YUCHENGCO vs.

THE MANILA CHRONICLE

G.R. No. 184315, 2009

FACTS:
1. Yuchengco alleges that Chronicle Publishing published in the Manila Chronicle a series
of defamatory articles against him. He was imputed to be:
A Marcos crony or a Marcos-Romualdez crony
He was likewise accused of unsound and immoral business practices
One of the articles portrayed him as being an unfair and uncaring
employer
The subject articles accused him of inducing RCBC to violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans.
The subject articles insinuated that he induced others to disobey lawful
orders of the Securities and Exchange
The subject articles imputed to him the derogatory tag of corporate
raider, implying that he was seeking to profit for something he did not
work for.

2. The Manila Chronicle contended that:

The subject articles were not defamatory since they were composed and
published in good faith and only after having ascertained their contents.
These articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable and balanced
comments on matters of legitimate public interest
They were acting within the bounds of constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press.
Plaintiff is a public figure and assuming that the articles were indeed
defamatory, they cannot be held liable for damages since they were not
impelled by actual malice in the composition thereof.

HELD:

Defamation is the publication of anything that is injurious to the good name or reputation of
another or tends to bring him into disrepute. In determining whether certain utterances are
defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and taken in their plain,
natural and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be understood by persons hearing
(or reading, as in libel) them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another
sense.
Statements are not libelous unless they refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person.
However, the obnoxious writing need not mention the libeled party by name. It is sufficient if it is
shown that the offended party is the person meant or alluded to.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the
reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It
is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Malice in law is a presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise
the presumption are shown to have been uttered. Malice in fact is a positive desire and intention
to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant was actuated by ill will or personal spite.
 Malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the RPC. There is a presumption of malice in the case
of every defamatory imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable
motive for making such imputation. The exceptions are qualifiedly privileged communications.
Defamatory imputations written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged
communications:
(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty
(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions
(3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest may still be considered actionable if
actual malice is proven. This is in contrast with absolutely privileged communications, wherein the
imputations are not actionable, even if attended by actual malice.

A topic or story should not be considered a matter of public interest by the mere fact that the
person involved is a public officer, unless the said topic or story relates to his functions as such.
Assuming a public office is not tantamount to completely abdicating ones right to
privacy. Therefore, for the purpose of determining whether or not a topic is a matter of public
interest, Yuchengco cannot be considered a public officer. Since Yuchengco, the person defamed
in the subject articles, is neither as public officer nor a public figure, said articles cannot be
considered as qualifiedly privileged communications even if they deal with matters of public
concern.