CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

PROVISIONS DIRECTLY LIMITS TAXATION POWER

A. Art. III, Section 20 of the Constitution- No person shall be imprisoned for non-payment of a poll
tax.
POLL TAX- one levied on persons who are residents within the territory of the taxing authority
without regard to their property, business or communication. COMMUNITY TAX under the Local
Government Code
It is only a prohibition for imprisonment of non-payment of poll/community tax; other
taxes therein imposed may be subjected by the law to imprisonment. Also, an imposition of a
fine or even imprisonment for any violation other that the non-payment is constitutional.

B. Art. VI, Section 28, par.1- The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
UNIFORMITY- all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated are to be treated alike or put
on equal footing (taxed at the same rate) both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivisions vs
Sarmiento). A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject matter may be found (State Railroad Tax Case; Patton vs Brady).
EQUALITY- accomplished when the burden of the tax falls equally and impartially upon all the
persons and property subject to it, so that no higher rate or greater levy in proportion to value is
imposed upon one person or species or property other that upon others similarly situated or of like
character. Simply means that tax shall be strictly proportional to the relative value of the property.
The call for uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality because this is
hardly attainable. It must only be equitable, which means fair, just, reasonable and proportionate to
ones ability to pay.
The power to selects the subjects of taxation and apportion the public burden among them
includes the power to make classification. When classification is proper:
1. Classification is based on substantial distinction, not arbitrary but reasonable
2. It applies both to present and future conditions
3. Classification is germane to the purposes of the law
4. Applies equally to all members of the same class

C. Art. VI, Section 28, par.3- Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries and all lands, buildings and improvements actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
Tax exemption covers property taxes ONLY, it can be subject to transfer taxes. Special levies or
assessments are not also covered for not being taxes, but the Local Government Code, however,
extends the exemption to special assessments.
Exclusively means primary not total or absolute used nor solely hence, it extends to
activities/facilities incidental to and necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.
 Actually and directly(without any intervention) used for religious, educational or charitable
purposes. Thus, idle land of, or property let to others for unlike purposes although owned by religious,
educational and charitable institutions could be subject to real estate tax. The test of exemption is used
(Abra Valley College Inc. vs Aquino) Also if it is used for non-exempt purpose will be taxable.
Why cemeteries are exempt? Because of the difficulty of collecting a tax thereon and the
obvious impropriety of selling the graves of the dead to defray the expenses of carrying on the
government of the living.
Charity is a gift to an indefinite number of persons which lessens the burden of government.
Charitable institutions provide for free goods and services to the public which would otherwise fall on
the shoulders of government thus the government foregoes taxes which should have been spent to
address public needs because certain private entities already assume a part of the burden.
St. Louis Young Mens Christian Association vs Gehner held that If real property is used for one
or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to
taxation. What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable institutions is
the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the
charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is
determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.

D. Art VI, Section 28, par.4- No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
It means concurrence of a majority not of the attendees constituting a quorum but of all the
members of the Congress. The inherent powers of the state to impose taxes naturally carry with it
the power to grant tax exemptions.
TAX EXEMPTION is an immunity from the civil liability only, it is an immunity or privilege, a
freedom from a charge or burden of which others are subjected. Exemptions from taxation may be
created directly by the Constitution or by an act of the legislature, subject to the limitations as the
constitution may place, expressly or by implication, upon the power of the legislature. The intent to
grant tax exemption must be clear since the rule of construction applies that exemption from taxation
are to be strictly construed against exemption and in favor of the right to tax.
Tax amnesties, tax condonations and tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. Tax
amnesty is immunity from all criminal and civil obligations arising from non-payment of taxes, a general
pardon given to all taxpayers.
A constitutional grant of exemption may be self-executing or may require an act of Congress for
its operation. When it is self-executing, the legislature can neither add nor detract from it; it only
prescribe procedures to determine if one can claim the exemption.

E. Art. VI, Section 29, par. 3- All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general
funds of the government.
 Gaston vs Republic Planters Bank regarding the issue of stabilization fees collected by the State
(PHILSU-COM) for the promotion of the sugar industry were in the nature of taxes and no
implied trust was created for the benefit of sugar producers. Thus, the revenues derived
therefrom are to be treated as a special fund to be administered for the purpose intended. No
part thereof may be used for the exclusive benefit of any private person or entity but for the
benefit of the entire sugar industry. Once the purpose is achieved, is to be transferred to the
general funds of the government.

F. Art. VI, Section 27, par 2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object.
The item or items vetoed shall be returned to the Lower House of Congress together with the
objections of the President. If after a reconsideration 2/3 of all the members of such House shall agree
to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objection, to the other House by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by 2/3 of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law.

G. Art. VI, Section 28, par. 2- The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the government.
The president is vested with authority by law to increase tariff rates, even for revenue
purposes only (flexible tariff rates under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code)
Custom duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes
which are imposed for both revenue raising and regulatory purpose.

H. Art. VIII, Section 5, par. 2(b)- The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in xxx all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment or toll or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
The Supreme Court exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over certain judgments or
orders of the lower courts involving the legality of a tax impost, assessment, fee or penalty imposed
in relation thereto.
Decisions of the BIR are appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Decisions of CTA may
be appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). Decisions rendered by the CA may be elevated to the
Supreme Court. Congress cannot pass a law declaring that the decisions of the CTA shall be final and
executory. However, CTA decisions appealable directly to SC are valid.

I. Art. X, Section 5 Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments.
 Art. X, Section 6 Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

This is an exception to the general rule that the constitution designs limitations on taxation as
this is a grant of taxing powers. Provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are mere territorial and
political subdivisions of the country hence they are not clothed with inherent power of taxation. The
1987 Constitution broadly delegates that power subject only to such limitations as the statutes may
prescribe.
Delegation of legislative taxing power to local governments is justified by the necessary
implication that the power to create political corporations for purposes of local self-government carries
with it the power to confer on such local government agencies the authority to tax. (Pepsi-Cola v.
Municipality ofTanauan, Leyte, L-31156, February 27,1976)
However, despite the grant of taxing power to local governments, judicial admonition is given to
the effect that the tax so levied must be for a public purpose, uniform, and must not transgress any
constitutional provision nor repugnant to a controlling statute. (Villanueva v. City oflloilo, L-26521,
December 28, 1968)
Nevertheless, Congress cannot abolish the local government's power to tax as it cannot
abrogate what is expressly granted by the fundamental law. The only authority conferred to Congress is
to provide the guidelines and limitations on the local government's exercise of the power to tax.

R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code) gives flesh to the guidelines and limitations
mentioned in the aforesaid constitutional provision as follows:

SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. The following fundamental principles shall

govern the exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's ability to pay;
(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint
of trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be
let to any private person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to
the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax,
fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
 SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.
Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa,
except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues,
and all other kinds of customs fees, charges and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed
and maintained by the local government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or
passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of local government units in the guise of charges of
wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever
upon such goods or merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal
farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer or
non-pioneer for a period of six (6) months and four (4) years, respectively from the date of
registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar
transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except
as provided in this Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(I) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all
kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as
otherwise provided herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and R.A. No. 6938 otherwise known as the
"Cooperatives Code of the Philippines" respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.

SECTION 198. Fundamental Principles. The appraisal, assessment, levy and collection
of real property tax shall be guided by the following fundamental principles:
(a) Real property shall be appraised at its current and fair market value;
(b) Real property shall be classified for assessment purposes on the basis of its actual
use;
 (c) Real property shall be assessed on the basis of a uniform classification within each
local government unit;
(d) The appraisal, assessment, levy and collection of real property tax shall not be let to
any private person; and
(e) The appraisal and assessment of real property shall be equitable.

The local government's power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise the needed
revenues. The right of local government units to collect taxes due must always be upheld to avoid
severe tax erosion. This consideration is consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy of
local governments and the objective of the Local Government Code that they enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to empower them to achieve their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
The power to tax is the most potent instrument to raise the needed revenues to finance and
support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the
promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the
people. (National Power Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeal [CBAA], 577 SCRA 418, 440
[2009])

J. Art. XIV, Section 4, par. 3&4 All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions,
their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively-owned, may likewise be
entitled to such exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions on
dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
Subject to the conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations or contributions
used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.

It covers all internal revenue taxes, customs duties and other taxes(property taxes) imposed by
either both the national government or political subdivisions on all revenues and assets of non-stock,
non-profit educational institutions, used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. It
does not cover revenues derived from, or assets used in, unrelated activities or enterprise. It is not also
tax exempt from payment of estate tax, but transfers to social welfare, cultural and charitable
institutions are exempt.

Exclusively here means solely; possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others.

Under Rev. Reg. No. 6-97, once non-stock, nonprofit educational institutions engage in business,
they are subject to value added tax. However, they shall be subject to internal revenue taxes on
income from trade, business or other activity, the conduct of which is not related to the exercise or
performance by such educational institutions of their educational purposes or functions (Sec.2,
Finance Department Order No. 137-87 as amended by Finance Department Order No. 92-88) i.e.,
rental payment from their building/premises.
 Unlike non-stock, non-profit corporations, their interest income from currency bank deposits
and yield from deposit substitute instruments used actually, directly and exclusively in pursuance of
their purposes as an educational institution, are exempt from the 20% final tax and 7 1/2% tax on
interest income under the expanded foreign currency deposit system imposed under Section 27(D)[1] of
the Tax Code of 1997, subject to compliance with the conditions that as a tax-exempt educational
institution, they shall on an annual basis submit to the Revenue District Office concerned an annual
information return and duly audited financial statement together with the following:
(a) Certification from their depository banks as to the amount of interest income earned from
passive investment not subject to the 20% final withholding tax and 7 1/2% tax on interest income
under the expanded foreign currency deposit system imposed by Section 27(D)[1] of the Tax Code of
1997;
(b) Certification of actual utilization of the said income; and
(c) Board Resolution by the school administration on proposed projects (i.e., construction
and/or improvement of school buildings and facilities, acquisition of equipment, books and the like) to
be funded out of the money deposited in banks or placed in money markets, on or before the 14th day of
the fourth month following the end of its taxable year. (Sec. 3, Finance Department Order No. 137-87)
Finally, the exemption does not cover withholding taxes. As an educational institution, they are
constituted as withholding agents for the government required to withhold the tax on compensation
income of their employees, or the withholding tax on income payments to persons subject to tax
pursuant to Section 57 of the Tax Code of 1997.

PROVISIONS INDIRECTLY AFFECTING TAXATION

A. Due Process of Law under Art III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
This may be invoked where a taxing statue is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the
Constitution, as where it can be shown to amount to a confiscation of property. One may be deprived of
property as long as the requirement of due process- notice and hearing- has been complied with. Due
process is also violated where the tax imposed is for a private purpose other than a public purpose; tax
imposed on property outside the State; extra-territorial taxation; violation of the inherent limitations
and arbitrary or oppressive methods are used in assessing and collecting taxes.
Due process does not require that the property subject to the tax or the amount to be raised
should be determined by judicial inquiry, and a notice and hearing as to the amount of the tax and
manner in which it shall be apportioned are generally not necessary to due process of law.

B. Equal Protection Art. III, Section 1 nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
law.
Our Constitution requires uniformity, not equality, in taxation. However, equality is
accomplished when the burden of the tax falls equally and impartially upon all persons and property
subject to it, so that no higher rate or greater levy in proportion to value is imposed upon one person or
property than upon others similarly situated or of like character.
 Equal protection does not require equal rates of taxation on different classes of property, nor
prohibit unequal taxation so long as the inequality is not based upon arbitrary classification. Inequality
of taxes means substantial differences. Practical equality is constitutional equality, not absolute equality.
It does not require universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. (see
discussion on when classification is proper on page 1)
The principle of equality admits of classification or distinction as long as they are based upon
real and substantial differences between the persons, property, or privileges and those not taxed must
bear some reasonable relation to the object of purpose of legislation or to some permissible
governmental policy or legitimate end of government.

C. Religious Freedom, Article III, Section 5 No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
In the case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila,"' the Supreme Court ruled that a
municipal license tax on the sale of bibles and religious articles by a non-stock, non-profit missionary
organization at minimal profit constitutes a curtailment of religious freedom and worship which is
guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, the income of such organizations from any activity conducted for profit or from any of
their property, real or personal, regardless of the disposition made of such income, is taxable.

D. Non-impairment Clause, Article III, Section 10 No law shall be passed impairing the obligations of
contract.
A contract is the law between the contracting parties. The obligation of a contract is the law
which binds the parties to perform their agreement. Any law which enlarges, or in any manner changes
the intention of the parties discoverable in it, necessarily impairs the contract itself. If the basis of the
tax exemption is by virtue of a franchise granted by Congress, the exemption may be revoked. (Art. Xll,
Sec. 11).
On the other hand, if the tax exemption constitutes a binding contract and for valuable
consideration, the government cannot unilaterally revoke the tax exemption. The charter of a private
corporation is a contract between the corporation and the state, based on a consideration and accepted
by a corporation. However, the grant of a franchise to a corporation does not imply a contract
exempting the property from taxation or from increased taxation; and there is no contract created by a
provision in a charter or franchise that the corporation shall pay annually a certain tax.
When the government enters into a contract, it descends to the level of an ordinary individual. It
cannot invoke state immunity. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing
authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into
by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of
authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked
without impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to
be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes of the nature of a grant
which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

CASES:
JUAN LUNA SUBDIVISION, INC. v. SARMIENTO, et al.
91 Phil. 371
FACTS: Juan Luna Subdivision, Inc. brought a suit against the City Treasurer and the Philippine Trust
Company as defendants in the alternative to determine which of the two defendants is liable for
plaintiff's check. It appears that plaintiff issued to the City Treasurer of Manila a check to be applied to
plaintiff's land tax for the second semester of 1941, the exact amount of which was yet undetermined.
On February 20,1942, after the amount had been verified, which was P341.60, the balance of Pl,868.92,
covered by voucher no. 1487 of the City Treasurer's Office, was noted in the ledger as a credit to the
Juan Luna Subdivision, Inc. Thereafter, the books of the Philippine Trust Company revealed that
plaintiff's check was deposited by the City Treasurer with the Philippine National Bank, and the latter
was paid the cash equivalent thereof by the Philippine Trust Company which debited the amount
against Juan Luna Subd., Inc. However, the City Treasurer refused after liberation to refund the plaintiff's
deposit or apply it to such future taxes as might be found due.

ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff is entitled for the claim of the whole amount of the check contending
that taxes for the last semester of 1941 had been remitted by C.A. No. 703?

HELD: Section 1 of this Act, which was approved on November 1, 1945, provides:
"All land taxes and penalties due and payable for the years nineteen hundred and forty-two,
nineteen hundred and forty-three, nineteen hundred and forty-four and fifty per cent of the tax due for
nineteen hundred and forty-five, are hereby remitted. The land taxes and penalties due and payable for
the second semester of the year nineteen hundred and forty-one shall also be remitted if the remaining
fifty per cent corresponding to the year nineteen hundred and forty-five shall have been paid on or
before December thirty-first, nineteen hundred and forty-five."
There is no ambiguity in the language of the law. It says "taxes and penalties due and payable,"
the literal meaning of which is taxes owed or owing. (See Webster's New International Dictionary.) Note
that the provision speaks of penalties, and note that penalties accrue only when taxes are not paid on
time. The word "remit" underlined by the appellant does not help its theory, for to remit is to desist or
refrain from exacting, inflicting, or enforcing something as well as to restore what has already been
taken. We do not see that literal interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 703 runs counter and does
violence to its spirit and intention, nor do we think that such interpretation would be "constitutionally
bad" in that "it would unduly discriminate against taxpayers who had paid in favor of delinquent
taxpayers."
The remission of taxes due and payable to the exclusion of taxes already collected does not
constitute unfair discrimination. Each set of taxes is a class by itself, and the law would be open to attack
as class legislation only if all taxpayers belonging to one class were not treated alike. They are not. As to
the justification of the measure, the confinement of the condonation to delinquent taxes was not
without good reason. The property owners who had paid their taxes before liberation and those who
had not were not on the same footing on the need of material relief. It is true that the ravages and
devastations brought by war operations had rendered the bulk of the people destitute or impoverished
and that it was this situation which prompted the passage of C.A. 703. But it is also true that the
taxpayers who had been in arrears in their obligation would have to satisfy their liability with genuine
currency, while the taxes paid during the occupation had been satisfied in Japanese military notes, many
of them at a time when those notes were well-nigh worthless. To refund those taxes with the restored
currency, even if the government could afford to do so, would be to unduly enrich many of the payers at
a greater expense of the people at large. What is more, the process of refunding would entail a
tremendous amount of work and difficulties, what with the destruction of the tax records and the great
number of claimants who would take advantage of such grace. It is said that the plaintiff's check was in
the nature of a deposit, held in trust by the City Treasurer, and that, for this reason, plaintiff's taxes are
to be regarded as still due and payable. The argument is well-taken, but only to the extent of Pl,868.92.
The amount of P341.60 as early as February 20,1942, had been applied to the second half of plaintiff's
1941 tax and become part of the general fund of the city treasury. From that date that tax was legally
and actually paid and settled.

CITY OF BAGUIO v. FORTUNATO DE LEON

25 SCRA 938
FACTS: Defendant-appellant De Leon, a real estate dealer, assailed the validity of an ordinance of the
City of Baguio imposing a license fee on any person, firm, entity, or corporation doing business in the
City of Baguio.

HELD: Republic Act No. 329 was enacted amending Section 2553 of the Revised Administrative Code,
empowering the City Council not only to impose a license fee but also to levy a tax for purposes of
revenue. Thus, the City Council of Baguio now has the power to tax, to license, and to regulate all
businesses, trades, and occupations therein. The ordinance under consideration, therefore, cannot be
considered ultra vires.

G.R. No. L-6093, February 24, 1954

THE SHELL COMPANY OF P. I. LTD., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. E. E. VAO, AS MUNICIPAL
TREASURER OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA, PROVINCE OF CEBU, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
PADILLA, J.:

FACTS: The Municipal Council of Cordova, Province of Cebu, adopted the following ordinances: No. 10,
series of 1946, which imposes an annual tax of P150 on occupation or the exercise of the privilege of
installation manager; No. 9, series of 1947, which imposes an annual tax of P40 for local deposits in
drums of combustible and inflammable materials and an annual tax of P200 for tin can factories; and
No. 11, series of 1948, which imposes an annual tax of P150 on tin can factories having a maximum
annual output capacity of 30,000 tin cans. The Shell Company of P. I. Ltd., a foreign corporation, filed
suit for the refund of the taxes paid by it, on the ground that the ordinances imposing such taxes are
ultra vires(issue).
HELD: The municipal ordinance imposing an annual tax of P40 for "minor local deposit in drums of
combustible and inflammable materials," and of P200 "for tin factory" was adopted under and pursuant
to section 2244 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides that the municipal council in the
exercise of regulative authority may require any person engaged in any business or occupation, such as
"storing combustible or explosive materials" or "the conducting of any other business of an
unwholesome, obnoxious, offensive, or dangerous character," to obtain a permit for which a reasonable
fee, in no case to exceed P10 per annum, may be charged, the annual tax of P40 and P200 are
unauthorized and illegal. The permit and the fee referred to may be required and charged by the
Municipal Council of Cordova in the exercise of its regulative authority, whereas the ordinance which
imposes the taxes in question was adopted under and pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 472, which authorizes municipal councils and municipal district councils "to impose municipal
license taxes upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges in the
municipality or municipal district, by requiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal
council or municipal district council," which shall be just and uniform but not "percentage taxes and
taxes oh specified articles." Likewise, Ordinance No. 10, series of 1946, which imposes an annual tax of
P150 on "installation manager" comes under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 472. But it is
claimed that "installation manager" is a designation made by the plaintiff and such designation cannot
be deemed to be a "calling" as defined in section 178 of the National Internal Revenue Code (Com. Act
No. 466), and that the installation manager employed by the plaintiff is a salaried employee which may
not be taxed by the municipal council under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 472. This
contention is without merit, because even if the installation manager is a salaried employee of the
plaintiff, still it is an occupation "and one occupation or line of business does not become exempt by
being conducted with some other occupation or business for which such tax has been paid and the
occupation tax must be paid "by each individual engaged in a calling subject thereto." And pursuant to
section 179 of the National Internal Revenue Code, "The payment of * * * occupation tax shall not
exempt any person from any tax, * * * provided by law or ordinance in places where such * * *
occupation in * * * regulated by municipal Jaw, nor shall the payment of any such tax be held to prohibit
any municipality from placing a tax upon the same * * * occupation, for local purposes, where the
imposition of such tax is authorized by law." It is true that, according to the stipulation of facts,
Ordinance No. 10, series of 1946, was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu in its Resolution No.
1070, series of 1946, and that it does not appear that if was approved by the Department of Finance, as
provided for and required in section 4, paragraph 2, of Commonwealth Act No. 472, the rate of
municipal tax being in excess of P50 per annum.
Ordinance No. 11, series of 1948, which imposes a municipal tax of P150 on tin can factories
having a maximum annual output capacity of 30,000 tin cans which, according to the stipulation of facts,
was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu and the Department of Finance, is valid and lawful,
because it is neither a percentage tax nor one on specified articles which are the only exceptions
provided for in section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 472. Neither does it fall under any of the prohibitions
provided for in section 3 of the same Act. Specific taxes enumerated in the National Internal Revenue
Code are those that are imposed upon "things manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic
sale or consumption" and upon "things imported from the United States and foreign countries," such as
distilled spirits, domestic denatured alcohol, fermented liquors, products of tobacco, cigars and
cigarettes, matches, mechanical lighters, firecrackers, skimmed milk, manufactured oils and other fuels,
coal, bunker fuel oil, diesel fuel oil, cinematographic films, playing cards, sacharine. And it is not a
percentage tax because it is tax on business and the maximum annual output capacity is not a
percentage, because it is not a share or a tax based on the amount of the proceeds realized out of the
sale of the tin cans manufactured therein but on the business of manufacturing tin cans having a
maximum annual output capacity of 30,000 tin cans.
In an action for refund of municipal taxes claimed to have been paid and collected under an
illegal ordinance, the real party in interest is not the municipal treasurer but the municipality concerned
that is empowered to sue and be sued.

ASSOCIATION OF CUSTOM BROKERS, INC. v. MUN. BOARD, CITY OF MANILA, et al.

93 Phil. 107
FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory relief to test the validity of Ordinance No. 3379 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila on March 24, 1950. The Association of Customs Brokers, Inc.,
which is composed of all brokers and public service operators of motor vehicles in the City of Manila,
and G. Manlapit, Inc., a member of said association, also a public service operator of trucks in said City,
challenge the validity of said ordinance on the ground that (1) while it levies a so-called property tax it is
in reality a license tax which is beyond the power of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila; (2) said
ordinance offends against the rule of uniformity of taxation; and (3) it constitutes double taxation.

HELD: "If a tax is in its nature an excise, it does not become a property tax because it is proportioned in
amount to the value of the property used in connection with the occupation, privilege or act which is
taxed. Every excise necessarily must finally fall upon and be paid by property and so may be indirectly a
tax upon property; but if it is really imposed upon the performance of an act, enjoyment of a privilege,
or the engaging in an occupation, it will be considered an excise." (26 R. C. L., 35-36.) It has also been
held that "The character of a tax as a property tax or a license or occupation tax must be determined by
its incidents, and from the natural and legal effect of the language employed in the act or ordinance,
and not by the name by which it is described, or by the mode adopted in fixing its amount. If it is clearly
a property tax, it will be so regarded, even though nominally and in form it is a license or occupation tax;
and, on the other hand, if the tax is levied upon persons on account of their business, it will be
construed as a license or occupation tax, even though it is graduated according to the property used in
such business, or on the gross receipts of the business." (37 C. J., 172.) The ordinance in question falls
under the foregoing rules. While it refers to property tax and it is fixed ad valorem yet we cannot reject
the idea that it is merely levied on motor vehicles operating within the City of Manila with the main
purpose of raising funds to be expended exclusively for the repair, maintenance and improvement of
the streets and bridges in said city. This is precisely what the Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992) intends
to prevent, for the reason that, under said Act, municipal corporations already participate in the
distribution of the proceeds that are raised for the same purpose of repairing, maintaining and
improving bridges and public highways (section 73 of the Motor Vehicle Law). This prohibition is
intended to prevent duplication in the imposition of fees for the same purpose. It is for this reason that
we believe that the ordinance in question merely imposes a license fee although under the cloak of an
ad valorem tax to circumvent the prohibition above adverted to.
 It is also our opinion that the ordinance infringes the rule of uniformity of taxation ordained by
our Constitution. Note that the ordinance exacts the tax upon all motor vehicles operating within the
City of Manila. It does not distinguish between a motor vehicle for hire and one which is purely for
private use. Neither does it distinguish between a motor vehicle registered in the City of Manila and one
registered in another place but occasionally comes to Manila and uses its streets and public
highways. The distinction is important if we note that the ordinance intends to burden with the tax only
those registered in the City of Manila as may be inferred from the word "operating" used therein. The
word "operating" denotes a connotation which is akin to a registration, for under the Motor Vehicle
Law no motor vehicle can be operated without previous payment of the registration fees. There is no
pretense that the ordinance equally applies to motor vehicles who come to Manila for a temporary stay
or for short errands, and it cannot be denied that they contribute in no small degree to the deterioration
of the streets and public highways. The fact that they are benefited by their use they should also be
made to share the corresponding burden. And yet such is not the case. This is an inequality which we
find in the ordinance, and which renders it offensive to the Constitution.

G.R. Nos. L-49839-46, April 26, 1991

JOSE B. L. REYES AND EDMUNDO A. REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. PEDRO ALMANZOR, VICENTE
ABAD SANTOS, JOSE RONO, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS APPOINTED AND ACTING MEMBERS OF THE
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS; TERESITA H. NOBLEJAS ROMULO M. DEL ROSARIO, RAUL
C. FLORES, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS APPOINTED AND ACTING MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF MANILA; AND NICOLAS CATIIL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY ASSESSOR OF
MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
PARAS, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners J.B.L. Reyes, Edmundo and Milagros Reyes are owners of parcels of land situated in
Tondo and Sta. Cruz Districts, City of Manila, which are leased and entirely occupied as dwelling sites by
tenants. Said tenants were paying monthly rentals not exceeding three hundred pesos (P300.00) in July,
1971. On July 14, 1971, the National Legislature enacted Republic Act No. 6359 prohibiting for one year
from its effectivity, an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units or of lands on which anothers
dwelling is located, where such rentals do not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month but
allowing an increase in rent by not more than 10% thereafter. The said Act also suspended paragraph
(1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code for two years from its effectivity thereby disallowing the ejectment
of lessees upon the expiration of the usual legal period of lease. On October 12, 1972, Presidential
Decree No. 20 amended R.A. No. 6359 by making absolute the prohibition to increase monthly rentals
below P300.00 and by indefinitely suspending the aforementioned provision of the Civil Code, excepting
leases with a definite period. Consequently, the Reyeses, petitioners herein, were precluded from
raising the rentals and from ejecting the tenants. In 1973, respondent City Assessor of Manila re-
classified and reassessed the value of the subject properties based on the schedule of market values
duly reviewed by the Secretary of Finance. The revision, as expected, entailed an increase in the
corresponding tax rates prompting petitioners to file a Memorandum of Disagreement with the Board of
Tax Assessment Appeals. They averred that the reassessments made were "excessive, unwarranted,
inequitable, confiscatory and unconstitutional considering that the taxes imposed upon them greatly
exceeded the annual income derived from their properties. They argued that the income approach
should have been used in determining the land values instead of the comparable sales approach which
the City Assessor adopted. The Board of Tax Assessment Appeals, however, considered the assessments
valid.

ISSUE: THE HONORABLE BOARD ERRED IN ADOPTING THE "COMPARABLE SALES APPROACH" METHOD
IN FIXING THE ASSESSED VALUE OF APPELLANTS' PROPERTIES.

HELD: Under Art. VIII, Sec. 17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution, then enforced, the rule of taxation must not
only be uniform, but must also be equitable and progressive. Uniformity has been defined as that
principle by which all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate (Churchill v. Concepcion, 34 Phil. 969 [1916]). Taxation is said to be equitable when its burden falls
on those better able to pay. Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources
of the person affected.
The taxing power has the authority to make a reasonable and natural classification for purposes
of taxation but the government's act must not be prompted by a spirit of hostility, or at the very least
discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Verily, taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance. However, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any
arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the
apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of
taxations, which is the promotion of the common good, may be achieved (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Algue, Inc., et al., 158 SCRA 9 [1988]). Consequently, it stands to reason that petitioners who
are burdened by the government by its Rental Freezing Laws (then R.A. No. 6359 and P.D. 20) under the
principle of social justice should not now be penalized by the same government by the imposition of
excessive taxes petitioners can ill afford and eventually result in the forfeiture of their properties.
By the public respondents own computation the assessment by income approach would
amount to only P10.00 per sq. meter at the time in question.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is GRANTED; (b) the assailed decisions of public
respondents are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (c) the respondent Board of Assessment Appeals of
Manila and the City Assessor of Manila are ordered to make a new assessment by the income approach
method to guarantee a fairer and more realistic basis of computation.

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS v. HIU

CHIONG TSAl PAO HO and JUDGE ARCA
86 SCRA 270 (1978)
FACTS: Respondent Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho challenged the validity of Ordinance No. 6537 passed by the
Municipal Board of Manila. The said ordinance prohibited aliens from being employed or to engage or
participate in any position, occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary
or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit
fee. Respondent judge declared the ordinance null and void.

HELD: The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider
valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the
equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed
alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a
highly paid executive.
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any
policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be
attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks
standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of
power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. Thus the ordinance violates the due process of law
and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE CASE

FACTS: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did
not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways &
Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino
averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes
the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul
Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but
the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would
be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But
this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and
of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.

2. Whether RA 7166 violates the principle of progressive system of taxation

RULING: No. Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any
discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the poor and middle income group
in society harder than it will the rich is largely an academic exercise.
Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. Evolve a progressive system of
taxation is a directive to Congress. These provisions are placed in the Constitution as moral incentives
to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION. G.R. No. 119761. August 29, 1996]

FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.
On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of
trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
The CIR initially classified 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed
in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the
names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from
the foreign brand category. Fortune also submitted proof the BIR that 'Champion' was an original
register and therefore a local brand. Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands.
RA 7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local brands
carrying a foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the three
brands classifying them as local brands carrying a foreign name.
 Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective. The CIR
filed a motion for reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the CA, an appeal, which was
also denied.

ISSUE: Whether the RMC was valid.

RULING: NO. The RMC was made to place the three brands as locally made cigarettes bearing foreign
brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its
amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity
were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the RMC, the brands were
subjected to 45% ad valorem tax. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law but it legislated
under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and
of publication should not have been then ignored.
The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and
effective administrative issuance.

Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City and Constantino Rosas
G.R. No. 144104 June 29, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks
exemption from real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the
hospital building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was
denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-
LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable
institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA
dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the
1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the
1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation
which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with
the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created
was to render medical services to the public in general including those who are poor and also the rich,
and become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the
gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government.
 2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes
only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled
to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real
properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions
occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to
private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Algue Inc., and Court of Tax Appeals

GR No. L-28896 February 17, 1988

Facts: The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company had earlier appointed Algue Inc., as its agent,
authorizing it to sell its land, factories and oil manufacturing process.As such,the corporation worked for
the formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation, until they were able to purchased the PSEDC
properties. For this sale, Algue Inc., received as agent a commission of P126, 000.00, and it was from this
commission that the P75, 000.00 promotional fees were paid to Alberto Guevara, Jr., Eduardo Guevara,
Isabel Guevara, Edith, O'Farell, and Pablo Sanchez.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends that the claimed deduction is not allowed because
it was not an ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense. The Court of Tax Appeals had seen it
differently. Agreeing with Algue Inc., it held that the said amount had been legitimately paid by the
private respondent for actual services rendered. The payment was in the form of promotional fees.

Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the P75, 000.00 deduction
claimed by private respondent Algue Inc., as legitimate business expenses in its income tax returns.

Ruling: No, The Supreme Court agrees with the respondent court that the amount of the promotional
fees was not excessive. The P75,000.00 was 60% of the total commission. This was a reasonable
proportion, considering that it was the payees who did practically everything, from the formation of the
Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate properties.
The claimed deduction by the private respondent was permitted under the Internal Revenue
Code and should therefore not have been disallowed by the petitioner.

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Commission (G.R. No. 75697)

FACTS: In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate
the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms
has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may
be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross
receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the
following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane
to the subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body,
because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist
the VRB in enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general
object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to
legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the
execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree,
the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the
deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].