri presented
20 witnesses, who affirmed and identified their
respective affidavits. For his part, Hayudini waived the
cross-examination. Thereafter, the parties were required
to submit their memoranda, and the appeal was then
deemed submitted for resolution.
On January 29, 2008, the COMELEC en banc promulgated
its assailed resolution, granting the Motion for
Reconsideration, reversing and setting aside the
Resolution of the Second Division, and declaring the
proclamation of Kabir Hayudini as VALID.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Suhuri's grounds for nullifying
Hayudini's proclamation as the duly elected
Mayor proper for a pre-proclamation
controversy.
2) Whether or not the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it held that the issue
proferred by petitioner does not involve a pre-
proclamation controversy.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
RULING 1: Suhuri's Grounds Were Not Proper
for a Pre-Proclamation Controversy.
A pre-proclamation controversy, according to Section 1,
Article XX of the Omnibus Election Code, refers to:
xxx any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of parties before the board or directly
with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns.
Not every question bearing on or arising from the
elections may constitute a ground for a pre-
proclamation controversy. Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code enumerates the scope of a pre-
proclamation controversy, as follows:
Sec. 243. Issue that may be raised in pre-proclamation
controversy - The following shall be proper issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board
of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete,
contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in other authentic copies
thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235,
and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under
duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not
authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing
of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
Clearly, Section 243, supra, limits a pre-proclamation
controversy to the questions enumerated therein. The
enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Resultantly, the
petition for a pre-proclamation controversy must fail in
the absence of any clear showing or proof that the
election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain
material defects (Section 234, Omnibus Election Code);
or appear to have been tampered with, falsified or
prepared under duress (Section 235, Omnibus Election
Code); or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to
any candidate, the difference of which affects the result
of the election (Section 236, Omnibus Election Code).
To be noted, too, is that in a pre-proclamation
controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an
examination of the election returns and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns
and to investigate election irregularities. For as long as
the election returns appear to be authentic and duly
accomplished on their faces, the Board of Canvassers
cannot look beyond or behind the election returns in
order to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting
or counting of votes.
Suhuri submits that the 25 challenged election returns
were defective for being manufactured, tampered with
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or falsified, and for statistical improbability. He lists the
following irregularities to buttress his submission.
Suhuri further submits that threat, violence, duress and
intimidation attended the preparation of the questioned
election returns. As proof, his petition-appeal has
included the following affidavits. In fine, Suhuri's
submissions and supporting affidavits show that the
election returns for Precinct Nos. 51A/52A lacked one of
the necessary BEI signatures; that six of the contested
election returns lacked some or all of the signatures
and/or thumbmarks of the poll watchers; that another
six election returns might indicate a statistical
improbability of results; and that only one election
return had no entries in the spaces for the precinct
number, barangay, city/municipality and province.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, the cited irregularities
and omissions could not be the bases for granting his
petition for the exclusion of the 25 election returns in a
pre-proclamation controversy.
Firstly, the defects cited by Suhuri were mere
irregularities or formal defects that did not warrant the
exclusion of the affected election returns. Indeed, the
mere attendance or presence of the formal defects did
not establish the commission of palpable irregularities in
the election returns. As held in Baterina v. Commission on
Elections, the grounds for the exclusion of election
returns from the canvassing as raised by the petitioners'
therein -referring to, among others, the failure to close
the entries with the signatures of the election inspectors,
and the lack of signatures of the petitioners'
watchers, both involving a violation of the rules governing
the preparation and delivery of election returns for
canvassing - did not necessarily affect the authenticity
and genuineness of the subject election returns as to
warrant their exclusion from the canvassing, being but
defects in form insufficient to support the conclusion
that these had been tampered with or spurious.
In this regard, the Court has said that the conclusion that
election returns were obviously manufactured or false
and should consequently be disregarded from the
canvass must be approached with extreme caution and
made only upon the most convincing proof; and that
only when the election returns were palpably irregular
might they be rejected.
Secondly, the MBC corrected the defects before the
canvass of the election returns upon finding the cause of
the defects to be satisfactorily explained by the members
of the Board of Election Tellers. The COMELEC en
banc expectedly approved of the MBC's actions, absent
any other plausible explanation for the defects
supported by substantial evidence. We agree with the
COMELEC en banc. The actions of the MBC were
reasonable and warranted. Judicial notice is properly
taken of the fact that the conduct of elections in many
parts of this country, particularly in areas like Patikul,
Sulu, often come under circumstances less than ideal and
convenient for the officials administering the elections;
and of the fact that the process of elections usually
involves sleepless nights, tiresome work, and constant
dangers to the lives and personal safeties of the many
officials who work to see to it that the elections are
orderly and peaceful and their results are obtained
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We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
smoothly and with the least delay. We can easily
conclude that such trying circumstances often lead to
unintended omissions in form similar to those Suhuri
pointed out.
Thirdly, the allegation of a statistical improbability
reflected in the election returns, lacks substance and
merit. The doctrine of statistical improbability was first
pronounced in Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections, in
which the Court upheld the power and duty of the
COMELEC to reject the returns of about 50 precincts
affecting the elections of Senators, because their results
were "contrary to all statistical probabilities," thus:
It appearing therein that -- contrary to all statistical
probabilities -- in the first set, in each precinct the
number of registered voters equalled the number of
ballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and
tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party,
the party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the
Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and in the second
set, -- again contrary to all statistical probabilities -- all
the reported votes were for candidates of the Liberal
Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same
number of votes in each precinct, ranging from 240 in
one precinct to 650 in another precinct; whereas, all the
candidates of the Nacionalista Party were given exactly
zero in all said precincts.
Lagumbay expounded on the doctrine of statistical
improbability and the doctrine's effect on the power of
the COMELEC to reject the results reflected in the
election returns when such returns showed prima
facie that they did not reflect the true and valid reports
of regular voting. Under Lagumbay, therefore, the
doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only
where the unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast
in favor of all the candidates belonging to one
party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of
all the opposing parties appear in the election
return. The doctrine has no application where there
is neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic blanking of
the candidates of one party. Thus, the bare fact that a
candidate for public office received no votes in one or
two precincts, standing alone and without more, cannot
adequately support a finding that the subject election
returns are statistically improbable. Verily, a zerovote
for a particular candidate in the election returns is but
one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that the
electoral returns were prepared under duress, force and
intimidation.
The Court has thus warned that the doctrine of statistical
improbability must be restrictively viewed, with the
utmost care being taken lest in penalizing fraudulent and
corrupt practices - which is truly called for - innocent
voters become disenfranchised, a result that hardly
commends itself. Such prudential approach makes us
dismiss Suhuri's urging that some of the electoral results
had been infected with the taint of statistical
improbability as to warrant their exclusion from the
canvass in a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically,
his petition and the records nowhere show that his
party-mates received a similar number of votes (or lack
of any) by which to conclude that there were a unique
uniformity of tally and a systematic blanking of other
candidates belonging to one party.
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Fourthly, Suhuri contends that threat, violence, duress
and intimidation were attendant in the preparation of
election returns of the 25 contested precincts. He has
presented the affidavits of voters and poll watchers from
the 25 precincts whose election returns he
questioned; the affidavit of one Ermalyn J. Jamasali, a
member of the BEI of one of the precincts; and the
affidavit of Police Inspector Panisan, Chief of Police of
Patikul, Sulu. Yet, the affidavits, because they referred to
incidents that had occurred at
the various precincts during the voting, did not
substantiate Suhuri's allegation of duress, threats,
coercion, and intimidation during the preparation or
making of the election returns. The COMELEC en
banc rightly noted and pointed this out in its assailed
resolution.
Fifthly, BEI member Jamasali narrated in her affidavit
her having personally witnessed fraud committed during
the elections. Even assuming that the fraud she thereby
exposed constituted an irregularity in the conduct of the
elections, the incident, being isolated, did not warrant
the exclusion of all the 25 election returns, but only of
the return for the precinct where the fraud had
occurred. However, the exclusion of the election returns
from that precinct (i.e., Precinct 17A/18A), if called for,
would not alter the overall result for the mayoralty
contest in Patikul, Sulu, considering that said precinct
had only 189 registered voters. We note that Hayudini
had a winning margin of 775 votes over Suhuri.
Lastly, Police Inspector Panisan's election
report, albeit official, would not justify the exclusion of
the returns from the precincts clustered in the Anuling
Elementary School. Concededly, Panisan's report, being
hearsay because he had not himself actually witnessed
the incidents described in the report, was unreliable and
had no value for purposes of Suhuri's petition-appeal. It
would not be trite to emphasize that the results of an
election should not be annulled based on hearsay
evidence.
RULING 2: In a special civil action for certiorari, the
petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the public respondent for its issuance of the impugned
order. Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there
is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law." In other words,
the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the
assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious or
despotic manner.
Suhuri did not discharge his burden as petitioner, to
satisfactorily show that his grounds were proper for a
pre-proclamation controversy. We cannot go to his
succor, for the COMELEC cannot not look behind or
beyond the 25 contested election returns in a pre-
proclamation controversy. Moreover, contrary to his
urging, the COMELEC en banc did not rely mainly on the
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
report submitted by the MBC on December 4, 2007 in
order to find against him. It is clear that the COMELEC en
banc took note of the matters and circumstances that
Suhuri himself had submitted to its consideration when
it rendered its assailed resolution. If it did not accept his
submissions, it did not abuse its discretion, because it
based its assailed resolution on the established facts, the
law, and the pertinent jurisprudence.
Before closing, we stress that the powers of the
COMELEC are essentially executive and administrative
in nature. This is the reason why the question of
whether or not there were terrorism, vote-buying and
other irregularities in the elections should be ventilated
in regular election protests. The COMELEC is not the
proper forum for deciding such protests. Accordingly, a
party seeking to raise issues, the resolution of which
compels or necessitates the COMELEC's piercing the veil
of election returns that appear prima facie to be regular
on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election
contest.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. No. 164195 | December 4, 2009)
FACTS: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners of five
parcels of agricultural lands located in San Isidro,
Tagum, Davao Province
AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels
of land to the government. After the initial processing at
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) application of AFC and HPI,
it was referred to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
for initial valuation. AFC and HPI received separately
from the DARs Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) of Davao province a notice of land acquisition
and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the
properties has been placed at P86, 900,925.88 or P165,
484.47 per hectare while HPIs properties were valued
at P164, 478,178.14. Both AFC and HPI considered the
valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just
compensation for the properties.
AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366
and No. 113359. AFC applied for the shifting of the mode
of acquisition for TCT No. 113359 from VOS to Voluntary
Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. HPI also
rejected the valuation of its three parcels of land covered
by TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362 and No. T-10363.
Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBPs
valuation, the DAR requested LBP to deposit the
amounts equivalent to their valuations in the names and
for the accounts of AFC and HPI. AFC thereafter
withdrew the amount of P26, 409,549.86, while HPI
withdrew the amount of P45, 481,706.76, both in cash
from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed the Register of
Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the
said properties and to issue a new one in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
After the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, the Register of Deeds of
Davao, upon the request of the DAR, issued TCTs and
 8
Certificates of Land Ownership Award to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.
(RTC BRANCH 2 TAGUM CITY) AFC and HPI filed separate
complaints for determination of just compensation with
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse
of more than three years from the filing of the
complaints, the DARAB failed and refused to render a
decision on the valuation of the land. Hence, two
complaints for determination and payment of just
compensation were filed by AFC and HPI before Branch
2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting
as a Special Agrarian Court), which were subsequently
consolidated.
Summons was served to defendants DAR and LBP. The
trial court appointed as Commissioners persons it
considered competent, qualified and disinterested to
determine the proper valuation of the properties.
DAR and LBP submitted their Answer. The pre-trial
order issued by the trial court reads: This Court will
determine the all-embracing concept of Just
Compensation, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to
damages, and also whether the value of the land and
improvements as determined by the Land Valuation of
Land Bank for the determination of just compensation,
and whether the plaintiff has violated Section 13 of
DARAB new rules and procedure. The commissioners
conducted an ocular inspection The court-appointed
commissioners submitted their appraisal report. The
case was considered submitted for decision.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision fixing
the just compensation for the 1,388.6027 hectares of
lands and its improvements owned by the plaintiffs AFC
and HPI.
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration mainly on the
ground that the trial court based its valuation on the
value of residential and industrial lands in the area
forgetting that the lands involved are agricultural. LBP
also sought a reconsideration of the award of attorneys
fees, the interest on the compensation over the lands
and the order of the trial court regarding the payment of
commissioners fees.
In an Order, the trial court modified its decision. From
this Order, LBP filed a Notice of Appeal which was
granted.
Subsequently, the trial court, citing this Courts ruling in
the case of "Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon,
"that a petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the
proper mode of appeal from a decision on the
determination of just compensation rendered by a
special agrarian court, issued an Order recalling its
Order and directed LBP to file a Petition for Review
within the reglementary period. LBP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that the case of Land Bank of
the Philippines v. De Leon was not yet final at that time;
hence, it is not certain whether the decision in that case
would have a retroactive effect and that appeal is the
appropriate remedy. This was denied by the trial court
in its Order.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
(COURT OF APPEALS) LBP filed a Petition for
Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222) before the Court of
Appeals assailing the orders of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals found the petition of LBP
meritorious. In a decision, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition and the assailed orders were NULLIFIED
and, accordingly, SET ASIDE.
AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution.
Earlier, DAR filed its own separate petition before the
Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Review (CA-
G.R. SP NO. 74879). In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for failure to state the material
dates under Rule 42, Section 2, of the Rules of Court.
The appellate court held: The importance of stating the
material dates cannot be overemphasized. It is only
through a statement thereof in the petition can it be
determined whether or not the petition was filed on
time. For its failure to state the material dates, the
petition can and should be outrightly dismissed.
xxxx
The petition is also defective in that it failed to attach
material portions of the record as would support the
allegations in the petition. More specifically, copies of
the alleged motion for reconsideration filed by the DAR,
the order denying it, and the notice of appeal were not
attached to the petition. The Decision became final and
executory and entry of judgment was issued by the
appellate court.
(SUPREME COURT) On the other hand, from the decision
of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by LBP, AFC
and HPI filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the filing by LBP of the Petition
for Certiorari is already barred by res judicata.
2) Whether or not the ruling of the SC in the Arlene
De Leon Case, giving only prospective effect to
its earlier resolution as to the proper mode of
appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts, is applicable in the instant case.
RULING 1: AFC and HPI pray that the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
76222 be reversed and set aside and that the Decision of
the RTC in Agrarian Cases be declared as final and
executory.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the Decision, dated 12
February 2004, and Resolution, dated 21 June 2004, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, giving due
course to LBPs appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED, this
Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in consideration of public
interest, the speedy administration of justice, and the
peculiar circumstances of the case, to give DUE COURSE
to the present Petition and decide the same on its merits.
Thus, the Decision, dated 25 September 2001, as
modified by the Decision, dated 5 December 2001, of the
 9
Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Branch 2, in Agrarian
Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000 is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
NO. The following are the elements of res judicata:
The former judgment must be final;
The court which rendered judgment must have
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter;
It must be a judgment on the merits; and
There must be between the first and second
actions identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.
In this case, the third element of res judicata, i.e., that the
former judgment must be on the merits is not present. It
must be remembered that the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No.
74879 was based on technicality, that is, for failure on
the part of the DAR to state material dates required by
the rules. Having been dismissed based on a technicality
and not on the merits, the principle of res judicata does
not apply. Res judicata applies only where judgment on
the merits is finally rendered on the first.
RULING 2: NO. In the case of Land Bank of the
Philippines v. De Leon, decided on 10 September 2002,
respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of
land. They voluntarily offered the subject property for
sale to the government. Unable to agree on the valuation
offered by the DAR, respondents filed a petition with the
RTC to fix the just compensation. In due time, the RTC
rendered judgment fixing the compensation of the
property.
Before the Court of Appeals, the DAR and LBP filed
separate petitions. The DAR filed a Petition for Review of
the decision of the RTC. LBP raised the case on appeal to
the Court of Appeals by way of ordinary appeal.
The petition of the DAR was given due course. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals dismissed LBPs
ordinary appeal on the ground that the same was
erroneous.
LBP filed a petition for review before this Court. In Land
Bank, we explained: A petition for review, not an
ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an
appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting
as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the
determination of just compensation to the landowners
concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and
categorically states that the said mode of appeal should
be adopted. There is no room for a contrary
interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical,
there is no room for construction, but only application.
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution
of this Court dated 20 March 2003, this Court
emphasized the prospective application of the Decision
dated 10 September 2002, that a petition for review is
the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after
the finality of this Resolution.
Essentially therefore, the rule is that a decision of the
RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court should be brought
to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. The
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Court of Appeals will no longer entertain ordinary
appeals thereon. However, this rule applies only after
the finality of the Resolution of this Court in Land Bank
of the Philippines v. De Leon dated 20 March 2003.
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it
gave due course to the appeal of LBP. LBPs Notice of
Appeal was filed on 27 December 2001. This was given
due course by the RTC in an Order dated 15 May 2002.
LBPs appeal was, thus, perfected before this Courts
Resolution in the aforementioned Land Bank of the
Philippines v. De Leon case. Hence, the Court of Appeals
could give due course to LBPs petition.
2010
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) AND
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
(G. R. No. 191002 | 17 March 2010)
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that
has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement
of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days
after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in
relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President
or Acting President from making appointments within
two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
automatically considered for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled
within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly
stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department)
 10
was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and
its insulation from political pressures, such as
stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within
which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is
whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume
its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from
the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be
it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
RULING: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does
not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of
the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be
clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4
(1) thereof.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-34150 | 16 October 1971)
FACTS: After the election of delegates to the
Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970,
the convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which
seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution,
lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971,
COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional
Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with
the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo
Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against
COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and
acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an
advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to
lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before
the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under
revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed
a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the court have jurisdiction over
the case.
2) Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1
constitutional?
3) Whether or not the petition will prosper.
 11
RULINGS: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed,
there will be an improper submission to the people. Such
is not allowed.
1) The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales
vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a
resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, violates the constitution is a
justiciable one and thus subject to judicial
review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court
is superior to the Convention but they are both
subject to the Constitution.
2) The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite
on a single amendment in Organic Resolution
No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution which states that all amendments
must be submitted to the people in a single
election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must
be provided sufficient time and ample basis to
assess the amendment in relation to the other
parts of the Constitution, not separately but
together.
3) The proposed amendments shall be approved
by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the
people for ratification. Election here is singular
which meant that the entire constitution must
be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite
only. Furthermore, the people were not given a
proper frame of reference in arriving at their
decision because they had at the time no idea
yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution
would ultimately be and therefore would be
unable to assess the proposed amendment in
the light of the entire document. This is the
Doctrine of Submission which means that all
the proposed amendments to the Constitution
shall be presented to the people for the
ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT
piecemeal.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO
(G.R. No. 191002 | 20 April 2010)
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the
March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision
directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its
proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the
vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare
the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent
President. Movants argue that the disputed
constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII,
Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight
appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and
they contended that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in
disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE (Section 4): Did the Constitutional Commission
extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article
VII?
RULING: The Constitutional Commission did not extend
to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments
during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The
deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales
quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or
Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision
on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the
Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010
decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.
15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does
not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.
LOKIN, JR. vs. COMELEC
(621 SCRA 385, June 22, 2010)
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution giving due course to
CIBACs Manifestation of Intent to participate in the
party-list election. Respondents, President and chairman
Villanueva submitted the certified Certificate of
Nomination of CIBACto the COMELEC Law Department.
Pia Derla submitted a 2nd Certificate of Nominees
including Lokin, Jr (petitioner) as party-list nominees as
she affixed her signature as acting secretary-general of
CIBAC. The nomination of petitioners was unauthorized
Respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition
to expunge from the records and/or for disqualification,
seeking to nullify the certificate filed by
Derla. Respondents contented that Derla had
misrepresented herself as acting secretary-general,
and not even a member of CIBAC. Resolution filed by the
COMELEC First division granted the petition
and ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunge
from the records, and declared respondents group
as the true nominees of CIBAC. COMELEC en
banc affirmed the Divisions findings as the commission
reiterated that Derla was unable to prove her authority
to file a certificate, whereas respondents presented
evidence that Villanueva deputized CIBAC secretary to
submit the Certificate of Nomination pursuant to
CIBACs Constitution and bylaws. The COMELEC en banc
affirmed the said Resolution, prompting Lokin Jr.
(petitioner) to file Petition for Certiorari for grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
said Resolution. The petitioner wants to be recognized
as the legitimate nominees and representative of CIBAC
party-list.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the authority of Secretary of CIBAC to file
the parts Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate
matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial
courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction;
(2) WON the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for
Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the
properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
RULINGS:
 12
(1) The COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining
to party leadership and the nomination of party-list
representatives. The present dispute stemmed from an
intra-corporate matter, their submissions even
recognize the COMELECs constitutional power to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. More specifically, as one of its constitutional
functions, the COMELEC is also tasked to "register, after
sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government.
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court
also declared that the COMELECs power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination
of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the
COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute,
in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.
(2) No error because it is indicated clearly in the law that
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election. Pia Derla, who is not even a
member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-
list, and clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as
CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the
COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with
the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary requirement
to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide
members of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr.
have not even presented evidence proving the affiliation
of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral
Party that is registered with COMELEC.
GOMEZ-CASTILLO vs. COMELEC
(621 SCRA 499 | 22 June 2010)
CASE DOCTRINE: (Political Law: Election, Remedial
Law): The jurisdiction over election contests involving
elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by
Section 251 BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the
other hand, A.M. No 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper
venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only
spelled out the manner by which an RTC with
jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules
on venue, .M. No 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure just
and orderly administration of justice and is permissive,
because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and
speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for
quo warranto involving elective municipal officials.
FACTS: Castillo and Revilla were mayoralty candidates
during the 2007 local elections. After Revilla was
proclaimed as the elected Municipal Mayor, Castillo filed
and Election Protest Ad Cautelam, in the RTC of Bacoor,
Cavite which was eventually raffled to Branch 19.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Revilla then sought for the dismissal of the election
protest alleging the erroneous filing of the case in the
wrong Branch, violating Supreme Court Administrative
Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007 which designated Branch 22
of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in
Cavite City to hear, try and decide election contests
involving municipal officials in Cavite. Consequently, the
RTC dismissed the case. Hence, Castillo appealed before
the COMELEC which, however, dismissed the appeal for
being brought beyond the five-day reglementary period.
ISSUES:
(1) Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
designate the RTC Branch that
has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does
it merely designate the proper venue for filing?
(2) Was the appeal validly dismissed?
RULING 1: It merely set the proper venue, it was not
jurisdictional. It is well-settled that jurisdiction is
conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed by
the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver
nor enlarged by the omission of the parties; nor
conferred by any acquiescence of the court. The
allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and
cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the
Government.
The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective
municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by Section
251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).
On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying
the proper venue where such cases may be filed and
heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC
with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other
rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to
ensure a just and orderly administration of justice, and is
permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the
exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and
petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal
officials.
RULING 2: YES. Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
provides that an aggrieved party may appeal the
decision to the Commission on Elections within five days
after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal with the
court that rendered the decision with copy served on the
adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
In this case, Castillo only file her notice of appeal eight
days after her receipt of the decision.
The period and perfection of appeal are not mere
technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for they are
essential to the finality of judgements, a notion
underlying the stability of our judicial system. A greater
reason to adhere to this notion exists herein, for the
short period of five days as the period to appeal
recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in
order that the will of the electorate is ascertained as
soon as possible so that the winning candidate is not
deprived of the right to assume office, and so that any
doubt that can cloud the incumbency of the truly
deserving winning candidate is quickly removed. Also,
the court cannot also presume the timeliness of her
appeal from the fact that the RTC gave due course to her
appeal by its elevating the protest to the COMELEC. The
 13
presumption of timeliness would not arise if her appeal
was actually tardy. Hence, the appeal was validly
dismissed.
MANIEBO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(627 SCRA 569 | 10 August 2010)
CASE DOCTRINES:
(Political Law: Admin Law): The presumption of good
faith does not apply when the employees Certificate of
Eligibility conflicts with the CSCs Masterliest of Eligibles.
Long and satisfactory government service does not
mitigate the penalty of dismissal when there is refusal to
own up to and when there is lack of remorse for
dishonesty.
(Remedial Law): An appeal under Rule 43 is a
discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either
dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without
merit, or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration; or may process by requiring the
respondent to file a comment on the petition; These
rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may result in prejudicing a partys
substantive rights.
FACTS: Justina M. Maniebo was issued a promotional
appointment as Cashier III in the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer, Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro because she appeared to posses the
qualifications for the position. But when the CSC
Regional Office No. IV verified her name against the
Masterlist of Eligibles, she was found out to have actually
failed in the examination for obtaining a rating of only
60%.She was then charged with possessing of spurious
report of rating, falsification, grave misconduct and
dishonesty after having indicated in her Personal Data
Sheet that she had passed the CSC (professional)
examination with a rating of 74.01%.
ISSUES:
1) Was the CSC was correct in imposing the
penalty of dismissal in view of the
circumstances obtaining in the case?
2) Did the court of appeals err in dismissing the
petition based on alleged technicality?
RULINGS:
1) YES. A permanent appointment implies the
holding of a civil service eligibility on the part of the
appointee, unless the position involved requires no such
eligibility. Where the appointee does not possess a civil
service eligibility, the appointment is considered
temporary. The subsequent acquisition of the required
eligibility will not make the temporary appointment
regular or permanent; a new appointment is needed.
Accordingly, any temporary employee who has served
for the required duration of seven years must first be
found by the CSC to continuously possess the minimum
qualifications for holding the position, except the
required eligibility, before he or she may be granted civil
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
service eligibility. Among the minimum qualifications is
the continuous observance of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The petitioner failed to comply with this
necessary minimum qualification. She thrived on her
having misled the Government into believing that she
had possessed the requisite civil service eligibility for
the various positions she had successively held in her 20
years of service. In the first place, she would not have
been appointed in a permanent or temporary capacity,
had the CSC sooner discovered her dishonesty. R.A. No.
6850 was never meant to cure an appointment void
from the very beginning for being based on a false
representation of eligibility, like that of the petitioner. A
contrary construction of the statute will, in effect,
reward dishonesty.
2) NO. The CA did not commit any error, least of all
a reversible one. Its dismissal was founded on the
correct application of the applicable rule. Indeed, Section
6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly requires the
petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed
from, together with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein and other
supporting papers. The requirement is intended to
immediately enable the CA to determine whether to give
due course to the appeal or not by having all the material
necessary to make such determination before it. This is
because an appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode
of appeal, which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the
petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or may
process by requiring the respondent to file a comment
on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days
from notice.
The petitioner was not entitled to a liberal construction
of the rules of procedure. The petitioner repeatedly
disregarded the rules too many times to merit any
tolerance by the Court, thereby exhibiting a deplorable
tendency to trivialize the rules of procedure. Yet, such
rules were not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance might have resulted in
prejudicing a partys substantive rights. The bare
invocation of substantial justice was not a magic wand
that would compel the suspension of the rules of
procedure. Of necessity, the reviewing court had also to
assess whether the appeal was substantially meritorious
on its face, or not, for only after such finding could the
review court ease the often stringent rules of
procedure. Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be
reduced to mere trifles.
JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ vs. ONG
(SCRA 626 | 24 August 2010) (A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J)
FACTS: Respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
sought reconsideration of SC Decision finding them
guilty for simple misconduct. The charge was based on
the complaint of Assistant Prosecutor Rodriguez who
alleged that the respondents failed to hear cases as
collegial during scheduled sessions by hearing the cases
either alone or only two of the three of them, and for
falsification of public documents grounded on their
 14
issuance of orders signed by the three of them making it
appear that they acted as a collegial body. It was also
alleged that they have conducted themselves in gross
abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct for
intemperate and discriminatory utterances during
hearings. Justice Ong and Hernandez admitted randomly
asking the counsels appearing before them from which
law schools they had graduated, and their engaging
during the hearings in casual conversation about their
respective law schools.
ISSUES:
1) Was the collegiality of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan preserved despite separately conducting
hearings?
2) Were the respondent justices liable for
improprieties during hearings amounting to gross abuse
of judicial authority and grave misconduct?
RULING 1: NO. Respondent Justices cannot lightly
regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit
together as members of the Fourth Division in
the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned
thereto. The information and evidence upon which the
Fourth Division would base any decisions or other
judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be
made directly available to each and every one of its
members during the proceedings. This necessitates
the equal and full participation of each member in the
trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not
enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth
Division were within hearing and communicating
distance of one another at the hearings in question, as
they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a
collegial body became impossible when not all of the
members sat together during the trial proceedings. The
internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance
of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires
that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in
the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be
made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the
rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the
Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by
the other respondents. Neither could the other
respondents properly and promptly contribute to the
rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondents non-observance of
collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying
criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a
Division of all three Justices. Although there are criminal
cases involving public officials and employees triable
before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as
amended, has always required a Division of three
Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused
in such cases holding higher rank or office than those
charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a
Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally
expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply
broader circumspection in trying and deciding such
cases. The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme
Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court,
which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary
appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the
convictions still undergo intermediate review before
ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all)
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors
men forgive and time forgets. They are expected to have
more than just a modicum acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. For this reason alone,
respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure
cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or
as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be
treated as simple misconduct, which is to be
distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross
ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not
liable for gross misconduct defined as the transgression
of some established or definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or
the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or
disregard of well-known legal rules considering that the
explanations they have offered herein, which the
complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to
maintain their collegiality by holding their separate
hearings within sight and hearing distance of one
another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of
the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to
show that the act complained of was ill-
motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate
the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances was
attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have
convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated
or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal
rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of
cases in the provinces.
RULING 2: NO. The Court approves the Court
Administrators finding and recommendation that no
evidence supported the complainants charge that Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the improper
and intemperate statements amounting to gross abuse of
judicial authority and grave misconduct. The Court
found the respondent justices conduct only
unbecoming.
By publicizing their professional qualifications, they
manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of
public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-
conceit. The court found their acts as bespeaking their
lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no
judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid
especially during their performance of judicial functions.
They should not exchange banter or engage in playful
teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter
how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as
they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that
they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards
all who appear before their court.
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that: Section
6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
 15
and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.
Publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of
having studied in and graduated from certain law
schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even
revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their
conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid
situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion
or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their
personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in
speech. In performing their judicial duties, they should
not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. It is
very essential that they should live up to the high
standards their noble position on the Bench demands.
Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the
best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard,
Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry
out judicial duties with appropriate consideration
for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers,
court staff, and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to
the proper performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is
defined as improper performance. Unbecoming
conduct applies to a broader range of transgressions of
rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or
logical procedure or prescribed method.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRINGAS
BUNAY y DAM-AT
(630 SCRA 445, September 14, 2010)
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in
Luna, Apayao tried and found the accused guilty of
qualified rape in its decision dated December 11, 2001,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, BRINGAS BUNAY y
DAM-AT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape as charged against him, this court hereby sentences
said accused to suffer the Supreme Penalty of DEATH.
The accused is further ordered to pay the victim, "AAA",
the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) by
way of civil indemnity plus exemplary and moral
damages of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00).
The accused is ordered to be immediately shipped to
New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, for imprisonment
thereat while awaiting the review of this decision by the
Supreme Court. IT IS SO ORDERED.
On December 13, 2001, the accused was committed to
the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, per the
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
certification issued on August 14, 2002 by the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections.
The conviction was brought for automatic review, but
the Court transferred the case to the CA for intermediate
review on November 9, 2004, conformably with People
v. Mateo.
On August 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the conviction of the accused for qualified rape in C.A.-
G.R. No. CR HC No. 00758, viz:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Luna, Apayao, Branch 26 in
Criminal Case No. 5-2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Following the CAs denial of his motion for
reconsideration, the accused now appeals to the Court.
On April 20, 2010, the Court received the letter dated
April 15, 2010 from Bureau of Corrections Assistant
Director for Operations Rodrigo A. Mercado, advising
that the accused had died on March 25, 2010 at the New
Bilibid Prison Hospital in Muntinlupa City. The report of
Dr. Marylou V. Arbatin, Medical Officer III, revealed that
the immediate cause of death had been cardio-
respiratory arrest, with pneumonia as the antecedent
cause.
On June 22, 2010, the Court required the Bureau of
Corrections to submit a certified true copy of the death
certificate of the accused.1avvphi1
By letter dated August 16, 2010, Armando T. Miranda,
Chief Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison,
submitted the death certificate of the accused.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the death of the
accused during the pendency of his appeal in this Court
totally extinguished his criminal liability. Such extinction
is based on Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which
pertinently provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
xxx
The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil
liability that was based exclusively on the crime for
which the accused was convicted (i.e., ex delicto),
because no final judgment of conviction was yet
rendered by the time of his death. Only civil liability
predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict
survived the death of the accused, which the offended
party can recover by means of a separate civil action.
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the appeal of
the accused is dismissed, and this criminal case is
considered closed and terminated.
2011
 16
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP)
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(643, SCRA 150, February 15, 2011)
FACTS: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into
law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad
rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to
secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities
had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did
not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached
the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities
mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29
filed between November and December of 2006, through
their respective sponsors in Congress, individual
cityhood bills containing a common provision, as
follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x
shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates
from March to July 2007 after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation
of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the
Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for
all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section
10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection
clause
RULING Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the
Constitution and the equal protection clause
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay
shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied)
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local
government units must follow the criteria established
in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality
or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locallygenerated average
annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100)
square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city
shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income.
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial
distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the
purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and
 17
4. The classification must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the
same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly,as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were
written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS
IN THE SECOND SEMESTER OF 2009
(645 SCRA 309, March 15, 2011)
Employees of the Judiciary should observe punctuality in
reporting to work. Tardiness, if habitual, prejudices the
efficiency of the service being rendered by the Judiciary
to the people, and cannot be tolerated. Thus, we sanction
certain administrative employees of the Court for their
habitual tardiness.
This administrative matter emanated from the reports
dated June 16, 2010 and June 17, 2010 made by the
Leave Division under the Office of Administrative
Services (OAS) to the Complaints and Investigation
Division, also under the OAS, to the effect that the
following employees had been habitually tardy in the
second semester of 2009.
On July 5, 2010, the OAS directed the concerned
employees to explain in writing why no administrative
disciplinary action should be taken against them for
their habitual tardiness during the covered period,
which habitual tardiness was in violation of Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series
of 1991, viz:
An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he
incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes,
ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a
semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during
the year. xxx
The concerned employees subsequently rendered their
respective explanations.
The OAS concluded that the concerned employees had
incurred habitual tardiness and that their justifications
were unacceptable. Thus, it recommended the penalties
to be imposed on the concerned employees.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the evaluation of OAS should be
adopted by the Court.
2) Whether or not the penalties imposed are
proper.
RULING 1: We adopt the evaluation of the OAS.
It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is
a public trust. This canon includes the mandate for the
observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
use of every moment of such hours for the public service,
because only thereby may the public servants
recompense the Government and the people for
shouldering the costs of maintaining the
Judiciary. Accordingly, court officials and employees
must at all times strictly observe official hours to inspire
the publics respect for the justice system.
The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed
upon court officials and employees reflect the premium
placed on the image of the courts of justice. That image is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work in the
Judiciary. It thus becomes the imperative duty of
everyone involved in the dispensation of justice, from
the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts
good name and standing as true temples of justice.
There is no question that all the concerned employees
incurred habitual tardiness within the context of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, supra.
Thereby, they fell short of the standard of conduct
demanded from everyone connected with the
administration of justice. Worthy of stress is that the
nature and functions of the employment of the officials
and employees of the Judiciary require them to be role
models in the faithful observance of the constitutional
canon that public office is a public trust. They are always
accountable to the people, whom they must serve with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
They can surely inspire public respect for the justice
system by strictly observing official time, among others.
Absenteeism and tardiness are, therefore,
impermissible.
The respective justifications of the concerned employees
(consisting of illness or poor health, travel difficulties,
household responsibilities, and similar causes) are not
unacceptable. Already in Re: Supreme Court Employees
Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the 2nd Semester of
2005, we enunciated that justifications for absences and
tardiness falling under the categories of illness, moral
obligation to family and relatives, performance of
household chores, traffic and health or physical
condition are neither novel nor persuasive, and hardly
evoke sympathy. If at all, such justifications may only
mitigate liability.
RULING 2: We next discuss the penalties.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999,
considers habitual tardiness as a light offense with the
following penalties:
First Offense Reprimand
Second Offense Suspension
Third Offense Dismissal
The penalties recommended by the OAS are well taken.
However, in the case of Albert C. Semilla, we moderate
the recommended penalty of suspension for three
months without pay to one month suspension without
pay but with a final warning that a repetition will be
dealt with more severely upon humanitarian
considerations. Although we insist that every official or
employee of the Judiciary must meet the standards of
 18
public service, we must practice compassion in
deserving cases to avoid the wrong and unwanted
impression that the Court wields only mailed fists.
Semilla deserves a degree of mitigation. In that regard,
Section 53 of Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the
disciplining authority the discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper
penalty. Thus, the mitigating factors in Semillas favor
are the following:
(a) His length of service and satisfactory performance
(i.e., having started as messenger of the Court on
November 7, 1979 and having served continuously until
the present, with his performance in the first and second
semesters of 2009, the year in question, being
satisfactory);
(b) The fact that this infraction of habitual tardiness was
his first since 2003; and
(c) His pleas for compassion (due to his medical
condition of benign prostatic hyperthropy, for which he
was under the care of the SC Clinic since May 2009, and
due to his reporting to work and returning home
through his bicycle to add to his financial capacity as a
solo parent of his family).
Even so, we hereby emphatically hold all the concerned
employees to their respective promises that they will not
commit the same infraction hereafter, or else they will
be at the end of the mailed fists of the Court. Our
compassion, which is not limitless but discriminating,
should not be taken for granted.
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III
ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ, vs.
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ,
AND RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN
(A. M. NO. 08-19-SB-J, April 12, 2011)
SC RESOLVED:
(a) the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated
September 14, 2010 filed by respondents Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) and
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez);
and
(b) the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable
Courts Decision Dated 1 September) dated September
15, 2010 of the complainant.
THROUGH THE DECISION, WE FOUND AND HELD
JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ LIABLE FOR
SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, AND DISPOSED AGAINST THEM
AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA
(JUSTICE PONFERRADA), AS FOLLOWS:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is
ordered to pay a fine of 15,000.00, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is
admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA
is warned to be more cautious about the proper
procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court
FACTS: THE COMPLAINANT, THEN AN ASSISTANT
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III IN THE OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, FILED AN AFFIDAVIT-
COMPLAINT DATED OCTOBER 23, 2008 CHARGING
JUSTICE ONG, JUSTICE HERNANDEZ AND JUSTICE
PONFERRADA, AS THE MEMBERS OF THE FOURTH
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN WITH:
grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a
Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the
interest of the service (grounded on their failing
to hear cases as a collegial body during the
scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held
in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice
Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other
cases together; and on their having
unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when
she objected to the procedure);
falsification of public documents (grounded on
their issuance of orders relative to the hearings
in Davao City, signed by all three of them, that
made it appear as if all of them had been present
during the particular hearing acting as a
collegial body, when in truth they were not);
improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to
gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct
(grounded on Justice Ong and Justice Hernandezs
making the following intemperate and discriminatory
utterances during the hearings of their Division in Cebu
City sometime in September 2006), to wit:
(a) We are playing Gods here, we will do what we
want to do, your contempt is already out, we fined you
eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that
time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
(b) You are better than Director Somido? Are you
better than Director Chua? Are you here to supervise
Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor
who is doing nothing.
(c) Just because your son is always nominated by
the JBC to Malacaang, you are acting like that! Do not
forget that the brain of the child follows that of their
(sic) mother and
(d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law
schools they had graduated, and frequently inquired
whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had
studied and from which he had graduated was better
than his (Justice Ongs) own alma mater. and
(d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law
(grounded on the fact that Criminal Case No. 25801,
entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused upon a finding that the
assailed contracts subject of the criminal case had never
been perfected contrary to the evidence of the
Prosecution, the dismissal order being signed by all
three respondents).
 19
IN THE DECISION OF AUGUST 24, 2010, SC EXPLAINED:
Respondents Violated the Provisions of PD 1606 and
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the
procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their
provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606,
as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan; and their adoption of the
procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing
before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan
to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby
rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings
open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing
before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan
was of the very essence of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process of law.
JUDGES ARE NOT COMMON INDIVIDUALS
WHOSE GROSS ERRORS MEN FORGIVE AND
TIME FORGETS.
They are expected to have more than just a modicum
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
For this reason alone, respondent Justices adoption of
the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere
deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their
part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which
is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or
gross ignorance of the law.
THE RESPONDENT JUSTICES WERE NOT
LIABLE FOR GROSS MISCONDUCT
Considering that the explanations they have offered
herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed
that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding
their separate hearings within sight and hearing
distance of one another. Neither were they liable for
gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on
reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was
ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to
violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known
legal rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances
was attendant herein, for the respondent. Justices have
convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated
or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal
rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of
cases in the provinces.
RESPONDENT JUSTICES DID NOT ENSURE
THAT THEIR PROCEEDINGS ACCORDED WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW AND
PROCEDURE.
Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in
order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a
sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no
malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the
procedure. They could have seen that their procedure
was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not
promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by
precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying
taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need
to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the
chief objective of judicial trials.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
RESPONDENT JUSTICES SIGNING OF THE
ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE FLAWED
PROCEEDINGS DOESNT AS A FORM OF
FALSIFICATION OR DISHONESTY, IN THAT
THEY THEREBY MADE IT APPEAR THAT THEY
HAD ALL BEEN PHYSICALLY PRESENT WHEN
THE TRUTH WAS DIFFERENT.
Such act merely ensued from the flawed proceedings
and cannot be treated as a separate offense.
UNBECOMING CONDUCT OF JUSTICE ONG AND
JUSTICE HERNANDEZ
THE COURT APPROVES THE COURT
ADMINISTRATORS FINDING AND
RECOMMENDATION THAT NO EVIDENCE
SUPPORTED THE COMPLAINANTS CHARGE
THAT JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ
HAD UTTERED THE IMPROPER AND
INTEMPERATE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO
THEM.
In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the
Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful and
true record of the proceedings, because they bear the
certification of correctness executed by the
stenographers who had prepared them.
JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ
ADMITTED RANDOMLY ASKING THE
COUNSELS APPEARING BEFORE THEM FROM
WHICH LAW SCHOOLS THEY HAD GRADUATED,
AND THEIR ENGAGING DURING THE HEARINGS
IN CASUAL CONVERSATION ABOUT THEIR
RESPECTIVE LAW SCHOOLS.
They thereby publicized their professional qualifications
and manifested a lack of the requisite humility
demanded of public magistrates.
Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit.
THEIR ACTS AS BESPEAKING THEIR LACK OF
JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT AND DECORUM,
WHICH NO JUDGE WORTHY OF THE JUDICIAL
ROBES SHOULD AVOID ESPECIALLY DURING
THEIR PERFORMANCE OF JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS.
They should not exchange banter or engage in playful
teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter
how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as
they want us to believe).
Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity
and act with courtesy towards all who appear before
their court.
INDEED, SECTION 6, CANON 6 OF THE NEW
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE
PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY CLEARLY ENJOINS
THAT:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
 20
representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.
PUBLICIZING PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
OR BOASTING OF HAVING STUDIED IN AND
GRADUATED FROM CERTAIN LAW SCHOOLS,
NO MATTER HOW PRESTIGIOUS, MIGHT HAVE
EVEN REVEALED, ON THE PART OF JUSTICE
ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ, THEIR BIAS
FOR OR AGAINST SOME LAWYERS.
Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for
Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid
situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion
or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their
personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their courts.
JUDGES SHOULD BE DIGNIFIED IN DEMEANOR,
AND REFINED IN SPEECH. IN PERFORMING
THEIR JUDICIAL DUTIES, THEY SHOULD NOT
MANIFEST BIAS OR PREJUDICE BY WORD OR
CONDUCT TOWARDS ANY PERSON OR GROUP
ON IRRELEVANT GROUNDS.
It is very essential that they should live up to the high
standards their noble position on the Bench demands.
Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the
best of intentions be misconstrued.
In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates
judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues,
without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ WERE
GUILTY OF UNBECOMING CONDUCT, WHICH IS
DEFINED AS IMPROPER PERFORMANCE.
Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of
ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed
method.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
THE CHARGE OF MANIFEST PARTIALITY FOR
ISSUING THE RESOLUTION GRANTING THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 25801 IS DISMISSED.
As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed
resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by
declaring the petition of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have failed to
sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed
any reversible error in the questioned judgment to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.
IN THEIR JOINT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE
HERNANDEZ MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY:
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
[A]ccept with all humility, and therefore, will no longer
contest the Honorable Courts finding that the
proceedings they had adopted in their provincial
hearings fell short of what the provisions of the law and
rules require. For such shortcoming, respondents Ong
and Hernandez can only express their regret and
apology.
JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ PRAY
FOR:
Exoneration, contending that they are not liable for
simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their
conduct for the simple reason that, as the Decision has
indicated, they have not been ill-motivated or inspired
by an intention to violate any law or legal rules in
adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of
cases in the provinces; their actions were not willful in
character or motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose; or even if their actions might be
irregular, wrongful, or improper, such could not be
characterized as simple misconduct necessitating
administrative sanction.
JUSTICE ONG AND JUSTICE HERNANDEZ POSIT
THAT THEY CANNOT BE MADE ACCOUNTABLE
FOR UNBECOMING CONDUCT BECAUSE THEY
ADMITTEDLY POSED QUESTIONS ON THE LAW
SCHOOLS OF ORIGIN OF THE COUNSEL
APPEARING BEFORE THEM:
That their propounding the queries, per se, did not
justify a finding of unbecoming conduct on their part
considering that they thereby never derided any law
school or belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the
basis of their school affiliations, nor exhibited bias for or
against any lawyer based on their alma mater.
JUSTICE ONG PRAYS THAT THE SANCTION
IMPOSED UPON HIM BE MADE EQUAL TO THAT
METED ON JUSTICE HERNANDEZ.
He implores the Honorable Court to re-examine the
propriety of imposing a different and heavier penalty
against him and take into due consideration its own
pronouncement in its decision that the Sandiganbayan
is a collegial court, and in a collegial court, the members
act on the basis of consensus or majority rule.
COMPLAINANT INSISTS THAT RESPONDENT
JUSTICES BE FOUND GUILTY OF ALL
ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES MADE AGAINST
THEM; AND THAT THE PENALTIES OR
CHASTISEMENT BE INCREASED TO BE
COMMENSURATE TO THEIR INFRACTIONS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion should be given merit.
RULING: ALL MRs ARE DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT
Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts
Decision Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010
of complainant Assistant Special Prosecutor III
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and
 21
the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September
14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez
SC DENY J. ONGS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
SC deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for
complete exoneration
RESPONDENT JUSTICES CANNOT LIGHTLY
REGARD THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR ALL
OF THEM TO SIT TOGETHER AS MEMBERS OF
THE FOURTH DIVISION IN THE TRIAL AND
DETERMINATION OF A CASE OR CASES
ASSIGNED THERETO.
The information and evidence upon which the Fourth
Division would base any decisions or other judicial
actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly
available to each and every one of its members during
the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full
participation of each member in the trial and
adjudication of their cases.
It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three
members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and
communicating distance of one another at the hearings
in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even
in those circumstances not all of them sat together in
session.
INDEED, THE ABILITY OF THE FOURTH
DIVISION TO FUNCTION AS A COLLEGIAL BODY
BECAME IMPOSSIBLE WHEN NOT ALL OF THE
MEMBERS SAT TOGETHER DURING THE TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS.
The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an
instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly
requires that rulings on oral motions made or objections
raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings
are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously,
the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong,
the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases
heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other
respondents properly and promptly contribute to the
rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him.
Respondents non-observance of collegiality
contravened the very purpose of trying criminal cases
cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all
three Justices. Although there are criminal cases
involving public officials and employees triable before
single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always
required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to
try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
in view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank
or office than those charged in the former cases.
THE THREE JUSTICES OF A DIVISION, RATHER
THAN A SINGLE JUDGE, ARE NATURALLY
EXPECTED TO EXERT KEENER JUDICIOUSNESS
AND TO APPLY BROADER CIRCUMSPECTION IN
TRYING AND DECIDING SUCH CASES.
The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the
review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
generally via the discretionary mode of petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court,
which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary
appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the
convictions still undergo intermediate review before
ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
IT IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE, THEN, THAT NO
MALICE OR CORRUPT MOTIVE IMPELLED
RESPONDENT JUSTICES INTO ADOPTING THE
FLAWED PROCEDURE.
As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been
well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the
valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
AS TO THE ARGUMENT OF JUSTICE ONG AND
JUSTICE HERNANDEZ AGAINST THIS COURTS
FINDING OF UNBECOMING CONDUCT ON
THEIR PART, THE MATTER HAS BEEN FULLY
ADDRESSED IN THE DECISION OF AUGUST 24,
2010.
SC held to be not well taken the urging of Justice Ong
that the penalty imposed upon him be similar to that
meted upon Justice Hernandez.
THE VARIANCE IN THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
RESPONDENT JUSTICES AS MEMBERS OF
THEIR DIVISION COMPEL THE
DIFFERENTIATION OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL
LIABILITIES.
Justice Ong, as the Chairperson, was the head of the
Division under the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan,
being the most senior Member, and, as such, he
possessed and wielded powers of supervision, direction,
and control over the conduct of the proceedings of the
Division.
This circumstance alone provided sufficient justification
to treat Justice Ong differently from the other
respondents.
SC NOTED IN THE DECISION THAT IN THE
EXERCISE OF HIS POWERS AS CHAIRMAN
OF THE FOURTH DIVISION, JUSTICE ONG
EXUDED AN UNEXPECTEDLY DISMISSIVE
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE VALID OBJECTIONS
OF THE COMPLAINANT
He steered his Division into the path of procedural
irregularity; and wittingly failed to guarantee that
proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within
the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. To be
sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada did not
direct and control how the proceedings of the Division
were to be conducted. Their not being responsible for
the direction and control of the running of the Division
and their having relied without malice on the Justice
Ongs direction and control should not be reproved as
much as Justice Ongs misconduct. Hence, their
responsibility and liability as Members of the Division
were properly diminished.
REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(648 SCRA 47 | 12 April 2011)
 22
FACTS: The Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in
the Sandiganbayan by complaint, impleading as
defendants respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
(Cojuangco) and 59 individual defendants.
Cojuangco allegedly purchased a block of 33,000,000
shares of SMC stock through the 14 holding companies
owned by the CIIF Oil Mills. For this reason, the block of
33,133,266 shares of SMC stock shall be referred to as
the CIIF block of shares.
Contention of the Republic of the Philippines:
That Cojuangco is the undisputed "coconut king" with
unlimited powers to deal with the coconut levy funds,
who took undue advantage of his association, influence
and connection, acting in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, misused coconut levy
funds to buy out majority of the outstanding shares of
stock of San Miguel Corporation.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and ACCRA law
offices plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and
confederated with each other in setting up, through the
use of coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate
framework and structures that led to the establishment
of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and
more than twenty other coconut levy-funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation shares and its institutionalization through
presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan:
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033-F was
dismissed for failure of plaintiff to prove by
preponderance of evidence its causes of action against
defendants with respect to the twenty percent (20%)
outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation
registered in defendants names.
Republic of the Philippines appealed the case to the
Supreme Court invoking that coconut levy funds are
public funds. The SMC shares, which were acquired by
respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and the Cojuangco companies
with the use of coconut levy funds in violation of
respondent Cojuangco, Jr.s fiduciary obligation are,
necessarily, public in character and should be
reconveyed to the government.
ISSUE: Whether Respondent Cojuangco Jr. used the
coconut levy funds to acquire SMC shares in violation of
his fiduciary obligation as a public officer.
RULING: Cojuangco violated no fiduciary duties.
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is
or was a government official or employee during the
administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a
prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
Republics burden to establish by preponderance of
evidence that respondents SMC shares had been
illegally acquired with coconut-levy funds was not
discharged.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and
1456 of the Civil Code (like the trustee using trust funds
to purchase, or a person acquiring property through
mistake or fraud), and Section 31 of the Corporation
Code (like a director or trustee willfully and knowingly
voting for or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation, among others) require factual foundations
to be first laid out in appropriate judicial proceedings.
Hence, concluding that Cojuangco breached fiduciary
duties as an officer and member of the Board of
Directors of the UCPB without competent evidence
thereon would be unwarranted and unreasonable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan could not fairly find that
Cojuangco had committed breach of any fiduciary duties
as an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the
UCPB. For one, the Amended Complaint contained no
clear factual allegation on which to predicate the
application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil Code,
and Section 31 of the Corporation Code. Although the
trust relationship supposedly arose from Cojuangcos
being an officer and member of the Board of Directors of
the UCPB, the link between this alleged fact and the
borrowings or advances was not established. Nor was
there evidence on the loans or borrowings, their
amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial court, the
Sandiganbayan could not presume his breach of
fiduciary duties without evidence showing so, for fraud
or breach of trust is never presumed, but must be
alleged and proved.
The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed
or lent might even preclude any consequent trust
implication but is more inclined to be a contract of loan.
To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing laws
do not provide for such requires evidence that
confidence is reposed by one party in another who
exercises dominion and influence. Absent any special
facts and circumstances proving a higher degree of
responsibility, any dealings between a lender and
borrower are not fiduciary in nature.
DISPOSITION:
The Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari and,
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan on November 28, 2007 in Civil Case No.
0033-F.
The Court declares that the block of shares in San Miguel
Corporation in the names of respondents Cojuangco, et
al. subject of Civil Case No. 0033-F is the exclusive
property of Cojuangco, et al. as registered owners.
LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC
(652 SCRA 798, June 28, 2011)
ACTION: These are consolidated petitions for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
 23
FACT: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into
law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law
Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on
30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to
convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of
Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved
in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives
re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint
Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16
cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting
all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives
approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved
the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga,
Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood
bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the Presidents
signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold
plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of
their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation
of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the
Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for
all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government
Code.
ISSUE: The petitions raise the following fundamental
issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal
protection clause.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
RULING: We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of
the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in
2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall
prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of
the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government
units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to
exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA
9009 remained an intent and was never written into
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on
unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws
were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
BAYONETTA vs. REYES
(660 SCRA 490, November 22, 2011)
FACTS: Chamelyn filed an administrative case against
Atty. Luis (Rivera). According to her, she was invited to
attend as maid of honor for her best friends wedding to
be held in the United States. To facilitate the issuance of
a US Visa, she engaged the services of Luis, who
introduced himself as an immigration lawyer, and
promised to facilitate the issuance of her US visa upon
payment of an initial amount of P350,000.00 and
another P350,000.00 upon the release of the US visa.
They both agreed that if the US visa was denied for any
reason other than her absence on the day of the
interview or for derogatory records, Luis would return
the amount. Despite receipt of the amount by Luis,
Chamelyn was not even scheduled for an interview at
the US embassy, and Luis failed to perform his
undertaking. Luis failed to return the amount, hence she
filed criminal and administrative charges against Luis. In
his defense, Luis admitted receiving the money, but
averred that his failure to do so was brought about by
the false pretences of a certain Rico Pineda, a purported
US consul, who also defrauded him after receiving the
money he gave for Chamelyns US visa. He attached as
proof emails from Rico, and photographs of him and his
family together with Rico.
 24
The IBP in its report and recommendation
recommended that Luis be suspended from the practice
of law for four months. It found Luis liable for
misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, for
engaging in deceitful conduct, failing to deliver the
service he undertook to perform; and being remiss in
returning the P350,000.00. It also refused to believe his
alibi on his purported transactions with Rico, and his
evidence consisting of emails and photographs which
were self-serving.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP is correct in its findings
and recommendation to suspend Luis from the practice
of law for four months.
RULING: After a judicious perusal of the records, the
Court concurs with the IBPs findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed
upon respondent.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing[1]. In this
regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself
as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to
complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the
issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of
P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In
truth, however, respondent has no specialization in
immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with
Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly
processes US visa applications for him. However,
respondent failed to prove Pinedas identity considering
that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all
self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative
value and consequently cannot be given any credence.
Undoubtedly, respondents deception is not only
unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him
unfit to practice law[2].
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed
to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is
to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor
of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer
takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve
the latter with competence, and to attend to such clients
cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him[3]. Therefore, a lawyers
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be
held administratively liable[4], as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the
amount of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client
is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great
fidelity and good faith[5]. The highly fiduciary nature of
this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received
for or from his client[6]. Thus, a lawyers failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics[7].
Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts,
jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers neglected their clients affairs and, at the same
time, failed to return the latters money and/or property
despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In
Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin[8], the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to
perform his undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client and to return the money given
to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz[9], the Court
suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for
his failure to return the amount his client gave him for
his legal services which he never performed. In this case,
not only did respondent fail to facilitate the issuance of
complainants US visa and return her money, he likewise
committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as
an immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to
his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty
should be imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing,
the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of
suspension from the practice of law of respondent from
six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2)
years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBPs recommendation
ordering respondent to return the amount of
P350,000.00 he received from complainant as
downpayment. It is well to note that while the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should
only revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyers administrative and not his civil
liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
 25
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely
civil in nature for instance, when the claim involves
moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct [from] and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement[10].
Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid amount
as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return
thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera
(respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years,
effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to
complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he received
from the latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within
ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision.
Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
2012
CONCEPCION vs. MINEX IMPORT
CORPORATION/MINERAMA CORPORATION
(663 SCRA 497, January 24, 2012)
CASE DOCTRINE: The employer may validly dismiss for
loss of trust and confidence an employee who commits
an act of fraud prejudicial to the interest of the
employer. Neither a criminal prosecution nor a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the crime is a
requisite for the validity of the dismissal. Nonetheless,
the dismissal for a just or lawful cause must still be made
upon compliance with the requirements of due process
under the Labor Code; otherwise, the employer is liable
to pay nominal damages as indemnity to the dismissed
employee.
FACTS: Respondent Minex Import-Export Corporation
(Minex) employed the petitioner initially as a
salesgirl,rotating her assignment among nearly all its
outlets. She was assigned at SM Harrison Plaza kiosk
with the instruction to hold the keys of the kiosk. On
November 9, 1997, the petitioner and her salesgirls had
sales of crystal items totaling P39,194.50. At the close of
business that day, they conducted a cash-count of their
sales proceeds, including those from the preceding
Friday and Saturday, and determined their total for the
three days to be P50,912.00. The petitioner wrapped the
amount in a plastic bag and deposited it in the drawer of
the locked wooden cabinet of the kiosk.At about 9:30 am
of November 10, 1997, the petitioner phoned Vina
Mariano to report that the P50,912.00 was missing,
explaining how she and her salesgirls had placed the
wrapped amount at the bottom of the cabinet the night
before, and how she had found upon reporting to work
that morning that the contents of the cabinet were in
disarray and the money already missing.
Later, while the petitioner was giving a detailed
statement on the theft to the security investigator of
Harrison Plaza, Vina and Sylvia Mariano, her superiors,
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
arrived with a policeman who immediately placed the
petitioner under arrest and brought her to Precinct 9 of
the Malate Police Station. There, the police investigated
her. She was detained for a day, from 11:30 am of
November 10, 1997 until 11:30 am of November 11,
1997, being released only because the inquest
prosecutor instructed so.On November 12, 1997, the
petitioner complained against the respondents for illegal
dismissal in the Department of Labor and
Employment.On November 14, 1997, Minex, through
Vina, filed a complaint for qualified theft against the
petitioner in the Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employerdenied the
employee dismissed with due process and thu liable for
damages?
RULING: Yes. To dismiss an employee, the law requires
the existence of a just and valid cause. Article 282 of
the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for
termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or the latters representative in
connection with the employees work; (b) gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud
or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or his duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by
the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
Indeed, the employer is not expected to be as strict and
rigorous as a judge in a criminal trial in weighing all the
probabilities of guilt before terminating the employee.
Unlike a criminal case, which necessitates a moral
certainty of guilt due to the loss of the personal liberty of
the accused being the issue, a case concerning an
employee suspected of wrongdoing leads only to his
termination as a consequence. The quantum of proof
required for convicting an accused is thus higher proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt than the quantum
prescribed for dismissing an employee substantial
evidence. In so stating, we are not diminishing the value
of employment, but only noting that the loss of
employment occasions a consequence lesser than the
loss of personal liberty, and may thus call for a lower
degree of proof.
Yet, even as we now say that the respondents had a just
or valid cause for terminating the petitioner, it becomes
unavoidable to ask whether or not they complied with
the requirements of due process. The petitioner plainly
demonstrated how quickly and summarily her dismissal
was carried out without first requiring her to explain
anything in her defense as demanded under Section 2
(d) of Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code. Instead, the respondents forthwith had her
arrested and investigated by the police authorities for
qualified theft. This, we think, was a denial of her right to
due process of law, consisting in the opportunity to be
heard and to defend herself. In fact, their decision to
dismiss her was already final even before the police
authority commenced an investigation of the theft, the
finality being confirmed by no less than Sylvia Mariano
herself telling the petitioner during their phone
conversation following the latters release from police
 26
custody on November 11, 1997 that she (Sylvia) no
longer wanted to see her.
The fair and reasonable opportunity required to be
given to the employee before dismissal encompassed not
only the giving to the employee of notice of the cause
and the ability of the employee to explain, but also the
chance to defend against the accusation. This was our
thrust in Philippine Pizza, Inc. v. Bungabong, where we
held that the employee was not afforded due process
despite the dismissal being upon a just cause,
considering that he was not given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to confront his accusers and to defend
himself against the charge of theft notwithstanding his
having submitted his explanation denying that he had
stolen beer from the company dispenser. The
termination letter was issued a day before the employee
could go to the HRD Office for the investigation, which
made it clear to him that the decision to terminate was
already final even before he could submit his side and
refute the charges against him. Nothing that he could say
or do at that point would have changed the decision to
dismiss him. Such omission to give the employee the
benefit of a hearing and investigation before his
termination constituted an infringement of his
constitutional right to due process by the employer.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant
case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual.
However, the employer should indemnify the employee
for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v.
National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to
be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent
practice of dismiss now, pay later, which we sought to
deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in
the nature of indemnification or penalty and should
depend on the facts of each case, taking into special
consideration the gravity of the due process violation of
the employer.
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due
process by the private respondent warrants the payment
of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The
amount of such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant
circumstances. Considering the prevailing
circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix
it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would
serve to deter employers from future violations of the
statutory due process rights of employees. At the very
least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this
fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor
Code and its Implementing Rules.
CAGAS vs. COMELEC
(663 SCRA 645, January 24, 2012)
FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first
legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon.
Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second
legislative district of the same province, House Bill No.
4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of
Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as
Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of
the Province of Davao Occidental.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the
holding of a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental
shall be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon
approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters
of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and
supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of
this Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of
R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of
all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the
preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and Local
Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the
COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation
of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October
2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the
COMELEC is without authority to amend or modify
section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is
only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act of
suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of
the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013,
simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
HELD: No. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
The COMELECs power to administer elections includes
the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule
prescribed by law. The conduct of a plebiscite is
necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10 and
11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special
metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a
plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their
basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local
executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of
the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created
shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the
direct exercise by the people of their sovereignty. After
the legislative branchs enactment of a law to create,
divide, merge or alter the boundaries of a local
government unit or units, the people in the local
government unit or units directly affected vote in a
plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the
change.
 27
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when
plebiscites should be held. This is in contrast with its
provisions for the election of members of the legislature
in Section 8, 4, Article VII. The Constitution recognizes
that the power to fix date of elections is legislative in
nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously
mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the
election of local government officials.
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGINEER OSCAR
L. ONGJOCO, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD/CEO OF
FH-GYM MULTI-PURPOSE AND TRANSPORT
SERVICE COOPERATIVE, AGAINST CA JUSTICES
(664 SCRA 465, January 31, 2012)
CASE DOCTRINE: Judicial officers do not have to suffer
the brunt of unsuccessful or dissatisfied litigants
baseless and false imputations of their violating the
Constitution in resolving their cases and of harboring
bias and partiality towards the adverse parties. The
litigant who baselessly accuses them of such violations is
not immune from appropriate sanctions if he thereby
affronts the administration of justice and manifests
disrespect towards the judicial office.
FACTS: On June 7, 2011, the Court received a letter from
Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, claiming himself to be the
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
of the FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service
Cooperative (FH-GYMN). The letter included a
complaint-affidavit, whereby Ongjoco charged the CAs
Sixth Division composed of Associate Justice Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. (as Chairman), Associate Justice Ramon M.
Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino as
Members for rendering an arbitrary and baseless
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 entitled FH-GYMN
Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative v. Allan
Ray A. Baluyut, et al.
The genesis of CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 started on July 26,
2004 when FH-GYMN requested the amendment
of Kautusang Bayan Blg. 37-02-97 of the City of San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan through the Committee on
Transportation and Communications (Committee) of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) in order to
include the authorization of FH-GYMNs Chairman to
issue motorized tricycle operators permit (MTOP) to its
members. During the ensuing scheduled public hearings,
City Councilors Allan Ray A. Baluyut and Nolly
Concepcion, together with ABC President Bartolome B.
Aguirre and one Noel Mendoza (an employee of
the Sanggunian), were alleged to have uttered
statements exhibiting their bias against FH-GYMN, giving
FH-GYMN reason to believe that the Committee
members were favoring the
existing franchisees Francisco Homes Tricycle Operators
and Drivers Association (FRAHTODA) and Barangay
Mulawin Tricycle Operators and Drivers Association
(BMTODA). Indeed, later on, the Sanggunian, acting
upon the recommendation of the Committee, denied the
request of FH-GYMN.
On July 15, 2005, FH-GYMN brought a complaint in the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charging
Baluyut, Concepcion, Aguirre, Mendoza with violations
of Article 124(2)(d) of the Cooperative Code, Section 3(e)
and (f) of the Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Corrupt Practices Act), and Section 5(a) of Republic Act
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct for Public Officials and
Employees). The complaint also charged Eduardo de
Guzman (FRAHTODA President) and Wilson de Guzman
(BMTODA President). Eventually, the complaint of FH-
GYMN was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence as to
the public officials, and for lack of merit and lack of
jurisdiction as to the private respondents. FH-GYMN
sought reconsideration, but its motion to that effect was
denied.
FH-GYMN timely filed a petition for review in the CA.
In the meanwhile, FH-GYMN filed in the Office of the
President a complaint accusing Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, Deputy Ombudsman
Emilio A. Gonzales III, and Graft Investigator and
Prosecution Officer Robert C. Renido with a violation of
Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019 arising from the
dismissal of its complaint.
On January 31, 2011, the CAs Sixth Division denied the
petition for review.
FH-GYMN, through Ongjoco, moved for the
reconsideration of the denial of the petition for review,
with prayer for inhibition, but the CAs Sixth Division
denied the motion.
Thereafter, Ongjoco initiated this administrative case
against the aforenamed member of the CAs Sixth
Division, wherein he maintained that respondent
members of the CAs Sixth Division violated Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically
stating the facts and the law on which the denial of the
petition for review was based; that they summarily
denied the petition for review without setting forth the
basis for denying the five issues FH-GYMNs petition for
review raised; that the denial was unjust, unfair and
partial, and heavily favored the other party; that the
denial of the petition warranted the presumption of
directly or indirectly becoming interested for personal
gain under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019; and
that the Ombudsman officials who were probably
respondent Justices schoolmates or associates
persuaded, induced or influenced said Justices to dismiss
the petition for review and to manipulate the delivery of
the copy of the decision to FH-GYMN to prevent it from
timely filing a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the decision promulgated on
January 31, 2011 by the CAs Sixth Division had
no legal foundation, thereby violating Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution?
2) Whether or not the administrative charge
against respondent Justices had no factual and
legal bases?
RULING 1: The Court finds the administrative complaint
against respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals
baseless and utterly devoid of legal and factual merit,
and outrightly dismiss it.
Firstly, Ongjoco insists that the decision promulgated on
January 31, 2011 by the CAs Sixth Division had no legal
 28
foundation and did not even address the five issues
presented in the petition for review; and that the
respondents as members of the CAs Sixth Division
thereby violated Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides as follows:
Section 14. No decision shall be
rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is
based.
No petition for review or motion
for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or
denied without starting the legal basis
therefor.
The insistence of Ongjoco is unfounded. The essential
purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that
a judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed
under the law as applied to the facts as proved; the
provision nowhere demands that a point-by-point
consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the
parties are necessary.
Its decision shows that the CAs Sixth Division complied
with the requirements of the constitutional provision.
Indeed, the definitive pronouncement of the CAs Sixth
Division that the Deputy Ombudsman found no
substantial evidence to prove that there was
interference in the internal affairs of FH-GYMN nor was
there a violation of the law by the respondents met the
constitutional demand for a clear and distinct statement
of the facts and the law on which the decision was
based. The CAs Sixth Division did not have to point out
and discuss the flaws of FH-GYMNs petition considering
that the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman sufficiently
detailed the factual and legal bases for the denial of the
petition.
Moreover, the CAs Sixth Division expressly found that
FH-GYMN had not discharged its burden as the
petitioner of proving its allegations with substantial
evidence. In administrative cases involving judicial
officers, the complainants always carried on their
shoulders the burden of proof to substantiate their
allegations through substantial evidence. That standard
of substantial evidence is satisfied only when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of although
such evidence may not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.
RULING 2: Secondly, Ongjoco ought to know, if he
genuinely wanted the Court to sustain his allegations of
misconduct against respondent Justices, that his
administrative complaint must rest on the quality of the
evidence; and that his basing his plain accusations on
hunches and speculations would not suffice to hold them
administratively liable for rendering the adverse
decision. Nonetheless, he exhibited disrespect for
respondent Justices judicial office by still filing this
administrative complaint against them despite
conceding in the administrative complaint itself his
having no proof of his charges.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
It is evident to us that Ongjocos objective in filing the
administrative complaint was to take respondent
Justices to task for the regular performance of their
sworn duty of upholding the rule of law. He would
thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for
not favoring his unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot
be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of
administrative investigation and prosecution made
against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his
regular performance of the judicial office always
subverts and undermines the independence of the
Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once
again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
brought against any judge in relation to the performance
of his official functions are neither complementary to
nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a
substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust
them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions.
In this regard, we reiterate that a judges failure to
correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the
evidence presented does not necessarily incur
administrative liability, for to hold him administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of
harassment and will make his position doubly
unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered
untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or
to interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment. Administrative
sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him
only when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious,
or is committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear
cases of violations by him of the standards and norms of
propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the
rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent
jurisprudence.
What the Court sees herein is Ongjocos proclivity to
indiscriminately file complaints. His proclivity reminds
us now of Joaquin T. Borromeo whom this Court
pronounced guilty of indirect contempt of court he
repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and
instructions given to him. The Court imposed the penalty
for contempt of court to the end that he may ponder his
serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due
respect for the Courts and their authority.
Having determined that the administrative charge
against respondent Justices had no factual and legal
bases, we cannot hesitate to shield them by immediately
rejecting the charge. We do so because unfounded
administrative charges do not contribute anything
worthwhile to the orderly administration of justice;
instead, they retard it.
Nor should we just let such rejected charge pass and go
unchallenged. We recognize that unfounded
administrative charges against judges really degrade the
judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of
their work for the Judiciary. Hence, we deem to be
warranted to now direct Ongjoco to fully explain his act
 29
of filing an utterly baseless charge against respondent
Justices.
RESOLUTION: The Court: (a) dismisses the
administrative complaint against Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr., Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and
Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino for its utter lack of
merit; and (b) orders Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco to show
cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why he
should not be punished for indirect contempt of court
for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals, and for interfering with
the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO
(681 SCRA 27, September 18, 2012)
CASE DOCTRINE: The issuance by the proper
disciplining authority of an order of preventive
suspension for 90 days of a civil service officer or
employee pending investigation of her administrative
case is authorized provided that a formal charge is
served to her and the charge involves dishonesty,
oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe
that she is guilty of the charge as to warrant her removal
from the service. Proof showing that the respondent
officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses
against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on
file at her office is not a prerequisite before she may be
preventively suspended.
FACTS: Trade and Investment Development Corporation
of the Philippines (TIDCORP) is a wholly owned
government corporation whose primary purpose is to
guarantee foreign loans, in whole or in part, granted to
any domestic entity, enterprise or corporation organized
or licensed to engage in business in the Philippines.
On May 13, 2003, the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
formally charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo
(Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP,
with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, insubordination, and gross
discourtesy in the course of official duties. The relevant
portions of the formal charge read:
After a thorough study, evaluation, and deliberation, the
Board finds merit to the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Committee on the existence of a
probable cause for Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
Insubordination, and Gross Discourtesy in the Course of
Official Duties. However and to avoid any suspicion of
partiality in the conduct of the investigation, the Board
hereby refers this case to the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel to conduct a formal investigation.
TIDCORP referred the charge to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) for formal
investigation and reception of evidence. Pending the
investigation, TIDCORP placed Demigillo under
preventive suspension for 90 days.
Demigillo assailed her preventive suspension in the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), which issued on January 21,
2004 Resolution No. 040047 declaring her preventive
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
suspension to be "not in order." The CSC stated that
under Section 19(2), Rule II, of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform
Rules), a civil service officer like Demigillo might be
preventively suspended by the disciplining authority
only if any of the two grounds were present, to wit: (1)
there was a possibility that the civil service employee
might unduly influence or intimidate potential witnesses
against him; or (2) there was a possibility that the civil
service employee might tamper the documentary
evidence on file in her office. According to the CSC,
TIDCORP did not prove with substantial evidence the
existence of any of such grounds.
Anent the potential tampering of documents by
Demigillo, the Commission similarly finds the same
remote. There is no showing that the documentary
evidence of the case leveled against her were in her
possession or custody as would otherwise justify the
imposition of preventive suspension. As borne by the
evidence on record, the acts complained of against
Demigillo constitute verbal tussles between her and
President Valdes which were all recorded and
documented by the TIDCORP. In this situation, there is
no chance of Demigillos tampering with documents.
From the foregoing disquisition, the Commission finds
that the preventive suspension of Demigillo for ninety
(90) days was improvidently made because the
possibility of exerting/influencing possible witnesses or
tampering with documents, which is the evil sought to
be avoided in this case, does not exist.
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration by the
CSC, TIDCORP appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
submitting the sole issue of:
Whether or not the CSC erred in so holding the
preventive suspension of appellant Demigillo was not in
order. On November 7, 2006, the CA promulgated its
decision affirming the CSC.
ISSUE: Whether or not TIDCORPs 90-day preventive
suspension of Demigillo is valid.
RULING: The Court grants the petition, and hold that the
90-day preventive suspension order issued against
Demigillo was valid.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (RAC)
embodies the major structural, functional and
procedural principles and rules of governance of
government agencies and constitutional bodies like the
CSC. Section 1, Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, of
the RAC states that the CSC is the central personnel
agency of the government. Section 51 and Section 52,
Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the RAC
respectively contain the rule on preventive suspension
of a civil service officer or employee pending
investigation, and the duration of the preventive
suspension, viz:
Section 51. Preventive Suspension. The proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
 30
grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from
the service.
Section 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending
Administrative Investigation. When the administrative
case against the officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining
authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the
date of suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That
when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the
fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the
period of delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.
Under Section 51, supra, the imposition of preventive
suspension by the proper disciplining authority is
authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty,
oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe
that the respondent is guilty of charges which would
warrant his removal from the service. Section 51
nowhere states or implies that before a preventive
suspension may issue there must be proof that the
subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses against
him or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in
her office.
In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that
preventive suspension pending investigation "is a
measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to
investigate charges against respondent by preventing
the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing
witnesses against him." As such, preventing the
subordinate officer or employee from intimidating the
witnesses during investigation or from tampering the
documentary evidence in her office is a purpose, not a
condition, for imposing preventive suspension, as shown
in the use of the word "intended."
Relevantly, CSC Resolution No. 030502, which was
issued on May 5, 2003 for the proper enforcement of
preventive suspension pending investigation.
Consequently, the CSC and the CA erred in making the
purpose of preventive suspension a condition for its
issuance Although, as a rule, we defer to the
interpretation by administrative agencies like the CSC of
their own rules, especially if the interpretation is
affirmed by the CA, we withhold deference if the
interpretation is palpably erroneous, like in this
instance.
We hold that TIDCORPs issuance against Demigillo of
the order for her 90-day preventive suspension pending
the investigation was valid and lawful.
The petition for review on certiorari was granted,
and the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
November 7, 2006 was set aside, and the order for the
preventive suspension for 90 days of Demiglio pending
her investigation for grave misconduct was declared as
valid
LLOREN vs COMELEC
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
(681 SCRA 27, September 18, 2012)
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. (Pua)
were the candidates for Vice Mayor of the Municipality
of Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the winning candidate
with a plurality of 752 votes for garnering 5,682 votes as
against petitioners 4,930 votes. Alleging massive vote-
buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the
clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election-
related manipulations, petitioner commenced Election
Protest Case (EPC) No. H-026 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Hilongos, Leyte. In his answer with special and
affirmative defenses and counterclaim, Pua alleged that
the election protest stated no cause of action, was
insufficient in form and content, and should be
dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the required
cash deposit.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not appeal was perfected.
2) Whether or not there was a valid election
contest.
RULING 1: Yes. The rules on the timely perfection of an
appeal in an election case requires two different appeal
fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the
filing of the notice of appeal within five days from notice
of the decision, and the other to be paid in the COMELEC
Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of
the notice of appeal.
In A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the Court promulgated the Rules
of Procedure In Election Contests Before The Courts
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials
(hereafter, the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC), effective on
May 15, 2007, to set down the procedure for election
contests and quo warranto cases involving municipal
and barangay officials that are commenced in the trial
courts. The Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC superseded
Rule 35 (Election Contests Before Courts of General
Jurisdiction) and Rule 36 (Quo Warranto Case Before
Courts of General Jurisdiction) of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
Under Section 8, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-
15-SC, an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the
trial court to the COMELEC within five days after
promulgation by filing a notice of appeal in the trial
court that rendered the decision, serving a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse counsel or on the
adverse party if the party is not represented by counsel.
Section 9, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
prescribes for that purpose an appeal fee of P 1,000.00
to be paid to the trial court rendering the decision
simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.
It should be stressed, however, that the Rules in A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC did not supersede the appeal fee prescribed
by the COMELEC under its own rules of procedure. As a
result, the requirement of two appeal fees by two
different jurisdictions caused a confusion in the
implementation by the COMELEC of its procedural rules
on the payment of appeal fees necessary for the
perfection of appeals. To remove the confusion, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486, effective on July
 31
24, 2008, whereby the COMELEC clarified the rules on
the payment of the two appeal fees by allowing the
appellant to pay the COMELECs appeal fee of P 3,200.00
at the COMELECs Cash Division through the ECAD or by
postal money order payable to the COMELEC within a
period of 15 days from the time of the filing of the notice
of appeal in the trial court.
The non-payment of the motion fee of P 300.00 at the
time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration did
not warrant the outright denial of the motion for
reconsideration, but might only justify the COMELEC to
refuse to take action on the motion for reconsideration
until the fees were paid, or to dismiss the action or
proceeding when no full payment of the fees is
ultimately made. The authority to dismiss is
discretionary and permissive, not mandatory and
exclusive, as expressly provided in Section 18, Rule 40 of
the 1993 Rules of Procedure.
RULING 2: Yes. Section 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M.
No. 10-4-1-SC pertinently provides as follows: Section
10. Contents of the protest or petition.
xxx
c. An election protest shall also state: (i) that the
protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and had been voted for the same
office; (ii) the total number of precincts in the
municipality; (iii) the protested precincts and votes of
the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement
of Votes by Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not
specified, an explanation why the votes are not specified;
and (iv) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions
complained of showing the electoral frauds, anomalies
or irregularities in the protested precincts.
As the findings of the RTC show, petitioner did not
indicate the total number of precincts in the municipality
in his election protest. The omission rendered the
election protest insufficient in form and content, and
warranted its summary dismissal, in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC.
TALAGA vs. COMELEC
(GR. NO. 197015 | October 9, 2012)
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the
disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the
winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of
who should assume the office following the substitutes
disqualification.
FACTS: Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo
(Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy
(CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be
contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and
local elections. Ramon declared that he was eligible for
the office he was seeking to be elected to.
Four days later, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a
petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of
Ramon as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3)
Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. He
allegedtherein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had
been elected and had served three consecutive terms as
Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of
Lucena City in the upcoming elections.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Ramon countered that the Sandiganbayan had
preventively suspended him from office during his
second and third terms; and that the three-term limit
rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing
jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary
separation from office amounted to an interruption of
continuity of service for purposes of the application of
the three-term limit rule.
In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court
promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, holding that preventive suspension, being a
mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for
avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus,
Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with
Motion to Resolve, acknowledging that he is now
DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of
LucenaCity; yet did not withdraw his CoC.
Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, however, he later on filed for its
withdrawal.On the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her
own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of
Ramon, her husband.
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon
remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his
favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his
substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being
ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against
Castillos 39,615 votes.
Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation
with the COMELEC, alleging that Barbara Ruby could not
substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled
and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be
considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc
had approved her substitution three days after the
elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be
considered stray.
Thereafter, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected
Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene, positing
that he should assume the post of Mayor because
Barbara Rubys substitution had been invalid and
Castillo had clearly lost the elections.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Barbara Rubys substitution was
valid.
2) Who among the contending parties should
assume the position.
RULING 1: Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine
qua non for a valid substitution. The filing of a CoC
within the period provided by law is a mandatory
requirement for any person to be considered a candidate
in a national or local election. This is clear from Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be
eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein.
 32
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate
from running in an electoral race. One is through a
petition for disqualification and the other through a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a
valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the
candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does
not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted,
because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has
not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
Declaration of Ramons disqualification rendered his CoC
invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be
properly substituted.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a
person lacks a qualification but also that he made a
material representation that is false. The false
representation under Section 78 must likewise be a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made
with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidates qualifications for public office.
Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses
cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and
cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is
patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate
results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material
falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot
run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both
cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws.
To be sure, the cause of Ramons ineligibility (i.e., the
three-term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution
and statutory law. The objective of imposing the three-
term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office."
To accord with the constitutional and statutory
proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from
asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for
the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was
invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the
incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his
eligibility to run.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility
when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve
on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to
render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents
and purposes the COMELECs declaration of his
disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was
no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right
to pass on to his substitute.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
RULING 2: Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume
the position of Mayordue to a permanent vacancy in the
office.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers
two situations. The first is when the disqualification
becomes final before the elections, which is the situation
covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is
when the disqualification becomes final after the
elections, which is the situation covered in the second
sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6
of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first
situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and
votes cast for him shall not be counted. Castillo could not
assume the office for he was only a second placer. On the
other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified
Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of
Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate
for her to substitute due to Ramons ineligibility.
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena
City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled
pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44
of the LGC, to wit:
Section 44.Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor
or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned
shall become the governor or mayor. x xx
CONCURRING OPINION/s: Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code is clear that before a substitution of
candidates for an elective position could be validity
done, the official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party should die, withdraw or must be qualified
for any cause. In the present case, the records will show
that at the time Ruby C. Talaga filed her Certificate of
Candidacy, or May 4, 2010, there was still no ground for
substitute since the judgment on Ramon Talagas
disqualification had not yet attained finality.
DISSENTING OPINION/s: It is Castillo who should be
seated as Mayor
a. the violation of the three-term limit rule is a
unique but proper ground for disqualification
and not for the cancellation of a CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC);
b. the petition filed by Castillo against Ramon was
based on the three-term limit rule and, hence,
was a petition for disqualification, but no
effective disqualification ever took place since
Ramon never qualified to serve for a fourth
term; and
c. since Ruby did not validly substitute Ramon and
Ramon opted to exit out of the election race
(although through an erroneous mode of asking
for a ruling disqualifying him), neither of the
two can be considered candidates and the votes
cast in their favor should be considered stray;
 33
thus, Castillo should be proclaimed as Mayor of
Lucena City.
Hidden behind but not erased by this simplistic recital of
the issues, rulings and dissent is the legal reality that
these cases pose issues way beyond the question of
substitution that appears on the surface. They require a
look into the nature of a CoC; distinctions between
eligibility, or lack of it, and disqualification; the effects of
cancellation and disqualification; the applicable
remedies; and the unique nature and the effect of the
constitutional three-term limit for local elective officials.
Although Castillo denominated his petition as one for
cancellation or denial of due course to Ramons COC and
sought the same relief, it did not raise any of the
specified grounds for such action under Sections 69 and
78 of the Omnibus Election Code
2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO
BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO
(G.R. No. 170634 | January 8, 2013)
FACTS: Pedro Buado y Cipriano Jr. was found guilty by
the RTC of Valenzuela (May 5, 2003) of two counts of
rape committed against his two minor daughters- 10 yrs
old and 8 yrs old. He was sentenced to suffer in each case
the death penalty.
The accused was his own sole witness. He denied raping
his two daughters and shifted the blame on his drug
addict son. He assailed the credibility of the two
daughters testimonies were replete with incredulous
statements, and insisting that they were motivated by
anger and revenge than by a sincere call for justice.
He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (April 27,
2005). The CA affirmed the conviction, but reduced the
death penalty to reclusion perpetua. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting the accused-appelant of the crime
charged despite the fact that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt; and
2) Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in
imposing the Death Penalty upon the accused-
appelant despite the prosecutions failure to
prove the Special Qualifying Circumstances of
Relationship and Minority.
RULING 1:
The appeal has no merit.
The trial records entirely supported the lower courts
findings in favor of the credibility of the two daughters
recollections. On the other hand, the accused did not
bring to the Courts attention any facts and
circumstances of weight that, if properly considered,
would change the result into one favorable to him. He
did not even submit to the court any argument that
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
would lead the court to doubt the findings of the RTC
and the CA on the credibility of the two daughters.
Moreover, long silence and delay in reporting the crime
of rape to the proper authorities have not always been
considered as an indication of a false accusation.
The Court discussed that, the essence of rape is the
carnal knowledge of a female either against her will
(through force or intimidation) or without her consent
(where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is
demented).
Thus, the presence or absence of injury or lacerations in
the genitalia of the victim is not decisive of whether rape
has been committed or not. Such injury or laceration is
material only if force or intimidation is an element of the
rape charged.
The accused may then be convicted solely on the basis of
the victims credible, natural and convincing testimony.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death
penalty is imposed if the rape is committed with the
attendance of any aggravating/qualifying
circumstances. One of such is when the victim is under
18 years of age and offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. Both minority and actual
relationship must be alleged and proved.
RULING 2: During the trial, the Prosecution adduced no
evidence to establish the minority of one of the raped
daughters in Crim. Case No. 912-V-99. Hence, the court
concurs with the CAs conclusion that the accused could
not be properly found guilty of qualified rape.
Accordingly, the CA correctly prescribed Reclusion
Perpetua as the penalty.
On the other hand, in Crim. Case No. 974-V-99, it
sufficiently stated the minority of the other daughter and
her being a legitimate daughter of the accused.
Accordingly, the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of
death.
But, with the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of
R.A. No. 9346, the imposition of the death penalty has
become prohibited. Thus, the retroactive application of
the prohibition against the death penalty must be made
here because it is favorable to the accused. Nonetheless,
he shall not be eligible for parole, because Sec 3 of R.A.
No. 9346 expressly provides that persons whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of this Act shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4103, as amended.
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.
DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M.
GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(G.R. No. 188056 | January 8, 2013)
FACTS: Spouses Augusto and Ofelia Dacudao were
among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr.
and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies
(Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy
 34
Group buy back agreement that earned them check
payments that were dishonored.
Thus, they filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso
Delos Angeles and his associates after the Spouses were
defrauded in a business venture.
The DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which
directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases
already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for
appropriate action. However, in a separate order which
is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that
cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of
the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City
need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in
Manila.
Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of the
Spouses was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special
Panel of the DOJ in Manila.
Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the
respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the Department Order and the Memorandum,
which according to the Spouses violated their right to
due process, right to equal protection of the law and
right to speedy disposition of the cases.
The petitioners opined that orders were
unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases
already filed and pending at the Prosecutors Office of
Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed
issuances should cover only future cases against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated.
They maintained that D.O. No. 182 was issued in
violation of the prohibition against passing laws with
retroactive effect.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the petitioners violated the
hierarchy of courts.
2) Whether or not the questioned Department
Order and Memorandum violate the spouses
equal protection of the laws.
3) Whether or not it violated their right to the
speedy disposition of cases.
4) Whether or not the assailed issuances can be
given retroactive effect.
RULING 1: Yes. The petitioners have unduly disregarded
the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court
with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus without tendering therein any special,
important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing
of the petition.
The court emphasized that the concurrence of
jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warrant, habeas
corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court
will cause the dismissal of the recourse.
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the
Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek
and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a
rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the
first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the
petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of
the policy on the hierarchy of courts, x x x x.
RULING 2: No. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction;
what it requires is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the
Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the
classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.
In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,
2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the
relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many
complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and
Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be
conducted by the special panel. He also took into account
that the cases had already been filed in the City
Prosecutors Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he
issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of
complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the
Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the
cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of
DO No. 182.
RULING 3: No. The Court has clarified that although the
Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible
concept.
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr.,
et al. was ordered obviously to obtain expeditious justice
for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them.
Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related
questions to be dealt with during the preliminary
investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the
consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means
of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of
having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.
RULING 4: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no
retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one
such exception concerns a law that is procedural in
nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute
relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not
create new rights or take away vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of its passage. All procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
retroactive application is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no
vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural laws.
 35
BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX,ZAMBOANGA CITY vs.
THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO
G. ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR.KHEM M.
INOK
(G.R. No. 188635 January 29, 2013)
FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a
program for human resources development in science
and technology in order to achieve and maintain the
necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would
sustain the drive for total science and technology
mastery.
Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the
Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following
the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
Thereafter, Brenda Nazareth, DOST Regional Office No.
IX released the Magna Carta benefits to the covered
officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite
the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in
the GAA.
Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by
COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas, several Notices of
Disallowance were issued disapproving the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits. Provision for use of saving of
GAA was vetoed by the President.
The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST
Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of
the President (OP) through his Memorandum a Request
for Authority to Use Savings for the Payment of Magna
Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, for the
authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna
Carta benefits.
Then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by
authority of the President, approved the request of
Secretary Uriarte, Jr.
Hence, the petitioner lodged an appeal with COA
Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting
of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits.
The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and
Adjudication Director (RLAD) which denied the appeal
and affirmed the NDs. Thus, the petitioner elevated the
matter to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office.
Director Khem N. Inok of the COA Legal and Adjudication
Office rendered a decision denying the petitioners
appeal with the modification that only the NDs covering
the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2000 were to be set
aside in view of the authorization issued by Executive
Secretary Zamora as the alter ego of the President.
Hence, the appellant filed the instant petition for review
with the main argument that the payment of Magna
Carta benefits to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX
employees are allowed pursuant to RA No. 8439.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
ISSUE: Whether or not the payment of Magna Carta
benefits for CYs 1998, 1999 and 2001 is valid and legal.
RULING: No. In the funding of current activities,
projects, and programs, the general rule should still be
that the budgetary amount contained in the
appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine
as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the
proponent agency.
The only exception is found in Section 25 (5),Article VI of
the Constitution, by which the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are
authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any
item in the GAA for their respective offices from the
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the
high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings
only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but
reasonably construed as exclusive.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one
item to another was explicit and categorical under the
1973 Constitution. The prohibition against the transfer
of appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the
payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001
without a specific item or provision in the GAA and
without due authority from the President to utilize the
DOSTs savings in other items for the purpose was
repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and the re-
enacted GAA for 2001.
Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials
who caused the payment of the Magna Carta benefits to
the covered officials and employees acted in good faith
in the honest belief that there was a firm legal basis for
the payment of the benefits.
The Court declares and holds that the disallowed
benefits received in good faith need not be reimbursed
to the Government.
DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. ACTING SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(G.R. No. 191644 | February 19, 2013)
FACTS: Agra was then the Government Corporate
Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera,
who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice.
Again, Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in
place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned.
Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate
Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an
Acting Solicitor General.
 36
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment.
Agra argued that his concurrent designations were
merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he
was holding multiple offices at the same time, his
designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-
over, so that he never received salaries and
emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Agras designation as Acting
Secretary of Justice is valid.
2) Whether or not Agra may concurrently hold the
positions by virtue of the hold-over principle.
3) Whether or not the offices of the Solicitor
General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex
officio capacity in relation to the other.
RULING 1: No. The designation of Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional
prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987
Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting
or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet
Members in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in GOCCs is
concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to
apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, because the objective of
Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in
the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and
their deputies and assistants.
RULING 2: No. Agras designation as the Acting
Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by
which he would have been validly authorized to
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of
one office being the consequence of holding the other.
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in
Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the
broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of
the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as
Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient
for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was
allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.
To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations
from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent
designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.
RULING 3: No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor
General are neither required by the primary functions
nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa.
The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent
of the latter, as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987
decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous.
With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same
qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives,
allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding
Judges of the Court of Appeals.
ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO vs.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(TIDCORP), and its BOARD OF DIRECTORS
(G.R. No. 168613 | March 5, 2013)
FACTS: Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized the structure
of TIDCORP. The issuance of appointments in
accordance with the reorganization ensued. Petitioner
Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed
as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status,
and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services
Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP.
Thereafter, the Board of Directors passed Resolution No.
1365, Series of 2002, on October 22, 2002 to approve a
so-called Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan
to implement a new organizational structure and staffing
pattern, a position classification system, and a new set of
qualification standards.
LCSD was abolished. Ma. Rosario Manalang- Demigillo,
albeit retaining her position as a Senior Vice President,
was assigned to head the Remedial and Credit
Management Support Sector (RCMSS). On the same date,
President Valdes issued her appointment as head of
RCMSS, such appointment being in nature a
reappointment under the reorganization plan.
Demigillo challenged before the Board of Directors the
validity of Resolution No. 1365 and of her assignment to
the RCMSS. She averred that she had been thereby
illegally removed from her position of Senior Vice
President in the LCSD to which she had been previously
assigned during the reorganization of July 1998. She
insisted the Board of Directors had not been authorized
to undertake the reorganization and corporate
restructuring.
Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), raising the same issues.
The CSC ruled through Resolution No. 041092 that the
2002 Organizational Refinements or Restructuring Plan
of TIDCORP had been valid for being authorized by
Republic Act. No. 6656; that Section 7 of Republic Act No.
8498 granted a continuing power to TIDCORPs Board of
Directors to prescribe the agencys organizational
structure, staffing pattern and compensation packages;
and that such grant continued until declared invalid by a
court of competent jurisdiction or revoked by Congress.
The CSC held, however, that TIDCORPs implementation
of its reorganization did not comply with Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6656, that although there was no
diminution in Demigillos rank, salary and status, there
was nonetheless a demotion in her functions and
authority.
The CSC further held that the dropping from the rolls of
Demigillo did not comply with the mandatory
requirement under Section 2, particularly 2.2 Rule XII of
 37
the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series
of 1998.
The CA ruled that being the alter ego of the President of
the Philippines, the Board of Directors of the TIDCORP is
authorized by law to have a continuous power to
reorganize its agency.
It further ruled that, reorganizations have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
Reorganization
Moreover, it ruled that in utter disregard of respondent
Demigillos right to security of tenure, petitioner
TIDCORP demoted her in the guise of "reorganization."
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President who
had the continuing authority to reorganize
TIDCORP.
2) Whether or not the reorganization of TIDCORP
effected in 2002 was valid.
3) Whether or not Demigillo had been legally
dropped from the rolls.
RULING 1: No. The doctrine of qualified political agency
could not be extended to the acts of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being
themselves the appointees of the President to the
Cabinet.
Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1080, as
further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494,
the five ex officio members were the Secretary of
Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the
Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority, and the Chairman of the
Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four
other members of the Board were the three from the
private sector (at least one of whom should come from
the export community), who were elected by the ex
officio members of the Board for a term of not more than
two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP
who was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board.
Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or
function, not because of their direct appointment to the
Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the
President that sat them in the Board.
When the members of the Board of Directors effected
the assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the
responsible members of the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as
the alter egos of the President.
RULING 2: Yes. The court upholds the 2002
reorganization and declares it valid for being done in
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
accordance with the exclusive and final authority
expressly granted under Republic Act No. 8494, further
amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, and the law
creating TIDCORP itself.
Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an
organizational structure and staffing pattern for officers
and employees of the Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP)
and upon recommendation of its President, appoint and
fix their remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits:
Provided, That the Board shall have exclusive and final
authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and re-
assign personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of
existing law to the contrary notwithstanding.
RULING 3: No. Having found the 2002 reorganization to
be valid and made pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494,
we declare that there are no legal and practical bases for
reinstating Demigillo to her former position as Senior
Vice President in the LCSD. To be sure, the
reorganization plan abolished the LCSD, and put in place
a set-up completely different from the previous one,
including a new staffing pattern in which Demigillo
would be heading the RCMSS, still as a Senior Vice
President of TIDCORP.
Hence, Demigillo was not demoted because she did not
suffer any diminution in her rank, status and salary
under the reorganization. Her reassignment to the
RCMSS, a smaller unit compared to the LCSD, maintained
for her the same rank of Senior Vice-President with a
corresponding increase in pay grade. The reassignment
resulted from the valid reorganization.
MALIKSI vs. COMELEC
(GR No. 203302| 11 April 2013)
SUBJECT: Requisites of Judicial Due Process
FACTS: During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the
position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes,
brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered
precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the
votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared
Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the
functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the
COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis
motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was
then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division,
without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount
the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated
March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the
amount necessary to defray the expenses for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it
issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan
to augment his cash deposit. On August 15, 2012, the
First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs
decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected
 38
Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that he had been denied his right to due process
because he had not been notified of the decryption
proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts
of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence,
had been unwarranted because there was no proof that
the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved
to deny Maliksis motion for reconsideration. Maliksi
then came to the Court via petition for certiorari,
reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images without prior notice to
him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images
in the recount proceedings conducted by the First
Division. In the decision promulgated on March 12,
2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksis
petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi
had not been denied due process because: (a) he had
received notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the First Division
referring to the orders of the First Division directing
Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he
had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in
his motion for reconsideration. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its
discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of
the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the
ballot images were not secondary images, but
considered original documents with the same
evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on
Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding
that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered
had been fully established by the large number of cases
of double-shading during the revision. Hence, Maliksi
filed the petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maliksi was deprived of due
process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on
appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images in the CF cards.
HELD: The petition was dismissed.
Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process when the
COMELEC First Division directed the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF
cards for the first time on appeal without notice to him,
thus depriving him of his right to be present and observe
the decryption proceedings.
The records also showed that Maliksi was aware of the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot
images by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC
First Division issued an Order dated 28 March 2012
directing Saquilayan to deposit the required amount for
expenses for the supplies, honoraria, and fee for the
decryption of the CF cards, and a copy of the Order was
personally delivered to Maliksis counsel. Maliksis
counsel was likewise given a copy of Saquilayans
Manifestation of Compliance with the 28 March 2012
Order. In an order dated 17 April 2012, the COMELEC
First Division directed Saquilayan to deposit an
additional anount for expenses for the printing of
additional ballot images from our clustered precincts,
and a copy of the Order was again personally delivered
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
to Maliksis counsel. The decryption took two weeks to
finish.
Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received
notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of
the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In
addition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption
in his motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
En Banc. The Court has ruled:
xxx The essence of due process, we have consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The requirement is
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. xxx.
There is no denial of due process where there is
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments
or pleadings, it is settled that opportunity to be heard
does not only mean oral arguments in court but also
written arguments through pleadings. Thus, the fact that
a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration
negates any violation of the right to due process. The
court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard
on his motion for reconsideration.
RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA B.
FABIANA AGAINST PRESIDING JUSTICE ANDRES
B. REYES, JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ISAIAS P.
DICDICAN AND STEPHEN C. CRUZ; CARAG
JAMORA SOMERA AND VILLAREAL LAW OFFICES
AND ITS LAWYERS ATTYS. ELPIDIO C. JAMORA,
JR. AND BEATRIZ O. GERONILLA-VILLEGAS,
LAWYERS FOR MAGSAYSAY MARITIME
CORPORATION AND VISAYAN SURETY AND
INSURANCE CORPORATION.
(A.M. No. CA-13-51-J | 2 July 2013)
SUBJECT: Pleadings and practice; Civil procedure;
consolidation of cases
HELD: It is true that under the Rules of Court, trial is
permissive and a matter of judicial discretion. This is
because trials held in the first instance require the
attendance of the parties, their respective counsel and
their witnesses, a task that surely entails an expense that
can multiply if there are several proceedings upon the
same issues involving the same parties. At the trial stage,
the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue
vexation to the parties is the primary objective of
consolidation of cases. But the permissiveness of
consolidation does not carry over to the appellate stage
where the primary objective is less the avoidance of
unnecessary expenses and undue vexation than it is the
ideal realization of the dual function of all appellate
adjudications.
In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is to
make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings
resting on the same set of facts, or involving identical
 39
claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such
consolidation should be made regardless of whether or
not the parties or any of them requests it. A mandatory
policy eliminates conflicting results concerning similar
or like issues between the same parties or interests even
as it enhances the administration of justice.
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A.
CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES SUBMITTED FOR
DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING MOTIONS
IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27,
SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION.
(A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC | 9 July 2013)
SUBJECT: Legal and Judicial Ethics; Judge; Gross
inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or
resolution of cases
FACTS: This administrative case originates from the
judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in view of the disability retirement
of Presiding Judge Antonio A. Carbonell.
According to the Audit Teams Report, Branch 27, Judge
Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases and 22 civil
cases. Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed
to resolve pending motions or incidents in four criminal
cases and 12 civil cases
In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA
recommended to the Court that a fine of P50, 000.00 be
imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for
failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve
pending motions and incidents.
In its Memorandum dated February 2, 2011 the OCA
reiterated its recommendation to impose a fine
of P50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting that he had
failed to render any valid reason for his delay in deciding
the cases submitted for decision and in resolving the
pending motions or incidents in other cases. The OCA
noted that the case records did not bear any requests for
extension of time or any directive for the transcription of
stenographic notes. It stressed that heavy caseload
would not justify the failure to promptly decide and
resolve cases because he could have simply asked the
Court for an extension of time.
HELD: The Supreme Court said that Carbonells failure
to decide cases within the reglamentary 90-day period
without any justifiable and credible reasons constitutes
gross inefficiency. They reiterated that as a frontline
official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act
with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to
be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional
competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to
be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that
he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the
public have reposed in him and the institution he
represents. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of
time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a
judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension
of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost
invariably granted such request. The Court reduced the
recommended penalty of fine fromP50,000 to P20,000
considering that Judge Carbonell has retired due to
disability, his poor health condition may have greatly
contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his
duties as a trial judge.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
FERDINAND A. SAMSON vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O.
ERA
(A.C. No. 6664 | 16 July 2013)
SUBJECT: Legal and Judicial Ethics; Attorney; Conflict of
interest
FACTS: Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint
for disbarment charging respondent Atty. Edgardo O.
Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client
by representing the interest of Emilia C. Sison, his
present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with
his interest.
Samson and his relatives were among the investors who
fell prey to the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS
Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level
Marketing Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation
whose corporate officers were led by Sison.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him
and his relatives in the criminal prosecution of Sison and
her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era
prepared the demand letter dated July 19, 2002
demanding the return or refund of the money subject of
their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-
affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July 26,
2002. Subsequently, the complaint-affidavit charged
Sison and the other corporate officials of ICS Corporation
with several counts of estafa.
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not
anymore appear for Samson and his group. This forced
them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to
find out later on, however, that Atty. Era had already
been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in
her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC
in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding scam that
she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated. In this
regard, they established Atty. Eras legal representation
of Sison by submitting several certified copies of the
minutes of the proceedings in the criminal cases
involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and
Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty.
Era had appeared as the counsel of Sison in the cases for
estafa pending and being tried in said courts.
HELD: The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was
fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would
be representing a client whose interest is directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the
same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a
client involving the same or a substantially related
matter that is materially adverse to the former client
only if the former client consents to it after consultation.
The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the clients case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered
in the course of the relationship must be treated as
sacred and guarded with care. It behoves lawyers not
only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing,
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice. The nature of that relationship
 40
is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.
Contrary to Atty. Eras ill-conceived attempt to explain
his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination
of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule
is that the clients confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer
disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in
the previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of
Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
CONCERNED CITIZEN vs. NONITA V. CATENA,
COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 50, PUERTO PRINCESA,
PALAWAN
(A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P | 16 July 2013)
SUBJECT: Legal and Judicial Ethics; Court personnel;
Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility;
Penalty
FACTS: This administrative case stemmed from an
undated anonymous letter-complaint charging
respondent Nonita Catena (Catena), a Court
Stenographer III of Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court
in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan (RTC) with gross
dishonesty she allegedly committed in connection with
her Civil Service eligibility accusing her of having caused
another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility
Examination in her stead.
On January 18, 2002, Justice Jose P. Perez, a Member of
this Court, as Deputy Court Administrator, forwarded
the complaint against Catena for investigation by the
Legal Division of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). On February 21, 2002, Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, a Member of this Court, the Court Administrator
then, directed Catena to comment within ten days on the
anonymous complaint.
Catena implored the OCA for a 30-day extension of the
period within which to submit her comment.Despite her
request being granted, she failed to submit a comment,
causing the Court to issue a tracer letter on September
24, 2002, but still enjoining her to comply with the
previous directive to file a comment within five days
from notice, or else the complaint would be resolved
without her comment.
Catena still failed to comment on the complaint
thereafter, prompting the Court to require her on March
17, 2004 to show cause why she should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure, and to comply with the October 1, 2003
resolution by submitting the comment within 10 days.
On March 9, 2005, however, Judge Nelia Yap-Fernandez
of the RTC formally informed the Court that Catena had
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
already resigned from her position effective on January
2, 2003.
Eventually on February 12, 2007, the Court directed the
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC to provide Catenas
current and correct address within 10 days because of
Judge Yap-Fernandezs intervening disability retirement.
After the subsequent attempt to serve still failed
because, as noted on the envelope, Catena as the
addressee had "moved out," the Court deemed the
resolution of October 26, 2009 as served on her on April
13, 2011.
Respondent, NONITA V. CATENA was located at her
residence in PurokSandiwa, Barangay Tiniguiban, Puerto
Princesa but refused to sign the herein NOTICE,
nevertheless received the document. Agent of the Puerto
Princesa District Office served the herein NOTICE on
respondent on July 25, 2011 and the same was
communicated to the Office of the Deputy Director for
Operations Services in Manila.
HELD: Respondent, a court stenographer III, was
charged with gross dishonesty in connection with her
Civil Service eligibility where she was accused of causing
another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility
Examination in her stead. Before the Decision was
imposed, however, respondent already resigned. The
Supreme Court held that the respondents resignation
from the service did not cause the Court to lose its
jurisdiction to proceed against her in this administrative
case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her
intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against her, for the act
complained of had been committed when she was still in
the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the
administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise,
exacting responsibility for administrative liabilities
incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.
Respondents dismissal from the service is the
appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be cancelled,
her retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her
disqualification from re-employment in the government
service to be perpetual. Her intervening resignation
necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no
longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is
imposed, the determination of the amount of which is
subject to the sound discretion of the Court.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
(704 SCRA 561, September 03, 2013)
FACTS: Applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application
for land registration covering the property in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30
years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation
of his title.To prove that the property was an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
 41
issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) which
stated that the subject property was verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC
approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan, ruling
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March
1982,theVelazcos possession prior to that date could
not be factored in the computation of the period of
possession. Malabanan died while the case was pending
with the Court of Appeals; hence, it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not it is sufficient that the classification of
land as alienable and disposable occurs at any time prior
to the filing of the applicant for registration provided
that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
(2) As for purposes of Section 14(2) of the PD 1529,
whether or not a parcel of land classified as alienable
and disposable may be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
RULINGS 1: In connection with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that
the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section
47 of the Public Land Act.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
RULING 2: In complying with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, consider that under the
Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or
no longer retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of
the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by
which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of
a patrimonial property through possession for at least
ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient
to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership
over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to
their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they
presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as
basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
EMBIDO vs. PE
(708 SCRA 1, October 22, 2013)
FACTS: Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the
RTC, received 2 letters from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a
Solicitor in the United Kingdom, requesting for a copy of
 42
the decision in Special Proceedings Case No.084
rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo. They
found, however, that the RTC had no record, as Special
Proceedings No. 084 was docketed as In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando
Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
They informed Mr. Hunt that what he had was a falsied
court document, and proceeded to communicate the
situation to the NBI, thus triggering an investigation.
Meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, brother of Shirley Quioyo,
executed an adavit stating that it was the respondent
who had facilitated the issuance of the falsied decision
for P60, 000. This was corroborated by the adavit of
Mary Rose Quioyo, Shirley Quiyos sister. Respondent
invoked his right to remain silent when the NBI invited
him to explain his side. After the investigation, the NBI
recommended that respondent be prosecuted for
falsication of public document under Article 171, 1 and
2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act3019, as well as for the Oce of the
Court Administrator to commence disbarment
proceedings against him. Respondent submitted a
counter-adavit denying participation in the
falsication. He alleged that he merely gave Shirley
Quioyo advice on annulment laws, that Dy Quiyo was the
one who caused the falsication through people on
Recto Avenue, and that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa had
executed a sword statement that her late husband,
Manual Jalipa, had been responsible for making the
falsied document at the instance of Dy Quioyo. The IBP
found respondent guilty of serious misconduct and
violations of the Attorneys Oath and Code of
Professional Responsibility, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Atty. Pe should be disbarred.
RULING: YES. In light of the established circumstances,
the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for
having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-
existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers
should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the
Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage
in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions
can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of
the court decision by the respondent was an act that
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part.
Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on
the personal status of a person. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. It then
becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine
Bar that they should do nothing that may in any way or
degree lessen the confidence of the public in their
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
professional fidelity and integrity. Thus, the Court finds
and pronounces Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Pe,
Jr. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
disbars him.
DE LEON vs. PEDREA
(708 SCRA 13, October 22, 2013)
FACTS: Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone
Pedrea, a Public Attorney. Records show, as established
by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, on January
30,2006 after asking about the status of the case Atty.
Pedrea told Jocelyn De Leon then to ride with him and
he would just drop Jocelyn by the jeepney station, she
refused to ride with him but Atty. Pedrea persistently
told her to get in the car, and so she acceded to his
request so as not to offend him. Inside the car Atty.
Pedrea rubbed the Jocelyns right leg with his hand
tried to insert his finger into her hand, grabbed her hand
and forcibly placed it on his crotch area and pressed his
finger against her private part. Jocelyn thereafter tried
at all cost to unlock the cars door and told him
categorically that she was getting off the car. Instead he
accelerated a bit more but sensing her insistence to get
off, he stopped the car, and allowed her to get off. In his
answer, Atty. Pedrea averred that De Leons allegations
were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a
complaint would open the gates to those who had evil
desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that the
complaint was premature and should be dismissed on
the ground of forum shopping because De Leon had
already charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the
Paraaque City Prosecutors Office; and that he had also
filed a complaint for theft against De Leon.
IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended for his
disbarment, the IBP Board of Governors however,
modifed the penalty to three month suspension from
practice of law. Upon motion for reconsideration by Atty.
Pedrea which the Board denied, they increased the
penalty to six months. Thereafter transmitted records
and resolution to the Court for approval.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Atty. Pedrea is guilty in
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of Code of Profession and
Responsibility.
RULING: Yes, Atty. Pedrea is guilty. The Supreme Court
adopted the finding and conclusions of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner. Given the circumstances in
which he committed them, his acts were not merely
offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and
grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the
part of any lawyer. In this regard, it bears stressing that
immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the communitys sense of decency. Yet, the Court
considers the recommended penalty of suspension for
six months not commensurate with the gravity of the
offensive acts committed.
 43
GANZON vs. ARLOS
(708 SCRA 115, October 22, 2013)
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo
City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of
Local Government issued several suspension orders
against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints
filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600
days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA
and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the
Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter-ego
to suspend and remove local officials. This is because the
1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local
Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend
and or remove local officials.
RULING: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of
the power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control
given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control
and supervision, are two different things which differ
one from the other in meaning and extent. In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of
the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid
power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.
VIVO vs. PAGCOR
(709 SCRA 276, November 12, 2013)
FACTS: The petitioner was employed by respondent
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was PAGCORs
Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of
his dismissal from office.5 On February 21, 2002, he
received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the Senior
Managing Head of PAGCORs Human Resources
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Department, advising that he was being administratively
charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering,
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and
loss of trust and confidence;6 that he should submit a
written explanation of the charges; and that he was at
the same time being placed under preventive
suspension.
Petitioner's counsel assailed the propriety of the show
cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the
petitioner under preventive suspension.
The petitioner received the summons for him to attend
an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear
before PAGCORs Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on
March 15, 2002. At the petitioners request, however, the
inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. His
statement was taken in a question-and-answer format.
He was also furnished the memorandum of charges that
recited the accusations against him and indicated the
acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. The
memorandum of charges was based on the statements of
PAGCOR personnel who had personal knowledge of the
accusations against him. However, when his counsel
requested to be furnished copies of the statements,
PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had
already been afforded the sufficient opportunity to
confront, hear, and answer the charges against him
during the administrative inquiry.
Thereafter, the CIU tendered its investigation report to
PAGCORs Adjudication Committee.
The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner
to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in order to address
questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the
re-scheduling of the meeting because he would not be
available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee
denied the request upon the reason that the presence of
counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. His
counsel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of
the request.
PAGCOR dismissed the petitioner from the service. A
motion for reconsideration was filed, however, denied.
Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the CSC which ruled
that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner's right to due
process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the
service. In fine, the Commission finds that the right of
Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted
from his office without the corresponding Board
Resolution that should have set out the collegial decision
of the PAGCOR Board of Directors. PAGCOR elevated the
case to the CA. CA promulgated its decision reversing
and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its finding
that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due
process. The CA remanded the case to the CSC for the
determination of the appeal of the petitioner on the
merits, specifically the issue of whether the dismissal
had been for cause.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that Petitioners right for due process was
violated transgressed the fundamental rules in
administrative due process.
RULING: The petitioner was not denied due process of
law, for he was afforded the fair and reasonable
 44
opportunity to explain his side. That the petitioner was
actually assisted by his counsel from the outset of the
administrative case against him, that counsel, Atty. Cesar
B. Jimenea Jr. of the Jimenea and Associates, ensured that
the petitioners every concern reached PAGCOR, and that
he was clarified of any matter affecting his rights all
throughout the investigation and hearings.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondents legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or
with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding
that P AGCOR had properly observed the requirements
of due process in its administrative proceedings against
the petitioner. Wherefore, the Court denies the petition.
(41-45)
2014
HEINZ R. HECK vs. CITY PROSECUTOR CASIANO
A. GAMOTIN, JR.
(719 SCRA 339, March 18, 2014)
SUBJECT: Legal Ethics
FACTS: In September 2000, complainant Heinz Heck
filed a complaint for disbarment against then City
Prosecutor Casiano A. Gamotin of Cagayan de Oro City.
According to Heck, he was a victim of the "faulty, highly
improper, suspicious anomalous and unlawful practice"
by the respondent, who had obstructed justice by
delaying cases and disregarding proper court
procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty. Ce(s)ilo A.
Adaza, his business partners and friends.
The controversy arose from the filing in 1999 by Heck of
a criminal case for unjust vexation against one Oliver
Cabrera in the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) in
Cagayan de Oro City. After the case against him was
dismissed, Cabrera countered with two criminal cases
against Heck one charging the latter with illegal
possession of firearms and the other with unlawful
incrimination of an innocent person. Atty. Adaza
represented Cabrera in both cases. The OCP initially
dismissed I.S. No. 2000-1860 for insufficiency of
evidence, but Atty. Adaza moved for the reconsideration
of the dismissal. The respondent granted the motion for
reconsideration. Heck challenged the order of the
respondent. In the meantime, other pending complaints
against Cabrera (for unjust vexation and grave threats)
were also dismissed because of prescription and
insufficiency of evidence. Heck moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissals twice, but his motions
were denied.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
ISSUE: WON Pros. Gamutin should be disbarred due to
his actions
RULING: The court considers that the evidence adduced
by the complainant insufficient to warrant the
disbarment of the respondent. Disbarment is the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction against a
misbehaving member of the Integrated Bar. As such, the
power to disbar is always exercised with great caution
only for the most imperative reasons and in cases of
clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. A lawyer like the respondent is not
to be sanctioned for every perceived misconduct or
wrong actuation. He is still to be presumed innocent of
wrongdoing until the proof arrayed against him
establishes otherwise. It is the burden of the
complainant to properly show that the assailed conduct
or actuation constituted a breach of the norms of
professional conduct and legal ethics. Otherwise, the
lawyer merits exoneration.
The court cannot sanction the respondent for having
angrily reacted to Hecks unexpected tirade in his
presence. The respondent was not then reacting to an
attack on his person, but to Hecks disrespectful remark
against Philippine authorities in general. Any self-
respecting government official like the respondent
should feel justly affronted by any expression or show of
disrespect in his presence, including harsh words like
those uttered by Heck. Whether or not Heck was
justified in making the utterance is of no relevance to us.
Lawyers may be expected to maintain their composure
and decorum at all times, but they are still human, and
their emotions are like those of other normal people
placed in unexpected situations that can crack their
veneer of self-control. That is how we now view the
actuation of the respondent in reacting to Hecks
utterance. The Court will not permit the respondents
good record to be tarnished by his having promptly
reacted to Hecks remark.
Moreover, Heck could have sincerely perceived the
respondents actuations to be arrogant and overbearing,
but it is not fair for the court to take the respondent to
task in the context of the events and occasions in which
the actuations occurred in the absence of a credible
showing that his actuations had been impelled by any
bad motive, or had amounted to any breach of any canon
of professional conduct or legal ethics.
ARAULLO vs. AQUINO III
(728 SCRA 1, July 01, 2014)
FACTS: The respondents maintain that the issues in
these consolidated cases were mischaracterized and
unnecessarily constitutionalized; that the Courts
interpretation of savings can be overturned by
legislation considering that savings is defined in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making
savings a statutory issue;7 that the withdrawn
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations
constitute savings and may be used for
augmentation;8 and that the Court should apply legally
 45
recognized norms and principles, most especially the
presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion
ISSUES and RULING:
1) The Courts power of judicial review
Issue: The respondents argue that the Executive has not
violated the GAA because savings as a concept is an
ordinary species of interpretation that calls for
legislative, instead of judicial, determination.
Held: Untenable. The interpretation of the GAA and its
definition of savings is a foremost judicial function. This
is because the power of judicial review vested in the
Court is exclusive.
Endencia and Jugo v. David: The interpretation
and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
judicial department. And this authority to interpret and
apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or
not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning
not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of
the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
conflict between the two, because if there is, then the
law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid
and unconstitutional.
2) Strict construction on the accumulation and
utilization of savings
The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly
construed by virtue of its being an exception to the
general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to
the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose.
Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their
management will also be strictly construed against
expanding the scope of the power to augment.15 Such a
strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the
Executive and other budget implementors within the
limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and
to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress
power of the purse.
Pertinent provisions
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized
to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
xxxx
Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the
Administrative Code provide:
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of
Appropriations. Except as otherwise provided in the
General Appropriations Act and whenever in his
judgment the public interest so requires, the President,
upon notice to the head of office concerned, is
authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further
expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any
other expenditure authorized in the General
Appropriations Act, except for personal services
appropriations used for permanent officials and
employees.
Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to
Cover Deficits.Except as otherwise provided in the
General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular
appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations
Act for programs and projects of any department, office
or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be
used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new
positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to
be funded from budgetary savings except when
specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that
whenever authorized positions are transferred from one
program or project to another within the same
department, office or agency, the corresponding
amounts appropriated for personal services are also
deemed transferred, without, however increasing the
total outlay for personal services of the department,
office or agency concerned.
Section 38 refers to the authority of the President to
suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds
allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure
authorized in the General Appropriations Act. When the
President suspends or stops expenditure of funds,
savings are not automatically generated until it has been
established that such funds or appropriations are free
from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is
authorized has been completed, discontinued or
abandoned.
Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may
have effectively resulted in the suspension or stoppage
of expenditures through the issuance of negative Special
Allotment Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of
withdrawn allotments to the original programs and
projects is a clear indication that the program or project
from which the allotments were withdrawn has not
been discontinued or abandoned.
At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that
the reversion to the General Fund of unexpended
balances of appropriations savings included pursuant
to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative
Code does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the
Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission
on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on
Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict
with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution because it allows the President
to approve the use of any savings in the regular
 46
appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and
projects of any department, office or agency to cover a
deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations.
As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5)
because the latter expressly limits the authority of the
President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in
his own Department out of the savings in other items of
his own Departments appropriations. Accordingly,
Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify
cross-border transfers under the DAP.
Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the
Executive within its department shall, however, remain
valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are
complied with.
3) The power to augment cannot be used to
fund non-existent provisions in the GAA
Argument: The respondents assert, however, that there
is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create
allotment classes within an item. What is required is for
Congress to create items to comply with the line-item
veto of the President.
Held: Tenable. The Court reversed its ruling.
Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions
of the term item that may be the object
of augmentation by the President, the Senate President,
and the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v.
Ochoa, we said that an item that is the distinct and
several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the
item veto power of the President, must contain specific
appropriations of money and not be only general
provisions.
Item, definition: the particulars, the details, the distinct
and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. an
item of appropriation must be an item characterized by
singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a
specified singular amount for a specified singular
purpose, otherwise known as a line-item. This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with
its definition as a specific appropriation of money but
also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the
same.
Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the
Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a
program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from
the expense category or allotment class. There is no
specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the
relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be
the expense category or allotment class. In the same
vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over
an expense category; he may only veto the item to which
that expense category belongs to.
Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there
must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or
object of expenditure with an appropriation to which
savings may be transferred for the purpose of
augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in
the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
amount of public fund, savings may be transferred
thereto for augmentation purposes.
Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take
away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the
appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by
legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116
DAP-funded projects had appropriation cover and were
validly augmented require factual determination that is
not within the scope of the present consolidated
petitions under Rule 65.
4) Cross-border transfers are constitutionally
impermissible
Argument: Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution
prohibits only the transfer of appropriation, not savings.
Held: Section 25(5) is clear. The Court stood by its
previous pronouncement.
VINUYA vs. ROMULO
(732 SCRA 595, August 12, 2014)
FACTS: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA
LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the
victims of rape by Japanese military forces in
the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the
Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the
women as part of the destruction of the village. Their
communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned,
and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and
slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and
held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly
raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of
the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have
spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries,
pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of
the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the
petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of
the comfort women for compensation had already been fully
satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between
the Philippines and Japan.
ISSUE: Whether or not to compel the respondents to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
RULING: The court ruled that the State, therefore, is the
sole judge to decide whether its protection will be
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it
cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power
the exercise of which may be determined by
 47
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to
the particular case.
The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft
Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this
traditional view. They (i) state that "the right of
diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State, (ii)
affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that
diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the
State; and (iii) stress that the state "has the right to
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It
is under no duty or obligation to do so.
It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the
State has a duty to protect its nationals and act on
his/her behalf when rights are injured. However, at
present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a
general international obligation for States to exercise
diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad.
Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice
nor opinio juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a
duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal
duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment.
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and
sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as
legally prohibited under contemporary international
law. However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in
claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply
that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable
obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly
since petitioners do not demand the imputation of
individual criminal liability, but seek to recover
monetary reparations from the state of Japan. Absent the
consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a
directive by the Security Council, there is no non-
derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan.
Indeed, precisely because of states reluctance to directly
prosecute claims against another state, recent
developments support the modern trend to empower
individuals to directly participate in suits against
perpetrators of international crimes.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General
Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of
crimes against humanity and the strong policy
arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states
does not yet support the present existence of an
obligation to prosecute international crimes. Of course a
customary duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot
find enough evidence to reasonably assert its
existence. To the extent that any state practice in this
area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting
amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or de
facto impunity to those who commit crimes against
humanity. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms
and ergaomnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus
cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not
deigned to show that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is
an ergaomnes obligation or has attained the status of jus
cogens.
MADRID vs. DEALCA
(734 SCRA 468, September 09, 2014)
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
SUBJECT: Legal ethics
FACTS: Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law
practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice
of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges
and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a
motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a
pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this
complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the
ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUES:
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and
criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
in violation of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in
seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795?
RULING:
1) The Lawyers Oath is a source ofobligations and
duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an
attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment,
suspension, or other disciplinary action.The oath exhorts
upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable.
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his
duty under his Lawyers Oath not to initiate groundless,
false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility thus wise: Rule 1.03 A
lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans
cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled
him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice
must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist
the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his
clients propensities to litigate, so must he equally guard
himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded
suits. While it is the Courts duty to investigate and
uncover the truth behind charges against judges and
lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from
unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass
them, among other things.
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to
assist the courts in the proper administration of justice.
He disregarded his mission because his filing of the
unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge
Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise
of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be
exercised in good faith. Atty. Dealcas bringing of the
 48
numerous administrative and criminal complaints
against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers
did not evince any good faith on his part, considering
that he made allegations against them therein that he
could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed
frivolous and unworthy of the Courts precious time and
serious consideration.
2) Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Dealca
maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace
inhibited himself" upon his motion to inhibit in order to
preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."
However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended
that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to
inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based
on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal
bases. The recommendation of IBP Commissioner
Hababag is warranted. Lawyers are licensed officers of
the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend
the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence,
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in
the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.
CAUSING vs. COMELEC
(734 SCRA 495, September 09, 2014)
FACTS: Petitioner Elsie Causing (Causing) assails the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc
(COMELEC En Banc) promulgated on September 9, 2011
dismissing her complaint-affidavit dated June 8, 2010
docketed as E.O. Case No. 10-131 entitled Elsie S. Causing
v. Hernan D. Biron, Sr. charging Municipal Mayor Hernan
D. Biron, Sr. (Mayor Biron) of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo with
violating COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in relation to
Section 261 (g), (h), and (x) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
ISSUE:
1) Procedural issue: Causing did not file a motion for
reconsideration before filing the petition for certiorari
2) Substantive Issues:Mayor Birons acts did not violate
the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Resolution
RULING:
1)Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that
unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For
this reason, the Rules of Court (1997) contains a separate
rule (Rule 64) on the review of the decisions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 is
generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65, except
as to the period of the filing of the petition
for certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is 30 days
from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later than 60
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
assailed.
Mayor Biron indicates that Causing did not file a motion
for reconsideration before coming to the Court. Causing
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
submits, however, that she was not required to file the
motion for reconsideration because the only recourse of
an aggrieved party from the decision of the COMELEC
was the filing of the petition for certiorari under either
Rule 64 or Rule 65.
The well-established rule is that the motion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an
aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort
to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public
respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or
fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of
the legal and factual aspects of the case.
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that
jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the
requirement for the filing of a petition
for certiorari without first filing a motion for
reconsideration, namely:
(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) Where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court;
(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question, and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the
Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject
matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) Where the petitioner was deprived of due
process, and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process;
(h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or
public interest is involved.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that
none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable herein.
Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for
reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the
filing of the motion for reconsideration in election
offense cases.
2) On the merits, the petition should also fail.
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is
defined in the Resolution as any personnel movement
from one government agency to another or from one
department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of
a government agency to another with or without the
issuance of an appointment; while detail as defined in
the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an
employee from one agency to another without the
issuance of an appointment. Having acquired technical
and legal meanings, transfer and detail must be
construed as such. Obviously, the movement involving
 49
Causing did not equate to either a transfer or
a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor
Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area
from its old location to the Office of the Mayor some
little steps away. We cannot accept the petitioners
argument, therefore, that the phrase any transfer or
detail whatsoever encompassed any and all kinds and
manner of personnel movement, including the mere
change in office location.
Moreover, Causings too-literal understanding
of transfer should not hold sway because the provisions
involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was
sought to be charged with an election offense punishable
under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a
basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes
are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor
of the accused. This means that the courts must not
bring cases within the provision of a law that are not
clearly embraced by it. In short, no act can be
pronounced criminal unless it is clearly made so by
statute prior to its commission (nullumcrimen,
nullapoena, sine lege). So, too, no person who is not
clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought
within them.
Equally material is that Mayor Birons act of transferring
the office space of Causing was rooted in his power of
supervision and control over the officials and employees
serving in his local government unit, in order to ensure
the faithful discharge of their duties and functions. His
explanation that he transferred Causings work station
from her original office to his office in order to closely
supervise her after his office received complaints against
her could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter
continued to perform her tasks, and uninterruptedly
received her salaries as the Municipal Civil Registrar
even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
The issuance of Office Order No. 13 by Mayor Biron
detailing Belonio to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
was not proof of Mayor Birons crystal clear intention
to replace and transfer her during the election period. As
the COMELEC En Banc found, Belonio did not receive the
order, and Causing remained as the Municipal Civil
Registrar, leaving the detailing of Belonio uncompleted.
Without the actual appointment of Belonio as the
Municipal Civil Registrar, it would be unwarranted to
criminally charge Mayor Biron of violating Section 261
of the Omnibus Election Code.
It is interesting to note that aside from the present
election offense case, Causing initiated an administrative
case in the Civil Service Commission to challenge her
reassignment pursuant to the same office orders. In
that administrative case, she referred to the personnel
movement not as a transfer or detail, but as
a reassignment that constituted her constructive
dismissal. On August 13, 2010, the CSC Regional Office
No. 6 in Mandurriao, Iloilo City ruled that although
Mayor Biron used the word detail in referring to the
personnel movement effected, the personnel action that
actually took place, albeit a reassignment, was a valid
reassignment
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
ALLEGED LOSS OF VARIOUS BOXES OF COPY
PAPER DURING THEIR TRANSFER FROM THE
PROPERTY DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS), TO VARIOUS
ROOMS OF THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY
(737 SCRA 176 | 30 September 2014)
"Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and
punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense
pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service."
FACTS: A financial audit of the books of accounts of
MTC, Bulan, Sorsogon covering the period July 28, 1993
to August 31, 2004 disclosed that:
(1) some collections were not properly and accurately
recorded in the cashbooks;
(2) there were shortages in the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund
in the amounts of P48,207.10 and P5,l 16.00,
respectively;
(3) the financial reports on the JDF, General/Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF) and Fiduciary
Fund (FF) were not regularly submitted to the
Accounting Division of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA);
(4) the records control is not systematic;
(5) no legal fees forms were attached to the case
records;
(6) daily transactions in the FF account were not duly
recorded in the cashbooks; and,
(7) documents needed to validate withdrawals of cash
bonds from the Municipal Treasurers Office (MTO) of
Bulan were missing.
The OCA concluded that Guan was remiss in the
performance of his duties and is administratively liable
for:
1) failing to properly remit his cash collections in
contrast with the requirements set forth in the
Commission on Audit (COA) and Department of Finance
(DOF) Joint Circular 1-81 and in Administrative Circular
No. 13-92 dated March 1, 1992 as amended by
Administrative Circular(A.C.) No. 3-2000 dated June 15,
2000; and,
2) failing to remit FF collections, in complete derogation
of Administrative Circular No. 50-95 dated October 11,
1995.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Guan is guilty of Gross Neglect?
RULING: Yes. Here, Guans shortages with respect to the
JDF in the total amount of 49,609.10 and to the SAJF
totalling to 5,824.00 were both due to unreported and
undeposited collections.
Guans transgressions did not merely consist of delay in
the remittance of his collections but to his total failure to
deposit the same as well.
 50
This is a clear case of gross neglect of duty. As held,
"Gross neglect is such neglect which, from the gravity of
the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so
serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the
public welfare."
In this case, the frequency of the instances alone, i.e., for
two separate periods of accountability, Guan was both
found to have incurred shortages with respect to the JDF
and SAJF due to unreported and undeposited collections,
makes respondents neglect of duty so serious in its
character as to threaten the public welfare.
"Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and
punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense
pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service."
ISSUE 2: Whether or not Guan is administratively liable?
RULING: Yes. While Guan had already been dropped
from the rolls for being absent without official leave
(AWOL) in A.M. No. 06-5-171-MTC, he still remains
administratively liable, although the penalty of dismissal
cannot be imposed upon him. "A fine can be imposed,
instead, and its amount is subject to the sound discretion
of the Court. Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the Revised
Uniform Rules provides that fine as a penalty shall be in
an amount not exceeding the salary for six months had
the respondent not resigned [or been dropped from the
rolls] the rate for which is that obtaining at the time of
his resignation. The fine shall be deducted from any
accrued leave credits, with the respondent being
personally liable for any deficiency that should be
directly payable to this Court. He is further declared
disqualified from any future government service."
NOTE:
Clerks of Court are the custodians of the courts funds
and revenues, records, properties, and premises. They
are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or
impairment of those entrusted to them. Any shortages
in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual
remittance constitute gross neglect of duty for which
the clerk of court shall beheld administratively liable.
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT ON THE
ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT AND FOR ENGAGING IN
THE BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY AT
USURIOUS RATES OF INTEREST OF MS.
DOLORES T. LOPEZ, SC CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF
OFFICER, AND MR. FERNANDO M. MONTALVO,
SC SUPERVISING JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER,
CHECKS AND DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FISCAL
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE
(737 SCRA 195 | 30 September 2014)
Anonymous complaint is always received with great
caution, originating as it does from a source unwilling to
identify himself or herself. It is suspect for that reason.
But the mere anonymity of the source should not call for
the outright dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
its being baseless or unfounded provided its allegations
can be reliably verified and properly substantiated by
competent evidence, like public records of indubitable
integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by evidence to
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
be offered by the complainant, whose identity and
integrity could hardly be material where the matter
involved is of public interest," or the declarations by the
respondents themselves in reaction to the allegations,
where such declarations are, properly speaking,
admissions worthy of consideration for not being self-
serving. the anonymous complaint has to be dealt with,
and its veracity tested with utmost care, for it points the
finger of accusation at two employees of the Court for
engaging in money-lending activities at unconscionable
rates of interest, with low-ranking employees of the
Court as their targets.
FACTS: An undated letter-complain addressed to the
Complaints and Investigation Division (CID) of the Office
of Administrative Services (OAS) of the Supreme Court
triggered this administrative matter. The letter
complaint, purportedly sent by a concerned employee
who chose to remain anonymous, assailed the profitable
money-lending with usurious interest scheme engaged
in by respondents Dolores T. Lopez, an SC Chief Judicial
Staff Officer, and Fernando M. Montalvo, an SC
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, both of the Checks
Disbursement Division of the Courts Fiscal Management
and Budget Office (FMBO).
It stated that the respondents had been involved in the
money-lending activities targeting the low-salaried
employees of the Court like the drivers and employees of
the janitorial services; that such money-lending had
been going on with the help of the personnel of the
Checks Disbursement Division of FMBO by enticing
employees of the Court to pledge forthcoming benefits at
a discounted rate; and that around 300 Automated
Teller Machine (ATM) cards were surrendered by the
borrowers to the respondents as collateral for the
individual borrowings.
Lopez denied the allegation that she had lent money to
around 300 court employees, and that she had held their
ATM cards in her custody as collateral; but admitted
having lent money to only about 20 personnel of the
janitorial agency and to some low-ranking employees of
the Court, like the utility workers and messengers for a
period of two years. She said that she would receive
only P10.00 for every P100.00 borrowed that she did not
consider as interest. She insisted that she did not require
her borrowers to pay her the P10.00 for every P100.00
borrowed because they voluntarily gave her the amount;
and that she did not engage in money lending because
she did not offer to lend money to anyone.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Lopez and Montalvo are guilty
of lending money with usurious interest rates?
RULING: The respondents are both responsible
fiduciary officers in the FMBO, the office that is in charge
of all the financial transactions of the Court, including
the preparation and processing of vouchers to cover the
payment of salaries, allowances, office supplies,
equipment and other sundry expenses, utilities,
janitorial, and security services, and maintenance and
other operating expenses, and the issuance of
corresponding checks therefor. The respondents
discharge the delicate task of handling the payment of
employees salaries and allowances.
(Ruling on Montalvo) The complaint against Montalvo
should be dismissed for no factual basis. His
 51
involvement in money lending was not shown to be
habitual, going on only as far as accommodating his
friends during their personal emergencies without
imposing any interests. The statement in the letter-
complaint to the effect that both respondents have been
in the forefront of syndicated lending activities was not
supported by any proof. It is notable that Montalvo
firmly denied the allegations against him, and that Lopez
corroborated his denial.
(Ruling on Lopez) Ms. Lopez is guilty of lending money
with interest which at most would reach up to 10% of
the total amount borrowed. While she denied that the
loan is somewhat like the famously known "5-6" loan.
She is the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division that
handles the preparation and issuance of checks to court
employees. It is beyond question that her official
functions consist of, among others, the supervision of
office staff. This gives us the impression that she took
advantage of her position and abused the confidence
reposed in her office, thus, placing at risk the integrity of
the division and the whole Fiscal Management and
Budget Office (FMBO). As an officer of the FMBO she can
be privy of the benefits which may be given. From there,
employees can borrow and/or advance money from her
and where she may easily accede knowing that after all
there will be benefits forthcoming.
Her actuation although not related to her official
functions as division chief, has undeniably fell short of
the high standards of propriety expected of employees of
the Judiciary. It is considered as conduct unbecoming of
an official of the Judiciary.
ISSUE 2: Did Lopezs money-lending activities render
her administratively liable?
RULING: Yes. "moonlighting" activities : Although many
"moonlighting" activities were themselves legal acts that
would be permitted or tolerated had the actors not been
employed in the public sector, moonlighting, albeit not
usually treated as a serious misconduct, can amount to a
malfeasance in office by the very nature of the position
held. In the case of Lopez, her being the Chief of the
Checks Disbursement Division of the FMBO, a major
office of the Court itself, surely put the integrity of the
Checks Disbursement Division and the entire FMBO
under so much undeserved suspicion. She ought to have
refrained from engaging in money lending, particularly
to the employees of the Court. We do not need to stress
that she was expected to be circumspect about her acts
and actuations, knowing that the impression of her
having taken advantage of her position and her having
abused the confidence reposed in her office and
functions as such would thereby become unavoidable.
There is no doubt about her onerous lending activities
greatly diminishing the reputation of her office and of
the Court itself in the esteem of the public. She plainly
disregarded the Constitution.
Misconduct in office refers to any unlawful behavior by a
public officer in relation to the duties of his office that is
willful in character. The term embraces acts that the
office holder had no right to perform, acts performed
improperly, and failure to act in the face of an
affirmative duty to act. The Court has invariably imposed
commensurate sanctions upon court employees found
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
and declared to be violating Administrative Circular No.
5.
ISSUE 3: WON the Court unfairly selective in causing
their investigation upon the anonymous complaint but
ignoring the "far more serious accusations" against
"employees, officials and justices even." Their accusation
has tended to diminish the publics faith and confidence
in the Court itself.
RULING 3: No. In ordering the administrative
investigation of the respondents, the Court was moved
only by the most laudable of purposes.
The investigation would never be unfair because they
would thereby be accorded the full opportunity to be
heard in order to clear them. The Court accords to
Montalvo and Lopez the reasonable opportunity to show
because why they should not be disciplined or otherwise
sanctioned for their censurable statements.
They were not being singled out because the Court has
always acted upon every appropriate complaint or
grievance anonymous or not brought against officials
and employees of the Judiciary without regard to their
ranks or responsibilities, including any of its sitting
Members, the incumbent Justices of the third-level
courts, and other active judges of the first and second
levels of the courts.
Verily, everyone who works in the Judiciary answers to
the exacting standards of conduct in order to maintain
the integrity of the Judiciary and to preserve the esteem
of the public for the courts, for the very image of the
Judiciary is inescapably epitomized in the official
conduct and the non-official demeanor of judicial
officers and court personnel. To accuse the Court of
unfairness and discrimination was, therefore,
censurable.
NOTES:
Anonymous complaint is always received with great
caution, originating as it does from a source unwilling to
identify himself or herself. It is suspect for that reason.
But the mere anonymity of the source should not call for
the outright dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
its being baseless or unfounded provided its allegations
can be reliably verified and properly substantiated by
competent evidence, like public records of indubitable
integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by evidence to
be offered by the complainant, whose identity and
integrity could hardly be material where the matter
involved is of public interest," or the declarations by the
respondents themselves in reaction to the allegations,
where such declarations are, properly speaking,
admissions worthy of consideration for not being self-
serving. the anonymous complaint has to be dealt with,
and its veracity tested with utmost care, for it points the
finger of accusation at two employees of the Court for
engaging in money-lending activities at unconscionable
rates of interest, with low-ranking employees of the
Court as their targets.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, ET.
AL
 52
(G.R. No. 191672 | 25 November 2014)
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly
describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although
their respective functions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the President of
the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each
of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules
and in the exercise of its own discretion.
FACTS: In 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque III (Duque) as
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, which was
thereafter confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. Subsequently, President Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864). Pursuant to it, Duque
was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the following
government-owned or government-controlled
corporations:
(a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b)
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH)
(c) the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC), and
(d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition
challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as The
Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of
Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being
clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Does the designation of Duque as member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the
independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional
prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple
offices for the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions?
RULING: Yes.
The Court partially grants the petition. The Court
upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3,
Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional
EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio
capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
independent. Although their respective functions are
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the
discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional
Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of
its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
provided by Section 7, Article IXA of the 1987
Constitution. To safeguard the independence of these
Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others,
imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution
certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the
Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to
wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their
tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any
business which in any way may be affected by the
functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in
any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification
abovementioned, which is the disqualification from
holding any other office or employment during Duques
tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it
imperative to interpret this disqualification in relation to
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution
and the Courts pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article
IX-B reads:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy
a Cabinet position (i.e., President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants),
Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated
under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold
any other office or employment in the Government
during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position.
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes
the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government and is principally mandated to establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit
and rewards system; to integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks; and to
institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear
that the CSC Chairmans membership in a governing
body is dependent on the condition that the functions of
the government entity where he will sit as its Board
member must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees. Based on this, the
 53
Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title
I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the
career development, rights and welfare of government
employees are among the primary functions of the CSC
and are consequently exercised through its Chairman.
The CSC Chairmans membership therein must,
therefore, be considered to be derived from his position
as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by
their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were
created. While powers and functions associated with
appointments, compensation and benefits affect the
career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and
employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are
also tasked to perform other corporate powers and
functions that are not personnel-related. All of these
powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not,
are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the
CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may
exercise these powers and functions, which are not
anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman,
such as imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted
contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of
health care providers, or approving restructuring
proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations.
The Court also notes that Duques designation as
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per
diem, a form of additional compensation that is
disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by
virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set
by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This
situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio
position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding
multiple offices, Duques designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
exercises control over all government offices in the
Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the
control of the President is not part of the Executive
Branch.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH
and ECC have the status of a government corporation
and are deemed attached to the Department of Health
and the Department of Labor, respectively. On the other
hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the
President. The corporate powers of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through
their governing Boards, members of which are all
appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
and the members of their respective governing Boards
are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC
Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity
that is under the control of the President without
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the
1987 Constitution.
In view of the application of the prohibition under
Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, Duque
did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with
his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to
be considered as a de jure officer while he served his
term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure
officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally
appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not
expired.That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto
officer during his tenure as a Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment
from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the
office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession
of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the
acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all
official actions of Duque as a Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed
valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification
is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity
of the dealings by the public with persons whose
ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duques
official actions covered by this clarification extend but
are not limited to the issuance of Board resolutions and
memoranda approving appointments to positions in the
concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and
guidelines on compensation and employee benefits, and
adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
2015
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER
(748 SCRA 286, January 27, 2015)
Section 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit
and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed
letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section
13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered
mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the
person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt,
both of which must be appended to the paper being
served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such
that there is no proof of service if either or both are not
submitted.
FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique
(LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of
 54
agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of
qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the
former obligating P4,393,593.60for the premium
payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique
for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment
for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its
appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money
claim in the COA. COA DENIED the petition, holding that
under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local
Government Code only municipal or city governments
are expressly vested with the power to secure group
insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting
the LGUs failure to comply with the requirement of
publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184
(Government Procurement Reform Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on
December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA
denied the motion, the denial being received by the
petitioner on July 14, 2014.
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on
August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was
dismissed on August 19,2014 for (a) the late filing of the
petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service
and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.
Hence this Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petitioner complied with rule on
proof of service
(2) Whether or not the fresh period rule applies on
Rule 64
(3) Whether or not the remedy of Certiorari is proper
RULING: Motion for Reconsideration is without merit
(1) NO. The petitioner obviously ignores that
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two
types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the
registry receipt, viz:
Section 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit
and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed
letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section
13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered
mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the
person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt,
both of which must be appended to the paper being
served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such
that there is no proof of service if either or both are not
submitted.
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit
of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who
declared that he had served copies of the petition by
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
registered mail, with registered receipts attached to the
appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the
petition."14 The petition only bore, however, the cut
print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt
numbers of the registered matters, not the registry
receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended
the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the
cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule.
(2) NO. Jurisprudence dictates that the belated
filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the
belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to
the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer
the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh
period rule under Neypes applied. Rules of procedure
may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice
that is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure. Absent this reason for liberality, the petition
cannot be allowed to prosper.
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on
January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the
assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days
from receipt of the denial of its motion for
reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it
received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had
only until July19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it
filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days
too late.
(3) No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did
not sufficiently disclose how the COA committed grave
abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the
petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of
discretion. To start with, the supposed delays taken by
the COA in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary
nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a
factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And,
lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had been
the main proponent of the Local Government Code in the
Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different
from the COA Commissioners own did not matter, for it
was the latters adjudication that had any value and
decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the
Constitutionally officials entrusted with the authority for
that purpose.
It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the
money claim of the petitioner for the further reason of
lack of sufficient publication as required by the
Government Procurement Act. In that light, the COA
acted well within its authority in denying the petitioners
claim.
 55
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, et al. v. BENIGNO
SIMEON AQUINO III, ET AL.
(G.R. Nos. 209287, 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,
209260, 209442, 209517 & 209569 | 3 February 2015)
The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly
construed by virtue of its being an exception to the
general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to
the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose.
Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their
management will also be strictly construed against
expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a
strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the
Executive and other budget implementors within the
limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and
to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress
power of the purse.
The ascertainment of good faith, or the lack of it, and the
determination of whether or not due diligence and
prudence were exercised, are questions of fact. The want
of good faith is thus better determined by tribunals
other than this Court, which is not a trier of facts.
FACTS: In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et
al. maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases
were mischaracterized and unnecessarily
constitutionalized because the Courts interpretation of
savings can be overturned by legislation considering
that savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act
(GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They
aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may
be used for augmentation and that the Court should
apply legally recognized norms and principles, most
especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving
their motion.
On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial
reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all
moneys under the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation
items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit
that augmentation of items beyond the maximum
amounts recommended by the President for the
programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the
budget submitted to Congress should be declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly
their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution and the principles of separation of power
and equal protection, constitutional?
2. Did the Courts Decision invalidated all DAP-funded
projects?
3. Did the Courts Decision throw out the presumption of
good faith of the authors, proponents and implementors
of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP)?
RULING:
1. No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of
the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the
acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant
provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should
remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds
used to finance the projects mentioned therein are
sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant
provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the
power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the
best intentions must come within the parameters
defined and set by the Constitution and the law.
Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal
methods.
Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative
Code refers to the authority of the President to suspend
or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted
for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in
the GAA.
When the President suspends or stops expenditure of
funds, savings are not automatically generated until it
has been established that such funds or appropriations
are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that
the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized has been completed,
discontinued or abandoned.
The reversion to the General Fund of unexpended
balances of appropriations savings included pursuant
to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative
Code22 does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary,
Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit,
Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights,
and the Office of the Ombudsman. The reason for this is
that the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the CFAG.
Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it
allows the President to approve the use of any savings in
the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for
programs and projects of any department, office or
agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate
of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the
authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA
to only those in his own Department out of the savings in
other items of his own Departments appropriations.
Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority
to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP.
Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the
Executive within its department shall, however, remain
valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are
complied with.
2. No. It is to be emphatically indicated that the Decision
did not declare the en masse invalidation of the 116
DAP-funded projects. To be sure, the Court recognized
the encouraging effects of the DAP on the countrys
economy, and acknowledged its laudable purposes, most
especially those directed towards infrastructure
development and efficient delivery of basic social
services. It bears repeating that the DAP is a policy
instrument that the Executive, by its own prerogative,
may utilize to spur economic growth and development.
 56
This modified interpretation does not take away the
caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate
GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally
accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-
funded projects had appropriation cover and were
validly augmented require factual determination that is
not within the scope of the present consolidated
petitions under Rule 65.
Nonetheless, the Decision did find doubtful those
projects that appeared to have no appropriation cover
under the relevant GAAs on the basis that: (1) the DAP
funded projects that originally did not contain any
appropriation for some of the expense categories
(personnel, MOOE and capital outlay); and (2) the
appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the
SARO did not correspond with the program specified in
the GAA.
Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the
Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a
program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from
the expense category or allotment class. There is no
specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the
relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be
the expense category or allotment class. In the same
vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over
an expense category; he may only veto the item to which
that expense category belongs to.
3. No. The Court has neither thrown out the presumption
of good faith nor imputed bad faith to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP.
The contrary is true, because the Court has still
presumed their good faith by pointing out that the
doctrine of operative fact cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there
are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the
proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil,
administrative and other liabilities.
TESDA v. COA
(G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015}
FACTS: The TESDA audit team discovered that for the
calendar year 2003, TESDA paid for healthcare
maintenance ALLOWANCE of P5,000.00 to covered
TESDA employees. This was pursuant to Administrative
Order (AO) No. 430, series of 2003, authorizing the
payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of
P5,000.00 to all officials and employees of the DOLE,
which was purportedly based on Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 33,
series of 1997, and Section 34 of the General Provisions
of the 2003 General Appropriations Act.
In the letter of CSC Director Imelda Laceras of Region VII
to DOLE Region VII Auditor, Ms. Damiana Pelino, the
former, HOWEVER, informed the latter that there are no
existing guidelines authorizing the grant of Health Care
Maintenance Allowance and medical Allowance to all
government officials and employees. Hence, DOLE
Administrative Order No. 430, series of 2003 is clearly
without legal basis.
Atty. Rebecca Mislang, Officer In-Charge of the COA LAO-
National, subsequently issued Notice of Disallowance
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
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(ND) No. 2006-015 dated May 26, 2006 of the P 5,000.00
allowance.
MC No. 33 did not intend the health care program to be a
single activity or endowment to achieve a fleeting goal,
for it rightfully concerned the institutionalization of a
system of healthcare for government employees. A
careful perusal of MC No. 33 and its precursor reveals
the unequivocal intent to afford government employees
a sustainable health care program instead of an
intermittent healthcare provision.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not COA properly disallowed the
payment of the healthcare allowance?
2) Whether or not TESDAs claim that of giving
allowances as a better option tenable?
RULING 1: YES. COA is generally accorded complete
discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and
responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of
public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly
beyond what is sanctioned by law. Only in instances
when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction shall the Court interfere.
MC No. 33, series of 1997 provides that [a]ll government
offices shall provide the following a. Health Program for
Government Employees which shall include 1.
Hospitalization services, 2. Annual mental, medical-
physical examinations.
The Court stated MC No. 33 did not intend the health
care program to be a single activity or endowment to
achieve a fleeting goal, for it rightfully concerned the
institutionalization of a system of healthcare for
government employees. A careful perusal of MC No. 33
and its precursor reveals the unequivocal intent to
afford government employees a sustainable health care
program instead of an intermittent healthcare provision.
It was not to give the allowances to the employees.
Thus, it was right for COA to disallow payments of
healthcare allowances.
RULING 2: NO. MC No. 33 and its precursor were
worded in a plain and straightforward manner to the
effect that the (h)ealth program for employees shall
include any or all of the following: 1) Hospitalization
services, and 2) Annual mental, medical-physical
examinations. Whatever latitude was afforded to a
government agency extended only to the determination
of which services to include in the program, not to the
choice of an alternative to such health program or to
authorizing the conversion of the benefits into cash. The
giving of health care maintenance allowance of P5,
000.00 to the TESDAs employees was not among any of
the hospitalization services or examinations listed in the
circular.
ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(767 SCRA 282, August 18, 2015)
CASE DOCTRINES: Primary objective of bail The
strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure
of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm
 57
to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is
afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure to wit: No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of his purported involvement in the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially,
Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a
warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to
Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b)
that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion
temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight
risk due to his age and physical condition.
Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution.
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter
of right unless the crime charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of
guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to
show that if ever petitioner would be
convicted, he will be punishable
by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show
that petitioner's guilt is strong.
2) Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he
is not a flight risk.
RULING 1: YES.
Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of
innocence. Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of
bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but no higher than what may
be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion. Right to bail is afforded in
Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in
Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
wit:
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
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Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted
according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides: Bail, when
discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice
of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved
by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may
be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail,
or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of
any party, reviews the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or
life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to
judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the
court held: [S]uch discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of
the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should
be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice
 58
is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing
should primarily determine whether the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described
in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right
or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7
and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
RULING 2: YES. Petitioner's poor health justifies his
admission to bail. The Supreme Court took note of the
Philippine's responsibility to the international
community arising from its commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process and for
detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from
Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC
emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate
in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which
safeguards their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. (Emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion.
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial
and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
the Motion to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and
capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post
bail].
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE LEONEN
Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very
weak legal basis the grant of bail over mere
humanitarian grounds. He also claims that the court has
no authority to use humanitarian grounds. Leonen
argues that [Petitioner's] release for medical or
humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in
his Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan, nor
were these grounds raised in the petition in the Supreme
Court.
Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither
presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in
any statute or provision of the Constitution.
Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted
bail as a special accomodation for the petitioner and he
goes on to criticize the decision to wit:
[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective
justice not based on their legal provisions, but one that is
unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the
presence or absence of human compassion.
x x x. Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the
Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with
motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide,
without guidance, whether bail should be granted
because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or
dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this
is applicable only to Senators and former Presidents
charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug
trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, and other crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. x
xx
Procedure for granting bail. Leonen's dissent also
examines the procedure outlined for the lower courts in
bail cases in order to demonstrate that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in denying Petitioner's
Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme Court
held:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the
Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges involving
bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the
basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the
Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has
been including lectures on the subject in the regular
seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we
reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right
or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
 59
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7
and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in
the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study
them as well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly,
judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous
decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much
too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of
cases on bail having already been decided, this Court
justifiably expect judges to discharge their duties
assiduously. For judge is called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of
justice can only be engendered if litigants are convinced
that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charge
with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan
grant his bail without any hearing for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. At
the Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution had no
opportunity to present any evidence because of the
prematurity of Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the
dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was correct in
denying the Motion based on prematurity.
Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate
Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on
humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan. Neither
petitioner nor the prosecution were able to develop
their arguments as to this point to establish legal and
factual basis for this kind of bail.
The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the
court to grant bail merely on the basis of the certification
of the attending physician, Dr. Gonzales, stating that the
Petitioner was suffering from numerous debilitating
conditions. The dissent states that:
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant
of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor's certification.
In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence
by doing away with cross-examination and
authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's
health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine
whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
x x x The better part of prudence is that we follow
strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and
canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to
determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This
is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a
mandatory manner after petition for bail is filed by
accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any,
should be pleaded and heard. x x x
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the
version deliberated upon, This section of the dissent
reveals that the Justices voted to grant bail based on a
substantially different version of the opinion, one which
did not use humanitarian considerations as a ground for
the granting of bail. The dissent explains that the Justices
voted 8-4 solely on the issue of whether or not bail is a
matter of right and reveals that the copy offered for
signature was substantially similar to an earlier draft
which used humanitarian considerations as the basis for
the granting of bail. The dissent makes it clear that this
was an irregularity.
The majority opinion offers no guidance. The dissent
argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the
privilege (humanitarian considerations, right to bail,
etc.) will apply to those who have similar conditions.
Whether or not this privilege will only apply to those
undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this
privilege can be granted to those of advanced age only.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not
ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the
ground of medical conditions.
There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if,
when and how bail can then be canceled.
Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced. The reliance of the
majority on the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR
vs. Olalia is misplaced because this case referred to
extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis on
international law. As applied to crimes charged under
Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights must be qualified by the
Constitution's rules regarding bail.
Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by
remanding the case back to the lower court for factual
determination of whether or not the accused was a flight
risk.
CHEVRON PHILS., INC. vs. CIR
(G.R. No. 210836 | September 1, 2015)
FACTS: Chevron Phils. Inc. (Chevron) sold and delivered
petroleum products to CDC in the period from August
2007 to December 2007. Chevron did not pass on to CDC
the excise taxes paid on the importation of the
petroleum products sold to Clark Development
Corporation (CDC) in taxable year 2007; hence, it filed
an administrative claim for tax refund or issuance of tax
credit certificate. Considering that respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) did not act on
the administrative claim for tax refund or tax credit,
Chevron elevated its claim to the CTA by petition for
review.
CTA First Division denied Chevron's judicial claim for tax
refund or tax credit through its decision and later on also
denied Chevron's Motion for Reconsideration. In due
course, Chevron appealed to the CTA En Banc, which
affirmed the ruling of the CTA First Division, stating that
there was nothing in Section 135(c) of the NIRC that
explicitly exempted Chevron as the seller of the
imported petroleum products from the payment of the
excise taxes; and holding that because it did not fall
under any of the categories exempted from paying excise
 60
tax, Chevron was not entitled to the tax refund or tax
credit. Chevron sought reconsideration, but the CTA En
Banc denied its motion for that purpose in the
resolution.
Chevron appealed to the Court, but the Court (Second
Division) denied the petition for review on certiorari
through the resolution for failure to show any reversible
error on the part of the CTA En Banc. Hence, Chevron
has filed the Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether Chevron was entitled to the tax refund
or the tax credit for the excise taxes paid on the
importation of petroleum products that it had sold to
CDC in 2007.
RULING: Yes, Chevron was entitled to the refund or
credit of the excise taxes erroneously paid on the
importation of the petroleum products sold to CDC.
Pursuant to Section 135(c), petroleum products sold to
entities that are by law exempt from direct and indirect
taxes are exempt from excise tax. As a duly-registered
enterprise in the Clark Special Economic Zone, CDC has
been exempt from paying direct and indirect taxes
pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916 (The
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995), in relation to
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9400 (Amending Republic
Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion
Development Act of 1992).
Inasmuch as its liability for the payment of the excise
taxes accrued immediately upon importation and prior
to the removal of the petroleum products from the
customs house, Chevron was bound to pay, and actually
paid such taxes. But the status of the petroleum products
as exempt from the excise taxes would be confirmed
only upon their sale to CDC in 2007. Before then,
Chevron did not have any legal basis to claim the tax
refund or the tax credit as to the petroleum products.
Consequently, the payment of the excise taxes by
Chevron upon its importation of petroleum products
was deemed illegal and erroneous upon the sale of the
petroleum products to CDC. Section 204 of the NIRC
explicitly allowed Chevron as the statutory taxpayer to
claim the refund or the credit of the excise taxes thereby
paid.
AGUSTIN vs. COMELEC
(774 SCRA 353, November 10, 2015)
In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States of America (USA). On October 5, 2012, he
filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of
Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be
contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections.5 As the
official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he declared
in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was
seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural born
Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years.
On October 10, 2012, respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a
rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC
a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, docketed
as SPA No. 13-023 (DC), alleging that the petitioner had
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating
that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos
for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein
only on May 31, 2012. The petition stated the sole
ground thus wise: THE DECLARATION UNDER OATH
MADE BY THE RESPONDENT THAT HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR
THE OFFICE OR SEEK TO BE ELECTED TO (sic)
CONSTITUTES MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION FOR
THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER (sic) HE HAS NOT
RESIDED AS REQUIRED BY LAW FOR A PERIOD OF ONE
YEAR IN THE LOCALITY HE SEEKS TO BE ELECTED; and
prayed to issue an order to immediately deny due course
and or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
respondent Arsenio A. Agustin.
In his answer, the petitioner countered that the one-year
requirement referred to residency, not to voter
registration; that residency was not dependent on
citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business
purposes did not violate the residency requirement
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence; and that as
regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of
Renunciation of U.S./American Citizenship executed on
October 2, 2012.
On January 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division
issued its omnibus resolution, pertinently holding:
As can be clearly gathered from the Velasco case, a
candidate's status as a registered voter is a material fact
which falls under the same classification as one's
citizenship or residence. While they are under the same
classification as referring to a candidate's qualification
for elective office, the requirements are different. The
requirement that a candidate must be a registered voter
does not carry with it the requirement that he must be
so one year before the elections because this refers to
the residency qualification.
On this score, it could not be said that respondents
falsely represented the length of their residence in the
municipality simply because they became registered
voters thereof only fairly recently. As far as registration
as a voter is concerned, it should suffice that they are
duly registered upon the filing of their COCs or within
the period prescribed by law for such registration.
Anent petitioner['] allegations that respondents were
unable to vote because they are residents of other
countries, the records are bereft of any evidence that
would substantiate this. It is a fundamental rule that he
who alleges, not he who denies, must prove. Mere,
petitioners have not adduced a single shred of
competent evidence that respondents were actually
residents or citizens of other countries that is why they
were unable to vote. The petitions are denied for lack of
merit.
On February 12, 2013, Pillos moved for the
reconsideration of the January 28, 2013 resolution with
the COMELEC En Banc.14 He underscored in his motion
that the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily
declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of
the USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on
October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport despite
his renunciation of his USA citizenship on October 2,
2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012, in
 61
which he declared that he was a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and that the
petitioner's declaration of his eligibility in his CoC
constituted material misrepresentation because of his
failure to meet the citizenship and residency
requirements.
The petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration.
On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its
assailed resolution cancelling and denying due course to
the petitioner's CoC, observing as follows:
Having admitted his dual citizenship, Agustin had the
burden of proving through his evidence that he complied
with the statutory requirements imposed upon dual
citizens provided under Republic Act 9225, particularly
Section 3 and 5(2) thereof, to wit:
x x x x While Agustin presented a copy of his Affidavit of
Renunciation, he failed to furnish this Commission a
copy of his Oath of Allegiance. Noteworthy is the fact,
that in Agustin's Affidavit of Renunciation, it was stated
that his Oath of Allegiance is attached as Annex "B";
however, said attachment has not been made available
for the perusal of this Commission. Having failed to
sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of
RA 9225, Agustin's COC must be cancelled and/or denied
due course. Consequently, the Motion for
Reconsideration is only granted as against Respondent
Agustin.
On May 3, 2013, the petitioner filed a Verified Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court.17He
attached thereto copies of the Order of Approval dated
February 12, 201218 and his Oath of Allegiance dated
March 9, 2012,19 both issued by the Consulate General
of the Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii. He further
attached certifications issued by Election Officers in
Ilocos Norte attesting that the documents had been
received by the COMELEC and retained in its files. He
explained that the documents were not presented during
the course of the proceedings because the sole issue
raised by Pillos' Petition to Deny Due Course and/or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy had involved only his
(petitioner) compliance with the one-year residency
requirement.
Pillos submitted a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution and Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court on May 8,
2013, praying that a writ of execution be issued to
implement the cancellation of the petitioner's COC.
On Election Day, May 13, 2013, the name of the
petitioner remained in the ballot. He was later on
proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte for obtaining 5,020 votes, the
highest among the contending parties.
Sensing that the 30-day period within which a petition
for certiorari should be filed in the Supreme Court was
about to expire, the petitioner filed on May 24, 2013 an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated May 3, 2013.
On May 28, 2013, the petitioner thus instituted this case,
alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En
Banc based on the following grounds:
The assailed En Banc Resolution was promulgated in
gross violation of Petitioner's guaranteed Constitutional
Right to Due Process and to be informed of the facts and
the law on which the same was based; and
The grave erroneous appreciation of the facts, law, and
the evidence of the case.
Meanwhile, on June 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc,
pointing out that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc resolution was not
allowed under Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure; and that, accordingly, the April 23, 2013
resolution was deemed final and executory pursuant to
Section 8, paragraph 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523,
issued the writ of execution.24
On July 16, 2013, the Court required the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of
the COMELEC En Banc resolution dated April 23, 2013.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disqualification of the
petitioner to run as mayor for being a dual citizen is
valid.
RULING: The Court finds and declares that the petitioner
made no material misrepresentation in his CoC; hence,
there is no legal or factual basis for the cancellation of
the CoC.
Even so, he was disqualified to run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being a dual
citizen. With his disqualification having been determined
and pronounced by final judgment before the elections,
the votes cast in his favor should not be counted.
Accordingly, his rival, respondent Pillos, should be
proclaimed duly elected Mayor for obtaining the highest
number of votes in the elections.
Administrative due process was observed. Before anything
more, let us deal with the petitioner's insistence that the
COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in
resolving Pillos' motion for reconsideration based on a
ground that was neither the basis of nor raised in
the Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin; that the
non-presentation of his Oath of Allegiance should not be
fatal to his constitutional right to run for public office
especially because the sole ground for Pillos' petition in
the COMELEC had dealt only with the residency
requirement; that Pillos could have included citizenship
as a ground by the amendment of his petition, but he did
not move for that purpose; that he duly complied with
the requirements for the re-acquisition of his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225, and the
proof of the re-acquisition had been submitted to the
Election Officers in Ilocos Norte; and that the COMELEC,
by not at least holding a clarificatory hearing to ascertain
and confirm such matters, violated his right to due
process by denying to him the opportunity to prepare
for his defense.
The petitioner's insistence lacks merit. We note that the
petitioner's citizenship came to the fore because he
himself asserted his Philippine citizenship in his answer
 62
to Pillos' petition to cancel his CoC in order to bolster his
allegation of compliance with the one-year residency
requirement. As such, he could not credibly complain
about being denied due process, especially considering
that he had been able to file an opposition to Pillos'
motion for reconsideration. It is worthy to state that the
observance of due process in administrative proceedings
does not always require or involve a trial-type
proceeding, for the demand of due process is also met
whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the
opportunity to explain or defend himself. Also, due
process is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek the
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. The rule is the same in election cases.
The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of
his USA passport after his renunciation of
foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified
from continuing as a mayoralty candidate. A valid CoC
arises upon the timely filing of a person's declaration of
his intention to run for public office and his affirmation
that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks
to assume. The valid CoC renders the person making the
declaration a valid or official candidate.
There are two remedies available under existing laws to
prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race.
One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by
petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy.
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the Court has
differentiated the two remedies thuswise: [A] petition
for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On
the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who
is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC.
The Court has described the nature of a Section 78
petition in Fermin thusly: [t]he denial of due course to or
the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to
the qualifications required of the public office he/she is
running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law,
is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo
warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the feet that a
"Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while
a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves
a finding not only that a person lacked a qualification for
the office he is vying for but also that such he made a
material representation in the CoC that was false. The
Court has stressed in Mitra v. Commission on
Elections32 that in addition to materiality there must be
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render the candidate
ineligible, viz.:
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise
be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made
with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidate's qualifications for public office.
Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses
cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and
cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is
patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate
results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material
falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot
run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both
cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws.
A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of
COC that falls short of the foregoing requirements should
not be granted.
The petition of Pillos in SPA No. 13-023 (DC) was in the
nature of the Section 78 petition to deny due course to
or to cancel the CoC of the petitioner because it
contained allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition,
namely: (a) the petitioner as a candidate made a
representation in his CoC; (b) the representation
referred to a material matter that would affect his
substantive right as candidate (that is, the right to run
for the position for which he filed his CoC); and (c) he
made the false representation with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public
office, or he deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render
him ineligible. Pillos further challenged the petitioner's
eligibility for public office based on his failure to comply
with the one-year residency requirement stated in
the Local Government Code, and ultimately specifically
prayed that the COMELEC "issue an order to
immediately deny due course and or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of respondent Arsenio A.
Agustin."34
Yet, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner's CoC
not because of his failure to meet the residency
requirement but because of his failure "to sufficiently
show that he complied with the provisions of RA
9225."35 In our view, such basis for cancelation was
unwarranted considering that he became eligible to run
for public office when he expressly renounced his USA
citizenship, by which he fully complied with the
requirements stated in Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225, to wit:
 63
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those
who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
x x x x (2) Those seeking elective public in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath; x x x x
More particularly, the petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and executed his Affidavit
of Renunciation on October 2, 2012. By his Oath of
Allegiance and his renunciation of his USA citizenship, he
reverted to the status of an exclusively Filipino citizen.
On October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was,
therefore, exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering him
eligible to run for public office. His CoC was valid for all
intents and purposes of the election laws because he did
not make therein any material misrepresentation of his
eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte.
Nonetheless, we uphold the declaration by the
COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to
run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6,
2012,36 after having renounced his USA citizenship and
having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using
his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a
citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport
in his subsequent travels abroad37 despite having been
already issued his Philippine passport on August 23,
2012.38 He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of
renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used
his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on
October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered
an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from
October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012.
The petitioner's continued exercise of his rights as a
citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after
the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to
his earlier status as a dual citizen.39 Such reversion
disqualified him from being elected to public office in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, viz.:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons arc
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected
to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the
qualifications for elective office.40 Even if it made no
finding that the petitioner had deliberately attempted to
mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of
his CoC, the COMELEC could still declare him
disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility
under the Local Government Code.
Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas
We Never Forget Traditional Spirit
The petitioner was declared disqualified by
final judgment before Election Day; hence, the
votes cast for him should not be counted. Considering
that the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to
cancel the CoC requires a finding that he made a material
representation in the CoC that was false, the
COMELEC En Banc, in granting Pillos' motion for
reconsideration, expressly held the petitioner ineligible
to participate in the elections or disqualified from the
mayoralty race, which was the basis for the cancellation
of his CoC. Such reason cancelling the petitioner's CoC
despite the absence of the material misrepresentation at
the time he filed his CoC might not be in order, but the
undisputed fact is that the COMELEC En Banc expressly
decreed his disqualification in the April 23, 2013
resolution.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified
by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for,
and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a
mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections,
which is the situation covered in the first sentence of
Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the situation
covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6
of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first
situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and
votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution
disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way
before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the
8,164 votes cast in Cayat's favor are stray. Cayat was
never a candidate in the 10 May 2004
elections. Palileng's proclamation is proper because he
was the sole and only candidate, second to none.
Even if his disqualification did not subvert the validity of
his CoC, the petitioner would be reduced to a non-
candidate under the terms of Section 6, supra, should it
be shown that the disqualification attained
finality prior to the 2013 elections. The effect was to
render the votes cast in his favor stray, resulting in Pillos
being proclaimed the winning candidate.
It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the
time when the judgment declaring the petitioner
 64

disqualified from running for the local elective position

attained finality.

Pillos submits that the April 23, 2013 resolution was

already deemed final and executory as of May 4, 2013;
hence, the writ of execution was issued on June 18,
2013; and that the petitioner's disqualification thus
attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections.
Pillos' submission is correct.

Although the petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion

for Reconsideration with Leave of Court on May 3,
201343 upon receiving the April 23, 2013 resolution
granting Pillos' motion for reconsideration,44such filing
did not impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from being
deemed final and executory because Section l(d), Rule
13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly
disallowed the filing of the motion for
reconsideration.45 Within the context of Section 13,
Rule 18,46 and Section 3, Rule 37,47 both of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the April 23, 2013
resolution became final and executory as of May 4, 2013
upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation
without a restraining order being issued by the Supreme
Court.

Under the circumstances, the finality of the petitioner's

disqualification pursuant to the April 23, 2013
resolution prior to the May 13, 2013 elections rendered
him a non-candidate, and the votes cast for him should
not have been counted.48 Pillos, being the qualified
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes, should
be proclaimed duly elected as Mayor of the Municipality
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the 2013 elections.

Lex Cervus Fraternity Lex Augustiniana Sororitas

We Never Forget Traditional Spirit