Republic vs Abrille

Synopsis
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title
alleging that: the subdivision of a parcel of land owned by defendant into two lots included an excess area of 82,127
square meters; the Land Registration Commissioner approved said petition for subdivision and; in view of which
transfer certificate of title, which included the excess area, was issued by the Register of Deeds. The lower court
rendered judgment cancelling the new certificates of title (one of the subdivided lots having been further subdivided
and new certificates of title issued therefor) containing the increased area and ordered the Register of Deeds to issue
new ones in lieu thereof after the increased portion had been deducted. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter
certified the case to the Supreme Court since it involved purely a question of law. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment holding that to bring the increased area under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Act
proceedings for registration of the land should be filed.

Facts
The increase area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609 of the Register of Deeds of
Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang, T-20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name
of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square
meters, or 82,127 square meters.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include the increase in area was a
petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the Commissioner of Land
Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new titles under Section 44, Act 496, as amended.
Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was sought, notice before the
hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no notice to the persons interested, including the
Director of Lands, before the petition was heard.

Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the case as movant-intervenors
but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in its order of August 16, 1969.

Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to interested persons, and in ordering the
cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713, and T-20690. It is the contention of the
defendant-appellant that since the government agencies, having to do with lands, know all the time the increase
in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted the
ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area, defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer the effect
of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan.
Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the
approval of their subdivision plan concern was well within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act
496, as amended.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan, with the increase
in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan;
and that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the
increased area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the Land Registration
Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the
subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-appellant's
petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed.

Issue
Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title.

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Ruling
We [SC] are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of
Transfer Certificates of Title. Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the
approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned increased area of
82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so for the increased area in question,
which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of
the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the
name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the
parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the
Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa
Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In
the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meter, has not yet been brought
under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-09322 and
Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to
have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following
requisites should all be satisfied:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the documents or other
evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing in the Official
Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon continuous owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the property by
the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the Land Registration
Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of the owners duplicate
original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.

Susi vs Razon and The Director of Lands

Facts
On December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same. After having been in
possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it.
Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land,
availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the
property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and
then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the
revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land, wherein after considering the
evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon,
dismissing the complaint. Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court,
Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914. Having learned of said
application, Valentin Susi filed an opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for
twenty-five years. After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the
opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of
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Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document,
Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought an action
for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property. Valentin Susi then brought this action.
The Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that
the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and
control of that of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with
law.
The Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff (Susi) entitled to the
possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the
Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment
rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is
controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the
annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title
issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and
(3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.

Ruling
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question
openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880,
that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela
Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and
rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a
fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it,
the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariilo vs. Government of the Philippine Islands is
applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, more over, the presumption juris et de jure [which means
conclusive presumptions of law, which cannot be rebutted by evidence] established in paragraph (b) of section 45
of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since
July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
When Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued
in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of
the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land
in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or
control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

Director of Lands vs IAC and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO

Facts
The land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities. The 1935 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines is applicable as the sale took place on
October 29, 1962. The possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel. The possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered
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from time immemorial. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain.
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth
of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982. The ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and the negotiation came to
reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought
by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon, Isabela on November 15, 1979, and which donation
was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela, during their special session on November 22,
1979.
The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial, on October 29, 1962. This was
accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long after the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. Since section 11 of its
Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in
1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration
in favor of Acme.

Issues
1. Whether or not the ruling in the case of Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome should be overturned in light of
jurisprudence.
2. Whether or not the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing public alienable lands in
1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively.

Ruling
1. Yes. The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco
must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the
line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal
was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a
registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land.
It is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was
disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited to a brief
paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short,
decided no constitutional question.

2. No. The land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title
on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make suchacquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that
matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and
owning private lands. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it purchased the
land from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting the purchase of alienable public lands by
private corporations or associations cannot be retroactively applied.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the
Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the
Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring
interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect"

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title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands
in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat
a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper, this
Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application
because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took
effect. That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding
one thousand and twenty-four hectares.

Diaz vs Republic
Facts
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration for the third time of the resolution of the Supreme
Courtdenying the petition for review fied by petitioner Florencia Diaz. The petitioner fied an application for
registration of a vast tract of land in Nueva Ecija. Petitioner's late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application
for registration of a vast tract of land located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of First
Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and
worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and
adversely for more than 26 years. OSG opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort
Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR) established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237) 3 in
1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, the Supreme Court already ruled in the case of Director of Lands vs.
Reyes that the property was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation and the existence of a Possessory
Information Title 216 (registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla) which the respondent in the sited case
anchored its claim on the land, was not proven.
CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the republic. During the pendency of
the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G.
Diaz. Subsequently, CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter. The parties ultimately
entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares
supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property
inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA. However,
OSG backed out from the settlement and informed the CA that the track of land subject of the amicable settlement
was still within the military reservation. CA ruled in favor of the Republic.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and assailed the decision of Justice Mendoza saying that Mendoza should
have inhibited himself when the case reached CA since he was also the assistance Sol Gen during the initial stages of
the land registration proceedings. Petitioner then filed for a review on certiorari which the SC denied. The MR was
also denied. The petitioner then wants the case referred to the SC en banc which was likewise denied. SC then issued
a directive that no further pleadings would be entertained. Petitioner then wrote letters addressed to Justice
Quisumbing and Justice Puno alleging there was a miscarriage of Justice and that the petitioner was tempted to go
to media regarding the situation.

Issue
Whether or not the land in dispute can be registered by the petitioner.

Ruling
The ruling in the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes is applicable in this case and thus constitutes res judicata.
To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner takes exception to the
fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she
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contends that since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be
determined independently of each other. The Supreme Court ruled that in registration cases filed under the
provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order
dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res
judicata, not only against the adverse claimant but also against all persons.
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July 1,
1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was
inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioner's argument that the findings of fact of the trial
court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded
great respect and bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this
Court's ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by
the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the
hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. It is
well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one
issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title.
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President
in a clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands) coupled with
possession by the claimant as well as that of herp redecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for the petitioner, she was
not able to produce such evidence.
Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into
ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any
occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession
requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.
Coming now to petitioner's contention that her "private rights" to the property, meaning her and her
predecessors' possession thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable.
As earlier stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was
established. Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military
reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and
her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense,
possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
The compromise agreement is null and void. Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites
concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through the appropriate
government agencies, i.e., the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land
Registration Authority, and the Office of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement
with her. The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement between the
parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases involving land
registration proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the
Republic of the Philippines.
The land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a contract because, being forest land, it was
inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides: All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the
object of contracts.

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 Sps Fortuna vs Republic
Facts
In December 1994, spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified
as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was filed with the RTC and
docketed as LRC No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was
succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3,
1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor
of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute
sale dated May 4, 1984.
[Note: from Vendiola to Clemente and Emeteria; from Emeteria to Clemente; from Clemente to Rodolfo;
from Rodolfo to sps Fortuna]
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as
evidence the lots survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment. In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,
the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna.
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the application, it did not present any
evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an
order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world, except the Republic.
In its decision dated May 16, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Although it found that the
spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of the land, they failed to show that they
complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. Through the present petition,
the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act
(PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public
domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession should
be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977;
and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Courts ruling in
Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al., they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only
on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year
requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastoras possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not contradict that fact that
Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to present documentary evidence proving possession earlier
than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the Provincial Assessor's Office, who testified that the
records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War II.
Republic's argument was that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortuna's
predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of the land only since 1948. they failed to
show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945.

Ruling
No. The petition was denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed
the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortunas application of registration of title.
It is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to establish
foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of
alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48 (b), will find application only from the time that a public land
has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable. Under Section 6 of the PLA, 20 the
classification and the reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President,
through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded
from the public domain.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation in the survey
plan, which states: This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395
certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation. It also relied on the Certification dated July 19,
1999 from the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record,
neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject parcel[.]" However, we find that

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neither of the above documents is evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain .The applicant must present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as
proclaimed by the President. The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the
President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable.
The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances
of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable agricultural lands. Under
Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be disposed of, among others, by judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a
30-year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942. On
January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by requiring possession since June 12,
1945.
[Note: Sec. 48 of PLA requires possession since July 26, 1894; RA 1942 requires 30-year possession; Sec. 4 of
PD 1073 requires possession since June 12, 1945]
To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their
predecessors-ininterest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48 (b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was
considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from January 25, 1977 the
effectivity date of PD No. 1073.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that [the] Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation, the Court
has declared in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, et al. that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for
its effectivity. [A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect
only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other
words, applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
[Note: No longer Jan. 25, 1977 but May 8, 1947 as the cut-off date]
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947. Even if the
Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses
Fortunas application for registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they
possessed the land since May 8, 1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show
the nature of Pastora's possession. Notably, Section 48 (b) of the PLA speaks of possession and occupation.
"Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession.
Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction." Nothing in Tax Declaration No.
8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land.
Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal."
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora
is 9,564 sq.m. This is too big an area for the Court to consider that Pastora's claimed acts of possession and
occupation (as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the size of the lots, it is
unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess and declare that its entirety belonged to
Pastora because she saw acts of possession and occupation in what must have been but a limited area. As
mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been
referring to Lot No. 4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.

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Land Titles: Original Registration and Judicial Confirmation
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