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Philosophical
Perspectives, 1988
2, Epistemology,
WHATIS "NATURAUZED
EPISTEMOLOGY?"
JaegwonKim
BrownUniversity
1. EpistemologyAs a NormativeInquiry
2. The FoundationalistStrategy
In orderto identify
thetargetofthenaturalistic
critique-inpar-
384/ JaegwonKim
3. Quine's Arguments
Ithasbecomecustomary forepistemologists
whoprofess allegiance
toa "naturalistic" conception ofknowledge topayhomagetoQuine
as thechiefcontemporary provenance oftheirinspiration-especially
to hisinfluential paper"Epistemology Naturalized".8 Quine'sprin-
cipalargument inthispaperagainsttraditional epistemology is bas-
ed on the claimthatthe Cartesianfoundationalist programhas
failed-that theCartesian "questforcertainty"is"a lostcause".While
thisclaimaboutthehopelessness oftheCartesian "questforcertain-
ty"is nothing new,usingitto discredit theveryconception ofnor-
mativeepistemology is new,something thatanyseriousstudent of
epistemology mustcontendwith.
Quinedividestheclassicepistemological program intotwoparts:
conceptualreductionwherebyphysicalterms,including thoseof
theoretical science,are reduced,via definition, to termsreferring
tophenomenal features ofsensory experience, anddoctrinal reduc-
tionwhereby truths aboutthephysical worldare appropriately ob-
tainedfrom truths aboutsensory experience. The"appropriateness"
justalludedto refers to therequirement thatthefavoredepistemic
status("certainty" forclassicepistemologists,according toQuine)of
ourbasicbeliefsbe transferred, undiminished,
essentially to deriv-
ed beliefs,a necessary requirement ifthederivational processis to
yieldknowledge from knowledge. Whatderivational methods have
thisproperty ofpreserving epistemic Perhapstherearenone,
status?
givenourproneness toerrinframing derivationsas inanything else,
notto mention thepossibility oflapsesofattention andmemory in
following lengthy proofs. Butlogicaldeduction comesas closetobe-
ingone as any;itcan at leastbe reliedon to transmit truth, ifnot
epistemic status.It couldperhapsbe arguedthatno methodcan
preserve certainty unlessitpreserves (orisknowntopreserve) truth;
andifthisisso,logicaldeduction istheonlymethod worthconsider-
ing.I do notknowwhetherthiswas theattitude of mostclassic
epistemologists; if
butQuineassumesthat deduction doesn'tfilltheir
bill,nothing will.
Quinesees theprojectofconceptual reduction as culminating in
Carnap'sDer LogischeAufbauder Welt.As Quinesees it,Carnap
"came nearestto executing"the conceptualhalfof the classic
epistemological project.But comingclose is not good enough.
Because of the holisticmannerin whichempiricalmeaningis
386/ JaegwonKim
reallyproceeds?Whynotsettleforpsychology? Sucha
surrender oftheepistemological burdento psychology is a
movethatwas disallowedin earliertimesas circular
reasoning. Iftheepistemologist's
goal is validation
ofthe
groundsofempirical science,he defeatshispurposeby
usingpsychology or otherempiricalsciencein the
validation.However,suchscruplesagainstcircularity have
littlepointonce we havestoppeddreaming ofdeducing
sciencefromobservation. Ifwe are outsimplyto understand
thelinkbetweenobservation and science,we are well
advisedto use anyavailableinformation, includingthat
providedby theverysciencewhoselinkwithobservation
we are seekingto understand.
to say aboutthefailureofCarnap's
AndQuinehas thefollowing
reductive
programin theAufbau:12
To relaxthedemandfordefinition, and settlefora kindof
reduction thatdoes noteliminate, is to renouncethelast
remaining advantagethatwe supposedrationalrecon-
structionto have overstraight psychology; namely,the
advantageoftranslational reduction. Ifall we hopeforis a
reconstruction thatlinksscienceto experiencein explicit
waysshortoftranslation, thenit wouldseemmoresensible
to settleforpsychology. Betterto discoverhowscienceis in
factdevelopedand learnedthanto fabricate a fictitious
structure to a similareffect.
Ifa taskis entirelyhopeless,ifwe knowitcannotbe executed,no
doubtit is rationalto abandonit; we wouldbe betteroffdoing
something else thathas somehopeofsuccess.We can agreewith
Quinethatthe"validation"-that is,logicaldeduction-of scienceon
thebasisofobservation cannotbe had;so itis rationalto abandon
thisparticularepistemologicalprogram, ifindeediteverwasa pro-
gramthatanyoneseriously undertook. ButQuine'srecommenda-
tionsgo further. thereare twoaspectsofQuine'spro-
Inparticular,
posalsthatare ofspecialinterest he is notonlyadvising
to us:first,
us toquittheprogram of"validatingscience",buturging us totake
up anotherspecific an empirical
project, psychologicalstudyofour
cognitiveprocesses;second,he is also claimihg thatthisnewpro-
gramreplacestheold,thatbothprograms arepartofsomething ap-
388/ JaegwonKim
4. Losing KnowledgefromEpistemology
dropsoutofepistemology,
Ifjustification knowledge itselfdrops
outofepistemology. Forourconceptofknowledge is inseparably
tiedtothatofjustification.
As earliernoted,knowledge itselfisa nor-
mativenotion.Quine'snonnormative, naturalizedepistemology has
no roomforourconceptofknowledge. Itis notsurprising that,in
describingnaturalizedepistemology, Quine seldomtalksabout
knowledge;instead,he talksabout"science"and "theories" and
"representations". Quinewouldhave us investigate howsensory
stimulation "leads"to"theories"and"representation" oftheworld.
I take it thatwithinthe traditional schemethese"theories" and
"representations" correspond tobeliefs,orsystems ofbeliefs; thus,
whatQuinewouldhaveus do istoinvestigate howsensory stimula-
tionleads to theformation ofbeliefsabouttheworld.
Butinwhatsenseof"lead"?I takeitthatQuinehasinminda causal
or nomological sense.He is urgingus to developa theory, an em-
piricaltheory, thatuncoverslawfulregularities governing thepro-
cessesthrough whichorganisms cometodevelopbeliefs abouttheir
environment as a causalresultof havingtheirsensoryreceptors
stimulated in certainways.Quinesays:19
[Naturalized studiesa naturalphenomenon,
epistemology]
viz.,a physicalhumansubject.Thishumansubjectis
390/ JaegwonKim
accordedexperimentally controlledinput-certainpatterns of
forinstance-andin the
in assortedfrequencies,
irradiation
fullnessoftimethesubjectdeliversas outputa description
ofthethree-dimensional externalworldand itshistory.The
relationbetween themeager inputand output
torrential is a
relationthatwe are promptedto study forsomewhat the
same reasonsthatalwaysprompted namely,
epistemology;
and in what
in orderto see how evidencerelatesto theory,
waysone'stheoryofnaturetranscends anyavailable
evidence.
Therelation Quinespeaksofbetween"meagerinput"and"torren-
tialoutput" is a causalrelation; at leastitis qua causalrelation that
the naturalizedepistemologist investigates it. It is none of the
naturalized epistemologist's business toassesswhether, andtowhat
degree,theinput"justifies" theoutput,howa givenirradiation of
thesubject's retinas makesit"reasonable" or"rational" forthesub-
jectto emitcertainrepresentational output.His interest is strictly
causalandnomological: he wantsus to lookforpatterns oflawlike
dependencies characterizing theinput-output relations forthispar-
ticularorganism and othersofa likephysicalstructure.
Ifthisis right, itmakesQuine'sattempt to relatehisnaturalized
epistemology to traditionalepistemology lookat bestlame.Forin
whatsense is the studyof causal relationships betweenphysical
stimulation ofsensoryreceptors and theresulting cognitive output
a way of "seeing how evidence relates to theory"in an
epistemologically relevantsense?The causalrelationbetweensen-
soryinputandcognitive outputisa relation between"evidence" and
"theory"; however, itis notan evidential relation. Thiscan be seen
from thefollowing consideration:thenomological patterns thatQuine
urgesus to look forare certainto varyfromspeciesto species,
depending on theparticular wayeachbiological(andpossibly non-
biological)speciesprocessesinformation, buttheevidential relation
in itspropernormative sensemustabstractfromsuchfactors and
concernitselfonlywiththe degreeto whichevidencesupports
hypothesis.
In anyevent,theconceptofevidenceis inseparable fromthatof
Whenwe talkof"evidence"
justification. inan epistemological sense
we aretalking aboutjustification:onething is"evidence" foranother
justincase thefirst tendstoenhancethereasonableness orjustifica-
Whatis "Naturalized / 391
Epistemology"?
and Rationality
5. BeliefAttribution
Perhapswe havesaidenoughtopersuadeourselvesthatQuine's
naturalized epistemology, whileitmaybe a legitimate scientificin-
quiry,is nota kindofepistemology, and,therefore, thattheques-
tionwhetherit is a betterkindof epistemology cannotarise.In
reply,however,it mightbe said thattherewas a sensein which
Quine'sepistemology andtraditional epistemology couldbe viewed
as sharinga common subjectmatter, namelythis:theybothconcern
beliefsor "representations". The onlydifference is thattheformer
investigatestheircausalhistories and connections whereasthelat-
teris concerned withtheirevidential orjustificatory properties and
relations.Thisdifference, ifQuineis right, leadstoanother(so con-
tinuesthereply):theformer is a feasibleinquiry, thelatteris not.
I nowwanttotakemyargument a stepfurther: I shallarguethat
theconceptofbeliefis itselfan essentially normative one,and in
consequencethatifnormativity is whollyexcludedfromnaturaliz-
ed epistemology itcannotevenbe thought ofas beingaboutbeliefs.
Thatis,ifnaturalized epistemology is tobe a scienceofbeliefsprop-
erlyso called,it mustpresuppose a normative conceptofbelief.
Briefly,theargument is this.In orderto implement Quine'spro-
gramofnaturalized epistemology, we shallneedtoidentify, andin-
dividuate, theinputand outputofcognizers. The input,forQuine,
consists ofphysicalevents("thestimulation ofsensoryreceptors")
andtheoutputis saidto be a "theory" or "picture oftheworld"-
thatis,a setof "representations" of the cognizer's environment. Let
In
usfocuson theoutput. order study to thesensory input-cognitive
outputrelations forthegivencognizer, therefore, we mustfindout
what"representations" he has formed as a resultoftheparticular
stimulations thathavebeenappliedto hissensory transducers. Set-
tingasidethejargon,whatwe need be to able to do is to attribute
beliefs,andothercontentful intentional states,to thecognizer.But
beliefattributionultimately requires a "radicalinterpretation" ofthe
cognizer, of hisspeech and intentional states;that is, we must con-
structan "interpretivetheory" thatsimultaneously assignsmeanings
tohisutterances andattributes tohimbeliefs andotherpropositional
attitudes.22
Evena cursory
consideration thatsuchan interpretation
indicates
cannotbegin-we cannotget a in oursubject'srealmof
foothold
meanings we
states-unless
andintentional assumehistotalsystem
Whatis "Naturalized / 393
Epistemology"?
"good"and"right" indescriptive
ornaturalistic
termsisanother.One
mayproperly rejecttheformer,theso-called"ethicalnaturalism",
as manymoralphilosophers havedone,and holdthelatter;there
here.G. E. Mooreis a philosopher
is no obviousinconsistency who
didjustthat.As is wellknown,he was a powerful criticofethical
naturalism,holdingthatgoodnessis a "simple"and "nonnatural"
property. At the same time,he held thata thing'sbeinggood
"follows"fromits possessingcertainnaturalistic properties.He
wrote:33
I shouldneverhave thought ofsuggestingthatgoodnesswas
unlessI had supposedthatit was 'derivative'
'non-natural', in
thesensethat,whenevera thingis good (in thesensein
question)itsgoodness...'dependson thepresenceofcertain
non-ethical possessedby thethingin
characteristics'
question:I have alwayssupposedthatit didso 'depend',in
thesensethat,ifa thingis good (in mysense),thenthatit is
so followsfromthe factthatit possesses certainnatural
intrinsicproperties...
Itmakessenseto thinkofthese"natural properties"
intrinsic from
whicha thing'sbeinggood is thoughtto followas constituting
naturalistic ofgoodness,
criteria oratleastpointing totheexistence
ofsuchcriteria.Onecan rejectethicalnaturalism, thedoctrine that
ethicalconceptsare definitionally
eliminable infavorofnaturalistic
terms,andatthesametimeholdthatethical properties,ortheascrip-
tionofethicalterms, mustbe governed bynaturalistic criteria.
Itis
clear,then,thatwe are hereusing "naturalism" ambiguously in
"epistemologicalnaturalism" and "ethicalnaturalism". In ourpre-
sentusage,epistemological naturalism does notinclude(nordoes
itnecessarily
exclude)theclaimthatepistemic terms aredefinitionally
terms.(Quine'snaturalism
reducibleto naturalistic is eliminative,
thoughit is nota definitionaleliminativism.)
If,therefore,we locatethesplitbetweenQuineand traditional
epistemology atthedescriptive vs.normative divide,thencurrently
influential
naturalisminepistemology is notlikelytofallon Quine's
side.Onthisdescriptivevs.normative issue,onecansidewithQuine
in one of two ways: first,one rejects,withQuine,the entire
epistemological
justification-based program; or second,likeethical
butunlikeQuine,one believesthatepistemic
naturalists concepts
arenaturalistically I doubtthatverymanyepistemological
definable.
Whatis "Naturalized / 399
Epistemology"?
willembraceeitherofthesealternatives.34
naturalists
Epistemology
7. EpistemicSupervenience-OrWhyNormative
Is Possible
Notes
1. In makingtheseremarks
I am onlyrepeating
thefamiliar
textbook
Whatis "NaturalizedEpistemology"?/ 401
Press,1983),p. 14.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.,p. 13.I shouldnotethatKitcher considers theapsychologistic ap-
proachto be an aberration ofthetwentieth century epistemology, as
represented by philosophers like Russell,Moore,C.I. Lewis,and
Chisholm, rather thanan historical characteristic oftheCartesian tradi-
tion.In "ThePsychological Turn", Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy
60 (1982):238-253,HilaryKornblith givesan analogouscharacteriza-
tionofthetwoapproaches tojustification; he associates"justification-
conferring processes" withthepsychologistic approachand"epistemic
rules"withtheapsychologistic approach.
30. See Goldman, "Whatis Justified Belief?".
31. DavidM.Armstrong, Truth,BeliefandKnowledge (London: Cambridge
University Press,1973),p. 166.
32. Theaptnessofthischaracterization ofthe"apsychologistic" approach
forphilosophers likeRussell,Chisholm, KeithLehrer, JohnPollock, etc.
canbe debated. Also,thereistheissueof"internalism" vs."externalism"
concerning whichI believemustbe distinguished
justification, from the
psychologistic vs. apsychologistic division.
33. Moore,"A Replyto MyCritics", in P.A.Schilpp(ed.),ThePhilosophy
ofG.E.Moore(Chicago& Evanston: OpenCourt,1942),p. 588.
34. RichardRorty's claim,whichplaysa prominent rolein hisarguments
againsttraditional epistemology inPhilosophy andtheMirror ofNature,
thatLockeandothermodernepistemologists conflated thenormative
conceptofjustification withcausal-mechanical concepts is itself
based,
I believe,on a conflationofjustthekindI amdescribing here.See Ror-
ty,ibid.,pp. 139ff. Again,thecritical conflation consistsin notseeing
thattheview,whichI believeiscorrect, thatepistemic like
justification,
anyothernormative concept,musthavefactual, naturalisticcriteria,
is entirelyconsistent withtherejection ofthedoctrine, whichI think
is incorrect,thatjustificationitselfis, or isreducibleto,a naturalistic-
nonnormative concept.
35. TheLanguageofMorals(London: Oxford University Press,1952),p.145.
36. See "ConceptsofSupervenience", Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research65 (1984):153-176.
37. ErnestSosa,too,considers epistemological supervenience as a special
case ofthesupervenience ofvaluational properties on naturalisticcon-
ditions,in"TheFoundation ofFoundationalism", Nous14(1980):547-64;
especially p. 551.See alsoJamesVanCleve'sinstructive discussion in
his"Epistemic Supervenience andtheCircleofBelief", TheMonist68
(1985):90-104;especially, pp. 97-99.
38. Perhapsonecouldavoidthiskindofcriteriological regress byembrac-
ingdirectly apprehended valuational properties (asinethicalintuitionism)
on thebasisofwhichcriteria forothervaluational properties couldbe
formulated. Thedenialofthesupervenience ofvaluational concepts on
factualcharacteristics, however, wouldsevertheessential connection
between valueandfactonwhich, itseems,thewholepointofourvalua-
tionalactivitiesdepends.Intheabsenceofsuchsupervenience, thevery
404 / JaegwonKim
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