Bourdieu and Culture

BOURDIEU AND CULTURE

Derek Robbins

SAGE Publications
L o n d o n T h o u s a n d O a k s N e w Delhi
 Derek Robbins 2000
First published 2000

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 For my wife, Diana,
and our sons, Oliver and Felix.
Contents

Acknowledgements ix
Introduction xi

Part I The Career

Chapter 1 A n insider/outsider Frenchman 1

Part The Concepts

Chapter 2 T h e socio-genesis o f the thinking instruments 25
Chapter 3 Production, reception and r e p r o d u c t i o n 42
Part III The Case Studies
Chapter 4 Flaubert and the social ambivalence o f literary
invention 67
Chapter 5 C o u r r g e s , the fashion system and anti-semiology 80
Chapter 6 M a n e t , the M u s e d'Orsay, and the installation o f art 93

Part I V The Criticisms

Chapter 7 Evaluating fragmented responses 105
Chapter 8 Meta-criticism: charting interminable territory 121

Conclusion: C o m m e n d i n g the B o u r d i e u paradigm: the sociologist as

conceptual artist 137
Bibliography 141

Index 153
Acknowledgements

This b o o k has b e e n long delayed. This is not the place to describe the
p r o b l e m s which arose with another publisher, but I am all the m o r e grate-
ful t o Sage for m o v i n g s o quickly t o offer a contract for producing a revised
text. In particular, I should like t o thank Chris R o j e k for his encourage-
ment and support and I h o p e this publication will add t o the reputation o f
Sage's list in relation t o theory, culture and society in general and t o its
h o n o u r a b l e r e c o r d in advancing discussion o f the w o r k o f B o u r d i e u b y the
publication o f his texts and o f constructive critical analysis such as that
offered b y Bridget F o w l e r in Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Theory. Critical
Investigations (1997).
M u c h o f the research for this b o o k has b e e n undertaken ' o n the g r o u n d '
in Paris, but, in L o n d o n , I am indebted to the librarians o f the University o f
East L o n d o n for their diligent pursuit o f m y inter-library loan requests.
T h e services o f the British Library have, as always, b e e n essential. O c c a -
sional visits t o Paris have b e e n funded from the allocation t o U E L ' s Sociol-
o g y unit o f assessment following the 1996 R e s e a r c h Assessment Exercise.
In Paris, I a m grateful to the librarians in the S o r b o n n e and the M a i s o n des
Sciences d e l ' H o m m e , and, in relation t o m y chapter o n Manet, I benefited
particularly from the help o f Jacques Thuillier o f the C o l l g e de France and
o f the administration o f the M u s e d'Orsay. I have valued the intellectual
support which has b e e n p r o v i d e d b y the team o f researchers in the Centre
d e S o c i o l o g i e d e l'Education et d e la Culture in the M a i s o n des Sciences d e
l ' H o m m e , n o w under the direction o f R m i L e n o i r , and I have also appre-
ciated the a c c o m m o d a t i o n facilities which have b e e n available through the
g o o d offices o f Jean-Michel A g e r o n o f the Paris A m e r i c a n A c a d e m y .
M a n y o f the thoughts in this b o o k w e r e tentatively articulated in sessions
with students at U E L and I a c k n o w l e d g e the influence o f discussions with
students w h o have f o l l o w e d the third year A n t h r o p o l o g y unit o n B o u r d i e u
that I have taught since 1995. Paramount, o f course, is m y indebtedness to
Pierre B o u r d i e u himself and to staff associated with his w o r k at the C o l l g e
d e France - notably Marie-Christine Rivire, R o s i n e Christin and
Gabrielle Balazs. A s a team, they have b e e n unreservedly o p e n in their
willingness t o p r o d u c e d o c u m e n t s , papers, references o r contacts in spite o f
the a w e s o m e w o r k l o a d that falls to a small w o r k f o r c e .
A s for Pierre Bourdieu himself, I can only say that this w o r k is offered
with respect and deference. I have had the g o o d fortune in my career to have
had contact with three intellectuals w h o could b e said to b e 'charismatic' -
Leavis, Williams and Bourdieu. Encounters with the first two were disap-
 Bourdieu and culture

pointing in that, in different ways, their 'charisma' had b e c o m e routinised.

Somewhat surprisingly, however, the words which Williams found, in an
obituary o f 1978, to c o m m e m o r a t e the achievement o f Leavis, succeed in
expressing what all three have in c o m m o n and what, for m e , Bourdieu still
represents. Wiliams blamed the academy for making something merely aca-
demic o f Leavis's life work, and he continued:

What this excludes and is meant to exclude, is what must, in Leavis's whole
work, be seen as central: not a profession but a vocation; an overwhelming, often
overwhelmed response to a sense of a major cultural crisis . . . But I could never
forget, and do not now forget, the intransigence, the integrity, the fierce courage
of the man.

B o u r d i e u rejects the notion o f 'charisma', but his intellectual influence has

b e e n inspirational. H e has not seen any part o f this b o o k in draft. In spite o f
his generalised encouragement and willingness t o find time t o meet with
m e at regular intervals, this b o o k gives a wholly independent interpretation
o f his w o r k . I believe that m y attempt to treat Bourdieu's w o r k with intel-
lectual integrity cannot fail to d o justice to the integrity o f his endeavours.

Lewisham
N o v e m b e r 1998
Introduction

Faust. And what are you that live with Lucifer?

Meph. Unhappy spirits that fell with Lucifer,
Conspir'd against our G o d with Lucifer,
And are for ever damn'd with Lucifer.
Faust. Where are you damn'd?
Meph. In hell.
Faust. How comes it, then, that thou art out of hell?
Meph. Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it.

(Christopher Marlowe: The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, 1604)

Garcin: Estelle, we shall get out of hell

Garcin (to the two women): Y o u disgust me, both of you. (He goes towards the
door.)
Estelle: What are you up to?
Garcin: I'm going.
Inez (quickly): Y o u won't get far. The door is locked.
Garcin: I'll make them open it. (He presses the bell-push. The bell does not ring.)
Estelle: Please! Please!
Inez (to Estelle): Don't worry; the bell doesn't work.
(J.-P. Sartre: Huis Clos, first performed 1944)

In the first chapter o f La Distinction, 1

B o u r d i e u wrote: T h e r e is n o way out
o f the g a m e o f culture . . . ' Just as M a r l o w e presents his Faustus as being
2

mistaken in supposing that hell might b e a place that c o u l d b e objectively

o b s e r v e d , s o B o u r d i e u is arguing - without infernal associations - that it is
o n e o f the defining characteristics o f the human condition for p e o p l e to b e
situated within culture. Culture is enacted b y e v e r y o n e . It is a game in
which there are n o non-participating spectators. It is a huis clos from which
n o o n e is e x c l u d e d and from which there is n o escape. It is a self-contained
p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l enclosure which has n o point o f reference b e y o n d o r
outside itself.

Disconnecting Education and Culture

W h y d o e s B o u r d i e u m a k e this point o n the s e c o n d page o f his text? T h e

b o o k is a sociological analysis o f 'taste'. In order to maintain the position o f
social d o m i n a n c e associated with the possession o f 'superior' taste, those
xii Bourdieu and culture

w h o possess such 'taste', B o u r d i e u argues at the outset, n e e d t o sustain a

myth a b o u t their innate aesthetic sensitivities o r gifts and t o d e n y resol-
utely that these attributes can b e learned. T h e o b j e c t s o f his s o c i o l o g i c a l
analysis, in other w o r d s , n e e d t o d e n y o r negate its intentions. T o
counteract the self-sustaining, aestheticist i d e o l o g y o f the d o m i n a n t
classes, B o u r d i e u c o n t e n d s , h o w e v e r , that the sociologist has t o d o m u c h
m o r e than demonstrate simply that 'taste' can b e gained through e d u c a -
tion. B o u r d i e u implies that this is barely w o r t h establishing precisely
b e c a u s e the educational system itself is i n v o l v e d in endorsing pre-existent
distinctions and in legitimating the n o t i o n that differences are the c o n -
s e q u e n c e s o f differing innate abilities rather than o f differing social b a c k -
grounds. T h e sociologist may appear t o have demonstrated that 'taste' is
related t o education but, for the d o m i n a n t classes, this link already
s e e m e d self-evident precisely b e c a u s e education was n o t itself culturally
neutral. I n d e e d , the d e g r e e o f p e r c e i v e d self-evidence in the correlation
b e t w e e n education and taste c o u l d b e taken t o b e an indicator o f the
cultural partisanship o f the educational e x p e r i e n c e . T h e research o f the
sociologist c o u l d b e m a d e t o appear t o state the o b v i o u s for as l o n g as
the sociologist failed to problematise the cultural function o f s c h o o l i n g .
B o u r d i e u p r o c e e d e d t o argue, therefore, that the sociologist must
' . . . unravel the p a r a d o x w h e r e b y the relationship with educational capi-
tal is just as strong in areas which the educational system d o e s not t e a c h ' 3

- o r , in other w o r d s , that the sociologist n e e d s t o r e c o g n i s e that s c h o o l s as

institutions function in maintaining class distinctions without reference t o
the cultural contents which they transmit. T h e c o l l e c t i o n o f statistical
data has traditionally sought t o clarify the relationship b e t w e e n e d u c a -
tional achievement and social origins, but, for B o u r d i e u , this very analyti-
cal p r o c e s s p r e s u p p o s e s and i m p o s e s the n o t i o n o f the cultural neutrality
o f the institutional means b y which achievement is educationally secured.
Unless this n o t i o n is challenged, unless w e question the relation o f e d u c a -
tion t o culture which educational research 'tacitly privileges', w e have n o
h o p e o f puncturing the self-fulfilling c o m p l a c e n c y o f the status q u o . T h e
questions which w e unthinkingly p o s e have t o b e q u e s t i o n e d , for, as
B o u r d i e u continues in the following sentence: ' T h e r e is n o way out o f the
g a m e o f culture; and o n e ' s o n l y c h a n c e o f objectifying the true nature o f
the g a m e is t o objectify as fully as possible the very o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h o n e
is o b l i g e d t o use in o r d e r t o achieve that o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . '
4

Indirectly and abstractly, B o u r d i e u was m o v i n g towards an explanation

o f the purpose o f La Distinction in relation t o his previous w o r k . In North
Africa in the late 1950s, he had o b s e r v e d the cultures o f Algerian tribes and
had o b s e r v e d the processes o f cultural adaptation amongst those tribes-
p e o p l e w h o were forced to leave the countryside t o settle in Algiers. H e
had written a ' s o c i o l o g y ' o f Algeria and p r o d u c e d t w o other b o o k s analy-
sing processes o f acculturation in Algeria. In o n e o f these - Travail et
travailleurs en Algrie - he wrote a short section in which he articulated his
disquiet about the role o f the colonial anthropologist, but his w o r k was5
 Introduction xiii

what he was later t o call 'objectivist' o n t w o counts. First o f all, he was

unalterably an outsider b y virtue o f his French nationality, but, secondly,
he constructed detachment b y writing up s o m e o f his research findings in
ways which deliberately situated them within the constructed discourse o f
a n t h r o p o l o g y b y addressing issues, such as that o f ' h o n o u r ' , which w e r e o f
theoretical relevance to that discipline.
B o u r d i e u ' s return t o France at the beginning o f the 1960s r e m o v e d the
first obstacle t o 'insider' research and his 'Clibat et c o n d i t i o n paysanne'
( 1 9 6 2 ) was a self-imposed m e t h o d o l o g i c a l test in respect o f insider/
6

outsider issues in that he sought t o analyse aspects o f the culture o f the

r e g i o n in w h i c h he had b e e n b r o u g h t up. C o m i n g t o terms with the o b j e c -
tivism i m p o s e d b y established a c a d e m i c disciplines was m o r e difficult.
B o u r d i e u carried o u t research o n the cultural interests and c o m p e t e n c e s
o f students. T h e b o o k w h i c h was the o u t c o m e o f this research - Les
Hritiers ( 1 9 6 4 ) was subtitled: les tudiants et la culture. In the terms
7

discussed a b o v e , Les Hritiers privileged the relationship b e t w e e n e d u c a -

tion and culture, assuming that it was the function o f the educational
system t o a c c o m m o d a t e diverse regional and class cultures, without suffi-
ciently asking w h e t h e r educational institutions already e m b o d i e d o n e
particular, d o m i n a n t class culture. B o u r d i e u analysed the cultures o f stu-
dents, but h e did s o in o r d e r t o c o m m e n t o n the relationship b e t w e e n
these cultures and those transmitted in educational institutions, t o c o m -
m e n t o n the extent t o w h i c h students w h o l a c k e d the necessary 'cultural
capital' w e r e c o n s i g n e d t o failure. B o u r d i e u ' s p r o p o s e d solution -
advocating 'rational p e d a g o g y ' w h e r e b y teachers w o u l d m o r e efficiently
transmit standardised c o u r s e c o n t e n t b y b e i n g trained t o b e sociologically
sensitive t o the cultural origins o f their students - was o n e w h i c h c o n -
tinued t o privilege an educational definition o f culture within a social
situation that was intrinsically multicultural.

The Development of an Autonomous Sociology of Culture

B o u r d i e u carried out t w o large research projects in the 1960s which c o u l d

almost b e said t o b e 'cultural studies' - o n e o n museums and the other o n
p h o t o g r a p h y - but his orientation was still dominantly educational, par-
ticularly in relation t o m u s e u m attendance where the p r o p o s e d solution to
cultural exclusion was still that schools should p e r f o r m the p e d a g o g i c func-
tion that w o u l d m a k e museums m o r e generally accessible. B o u r d i e u went
s o m e way to remedying the faults o f Les Hritiers in La Reproduction
( 1 9 7 0 ) , but the argument was m a d e very abstractly. Society was seen as a
8

series o f 'arbitrary', that is to say, non-referential, socially constructed, o r

relative, cultures which w e r e in c o m p e t i t i o n with each other and in which
d o m i n a n c e was secured, not as the result o f any intrinsic merit o r superi-
ority, but only, force majeure, as a result o f a p o w e r struggle b e t w e e n
xiv Bourdieu and culture

institutions possessing 'arbitrary', that is t o say, non-intrinsic, socially

e n d o w e d , authority. T h e curriculum taught in state-controlled s c h o o l s
was just o n e e x a m p l e o f the imposition o f arbitrary content b y arbitrary
authority. F o r the first time, B o u r d i e u was beginning t o establish a
theoretical basis for liberating the study o f culture f r o m its hitherto sub-
servient function within the study o f education. W h e r e a s his studies o f
the cultural tastes o f students had b e e n subordinated t o the consideration
o f the appropriate f o r m o f p e d a g o g y t o b e a d o p t e d within the educational
system, B o u r d i e u b e g a n , instead, t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k for
analysing sociologically the distribution o f diverse cultural tastes for
themselves. T h e c o n c e p t u a l w o r k b e g a n with ' C h a m p intellectuel et p r o -
jet crateur' ( 1 9 6 6 ) which, significantly, was published in a n u m b e r o f
9

Les Temps modernes d e v o t e d t o the p r o b l e m s o f structuralism. A t the

same time that B o u r d i e u was rejecting the n o t i o n that the educational
system should actually b e privileged in structuring o r r e p r o d u c i n g culture
within society, he was also rejecting a m e t h o d o l o g y which s u p p o s e d that a
d e t a c h e d , structuralist analysis o f societies and cultures c o u l d adequately
explain them. In the early 1970s, B o u r d i e u refined his c o n c e p t o f 'field' in
such a way as t o g o b e y o n d structuralist explanation. A g e n t s are i n v o l v e d
in the construction o f the 'fields' within which their actions have meaning
and r e c e i v e recognition. Historical s o c i o l o g y enables us t o understand the
'genesis and structure' o f c o m p e t i n g cultural fields. T h e ways in w h i c h
p e o p l e a d o p t different tastes o r cultural affiliations are not t o b e under-
s t o o d b y generating a post hoc interpretative correlation b e t w e e n these
tastes and social conditions. This was the attempt, rejected b y B o u r d i e u ,
m o s t exemplified in France in the 1960s in the w o r k o f L u c i e n G o l d m a n n .
Rather, they are t o b e u n d e r s t o o d , n o t as reflections o f class positions but,
instead, as e v i d e n c e o f social position-taking in action. Importantly,
B o u r d i e u also argued that this position-taking o c c u r s , as it w e r e , at t w o
levels. P e o p l e secure recognition for themselves within the assumptions
o f o n e field, but they also 'trade' that r e c o g n i t i o n for r e c o g n i t i o n within a
different field altogether. Position-taking o c c u r s , in other w o r d s , b o t h
within and b e t w e e n fields and, in this s e c o n d , meta-context, p e o p l e
d e p l o y 'strategies o f r e c o n v e r s i o n ' .
T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Bourdieu's theoretical framework is described in
m o r e detail in Chapters 2 and 3. T h e important point here is that in ex-
tricating the analysis o f culture from a pedagogical context, B o u r d i e u cer-
tainly did not wish to relinquish a sociological perspective. In 1975, he
launched his journal - Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. T h e prefa-
tory article in the first number - ' M t h o d e scientifique et hirarchie sociale
des o b j e t s ' - m a d e it clear that the journal was t o b e innovative in being
1 0

prepared to apply social scientific m e t h o d comprehensively to all possible

social and cultural p h e n o m e n a . A s partial exemplification o f this c o m m i t -
ment, B o u r d i e u ' s ' A n a t o m i e du g o t ' appeared the following year and
1 1

the culmination o f this strand o f Bourdieu's w o r k was the publication o f La

Distinction.
 Introduction xv

The Changing English Field of Reception - from Education' to

Cultural Studies'

It is clear that B o u r d i e u ' s analyses o f culture w e r e p r o d u c e d as affirmations

o f the approach t o social scientific research outlined in Le Mtier de so-
ciologue ( 1 9 6 8 ) . Nevertheless, B o u r d i e u has played the 'game o f culture'
1 2

that he has o b s e r v e d . T h e r e is n o m o r e escape from that game for him than

for a n y o n e else. His productions have, therefore, b e e n elements in his
strategic position-taking - within and b e t w e e n fields. L i k e e v e r y o n e else,
he has b e e n caught up in situations which have meant that his achieve-
ments have b e e n the c o n s e q u e n c e b o t h o f his o w n structuring and o f the
structuring i m p o s e d u p o n them b y various fields o f reception o r c o n s u m p -
tion. Whilst, in the 1970s, he was laying the foundations for establishing a
s o c i o l o g y o f culture that c o u l d b e independent o f the s o c i o l o g y o f educa-
tion, within the English and A m e r i c a n fields o f reception he acquired a
reputation as a sociologist o f education. In the U K , specifically, B o u r d i e u ' s
n a m e was linked with the ' n e w directions for the s o c i o l o g y o f education'
m o v e m e n t as a result o f the publication o f t w o o f his articles in M . F . D .
Y o u n g ' s Knowledge and Control ( 1 9 7 1 ) . A s a force for radical change,
13

this m o v e m e n t was exhausted b y the late 1970s. During that d e c a d e , inter-

estingly, b o t h the political Left and Right sought to over-privilege the role
o f educational change in securing social reform. T h e shift from Mrs
Thatcher's endeavours as Minister o f Education in the early 1970s -
p r o p o s i n g curricular reforms in her W h i t e Paper, A Framework for Expan-
sion (1972) - t o her attempt t o enforce e c o n o m i c sanctions o v e r university
affairs after her election as Prime Minister in 1979, parallels the waning o f
the influence o f the ' n e w directions' m o v e m e n t . T h r o u g h o u t the 1970s,
h o w e v e r , there was, in the U K , another context for Left-wing social and
political criticism which apparently had little contact with the ' n e w dir-
ections' m o v e m e n t in education. T h e main leaders o f the ' N e w Left' w e r e
primarily either historians o r literary critics - Richard Hoggart, R a y m o n d
Williams, Stuart Hall, Eric H o b s b a w m , E.P. T h o m p s o n and Francis
Klingender. This is not the place to g o into any detail about the w o r k o f this
g r o u p and o f those associated with them. I return to this 'field' - c o n -
structed through a network o f social and intellectual contacts b e t w e e n the
Centre for C o n t e m p o r a r y Cultural Studies at Birmingham and the M a y
D a y Manifesto g r o u p that congregated around Williams in Cambridge and
L o n d o n - as a 'field o f reception' for B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k in Chapter 8. F o r the
m o m e n t , m y point is that, within the U K , a 'field' o f Cultural Studies was
established which derived its intellectual inspiration from the humanities
rather than the social sciences.
B o u r d i e u had cited Williams' Culture and Society in ' C h a m p intellectuel
et projet crateur' and he had also participated in J.-C. Passeron's p r o -
duction, in 1970, o f a translation o f Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy. 14

Passeron's prefatory 'presentation' o f his translation sought to appropriate

H o g g a r t as a proto-sociologist o f culture even though Hoggart never had
xv Bourdieu and culture

any sociological pretensions. In short, the affinity b e t w e e n the t w o types o f

cultural analysis was strained. Indeed, in 1971 Williams wrote an obituary
o f Lucien G o l d m a n n in which he regretted that his premature death had
1 5

prevented the d e v e l o p m e n t o f sympathetic intellectual exchanges.

Williams sought to introduce t o English literary criticism the kind o f Marx-
ist structuralist m e t h o d practised b y G o l d m a n n which B o u r d i e u had al-
ready rejected. Later in the d e c a d e , Williams was to p r o d u c e his o w n
critical evaluation o f Marxist analyses o f literature. In the Introduction t o
his Marxism and Literature (1977) Williams describes h o w he had first
encountered Marxist literary argument w h e n he c a m e t o C a m b r i d g e in
1939 t o study English literature. H e recalls h o w his 'experience o f growing
up in a working-class family' had led him ' t o accept the basic political
position' which Marxist analysis 'supported and clarified'. Williams g o e s
16

o n , h o w e v e r , t o s h o w h o w the practice o f Marxist cultural criticism had

failed to d o justice to his experience o f culture. H e writes:

Instead of making cultural history material,... it was made dependent, second-

ary, 'superstructural': a realm of 'mere' ideas, beliefs, arts, customs, determined
by the basic material history. What matters here is not only the element of
reduction; it is the reproduction, in an altered form, of the separation of 'culture'
from material social life, which had been the dominant tendency in idealist
cultural thought. 17

Williams saw the n e e d for a cultural materialism which w o u l d discard the

remnants o f idealist Kulturgeschichte. Marxist materialism had not b e e n
materialist e n o u g h in respect o f culture. Marxist thought, if not the thought
o f Marx, had b e e n t o o mechanical and had not recognised that cultural
products are expressive o f w h o l e ways o f life. In developing the notion o f a
'structure o f feeling' as a way o f describing this organic integration o f
previously separated base and superstructure c o m p o n e n t s , Williams sought
t o m a k e all culture c o n f o r m t o his primary experience o f working-class
culture. W h a t Terry Eagleton had already argued in respect o f Williams'
Culture and Society - that it was 'in reality an idealist and academicist
p r o j e c t ' - was also true o f the transformed Marxism o f Williams' Marx-
18

ism and Literature. Williams safeguarded the idealist cultural values he had
espoused as a result o f working as a cultural critic simply b y calling them
material and b y claiming that the forms o f high culture were constituted
as holistically as those o f an idealised working-class culture. In trying t o
totalise working-class culture, Williams surrendered the possibility o f un-
derstanding competing cultures. Williams' cultural materialism was a soph-
isticated amalgamation o f materialist and organicist elements o f
nineteenth-century cultural thought but, as such, it failed t o think outside
the tradition which had generated it. It failed to o p e n up the possibility o f a
scientific analysis o f material culture.
Williams was well aware o f the c o m p e t i n g senses in which the
w o r d culture has b e e n used. In 1976, he published his Keywords: A
Vocabulary of Culture and Society. 19
In the entry o n 'culture', Williams
 Introduction xvii

argued that '. . . culture was developing in English towards some o f its modern
senses before the decisive effects o f a new social and intellectual m o v e m e n t ' .20

T h e change in meaning, in other words, is tacitly explained causally by a new

social and intellectual movement which, Williams continues, occurred mainly
in Germany. It was Herder, Williams argues, w h o , in his Ideas on the Philoso-
phy of the History of Mankind (1784-91), attacked the notion that 'civilisation'
or 'culture' '. . . was what w e would n o w call a unilinear process, leading to the
high and dominant point o f C18 European culture' with the result that, in
21

what Williams calls 'a decisive innovation', he argued that it was necessary '. . .
to speak o f "cultures" in the plural: the specific and variable cultures o f
different nations and periods, but also the specific and variable cultures
o f social and e c o n o m i c groups within a nation'. 22

Williams convincingly suggested that it was at the end o f the eighteenth

century that the w o r d 'culture' a c c o m m o d a t e d a social anthropological
interest in 'cultures' as well as an earlier meaning dominantly associated
with the idea o f 'civilisation'. H e also recognises a third usage which is 'in
fact relatively late'. This is: '. . . the independent and abstract n o u n which
describes the w o r k s and practices o f intellectual and especially artistic
activity. This seems often n o w the most widespread use: culture is music,
literature, painting and sculpture, theatre and film.' 23

Williams' attempted social history o f semantic change successfully iden-

tified the m o m e n t in which e m e r g e d an interest in 'folk culture' and in the
social anthropological analysis o f cultural practices and, equally, the m o -
ment in which certain cultural forms assumed a sense o f superiority as
'culture' o v e r 'cultures', but he w r o t e about these changes from within the
discourse o f 'culture'. H e c o u l d talk about the e m e r g e n c e o f different
meanings but only from within a conceptual framework concerning 'cul-
ture' that the approach attributed to H e r d e r w o u l d seek t o place relativ-
istically as simply o n e framework amongst many.

Producing a Scientific Sociology of Culture

T h e r e was n o way out o f the g a m e o f culture for Williams but, in B o u r -

dieu's terms, he did not a c k n o w l e d g e reflexively the extent to which he had
b e e n initiated intellectually into a partisan position within the game. B y
contrast, B o u r d i e u tried to play the g a m e o f culture b y analysing cultures -
including 'culture' o r 'high culture' from outside the 'culture' tradition and,
instead, from within a scientific tradition. H e sought to d e p l o y the cre-
24

dentials he had already acquired in sociological research in the field o f

cultural analysis. A s a p r o d u c e r o f cultural researches, B o u r d i e u placed
himself outside the tradition o f cultural analysis which confirms itself b y
never questioning its o w n value - b y deliberately presenting himself as a
scientist. Rejecting - or, rather, recognising the historical reasons for - the
comfortable demarcation b e t w e e n Kulturwissenschaft and Naturwissen-
schaft, B o u r d i e u undertakes a scientific analysis o f cultural forms and o f
xviii Bourdieu and culture

the internal critical practices b y which they are sustained. H e has described
himself as being in the epistemological tradition established b y Claude
Bernard in French life sciences towards the e n d o f the nineteenth century.
This tradition sees itself as being b o t h anti-positivist and anti-metaphysical.
It emphasises the continuous application o f m e t h o d m o r e than the for-
mulation o f laws. It emphasises experimental testing m o r e than empirical
observation. It is neither materialist n o r idealist, but presents itself as 'natu-
ralist'. In practice, this means that all thought in terms o f the m i n d / b o d y
dualism has t o b e discarded in natural science as being an antiquated
hangover o f the c o n c e p t s d e v e l o p e d in medieval scholasticism. 'Natural'
p h e n o m e n a have t o b e confronted without these kinds o f anachronistically
philosophical p r e c o n c e p t i o n s and they have t o b e confronted as they are b y
constructing analytical c o n c e p t s which s e e m intrinsically appropriate and
can b e tested and refined. Naturalist scientists are naturally present with
the natural p h e n o m e n a o n which they c o n d u c t experiments. W o r k i n g hy-
potheses are artificial devices for generating testable findings. ' S c i e n c e ' is
not static, o r final, o r absolute. H y p o t h e s e s are the products o f historical,
cultural conditions and they generate findings which culturally affect the
production o f subsequent hypotheses. T h e field o f 'science' is o n e o f the
plurality o f c o m p e t i n g 'cultures' within society but, within the g a m e o f
culture from which there is n o escape, it provides a vantage point from
which the assumptions o f 'culture' can b e analysed.

Mobilising 'Cultural Studies' Strategically

T h e point o f the scientific intervention, for B o u r d i e u , is to s h o w the ways in

which cultural value judgements are d e p l o y e d spuriously t o legitimise s o -
cial distinctions. This demonstration can only b e achieved b y conducting
sociological analysis subversively but, equally importantly, the subversive
critique o f 'culture' can only b e effective if, like a Trojan horse, it gains
currency within the field which it criticises. It is significant, therefore, that
there was an apparent approchement b e t w e e n B o u r d i e u and his associates
and the writers o f the English N e w Left w h o w e r e in the process o f estab-
lishing the n e w field o f Cultural Studies. Translations o f the w o r k o f
T h o m p s o n , Williams, H o b s b a w m and Klingender appeared in the Actes de
la recherche en sciences sociales b e t w e e n 1976 and 1 9 7 8 . This a c c o m m o d -
25

ation b y B o u r d i e u o f elements o f English ' N e w Left' 'cultural studies' was

matched b y an English response. Referring specifically t o B o u r d i e u ' s 'Sur
le p o u v o i r s y m b o l i q u e ' ( 1 9 7 7 ) which, as yet, was only available in English
2 6

translation as a stencilled, internal paper o f the Centre for C o n t e m p o r a r y

Cultural Studies, Stuart Hall, at the end o f his ' T h e hinterland o f science:
27

ideology and the " S o c i o l o g y o f k n o w l e d g e " ' ( 1 9 7 8 ) , implied that B o u r -

28

dieu's w o r k potentially offered a way forward for cultural theory b e y o n d

the conflicting legacies o f wholly internal o r wholly external analyses o f
symbolic systems.
 Introduction xix

Importantly, the following year (1980), the journal Media, Culture and
Society devoted a number to the work o f Bourdieu in which were published
some prepublication selections from the translation o f La Distinction ', a 29

translation o f 'La production de la croyance: contribution une c o n o m i e des

biens symboliques' ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; as well as a short bibliography o f Bourdieu's work
30

and an article b y Nicholas Garnham and R a y m o n d Williams. Entitled

31

'Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology o f culture', this article was the most signifi-
cant indication that the appropriation o f Bourdieu's work in England had
shifted from the field o f educational analysis to the field o f cultural studies.
T h e translation o f the full text o f La Distinction was published in 1984.
B y this time, 'Cultural Studies' was beginning t o establish itself as an
a c a d e m i c field within British universities. A s it b e c a m e an increasingly
popular 'subject' - generating an a u t o n o m o u s discourse and a discrete field
o f criticism and inquiry - the conjunction o f the 1960s and 1970s b e t w e e n
Left-wing politics and cultural study b e g a n t o wane. Significantly, Stuart
Hall m o v e d f r o m Birmingham in 1979 t o b e c o m e Professor o f S o c i o l o g y at
the O p e n University, whilst, in 1983, R a y m o n d Williams retired from his
post at C a m b r i d g e after the publication o f Towards 2000 and, for the rest
o f his life until his death in 1988, was t o turn dominantly t o the writing o f
n o v e l s . B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k was t o b e c o m e assimilated within an intellectual
32

field that was b e c o m i n g pathologically depoliticised. In the same period,

B o u r d i e u ' s o w n situation had changed. A f t e r his appointment t o the Chair
o f S o c i o l o g y at the C o l l g e de France, Paris in 1981-82, he b e c a m e in-
creasingly interested in the relationship b e t w e e n the cultural capital that he
had acquired personally and the institutionalised capital e m b o d i e d in the
institution which e m p l o y e d him. His n e w position enabled him to reflect
u p o n - and apply t o himself - those issues that he had discussed in the
section o f La Distinction entitled 'Culture and polities'. Whereas, in the
1960s, B o u r d i e u had argued that the state-controlled education system was
an instrument for imposing a dominant culture and o f excluding the many
functionally satisfactory, but dominated, cultures existing within society, by
the 1980s he was m o r e inclined t o regard the political system and its associ-
ated political discourse as m o r e powerful instruments o f domination. H e
had shifted from the analysis o f cultures within an educational frame o f
reference t o the analysis o f cultural diversity in relation t o political parti-
cipation. T h e 'autonomisation' o f Cultural Studies is a political p h e n o m -
e n o n which, in B o u r d i e u ' s view, has to b e analysed as such sociologically.
Whilst Bourdieu was assembling the findings o f s o m e o f his earlier re-
search to e x p o s e , in La Noblesse d'tat ( 1 9 8 9 ) , the mechanisms by which
33

dominant educational capital converted into dominant political p o w e r within

the specific French social system, Polity Press began the process which would
'market' B o u r d i e u as a social theorist o f global significance. Bourdieu's
Homo Academicus ( 1 9 8 4 ) was translated into English in 1988, and the
34

translation was offered with a 'Preface to the English e d i t i o n ' in which 35

B o u r d i e u somewhat nervously sought to guard against the possibility that his

works w o u l d b e c o m e socially decontexted intellectual commodities. T h e
xx Bourdieu and culture

increasingly widespread international translation o f his w o r k forced Bour-

dieu to reflect systematically in respect o f his o w n cultural production - in
precisely the terms that he had outlined objectively as early as 1966 in
'Intellectual Field and Creative Project' - o n the relationship between the
meanings o f texts as products o f the trajectories o f authors and their mean-
ings as free-standing items within a field o f reception.
T h e game o f culture that Bourdieu, in part, plays and which, in part,
plays him, has b e c o m e increasingly c o m p l e x . A s s o m e o n e w h o was insis-
tent that he was intent o n producing sociological analyses o f culture, he
nevertheless colluded in, o r acquiesced in, a process which inserted his
texts within the field o f cultural study. T h e shift in his attitude towards
Flaubert, discussed in Chapter 4, is indicative o f his o w n changing intellec-
tual strategy. A t first, Flaubert was found guilty o f distorting his social
perceptions b y inserting them, as fictions, within a literary cultural field.
B o u r d i e u c a m e to acknowledge, h o w e v e r , that interventions m a d e within
cultural fields - including the novels o f Flaubert - might possess greater
potential for effecting social and political change than supposedly 'scien-
tific' interventions m a d e within a field o f social science which is increasingly
subjected t o state apparatuses o r system worlds which sponsor it finan-
cially. B o u r d i e u m o v e d away from the view that insertion within an auto-
n o m o u s cultural field implied an aesthetic escape from social engagement
towards the view that the constructed a u t o n o m y o f the cultural field c o u l d
b e d e p l o y e d m o r e effectively for political purposes than c o u l d a social
science field w h o s e autonomy had b e c o m e dangerously weak. T h e key was
to ensure that the autonomy o f the cultural field should b e a functional
a u t o n o m y and should not b e c o m e self-indulgently detached from politics.
This tension explains the way in which B o u r d i e u has tried to play the
g a m e o f the a u t o n o m o u s field o f reception offered to him b y Cultural
Studies whilst at the same time asserting his dominantly social and political
commitments. Within the market o f Bourdieu's symbolic g o o d s , the situa-
tion is confused b y the detemporalising effect o f the production o f transla-
tions o f s o m e o f his texts: the translation o f La Noblesse d'tat (1989) did
not appear until after Polity had published English versions o f the t w o texts
o f the 1960s (L'Amour de l'art ( 1 9 6 6 ) and Un art moyen ( 1 9 6 5 ) ) which
3 6 3 7

can b e characterised as 'precultural study' studies o f culture - The Love of

Art ( 1 9 9 0 ) and Photography ( 1 9 9 0 ) . T h e political control exercised o v e r
3 8 39

cultural study within Bourdieu's field o f production was, therefore, missed

initially as the chronologically indifferent republications o f The Love of Art
and Photography s e e m e d to confirm that B o u r d i e u was n o w a contributor
within the field o f Cultural Studies. Presumably, B o u r d i e u himself c o l l u d e d
in the timing o f the publication, by Polity Press, o f a collection o f his essays
under the title o f The Field of Cultural Production ( 1 9 9 3 ) . It was only as a
40

result o f the publication o f Les Rgles de l'art ( 1 9 9 2 ) - translated in 1996

41

as The Rules of Art 42

- and o f Libre-change ( 1 9 9 4 ) - translated in 1995
4 3

as Free Exchange 44
- that it b e c a m e clear that, like Z o l a , B o u r d i e u was
seeking to d e p l o y strategically in the political sphere the capital that he had
 Introduction xxi

accumulated through his cultural studies and that, like Hans H a a c k e , he

was interested in the capacity o f art t o instigate subversive social criticism.

Explicating Bourdieu's Sociological Contribution to the Study

of Cultures

T h e bulk o f this b o o k was written b e t w e e n 1994 and 1996. It was c o m m i s -

sioned and c o m m e n c e d during the temporal hiatus generated b y the cross-
Channel and transatlantic translation o f Les Rgles de Tart and Libre-
change described a b o v e . It was c o m m i s s i o n e d t o b e an assessment o f
B o u r d i e u ' s contribution t o cultural analysis which w o u l d itself b e located
within the field o f cultural criticism. In B o u r d i e u ' s o w n terms, therefore, it
was due t o b e the kind o f criticism from within a discourse which has the
over-riding, but covert, p u r p o s e o f sustaining the legitimacy o f that dis-
course. T o b o r r o w the distinction m a d e b y B o u r d i e u in O n symbolic
p o w e r ' that was favourably received b y Stuart Hall, m y c o m m i s s i o n was to
analyse B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k in terms o f the 'internal relations' within the field
o f cultural study - t o analyse his w o r k as 'structured structure' - rather than
t o see it in its external context and understand it as a 'structuring structure'.
T h e essence o f the argument advanced b y B o u r d i e u in ' O n symbolic
p o w e r ' and, indeed, the essence o f his poststructuralist analysis o f culture
in general, is that w e must g o b e y o n d these alternative stances and should
seek t o establish a synthetic position which accepts that cultural forms are
susceptible to analysis b o t h as forms in themselves and as social constructs.
A s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f m y acceptance o f B o u r d i e u ' s synthetic solution - o n e
which places what formal criticism can say about cultural products in an
analytic alliance with what s o c i o e c o n o m i c history m a y say about the condi-
tions o f that p r o d u c t i o n without subscribing t o materialist determinism - it
b e c a m e necessary myself t o adopt a d o u b l e stance. In taking three distinct
areas o f B o u r d i e u ' s cultural analysis - his discussions o f Flaubert, fashion
and M a n e t - I have tried to consider B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k in relation to the
w o r k o f other contributors t o the cultural subfields o f literature, fashion
and art. T h e s e analyses that are internal to the subfields are, however,
presented in such a way as t o s h o w that this conceptual framework belongs
t o o u r field o f reception whilst, for B o u r d i e u , the p r o d u c t i o n o f his analyses
was consistent with a wholly different agenda. T h e b o o k offers an introduc-
tory account o f B o u r d i e u ' s career and also an exegesis o f his main c o n -
cepts, but the intention is that these sections should p r o v i d e sufficient
detail t o indicate that B o u r d i e u ' s career trajectory and his conceptual de-
v e l o p m e n t interact and mutually constitute each other. T h e intention is
that, jointly, these sections should s h o w that B o u r d i e u ' s specific cultural
analyses are the means b y which he transforms his personal cultural posi-
tion. T h e b o o k is organised in such a way, in other w o r d s , to allow the
reader t o appreciate B o u r d i e u ' s cultural analyses b o t h as 'structures' and
as elements in his o w n 'structuring' o r position-taking activity.
xxii Bourdieu and culture

Bourdieu's discussions o f Flaubert, Courrges and Manet - considered

in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 - are objective but they are also crucially self-
regarding. N o t only is the content o f the analyses self-regarding but, for
Bourdieu, the form o f the analytical activity is also performative. H e c o n -
siders the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f Flaubert's transformation o f social observation
into cultural form, but, at the different m o m e n t s at which B o u r d i e u was
making an objective analysis o f the relative merits, in the case o f Flaubert,
o f social scientific o r creative representations, B o u r d i e u was making a
contextually contingent assessment o f these same relative merits in his o w n
case and, additionally, allowing the submission o f his analyses t o differing
fields o f reception to b e an enactment in practice o f the conclusions
reached theoretically and vicariously within the texts. Just as B o u r d i e u
argues, against Sartre, that Flaubert's Frdric in L'ducation sentimentale
is not an autobiographical self-representation but, rather, a constructed
persona through w h o m Flaubert e x p l o r e d experimentally, in fiction, a
range o f potential social trajectories that he might, in fact, adopt, s o
B o u r d i e u ' s analyses o f Flaubert are similarly exploratory rather than
representational.
In short, producing cultural analyses is o n e o f the ways in which B o u r -
dieu has played the game o f culture. T h e analyses and the game-playing are
reciprocally related and inseparable. In practical terms, m y attempt t o offer
a synthetic account o f Bourdieu's contribution to the analysis o f culture has
resulted in an organised argument which can b e summarised briefly for the
guidance o f readers.

The Structure of this Book

Part I ( T h e career') contains o n e chapter which provides an outline o f

B o u r d i e u ' s career as, in his o w n terms, an intellectual 'trajectory' manifest-
ing a series o f strategic developments, sometimes 'planned' and sometimes
'random'.
T h e career is presented in three phases - the 'intellectual apprenticeship'
from 1950 to about 1970; 'from lector to auctof during the 1970s; and the
'politics o f self-presentation' in the p e r i o d since his appointment t o the
Chair o f S o c i o l o g y at the Collge d e France in 1981-82. This account is not
to b e read as the biographical ' b a c k g r o u n d ' to his w o r k . T h e purpose is not
to present an objectified o r fixed version o f the relationship b e t w e e n B o u r -
dieu's w o r k s and his career but, rather, t o p r o v i d e the basis for an under-
standing o f the dynamic pragmatism underlying all the w o r k o f B o u r d i e u
which is to b e examined in the rest o f the b o o k . Subsequent chapters are to
b e read with reference to this introductory historical contextualisation.
Part II ( T h e c o n c e p t s ' ) contains t w o chapters which p r o v i d e an account
o f the key concepts which B o u r d i e u has d e v e l o p e d and which have shaped
his empirical findings and the way in which he has conceptualised society.
B o u r d i e u has insisted that these concepts are historically contingent and
 Introduction xxiii

have b e e n d e p l o y e d strategically. T h e s e chapters seek t o clarify the mean-

ings o f the c o n c e p t s and t o evaluate them whilst still accepting B o u r d i e u ' s
view that, for him, they have always b e e n tools o f investigation and should
only b e used pragmatically b y others in full k n o w l e d g e o f the complexity o f
conceptual transfer and not replicated routinely. This means that the prag-
matism o f their genesis as well as o f their potential use has t o b e appreci-
ated. T h e first chapter initially discusses what B o u r d i e u might m e a n b y a
' c o n c e p t ' and then outlines the d e v e l o p m e n t o f his use of, amongst others,
'habitus', 'field' and 'cultural capital'. T h e s e are certainly operational c o n -
cepts that have p e r f o r m e d slightly different functions for B o u r d i e u at dif-
ferent points in his career. T h e s e c o n d chapter considers the d e v e l o p m e n t
o f B o u r d i e u ' s use o f 'reproduction' in the context o f the c o n t e m p o r a r y
thinking about ' p r o d u c t i o n ' and ' c o n s u m p t i o n ' o r 'reception'. It asks
whether, for B o u r d i e u , 'reproduction' is m o r e than a conceptual t o o l for
understanding social processes and is, instead, in spite o f his disclaimers,
m o r e nearly an explanation o f social reality.
If Part II isolates B o u r d i e u ' s conceptual activity, Part III ( ' T h e case
studies'), consisting o f three chapters, explores the ways in which the c o n -
cepts have functioned in providing an approach to cultural forms. It is not
possible, h o w e v e r , t o maintain a clear distinction b e t w e e n c o n c e p t and
object. B o u r d i e u ' s concepts are not applied to self-existent facts because,
for him, there is a constant reciprocity b e t w e e n o b s e r v e d p h e n o m e n a and
the language in which observation is expressed. B o u r d i e u ' s concepts de-
v e l o p , are refined, as they are used. Separate chapters isolate Bourdieu's
w o r k o n Flaubert, fashion and Manet, partly t o s h o w his analysis in action
and partly to extract from his multidisciplinary practice s o m e contributions
m a d e b y B o u r d i e u which can b e c o m p a r e d with other contributions in the
established fields o f literary and art criticism. T h e s e are, therefore, arti-
ficially constructed case studies o f B o u r d i e u ' s practice - partially circum-
scribed b y discipline boundaries which he refuses to accept. A t the same
time, the chapters seek to d o justice t o this refusal. T h e y suggest the ways
in which these paradigmatic studies are most significant as evidence o f an
intellectual style which should b e recognised as the true B o u r d i e u para-
digm. T h e y demonstrate that it should b e clear from what B o u r d i e u says
about M a n e t o r Flaubert o r Z o l a that he wants, like them, to sustain the
affinities b e t w e e n cultural production and scientific naturalism, which
means that B o u r d i e u wants to carry o n producing objects and d o e s not
want to contribute t o any 'definitive' objectification o f those artists w h o are
his m o d e l s . Relating to the discussions in Part I and Part II, the chapters o f
Part III s h o w the ways in which B o u r d i e u ' s thinking about individual artists
has shifted b o t h in relation to his developing career and in relation to his
continuing refinement o f his concepts.
T h e corollary o f B o u r d i e u ' s view o f the mutually reinforcing integrity o f
his career and his concepts is that he renders his w o r k abstractly uncriticis-
able or, put another way, that he obliges all criticism o f his w o r k to b e ad
hominem criticism. B o u r d i e u seeks to elicit a response t o the package o f his
xxiv Bourdieu and culture

life and w o r k and t o deny the possibility that the w o r k can usefully b e
extracted and subjected t o impersonal criticism. T h e t w o chapters in Part
I V ( ' T h e criticisms') explore the criticisms o f B o u r d i e u that have b e e n
m a d e and examine the validity o f his strategic evasion o f criticism. T h e first
chapter summarises the main lines o f criticism that have b e e n advanced in
the secondary literature. T h e presentation is not comprehensive, but it
takes a range o f significant arguments, evaluates them and, in d o i n g s o ,
seeks t o clarify B o u r d i e u ' s position. T h e s e c o n d chapter considers the case
B o u r d i e u has offered in self-defence against criticism and then seeks a w a y
out o f the apparent impasse w h e r e b y debate and disagreement about the
value o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k s e e m logically interminable.
T h e last chapter attempts t o summarise the development o f the argument
in the text and to reach a judgement o f Bourdieu's work. If, as the b o o k
argues, Bourdieu's cultural analyses and findings were, and still are, inte-
grally related t o his social position-taking, but if it is also possible, as the
b o o k demonstrates, tactically t o appreciate them both as functioning c o n c e p -
tual objects and as components o f his subjective, socio-genetic trajectory, is it
not, nevertheless, illegitimate o r undesirable to p r o p o s e a divided response
to his life and w o r k ? Bourdieu has sought to live, o r incorporate, his c o n -
cepts, but is it o p e n to us to take critical advantage o f the disembodied
concepts without reference t o any ethical judgement o f his career - o r d o e s
this inclination to treat his concepts autonomously amount to a form o f
idealism and constitute, therefore, a complete rejection o f his unified intel-
lectual and existential project? Is it defensible t o adopt the relativism o f
Bourdieu's cultural analysis whilst simultaneously 'bracketing' a relativist
analysis o f its cultural provenance? Pursuing these questions, the Conclusion
argues that it is not possible t o disintegrate Bourdieu's life and work. It
argues for a pragmatic response - not to his disembodied concepts but t o his
paradigmatic life o f creative conceptualisation.

Post-Script

T h e game o f culture is not static. It is o n e which is inescapably changing,

generating its o w n dynamism like an internal c o m b u s t i o n engine. Having
carried out his intellectual reconnaissance o f the relations b e t w e e n culture
and politics, and having increased his cultural capital as a result o f his
interventions in the field o f Cultural Studies, B o u r d i e u has recently embar-
ked o n a process o f reconversion, offering the authority that he has ac-
quired intellectually in the political service o f the socially, politically and
culturally dominated m e m b e r s o f society.
In an interview o f O c t o b e r , 1992, about Les Rgles de l'art, entitled ' T o u t
est s o c i a l ! ' , Bourdieu argued that the research that he had directed leading
45

to the publication o f La Misre du monde ( 1 9 9 3 ) was not unconnected with

46

the interests underlying Les Rgles de l'art. H e claimed that he was trying to
use literary form t o allow the dispossessed o f French society to have a
 Introduction xxv

political voice. This marks a shift away from a concentration o n the political
potential o f collective intellectuals towards an attempt t o find grounds for
collective action which unite intellectuals and non-intellectuals.
O n e o f the bases for such collective action is the c o n v i c t i o n that social
solidarity b e t w e e n individuals in society has b e e n undermined b y the dis-
torting affects o f m e d i a c o v e r a g e which, in turn, is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the
effects o f an unregulated market e c o n o m y . R e l a t e d is the v i e w that n e o -
liberal politics are the c o n s e q u e n c e o f the w o r l d d o m i n a n c e o f A n g l o -
Saxon i d e o l o g i e s based o n the elevation o f individual f r e e d o m rather than
collective welfare. T h e recent article (with L o c W a c q u a n t ) : 'Sur les ruses
d e la raison i m p r i a l i s t e ' is a diatribe against the way in which particular
47

A m e r i c a n i d e o l o g i e s masquerade as universal truths.

Since La Misre du monde, B o u r d i e u has sought t o transpose what he
called the 'social maieutics' o f that text f r o m the formal, written, sphere to
the sphere o f direct political action. A f t e r supporting the striking railway
w o r k e r s in D e c e m b e r 1995, B o u r d i e u established a social m o v e m e n t en-
titled ' R a i s o n s d'agir', b a c k e d b y a publishing venture - Liber-Raisons
d'agir. His first publication f o l l o w e d from the identification o f the media as
significant culprits in relation t o o u r current social and political malaises.
Sur la tlvision, suivi de Vemprise du journalisme was published in D e c e m -
b e r 1 9 9 6 . T w o other texts b y associates f o l l o w e d in 1997: A R E S E R
48

( A s s o c i a t i o n for Reflection o n Higher E d u c a t i o n and R e s e a r c h ) : Quelques

diagnostics et remdes urgents pour une universit en pril, and S. Halimi:
Les Nouveaux Chiens de garde. In 1998, other associates have p r o d u c e d Le
'Dcembre' des intellectuels franais and B o u r d i e u has published a collec-
tion o f his o w n speeches and interventions, assembled f r o m the period
b e t w e e n 1992 and 1998: Contre-feux 49
Within this p e r i o d , B o u r d i e u has
also published Mditations pascaliennes ( 1 9 9 7 ) in which, amongst other
5 0

things, he has presented himself as a reluctant intellectual and has tried to

deconstruct the a c a d e m i c gaze in o r d e r t o liberate the possibility o f collec-
tive social action which is not contaminated b y artificial academic and
status distinctions.
B o u r d i e u has also recently published La Domination masculine ( 1 9 9 8 ) 51

which has generated debate in Paris. Part o f the same debate has also b e e n
the publication o f a b o o k which attempts t o put the brake o n Bourdieu's
political influence. This is J. V e r d s - L e r o u x : Le Savant et la politique: essai
sur le terrorisme sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu. 52
A l t h o u g h this text
offers analysis o f B o u r d i e u ' s earlier w o r k , it seems t o b e mainly motivated
b y the views, first, that B o u r d i e u is t o o influential, and, m o r e significantly,
that he has transgressed hallowed boundaries b e t w e e n the scientific and
the political.
B o u r d i e u is currently deploying in the political field the cultural capital
that he has acquired through his scientific research. In m y view he is doing
this legitimately precisely because his present actions follow logically from
and seek t o actualise the theory o f practice which first brought him intel-
lectual authority. T h e r e is n o abuse o f authority for its o w n sake but a
xxvi Bourdieu and culture

coherent implementation o f a life-long strategy. Writing in 'Sur les ruses de

la raison imprialiste' (1998), B o u r d i e u (and W a c q u a n t ) n o w cite the
spread o f 'Cultural Studies' as o n e example o f the general pathology
w h e r e b y concepts and social m o v e m e n t s acquire artificial status and cur-
rency in a field o f international intellectual exchange that has b e c o m e
divorced from their particular conditions o f production. B o u r d i e u and
W a c q u a n t argue:

Thus it is that decisions of pure book marketing orient research and university
teaching in the direction of homogenisation and of submission to fashions com-
ing from America, when they do not fabricate wholesale 'disciplines' such as
Cultural Studies, this mongrel domain born in England in the 70s, which owes its
international dissemination (which is the whole of its existence) to a successful
publishing policy.53

This attack o n 'Cultural Studies' here has two elements. T h e authors c o m -

plain that it is a commercial product and, separately, that it was, in origin, a
mongrel construct. I have suggested in this Introduction that this second
point d o e s not represent a new position for Bourdieu. H e has consistently
seen himself as a sociologist o f cultural phenomena and has, therefore, b e -
lieved that the development o f 'Cultural Studies' as a discipline has illus-
trated a methodological error in that it has allowed the object o f inquiry to
prescribe the framework within which it is conceived. I have also suggested,
however, that Bourdieu has acquired cultural capital as a result o f the inser-
tion o f his texts in the field o f commercial exchange that he n o w disowns.
What w e see in 'Sur les ruses de la raison imprialiste', therefore, is Bourdieu
seeking to regain control over his international griffe o r brand-label (to use
the terminology used by Bourdieu in relation to fashion - as discussed in
Chapter 5 ) , to reassert that cultural analyses are instruments o f strategic
action in particular situations and not repositories o f universal explanation.
In the light o f Bourdieu's n e w m o v e s within the g a m e o f culture, this
b o o k offers the opportunity t o observe the ways in which B o u r d i e u ' s
cultural analyses w e r e integral t o a developing theoretical understanding o f
the relations b e t w e e n culture and politics - the publication and dissemina-
tion o f which within the cultural field have p r o v i d e d him with the p o w e r to
enact it through direct action in the political sphere.

Notes

1. P. Bourdieu (1979) La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement, Paris, di-

tions de Minuit.
2. P. Bourdieu (1984) Distinction, A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 12.
3. Ibid., 11-12.
4. Ibid., 12.
5. See the Foreword to the second part of P. Bourdieu et al. (1963) Travail et
travailleurs en Algrie, Paris and The Hague, Mouton, 257-67.
 Introduction xxvii

6. P. Bourdieu (1962) 'Clibat et condition paysanne', tudes rurales, 5-6, 32-136.

7. P. Bourdieu (with J.-C. Passeron) (1964) Les Hritiers. Les tudiants et la
culture, Paris, ditions de Minuit.
8. P. Bourdieu (with J.-C. Passeron) (1970) La Reproduction. lments pour une
thorie du systme d'enseignement, Paris, ditions de Minuit.
9. P. Bourdieu (1966) 'Champ intellectuel et projet crateur', Les Temps mod-
ernes, 246, 865-906.
10. P. Bourdieu (1975) 'Mthode scientifique et hirarchie sociale des objets',
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 1, 4-6.
11. P. Bourdieu (with M. de Saint Martin) (1976) 'Anatomie du got', Actes de la
recherche en sciences sociales, 5, 2-112.
12. P. Bourdieu (with J.C. Chamboredon and J.-C. Passeron) (1968) Le Mtier de
sociologue, Paris, Mouton-Bordas, translated (1991) as The Craft of Sociology,
Berlin and New York, de Gruyter.
13. P. Bourdieu (1971) 'Intellectual field and creative project' and 'Systems of edu-
cation and systems of thought' in M.F.D. Young, ed. Knowledge and Control.
New Directions for the Sociology of Education, London, Collier-Macmillan.
14. R. Hoggart (1970) La Culture du pauvre (prsentation de J.-C. Passeron),
Paris, Editions de Minuit.
15. R. Williams (1971) 'Literature and sociology: in memory of Lucien Gold-
mann', New Left Review, 67, 3-18.
16. R. Williams (1977) Marxism and Literature, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1.
17. Ibid., 19.
18. T. Eagleton (1976) Marxism and Literary Criticism, London, Routledge, 25.
19. R. Williams (1976) Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Fontana
Communications Series), London, Collins.
20. Ibid., 88.
21. Ibid., 89.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 90.
24. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between Williams and Bour-
dieu, see my (1997) 'Ways of knowing cultures: Williams and Bourdieu', in J.
Wallace et al., eds. Raymond Williams Now. Knowledge, Limits and the Future,
London, Macmillan, 40-55.
25. E.P. Thompson (1976) 'Modes de domination et rvolutions en Angleterre',
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 2-3, 133-51; R. Williams (1977)
'Plaisantes perspectives. Invention du paysage et abolition du paysan', Actes
de la recherche en sciences sociales, 17-18, 29-36; E. Hobsbawm (1978) 'Sexe,
symboles, vtements et socialisme', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales,
23, 2-18; F. Klingender (1978) 'Joseph Wright de Derby, peintre de la Rvolu-
tion industrielle', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 23, 23-36.
26. P. Bourdieu (1977) 'Sur le pouvoir symbolique', Annales, 3, 405-11.
27. Translated by Richard Nice (who was working at CCCS at that time) in Two
Bourdieu Texts, CCCS stencilled Papers no. 46 (1977). This translation was
subsequently published in Critique of Anthropology, (1979), 4, 77-85; whilst a
different translation (by C. Wringe) was published in D . Gleeson, ed. (1977)
Identity and Structure: Issues in the Sociology of Education, Driffield, Naffer-
ton Books, 112-19.
28. S. Hall (1978) in S. Hall (1978) On Ideology, London, CCCS/Hutchinson.
29. 'The aristocracy of culture' - translation of La Distinction, 9-61 - in Media,
Culture and Society, (1980), 2, 225-54; diagram of social position and life-
style' - translation of La Distinction, 1 3 9 ^ 4 - in Media, Culture and Society,
(1980), 2, 255-9.
30. P. Bourdieu (1977) 'La production de la croyance: contribution une con-
omie des biens symboliques', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 13,
xxviii Bourdieu and culture

3-43; translated by R. Nice as T h e production of belief: contribution to an

economy of symbolic goods', Media, Culture and Society, (1980), 2,261-93.
31. N. Garnham and R. Williams (1980) 'Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of
culture', Media, Culture and Society, 2, 209-223.
32. For detail and comment on this phase of Williams' life, see F. Inglis (1995)
Raymond Williams, London, Routledge, Chap. 12, 266-96.
33. P. Bourdieu (1989) La Noblesse d'tat. Grandes coles et esprit de corps, Paris,
ditions de Minuit.
34. P. Bourdieu (1984) Homo Academicus, Paris, ditions de Minuit.
35. P. Bourdieu (1988) Homo Academicus, Oxford, Polity Press, xi-xxvi.
36. P. Bourdieu (with A . Darbel and D . Schnapper) (1966) L Amour de l'art. Les
Muses d'art et leur public, Paris, ditions de Minuit.
37. P. Bourdieu (with L. Boltanski, R. Castel and J.C. Chamboredon) (1965) Un
art moyen. Essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie, Paris, ditions de
Minuit.
38. P. Bourdieu (with A . Darbel and D . Schnapper) (1990) The Love of Art,
European Art Museums and Their Public, Oxford, Polity Press.
39. P. Bourdieu (with L. Boltanski, R. Castel and J.C. Chamboredon) (1990)
Photography, A Middle-Brow Art, Oxford, Polity Press.
40. P. Bourdieu (ed. and int. by R. Johnson) (1993) The Field of Cultural Produc-
tion. Essays on Art and Literature, Oxford, Polity Press.
41. P. Bourdieu (1992) Les Rgles de l'art. Gense et structure du champ littraire,
Paris, ditions du Seuil.
42. P. Bourdieu (1996) The Rules of Art. Genesis and Structure of the Literary
Field, Oxford, Polity Press.
43. P. Bourdieu and H. Haacke (1994) Libre-change, Paris, ditions du Seuil.
44. P. Bourdieu and H. Haacke (1995) Free Exchange, Oxford, Polity Press.
45. P. Bourdieu (1992) T o u t est social!', Magazine littraire, 303,104-11.
46. P. Bourdieu et al. (1993) La Misre du monde, Paris, ditions du Seuil.
47. P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant (1998) 'Sur les ruses de la raison imprialiste',
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 121-22,109-18.
48. Translated as On Television (1998), Oxford, Polity Press.
49. Translated as Acts of Resistance (1998), Oxford, Polity Press.
50. P. Bourdieu (1997) Mditations pascaliennes, Paris, ditions du Seuil.
51. P. Bourdieu (1998) La Domination masculine, Paris, ditions du Seuil.
52. J. Verds-Leroux (1998) Le Savant et la politique. Essai sur le terrorisme
sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu, Paris, Grasset.
53. P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant (1999) O n the cunning of imperialist reason',
Theory, Culture and Society, 16,1, 47.
Part I

THE CAREER

1 An insider/outsider Frenchman

B o u r d i e u ' s career t o date can usefully b e divided into three phases, and
these can b e briefly stated b e f o r e giving a detailed account.
T h e r e was, first o f all, an introductory period between 1950 and 1970 in
which he trained as a philosopher and gradually m a d e his way intellectually
towards sociological practice b y way o f ethnographic fieldwork. A l t h o u g h
there was a philosophical origin for those things that he found empirically
interesting o r problematic, intellectual circumstances ensured they were for-
mulated in the current anthropological frame o f thinking. Bourdieu was
interested in doing practical p h e n o m e n o l o g y , but his early w o r k appeared to
b e influenced b y what contemporary A m e r i c a n anthropologists were calling
'acculturation' studies and to b e relating itself uneasily to the prevalent
French practice o f Lvi-Strauss. In this period, therefore, Bourdieu estab-
lished himself as a cultural anthropologist w h o was prepared to apply an-
thropological methodologies to the analysis o f contemporary French culture.
A l t h o u g h there is n o clear-cut rupture with this introductory p e r i o d , it is
possible, nevertheless, to suggest that it was from 1968 that B o u r d i e u d e -
v e l o p e d an i d e o l o g y o f science and presented himself as a scientific prac-
titioner. In this s e c o n d p e r i o d , through the 1970s, B o u r d i e u directed a
research centre, established his o w n research journal and, through b o t h ,
inspired the w o r k o f a team o f colleagues and collaborators. It was in this
p e r i o d that he fully articulated an epistemological approach which sought
to supersede structuralism without cancelling out its achievements, and
constructed a conceptual apparatus to b e d e p l o y e d in a range o f inquiries.
T h e s e inquiries w e r e not only social scientific ones. H e had always b e e n
interested in art and literature o r in conventional cultural history as well as
in c o n t e m p o r a r y cultural practice. F r o m the late 1960s, he led a research
seminar which sought to analyse late nineteenth-century French cultural
history with the same kind o f scientific rigour and the same c o n c e p t s as
w e r e being used in analysing, for instance, the c o n t e m p o r a r y attitudes and
values o f the patrons o f large industrial and c o m m e r c i a l firms.
T h e third p e r i o d can b e said t o have b e g u n with B o u r d i e u ' s appointment
t o the Chair o f S o c i o l o g y at the C o l l g e de France, Paris, in 1981-82. His
2 Bourdieu and culture

w o r k has b e c o m e less r o o t e d in corporate research activity. H e has, in-

stead, b e c o m e interested in the relationship b e t w e e n his personal status
and p o w e r and those o f the institution in which h e is e m p l o y e d and which,
in s o m e sense, h e represents. A s his texts have b e e n translated and b e c o m e
k n o w n internationally, h e has b e c o m e conscious o f the disparity o r tension
between the universal meanings o f those texts and their particular mean-
ings as they have b e e n associated with his personal trajectory. A reputation
based o n writing bestows p o w e r but there is the constant danger that
misinterpretations o f what is written m a y affect the w a y in which the ac-
quired p o w e r can b e exercised. B o u r d i e u n o w attempts t o m a k e his actions
as an intellectual supersede his scientific practice in the same way as earlier
his emphasis o f reflexive practice had b e e n designed t o supersede, n o t
negate, structuralism. H e relates t o c o n t e m p o r a r y culture as a person w h o
n o w is the accumulated product o f what h e has b e e n - b o t h a cultural
anthropologist and a social scientist. B o u r d i e u ' s observation o f culture
involves a rigorous analysis o f the genesis o f what is o b s e r v e d and an
acceptance o f the genesis o f the position from which the observation is
made. It is for this reason that the detailed account o f B o u r d i e u ' s career
which follows is t o b e seen as c o m p l e m e n t a r y t o his current strategy. It is
an essential element o f his approach in this third phase o f his career that his
social and intellectual trajectories should b e seen as equally constitutive o f
his present self and that o n e should n o t b e thought t o explain the other.

The Intellectual Apprenticeship

Bourdieu was b o r n in 1930 in the Beam in G a s c o n y in southwest France

near t o the Pyrenees and the Spanish b o r d e r , a region with a distinctive
dialect and culture. H e has argued that his capacity t o b e an alien observer
o f social relations within his h o m e , familiar region helped h i m w h e n h e
came t o carry out ethnographic fieldwork in A l g e r i a at the e n d o f the
1950s. Understanding the familiar culture o f the Beam p o s e d for B o u r -
1

dieu the extreme test o f his capacity t o construct the detachment which is
the prerequisite for science.
Bourdieu has also offered an explanation o f his detachment. W h e n pressed
by Wacquant in a workshop in Chicago in 1987 t o overcome his reticence in
giving information about his private life, Bourdieu made s o m e revealing c o m -
ments about his upbringing: spent most o f my youth in a tiny and remote
village o f Southwestern France, a very "backward" place as city people like t o
say. A n d I could meet the demands o f schooling only b y renouncing many o f
my primary experiences and acquisitions, and not only a certain a c c e n t . . . ' 2

H e went o n to suggest that 'Anthropology and sociology have allowed m e to

reconcile myself with my primary experiences and to take them upon myself,
to assume them without losing anything I subsequently acquired'. Neverthe- 3

less, it was the particular form o f schooling which, possibly, fostered Bour-
dieu's sociologically detached social involvement:
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 3

Reading Flaubert, I found out that I had also been profoundly marked by
another social experience, that of life as a boarder in a public school [internat]
. . . Sometimes I wonder where I acquired this ability to understand or even to
anticipate the experience of situations that I have not known firsthand, . . . I
believe that I have, in my youth and throughout my social trajectory . . . taken a
whole series of mental photographs that my sociological work tries to process.' 4

In these remarks o f 1987, B o u r d i e u suggests that his schooling might ex-

plain the characteristic style o f his sociological w o r k - his practice o f 'parti-
cipant objectification', but, in the English Preface t o Homo Academicus
(1988), he hints at a m o r e formal c o n s e q u e n c e . Placing the b o o k in its
pre-1968 context, B o u r d i e u describes h o w the previously dominant intel-
lectual disciplines (including p h i l o s o p h y ) w e r e threatened b y the ' n e w '
disciplines ( ' e v e n ' s o c i o l o g y ) , and h o w the 'social foundations o f their aca-
d e m i c existence' w e r e also 'under siege'. H e c o m m e n t s :

This double criticism frequently awakens touching reactions of traditionalist

conservatism in those professors who did not have the instinct and the boldness
to recycle themselves in time, and in particular among those whom I call the
Oblates' and who, consigned from childhood to the school institution (they are
often children of the lower or middle classes or sons of teachers), are totally
dedicated to it. 5

A l t h o u g h B o u r d i e u had the 'instinct and the b o l d n e s s ' t o recycle himself,

as s o m e o n e w h o surely was tacitly presenting himself as an O b l a t e ' he did
retain an engrained c o m m i t m e n t t o institutionalisation.
L i k e D u r k h e i m , Lanson, B e r g s o n , Sartre, Derrida, Foucault, Merleau-
Ponty and Althusser, to name just a few 'big names', B o u r d i e u entered the
c o l e N o r m a l e Suprieure, Paris. B o u r d i e u was admitted in 1951. H e was
an angry y o u n g man, violently denouncing the cole for forming the
'watch-dogs o f the b o u r g e o i s i e ' . Dufay and D u f o r t q u o t e a contemporary
6

w h o recalls that B o u r d i e u was ' . . . animated b y an extraordinary desire

for revenge. H e had a kind o f mistrust o f Parisians - which w e were. E v e n
b y his thick-set physique, he s e e m e d t o proclaim his anti-Parisianism. I
d o n ' t k n o w whether he has ever o v e r c o m e this resentment which inspired
his fine b o o k , Les Hritiers . . . ' M u c h o f his anger was directed against
7

the staff w h o w e r e his teachers. T h e c o n t e m p t which he felt is still apparent

in the c o m m e n t s which he m a d e in an interview in 1985: 'Philosophy as
taught in the University was not very inspiring - even if there were s o m e
very c o m p e t e n t p e o p l e , like Henri G o u h i e r , . . . G a s t o n Bachelard and
G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m ' and ' . . . o u r c o n t e m p t for s o c i o l o g y was intensified
8

b y the fact that a sociologist c o u l d b e president o f the b o a r d o f examiners

o f the competitive " a g r g a t i o n " e x a m in p h i l o s o p h y and force us to attend
his lectures - which w e thought w e r e lousy - o n Plato o r R o u s s e a u ' . 9

B o u r d i e u ' s c o m m e n t s in the same interview d o , h o w e v e r , give lots o f

positive indications o f the w a y in w h i c h his thinking was d e v e l o p i n g in the
1950s. A s k e d what the intellectual situation was like w h e n he was a
4 Bourdieu and culture

student - 'Marxism, p h e n o m e n o l o g y and so o n ' - Bourdieu replied: ' W h e n I

was a student. . . p h e n o m e n o l o g y , in its existentialist variety, was at its peak,
and I had read Being and Nothingness very early o n , and then Merleau-
Ponty and H u s s e r l . . . ' In relation to Marxism, he commented: 'Marxism
1 0

didn't really exist as an intellectual position,. . . H o w e v e r , I did read Marx at

that time for academic reasons; I was especially interested in the young
Marx, and I had b e e n fascinated b y the "Theses o n F e u e r b a c h " . ' 11

B o u r d i e u implies that it was his reading o f Sartre which p o i n t e d him

towards Merleau-Ppnty and Husserl, in search, in b o t h cases, for ways out
o f existentialism. In the case o f Husserl, he w e l c o m e d the attempt t o
m a k e philosophical analysis rigorously scientific. F o r the same reason, he
' . . . studied mathematics and the history o f the s c i e n c e s ' . In the case o f
12

M e r l e a u - P o n t y , it was not his 'existentialism' that was the attraction: ' H e

was interested in the human sciences and in b i o l o g y , and he gave y o u an
idea o f what thinking a b o u t immediate present-day c o n c e r n s can b e like
w h e n it d o e s n ' t fall into the sectarian over-simplifications o f political
discussion . . . ' It was out o f a wish t o a v o i d for himself such sectarian
1 3

oversimplifications that B o u r d i e u a v o i d e d b o t h the C o m m u n i s t Party cell

run b y L e R o y Ladurie in the cole and Foucault's splinter g r o u p . His
' a c a d e m i c ' reading o f M a r x was t o furnish analytical detachment f r o m
everyday social issues rather than e n g a g e m e n t with them.
In the same interview, B o u r d i e u b o t h dissociates himself from the 'struc-
turalist generation' and acknowledges that he did share with them a similar
attitude towards existentialism:

Many of the intellectual leanings that I share with the 'structuralist' generation
(especially Althusser and Foucault) - which I do not consider myself to be part
of, firstly because I am separated from them by an academic generation (I went
to their lectures) and also because I rejected what seemed to me to be a fad - can
be explained by the need to react against what existentialism had represented for
them: the flabby 'humanism' that was in the air, the complacent appeal to 'lived
experience' and that sort of political moralism that lives on today in Esprit. 14

B o u r d i e u c h o s e his w o r d s carefully when he went o n to admit that he had

found the w o r k o f Heidegger attractive and useful:

I read Heidegger, I read him a lot and with a certain fascination, especially the
analyses in Sein una Zeit of public time, history and so on, which, together with
1

Husserl's analyses in Ideen II, helped me a great d e a l . . . in my efforts to analyse

the ordinary experience of the social. 15

B o u r d i e u is here suggesting that he was able t o use the insights o f transcen-

dental p h e n o m e n o l o g y which had b e e n designed t o disclose the universal
and the essential t o offer, instead, a descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the
plurality o f social experiences.
Half way through his time at the cole, in 1953, B o u r d i e u wrote a thesis,
under the supervision o f Gouhier, for a diplme d'tudes suprieures. It was
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 5

a translation of, and c o m m e n t a r y o n , Leibniz's Animadversiones. These, in

turn, w e r e Leibniz's critical c o m m e n t s o n Les Principes de la philosophie o f
D e s c a r t e s . A l q u i had published notes o n the first part o f this w o r k o f
16

Descartes in 1933. It was a w o r k in which Descartes attempted to sum-

marise his philosophy in a series o f short paragraphs so as to provide a
counter-scholastic manual. Paragraphs 7 to 13 are d e v o t e d to T h e thinking
s e l f and A l q u i had noted: Tn taking as his point o f departure n o longer
the o b j e c t but the thinking subject, Descartes set philosophy o n the path o f
i d e a l i s m . ' It is significant that B o u r d i e u early in his career w o u l d have
17

k n o w n well Leibniz's critique o f this crucial Cartesian point o f departure.

Leibniz wrote:

Descartes' thesis that the 7 think therefore I am' is one of the primary truths is
excellent. But it would have been only fair not to neglect other truths of the
same kind . . . For I am conscious not only of my thinking self, but also of my
thoughts, and it is no more true and certain that I think than that I think this or
that. 18

In these cryptic w o r d s , Leibniz o p e n e d up the possibility o f a c o n c e p t i o n o f

history as the continuous generation o f an infinity o f thoughts by an infinity
o f thinkers rather than as the progressive refinement o f an ideal A b s o l u t e .
After his agrgation in 1955, B o u r d i e u taught for a year in a provincial
lyce in Moulins o n the northern e d g e o f the A u v e r g n e . In 1956 he was
conscripted and served for t w o years with the French A r m y in Algeria. It
was in this p e r i o d o f national service that he w r o t e his Sociologie de
l'Algrie which was published in Paris in 1958. In reading this text, it is
immediately clear that B o u r d i e u was confronted b y the p r o b l e m articula-
ted b y Lvi-Strauss in 'History and anthropology': he wanted to undertake
an ethnological analysis o f the disappearing social organisations o f A l -
gerian tribesmen and also undertake an ethnographic study o f the b e -
haviour and attitudes o f those tribesmen in their n e w urban situations. A s
ethnographer, B o u r d i e u ' s working assumption had to b e that his ethnologi-
cal analysis o f the social historical backgrounds o f his interviewees was a
present, internalised force in influencing their m o d e s o f adaptation to
changing conditions.
Sociologie de l'Algrie (1958), therefore, was based o n secondary texts
even though, undoubtedly, it was an account o f p e o p l e and regions with
w h o m B o u r d i e u had b e c o m e familiar. In relation, for instance, to the tribe
to which, perhaps, B o u r d i e u was most 'attracted' - the Kabyles - he drew
heavily o n a three-volume account o f the region and o f the customs o f its
inhabitants which had b e e n published in 1 8 7 3 . A l t h o u g h all the theoreti-
19

cal texts referred to in the bibliography were, with the exception o f

W e b e r ' s Gesammelte Aufstze zur Religionssoziologie, recent A m e r i c a n
publications c o n c e r n e d with culture and cultural c h a n g e , the p r e d o m i -
20

nant impression given by the text is o f an epistemological uncertainty in

respect o f what might b e said to constitute a culture or the object o f
cultural study. T h e uncertainty is reflected in the shifts o f title and chapter
6 Bourdieu and culture

titles b e t w e e n the first edition o f the text (1958), the s e c o n d edition (1961)
and the English translation o f 1962. Lvi-Strauss had suggested that it was
ethnography rather than ethnology that tended towards sociology. B o u r -
dieu clearly wanted to p r o d u c e an ethnographic study o f c o n t e m p o r a r y
Algerians. Sociologie de l'Algrie (1958), h o w e v e r , was an ethnological
analysis o f Algeria, not a sociology o f the country. T h e chapters o f the first
edition are 'La culture K a b y l e ' , ' L a culture C h a o u i a ' and s o o n , but, in the
s e c o n d edition, these have b e c o m e ' L e s K a b y l e s ' and ' L e s Chaouia', and
the English translation consolidates this change o f emphasis b y adopting
the title o f The Algerians.
W h a t was at issue here was, in part, the c o n s e q u e n c e o f linguistic inter-
ference. T h e Kultur o f G e r m a n Kulturgeschichte implied the culture o f a
totality, o f a civilisation, whereas la culture retained the sense o f the per-
sonal culture o f individuals. B o u r d i e u seems t o have b e e n unclear a b u t his
o w n emphasis. T h e first sentence o f the 1958 text boldly states: 'It is
o b v i o u s that Algeria, when considered in isolation from the rest o f the
M a g h r e b , d o e s not constitute a true cultural u n i t . ' T h e Introduction p r o -
21

ceeds to itemise many instances o f cultural diversity within the geograph-

ical territory k n o w n as Algeria. B o u r d i e u d o e s not define a 'true cultural
unit' but, at the beginning, argues that the 'unity' o f the object o f study is
i m p o s e d b y his conceptual interest and selection: 'Algeria is specifically the
object o f this study because the clash b e t w e e n the indigenous and the
E u r o p e a n civilizations has m a d e itself felt here with the greatest force.
Thus the p r o b l e m under investigation has determined the c h o i c e o f sub-
j e c t . ' B y the end o f the chapter, h o w e v e r , B o u r d i e u is suggesting that
2 2

there are inherent unities o r identitities. This is true, first o f all, in relation
to the diversity b e t w e e n internal groups:

No completely closed and, therefore, pure and intact society exists in the
Maghreb; however isolated and withdrawn into itself a group may be, it still
thinks of itself and judges itself by comparison with other groups. Each group
seeks to establish and base its own identity on the ways in which it differs from
others; the result is diversification rather than diversity. 23

Within Algeria, different groups construct their o w n identities, and the

same applies to the identity o f ' A l g e r i a ' . B o u r d i e u continues:

. . . one of the keys to the present drama may be found in the painful debate of a
society which is compelled to define itself by reference to another . . . Its drama
is the acute conflict within an alienated conscience, locked in contradictions and
craving for a way to re-establish its own identity . . . ' 2 4

G r o u p s and society are here anthropomorphised and analysed as 'beings-

for-themselves' to use, deliberately, the terminology o f Sartre's Being and
Nothingness. G r o u p s and societies are not, therefore 'totalities' to b e o b -
served, but 'totalising' entitities. This is the language o f Sartre's Critique de
la raison dialectique which was not yet published, but, whereas Sartre was
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 7

t o suggest a process b y which free individuals might effect totalisation,

B o u r d i e u ' s account o f K a b y l e society seems to oscillate b e t w e e n Hegelian
idealist and materialist determinisms. O n the o n e hand, B o u r d i e u praises
K a b y l e social organisation as an art f o r m in a way reminiscent o f Burck-
hardt's celebration o f the Florentine city-state: 'In the K a b y l e d e m o c r a c y ,
the ideal o f a d e m o c r a c y seems to have b e e n realized: indeed, without the
intervention o f any restraint other than the pressure o f public opinion, the
will o f the individual is immediately and spontaneously m a d e to c o n f o r m to
the general will' (1961 and 1 9 6 2 ) . O n the other hand, he emphasises the
25

material conditions which have fostered the flowering o f human relations.

T h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f adverse physical conditions is that

By a sort of phenomenon of compensation, to the imperfection of techniques

there is a corresponding exaggerated perfection [une perfection en quelque sorte
hyperbolique ou hypertrophique] of the social order - as if the precariousness of
the adjustment to the natural environment were counterbalanced by the excel-
lence of the social organization; as if, to counteract his powerlessness in regard to
things, man had no other recourse than to develop associations with other men
in a luxuriant growth of human relationships (1958,1961,1962). 26

In these sentences, B o u r d i e u discloses the influence o f Merleau-Ponty. It is

in observing h o w m e n as physical beings construct themselves in a physical
universe that w e can p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y achieve ontological disclosures.
B o u r d i e u ' s 1985 interview gives further indication o f the influence o f
Merleau-Ponty. A s k e d why he began with ethnological research, B o u r d i e u
replied that he had

. . . undertaken research into the 'phenomenology of emotional life' [la vie

affective], or more exactly into the temporal structures of emotional experience
[exprience affective]. T o reconcile my need for rigour with philosophical re-
search, I wanted to study biology and so on. I thought of myself as a philosopher
and it took me a very long time to admit to myself that I had become an
ethnologist. 27

T h e n e w prestige given t o e t h n o l o g y b y Lvi-Strauss h e l p e d B o u r d i e u ' s

c h o i c e o f career. B o u r d i e u was attracted b y the 'scientific humanism' o f
Lvi-Strauss's m e t h o d , b y the way in which he analysed the m y t h o l o g i e s
o f A m e r i c a n Indian tribes as 'a language containing its o w n reason and
raison d'tre', 28
but he reacted against the t e n d e n c y prevailing at the time
t o see ' m y t h ' and 'ritual' as manifestations o f 'primitive' society. So-
ciologie de l'Algrie (1958) attempted to describe the social organisation
o f A l g e r i a n tribes without paying m u c h attention t o those myths and
rituals w h i c h w o u l d have s e e m e d to ' p l a c e ' the tribes as ' b a c k w a r d ' ( t o
use B o u r d i e u ' s w o r d a b o u t his o w n origins). It a p p e a r e d as if Lvi-Strauss
was isolating systems o f myth and ritual, exploring their internal, rela-
tional aspects, without regard to their social functions. T h e transition
from the first to the s e c o n d edition o f Sociologie de l'Algrie o c c u r r e d
8 Bourdieu and culture

alongside the c o m p i l a t i o n o f sociological information a b o u t the tribes-

m e n w h o w e r e then living in A l g i e r s . In the s e c o n d edition o f Sociologie
de l'Algrie, B o u r d i e u tried t o insert c o n v e n t i o n a l , 'Lvi-Straussian'
analyses o f myths and rituals into his accounts o f historical social organ-
isation, and then, in Travail et travailleurs and Le Dracinement, he tried
t o test the extent t o which the mutually reinforcing p h e n o m e n a o f tradi-
tional myth, ritual and social organisation had b e e n ' i n c o r p o r a t e d ' b y
individuals w h o w e r e adjusting t o n e w conditions.
This meant that B o u r d i e u was prepared to use the insights derived from
structural analysis in a functionalist framework. It is significant that he has
recalled that, in 1958-59, he lectured in the University o f Algiers o n 'Durk-
heim and Saussure, trying to establish the limits o f attempts to p r o d u c e
"pure theories" ' . A t the same time, he was considering the explanatory
2 9

usefulness o f the distinction b e t w e e n the 'proletariat' and the 'sub-

proletariat' in understanding the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the Algerian war o f inde-
p e n d e n c e as it m o v e d into b e c o m i n g a revolutionary war. T h e r e is n o
evidence that B o u r d i e u had any sympathy for C a m u s ' notion o f continuous
rebellion rather than revolution, but he has c o m m e n t e d explicitly that he
was driven b y a desire to get away from the ideology-driven speculation
offered b y Fanon in order to analyse the events which were u n f o l d i n g . In 30

1985, he summarised in the following way the views which he formulated in

several articles in the early 1960s culminating in ' C o n d i t i o n de classe et
position de classe' in 1966:

. . . by analysing the economic and social conditions of the appearance of econ-

omic calculation, in the field of economics but also that of fertility and so on, I
tried to show that the principle behind this difference (between proletariat and
sub-proletariat) can be traced to the domain of the economic conditions enab-
ling the emergence of types of rational forecasting, of which revolutionary aspi-
rations are one dimension. 31

In other words, in relation both to the tendency o f structuralists to abstract

mythic systems from social conditions and o f the Marxists to privilege
e c o n o m i c explanation, Bourdieu was seeking to identify the prior c o n -
ditions which c o u l d b e said equally to underlie and explain those explana-
tions offered at all points o f a materialist/idealist continuum. T h e r e
remained an unresolved tension. Just as ' A l g e r i a ' was partly the construct
o f the researcher and partly the construct o f the inhabitants o f a region o f
North Africa, so the meaning o f the behaviour o f p e o p l e w h o are o b s e r v e d
by an ethnographer is partly i m p o s e d by the ethnographer and partly gen-
erated by the p e o p l e themselves. In both cases, the capacity to understand
meaning, to b e objective about o n e ' s o w n motives whether in acting o r in
observing, depends o n the varying conditions which make varying degrees
of objectivity possible.
B o u r d i e u returned to Paris in 1960 after completing his empirical re-
search. H e spent o n e year there in which he attended the lectures o f Lvi-
Strauss and w o r k e d as an assistant to A r o n . F r o m 1961 until 1964, he was to
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 9

w o r k at the University o f Lille. It was at Lille that he launched the research

p r o g r a m m e s which, separately, were to culminate in the publication o f Les
Hritiers. Les tudiants et la culture (1964), Un Art moyen. Essai sur les
usages sociaux de la photographie (1965), and L'Amour de l'art, les muses
d'art et leur public (1966). In 'Clibat et condition paysanne' (1962), B o u r -
dieu had already written up the findings o f research which he had under-
taken in the region w h e r e he had b e e n brought up - the Barn. A s a
'native' w h o had acquired the capacity t o o b s e r v e the natives objectively as
a result o f his state-controlled schooling, B o u r d i e u sought to analyse the
p r o b l e m s experienced b y peasants in adapting to urbanisation and m o d e r n -
isation. T h e structure o f the inquiry was similar to that o f the inquiries in
Algeria. In b o t h cases, B o u r d i e u seems to have b e e n intrigued b y the ways
in which a potent network o f mutually reinforcing behaviours and attitudes
ceased to c o h e r e under the impact o f external forces o f change. T h e influ-
e n c e o f Merleau-Ponty was still strong, particularly, in this case, o f his La
Structure du comportement. B o u r d i e u suggested that the network o f tradi-
tional values was o n e o f affective relations so that, for instance, the physical
bearing - the awkwardness o r gaucherie - o f the peasants and their use o f
dialect rather than French were as potent distinctions in sustaining their
social exclusion as any supposed differences o f thoughts, ideas or beliefs.
This is the context within which Les Hritiers should b e understood.
B o u r d i e u sought to analyse the p r o b l e m s experienced b y 'provincial' and
'working-class' p e o p l e in adapting to b e c o m i n g students in urban university
institutions. Significantly, the sample consisted o f students o f philosophy
and s o c i o l o g y - those w h o w e r e studying what B o u r d i e u had himself stud-
ied just ten years b e f o r e and those w h o w e r e studying what B o u r d i e u was
n o w teaching. T h e c h o i c e o f intellectual discipline was a matter o f relative
social confidence and relative capacity to take risks. Just as the Algerian
proletariat was distinguished from the subproletariat b y different disposi-
tions to m a k e forward projections, either in terms o f e c o n o m i c calculation
or in terms o f family planning, as a result o f their different s o c i o e c o n o m i c
conditions, so potential students or the parents o f students possess dif-
ferent dispositions to plan their future studies. Students possessing l o w
prior social confidence are disposed to c h o o s e an established subject, such
as philosophy, in order to acquire social status and recognition. Students
possessing high prior social confidence are disposed to study a 'risky' sub-
ject such as, then, s o c i o l o g y , since their social investment is less b o u n d up
in educational attainment. Quite apart from the content o f studies - the
mismatch, for ' b a c k w a r d ' students, b e t w e e n their indigenous culture and
the k n o w l e d g e culture transmitted in university curricula - Bourdieu's n o -
tion o f 'cultural capital' is primarily about the social distribution o f the
dispositions to m a k e variable formal choices.
In conducting his inquiries into students and their studies, B o u r d i e u ' s
o w n career was in transition. His analyses o f the adaptations o f Algerian
tribesmen and Barnais peasants b o t h tacitly assumed that there were
irreversible processes o f modernisation in operation. A s s o m e o n e w h o
10 Bourdieu and culture

perceived himself to have b e e n modernised b y his education, t o have

achieved social recognition through intellectual attainment in philosophy,
B o u r d i e u was disposed to see his o w n experience as paradigmatic. F o r this
process to b e effective, curriculum content had t o remain static. Unless the
educational goal posts remain fixed and the status o f educational attain-
ment is retained, investment in education is futile in securing social
advance. B o u r d i e u was, therefore, disposed to sustain the authority o f a
centrally regulated and standardised state educational provision. In Les
Hritiers, therefore, he argued that a 'rational p e d a g o g y ' should b e
d e v e l o p e d which w o u l d m a k e teachers m o r e sociologically sensitive in
transmitting a fixed curriculum to those students w h o s e cultures prepared
them differently to receive it. B o u r d i e u explicitly expressed his dislike o f
'populism' which sought to construct curricula which were expressions o f
the existing cultures o f learners. 32

Exactly the same pattern applies in respect o f Bourdieu's analyses o f

museums and art galleries. In his 1985 interview, B o u r d i e u recollected that
w h e n he was considering the applicability o f Marxist concepts to the anal-
ysis o f the behaviour o f Algerian workers, he was ' . . . also working o n the
Marxist notion o f relative a u t o n o m y in relation t o the research that I was
starting to carry out into art. . . ' T h e first manifestation o f this strand o f
3 3

research was to b e the publication o f t w o short articles - 'Les muses et

leurs publics' (1964) and ' L e muse et son public' (1965) - which predated
the publication o f L'Amour de l'art, les muses d'art et leur public (1966).
T h e surveys o f French museums were undertaken in 1964-65 at the request
o f the Study and Research Service o f the French Ministry o f Cultural
Affairs which financed the main survey o f 21 museums in France, but the
project was extended to include an analysis o f museums in other countries.
T h e important point is that the focus o f the research was o n the formal
accessibility o f museums as institutions. B o u r d i e u c o n c l u d e d :

In these sacred places of art such as ancient palaces or large historic residences,
. . . where bourgeois society deposits relics inherited from a past which is not its
own, everything leads to the conclusion that the world of art opposes itself to the
world of everyday life just as the sacred does to the profane . . .3 4

but the action that this conclusion entailed was that the institutions should
b e deconsecrated. It was the ethos o f the institutions which should b e
changed, not the works which they displayed, just as it was the accessibility
o f universities which was in n e e d o f reform rather than their curricula. This
interpretation is confirmed by Bourdieu's final paragraph:

The museum presents to all, as a public heritage, the monuments of a past

splendour, instruments for the extravagant glorification of the great people of
previous times: false generosity, since free entry is also optional entry, reserved
for those who, equipped with the ability to appropriate the works of art, have the
privilege of making use of this freedom, and who thence find themselves legiti-
mated in their privilege . . .
3 5
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 11

T h e message o f the b o o k is that museums as public institutions should b e

formally modified s o as t o ensure that the 'public heritage' is really avail-
able t o the w h o l e public.
A t the same time, h o w e v e r , B o u r d i e u was pursuing a different line o f
inquiry. H e was investigating the e m e r g e n c e o f a f o r m o f artistic practice
which was supremely accessible: photography. T h e thoughts which were t o
b e presented, in collaboration with a team o f researchers, in Un art moyen.
Essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie (1965) had taken shape as
early as 1960 w h e n B o u r d i e u had prepared m o n o g r a p h s o n the social func-
tions o f p h o t o g r a p h y in a village in the Beam, amongst workers in Renault
factories, and in t w o p h o t o clubs in the Lille r e g i o n . A s he was t o say in
36

the Introduction t o Un art moyen: 'Unlike m o r e demanding cultural ac-

tivities, such as drawing, painting o r playing a manual instrument, unlike
even going t o museums o r concerts, photography presupposes neither aca-
demically c o m m u n i c a t e d culture [la culture transmise par l'cole]. . . ' In
3 7

a f o o t n o t e , he gave figures t o s h o w 'the enormously wide diffusion that

p h o t o g r a p h i c practice o w e s t o its accessibility ( m y e m p h a s i s ) ' . A s the
38

analysis o f museums was showing, consecrated art was inaccessible, but the
accessibility o f photography and the non-existence o f prior norms and
values concerning photographic practice meant that it offered the s o c i o l o -
gist ' . . . the means o f apprehending, in their most authentic expression,
the aesthetics (and ethics) o f different groups o r classes and particularly the
popular "aesthetic" which can, exceptionally, b e manifested in i t ' . 39

B o u r d i e u was o p p o s e d t o the insertion o f popular k n o w l e d g e into the

s c h o o l curriculum o r , perhaps, to the intrusion o f popular art into
the displays o f established art galleries, but he was interested in examining
the e m e r g e n c e o f a n e w cultural f o r m which was taking place without
reference t o the established mechanisms for sustaining established culture.
In Un art moyen, B o u r d i e u was analysing the expressions o f practical aes-
thetics o r o f aesthetics in practice. A s he put it: 'Thus, most o f society can
b e e x c l u d e d from the universe o f legitimate culture without being excluded
from the universe o f aesthetics.' Whilst, therefore, B o u r d i e u was, o n the
40

o n e hand, arguing for i m p r o v e d p e d a g o g y which w o u l d make a total public

heritage o r total culture accessible to all, he was, o n the other hand, want-
ing t o express support for the e m e r g e n c e o f aesthetic practices belonging to
multiple social groups. T h e possible kinds o f aesthetic judgement, just like
the possible kinds o f e c o n o m i c calculation, relate t o differentiated social
positions. T h e n o t i o n that there might b e ' a u t o n o m o u s ' aesthetic j u d g e -
ments is at o n e extreme o n the spectrum o f possible aesthetic judgements
and it corresponds with a social disposition t o deny to aesthetics any practi-
cal function. B o u r d i e u continued:

Even when they do not obey the specific logic of an autonomous aesthetic,
aesthetic judgements and behaviour are organized in a way that is no less sys-
tematic but which start out from a completely different principle, since the
aesthetic is only one aspect of the system of implicit values, the ethos, associated
with membership of a class. The feature common to all the popular arts is their
12 Bourdieu and culture

subordination of artistic activity to socially regulated functions while the elab-

oration of 'pure' forms, generally considered the most noble, presupposes the
disappearance of all functional characteristics and all reference to practical or
ethical goals.41

W h a t was true o f aesthetics was also logically true o f k n o w l e d g e . A s a

sociologist, B o u r d i e u was observing the e m e r g e n c e o f n e w cultural forms.
A s a university lecturer, he was aware that he was advancing n e w cognitive
content within a traditional institutional form. F o r the m o m e n t , h o w e v e r ,
Bourdieu's emotional attachment to the social role o f schooling, his educa-
tional conservatism, was proving useful in helping him to g o b e y o n d the
explanatory achievements o f structuralism. W e have seen that B o u r d i e u
has retrospectively indicated that, as early as his p e r i o d o f Algerian field-
w o r k , he had had doubts about the structural anthropology o f Lvi-Strauss.
These were not articulated, h o w e v e r , until the mid-1960s and, even then,
only indirectly in non-anthropological contexts. In 1967, B o u r d i e u was to
publish, in o n e v o l u m e , his translations o f Panofsky's Abbot Suger on the
Abbey Church of Saint-Denis and its Art Treasures (1946) and Gothic
Architecture and Scholasticism (1951). T h e translations were followed b y
an A f t e r w o r d in which B o u r d i e u characterised the orientation o f the 'struc-
turalist m e t h o d ' as being

. . . generally content to establish (which is no small achievement) the homologies

which develop between the structures of the different symbolic systems of a society
and a period and the formal principles of conversion which allow transfer from one
to another, each considered in itself and for itself in its relative autonomy . . . 4 2

This relationalism o f symbolic forms c o u l d b e said t o characterise the w o r k

o f Cassirer, but, for Bourdieu, the achievement o f Panofsky was that he
p r o p o s e d an explanation o f h o w these h o m o l o g i e s w e r e actualised b y living
persons rather than c o n c e i v e d b y latter-day observers. In a passage which
was exactly r e p r o d u c e d in his 'Systmes d'enseignement et systmes de
p e n s e ' (1967), B o u r d i e u went o n to argue that

. . . Erwin Panofsky does not rest content with references to a 'unitarian vision
of the world' or a 'spirit of the times' - which would come down to naming what
has to be explained or, worse still, to claiming to advance as an explanation the
very thing that has to be explained; he suggests what seems to be the most naive
yet probably the most convincing explanation. This is that, in a society where the
handing on of culture is monopolized by a school, the hidden affinities uniting
the works of man (and, at the same time, modes of conduct and thought) derive
from the institution of the school, whose function is consciously (and also, in
part, unconsciously) to transmit the unconscious or, to be more precise, to
produce individuals equipped with the system of unconscious (or deeply buried)
master-patterns that constitute their culture. 43

T h e r e is a neo-Kantian feel to this gloss o f Panofsky's achievement: our

perceptions o f reality are regulated, but they are regulated, not b y the
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 13

intrinsic, universal categories o f the mind, but by the thought patterns

which are the social legacy o f previous generations. It is the function o f the
s c h o o l to represent this legacy and to offer it, not as a c o m p l e t e d explana-
tion o f the w o r l d but s the raw material for n e w explanation. A s B o u r d i e u
w r o t e in 'Systmes d'enseignement et systmes d e pense':

Culture is not merely a common code or even a common catalogue of answers to

recurring problems; it is a common set of previously assimilated master patterns
from which, by an 'art of invention' similar to that involved in the writing of
music, an infinite number of individual patterns directly applicable to specific
situations are generated. 44

A l r e a d y , in 1967, B o u r d i e u was careful to point out that the s c h o o l c o u l d

only exercise this kind o f domination o v e r thought in a society where it
' m o n o p o l i s e s the handing o n o f culture'. H e already knew, h o w e v e r , that
this was to legitimate the total, sacred view o f the world o f the social
minority and to marginalise the plural, profane view o f the majority. T h e
future lay with the p r o d u c t i o n o f photographs rather than with the preser-
vation o f museums. Equally, the future lay with the continuous generation
o f n e w thought forms rather than with the transmission o f m o r i b u n d learn-
ing, with the creative adaptation o f the master patterns o f sociological
m e t h o d rather than with the c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f a-temporal 'social theory'.

From lector to auctor

A s a university lecturer, B o u r d i e u had the instinct to k n o w , in 1967-68,

that he had to ' r e c y c l e ' himself. In 'Structuralism and theory o f sociological
k n o w l e d g e ' he m a d e 'a clear-cut distinction b e t w e e n theory o f sociological
k n o w l e d g e and theory o f the social s y s t e m ' and, with Passeron, he wrote,
45

in ' S o c i o l o g y and philosophy in France since 1945: death and resurrection

o f a p h i l o s o p h y without subject' (1967), an 'outline o f a s o c i o l o g y o f French
s o c i o l o g y ' . In this text B o u r d i e u implicitly repositioned himself. T h e dis-
46

cussion o f D u r k h e i m and the Durkheimians suggests that D u r k h e i m ' s sci-

entific achievement was perverted b y his willingness to m a k e concessions to
a university establishment which was still dominated by philosophy:

The records of the discussions of the French Philosophical Society reveal how
Durkheim had to fight on his opponents' ground, accepting the role of defendant
by the very fact of offering a defence and in the end yielding to his opponents by
explaining the reasons for his action in terms of the reasoning of his opponents. 47

D u r k h e i m ' s concessions enabled his w o r k to ' p r o v i d e material for rou-

tinized instruction and official p e d a g o g i s m ' . T h e s e were the pitfalls which
48

B o u r d i e u sought to avoid.
In collaboration, again, with Passeron, B o u r d i e u published Le Mtier de
sociologue in 1968. It was a compilation o f extracts from texts which had
14 Bourdieu and culture

b e e n used in teaching and it was designed to b e a h a n d b o o k for students

which w o u l d sustain continuous sociological practice rather than c o n v e y
established social theory. It was designed to counteract routinisation o f
instruction, in particular the perceived routinisation o f instruction in social
science ' m e t h o d s ' associated with the c o n t e m p o r a r y ascendancy o f A m e r i -
can social scientific positivism. Bourdieu's reflexive sociological account o f
the relations b e t w e e n philosophy and sociology in postwar France had led
him to argue for a sociological practice which should b e constantly in-
f o r m e d philosophically o r theoretically. It should not accept the terms o f
philosophy, but neither should it allow itself t o b e c o m e a-philosophical and
merely technical. Le Mtier de sociologue assembled texts extracted from
the works of, amongst others, D u r k h e i m , W e b e r and Marx. It sought to
s h o w that these m e n were intellectual 'craftsmen' w h o used the master
patterns o f thought which were available to them to generate n e w k n o w -
ledge - demonstrating an 'art o f invention'. Texts extracted from the w o r k
o f Bachelard are used but, m o r e importantly, the rationale for the 'illustra-
tive texts' which is offered in an extended introductory essay is explicitly
derived from Bachelard's thought. Following Bachelard, sociologists are
advised to construct a science b y making a deliberate break with the every-
day prenotions o f the social world. T h e texts are to b e appreciated as data
in a history o f epistemology after the manner p r o p o s e d b y Bachelard.
Specifically, they are data for appreciating the social and historical condi-
tions o f the construction o f social science discourse. In the terms which
B o u r d i e u was s o o n to adopt, they are data for appreciating the genesis o f
the field o f social science. A n y prospective sociologist must w o r k within the
inherited boundaries o f that field whilst, simultaneously, seeking t o modify
that field in response to current social issues in the same way as the field
itself only possesses an artificial status.
It was b y adopting Bachelard's view o f science that B o u r d i e u reposi-
tioned himself within the institutional field o f French academic life.
D u r k h e i m ' s error had b e e n to try to m o d e l the university institution in
accordance with his view o f social science. Instead, B o u r d i e u sought simply
to institutionalise social science. Durkheim's had b e e n a 'totalising' at-
tempt whereas B o u r d i e u tried to instate social scientific practice as a field
o f activity within a plurality o f fields. This emphasis enabled him to estab-
lish a distinction b e t w e e n the advancement o f social science practice and
the transmission o f social theory. T h e r e was n o n e e d for social scientific
practice to b e located within the field o f the educational system at all.
Extending Panofsky's critique o f structuralism, B o u r d i e u had c o m e to
see that unified p h e n o m e n a or totalities such as, for instance, ' G o t h i c archi-
tecture' o r ' A l g e r i a ' , are not the products o r expressions o f the unifying o r
totalising function o f a total o r unified educational system. Within any
society there are, instead, a plurality o f systems o f thought and a corres-
ponding plurality o f social systems which exist to r e p r o d u c e thought.
Within the plurality o f intellectual/institutional systems, there is a c o n -
tinuous competition whereby single systems attempt to appropriate the
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 15

identity o f the w h o l e . In La Reproduction. lments pour une thorie du

systme d'enseignement (1970), B o u r d i e u was to revisit the research which
had led to Les Hritiers. T h e conclusion n o w was that the pedagogical
process w o r k s throughout society in consolidating the allegiance o f individ-
uals to the social groups to which they are attracted. T h e pedagogical
process is not limited in activity to the transmission o f k n o w l e d g e pre-
scribed b y the 'state' in institutions prescribed b y the 'state'. Because
society and state cannot b e thought to c o i n c i d e - since the 'state' is only a
political construct o f identifiable interest groups within society - state edu-
cational provision carries n o socially legitimated absolute validity. It takes
its place alongside other 'arbitrary' institutions dispensing self-validating
arbitrary k n o w l e d g e .
Objectivist social science is o n e such p h e n o m e n o n o f arbitrary knowledge.
Shortly after the publication o f La Reproduction, Bourdieu was to offer a
similar poststructuralist revision o f his earlier anthropological w o r k in Es-
quisse d'une thorie de la pratique, prcd de trois tudes d'ethnologie kabyle
(1972). F o r Bourdieu, social science cannot exist unless its practitioners con-
sciously objectify what they observe within parameters which have histor-
ically b e e n set for the field o f social science. There were two main fallacies
with the objectivity o f structuralism. First o f all, the c o m m o n form o f struc-
turalism was to suppose that the behaviour o f observed individuals is a
reflection o f an underlying structure o f which they are unaware. In Esquisse,
Bourdieu attacks Saussure's general theory o f linguistics as a paradigmatic
and influential instance o f this fallacy: our individual paroles stand alone
without referents, without the unconscious regulating mechanism o f an un-
derlying langue. H o w e v e r , the greater fallacy is to suppose that the detached
observer can k n o w the total system o f relations which preconditions the
unselfconscious actions o f those observed. In a passage which was shortly to
be published separately in translation as ' T h e three forms o f theoretical
k n o w l e d g e ' (1973), Bourdieu argued, therefore, that the methodological
break required o f the sociologist from primary experience in order to con-
struct scientific objectivity has to b e followed by a second break in which the
sociologist must also reflect o n the social conditions o f the first epistemologi-
cal break. This view is in complete conformity with Le Mtier de sociologue,
but it clarifies further that Bourdieu's objection was to forms o f objectivism
which seemed to offer ex cathedra accounts o f totality. Bourdieu was in
favour o f a functional objectivity which should b e at the disposal o f everyone
in observing the behaviour o f others. It followed that the practice o f sociol-
ogy, like that o f photography, should b e accessible to all and that the objects
o f sociological inquiry, like the subjects o f photographs, should b e expres-
sions o f the ethical and class positions o f the sociologists rather than contri-
butions to the higher consecration o f sociology.
A s a practising researcher, Bourdieu continued to clarify his position in
relation to previous practitioners, notably W e b e r , in ' U n e interprtation de
la thorie de la religion selon M a x W e b e r ' and in ' G e n s e et structure du
champ religieux' (both in 1971), but he was to d e v e l o p and refine his o w n
16 Bourdieu and culture

terminology to b e deployed scientifically in society. H e has subsequently

given his o w n account o f 'the genesis o f the concepts o f habitus and field'. 49

Habitus, in particular, was developed as a concept to explain the process b y

which, in a socially plural situation, all individuals internalise as a guide to
their actions and attitudes, the partial structural explanations o f their situa-
tions which impinge upon them partially as a consequence o f those situa-
tions. Bourdieu expressed this briefly in the following way at the end o f
'Structuralism and theory o f sociological knowledge': ' . . . as a principle o f a
structured, but not structural, praxis, the habitus - internalization
o f externality - contains the reason o f all objectivation o f subjectivity.' But 50

the footnote to this statement is m o r e significant. Bourdieu c o m m e n t e d :

Culture, which may be applied to the system of objective regularities as well as to

the competence of the agent as a system of internalized models, would be a
better term than habitus. However, this overdetermined concept risks being
misunderstood and it is difficult to define exhaustively the conditions of its
validity.
51

T h e analysis o f the subsidiary 'total cultures' o f the Algerian tribes that had
b e e n offered in Sociologie de VAlgrie gave way to the analysis o f the
cultural dispositions o f displaced tribesmen. B o u r d i e u makes it clear in
1968 that his sociological interest is not in the analysis o f 'culture' but in the
analysis o f the multiplicity o f cultural dispositions.
In 1968, B o u r d i e u was appointed Director o f the Centre de S o c i o l o g i e
E u r o p e n n e . Its offices were based in the M a i s o n des Sciences de
l ' H o m m e , Paris, and it was co-funded b y the governmental Centre
National de la R e c h e r c h e S o c i o l o g i q u e and the c o l e des Hautes tudes
en Sciences Sociales - balanced, therefore, b e t w e e n 'state' and 'educa-
tional' control. T h e logic o f Bourdieu's intention t o establish a u t o n o m o u s
scientific practice outside institutionalised social hierarchies was to b e real-
ised m o r e convincingly in the establishment, in 1975, o f a journal under his
direction: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. In his introductory
essay, entitled ' M t h o d e scientifique et hirarchie sociale des objets', B o u r -
dieu suggested that often the status a c c o r d e d socially to scientific explana-
tions d e p e n d e d o n the status a c c o r d e d socially to the object o f the research.
B o u r d i e u ' s view o f science and o f the science to b e given space in his
journal was different: 'Science d o e s not take sides in the struggle to main-
tain o r to subvert the system o f dominant classification - it takes it as an
object o f s t u d y . ' T h e sociology o f cultural dispositions, in other w o r d s ,
52

analyses cultural value judgements without itself making any.

T h e contents o f the early numbers o f the Actes de la recherche en sciences
sociales indicate the range o f objects that w e r e being subjected to scientific
analysis b y B o u r d i e u and b y colleagues largely under his direction. T h e
numbers o f 1975 contained the analysis o f the Parisian fashion industry
undertaken b y B o u r d i e u and Y v e t t e Delsaut, published as ' L e couturier
et sa griffe'; Bourdieu's 'L'invention de la vie d'artiste' about Flaubert;
and Bourdieu's ' L ' o n t o l o g i e politique de Martin Heidegger'.
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 17

T h e y also contained articles b y Jean-Claude C h a m b o r e d o n o n the 'literary

field'; Christophe Charle o n late nineteenth-century literary production;
Jean B o l l a c k o n H e i d e g g e r ; and ' L e titre et le p o s t e ' co-authored b y B o u r -
dieu and L u c Boltanski. T h e articles are evidence o f a c o n c e r t e d attempt to
analyse material culture in a way which was not materialist in a Marxist
sense but was, nevertheless, thoroughly anti-idealist.
B o u r d i e u ' s d e v e l o p m e n t in the first half o f his career had, h o w e v e r ,
generated p r o b l e m s for its continuation b e y o n d 1975. If the main task o f
the sociologist was to construct an object susceptible to sociological under-
standing, B o u r d i e u ' s inclination to m a k e everything social m a d e the
conventionally discreet sphere o f sociological explanation redundant.
B o u r d i e u was interested in analysing the relations b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g
fields o n the assumption that all these fields are socially constructed and
r e p r o d u c e d , but he was not interested in sustaining a s e c o n d - o r d e r sociol-
o g y which might b e struggling for explanatory survival in competition with
other 'disciplines'. Similarly, if all forms o f p r o d u c t i o n are thought t o ex-
emplify a mechanism o f social reproduction, it was inescapable that B o u r -
dieu's intellectual p r o d u c t i o n c o u l d b e situated in the process o f social
reproduction that he described. H e was driven to locate himself o n t o -
logically within the w o r l d that he had conceptually constructed.
There were t w o main strategic options which might seem to have b e e n
available to Bourdieu. H e could have consolidated his growing reputation by
accommodating his insights to fit the rules o f existing discourses and fields.
H e could have b e e n thought to have b e e n making 'interesting' contributions
in the sociology o f literature o r o f art o r education, o r in sociology and social
anthropology. This would have meant a reduction o f his ambitious intellec-
tual project and, also, an a c c o m m o d a t i o n to the routine processes o f aca-
demic k n o w l e d g e transmission. T h e alternative was to opt for a path o f
continuous non-disciplinary creativity, o n e in which he would act within the
framework o f the world he had constructed and would not offer that frame-
w o r k as if it constituted a complete, objective account o f social reality.
B o u r d i e u seems t o have m a d e this shift - away from seeking t o d e m o n -
strate that the w o r l d is entirely explicable socially to acting personally as if
his demonstration w e r e p r o v e n - towards the e n d o f the 1970s. H o w e v e r
dynamic and relational is B o u r d i e u ' s representation o f the w o r l d o f
cultural tastes in La Distinction, it is still a representation. B y contrast,
B o u r d i e u ' s Le Sens pratique (1980) - his summative account o f his A l -
gerian fieldwork - is less a representation o f Algeria than a presentation o f
the self as it had b e c o m e constituted as a result o f intellectual engagement
with the experience o f Algerian tribes.

The Politics of Self-Presentation

These are s o m e o f the considerations which lie behind the shift in Bourdieu's
career which coincided with his appointment to the Chair o f Sociology at the
18 Bourdieu and culture

Collge de France, Paris, in 1981-82. During the 1980s, Bourdieu carried out
less empirical research than in previous decades. Ce que parler veut dire.
Uconomie des changes linguistiques (1982) assembled earlier articles o n
language; Homo Academicus (1984) was based o n w o r k carried out in Paris
between 1968 and 1973; Choses dites (1987) was a collection o f interviews;
L'Ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger (1988) was a reissue o f the article
o f 1975; and La Noblesse d'tat (1989) c o m b i n e d w o r k and thinking based o n
the ' L e Patronat' research project o f the 1970s and the analysis o f the
grandes coles and classes prparatoires which had b e e n initially published in
an article o f 1981. There is a sense, therefore, in which a disintegration was
occurring between Bourdieu's personal trajectory and the autonomous exis-
tence o f his texts. This p h e n o m e n o n has, o f course, b e e n accentuated b y the
translation o f Bourdieu's texts into other languages, notably into English as a
result o f the intervention o f Polity Press since its foundation in 1984. Whilst
Bourdieu's texts have, in the last decade, acquired a meaning within the
contemporary intellectual field and have b e c o m e g o o d s within a c o n t e m p o -
rary symbolic market, Bourdieu has himself increasingly focused his intellec-
tual attention o n his personal experience o f the p h e n o m e n o n which, earlier,
he had analysed in respect o f others - notably Flaubert, Manet and Cour-
rges - the p h e n o m e n o n , that is, o f the relations between production and
reception within socially constructed cultural fields. Increasingly, therefore,
Bourdieu's 'objective' accounts o f contemporary culture have b e e n openly
presented as his 'objectified' account o f the specific contexts within which he
inserts himself and his texts.
A s he c a m e to concentrate explicitly o n his o w n social trajectory and o n
his o w n creative project within his perception o f society and its c o m p e t i n g
cultural fields, B o u r d i e u was first c o n c e r n e d in the early 1980s with the
function o f institutions. Bourdieu's inaugural lecture at the C o l l g e d e
France, ' L e o n sur la l e o n ' , given o n 23 A p r i l 1982, indicates a self-
5 3

understanding which anticipates his conceptualisation o f the situation o f

Manet. B o u r d i e u presents himself as a sociologist w h o has sociologically
e x p o s e d the symbolic violence practised b y higher education institutions.
H e k n o w s that it is this scientific exposure which has m a d e him eligible for
a prestigious academic position, but he seeks to secure the acceptance o f
the college that he wishes to use its institutional traditions t o institu-
tionalise his o w n anomie vis--vis academicism. This interest in the func-
tion o f institutions was also expressed at m u c h the same time in 'Les rites
d'institution' ( 1 9 8 2 ) and manifested itself in discussions o f the nature o f
5 4

representation (in 'La reprsentation politique. lments p o u r une thorie

du c h a m p politique', 1 9 8 1 ) and o f corporate identity (in ' A n antimony in
55

the notion o f collective protest', 1 9 8 6 ) .

56

Bourdieu was looking for a social space within which intellectuals might
speak and b e heard. There was a short period o f apparent affinity with
H a b e r m a s in the mid-1980s but Bourdieu could not work with Habermas's
57

theorised, objective 'public sphere' and needed, instead, to argue that

equivalents to a 'public sphere' have b e e n historically constructed and are in
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 19

need o f construction in the present. T h e search for space for intellectuals

involved a continuing criticism o f the ossified stance o f academicism and o f
academic perspectives o n the o n e hand (in Homo Academicus, 1984, but also
in T h e historical genesis o f a pure aesthetic', 1 9 8 7 ) , and, o n the other, a
58

continuing insistence that freedom o f thought might only b e acquired by a

full analysis and recognition o f the social conditions which might make the
constitution o f such a field o f free thinking possible - in ' C o m m e n t librer les
intellectuels libres?', 1 9 8 0 ; ' D ' a b o r d dfendre les intellectuels', 1 9 8 6 ; and
59 60

'For a socio-analysis o f intellectuals: o n Homo Academicus', 1989 . Most 61

recently, Libre-change ( 1 9 9 4 ) is at the same time a celebration o f the

62

construction o f a formal space within which Bourdieu can converse with the
artist Hans Haacke and, in the substance o f their conversations, an account
o f the strategies which have to b e adopted by artists/intellectuals - both
Bourdieu and Haacke - to communicate their views in opposition to forms
o f political censure n o w particularly in evidence in the U S A .
Increasingly, B o u r d i e u s e e m e d to think that, as a sociological writer, the
field within which his creativity should b e inserted was the field o f literature
rather than the field o f the social sciences. His institutional position was
that o f a professor o f s o c i o l o g y , but he c o u l d sustain intellectual indepen-
d e n c e b y writing within a literary field rather than for academic s o c i o -
logists. B o u r d i e u ' s recent analyses o f the literary field have, therefore,
increasingly s e e m e d like attempts to situate himself in it than to make a
contribution to the future d e v e l o p m e n t o f literary criticism. Articles such
as ' L e c h a m p littraire' ( 1 9 8 4 ) and 'Existe-t-il une littrature b e l g e ? '
63

( 1 9 8 5 ) w e r e carrying out in relation to the literary field what B o u r d i e u

6 4

had r e c o m m e n d e d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y to sociologists in respect o f the field o f

social science in Le Mtier de sociologue.
M a n y o f the arguments d e v e l o p e d in these articles o f the 1980s are
brought together coherently in Les Rgles de Vart. Gense et structure du
champ littraire (1992). In his F o r e w o r d , B o u r d i e u aggressively o p p o s e s
those w h o attempt to ensure that art and literature are ineffable, or contain
revelations which must not b e r e d u c e d b y scientific analysis. H e quotes
G a d a m e r as an example o f a critic o f literature w h o ideologically will not
c o u n t e n a n c e any 'reduction' o f the status o f the literary. This clear initial
position-taking o n B o u r d i e u ' s part is followed by a ' P r o l o g u e ' in which he
revisits his earlier analysis o f Flaubert's U ducation sentimentale, and then
by a systematic historical account, in Part I, o f the 'three states' o f the
literary field.
In Les Rgles de Vart, B o u r d i e u offers an interpretation o f Flaubert
which seems to continue where 'L'invention de la vie d'artiste' left off and,
in d o i n g so, applies explicitly to Flaubert the position that had b e e n ad-
v a n c e d in relation to Manet in t w o articles o f 1987. B o u r d i e u n o w argues
that Flaubert is to b e definitively distinguished from his supposed persona -
Frdric - because Frdric was represented b y Flaubert as a failed writer
whilst, patently, Flaubert had s u c c e e d e d as a writer. 'Flaubert separates
himself from Frdric, from the indtermination and the powerlessness
20 Bourdieu and culture

which define him, in the very act o f writing the story o f Frdric, w h o s e
i m p o t e n c e manifests itself, amongst other things, b y his inability to write,
t o b e c o m e a w r i t e r . ' Bourdieu's Flaubert is n o longer, as in 1975, a p r o t o -
65

sociologist w h o , fatally and at the expense o f his g o o d faith, c o n f o r m e d to

the laws o f the current literary field. Bourdieu's Flaubert is n o w a writer
w h o used literary form to objectify himself b y a process o f auto-analysis
and socio-analysis. B o u r d i e u n o w argues: 'In fact, Sentimental Education
reconstitutes in an extraordinarily exact manner the structure o f the social
world in which it was p r o d u c e d and even the mental structures which,
fashioned by these social structures, form the generative principle o f the
w o r k in which these structures are r e v e a l e d . ' In other w o r d s , Flaubert's
66

sociological analysis enabled him b o t h to represent the social w o r l d and

also t o understand the social conditions which m a d e possible that represen-
tation in literary form. B o u r d i e u reads into Flaubert's achievement pre-
cisely his o w n project o f the late 1980s.
B o u r d i e u goes further. H e p r o c e e d s to analyse the transformations in
the literary field in nineteenth-century France. In a title reminiscent o f
Bachelard, B o u r d i e u calls the first phase T h e conquest o f a u t o n o m y ' . In
the p e r i o d o f the S e c o n d Empire, the dominant feature o f society, a c c o r d -
ing to B o u r d i e u , was the rise o f industrialists and businessmen possessing
huge fortunes and little culture w h o were . . . ready to m a k e b o t h the
4

p o w e r o f m o n e y and a vision o f the w o r l d profoundly hostile t o intellectual

things triumph within the w h o l e s o c i e t y ' . It was in this context that a
67

literary field began to define itself in opposition to the w o r l d o f m o n e y , to

establish itself as a self-contained market, o n e o f art for art's sake.
Flaubert, h o w e v e r , was neither a realist nor an aesthete: ' H e o p p o s e s b o t h
o f them, and he constructs himself as much against Gautier and Pure A r t as
against r e a l i s m . ' It was this that m a d e Flaubert unique: ' . . . he p r o d u c e s
68

writings taken to b e "realist" ( n o d o u b t by virtue o f their o b j e c t ) which

contradict the tacit definition o f "realism" in that they are written, that they
have " s t y l e " . '
69

T h e new feature o f Les Rgles de Vart, h o w e v e r , is not simply that

B o u r d i e u acknowledges the importance o f what he calls 'realist formalism'
- the positive form-making activity celebrated in the essays o n Manet. It is
even m o r e that B o u r d i e u takes his historical account b e y o n d the deaths o f
b o t h Flaubert and Manet. In a chapter entitled ' T h e e m e r g e n c e o f a dualist
structure', B o u r d i e u outlines the state o f the literary field which b e c a m e
established in the 1880s and continues 'up until the present time . . . ' T h e 7 0

dualism referred to is between 'symbolism' and 'naturalism': ' . . . it pits an

artistic and spiritualist art which cultivates the sense o f mystery against a
social and materialist art based o n science . . . ' It is in this duality that
7 1

B o u r d i e u still inserts himself. Postmodernist thinking is a form o f mystifica-

tion which d o e s not say anything about capitalism o r postcapitalism but,
instead, participates in the valueless w o r l d which it describes. T h e person
o f the 1880s w h o m B o u r d i e u n o w most admires seems to b e Z o l a . B o u r -
dieu's view is that Z o l a used the dualism to construct a position for himself
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 21

as a writer/intellectual rather than simply as a writer. His use o f science -

his interest in Bernard's b i o l o g y - was not, B o u r d i e u suggests, significant in
terms o f content s o much as formally: Z o l a used 'scientificity' as a way o f
securing s o m e discourse detachment from his realist objects without adher-
ing t o the values o f ' a r t ' . M o s t significantly, h o w e v e r , B o u r d i e u argues
72

that Z o l a used his position in the literary field to intervene politically and
so constitute himself as an 'intellectual' within a constituted 'intellectual'
field:

J'accuse is the outcome and the fulfilment of a collective process of emancipation

that is progressively carried out in the field of cultural production: as a prophetic
rupture with the established order, it reasserts against all reasons of state the
irreducibility of the values of truth and justice and, at the same stroke, the
independence of the guardians of these values from the norms of politics (those
of patriotism, for example) and from the constraints of economic life. 73

It is clear that, in Les Rgles de Vart, B o u r d i e u sees himself as an inheritor

o f Z o l a ' s achievement. T h e reproduction o f ' L e march des biens symboli-
ques', written in 1976, as the third stage o f the historical progression to the
present, is an indication o f the extent to which B o u r d i e u sees the c o n t e m -
porary function o f cultural analysis to b e the construction within culture o f
a sphere o f intellectual a u t o n o m y from which that culture can b e criticised.
H e is supremely conscious that this a u t o n o m y has to b e constantly re-
formed:

It is clear in effect that the intellectual (or, better, the autonomous fields which
make the intellectual possible) is not instituted once and for all with Zola, and
that the holders of cultural capital may always 'regress' . . . towards one or
another of apparently exclusive positions, either towards the role of 'pure'
writer, artist or scholar, or towards the role of political actor, journalist, politi-
cian, expert. 74

It is the intention o f B o u r d i e u ' s writing action that he should never 're-

gress' to either o f these alternative extremes. La Misre du monde (1993)
and the o n g o i n g publication o f the journal Liber as well as o f the Actes de
la recherche en sciences sociales are all evidence o f B o u r d i e u ' s continuing
desire t o use his analysis o f the non-referential relativities o f c o n t e m p o r a r y
culture as a basis for making non-relative interventions in a c c o r d a n c e with
his c o n c e p t i o n o f a modernist tradition.

Notes

1. P. Bourdieu (1990) The Logic of Practice (trans. R. Nice), Oxford, Polity

Press, 16; Le Sens pratique (1980), Paris, ditions de Minuit, 32-3.
2. P. Bourdieu and L.J.D. Wacquant (1992) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology,
Oxford, Polity Press, 204; Rponses. Pour une anthropologie reflexive (1992),
Paris, ditions du Seuil, 176-7.
22 Bourdieu and culture

3. Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation, 204; Rponses, 177.

4. Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation, 205; Rponses, 177.
5. P. Bourdieu (1988) Homo Academicus (trans. P. Collier), Oxford, Polity Press,
xxiv.
6. F. Dufay and P.-B. Dufort (1993) Les Normaliens. De Charles Pguy
Bernard-Henri Lvy. Un sicle d'histoire, Paris, ditions J.-C. Lattes, 196. The
expression is taken from P. Bourdieu (1989) 'Aspirant philosophe', in Les
Enjeux philosophiques des annes cinquante, Paris, ditions du Centre
Georges Pompidou.
7. Dufay and Dufort, Les Normaliens, 196. Their source for this recollection is
Dominique Fernandez.
8. P. Bourdieu (1990) In Other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology
(trans. M. Adamson), Oxford, Polity Press, 3; Choses dites (1987), Paris, di-
tions de Minuit, 13. (The full text of this interview in German has interesting
elements which are not always reproduced in the French and English texts -
see 'Der Kampf um die symbolische Ordnung', sthetik und Kommunikation,
1986,16,143.)
9. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 5; Choses dites, 15; 'Der Kampf, 145.
10. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 3; Choses dites, 13; 'Der Kampf, 142.
11. Ibid.
12. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 4; Choses dites, 14; 'Der Kampf, 143.
13. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 5; Choses dites, 15; 'Der Kampf, 144.
14. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 4; Choses dites, 14; 'Der Kampf, 144.
15. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 5; Choses dites, 15; 'Der Kampf, 144.
16. First published as Renati Descartes principia philosophiae in Amsterdam in
1644, and published in French in Paris in 1647. Leibniz's Animadversiones in
partem generalem principiorum Cartesianorum ('Critical remarks concerning
the general part of Descartes' principles') was written in 1692 but was not
published until 1844 (see G.W. von Leibniz (1965) Monadology and Other
Philosophical Essays (trans. P. & A . M . Schrecker with an introduction and
notes by P. Schrecker), Indianapolis, IN, and New York, Bobbs-Merrill, xxvi).
17. F. Alqui (1933) Notes sur la premire partie des principes de la philosophie de
Descartes, Carcassonne, ditions Chantiers, 18.
18. Von Leibniz, Monadology, 25.
19. A . Hanoteau, and A . Letourneux. La Kabylie et les coutumes kabyles, 3 vol.
1873.
20. Herskovits, M.J. (1938) Acculturation, New York; Keesing, F.M. (1953) Cul-
ture Change, Stanford, C A , Stanford University Press; Mead, M. (1965)
Cultural Patterns and Technical Change, New York, UNESCO (Mentor
Book); Siegel, B.J. (1955) Acculturation, Stanford, C A , Stanford University
Press; Spicer, E.H. (1955) Human Problems in Technological Change.
21. P. Bourdieu (1962) The Algerians (trans. A.C.M. Ross), Boston, M A , Beacon
Press, xi, footnote 1; (1958) Sociologie de l'Algrie, Paris, Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 5.
22. Ibid.
23. Bourdieu, The Algerians, xiii; Sociologie de l'Algrie, 10.
24. Bourdieu, The Algerians, xiv; Sociologie de l'Algrie, 10.
25. Bourdieu, The Algerians, 24; Sociologie de l'Algrie, Paris, Presses Univer-
sitaires de France (2nd edn), 25.
26. Bourdieu, The Algerians, 2; Sociologie de l'Algrie (1958), 13; Sociologie de
l'Algrie (1961), 11 ('une perfection hyperbolique').
27. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 6-7; Choses dites, 16-17; 'Der Kampf, 146.
28. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 2; Le Sens pratique, 9.
29. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 6; Choses dites, 16; 'Der Kamp', 145.
30. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 7; Choses dites, 17; 'Der Kampf, 149.
31. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 7; Choses dites, 17; 'Der Kampf, 148.
 An insider/outsider Frenchman 23

32. Bourdieu (with J-C. Passeron) (1979) The Inheritors, French Students and their
Relation to Culture (trans. R. Nice), Chicago, IL, and London, University of
Chicago Press, 72; (1964) Les Hritiers. Les tudiants et la culture, Paris,
ditions de Minuit, 110.
33. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 7; Choses dites, 17; 'Der Kampf, 149.
34. P. Bourdieu and A . Darbel (1990) The Love of Art (trans C. Beattie and
N. Merriman), Oxford, Polity Press, 112; L Amour de l'art. Les Muses d'art et
leur public, Paris, ditions de Minuit, 165-6.
35. Bourdieu and Darbel, The Love, 113; L'Amour, 166-7.
36. P. Bourdieu, L. Boltanski, R. Castel, J.-C. Chamboredon and D . Schnapper
(1990) Photography. A Middle-brow Art (trans. S. Whiteside), Oxford, Polity
Press, 175, footnote 9; (1965) Un art moyen. Essai sur les usages sociaux de la
photographie, Paris, ditions de Minuit, 26, footnote 9.
37. Bourdieu et al., Photography, 5; Un art moyen, 22.
38. Bourdieu et al., Photography, Il A, footnote 5; Un art moyen, 22, footnote 5.
39. Bourdieu et al., Photography, 7; Un art moyen, 24.
40. Bourdieu et al., Photography, 8; Un art moyen, 25.
41. Ibid.
42. . Panofsky (1967) Architecture gothique et pense scolastique (trans, and
Postface by P. Bourdieu), Paris, ditions de Minuit, 147.
43. Ibid; and (1971) 'Systems of education and systems of thought', in M.F.D.
Young, ed., Knowledge and Control. New Directions for the Sociology of
Education, London, Collier-Macmillan, 194.
44. Panofsky, Architecture, 151-2; 'Systems', 192.
45. P. Bourdieu (1968) 'Structuralism and theory of sociological knowledge'
(trans. A . Zanotti-Karp), Social Research, 35, 681.
46. P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron (1967) 'Sociology and philosophy in France
since 1945: death and resurrection of a philosophy without subject', Social
Research, 34,162.
47. Ibid., 170.
48. Ibid., footnote 13.
49. See (1985) 'The genesis of the concepts of habitus and field (trans. C. New-
man)', Sociocriticism, 2, 11-24.
50. Bourdieu, 'Structuralism', 706.
51. Ibid., footnote 23.
52. P. Bourdieu (1975) 'Mthode scientifique et hirarchie sociale des objets',
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 1,6.
53. P. Bourdieu (1982) Leon sur la leon, Paris, ditions de Minuit, (trans, in
Bourdieu, In Other Words, 177-98 as lecture on the lecture').
54. P. Bourdieu (1982) 'Les rites d'institution', Actes de la recherche en sciences
sociales, 43, 58-63.
55. P. Bourdieu (1981) 'La reprsentation politique. lments pour une thorie
du champ politique', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 36-7, 3-24.
56. P. Bourdieu (1986) 'An antimony in the notion of collective protest', in
A . Foxley et al., eds. Development, Democracy, and the Art of Trespassing:
Essays in Honor of Albert O. Hirschman, Notre Dame, IN, University of
Notre Dame Press, 301-2.
57. The affinity or convergence is apparent in the questions and answers in the
'Fieldwork in philosophy' interview in Bourdieu, In Other Words. The inter-
view took place in April 1985, and one of the interviewers - Axel Honneth -
was, at that time, an assistant to Habermas. For more detailed discussion, see
Chapter 8, pp. 125-7.
58. 'The historical genesis of a pure aesthetic', in P. Bourdieu (1993) The Field of
Cultural Production, Oxford, Polity Press, 254-66.
59. 'Comment librer les intellectuels libres?', in P. Bourdieu (1980) Questions de
sociologie, Paris, ditions de Minuit, 67-78. Translated as 'How can "free-
24 Bourdieu and culture

floating intellectuals' be set free?', in P. Bourdieu (1993) Sociology in Ques-

tion, London, Thousand Oaks, C A , and New Delhi, Sage, 41-8.
60. P. Bourdieu (1986) 'D'abord dfendre les intellectuels', Le Nouvel Obser-
vateur, 12-18 September, 82.
61. P. Bourdieu (1989) 'For a socio-analysis of intellectuals; on Homo Aca-
demicus', Berkeley Journal of Sociology, X X X I V , 1-29.
62. P. Bourdieu and H. Haacke (1994) Libre-change, Paris, ditions du Seuil.
Translated as (1995) Free Exchange, Oxford, Polity Press.
63. P. Bourdieu (1989) 'Le champ littraire. Pralables critiques et principes de
mthode', Lendemains (Berlin-Cologne), IX, 5-20.
64. P. Bourdieu (1985) 'Existe-t-il une littrature belge/Limites d'un champ et
frontires politiques', tudes de Lettres (Lausanne), 4, 3-6.
65. P. Bourdieu (1992) Les Rgles de l'art. Gense et structure du champ littraire,
Paris, ditions du Seuil, 50; P. Bourdieu (1996) The Rules of Art. Genesis and
Structure of the Literary Field, Oxford, Polity Press, 25.
66. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 59-60; The Rules, 31-2.
67. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 76; The Rules, 48.
68. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 140-1; The Rules, 95.
69. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 143; The Rules, 96.
70. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 165; The Rules, 113.
71. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 171; The Rules, 117-18.
72. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 170; The Rules, 116-17.
73. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 186; The Rules, 129.
74. Bourdieu, Les Rgles, 465-6; The Rules, 343.
Part II

THE CONCEPTS

2 The s o c i o g e n e s i s of the thinking

instruments

W h e n w e c o n c e i v e something, w e are i n v o l v e d in an active process.

A c o n c e p t is what w e p r o d u c e in the process o f c o n c e i v i n g o r c o n c e p -
tualisation which is retrospectively called c o n c e p t i o n . C o n c e p t s , therefore,
are objects. T h e y are thrown out in the process o f conceiving and they
acquire an existence which is independent o f the process. Similarly, w e
receive things and receipts are the objective r e c o r d o f the process which is
called reception, o r w e d e c e i v e p e o p l e and a deceit is the objective form
taken b y a d e c e p t i o n . A l t h o u g h w e perceive things and w e refer to the
process o f perception, w e rarely talk about percepts in ordinary speech.
This is perhaps because the defining characteristic o f the process o f per-
ceiving is that w e grasp things b y being i n v o l v e d in them, b y responding
through them. T h e objectified products o f this process should have n o
function in subsequent acts o f perceiving. B y contrast, the defining charac-
teristic o f the process o f conceiving is that w e seize things with other things.
T h e act o f c o n c e i v i n g is cumulative. W e c o n c e i v e a set o f actions o n a field
t o b e a g a m e o f football because w e grasp the p h e n o m e n o n b y using the
prior c o n c e p t o f a g a m e t o generate the m o r e refined c o n c e p t . W e use
c o n c e p t s socially t o fix conventional meanings which affect practices. A c -
tions, for instance, which are c o n c e i v e d as games acquire rules which e m -
b o d y and consolidate the c o n c e p t . C o n c e p t s are tools b y which w e define
and classify p h e n o m e n a . T h e y d o not have intrinsic meaning. T h e y d o not
represent real things but themselves acquire objective reality as they func-
tion in helping us to m a k e sense o f things and objects. Their uses are
transitory. T h e y are never destroyed but they are always superseded. T h e y
have an in-built functional o b s o l e s c e n c e .
This account o f B o u r d i e u ' s position is a way o f stating that, in the terms
o f medieval scholasticism, he is a nominalist rather than a realist. H e b e -
lieves that names have reality and d o not simply refer to reality. H e b e -
lieves that w o r d s are things rather than just the descriptors o f things. This
explains w h y his short account, published in 1985, o f his use o f the concepts
o f habitus and field is called ' T h e genesis o f the c o n c e p t s o f habitus and o f
26 Bourdieu and culture

field'. H e offers an account o f the emergent functions o f these concepts in

his thinking. T h e use o f 'genesis' in the title is a recognition that these, and
all, concepts are constructs which have beginnings, but B o u r d i e u is not at
all intent o n privileging the meanings o f original usages. Scientific theory is
to b e exercised rather than contemplated. It involves the continuous, prac-
tical d e p l o y m e n t o f concepts. A s B o u r d i e u puts it himself:

Unlike theoretical theory, a prophetic or programmatic discourse which is its

own end, and which stems from and lives by confrontation with other theories,
scientific theory emerges as a program of perception and of action which is
disclosed only in the empirical work in which it is actualized. It is a temporary
construct which takes shape for and by empirical work and which gains less by
theoretical polemics than by confrontation with new objects. 1

T h e purpose o f this chapter, therefore, is to point to the ways in which

B o u r d i e u has d e v e l o p e d and used his concepts and not at all to establish
definitive meanings for them.

Habitus

Published in the third period o f Bourdieu's career, T h e genesis o f the

concepts o f habitus and field' offers a retrospection o n the historical d e -
v e l o p m e n t o f these t w o key concepts. Published in the year that B o u r d i e u
gave the interview which was subsequently issued as 'Fieldwork in philo-
s o p h y ' and not t o o long b e f o r e the conversations which were to b e
2

assembled as Rponses, 3
the article is indicative o f B o u r d i e u ' s strategic
insistence that b o t h his career and his concepts were haphazard mixtures o f
strategy and contingency. B o u r d i e u first l o o k s at his c o n c e p t o f habitus. H e
argues: ' . . . the notion o f habitus expresses first and foremost the rejection
o f a w h o l e series o f alternatives into which social science (and m o r e gener-
ally, all o f anthropological theory) has l o c k e d itself, that o f consciousness
( o r o f subject) and o f the unconscious, that o f Finalism and o f Mechanical-
ism, etc. . . . '4

H e claims that it was in his 1967 'postface' t o the French translations o f

Panofsky's Abbot Suger on the Abbey Church of Saint-Denis and its Art
Treasures and Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism 5
that he first appropri-
ated the c o n c e p t for his o w n purposes. W h e r e a s Panofsky had used the
c o n c e p t solely t o explain the affinities b e t w e e n scholastic thinking and
G o t h i c architecture, B o u r d i e u used it to account for the ways in which all
social structures are generated in practice b y participating social agents.
W h e r e a s Panofsky solely tried to s h o w h o w our present c o n c e p t i o n o f a
structural relationship in o n e particular historical p e r i o d b e t w e e n thought
and art was not the product o f our disposition t o i m p o s e patterns but
c o r r e s p o n d e d , instead, to an actual process inherent within the historical
period, B o u r d i e u used the c o n c e p t o f habitus m o r e extensively. A l l humans
inherit dispositions to act in circumscribed ways. In this sense they possess
 The socio-genesis of the thinking instruments 27

an inherited c o n c e p t o f society which they then modify, generating a n e w

c o n c e p t which is apt for their conditions and experiences. F o r Bourdieu,
the c o n c e p t o f habitus d e v e l o p e d in similar circumstances to C h o m s k y ' s
notion o f generative grammar, but, unlike C h o m s k y , B o u r d i e u was not
searching for a universal explanatory principle, only a c o n c e p t with which
to describe localised strategic actions.
B o u r d i e u explains h o w the c o n c e p t o f habitus enabled him to resolve a
series o f intellectual p r o b l e m s , but he rightly realises that his account o f the
use to him o f the c o n c e p t gives this function t o o m u c h p r o m i n e n c e . H e
comments:

The first uses that I was able to make of the notion of habitus probably contained
more or less all of that - but only in an implicit state: they were the product not
of a theoretical calculation similar to the one that I have just performed . . . but
of practical strategy of scientific habitus . . . 6

It is clear that there is in Bourdieu's retrospection o f 1985 an element o f

post hoc rationalisation with respect to the value o f habitus in helping him
to adopt a coherent attitude towards structuralism. T h e motivation for the
c o n c e p t was m o r e directly practical and its d e v e l o p m e n t was latent in the
way in which B o u r d i e u tried in his earliest w o r k to reconcile existential
p h e n o m e n o l o g y with cultural anthropology.
In his discussion o f K a b y l e culture in Sociologie de l'Algrie B o u r d i e u
c o n c l u d e d with a subsection d e v o t e d to ' " l i v e d " d e m o c r a c y and " c o n -
stituted" d e m o c r a c y ' . H e claimed that family solidarity p r o v i d e d the pat-
7

tern for the solidarity o f the w h o l e society. Family and political structures
w e r e h o m o g e n e o u s because they w e r e parallel, logical developments from
the same underlying schema. In Kabyle society there was n o n e e d for a
written 'constitution' because there already existed a harmony b e t w e e n
public and private affairs since b o t h shared a c o m m o n generative impulse.
T h e argument is stated at the end o f the corresponding section o f The
Algerians in the following way:

By the very reason of the intensity of communal sentiments, the rules on which
the community is based do not need to be made to appear as imperatives. They
permeate the living reality of manners and customs. The gentilitial democracy
does not have to define itself in order to exist; perhaps it even exists with a much
greater vitality in proportion as the sentiments on which it is based are less
defined. 8

B o u r d i e u claimed to have o b s e r v e d a social system that had so constituted

itself that it functioned automatically and harmoniously. T h e r e was a pre-
ordained order which c o u l d b e perpetuated as long as the mechanisms for
unquestioning socialisation c o u l d all b e sustained. In other w o r d s , B o u r -
dieu did not want to assume that the harmony o f the social system was
preserved b y a mysteriously collective consciousness, but, rather, that the
generic order had to b e constantly renewed. This was a fragile condition
28 Bourdieu and culture

and, b y contrast, western d e m o c r a c y evidenced the conflict which inevita-

bly flowed from the collapse o f the mechanisms o f value transmission.
Bourdieu's account o f pre-lapsarian K a b y l e society was the backcloth for
his analyses o f the cultural adaptation, the acculturation, o f K a b y l e
workers in Algiers. H e sought t o o b s e r v e the operation o f the mechanisms
for value transmission in a situation where the original c o h e r e n c e o f the
w h o l e system had collapsed. A l t h o u g h h e did n o t at this stage give the
mechanism a name, it is clear that the observation o f the acculturation o f
workers called f o r a c o n c e p t - habitus - which w o u l d m a k e sense b o t h o f
the persistence o f o l d values in n e w behaviour and o f the ways in which
n e w collective values w e r e actively constructed b y individuals w h o h a d
b e e n dispossessed o f their places in an automatically self-harmonising
system.
Talk o f 'values', h o w e v e r , must n o t cause us t o lose track o f the corporal
force o f habitus. T h e adaptations that B o u r d i e u o b s e r v e d w e r e physical as
well as attitudinal and part o f the use o f habitus as a c o n c e p t was that it
denied this kind o f b o d y / m i n d separation. B o u r d i e u has c o m m e n t e d that
Marcel Mauss had rediscovered the corporal dimension o f hexis/habitus
' . . . as behaviour, d e p o r t m e n t , . . . where it serves t o express the systema-
tic functioning o f the socialized b o d y ' . This was particularly n o t e d in
9

relation t o dancing and it is in this context that B o u r d i e u first used the

concept in 1962 in 'Clibat et condition paysanne'. B o u r d i e u describes the
small country dances o f his native Beam, held either at Christmas o r at the
N e w Y e a r , as being occasions o f a clash o f civilisations - b e t w e e n rural and
urban life. T h e difficulties o f cultural adaptation experienced b y the tradi-
tional peasants are manifested in their awkward physical m o v e m e n t s .
Bourdieu c o m m e n t s that 'This is n o t the place t o analyse the m o t o r habits
peculiar to a peasant from the Beam, that habitus which d e n o u n c e s the
paysanas, the clumsy peasant. Popular observation understands perfectly
this hexis which is the basis for s t e r e o t y p e s ' .
10

T h e habitus and its G r e e k antecedent the hexis function here for B o u r -

dieu as concepts which suggest that lapses from prior coherent value sys-
tems, whether in Algeria o r the B e a m , are physically apparent. B o u r d i e u
has noted that Merleau-Ponty did n o t use the c o n c e p t o f habitus, 11
but the
association o f Mauss's social psychological usage with the thinking o f
Merleau-Ponty 's La Structure du comportement, first published in 1942,
enabled B o u r d i e u t o extend the function o f the c o n c e p t . Merleau-Ponty's
work evaluated the o p p o s i n g contributions o f Pavlov's theory o f c o n d i -
tioned reflex and o f Gestalt p s y c h o l o g y t o the explanation o f human b e -
haviour. H e c o n c l u d e d that behaviour is neither explicable as a response to
stimuli n o r as purposeful action dictated holistically. Instead, behaviour is
to b e understood as the physically and mentally adaptive piecemeal actions
of behaving p e r s o n s . O n e o f the features o f K a b y l e peasant life that
12

Bourdieu had o b s e r v e d was that the peasants possessed n o sense o f c o n -

stituted time. T h e y lived in a continuous present in harmony with the
rhythm o f the seasons. B o u r d i e u was able t o use the c o n c e p t o f habitus t o
 The socio-genesis of the thinking instruments 29

graft this p e r c e p t i o n t o Merleau-Ponty's materialist p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f b e -

haviour. F o r B o u r d i e u , the habitus e m b o d i e s the attitudes which w e in-
herit, but it d o e s not constitute a stimulus which conditions h o w w e must
b e h a v e . This is what B o u r d i e u means w h e n h e says that the c o n c e p t o f
habitus enables him to a v o i d 'mechanicalism'. W e d o not act out mechan-
ically o r automatically any dispositions which w e can b e said to possess
intrinsically prior t o their enactment. T h e c o n c e p t o f habitus also enables
B o u r d i e u t o o p p o s e the alternative extreme o f 'finalism'. W e d o not regu-
late our present actions b y reference t o any future goal. O u r actions are not
purposeful but, rather, continuously adaptive.

Situation, Position and Condition

In denying that the habitus conditions behaviour either mechanistically o r

finalistically, w e are forced t o consider the distinction that B o u r d i e u makes
b e t w e e n 'situation' and 'position'. It is important t o realise that Bourdieu
d o e s not c o n t e n d that the habitus operates identically for all p e o p l e . It is
not a universal entity o r faculty. T h e best clarification o f Bourdieu's think-
ing here is his ' C o n d i t i o n d e classe et position d e classe' (1966). Like
'Intellectual field and creative project', published in the same year, ' C o n d i -
tion de classe et position d e classe' clarifies B o u r d i e u ' s relation to struc-
turalism. A t the beginning o f the article, he writes:

To take seriously the notion of social structure is to suppose that each social class
owes positional properties which are relatively independent of intrinsic proper-
ties . . . to the fact that it occupies a historically defined position in a social
structure and that it is affected by relations which unite it with other constitutive
aspects of the structure. 13

Structuralism involves taking seriously the fact that individuals, groups or

classes o c c u p y positions in society which are defined in relation to the total
structure o f that society and in relation to each other. Position-taking is
adaptive. Position-taking is relational rather than intentional. Bourdieu gives
an example derived b o t h from his researches in Algeria and in the B e a m :

. . . you can isolate, as Weber does, in the peasant condition that which relates to
the situation and the practice of working the soil, that is to say a certain kind of
relationship with nature, based on dependence and submissiveness, and correla-
tive with certain recurrent traits of peasant religious belief, or you can isolate
that which relates to the position of the peasant in a specific social structure, an
extremely variable position in different societies at different times, but domi-
nated by the relationship with the citizen and urban life . . . 1 4

F o r B o u r d i e u , the structural analysis which is o f interest is the analysis o f

social groups in different societies w h o o c c u p y c o m p a r a b l e positions rela-
tive to their different social structures, rather than the analysis o f groups
30 Bourdieu and culture

w h o might b e supposed to have the same intrinsic situation. T h e interesting

comparison, in other words, b e t w e e n societies, b o t h geographically and
historically, is b e t w e e n the ways in which groups strategically acquire dif-
ferent positions rather than in the universal similarities o f their situations.
Nevertheless, as the passage a b o v e explicitly states, a group's capacity to
adapt relationally is itself relative t o its situation. A group's condition is a
function b o t h o f its situation and o f its position. F o r s o m e groups, their
condition may almost coincide with their situation which then appears to
b e 'natural' and legitimately t o give rise to universal explanations, whilst,
for other groups, their condition may almost coincide with their position
such that it appears contrived and, consequently, appropriately susceptible
t o relational analysis.
A l t h o u g h individuals, groups and classes d o not have fixed, objective
existence, they all comprise variable mixtures o f situation and position
which m a k e them unstable, possessing the potential for change. Individuals
modify their situations positionally b y reference to groups; groups b y refer-
e n c e to classes; and classes b y reference to the total structure o f society.
T h e position-taking is not simply b y reference t o a static network o f rela-
tions. Position-taking a c c o m m o d a t e s b o t h the past and the future. A l -
though ' C o n d i t i o n d e classe et position d e classe' d o e s not refer t o the
c o n c e p t o f habitus, the dynamic relationalism o f position-taking d o e s in-
v o l v e the habitus. T h e habitus o f every individual inscribes the inherited
parameters o f modification, o f adjustment from situation t o position which
provides the legacy o f a n e w situation. T h e parameters o f modification for
individuals relate to the objective trajectories o f the groups from which
they acquire their habitus and o f those with which they align themselves.
Individuals and groups possess the capacity to gauge the upward o r d o w n -
ward mobility o f the larger groups with which they affiliate.
B o u r d i e u recognises that the distinction b e t w e e n situation and position
may only b e 'heuristically f e r t i l e ' rather than absolute. O n e person's
15

situation is another person's position or, even, all persons constantly gener-
ate positions from situations and, in turn, generate n e w positions from
those n e w situations. T h e important emphasis, h o w e v e r , is that situations
are given o r received whereas positions are actively m a d e . Situations are
static whereas position-taking is the dynamic activity that constantly d e -
stabilises situations. Bourdieu's view is that it is the position-taking which
occurs within and in relation t o the transiently objective situation o f larger
groups that brings about change. T h e position-taking o f individuals in
groups modifies the objective situation o f those groups whilst, at the same
time, groups position themselves as groups in relation to classes, and s o o n .
Having rejected the form o f structuralism that w o u l d m a k e comparisons
across societies b e t w e e n groups sharing the same intrinsic situations in
favour o f a form o f structuralism that w o u l d c o m p a r e across societies the
relational positions o f groups within those societies, B o u r d i e u g o e s further.
H e wants to understand the process o f position-taking itself. It is not
e n o u g h for Bourdieu, in other words, to c o m p a r e situations o r positions
 The socio-genesis of the thinking instruments 31

structurally at all, even if this is d o n e in a way which attempts to offer a

dynamic grid. T h e p r o b l e m is h o w t o avoid representing dynamism stat-
ically. B o u r d i e u ' s solution is to argue that positions are not just mathemati-
cal functions o f situations that can b e plotted b y an external observer.
Position-taking is immanently creative. It is the habitus that immanently
transforms situations into positions. Individuals in different situations have
different capacities to generate positions, but all individuals possess s o m e
capacity for positional change. T h e extent t o which this capacity is actu-
alised d e p e n d s o n r a n d o m encounters with other individuals and groups,
such that social trajectories can never b e fully calculated o r predicted b y
detached observers. T h o s e w h o present themselves as detached observers
are only indulging in their o w n position-taking - producing a relatively
m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e calculation o f the relatively less calculated position-
taking o f others as the basis for their o w n position-taking.
B o u r d i e u argues that position-taking is always embellished. T h e r e is an
element o f artifice involved. T h e structuralism that B o u r d i e u o p p o s e s is
based o n a functionalism which supposes that there are intrinsically dif-
ferent functions in societies. In contrast, B o u r d i e u offers a view o f social
relations which supposes that individuals and groups artificially construct
differences as part o f their position-taking activity. F o r Bourdieu, the cul-
tures o f individuals and groups are the tokens b y which they distinguish
themselves in o r d e r to position themselves. Cultures are, therefore, arti-
ficial objects d e p l o y e d in position-taking rather than integral parts o f
intrinsically differentiated situations. Consideration o f the relationship b e -
tween situation and position leads, in other w o r d s , towards an understand-
ing o f B o u r d i e u ' s c o n c e p t o f 'cultural capital'. In ' C o n d i t i o n d e classe et
position d e classe', B o u r d i e u writes:

A social class is never defined only by its situation and its position in a social
structure, that is to say by the relations which it objectively has with the other
social classes. It also owes a number of its properties to the fact that the individ-
uals who compose it enter deliberately or objectively into symbolic relations
which, in expressing differences of situation and of position according to a
systematic logic, tend to transmute them into signifying distinctions. The relative
independence of the system of actions and expressive processes or, if you like, of
marks of distinction, thanks to which social subjects express and, at the same
time, constitute, for themselves and for others, their position in the social struc-
ture (and the relation that they hold to this position) - by bringing about an
expressive reduplication of the 'values' (in the linguistic sense) necessarily
attached to the class position - authorises the methodological authorisation of a
properly cultural order. In fact, this 'systematic expression' (in the terms used by
Engels) of the economic and social order can, as such, be legitimately constituted
and treated as a system and, therefore, be made the object of structural
apprehension. 16

B o u r d i e u is saying that abstractly formulated relations b e t w e e n situations

and positions within social structures are actually constructed practically by
32 Bourdieu and culture

participants. Practical construction reduplicates what is abstractly observ-

able o r systematically analysable. Nevertheless, the practical construction
is effected b y using cultural signifiers which themselves have a systemic
autonomy from those relationships which enable social structures to b e
characterised as systems. T h e cultural signifiers used b y subjects t o re-
duplicate their unembellished situations and positions n o m o r e have intrin-
sic meaning o r value than d o the situations and positions which they
reduplicate.
It is important t o realise that, for B o u r d i e u , cultural value judgements
and the cultural allegiances o f individuals are arbitrary within an auto-
n o m o u s system o f cultural objects. That is to say that there are 'elective
affinities' within an a u t o n o m o u s cultural system - that o u r cultural
'choices' are strategically guided b y our habitus, neither mechanistically
nor finalistically determined - but situations and positions within this auto-
n o m o u s cultural context are not reflections o f parallel social situations and
positions. Instead, B o u r d i e u argues that an individual can d e p l o y a cultural
situation o r position strategically t o take a n e w social position, and vice
versa. Neither the social nor the cultural conditions o f individuals represent
their true being. T h e notion o f true being is excluded. H u m a n society is
seen b y B o u r d i e u as a series o f encounters b e t w e e n entities which have
relational meaning within a u t o n o m o u s systems and also relational meaning
across systems.

Cultural Capital

In order to enforce this view that culture is a currency that p e o p l e use

rather than an intrinsic quality, B o u r d i e u t o o k h o l d o f the c o n c e p t o f
'capital' as d e v e l o p e d in e c o n o m i c theory and applied it to culture. T h e
possession o f m o n e y enables us to m a k e purchases which alter our social
condition. W e trade the value o f o u r situation within the e c o n o m i c system
in order to i m p r o v e our position within that system, but our personalities
are not modified b y the nature o f the coins which w e use, only, instead, b y
the quantity o f our possessions and b y the fact that the e c o n o m i c system
operates b y esteeming quantity. Similarly, o u r social positions are only
modified by our cultural tastes in as m u c h as the cultural system assigns
m o r e value to s o m e tastes than to others. W e are not intrinsically altered
by preferring M o z a r t o v e r Morrissey o r M a n e t o v e r M a n R a y , but the
judgements o f value m a d e b e t w e e n our preferences within the cultural
system affect our position within that system and have c o n s e q u e n c e s for
both our e c o n o m i c and our social position-taking.
Gary Becker's Human Capital, published in 1964, reported o n a research
project which had c o m m e n c e d in 1957 and had b e e n undertaken under the
auspices o f the National Bureau o f E c o n o m i c Research, N e w Y o r k . A s
B e c k e r c o m m e n t e d in his Introduction, interest in the e c o n o m i c s o f educa-
tion had ' m u s h r o o m e d throughout the w o r l d ' during this p e r i o d o f seven
1 7
 The socio-genesis of the thinking instruments 33

years. A t governmental level, in rich and p o o r countries, it had b e c o m e

important to establish what might b e the rates o f return o n m o n e y invested
in education. O n e main conclusion o f B e c k e r ' s analysis o f the e c o n o m i c
benefits accruing t o different categories o f students in different kinds o f
A m e r i c a n educational establishments was that

. . . because observed earnings are gross of the return on human capital, some
persons earn more than others simply because they invest more in themselves.
Because 'abler' persons tend to invest more than others, the distribution of
earnings would be very unequal and skewed even if 'ability' were symmetrically
and not too unequally distributed. 18

B o u r d i e u first used the term 'capital' in Les tudiants et leurs tudes (1964)
in o r d e r to argue that the analysis o f student performance in higher educa-
tion is neither a direct reflection o f innate, individual abilities nor o f social
class. T h e cultures which students possess o n c o m m e n c i n g their higher
studies have b e e n accumulated during the protracted p e r i o d o f cultural
initiation which is c o m p u l s o r y state schooling. Cultural position-taking has
already acquired relative i n d e p e n d e n c e o f social situation through the
w o r k o f school. T h e degree o f future aspiration which will affect perfor-
m a n c e correlates with the level o f achieved position and, as an example,
B o u r d i e u suggests that 'certain professions' are thought, from the outset, to
'suppose the possession o f a c a p i t a l ' such that students without this capi-
19

tal effectively exclude themselves by assuming that they are not able to
c o m p e t e for admission.
B o u r d i e u m a d e lavish use o f the c o n c e p t o f cultural capital in La Repro-
duction (1970) and in ' R e p r o d u c t i o n culturelle et reproduction sociale'
(1971). H e was resolute in denying that scholastic success could b e ex-
plained by innate ability but he was equally resolute in denying a facile,
static correlation b e t w e e n student performance and class origins:

Social origin, with the initial family education and experience it entails, must
therefore not be considered as a factor capable of directly determining practices,
attitudes and opinions at every moment in a biography, since the constraints that
are linked to social origin work only through the particular systems of factors in
which they are actualized in a structure that is different each time. 20

Nevertheless, B o u r d i e u ' s c o n c e p t o f 'cultural capital' has often b e e n misin-

terpreted. T h e degree o f cultural capital possessed has often b e e n taken to
be a direct expression o f class position. This is, h o w e v e r , to ignore the
genesis and d e v e l o p m e n t o f the c o n c e p t . B o u r d i e u has explained these in
his 'Les trois tats du capital culturel' (1979). H e r e he explicitly c o m m e n t s
o n the w o r k o f B e c k e r . T h e economists o f education had the merit that
they 'explicitly p o s e d the question o f the relationship b e t w e e n the rates o f
profit assured by educational investment and by e c o n o m i c investment
. . . ' but, having raised the question o f the relationship b e t w e e n straight,
2 1

money-making, e c o n o m i c activity and educational or cultural investment,

34 Bourdieu and culture

they were only able t o analyse the relationship in e c o n o m i c terms. T h e

e c o n o m i c system was an example o f an unembellished system o f monetary
values comparable in practice with the abstract systems o f relations c o n -
structed b y structuralist sociologists. B o u r d i e u argued, instead, that b e -
haviour within the e c o n o m i c system relates strategically with behaviour
within the social and cultural systems. A s a result, the economists failed to
recognise the 'domestic transmission of cultural capital*. 22
T o b e precise,
the economists sought to analyse the extent to which investment in educa-
tion might i m p r o v e o n the profits which ' a b l e ' p e o p l e might b e e x p e c t e d to
acquire without recognising that ability is itself the c o n s e q u e n c e o f invest-
ment. Explicitly citing Becker, B o u r d i e u c o m m e n t s generally that the in-
quiries o f the economists ' . . . o n the relation b e t w e e n " a p t i t u d e " (ability)
in studies and investment in studies s h o w that they are unaware that "apti-
t u d e " or "giftedness" are also the product o f investment in time and in
cultural c a p i t a l . . . ' A l t h o u g h B o u r d i e u b o r r o w s e c o n o m i c terminology
2 3

from the human capital economists, he d o e s s o , therefore, in order t o

suggest that the cultural sphere operates autonomously as a market and, in
doing so, constitutes a system which impinges o n the austerely monetary
system artificially constructed b y e c o n o m i s m .
'Les trois tats du capital culturel' is an important article not only b e -
cause Bourdieu reflects retrospectively o n the origin o f the c o n c e p t o f
cultural capital but also because, writing in 1979, he makes adjustments to
it. T h e article demonstrates clearly the way in which the function o f the
concept has shifted o v e r time in order to perform n e w tasks. A s the title o f
the article suggests, B o u r d i e u n o w identifies three kinds o f cultural capital.
H e summarises in the following way:

Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in an incorporated state, that is to say in
the form of the durable dispositions of the organism; in an objectivated state, in
the form of cultural goods, pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines,
which are the marks either of realised theories or of criticisms of these theories,
of problems, etc.; and finally in an institutionalised state, a form of objectivation
which must be kept separate since, as can be seen in relation to scholastic titles, it
confers on cultural capital the supposed capacity to guarantee completely origi-
nal properties. 24

Incorporated cultural capital is indistinguishable from the habitus, but

Bourdieu is making it clear, for the first time, that there are cultural dis-
positions which are biologically transmitted. It is not the case, in other
words, that the cultural dispositions o f individuals are wholly artificial c o n -
structs - pawns in strategic position-taking acting in accordance with the
dispositions o f an essentially social habitus. In as m u c h as B o u r d i e u had
earlier implied that cultural dispositions are d e p l o y e d b y primarily social
beings, he n o w seems to b e denying the vestiges o f a humanist, essentialist
conception o f selves o r social beings that this w o u l d s e e m to suggest. T h e
emphasis, however, is not that beings are integrally sociocultural. Rather,
the emphasis - in accord with his sympathy for Gilbert R y l e ' s 'the ghost in
 The socio-genesis of the thinking instruments 35

the m a c h i n e ' as expressed in 'Structuralism and theory o f sociological

25

k n o w l e d g e ' ( 1 9 6 8 ) - is that beings are integrally nothing at all. T h e habitus

2 6

is an amalgam o f social, cultural and e c o n o m i c dispositions, but n o o n e o f

these dispositions has primacy in determining the configuration o f the others.
Beings, as objects, m o v e randomly within predetermined parameters. T h e
only controlling factor o v e r individual objects, therefore, is the successive
reproduction o f parameters. T h e objects d o not themselves exercise 'self-
control. T h e key factor about incorporated culture is, as Bourdieu proceeds
to point out, that it is confined to the physical life-spans o f individuals. Every
incorporated culture is the unique product o f unique dispositions.
Objectivated cultural capital, o n the other hand, exists independently o f
persons possessing different incorporated cultural capitals. In origin, all
kinds o f objectivated cultural capital w e r e the products o f objectification as
p e o p l e sought t o modify their incorporated cultural capital through the
duration o f their lives. Objectivated cultural capital acquired a u t o n o m o u s
market value o v e r time and, thus, present position-takers n o w deploy,
s e c o n d o r third hand, the value created first hand b y earlier position-takers.
It was as if, writing shortly after the publication o f La Distinction, B o u r d i e u
was anxious t o m a k e it clear that he had not b e e n positing necessary, o r
static and fixed, relationships b e t w e e n specific tastes and specific class posi-
tions. O n the contrary, the objectivated cultural stock accumulated in o n e
generation can crash in the next. T h e value o f the objectivated cultural
capital o f the past has constantly t o b e r e n e w e d and reactivated in the
c o n t e m p o r a r y market. A l t h o u g h objects - such as b o o k s o r pictures - can
b e said t o b e the repositories o f objectivated cultural capital, they have n o
value unless they are activated strategically in the present b y those seeking
to modify their incorporated cultural capital. A l l those objects o n which
cultural value has ever b e e n b e s t o w e d lie perpetually dormant waiting to
b e revived, waiting for their o l d value to b e used t o establish n e w value in a
new market situation.
Objectivated cultural capital is permanently potential, always dependent
o n the selections o f individuals. Institutionalised cultural capital, by c o n -
trast, has an objective existence which is instrumental in constituting indi-
viduals. Institutions are consolidated social groups which have the p o w e r to
prescribe o r pre-empt the ways in which individuals might try to use objec-
tivated cultural capital to modify their o w n incorporated cultural capital.
B o u r d i e u refers particularly to educational institutions which are e m b o d -
ied value systems. B y bestowing titles and awards o n individuals they
appear t o b e giving expression to the differences b e t w e e n those individ-
uals. In reality, h o w e v e r , they are constructing differences in terms o f their
values and denying the validity o f the differentiations m a d e by individuals
themselves. Objectivated cultural capital implies a free market with a float-
ing currency whereas institutionalised cultural capital implies a market
with fixed rates o f exchange.
T h e s e distinctions w e r e o f particular importance to B o u r d i e u when he
was about to take the Chair o f S o c i o l o g y at the C o l l g e de France, Paris.
36 Bourdieu and culture

T h e question was whether the historical tradition o f the college - its institu-
tionalised cultural capital - w o u l d prevail o v e r his capacity to construct his
o w n social trajectory o n the basis o f his incorporated cultural capital and
his d e p l o y m e n t o f his objectivated - intellectual - cultural capital, o r
whether he w o u l d b e able t o 'mobilise' the capital o f the college t o advance
his o w n career. T h e key general question was whether all institutionalised
cultural capital might properly b e recognised to b e a form o f objectivated
cultural capital. W a s the value o f an institution dependent o n a process o f
continual reactualisation in the same way as the value o f a picture? Might
institutionalised cultural capital b e d e p l o y e d b y individuals in the same way
as objectivated cultural capital?
A l t h o u g h the c o n c e p t o f 'institutionalised cultural capital' was only artic-
ulated at the point in his career w h e n B o u r d i e u was making a c h o i c e o f
institutional affiliation, it was, nevertheless, a legacy o f the thinking o f the
1960s. It was the institutions o f the state which i m p o s e d standardised titles
and labels o n the w h o l e population. In w o r k o f the 1970s and 1980s
culminating in La Noblesse d'tat (1989), B o u r d i e u attempted t o s h o w that
industrial organisations and higher education institutions w e r e the p r o d -
ucts o f the strategies o f their m e m b e r s . State organisations w e r e the organs
o f the partisan groups within society w h o s u c c e e d e d in imposing their
particular interests o n the w h o l e o f society b y constructing and dominating
the c o n c e p t o f the state. It was n o longer e n o u g h to argue that s o m e parts
o f the population could b e seen to b e socially excluded as a result o f their
cultural disadvantage in respect o f the dominant culture transmitted in
state educational institutions. It had to b e recognised, instead, that institu-
tions themselves are the instruments used b y social groups t o perpetuate
their values. T o that extent, the cultures transmitted within institutions are
o f secondary significance in relation t o the divisions o f social capital e m -
b o d i e d in institutional divisions.
It was logical, therefore, that Bourdieu should publish ' L e capital social:
notes provisoires' in 1980. It is important to b e clear that Bourdieu is not at
all reverting to an emphasis o f social class determinants o f social o r cultural
opportunity. It is better to see 'social capital' as a further, fourth, kind o f
cultural capital. Social capital has nothing to d o with any integral personality
qualities o f individuals, n o affinity whatsoever with individual 'charisma'.
There is an autonomous market o f social esteem as o f cultural taste o r
e c o n o m i c power. 'Social' properties have value within a market-place which
assigns them value, and they are used by individuals to develop a social
position-taking that is real rather than simply artificial. Social cultural capital is
deployed b y possessors o f incorporated cultural capital in the same way as is
objectivated capital. It makes sense to suggest that whereas cultural capital
is objectivated in cultural objects, social capital is objectivated in institutions.
B o u r d i e u writes:

The existence of a network of bonds is not a natural datum, nor even a 'social
datum', constituted once and for all by a social act of institution (represented, in
 The socio-genesis of the thinking instruments 37

the case of the family group, by the genealogical definition of parent relations
which is characteristic of one social formation), but the product of the work of
establishment and maintenance which is necessary to produce and reproduce
those durable and useful bonds that are appropriate for acquiring material or
symbolic profits. 27

Instead o f referring to a 'network o f b o n d s ' (un rseau de liaisons), Bourdieu

might just as appropriately have talked about a market or a system o f social
relations. E v e n m o r e , he might have talked about a 'field' o f social relations.
It was in the mid-1960s that B o u r d i e u d e v e l o p e d the c o n c e p t o f 'field' to
signify in abstract the formal context in which every kind o f capital must
acquire its particular value. A t first the c o n c e p t was used in parallel with
the c o n c e p t o f habitus in o p p o s i t i o n to structuralist thinking. O n e reading
o f 'Intellectual field and creative project' (1966) w o u l d b e to say that B o u r -
dieu equated 'fields' with 'structures'. H e argued that nineteenth-century
intellectuals had themselves constructed the market, or field, or structure
within which their g o o d s w o u l d b e received and valued. B y contrast, struc-
turalist analysts tried to explicate historical texts by reference to the social
structure within which they were p r o d u c e d as if that structure possessed an
independent existence. B o u r d i e u introduced the notion o f field to try to
ensure that texts w o u l d neither b e interpreted internally - without refer-
e n c e to any context - nor externally b y reference to a post hoc, intel-
lectually constructed context. B o u r d i e u wanted to argue that the p r o p e r
externality to b e understood was the externality internalised by authors
themselves in the process o f creating.

Field

A s B o u r d i e u has himself implied, h o w e v e r , the achievement o f 'Intellec-

tual field and creative project' was limited. It transformed authors into
producers o f fields rather than texts and, in doing s o , invited an analysis o f
the field o f a u t o n o m o u s literary production in the place o f an analysis o f
a u t o n o m o u s texts. B o u r d i e u was analysing a past literary field from a
position within that field as it had b e e n intergenerationally r e p r o d u c e d
ever since. T h e notion o f an 'intellectual field' was unfortunate if it implied
that the construction o f a field is an action peculiar to intellectuals rather
than that an intellectual field is a particular manifestation o f a universal
process o f field generation and maintenance.
It is clear from the second paragraph o f 'Intellectual field and creative
project' that Bourdieu was aware that he was offering an artificially auto-
nomised literary history o f literary production. It was only in the late 1960s
and early 1970s that it b e c a m e clear that Bourdieu was seeking to produce a
science o f the humanities and that, in order to d o so, he was using 'field' in a
way that was derived analogously from the physical sciences. Bourdieu con-
tended that he was subscribing to the approach o f m o d e r n science that
Cassirer had made explicit - that it involved a 'relational m o d e o f thinking' 28
38 Bourdieu and culture

rather than o n e that supposed that it was dealing with the interactions o f
substances. In 1968, Bourdieu made it completely clear that he was attempt-
ing to banish humanist presuppositions from the analysis o f humanist cul-
ture. In 'Structuralism and theory o f sociological knowledge', he wrote:

To remove from physics any remnant of substantialism, it has been necessary to

replace the notion of force with that of form. In the same way social sciences
could not do away with the idea of human nature except by substituting for it the
structure it conceals, that is by considering as products of a system of relations
the properties that the spontaneous theory of the social ascribes to a substance. 29

Somewhat paradoxically, B o u r d i e u was influenced in his d e v e l o p m e n t o f

the c o n c e p t o f field b y the w o r k o f Kurt Lewin. T h e r e is a logic here in that
Lewin, like Bourdieu, admired Cassirer, and for the same reasons. Lewin's
summary o f Cassirer's achievement, published in 1949, has a Bachelardian
flavour that w o u l d have b e e n congenial to Bourdieu:

He discloses the basic character of science as the eternal attempt to go beyond

what is regarded scientifically accessible at any specific time. T o proceed beyond
the limitations of a given level of knowledge the researcher, as a rule, has to
break down the methodological taboos which condemn as 'unscientific' or 'illogi-
cal' the very methods or concepts which later on prove to be basic for the next
major progress. 30

T h e paradox is that Lewin introduced the relational thinking o f physics to a

discipline - social p s y c h o l o g y - which, in Bourdieu's terms, was already, b y
definition, substantialist. T h e affinity b e t w e e n the thinking o f B o u r d i e u and
Lewin and, yet, the fundamental difference, are b o t h apparent in the fol-
lowing extract from Lewin's 'Constructs in field theory' (1944):

One of the basic psychological concepts is that of psychological position. Posi-

tion is a 'spacial relation of regions'; for instance, the position of a region A can
be characterised by its lying in B. Examples of psychological concepts which
have the conceptual dimension of position are: group belongingness of an indi-
vidual, his occupational position, involvement in an activity. 31

T h e affinity for B o u r d i e u relates to the d e v e l o p m e n t o f notions o f position-

taking, social capital and social space, but Bourdieu's difference from
Lewin is similar in form to his difference from the human capital e c o n o -
mists - that human individuals are substantialised and e x e m p t e d from the
relationalist approach that is otherwise adopted.
B o u r d i e u has a c k n o w l e d g e d that it was a reading o f the chapter o f
W e b e r ' s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft d e v o t e d to the s o c i o l o g y o f religion
that enabled him to d e v e l o p his o w n thinking further. A l t h o u g h W e b e r ' s
analysis 'permanently referred to the intellectual field', nevertheless it
'wasn't at all an academic c o m m e n t a r y ' . B o u r d i e u was liberated, in other
32

words, b y the fact that the nature o f W e b e r ' s analysis was not determined
b y the consecrated status o f its object. It was possible to treat religion
 The socio-genesis of the thinking instruments 39

scientifically rather than from within an intellectual field that was pre-
disposed to regard the existence o f religion as a necessary datum.
B o u r d i e u p r o c e e d e d to clarify the way in which religion should b e ana-
lysed scientifically, but the next breakthrough was the realisation that the
33

c o n c e p t o f field c o u l d best b e elaborated b y resolutely applying it to a wide

range o f social p h e n o m e n a . A l t h o u g h B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k o n W e b e r ' s s o c i o -
logy o f religion had assisted him, the fact that the object o f analysis,
h o w e v e r scientific, was religion suggests that B o u r d i e u was still in the
process o f exorcising a research agenda that had b e e n set b y the functional
theory o f stratification. T h e ' D a v i s - M o o r e T h e o r y o f Stratification', ad-
v a n c e d in 1945, was still the subject o f lively debate in the American Socio-
logical Review well into the 1960s. Davis and M o o r e had insisted that their
analysis related t o 'the system o f positions, not t o the individuals occupying
those p o s i t i o n s ' . T h e y c o n t e n d e d , h o w e v e r , that the system o f positions
34

in society was functionally necessary. T h e y argued: ' A s a functioning m e c h -

anism a society must s o m e h o w distribute its m e m b e r s in social positions
and induce them to p e r f o r m the duties o f these p o s i t i o n s . ' A n d , amongst
35

the major, necessary societal functions, they listed religion, claiming that
' T h e reason w h y religion is necessary is apparently to b e found in the fact
that human society achieves its unity primarily through the possession b y
its m e m b e r s o f certain ultimate values and ends in c o m m o n ' . 3 6

T h e r e are respects in which 'system' and 'field' function similarly as

concepts. It was, therefore, crucial that B o u r d i e u should dissociate himself
from any reading which might suggest that he c o n c e i v e d o f society as m a d e
up o f fixed fields which w e r e functionally inter-related - with their respec-
tive roles allocated b y s o m e transcendent, controlling entity which was
'society'. This explains why, as B o u r d i e u puts it,

There remained only the need to put to work this thinking tool defined in this
manner in order to discover, by applying it to different fields, the specific proper-
ties of each field: haute couture, literature, philosophy, politics, e t c . . . . as well as
the invariables which a comparison of the different universes treated as 'particu-
lar instances of the possible' might reveal. 37

B o u r d i e u was explicit in 'Les stratgies de reconversion' (1973) that fields

are not functional invariables, although they may possess c o m m o n , invari-
able characteristics. H e n c e his constant attention to the 'genesis' o f fields as
well as to their perpetuation. T h e capital which individuals transfer b e -
tween fields d o e s not have a fixed exchange rate. T h e strategic m o v e m e n t
o f capital b e t w e e n fields takes place simultaneously with a strategic re-
valuation o f o l d fields or regeneration o f new. Fields are simply parts o f the
infinitely fluid g a m e . Individuals with individual habitus act and react in a
continuous present, neither influenced b y the past o r the future. In effect,
the habitus defines the sphere o f operation o f human automata. S o m e
d e g r e e o f capital is associated with the habitus, but, by and large, objects
which acquire value in independent fields - cultural, social o r e c o n o m i c
value in their respective fields - accrete to individuals transiently. T h e
40 Bourdieu and culture

objectivated capital which temporarily adheres to the incorporated cultural

capital o f individuals has constantly fluctuating value since the judgements
o f value within independent fields are constantly changing and, at the same
time, the relations between fields and the relative value o f the values o f
those fields are also perpetually contingent. T h e temporary adhesion o f
objectivated capital to incorporated capital enables individuals to o c c u p y
a position in the social structure, but that position immediately b e c o m e s a
situation and, as such, a stepping-stone for further position-taking.
Bourdieu's relational concepts, therefore, are ways o f talking about a
relational world. It is a vision o f society as o n e o f continuous creation o r
production. O n l y the c o n c e p t o f habitus prevents total contingency. T h e r e
is a constant tension between the urge t o create and the urge to conserve,
b e t w e e n the tendency o f the habitus t o d e p l o y objectivated cultural capital
creatively o r t o b e constrained and conditioned b y the legacy o f insti-
tionalised cultural capital. In any society, in other words, there is tension
b e t w e e n production and reproduction.

Notes

1. P. Bourdieu (1985) 'The genesis of the concepts of habitus and of field', So-
ciocriticism, 2,11.
2. The interview with A . Honneth, H. Kocyba and B. Schwibs was given at Paris
in April 1985, and published in German under the title of 'Der Kampf um die
symbolische Ordnung' in Asthetik und Kommunikation, (1986), 16, nos. 61-2.
It was collected in P. Bourdieu (1987) Choses dites, Paris, ditions de Minuit,
and in translation in P. Bourdieu (1990) In Other Words, Oxford, Polity Press.
3. The conversations, described by Loic Wacquant as the Chicago and the Paris
Workshops of Winter/Spring 1987-88, were published in P. Bourdieu with
L.J.D. Wacquant (1992) Rponses, Paris, ditions du Seuil; translated as P.
Bourdieu and L.J.D. Wacquant (1992) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology,
Oxford, Polity Press.
4. Bourdieu with Wacquant, Rponses, 12-13.
5. . Panofsky (1967) Architecture gothique et pense scolastique (trans, and with
a Postface by P. Bourdieu), Paris, ditions de Minuit.
6. Bourdieu, T h e genesis . . . ', 13-14.
7. See 'Dmocratie "vcue" et dmocratie "constitue" ', in P. Bourdieu (1958)
Sociologie de VAlgrie, Paris, PUF, 'Que Sais-je?' collection, no. 802, 27-30.
8. P. Bourdieu (1962) The Algerians, Boston, M A , Beacon Press, 23-4.
9. Bourdieu, 'The genesis of . . . ', 14.
10. P. Bourdieu (1962) 'Clibat et condition paysanne', tudes rurales, 5-6,99. On
this same page, Bourdieu refers to an anecdote told by Mauss in a communica-
tion to the Socit de Psychologie, 17 May 1934, and published in the Journal
de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, (1935), 35, 271-93. In the same arti-
cle, entitled 'Body techniques', Mauss wrote:
Hence, I have had the notion of the social nature of the 'habitus' for many
years. Please note that I use the Latin word - it should be understood in
France - habitus. The word translates infinitely better than 'habitude' (habit
or custom), the ' e m ' , the 'acquired ability' and 'faculty' of Aristotle (who was
a psychologist). It does not designate those metaphysical habitudes, that
mysterious 'memory', the subjects of volumes or short and famous theses.
These 'habits' do not vary just with individuals and their imitations; they vary
 The socio-genesis of the thinking instruments 41

especially between societies, educations, proprieties and fashions, prestiges.

In them we should see the techniques and work of collective and individual
practical reason rather than, in the ordinary way, merely the soul and its
repetitive faculties (M. Mauss, trans. B. Brewster (1979) Sociology and Psy-
chology. Essays, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 101).
11. Bourdieu, T h e genesis of . . . ', 14.
12. 'We are upholding no species of vitalism whatsoever here. We do not mean
that the analysis of the living body encounters a limit in irreducible vital forces.
We mean only that the reactions of an organism are understandable and
predictable only if we conceive of them, not as muscular contractions which
unfold in the body, but as acts which are addressed to a certain milieu, present
or virtual: the act of taking a bait, of walking toward a goal, of running away
from danger' (M. Merleau-Ponty (1965) The Structure of Behaviour, trans. A .
Fisher, London, Methuen, 151).
13. P. Bourdieu (1966) 'Condition de classe et position de classe', Archives euro-
pennes de sociologie, VII, 201.
14. Ibid., 201-2.
15. Ibid., 202.
16. Ibid., 212.
17. G.S. Becker (1964) Human Capital A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
with Special Reference to Education, New York, National Bureau of Economic
Research, xv.
18. Ibid., 153.
19. P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron (1964) Les tudiants et leurs tudes, Paris, The
Hague, Mouton, Cahiers du Centre de Sociologie Europenne, 1, 46.
20. P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron (1977) Reproduction in Education, Society and
Culture, London and Beverly Hills, C A , Sage, 88.
21. P. Bourdieu (1979) 'Les trois tats du capital culturel', Actes de la recherche en
sciences sociales, 30, 3.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Developed in G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1949.
26. See P. Bourdieu (1968) 'Structuralism and theory of sociological knowledge',
Social Research, 35, 690.
27. P. Bourdieu (1980) 'Le capital social. Notes provisoires', Actes de la recherche
en sciences sociales, 31, 2.
28. Bourdieu, 'The genesis of . . . ', 16.
29. P. Bourdieu (1968) 'Structuralism and theory of sociological knowledge', op.
cit. 692.
30. . Lewin (1949) 'Cassirer's philosophy of science and the social sciences', in
P.A. Schilpp ed. The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, Evanston, IL, Library of
Living Philosophers, 275.
31. K. Lewin (ed. D . Cartwright) (1952) Field Theory in Social Science. Selected
Theoretical Papers, London, Tavistock Publications, 39.
32. Bourdieu, T h e genesis of . . . ', 17.
33. See P. Bourdieu (1971) 'Une interprtation de la thorie de la religion selon Max
Weber', Archives europennes de sociologie, XII, 1, 3-21; P. Bourdieu (1971)
'Gense et structure du champ religieux', Revue franaise de sociologie, XII, 3,
295-334.
34. K. Davis and W.E. Moore (1945) 'Some principles of stratification', American
Sociological Review, , 2, 242.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 244.
37. Bourdieu, T h e genesis of . . . ', 18.
3 Production, reception and reproduction

In 'Structuralism and theory o f sociological k n o w l e d g e ' (1968), B o u r d i e u

argued that

. . . the plurality of theories of the social system must not conceal the unity of the
meta-science upon which all that in the former stands out as scientific is founded;
scholars such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber, totally different in their views of
social philosophy and ultimate values, were able to agree on the main points of
the fundamental principles of the theory of knowledge of the social world. 1

This was also the principle which underpinned the collection o f extracts o f
sociological writings which, with Passeron and C h a m b o r e d o n , B o u r d i e u
assembled in the same year in Le Mtier de sociologue. T h e r e was a s o -
ciological way o f conceptualising that unified the practice o f s o c i o l o g y in a
way which was much m o r e important than any possible unity o f c o n c e p -
tions o f society. W e have seen in the last chapter that B o u r d i e u has tried to
maintain this position in his retrospective accounts o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f
his working concepts.
A t about the time, however, that B o u r d i e u was refining his c o n c e p t o f
cultural capital t o contain the n o t i o n o f its existence in an institutionalised
form, he was also reflecting o n the relationship b e t w e e n description and
prescription in 'Dcrire et prescrire' (1981). W h e r e a s he had earlier sup-
p o s e d that concepts b e c a m e objects and c o u l d thus b e thought o f as c o m -
ponents o f 'objectivated cultural capital', he was n o w prepared to consider
that concepts might b e c o m e e m b e d d e d and institutionalised. T h e c o n s e -
q u e n c e o f his d e p l o y m e n t o f his social capital to mobilise support might b e
that society might b e thought actually to b e as he conceptualised it. C o n -
cepts c o u l d not represent things as they really are, but they c o u l d i m p o s e
themselves as reality. Through the 1970s, it began to feel as if the c o n c e p t s
o f habitus, or 'cultural capital', o r 'field' were b e c o m i n g m o r e than ways o f
sociological knowing. Having plucked these objectivated concepts from
their disparate contexts in Mauss, or B e c k e r , o r Lewin, B o u r d i e u had
individually m o u l d e d them to constitute an interlocking system o f ideas.
T h e y had b e c o m e conceptions o f society. T h e y were acquiring an institu-
tionalised status that matched his new institutional position. B o u r d i e u p r o -
c e e d e d to w o r k as if'his concepts were true rather than continuing to w o r k
with concepts as infinitely adaptable instruments for grasping infinitely
changing realities.
 Production, reception and reproduction 43

In seeking t o secure public recognition for the conceptual meanings that

he had privately constructed, B o u r d i e u had to o v e r c o m e s o m e rival c o n -
ceptualisations which w e r e already firmly institutionalised o r which p o s -
sessed n e w currency. B o u r d i e u ' s notion o f 'reproduction' in culture and
society d e v e l o p e d not so m u c h as a c o n c e p t t o b e d e p l o y e d empirically but
as a c o n c e p t i o n to b e a d o p t e d in o p p o s i t i o n to Marxist o r neo-Marxist
theories o f p r o d u c t i o n o n the o n e hand and, o n the other, to idealist
theories o f artistic and literary reception.

Production

A s w e have seen, B o u r d i e u read M a r x as a student 'for academic reasons';

was 'especially interested in the y o u n g M a r x ' ; and had b e e n 'fascinated b y
the 'Theses o n F e u e r b a c h ' .2

W h a t M c L e l l a n has described as Marx's 'summary statement o f the ma-

terialist c o n c e p t i o n o f history, which has b e c o m e - often t o o exclusively -
the 'classical' exposition o f this i d e a ' , reads as follows:
3

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which cor-
respond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces.
The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure
of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of
production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life
process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being,
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. 4

This famous passage from the Preface to a Critique of Political Economy is

a crucial statement. It was responsible for the institutionalisation o f the
c o n c e p t o f ' p r o d u c t i o n ' in o r t h o d o x Marxist thinking - an institutionalised
f o r m o f cultural capital in relation to which B o u r d i e u had to adopt a
position in the 1960s.
Marx posited t w o kinds o f production. A s social beings, individuals gener-
ate structures o f objective relations which, as such, acquire a force that is
independent o f the wills o f the originating individuals. This is presented as a
general, a-historical principle, but the form taken by these objectified struc-
tures 'corresponds t o ' definite stages in the development o f material produc-
tion. T h e principle o f objective production is a-historical but the forms taken
by the objectivations are determined historically. Because the relations o f
production directly reflect the levels o f material production, they constitute
the ' e c o n o m i c structures' o f society. T h e constructed e c o n o m i c structures
b e c o m e the 'real foundation' for the second kind o f production. Legal and
political superstructures rise in correspondence with base e c o n o m i c struc-
tures and, in turn, forms o f consciousness correspond to these superstruc-
tures. A s a result o f this process o f two-tiered production, Marx was able to
44 Bourdieu and culture

bypass the mediating function o f e c o n o m i c structures to claim that social

being determined consciousness.
T h e r e was a hint o f the influence o f social contract theory b e h i n d
M a r x ' s willingness to posit a state o f natural, material p r o d u c t i o n prior t o
the construction o f e c o n o m i c structures. In o p p o s i t i o n t o M a r x ' s theory,
h o w e v e r , B o u r d i e u ' s anthropological research amongst A l g e r i a n tribes
had suggested that material p r o d u c t i o n and social organisation w e r e suc-
cessfully integrated without the n e e d for e c o n o m i c structures at all. T h e r e
was little e v i d e n c e that the exercise o f the law o r o f authority within the
tribe, kinship practices, the ownership o f property, the e x c h a n g e o f
g o o d s , agricultural p r o d u c t i o n and c o n s u m p t i o n , religious beliefs o r rit-
ual and myth-making activities constituted, any o f them, separate struc-
tures, s o m e o f which c o u l d b e said t o b e infrastructures and s o m e
superstructures. Rather, B o u r d i e u o b s e r v e d the c o h e r e n t w h o l e t o b e the
p r o d u c t o f social agents w h o w e r e able to sustain that h a r m o n i o u s c o -
h e r e n c e intergenerationally for as l o n g as material p r o d u c t i o n r e m a i n e d
unchanged. H e n c e he was able t o characterise K a b y l e society as ' l i v e d '
rather than 'constituted' d e m o c r a c y .
A l t h o u g h Marx emphasised that the consciousness o f m e n did not deter-
mine their being, elsewhere in his writing he did insist that m e n are dis-
tinguished from animals b y their capacity to reflect consciously o n their
actions. In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx m a d e
a distinction b e t w e e n instinctive and rational production. H e wrote:

The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. It does not distinguish
itself from it. It is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of
his will and of his consciousness. Admittedly animals also produce. They build
themselves nests and dwellings,. . . But an animal only produces what it immedi-
ately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, while man produces
universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need,
while man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly
produces in freedom therefrom. A n animal produces only itself, while man
reproduces the whole of nature. 5

In contrast, the influence o f Merleau-Ponty led B o u r d i e u to emphasise the

corporality o f human behaviour and to emphasise the role o f consciousness
as an instrument o f adaptability. Marx's distinction b e t w e e n 'human' and
'animal' behaviour was t o o facilely dualistic. B o u r d i e u was inclined to b e
m o r e Marxian than Marx: the position o f persons o n a spectrum o f animal/
human behaviour is itself a function o f their real condition - their in-
stinctiveness o r their consciousness are determined by their social being
rather than the reverse. Equally, the capacity to universalise is not o n e
which distinguishes m e n from animals but only s o m e m e n from others
corresponding with their social condition. It follows, finally, that the p r o -
duction o f 'art' is not an activity which distinguishes the human but, rather,
there is a spectrum o f arts and artifacts corresponding to the social condi-
tions o f their producers.
 Production, reception and reproduction 45

T h e legacy o f M a r x ' s thought about production, therefore, was confused.

A doctrinaire C o m m u n i s t interpretation that insisted rigidly o n a mechan-
ical relationship b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c bases and cultural superstructures pre-
vailed in G e r m a n y until it was challenged there for a short while from the
late 1920s until 1933 b y the Frankfurt S c h o o l . In spite o f his idealist philo-
sophical leanings, Lukacs a d o p t e d this ideological position in the w o r k that
he did in the U S S R b e t w e e n 1933 and 1944. It was against this doctrinaire
position that Sartre began to formulate a f o r m o f Marxist existentialism
which e n d e a v o u r e d to graft a belief in the role o f human consciousness in
the p r o d u c t i o n o f society o n to the tradition o f dialectical materialism that
was still upheld b y the political Stalinists.
M a r x ' s German Ideology and Paris Manuscripts of 1844 did not appear
in French until 1937 and w e r e largely ignored until after 1945. Poster has
emphasised the role played b y Jean H y p p o l i t e in introducing the w o r k o f
H e g e l and M a r x t o France from his translation o f H e g e l ' s Phenomenology
of Spirit ( b e t w e e n 1939 and 1941) through to his tudes sur Marx et Hegel
(1955). T h e recent availability o f s o m e o f the w o r k s o f the y o u n g Marx and
H y p p o l i t e ' s Hegelian representation o f M a r x c o m b i n e d to prepare the way
for a revision o f doctrinaire Marxism. W h e r e a s the doctrinaire position still
emphasised that superstructures were determined b y e c o n o m i c bases, mind
by matter, in o p p o s i t i o n there was a r e n e w e d interest in explaining the
mechanisms o f a historical dialectic.
Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique was published in 1960 in Paris.
After the war there had b e e n a series o f Communist attacks o n Sartre's
existentialism culminating in Lukacs's Existentialisme ou marxisme (1948).
Sartre c o n t e n d e d that existentialism advocated the exercise o f freedom
whilst the French Communist Party required unquestioning acceptance o f
the d o g m a o f dialectical materialism. Wishing, nevertheless, to b e politically
engaged and sympathetic to the political goals o f the Communists, Sartre
sought to w o r k out a philosophical position which reconciled his belief in
freedom with his commitment to a progressive and materialist view o f
history. Sartre did not want to ignore the role o f writers and intellectuals in
effecting the progress o f materialism. This meant that, for Sartre, the
production o f art was instrumental in the process o f producing social change.
Whereas Lukacs had conceived the function o f a novelist like Scott as being
almost unconsciously to articulate the hidden forces in society which were
driving it forward, Sartre, by contrast, sought to emphasise the role o f
the writer in bringing historical changes into existence. Instead o f seeing the
writer as a participatory facilitator o f materialist change, Sartre saw the
writer as a detached, idealist mentor w h o is capable o f transcending his o w n
social situation and o f projecting his transcendent vision by co-opting the
free participation o f readers. Consequently, for Sartre, novels were not to b e
seen as inert 'totalities' offering representations o f complete and completed
realities, but as 'totalisations' - moments in the process o f bringing the
writer's transcendence o f his o w n situation into social existence through
the constantly renewable 'completions' made by readers.
46 Bourdieu and culture

Like the Hegelian y o u n g Marx, Sartre presented the production o f art as

the action o f consciousness which operated as a g o - b e t w e e n b e t w e e n mind
and matter in the dialectically materialist progress o f history. In wanting to
c o m b a t the view that art is a mechanical, superstructural reflection o f
material conditions, Sartre argued that art - operating through conscious-
ness - is active in shaping the material w o r l d - Sartre sustained a dualistic
attitude which, therefore, refused to admit that art functions within society,
sometimes reflectively and sometimes proactively.
B o u r d i e u was later to use his response t o Sartre's five-volume study o f
Flaubert, L'Idiot de la famille, 1821-57, published b e t w e e n 1966 and 1972,
to articulate fully a critique o f Sartre's account o f social and cultural p r o -
d u c t i o n . In the mid-1960s, h o w e v e r , B o u r d i e u recognised that Touraine's
6

ideas o f agency and social action implied a view o f the production o f

society that was akin to Sartre's. ' U n e sociologie d e l'action est-elle poss-
i b l e ? ' (1966) was a review o f Touraine's Sociologie de l'action ( 1 9 6 5 ) .
7 8

B o u r d i e u quotes Touraine's view that 'Through labour, man constructs,

out o f nature and against nature, a social world; he creates a universe o f
human products and b e c o m e s conscious o f himself in his relation with
these w o r k s ' . F o r Touraine, ' m e n make their o w n h i s t o r y ' through la-
9 10

b o u r just as, for Sartre, they d o so through the exercise o f rationality. T h e

agents o f this productivity are 'historical subjects', but, according to B o u r -
dieu, they are not empirical agents so much as manifestations of, in T o u r -
aine's words, 'the emergent structure o f a totalizing activity, the unity o f
the dialectical m o v e m e n t s o f historical a c t i o n ' . It is readily possible t o see
11

why B o u r d i e u was anxious to clarify that Touraine's c o n c e p t i o n o f socially

productive labour was different from his o w n emergent view o f social
practice o r 'le sens pratique'. B o u r d i e u c o m m e n t e d in conclusion that ' T h e
historical subject secularizes the Hegelian Spirit, o r matches the determi-
nisms o f the dialectical reason o f J.P. Sartre, but the fundamental objective
is the s a m e ' .
12

T h e Marxisms o f Sartre and Touraine were different in privileging the

sociohistorical function of, for the former, intellectuals and, for the latter,
labour, but they were b o t h attempts to offer a n e w interpretation o f dialec-
tical materialism. Sartre and Touraine b o t h tried to offer an explanation o f
the ways in which conscious human action contrived to actualise a histor-
ical process which was, in any case, independently necessary. T h e notion o f
dialectical progress required that the terms o f the dialectic should have
a u t o n o m o u s existence. A u t o n o m o u s , 'free' agents related dialectically with
a u t o n o m o u s matter. Producers were separate from their productions.
It is clear that Bourdieu's developing concepts - particularly o f habitus
and 'field' - were directly antagonistic to Hegelianised versions o f Marx-
ism. T h e c o n c e p t o f 'field' was to provide a substitute for Marx's ' e c o n o m i c
structures' in mediating between beings and superstructures. F o r B o u r d i e u ,
there was only ontological base and objectivated fields. T h e c o n c e p t o f
habitus enabled B o u r d i e u to insist, h o w e v e r , that beings are not essences
but have biological existence. T h e producers o f structures d o not have
 Production, reception and reproduction 47

a u t o n o m y . T h e y p r o d u c e in a c c o r d a n c e with the ways in which they them-

selves w e r e p r o d u c e d and in relation to p r o d u c e d structures. Producers
necessarily r e p r o d u c e , not in the sense that they replicate something that
has already existed but in the sense that they are caught up in a process o f
constant reproduction. B o u r d i e u ' s theory o f reproduction is a Marxist
theory o f p r o d u c t i o n from which the dialectic has b e e n exorcised.
Whilst B o u r d i e u was m o v i n g towards a theory o f reproduction in o p p o -
sition to the revisionist Marxist theories o f production, another view o f
M a r x was gaining ascendancy. In the early 1960s, Althusser initiated a new
approach t o the study o f Marx. Reacting against the postwar Hegelian,
existentialist and p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l readings o f Marx, Althusser sys-
tematically applied, instead, an analytical p r o c e d u r e derived from Bach-
elard t o the study o f Marx's texts. In Pour Marx (1965), Althusser
assembled articles and papers written in the previous five years. His main
contention was that there was a 'break' - a 'coupure pistmologique' in
Bachelard's phrase - in Marx's w o r k at about the time o f The German
Ideology such that M a r x m o v e d from producing political philosophy to
producing political 'science'. O n e o f Althusser's main followers was Pierre
M a c h e r e y w h o p r o v i d e d a contribution to V o l u m e 1 o f Lire le Capital
(1965) which sought to analyse the way in which Marx had contrived to
present Le Capital as 'science'. It was a detailed textual study o f the o p e n -
ing section o f M a r x ' s text and M a c h e r e y insisted that in concentrating o n
this c o m m e n c e m e n t

What we have to confront right at the outset is not, as one might by deduction,
the way Marx's discourse continues, but completely the opposite: what precedes
it, its conditions. Thus the question posed in this reading of a paragraph seems
quite simple: in what respect is Marx's discourse scientific? And can we read the
imprint of this in the introduction? 13

M a c h e r e y argues that Marx did not present his text as science in accord-
ance with the way in which science was already understood. H e wanted '
. . . simultaneously t o constitute a certain idea o f science and realise a
scientific d i s c o u r s e ' . F o r this reason, according to M a c h e r e y , it is not
14

possible to extrapolate from the text a Marxist theory o f science. Rather,

The theories go with their practice; you need to embark on the path of this
practice in order to trace that of the theory which alone explains the practice. In
this way we can already see in what way Marx breaks with a certain conception, a
classical presentation of science. 15

Althusser and M a c h e r e y attempted to effect an epistemological break with

their c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophical context b y reading into Marx the view
that he had historically effected an epistemological break. F o r M a c h e r e y , it
was the c o n t e m p o r a r y j o b o f the philosopher to identify the discourse
claims which texts might m a k e for themselves, ' . . . to study in what condi-
tions, and for what conditions scientific p r o b l e m s are p o s e d ' . 1 6
48 Bourdieu and culture

It was Bourdieu's v i e w that Macherey's approach preserved the func-

1 7

tion o f the philosopher as arbiter o f the scientificity o f social science writing

o r o f the 'literariness' o f literature. Macherey's formulation in Lire le Capi-
tal, h o w e v e r , was ambiguous. Because M a c h e r e y ' s analysis was about Marx
and, therefore, b y implication, about the way in which M a r x constructed a
science o f human history which assigned primacy to the influence o f the
progressive transformations o f the means o f material production, it was
assumed that Macherey's approach was itself materialist and Marxist. T h e
title o f M a c h e r e y ' s next b o o k - Pour une thorie de la production littraire
(1966) - c o m p o u n d e d this confusion although a reading o f the text quickly
clarifies the situation. In the passage q u o t e d a b o v e , M a c h e r e y argues that it
is the task o f the philosopher to analyse the conditions in which scientific
p r o b l e m s are ' p o s e d ' . H e might have written ' p r o d u c e d ' , but he should
have written 'constructed'. In other words, M a c h e r e y ' s language falsely
gives the impression that he is interested in analysing - as a social scientist
o r social historian - the material conditions o f the production o f science o r
literature. O n the contrary, M a c h e r e y is interested in analysing philo-
sophically h o w texts construct for themselves the field o r discourse within
which they wish to b e received. H e is interested in h o w texts position
themselves rather than in the s o c i o e c o n o m i c conditions which might b e
thought to determine the parameters within which that position-taking can
occur. In all this, M a c h e r e y follows Bachelard rather m o r e than Marx.
In as much as M a c h e r e y d o e s follow Bachelard, he says much with which
B o u r d i e u w o u l d b e in agreement. M a c h e r e y argued that it was crucial to
make a distinction between ' . . . criticism as appreciation (the education o f
taste), and criticism as k n o w l e d g e (the "science o f literary p r o d u c t i o n " ) .
T h e former is normative and invokes rules; the latter is speculative and
formulates laws. T h e o n e is an art, a technique (in the strict sense). T h e
other is a s c i e n c e ' . Bourdieu w o u l d certainly agree with the basic distinc-
18

tion, although he w o u l d reject M a c h e r e y ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f science as stated

here. B o u r d i e u advocates a scientific analysis o f culture rather than the
d e v e l o p m e n t o f 'taste' and, indeed, La Distinction precisely seeks to sub-
ject 'taste' to scientific scrutiny, but B o u r d i e u d o e s not o p p o s e art to
science nor d o e s he suppose that science 'formulates laws'. It should b e the
'craft' o f the social scientist to analyse, within the rules o f his o w n practice,
the methods o f self-regulation constructed b y other cultural practices -
19

whether they are rules o f 'taste' o r o f 'science'.

Relatedly, M a c h e r e y suggests that the task o f the scientist o f literary
production involves the construction o f a n e w scientificity in relation to
texts, distinguished from empirical literary criticism:

Knowledge is not the discovery or reconstruction of a latent meaning, forgotten

or concealed. It is something newly raised up, an addition to the reality from
which it begins . . . Let us say, provisionally, that the critic, employing a new
language, brings out a difference within the work by demonstrating that it is
other than it is.20
 Production, reception and reproduction 49

It has t o b e recognised that the same principle applies to the texts under
scrutiny. A newly constructed science o f literature must analyse texts as
themselves n e w constructions. This explains why structuralist thinking has
b e e n so misleading. M a c h e r e y writes:

If we are to make sense of the concept of structure it must be with the recogni-
tion that structure is neither a property of the object nor a feature of its rep-
resentation: the work does not derive from the unity of an intention which
permeates it, nor from its conformity to an autonomous model. 21

B o u r d i e u c o u l d not have better expressed his reservations about structural-

ism, rejecting, like M a c h e r e y , the notion that actions are g o v e r n e d either
by prior structural intention o r b y any immanent purposiveness. T h e dif-
ference, o f course, is that M a c h e r e y considers that texts behave strategically
whereas B o u r d i e u regards 'texts' as s y m b o l i c counters d e p l o y e d strate-
gically b y p e o p l e in the process o f maneouvring socially for positions o f
p o w e r and status.
M a c h e r e y d o e s not discount the role o f the author as producer, but he
contends that the defining characteristic o f a new, a u t o n o m o u s science o f
literature must b e that it treats literature as itself a u t o n o m o u s :

The specificity of the work is also its autonomy: in so far as it is self-elaborating it

is a law unto itself and acknowledges only an intrinsic standard, an autonomous
necessity. This is why literary works ought to be the object of a specific science:
otherwise they will never be understood. 22

M a c h e r e y ' s concentration o n texts is a strategic limitation. H e insists that

'autonomy must not be confused with independence' 23
and c o m m e n t s that a
b o o k ' . . . is, like all products, a second reality, though it d o e s have its o w n
l a w s ' . F o r B o u r d i e u , h o w e v e r , this recognition is inadequate. M a c h e r e y ' s
24

new science o f literature is misguided because it represents ' a u t o n o m y ' as

an absolute, a-historical quality o f 'literature'. It d o e s not a c k n o w l e d g e that
the extent t o which art presents itself as a u t o n o m o u s is a function o f the
d e g r e e o f its d e p e n d e n c y o n non-artistic conditions. B y studying all literary
' p r o d u c t i o n ' as if it w e r e a u t o n o m o u s , M a c h e r e y failed to realise that 'real
e c o n o m i c conditions p r o d u c e variable degrees o f a u t o n o m y within which
various kinds o f literature may then b e p r o d u c e d .
A f o l l o w e r o f B a c h e l a r d as m u c h as was M a c h e r e y , B o u r d i e u saw 2 5

the n e e d t o construct a n e w social science o f cultural p r o d u c t i o n - o n e

which w o u l d have the capacity t o identify the social function o f the w h o l e
range o f cultural forms rather than o n e which assumed the a u t o n o m y and
privileged status o f Literature. A f o l l o w e r o f the M a r x w h o m the
Althusserians sought t o discredit as 'pre-Marxist', B o u r d i e u sought to
establish a s c i e n c e o f cultural forms in their relations to the prevailing
c o n d i t i o n s o f social b e i n g rather than supposing that they w e r e reflections
o f m o d e s o f material p r o d u c t i o n . In d o i n g this, B o u r d i e u a u t o n o m i s e d
s y m b o l i c e x c h a n g e as social rather than e c o n o m i c e x c h a n g e . In this
50 Bourdieu and culture

a u t o n o m i s e d field, cultural p r o d u c t i o n operates in e x c h a n g e with cultural

reception.
In spite o f the trappings o f Althusserian radicalism, M a c h e r e y ' s views
can b e regarded as fundamentally conservative. His insistence o n the c o n -
struction o f a science o f literary production can b e seen as an attempt to
stabilise the significance o f an unquestioned c a n o n o f texts and to k e e p shut
the floodgates which held back a plurality o f unscientific and individual
textual interpretations. M a c h e r e y had n o way o f answering why he should
not b e considering fashion as discourse as scientifically as the novels o f
Jules V e r n e . It was just assumed that the novels merited the kind
o f philosophical attention that he advocated. His analysis o f the production
o f literature was carried out o n texts which were already socially desig-
nated as 'literature' within a wider cultural context, but that prior value
judgement was not regarded as a p r o p e r object o f attention. W h a t c o n -
stituted itself as literature c o u l d b e philosophically determined and, hence,
M a c h e r e y ' s approach proscribed h e t e r o d o x textual interpretations.
A c c o r d i n g to Lecourt, the events o f M a y 1968 shattered the Althusserian
Marxism which had dominated the French Left throughout that d e c a d e .
Describing the background to his writing o f L'pistmologie historique de
Gaston Bachelard in the autumn o f 1968, Lecourt writes in the introduction
to the later English translation that, after M a y o f that year,

. . . there arose the ultra-left breeze which, its voice slowly growing stronger,
took up the same arguments in a different tone. The very term science soon
seemed suspect, on the pretext that in our society the sciences are enrolled in the
service of capital: Althusser was found guilty of having wished to apply it to
Marxism; this was seen as the hallmark of his theoreticism, the proof of his
revisionism. 26

T h e attempt m a d e b y Althusser and M a c h e r e y to amalgamate Bachelard

and Marx had distorted Bachelard's historical epistemology as m u c h as
Marx's political philosophy, and L e c o u r t sought to 'disentangle' these el-
ements. It was in 1968, also, that B o u r d i e u and Passeron published Le
Mtier de sociologue which advocated the cultivation o f reflexive scien-
tificity - the production o f 'science' which remains constantly conscious o f
the social conditions o f its existence. B o u r d i e u was in sympathy with
M a c h e r e y ' s wish to emphasise the scientific explanation o f literary p h e n o -
mena, but this involved, as it did not for Macherey, a full sociological
agenda. It entailed, first o f all, a social historical analysis o f the structures o f
tastes and value judgements which caused certain past works to b e offered
as 'literature' for the reception o f future generations. It entailed, secondly,
a sociological explanation o f the different ways in which that literature is
received in the present. Bourdieu's scientific agenda required, finally, that
sociologists should b e systematically reflexive in order to explain b o t h their
social historical constructions o f the contexts o f past literary production
and their o w n peculiar positions within the structure o f contemporary
responses to the historical literary legacy. In Bourdieu's terminology,
 Production, reception and reproduction 51

M a c h e r e y was arguing that the meanings o f texts had to b e appreciated

within the field o f meaning which they themselves proclaimed. E v e n
though M a c h e r e y w r o t e against the interpretation o f texts, he nevertheless
uncritically assumed that it was the function o f philosophers, writing within
the field o f philosophical discourse, t o interpret the fields to which texts
might b e l o n g . B y contrast, B o u r d i e u ' s approach enabled him to offer a
sociological account o f the ways in which diverse cultural products -
including literary texts - w e r e , and are, situated within their particular
fields and, at the same time, to offer an identically sociological account o f
the c o n t e m p o r a r y status o f the sociological field itself. H e was able to
situate his analysis o f culture within culture whereas M a c h e r e y ' s analyses
left the supremacy o f philosophical discourse unchallenged. M a c h e r e y ' s
shortcoming was that he sought to apply Bachelard's historical epistemol-
o g y a-historically, whereas B o u r d i e u attempts t o follow through the logic
o f Bachelard's historicity in b e c o m i n g c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y reflexive.

Production/Reception

U n d e r the influence o f forces similar to those which surfaced in Paris in

M a y 1968, an approach to literature was d e v e l o p i n g in G e r m a n y that
sought to understand cultural p r o d u c t i o n in a c o m p l e t e l y non-Marxist
manner. In 1967, H . R . Jauss gave an inaugural lecture at the University o f
Konstanz entitled Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissen-
schaft (Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory) which was p u b -
lished in G e r m a n in 1970 and which subsequently appeared in French in
1978 in Pour une esthtique de la rception. W i t h his colleague, W o l f g a n g
Iser, w h o s e Der Akt des Lesens. Thorie sthetischer Wirkung (The Act of
Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response) was published in 1976, Jauss
established what was to b e k n o w n as the Konstanz S c h o o l o f criticism.
Joseph Jurt has suggested that the inaugural lecture was inspired b y 'the
new life which breathed in this n e w university beside L a k e Constance, an
institution destined at the time to b e c o m e a G e r m a n H a r v a r d ' and he has
27

indicated the strategies a d o p t e d in the early 1970s to ensure that 'reception

theory' effected a paradigm shift in literary studies in higher education
institutions throughout G e r m a n y . W i t h the hindsight gained by 1985, the
editor o f the French translation o f Iser's The Act of Reading - Pierre
Mardaga - was prepared to argue that the novelty o f the Konstanz ap-
p r o a c h to literature 'derived from the historical situation o f the G e r m a n
universities in the 1 9 6 0 s ' . T h e increasing dmocratisation o f the univer-
28

sity institutions generated the situation in which the presumed literary

c a n o n was called into question. A s Mardaga puts it: ' T h e question o f the
d e v e l o p m e n t o f the tradition and its conservation was p o s e d m o r e and
m o r e pressingly mainly because the scientific approach to literature found
itself increasingly incapable o f coping with conflicts o f interpretation.' 29

Rather than seek to establish new, philosophical grounds for differentiating

52 Bourdieu and culture

'literature' and for outlawing interpretation altogether, in the manner o f

M a c h e r e y , the Konstanz School sought, instead, systematically to incorpor-
ate the diversity o f responses into the literary canon. Jauss's inaugural
lecture was the key manifesto. It was n o longer possible, he claimed, to
write the kind o f literary history offered b y those late nineteenth-century
critics w h o s e goal had b e e n ' . . . to represent, through the history o f the
products o f its literature, the essence o f a national entity in pursuit o f
i t s e l f . Nationalistic literary history was n o longer possible and, c o n s e -
30

quently, it was n o longer possible to practise positivist literary historical

research that assumed that the facts o f a nation's literary history existed
independently o f historical value judgements. Jauss argued that

In effect, the value and status of a literary work are neither deducible from the
biographical or historical circumstances of its conception, nor from the simple
place which it occupies in the evolution of a genre, but from criteria which are
much more difficult to handle: the effect produced, 'reception', the influence
exercised, and the value recognised by posterity. 31

Jauss p r o c e e d e d to present his theory o f reception as a middle way b e -

tween, o n the o n e hand, the extraneous, mimetic orientation o f Marxist
theory and, o n the other, the internal, textual focus o f the formalists. Jauss
p r o p o s e d seven guiding theses. H e insisted, first o f all, that the historian o f
literature 'must himself always b e c o m e again a reader b e f o r e being able to
understand and situate a w o r k ' . This involves 'founding his o w n j u d g e -
3 2

ment o n his consciousness o f his situation in the historical chain o f succes-

sive r e a d e r s ' . Jauss takes care differently in his s e c o n d thesis to ensure
33

that the interpretation o f the contemporary reader historian cannot b e

wilfully individualistic. N o t only must the present reader b e aware o f his
position in the tradition o f previous readers, but he must also recopstruct
the horizon d'attente - the attention parameters - o f the first public o f the
w o r k , a reconstruction which, for Jauss, involves, amongst other things, an
appreciation o f the prior k n o w l e d g e o f the w o r k ' s genre that might b e
presupposed in its first readership. B y reconstructing this horizon d'attente,
Jauss argues, in the third thesis, that the historian establishes the data b y
which he can gauge the extent to which a w o r k succeeds in its effect in
changing the horizon out o f which it emerged. T h e impact o f the w o r k , its
immediate o r posthumous reputation, b e c o m e criteria for evaluating its
achievement. M o s t importantly, the reconstitution o f the horizon ensures
that evaluative criteria are not anachronistically e m p l o y e d or, even m o r e ,
that there is n o critical recourse to a-temporal aesthetic qualities inherent
in works that are accessible a-temporally to readers at all times.
Without referring further to Jauss's remaining theses, it is immediately
clear that the extraordinary p r o g r a m m e which he p r o p o s e d was a blueprint
for a n e w academic exclusivity. Threatened b o t h b y the disrespect o f the
y o u n g generation o f students for the established literary c a n o n and b y their
interpretative libertarianism, an academic scholar sought to legitimate his
academicism by arguing that a correct way o f receiving a text might b e
 Production, reception and reproduction 53

attained b y knowing the history o f all previous receptions. F o r Jauss, the

meanings o f texts are p r o d u c e d b y readers. T h e texts d o not reflect the
material conditions o f their production as in doctrinaire Marxism, nor d o
the intersubjectively acquired meanings derived from the encounter b e -
tween authors and readers i m p o s e themselves dialectically, as for Sartre,
o n material history. Instead, readers are m e m b e r s o f an a u t o n o m o u s , trans-
historical community. Textual readings are c o c o o n e d . Current readings are
informed b y past readings without, in either case, any reference to their
social conditions. Jauss's field o f literature, to use B o u r d i e u ' s term, is en-
tirely self-referential.
A l t h o u g h normally regarded as the c o - f o u n d e r o f 'reception theory',
W o l f g a n g Iser distanced himself from the original manifesto statement o f
his senior colleague. In the Preface to Der Akt des Lesens, Iser was quite
explicit that his b o o k offered a theory o f aesthetic response (Wirkungs-
theorie)
34
rather than o n e o f reception (Rezeptionstheorie). Without
mentioning Jauss, Iser's theoretical distinction is clearly an act o f
differentiation:

. . . a theory of aesthetic response is confronted with the problem of how a

hitherto unformulated situation can be processed and, indeed, understood. A
theory of reception, on the other hand, always deals with existing readers, whose
reactions testify to certain historically conditioned experiences of literature.
A theory of response has its roots in the text; a theory of reception arises from a
history of readers' judgements. 35

T h e distinction, h o w e v e r , is not primarily b e t w e e n 'response' and 'recep-

tion', but rather o n e b e t w e e n actual o r potential responses/receptions.
Iser's interest is not in the empirical reader. His theory d o e s not d e p e n d
u p o n information about h o w previous readers might actually have re-
s p o n d e d to a text. H e usefully clarifies the categories o f reader that have
often b e e n i n v o k e d in literary criticism:

In the first instance, we have the 'real' reader, known to us by his documented
reactions; in the second, we have the 'hypothetical' reader, upon whom all
possible actualizations of the text may be projected. The latter category is fre-
quently subdivided into the so-called ideal reader and the contemporary
reader. 36

Iser p r o c e e d s to elaborate these subdivisions in the following way. T h e r e

are, he argues, three types o f ' c o n t e m p o r a r y ' reader: ' . . . the o n e real and
historical, drawn from existing documents, and the other t w o hypothetical:
the first constructed from social and historical k n o w l e d g e o f the time, and
the s e c o n d extrapolated from the reader's role laid d o w n in the t e x t . ' B y 37

contrast, the 'oft-quoted ideal reader' is a 'structural impossibility' because

An ideal reader would have to have an identical code to that of the author;
authors, however, generally recodify prevailing codes in their texts, and so the
54 Bourdieu and culture

ideal reader would also have to share the intentions underlying this process. And
if this were possible, communication would then be quite superfluous, for one
only communicates that which is not already shared by sender and receiver. 38

Iser expresses his dissatisfaction with all these concepts o f the reader b e -
cause they are all basically c o n c e r n e d with the 'results p r o d u c e d rather
than with the structure o f effects, which causes and is responsible for these
results'. Instead, Iser contends that the theory o f aesthetic response en-
39

tails an analysis o f texts o n the understanding that they presuppose p o t e n -

tial readership without predetermining actual readers. A n indeterminate
reader is present in every text, and every act o f reading actualises this
potential being differently. ' F o r want o f a better term', Iser calls this latent
being the 'implied reader' w h o

. . . embodies all those predispositions necessary for a literary work to exercise

its effect - predispositions laid down, not by an empirical outside reality, but by
the text itself. Consequently, the implied reader as a concept has his roots firmly
planted in the structure of the text; he is a construct and in no way to be
identified with any real reader.40

In spite o f the emphasis o f this last sentence, Iser is not saying, as M a c h e r e y

might, that texts p r o d u c e their effects. This was a variant o f 'reception
theory' d e v e l o p e d at the time b y East G e r m a n Marxist critics w h o argued
that texts offer a structured prefigurement (Rezeptionsvorgabe) o f their
reception. F o r Iser, this term ' . . . relates only to discernible textual struc-
tures and completely ignores the dynamic act which elicits the response t o
those structures'. Concentration o n the response elicited is equally an
41

error - the 'affective fallacy'. Iser instead advocates the analysis o f the
encounter ('the dynamic act') b e t w e e n the 'textual structure' which c o n -
tains the implied reader and the 'structured act' o f the respondent which
actualises what is implicit. T h e theory o f aesthetic response, in other w o r d s ,
uses the text to generate a p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f affectivity o r intersubjec-
tivity which, after the manner o f Husserl, brackets b o t h the referentiality o f
the text and the psychology o f the reader. Significantly, Iser himself sums
up his position b y saying that the c o n c e p t o f the implied reader 'is a
transcendental m o d e l ' and b y quoting in his support from a 1960 text o n
4 2

the p h e n o m e n o l o g y and psychology o f perspective in which the author -

C F . Graumann - claimed:

The observing subject and the represented object have a particular rela-
tionship one to the other; the 'subject-object relationship' merges into the
perspective way of representation. It also merges into the observer's way of
seeing; for just as the artist organizes his representation according to the
standpoint of an observer, the observer - because of this very technique of
representation - finds himself directed toward a particular view which more or
less obliges him to search for the one and only standpoint that will correspond
to that view.43
 Production, reception and reproduction 55

Iser used this passage as e v i d e n c e that his c o n c e p t i o n o f textual structure

f o l l o w e d 'a basic rule o f human perception, as our views o f the world are
always o f a perspective n a t u r e . ' Iser's theory tended towards a transcen-
44

dental p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f consciousness, identifying the function o f litera-

ture in the universal, Overall make-up o f m a n ' - a tendency confirmed by
4 5

his most recent Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary Anthropol-

ogy ( 1 9 8 9 ) . W e have seen that B o u r d i e u ' s philosophical 'fieldwork' in
4 6

A l g e r i a had b e e n motivated b y an attempt to offer a p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f

'affective life'. D u r i n g the 1960s, B o u r d i e u was c o m i n g t o realise that the
meanings o f myths and rituals w e r e socially constructed b y the participat-
ing actors and that linguistic meaning generally was performative. A w a y
from his empirical ethnography, the p r o b l e m o f understanding the mean-
ings o f cultural actions was not just o n e o f observation. It was also o n e o f
transhistorical interpretation. W h e n B o u r d i e u started t o reflect o n our
current understanding o f past culture, he was f o r c e d t o consider b o t h the
ways in which meanings w e r e intersubjectively created in history and the
nature o f our current intersubjective relations with those historical mean-
ings. Since he was hostile t o the kind o f transcendental p h e n o m e n o l o g y to
which Iser's w o r k was tending, B o u r d i e u e x p l o r e d simultaneously both a
descriptive p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the process o f p r o d u c t i o n and reception by
which historical literature o r art was established and a descriptive p h e n o -
m e n o l o g y o f the process b y which w e currently understand past texts or
pictures.

Production/Reception as Reproduction

B o u r d i e u first discussed the relationship b e t w e e n p r o d u c t i o n and reception

in history in ' C h a m p intellectuel et projet crateur' which appeared in a
n u m b e r o f Les Temps modernes o f 1966 d e v o t e d to ' P r o b l e m s o f structural-
ism'. B o u r d i e u argued his case concretely:

It is possible to see, from the history of Western intellectual and artistic life, how
the intellectual field (and at the same time the intellectual, as distinct from the
scholar, for instance) gradually came into being in a particular type of historical
society. As the areas of human activity became more clearly differentiated, an
intellectual order in the true sense, dominated by a particular type of legitimacy,
began to define itself in opposition to the economic, political and religious
powers, that is, all the authorities who could claim the right to legislate on
cultural matters in the name of a power or authority which was not properly
speaking intellectual. 47

D r a w i n g extensively o n L . L . Schucking's The Sociology of Literary Taste

for detailed i n f o r m a t i o n , B o u r d i e u argues that
48

There began to appear specific authorities of selection and consecration that were
intellectual in the proper sense (even if, like publishers and theatre managers,
56 Bourdieu and culture

they were still subjected to economic and social restrictions which therefore
continued to influence intellectual life), and which were placed in a situation of
competition for cultural legitimacy. 49

A l t h o u g h n o precise date o r p e r i o d is given, the argument is that at s o m e

point towards the end o f the seventeenth century, writers and thinkers
succeeded in establishing a market for their works and ideas which was
independent o f the influences - whether religious, aristocratic o r e c o n o m i c
- which had hitherto prevailed in controlling value judgements and in
making o r breaking reputations. A t a particular point in western E u r o p e a n
history, an a u t o n o m o u s intellectual o r cultural field established itself in
competition with other fields in a society that had b e c o m e structurally
differentiated. This occurrence within a b r o a d historical p e r i o d was, for
B o u r d i e u , comparable with the competition that he had already e m -
pirically e x p o s e d between the consecrated field o f art gallery art and the
emergent field o f photographic art. It was also comparable in history with
his o w n experience in seeking to construct the self-regulating and self-
legitimating field o f sociology in intellectual competition with the 'external'
control exercised b y consecrated Philosophy.
M u c h o f the remainder o f this article was d e v o t e d to a consideration o f
the nature o f the conditions that m a d e possible different degrees o f e m -
phasis o f intellectual and cultural autonomy - especially the extreme case
o f the e m e r g e n c e o f an i d e o l o g y o f 'art for art's sake'. T h e main point here,
h o w e v e r , is that B o u r d i e u articulated clearly b y reference t o the nineteenth
century his view that the production and reception o f intellectual and
cultural artifacts is to b e seen as a strategy whereby distinct social groups
have sustained their distinction and r e p r o d u c e d themselves. T h e analysis o f
the historical d e v e l o p m e n t o f secular culture is, therefore, n o different in
kind from the analysis of, for instance, the aristocracy o r the clergy.
In the year o f the M a y events, B o u r d i e u published 'Outline o f a s o c i o -
logical theory o f art perception'. T h e article was an attempt to understand
sociologically the ways in which w e respond in the present t o w o r k s o f art
o f the past which, as B o u r d i e u had already argued, were themselves the
products o f a reciprocal process o f production and reception in history. A s
in La Reproduction which was to follow in 1970, B o u r d i e u here advances
his argument b y a set o f propositions, beginning with the statement that
' A n y art perception involves a conscious o r unconscious deciphering o p e r -
ation . . . ' 5 0
followed immediately b y a characterisation o f the situation
which Iser had regarded as a 'structural impossibility' and which B o u r d i e u
labels later as an 'unrecognized special case':

1.1. A n act of deciphering unrecognized as such, immediate and adequate

'comprehension' is possible and effective only in the special case in which the
cultural code which makes the act of deciphering possible is immediately and
completely mastered by the observer (in the form of cultivated ability or
inclination) and merges with the cultural code which has rendered the work
perceived possible. 51
 Production, reception and reproduction 57

B o u r d i e u posits first o f all the hypothetical extreme case o f a c o m m u n i c a -

tive p r o c e s s in which the meaning received is identical with the meaning
offered. H e d o e s this in order to assert that this (impossible) harmony
w o u l d b e the c o n s e q u e n c e o f the identity o f c o d e s o f p r o d u c t i o n and recep-
tion rather than any intuitive empathy b e t w e e n a p r o d u c e r and a receiver.
This extreme case shows that B o u r d i e u applies t o the process o f perception
the same two-tiered a p p r o a c h as he d o e s t o the process o f production.
S o c i o e c o n o m i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d receivers have t o ' l o g o n ' t o the c o d e s to
which authors w e r e ' l o g g e d o n ' in producing their w o r k s . Since, however,
as Iser recognised, the perfect matching o f c o d e s o f p r o d u c t i o n and recep-
tion negates c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the actual situation is always o n e o f partial
misunderstanding. A s B o u r d i e u puts it:

. . . the illusion of immediate comprehension leads to an illusory comprehension

based on a mistaken code. In the absence of perception that the works are
coded, and coded in another code, one unconsciously applies the code which is
good for everyday perception, for the deciphering of familiar objects, to works in
a foreign tradition . . . 5 2

A l i e n c o d e s can b e learnt, and Bourdieu's second set o f propositions in

'Outline o f a sociological theory o f art perception' relate to the gradations o f
perception within c o d e s rather than to the categoral misapplication o f codes.
H e writes: ' A n y deciphering operation requires a m o r e o r less c o m p l e x c o d e
which has b e e n m o r e o r less completely m a s t e r e d . ' A n d he claims that
53

here, again, sociological observation is useful because, through it,

. . . it is possible to reveal, effectively realized, forms of perception correspond-

ing to the different levels which theoretical analysis frames by an abstract dis-
tinction. Any cultural asset, from cookery to dodecaphonic music by way of the
Wild West film, can be a subject for apprehension ranging from the simple,
actual sensation to scholarly appreciation. 54

T h e spectrum o f apprehension ranges from o n e which d e p l o y s 'art c o m p e t -

e n c e ' t o o n e which d e p l o y s 'artistic c o m p e t e n c e ' . A r t c o m p e t e n c e , Bour-
dieu says, ' . . . can b e provisionally defined as the preliminary k n o w l e d g e
o f the possible divisions into c o m p l e m e n t a r y classes o f a universe o f
representations . . . ' A r t objects can b e classified in accordance with the
5 5

dominant classification systems o f the day (Impressionist, post-

Impressionist, Cubist, Surrealist o r whatever) o r b y reference to everyday
classification systems w h e r e b y objects in pictures are apprehended by ref-
erence t o the dominant classification system o f 'real' objects that they are
taken t o represent. T h e first approach displays specific 'artistic' c o m p e t -
e n c e . B o u r d i e u gives the following example o f the distinction he is making:

In the first case the beholder is paying attention to the manner of treating the leaves
or the clouds, that is to say to the stylistic indications, locating the possibility realized,
characteristic of one class of works, by reference to the universe of stylistic
58 Bourdieu and culture

possibilities; in the other case, he is treating the leaves or the clouds as indications or
signals associated, according to the logic set forth above, with significations transcen-
dent to the representation itself ('that's a poplar', 'that's a storm').56

T h e degree o f art c o m p e t e n c e o f a person is, therefore, to b e measured b y

that person's capacity to appreciate the artificiality o f artifacts so as t o b e
able t o demonstrate artistic c o m p e t e n c e . T h e highest level o f art c o m p e t -
e n c e involves the recognition that the object o f apprehension, whether a
Czanne painting o r a U 2 concert, is a self-referential system which d e -
mands t o b e appreciated in its o w n terms. It is possible to differentiate
sociologically b e t w e e n the c o d e s which p e o p l e d e p l o y and, according t o
Bourdieu, equally possible t o differentiate sociologically within c o d e s . T h e
degree o f mastery o f any c o d e is measurable independent o f the supposed
hierarchical status o f that c o d e .
'Outline o f a sociological theory o f art p e r c e p t i o n ' offered an abstracted
summary o f the findings o f the cultural analysis undertaken b y B o u r d i e u
earlier in the 1960s. It provides a theoretical framework for understanding
the tendency o f Les Hritiers, Un art moyen and L'Amour de Vart. T h e
questionnaires given to students at the University o f Lille and at other
French universities at the beginning o f the d e c a d e had p r o v i d e d informa-
tion from which B o u r d i e u c o u l d correlate the artistic c o m p e t e n c e o f the
students with their s o c i o e c o n o m i c condition. Questions w e r e p o s e d in re-
spect o f a range o f cultural forms and each separate f o r m was represented
b y a c o m p l e t e spectrum o f practitioners. In effect, students were being
asked t o s h o w their capacity to distinguish b e t w e e n cultural c o d e s and t o
m a k e classifications within them. T h e conclusion o f Les Hritiers was that
those with l o w art c o m p e t e n c e or, to use the significantly different expres-
sion c o i n e d there, l o w 'cultural capital', should b e enabled t o acquire
higher c o m p e t e n c e . It should b e the function o f the educational system t o
initiate the uninitiated into the dominant scholarly culture. This, t o o , was
the conclusion o f L'Amour de l'art - it should b e the function o f schools to
inculcate the c o d e s which w o u l d thus enable all p e o p l e t o achieve s o m e
mastery o f the c o d e s d e p l o y e d b y the producers o f the artifacts exhibited in
museums and art galleries.
T h e conclusion o f 'Outline o f a sociological theory o f art p e r c e p t i o n '
makes the case for the function o f the school:

Only an institution like the school, the specific function of which is methodically
to develop or create the inclinations which produce an educated man and which
lay the foundations, quantitatively and consequently qualitatively, of a constant
and intense pursuit of culture, could offset (at least partially) the initial disadvan-
tage of those who do not receive from their family circle the encouragement to
undertake cultural activities and the competence presupposed in any disser-
tation on works . . . 5 7

W h e r e a s the approach o f the Konstanz S c h o o l required the initiation o f

students o f literature into the historical field o f literature in order that they
 Production, reception and reproduction 59

c o u l d b e c o m e valid readers, B o u r d i e u still saw it t o b e the function o f

schools in society t o initiate all students into all the artificially constructed
cultural c o d e s in operation in that society. Shortly after the publication o f
O u t l i n e o f a sociological theory o f art p e r c e p t i o n ' B o u r d i e u was t o embark
o n a revision o f Les Hritiers which was t o b e published in 1970 as La
Reproduction. T h e subtitle o f the French text was lments pour une
thorie du systme d'enseignement, but the English translation o f 1977 m o r e
accurately captured its spirit b y making the full title: Reproduction in Edu-
cation, Society and Culture. It had b e c o m e clear that although schools
might i m p r o v e the artistic c o m p e t e n c e o f pupils, they did so from a
perspective which assumed the supremacy o f s o m e cultural c o d e s o v e r
others. S c h o o l s w e r e not involved in improving c o m p e t e n c e which might
b e transferable b e t w e e n c o d e s but in sustaining the hierarchy o f c o d e s .
Whilst apparently raising the c o m p e t e n c e and consciousness o f all pupils,
the p e d a g o g i c process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n within the dominant cultural c o d e
was reproducing the social differences which w e r e manifest in different
c o d e s . A s c o d e s o f p e r c e p t i o n c a m e to b e seen as institutionalised 'fields',
schooling itself represented o n e mechanism o f codification within a society
c o n c e i v e d as the location o f c o m p e t i n g 'fields'.
T h e initial proposition o f La Reproduction in respect o f 'the twofold
arbitrariness o f p e d a g o g i c action' is well k n o w n . B o u r d i e u states: ' A l l
pedagogic action ( P A ) is, objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is the
imposition o f a cultural arbitrary b y an arbitary p o w e r . ' T h e 'gloss' which
5 8

follows is highly significant in clarifying that the education system is n o w

seen only as a particular manifestation o f general social behaviour:

The propositions which follow (up to and including those of the third degree)
refer to all PAs, whether exerted by all the educated members of a social
formation or group (diffuse education), by the family-group members to whom
the culture of a group or class allots this task (family education) or by the system
of agents explicitly mandated for this purpose by an institution directly or indi-
rectly, exclusively or partially educative in function (institutionalized education),
and unless otherwise stated, whether that P A seeks to reproduce the cultural
arbitrary of the dominant or of the dominated classes. In other words, the range
of these propositions is defined by the fact that they apply to any social forma-
tion, understood as a system of power relations and sense relations between
groups or classes. It follows that in the first three sections, we have refrained
from extensive use of examples drawn from the case of a dominant, school PA,
to avoid even implicitly suggesting any restrictions on the validity of the proposi-
tions concerning all P A s . 59

This contention that reproduction occurs within all a u t o n o m o u s fields o r

structures allows B o u r d i e u to specify the characteristics o f the educational
system:

Every institutionalized educational system (ES) owes the specific characteristics

of its structure and functioning to the fact that, by the means proper to the institu-
tion, it has to produce and reproduce the institutional conditions whose existence
60 Bourdieu and culture

and persistence (self-reproduction of the system) are necessary both to the exercise
of its essential function of inculcation and to the fulfilment of its function of
reproducing a cultural arbitrary which it does not produce (cultural reproduc-
tion), the reproduction of which contributes to the reproduction of the relations
between the groups or classes (social reproduction). 60

What followed from Bourdieu's 'placing' o f schooling was that he elevated

sociological awareness into a substitute for the traditional effect o f s c h o o l -
ing. T h e task o f the sociologist is t o understand the mechanisms o f p r o d u c -
tion and reception, t o understand that they c o n c e a l social reproduction,
and, b y that understanding, t o b e m o r e effective than schooling in making
all cultural c o m p e t e n c e s accessible t o e v e r y o n e . T h e task o f the practising
sociologist ( w h o is explicitly not in the business o f reproducing the science
which he d o e s not p r o d u c e ) is to p r o d u c e a scientific analysis o f all the
various strategies o f reproduction within society - just o n e o f which w o u l d
b e the educational reproduction o f social scientific k n o w l e d g e which the
practitioner might repudiate. A s B o u r d i e u put the situation at the begin-
ning o f 'Cultural reproduction and social reproduction': ' T h e specific role
o f the s o c i o l o g y o f education is assumed o n c e it has established itself as the
science o f the relations b e t w e e n cultural reproduction and social r e p r o d u c -
t i o n . ' O r , as he might m o r e clearly have stated, o n c e the s o c i o l o g y o f
61

education has established that it is not exclusively c o n c e r n e d with the

analysis o f the subset o f social operations which is labelled 'educational'.
This brief for the sociologist entails the generation o f ' T h e science o f the
reproduction o f structures, understood as a system o f objective relations
which impart their relational properties to individuals w h o m they pre-exist
and survive . . . ' 6 2

A l t h o u g h B o u r d i e u ' s thinking has s o m e affinity with that o f Jauss and

Iser, his emphasis o n the production o f such a science o f the reproduction
o f structures subsumes b o t h his o w n interpretation o f Marxist ' p r o d u c t i o n '
and 'reception' theories. B o u r d i e u argues that cultural fields are p r o d u c e d
b y human agents. T h e y d o not have a necessary existence. T h e y are c o n -
structed o r generated in history. Within these fields, a reciprocal process o f
production and reception d e v e l o p s . Artists internalise an 'implied reader'
in order to secure recognition within their field o f production. W h e r e a s ,
however, for Iser, the process o f current engagement with past texts can
disclose transcendence, B o u r d i e u simply sees the historical c o m m u n i c a t i o n
between authors and their implied readers as the mechanism b y which they
established the value o f their texts, and, b y doing s o , perpetuated a field
which w o u l d historically r e p r o d u c e itself in such a way that future particip-
ants in the field w o u l d regard those texts as canonical. A f t e r being c o n -
cerned with the point at which any cultural field is historically generated,
Bourdieu's interest then transfers t o the present status o f that field in its
sedimented form. T h e effect o f Jauss's approach was t o m a k e the study o f
the internal self-reproduction o f the field o f literary criticism o n e which
would b e c o m e constitutive o f legitimate textual interpretation in the pres-
ent. F o r Bourdieu, this w o u l d have b e e n an ultimately sophisticated f o r m
 Production, reception and reproduction 61

o f cultural reproduction. Rather than use cultural reproduction as the basis

for current cultural criticism, B o u r d i e u , instead, has tried t o e x p o s e the
extent t o which such forms o f literary critical incestuousness perpetuate a
social r e p r o d u c t i o n which is socially exclusive in the present.

Summary

I have suggested that B o u r d i e u ' s notion o f ' p r o d u c t i o n ' derived from the
amalgamation o f his observations o f the behaviour o f Algerian tribes with
his interpretation o f Marx. Using Marx's representation o f precapitalist
society, B o u r d i e u was able t o argue that the e c o n o m i c structures o f 'primi-
tive' societies, as m u c h as their s y m b o l i c , legislative, political o r religious
structures, o w e d their existence to their function in sustaining social c o -
herence. Emanating f r o m social being, their over-riding role was to main-
tain a primary social organisation. C o m b a t i n g b o t h those structuralists w h o
sought t o analyse structures formally as free-standing entities, and those
'Marxist' structuralists w h o sought to explain superstructures as the direct
functions o f material m o d e s o f p r o d u c t i o n , B o u r d i e u argued that individ-
uals in society are productive agents w h o p r o d u c e the structures they need
t o safeguard the originating social condition. T h e s e individual agents re-
ceive and biologically internalise structures which are inherited from the
p r o d u c t i o n o f previous generations, and, in turn, they take steps to c o n -
serve these inherited structures b y reproducing them in future generations.
T h e r e is, therefore, a p r o c e s s o f reproduction which o c c u r s intergenera-
tionally within structures, but it must not b e forgotten that these structures
themselves are not absolute. T h e y are the constantly modifying objective
mechanisms b y which individuals in society r e n e w themselves and preserve
the fabric o f their society. Social reproduction is the hidden agenda o f all
forms o f cultural reproduction.
T h r o u g h o u t the 1960s, B o u r d i e u articulated this position b y reference to
his understanding o f the 'undifferentiated' social organisation o f Algerian
tribes - a societal organisation which extended outwards in concentric
circles from a basic, d o m e s t i c unit without the disruptive intervention o f
rival seats o f p o w e r and authority. Customs which w e r e handed d o w n in
the family w e r e expressed without mediation in the customary practices o f
the w h o l e society. T h e habitus was the mechanism b y which the values o f
o n e generation w e r e e m b o d i e d in those o f the next. In undifferentiated
societies there was very little n e e d for these transmitted values to b e objec-
tified o r articulated at all. T h e r e is always the possibility that objective
structures b e c o m e self-fulfilling and, b y a process o f continuous inter-
generational reproduction, historically b e c o m e alienated from the social
needs which they first satisfied, but it is a characteristic o f undifferentiated
society that structures are not necessary. B o u r d i e u attempted to transpose
insights derived from his Algerian experience to analyse the 'differenti-
ated' organisation o f mainland France. A t first, the French educational
62 Bourdieu and culture

system assisted theoretically in this transposition because B o u r d i e u re-

garded it as an institutionalised habitus. T h e s c h o o l system was seen as a
catalyst in the process o f social reproduction. It was a functional substitute
for the family unit o f undifferentiated societies. B y compulsorily receiving
all children, the m o d e r n state schooling system a c c o m m o d a t e d all the d o -
mestic habitus in play in society - all the attitudes and values transmitted
intersubjectively and intergenerationally b e t w e e n parents and children at
h o m e . A t the same time, the schooling system - through its curriculum and
the associated educational qualifications - represented the range o f dif-
ferent, objective structures in differentiated society which n o w w e r e ab-
stracted from the domestic context. It represented intellectual divisions o f
k n o w l e d g e and the distinctions amongst professional and occupational
structures. T h e schooling system was seen t o mediate b e t w e e n the subjec-
tive and the objective where, in undifferentiated society, n o mediation had
b e e n thought necessary. A s a national, state-controlled system, the s c h o o l
system mediated b e t w e e n the totality o f society and the totality o f all
individual social agents. A s a state-financed system, it appeared t o fulfil the
function o f precapitalist reproduction b y operating as an a u t o n o m o u s sys-
t e m mediating b e t w e e n the primary social sphere and the secondary struc-
tures which society had historically generated t o preserve itself.
T o use the terms e m p l o y e d b y B o u r d i e u in O u t l i n e o f a sociological
theory o f art perception', the schooling system w o u l d render itself o b s o l e t e
in the 'unrecognised special case' where immediate c o m p r e h e n s i o n existed
as a result o f the identity between the c o d e s o f production and reception.
In this hypothetical instance, differentiated society w o u l d have reverted t o
an undifferentiated state. T h e real situation in differentiated society is,
h o w e v e r , that all m e m b e r s o f society display varying degrees o f mastery
o v e r the c o d e s in which their social heritage is expressed. F r o m the m o -
ment w h e n c o d e s first b e c o m e objectified, c o m m u n i c a t i o n ceases t o b e
natural and b e c o m e s acquired. F r o m that same m o m e n t , there is r o o m for
misunderstanding and misinterpretation but, equally, there is s c o p e for
learning what is not k n o w n naturally.
Cultural production is o n e social p h e n o m e n o n amongst many which
suffers the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the transition from undifferentiated to dif-
ferentiated social organisation. In the undifferentiated situation, the p r o -
duction o f 'art' is inseparable from the production o f ritual o r the
production o f crops and, indeed, these and other forms o f productivity are
inextricably linked. There is not a discrete 'cultural' sphere. F r o m the
m o m e n t w h e n this functional c o h e r e n c e o f forms collapses, individual
agents are forced n o longer to act as simply social agents but as social
agents w h o n e e d to p r o d u c e in conformity with the norms o f the objectified
structures which have acquired status in their society. T h e c o m p l e t e actions
o f individuals are n o longer simply expressions o f their d o m e s t i c habitus.
A c t i o n s in differentiated society b e c o m e m o r e complicated. Individuals act
within the prescribed framework o f pre-existing structures. T o p r o d u c e
culturally n o w involves the recognition o f the existence o f a cultural field o f
 Production, reception and reproduction 63

p r o d u c t i o n . T h e primary social c o n d i t i o n o f individuals n o longer disposes

them t o b e productive absolutely for the benefit o f an automatically c o -
herent w h o l e society but, instead, it predisposes them t o b e productive only
within those fields o f p r o d u c t i o n which are accessible t o them.
T h e mechanisms which enable individuals to b e c o m e culturally product-
ive are mirrored b y those which enable them to b e c o m e culturally r e c e p -
tive. In an undifferentiated state, the c o d e s o f p r o d u c t i o n and reception are
identical and c o m m u n i c a t i o n occurs without the interference o f articulated
structural meaning. T h e transition to differentiation introduces c o d a i dis-
parities and it also introduces the possibility o f historical change. A t the
primary social level, individuals biogenetically r e p r o d u c e the dispositions
which they inherit. Varying original dispositions at first caused the genera-
tion o f differentiated structures and c o d e s . T h e s e reflected the differences
within the population. F r o m that initiating point onwards, h o w e v e r , struc-
tures acquired a reproductive life o f their o w n precisely so as to consolidate
their distinction from other structures and to construct a cumulatively arti-
ficial detachment from those capacities which are genetically transmitted.
History b e c a m e possible w h e n social beings constructed the possibility o f
intergenerational cultural change that was separate from genetic mutation.
T h e biological and the cultural interact. It is not that biological and cultural
evolution p r o c e e d independently. T h e reproduction o f social beings c o n -
stantly activates the interaction o f the biological and the cultural, but, at
any historical m o m e n t , there is a tension for individuals to c h o o s e whether
to position themselves socially b y accentuating their 'natural' capacities
and, therefore, b y constructing original cultural forms expressive o f those
capacities, o r b y sustaining c o m m i t m e n t t o those 'consecrated' forms o f
culture which they already possess and which offer a ready-made social
distinction.
B o u r d i e u has m o v e d towards a f o r m o f productivity which amalgamates
sociological craftsmanship with artistic creativity. H e has himself chosen to
express the 'natural' rather than sustain the 'consecrated', to b e engaged
with social change rather than reflectively t o apprehend it. Rejecting the
notion o f the artist o r intellectual as the privileged p r o d u c e r o f social
change, he has o p t e d to place his understanding o f the reciprocity o f p r o -
duction and reception within a process o f continuous reproduction. His
sociological studies o f cultural practitioners have informed the process b y
which he has n o w c o m e to present his s o c i o l o g y as art.

Notes

1. P. Bourdieu (1968) 'Structuralism and theory of sociological knowledge', So-

cial Research, 35, 682.
2. P. Bourdieu, 'Fieldwork in Philosophy' in In Other Words op cit 3.
3. D . McLellan (ed.) (1977) Karl Marx, Selected Writings, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 388.
4. Ibid., 389.
64 Bourdieu and culture

5. L. Baxandall and S. Morawski (1973) Marx and Engels on Literature and Art.
A Selection of Writings (with an introduction by S. Morawski), St Louis, MI,
Milwaukee, WI, Telos Press, 51.
6. See Chapter 4.
7. P. Bourdieu with J.D. Reynaud (1966) 'Une sociologie de l'action est-elle
possible?', Revue franaise de sociologie, VII, 4, 508-17, translated as 1974, 'Is
a sociology of action possible?', in A . Giddens ed. Positivism and Sociology,
London, Heinemann Educational Books, 101-13.
8. A . Touraine (1965) Sociologie de Faction, Paris, ditions du Seuil.
9. Bourdieu, 'Une sociologie', 511; 'Is a sociology', 105. The quotation is from
Touraine, Sociologie, 120.
10. Bourdieu, 'Une sociologie', 511; 'Is a sociology', 104.
11. Bourdieu, 'Une sociologie', 511; 'Is a sociology', 105. The quotation is from
Touraine, Sociologie, 121.
12. Bourdieu, 'Une sociologie', 517; 'Is a sociology', 112.
13. P. Macherey (1965) ' propos du processus d'exposition du "Capital",' in L.
Althusser ed. Lire le Capital. Vol. I, Paris, Franois Maspero, 215.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 216.
17. Expressed in P. Bourdieu (1976) 'La lecture de Marx, ou quelques remarques
critiques propos de "quelques critiques propos de "Lire le Capital" ', Actes
de la recherche en sciences sociales, 5-6, 65-79. Bourdieu writes (p. 69):
. . . it isn't just a question of understanding Marx better than Marx himself,
of superceding Marx (the young) in the name of Marx (the old), of correct-
ing the 'pre-Marxist' Marx which survives in Marx in the name of the really
Marxist Marx that the more Marxist than Marx 'reading' produces . . . By
constituting the theoretical reading of theoretical texts within scientific
practice, philosophy is relieved, by appropriation or by negation, of the
competition from the 'so-called social sciences' and the philosophers,
guardians or guarantors of the store-room, are restored to the function (to
which they have always laid claim) of judges 'of the last resort' of scientific
practice (which, by the same token, they render dispensable).
18. P. Macherey (1978) A Theory of Literary Production, London, Routledge &
Kegan Paul (trans, of P. Macherey (1966) Pour une thorie de la production
littraire, Paris, Librairie Franois Maspero, 3).
19. See the discussion of P. Bourdieu et al. (1965) Un art moyen. Essai sur les usages
sociaux de la photographie, Paris, ditions de Minuit, 17-28; Les Rgles de Vart.
Gense et structure du champ littraire, Paris, ditions du Seuil, 9-14.
20. Macherey, A Theory, 6-7.
21. Ibid., AO.
22. Ibid., 52.
23. Ibid., 53.
24. Ibid.
25. See, for instance, the constant presence of the influence of Bachelard and
Canguilhem in P. Bourdieu et al. (1968) Le Mtier de sociologue, Paris,
Mouton-Bordas, and compare with P. Macherey (1964) 'La philosophie de la
science de Georges Canguilhem. Epistmologie et histoire des sciences (pre-
sented by L. Althusser)', La Pense, 113, 50-74. For another indication of the
influence of Canguilhem, see Foucault's introduction to G. Canguilhem, On
the Normal and the Pathological, 1978.
26. D . Lecourt (1975) Marxism and Epistemology. Bachelard, Canguilhem and
Foucault (trans. . Brewster, Introduction to the English edition), London,
New Left Books, 8.
 Production, reception and reproduction 65

27. J. Jurt (1989) 'De l'analyse immanente l'histoire sociale de la littrature.

propos des recherches littraires en Allemagne depuis 1945', Actes de la
recherche en sciences sociales, 78, 94-101.
28. W. Iser (1985) LActe de lecture. Thorie de l'effet esthtique (ed. P. Mardaga),
Brussels, Mardaga, 6.
29. Ibid.
30. H.R. Jauss (1978) 'L'histoire de la littrature: un dfi au thorie littraire', in
H.R. Jauss Pour une esthtique de la rception (trans, from the German by C.
Maillard), Paris, Gallimard, 21.
31. Ibid., 24.
32. Ibid., 47.
33. Ibid.
34. A footnote to the Preface of the English translation comments:
The German 'Wirkung' comprises both effect and response, without the
psychological connotations of the English word 'response'. 'Effect' is at
times too weak a term to convey what is meant by 'Wirkung\ and 're-
sponse' is a little confusing. Confronted by Scylla and Charybdis I have
finally opted for 'response'.
See W. Iser (1978) The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response,
Baltimore, M D , and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, ix.
35. Ibid., x.
36. Ibid., 27.
37. Ibid., 28.
38. Ibid., 28-9.
39. Ibid., 30.
40. Ibid., 34. For Iser's exemplification of the use of 'the implied reader' in crit-
icism, see W. Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communications in Prose
Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press.
41. Iser, The Act, 36. Iser refers specifically to Manfred Naumann et al. (1975)
Gesellschaft - Literatur - Lesen. Literaturrezeption in theoretischer Sicht,
Berlin and Weimar, and he refers to his own critique of this book, 'Im Lichte
der Kritik', in R. Warning ed. (1975) Rezeptionssthetik. Thorie und Praxis,
Munich, 335-41, and also to Jauss's critique also in R. Warning (pp. 343ff). For
a discussion of the differences between the development of 'reception theory'
in West and East Germany, see A . Billaz (1981) 'La problmatique de la
"rception" dans les deux Allemagnes', Revue d'histoire de la littrature fran-
aise, 81, 109-20.
42. Iser, The Act, 38.
43. C F . Graumann (1960) Grundlagen einer Phnomenologie und Psychologie
der Perspektivitt, Berlin, 14, quoted in Iser, The Act, 38.
44. Iser, The Act, 38.
45. Ibid., xi.
46. W. Iser (1989) Prospecting. From Reader Response to Literary Anthropology,
Baltimore, M D , and London, Johns Hopkins University Press.
47. P. Bourdieu (1971) 'Intellectual field and creative project', in M.F.D. Young
ed. Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education,
London, Collier-Macmillan, 162.
48. L.L. Schucking (1966) The Sociology of Literary Taste (trans. B. Battershaw),
London, Routledge. Schucking's work relates to the sociology of literature
and art developing in the late 1920s and early 1930s at the Frankfurt Institute
of Social Research.
49. P. Bourdieu, 'Intellectual field and creative project', op. cit., 162.
50. P. Bourdieu (1968) 'Outline of a sociological theory of art perception', Interna-
tional Social Science Journal, X X , 4, 589; republished in P. Bourdieu (1993)
66 Bourdieu and culture

The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature (ed. and intro.
by R. Johnson), Oxford, Polity Press, 215.
51. Bourdieu, Outline', 589.
52. Bourdieu, Outline', 590; The Field, 216.
53. Ibid.
54. Bourdieu, Outline', 593; The Field, 220.
55. Bourdieu, Outline', 595; The Field, 221.
56. Ibid.
57. Bourdieu, Outline', 607; The Field, 233.
58. P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron (1977) Reproduction in Education, Society and
Culture (trans. R. Nice), London and Beverly Hills, C A , Sage, 5.
59. Ibid., 5-6.
60. Ibid., 54.
61. P. Bourdieu (1973) 'Cultural reproduction and social reproduction', in R. Brown
ed. Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change, London, Tavistock, 71.
62. Ibid.
Part III

THE CASE STUDIES

4 Flaubert and the social ambivalence of

literary invention

In o n e o f the earliest w o r k s o n Flaubert - first published in 1899 only 19

years after the novelist's death - E m i l e Faguet b e g a n his study in the
following way:

Gustave Flaubert was born at Rouen on the 12th December 1821.

His father, the son of a veterinary surgeon of Nogent-sur-Seine, after studying
medicine in Paris, had settled down at Rouen, where he had become the highly
esteemed and even celebrated Dr. Flaubert, surgeon-in-chief of the Htel-Dieu
Hospital, where he lived.
His mother, Anne Justine Caroline Fleuriot, was born at Pont l'vque in
Calvados, and was, through her mother, connected with the oldest families in
Lower Normandy. Gustave Flaubert was therefore a Champenois through his
father, and a Norman on his mother's side. Thus there is no special induction to
be drawn from his descent concerning his disposition and the turn of his mind. 1

T h e ghost o f Taine can b e glimpsed behind these o p e n i n g remarks. Faguet

feels o b l i g e d t o itemise Flaubert's ethnic p e d i g r e e whilst, in his use o f the
w o r d 'induction', simultaneously disowning b o t h the attempt to make liter-
ary analysis scientific and the substantive effort t o explain the creativity o f
an individual b y reference to ethnicity. Instead, Faguet d e v e l o p e d a dif-
ferent explanatory account. H e represented literary history as a continuing
oscillation b e t w e e n p e r i o d s o f 'romanticism' and p e r i o d s o f 'realism' in
m u c h the same way as, in England, M a t t h e w A r n o l d had argued that there
w e r e always alternating p e r i o d s o f 'creativity' and 'criticism'. Flaubert's
2

situation within this historical dialectic was offered as an explanation o f the

duality o f his personality. T h e constructed categories o f literary and social
history w e r e transposed into psychological categories which explained the
characteristics o f Flaubert's literary p r o d u c t i o n .
Faguet described the secondary properties o f 'romanticism' in the fol-
lowing way: taste for sadness and mystery, for the lugubrious and the
g r u e s o m e , for exotism, for the East and for dazzling light - such are indeed
the elements which m a k e up the soul o f a R o m a n t i c i s t . ' But the primary,
3
68 Bourdieu and culture

defining property o f 'romanticism' is only defined antithetically: ' T h e basis

o f Romanticism is a horror o f Realism and an ardent desire to escape from
it. Romanticism is essentially romantic; it d o e s away with Observation,
which means submission to the real object, and with R e a s o n , which merely
starts from reality . . . ' A c c o r d i n g t o Faguet, Flaubert internalised the
4

objective m o m e n t o f transition from romanticism to realism:

It is sufficiently known that Flaubert was at one and the same time a Romanticist
and a Realist, as if, coming into literary life in the middle of the nineteenth
century, he had wished to present in himself an epitome of the forty years which
preceded him and of the forty years which were to follow. 5

Flaubert, so Faguet's argument continues, possessed all the secondary

properties o f romanticism but not its primary opposition to the real. Thus,
concludes Faguet, there

. . . developed and grew that singular realistic Romanticist who was Flaubert.
Which was the real man? Truly I do not know; does one ever know, in a complex
nature, what constitutes its real basis? Diverse tendencies either strive with each
other, neutralise each other, succeed in combining harmoniously, or else give
way to each other in turn. 6

In Flaubert's case, it was alternation which maintained the balance o f

personality. 'Invariably, a romantic w o r k c o m e s after a realistic o n e and
vice versa' and, hence, Faguet p r o c e e d e d t o discuss Salammb and La
7

Tentation de Saint Antoine as 'romantic' novels and Madame Bovary,

L'ducation sentimentale and Bouvard et Pcuchet as 'realist' ones.
Faguet's study represented o n e o f the earliest attempts t o c o m p r e h e n d the
diversity o f Flaubert's work. F r o m 1865 until his death Flaubert had b e e n
celebrated as 'a marvellous, unrivalled realist' w h o had dabbled aberrantly
8

with works o f imagination, but it was the first publication o f his Correspond-
ance, beginning, in 1884, with his Lettres George Sand, which had imposed
the need to c o m e to terms with the whole personality o f the novelist. Lanson,
however, resisted the temptations o f psychological explanation. In the sixth
part o f his Histoire de la littrature franaise (1894), devoted to the contem-
porary period, and in a section treating ' L e naturalisme, 1850-1890', Lanson
offered the following summary o f Flaubert's significance:

Between the two schools - of romanticism and naturalism - is situated Gustave

Flaubert who follows on from the one and establishes the other, correcting the
one by the other and combining in himself the qualities of both - from which is
derived exactly the perfection of his work. At the unique moment when romanti-
cism becomes naturalism, Flaubert writes two or three novels which are the most
substantial that have been produced this century. 9

This summary is supported in a f o o t n o t e b y the barest o f biographical

details: 'Biography: G . Flaubert (1821-1880), b o r n at R o u e n , the son o f a
 Flaubert and the social ambivalence of literary invention 69

surgeon, passed most o f his life at his property at Croisset, near to R o u e n .

H e was a great worker: very b o u r g e o i s in his way o f life with a romantic
hatred o f the b o u r g e o i s . ' T h e ingredients o f Faguet's analysis are here
10

d e p l o y e d differently. T h e supposed transition from romanticism to what

L a n s o n calls 'naturalism' is o n e which was effected b y Flaubert as he
' c o r r e c t e d ' and ' c o m b i n e d ' the o p p o s i n g tendencies. In Lanson's view,
Flaubert inserted himself into the unique m o m e n t o f historical transition.
His w o r k was the c o n s e q u e n c e o f his sensitivity t o his social position rather
than the expression o f a personality d e d u c e d retrospectively b y critics from
a retrospectively constructed historical dialectic b e t w e e n romanticism and
realism. Eschewing psychologism, Lanson simply draws attention to
Flaubert's social ambivalence vis--vis the ' b o u r g e o i s i e ' but, in his short
discussions o f the major novels, he confines himself to an explication de
textes without extraneous reference either to Flaubert's psychological traits
or his social position. O f L'ducation sentimentale, for instance, Lanson
c o n c l u d e d : ' T h e profundity and the s o r r o w o f the w o r k lies in this flow o f a
life where nothing happens, and, without anything happening, the final sink-
ing o f all the h o p e s o f youth in the silly, crass and m o n o t o n o u s existence o f
the small t o w n b o u r g e o i s . '
11

It was because L a n s o n treated texts as the constructs o f authors rather

than as the expressions o f their personalities that he was able to perceive
the difference o f intention b e t w e e n the 'realist' and 'naturalist' novels o f
the s e c o n d half o f the nineteenth century. In an article o f 1895 entitled ' L a
littrature et la science', Lanson offered a historical sketch in which he
outlined the changing relations b e t w e e n science and literature. These were
not, h o w e v e r , inevitable oscillations but fluctuations arising from the c o m -
petition b e t w e e n intellectuals. In the late seventeenth century and for most
o f the eighteenth 'the scientific spirit m a d e itself master o f literature to the
detriment o f a r t ' or, to clarify, a scientific paradigm dominated thought
12

such that literature was reduced to m e r e embellishment and ceased to b e

regarded as itself a m e d i u m for legitimate thinking. R o m a n t i c i s m reversed
this domination but, according to Lanson, the scientific paradigm had re-
gained control b y the s e c o n d half o f the nineteenth century. W h e r e a s the
dominant scientific influence in the seventeenth century had b e e n mathe-
matics, it was n o w the physical and natural sciences, giving rise to the term
'naturalism'. A s Lanson succinctly puts it: '. . . just as the mathematician
Descartes supplied t o B o i l e a u the principle o f his literary theory so n o w the
physiologist Claude Bernard supplies his to M o n s i e u r Z o l a . ' 1 3

F o r Lanson, it was the adoption o f a scientific paradigm that differenti-

ated naturalism from realism and m a d e the n e w term necessary. H e
d e f e n d e d his use o f the n e w term, in o p p o s i t i o n to Faguet, in a f o o t n o t e :

It is important to distinguish the novel with a scientific intention from the pictur-
esque realism which preceded it. We must reserve the word realism for that
small school which, following painting in particular, aimed less to give scientific
form to the real than to offer an aesthetic imitation of it. The 'naturalists' have at
least had pretensions which realism has never claimed for itself. 14
70 Bourdieu and culture

It followed that Lanson was able t o claim that Flaubert had ' e x p o u n d e d the
case o f M a d a m e B o v a r y like a lecture in a dissecting t h e a t r e ' and that
15

Madame Bovary altogether was a masterpiece o f 'exact, subtle and p e n e -

trating p s y c h o l o g y ' . Lanson's understanding o f the 'naturalist' intention,
16

applied t o the w o r k o f Flaubert, was, therefore, that the novels should not
b e regarded either as expressive o f the personality o f the author o r as
imitative o f the reality which he had observed. O n the contrary, Lanson
q u o t e d Z o l a in confirmation o f his interpretation o f the naturalist inten-
tion. A novel, said Z o l a , '. . . is not an observation: it is an experiment. I set
up m y experiment through conceiving an action which m o v e s m y charac-
ters; I study the modifications which the initial temperament undergoes in
given milieux and conditions. That's what Claude Bernard d o e s in his
laboratory'. 17

T h e r e is a sense in which the literary critical m e t h o d which Lanson

institutionalised at the S o r b o n n e was itself an extension o f the p r o g r a m m e
o f the naturalists. Certainly it was the general view that Lanson's m e t h o d
destroyed the 'soul' o f literature b y its meticulous textual dissection. T h e
ideological opposition to the N o u v e l l e S o r b o n n e had its influence o n the
interpretation o f Flaubert. A l b e r t Thibaudet published a b o o k in defence
o f Bergsonism in 1923 just o n e year after publishing his influential study o f
Flaubert entitled Gustave Flaubert 1821-1880. Sa vie - ses romans - son
style. T h e f o r m and the content o f Thibaudet's criticism was Bergsonian.
Thibaudet's biographer (and ex-student) - A l f r e d Glauser - deliberately
e c h o e d Bergson's L'volution cratrice in calling his study Albert
Thibaudet et la critique cratrice and the biography follows Thibaudet's
creative career with almost n o reference to the factual circumstances o f his
life, representing his criticism as an extension o f his youthful p o e t i c inclina-
tions. Thibaudet had the capacity to animate and b e animated b y those
authors w h o m he studied and, as such, was the only critic since Sainte-
B e u v e to realise the potential o f the critical vocation. Glauser claimed that
Thibaudet was the only critic '. . . w h o has lived with others in such a
continuous way, and w h o s e genius has b e e n precisely t o let others speak,
but to let them speak with originality as a result o f his being present in his
discussion with others with the w h o l e force o f his o w n originality'. 18

T h e r e was, in other words, a subterranean creative force underlying his

'critical' engagement with the w o r k o f others, a force which released n e w
creative energies. T h e metaphor is apt here because, faced with the du-
alities o f Flaubert's personality and o f his literary production posited b y the
critical tradition, Thibaudet remarked o f La Tentation de Saint Antoine and
Madame Bovary: 'If there is n o continuity b e t w e e n the t w o b o o k s . . . there
remains the continuity o f the life o f Flaubert, the intelligible transition
beneath the appearances o f fracture, the d e e p folds which explain the
geological unity o f t w o separate massifs.' 19

R e j e c t i n g the historical dialectic i m p o s e d b y Faguet o n Flaubert's life,

T h i b a u d e t identified an u n c o n s c i o u s continuity, o r duration, through
time. Having asserted that ' T h e p s y c h o l o g y o f Flaubert during the
 Flaubert and the social ambivalence of literary invention 71

c o m p o s i t i o n o f Madame Bovary is o n e o f the m o s t interesting literary

p r o b l e m s w h i c h can b e p o s e d ' T h i b a u d e t presented the p o p u l a r view
2 0

that in Madame Bovary there was 'less o f Flaubert than o f counter-

Flaubert' 21
and cited in e v i d e n c e D e s c h a r m e s ' s argument in Flaubert
avant 1857 that Flaubert had '. . . f o r g e d artificially a nature o p p o s e d t o
the o n e w h i c h perhaps heredity and certainly his earliest e d u c a t i o n . . .
had fashioned . . . ' F o r T h i b a u d e t , h o w e v e r , this explanation m a k e s n o
2 2

sense. His specific reaction b r o a d e n e d o u t into a general critique o f the

application o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l explanation w h i c h did not a c k n o w l e d g e the
d y n a m i c e v o l u t i o n o f the personality:

So long as it has not reached the automatism of old age, the nature of a man
modifies constantly and nothing is psychologically more arbitrary nor more false
than to cut off in this nature a morsel which is called natural nature and a morsel
which is called artificial nature. We live in duration, and to live in duration is to
have a present, that is to say a nature which modifies, which we modify from
within or which is modified from outside, and a past, that is to say a fixed
nature. 23

Unlike Lanson, Thibaudet was not disposed to see novels as constructs o r

as laboratories for experimentation. Unlike Lanson again, Thibaudet did
not cultivate a scientific detachment from the texts which he interpreted. In
the introduction t o his b o o k o n Flaubert which originated in lectures given
at the universities o f Uppsala and G e n e v a , for instance, Thibaudet a p o l o -
gised that these contexts had caused his text to b e rather m o r e ' s c h o l a r l y ' 24

than he w o u l d have liked. F r o m 1920 until his death in 1936 Thibaudet was
the principal literary critic o f the Nouvelle revue franaise such that Fowlie
has described him as 'practically the official French c r i t i c ' during this 25

p e r i o d . H e was, therefore, a 'professional critic' which meant that he was

neither an ' a c a d e m i c ' critic, like Lanson, nor, to use F o w l i e ' s category, a
practising 'creative' critic, that is to say a p o e t o r novelist - like Valry o r
G i d e - w h o s e criticisms w e r e integral parts o f their creative activities.
Thibaudet was most certainly not an 'existentialist' critic either but, after
his death, it was, nevertheless, Sartre w h o most pre-eminently sustained
the psychological orientation in Flaubert criticism. Simultaneously, as n o v -
elist, a 'creative' critic and, as editor o f Les Temps modernes from 1945, a
'professional' critic, Sartre was, as an existentialist intellectual, least o f all
an ' a c a d e m i c ' critic. W i t h o u t specific reference to literary production,
Sartre had m a d e clear in L'Imagination (1936) that, in his view, Bergson's
p h i l o s o p h y was just the most recent, plausible manifestation o f the varying
classical accounts o f a representational relationship b e t w e e n the real and
the imaginary. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p s y c h o l o g y which Sartre p r o p o s e d
w o u l d dispense with the notion that there is an underlying, a u t o n o m o u s l y
continuous 'personality' that occasionally erupts in apparently contradic-
tory forms. Instead, individuals construct their personalities existentially
without reference to any prescribed, unconscious pattern.
72 Bourdieu and culture

It was in What is Literature? that Sartre first directly reflected o n the

relationship b e t w e e n the philosophy he had advanced in L'tre et le nant
and the practice o f writing literature. A s a result o f asking ' W h a t is writ-
i n g ? ' and ' W h y write?', Sartre c o n c l u d e d that ' T o write is thus b o t h to
disclose the w o r l d and t o offer it as a task t o the generosity o f the r e a d e r ' 26

or, in other words, that the process o f reading written texts is o n e which
intersubjectively and p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y brings the transcendent into
being. It followed, therefore, that in discussing ' F o r w h o m d o e s o n e write?',
Sartre should c o m m e n t :

And since the freedoms of the author and reader seek and affect each other
through a world, it can just as well be said that the author's choice of a certain
aspect of the world determines the reader and, vice versa, that it is by choosing
his reader that the author decides upon his subject. 27

Sartre then p r o c e e d e d to explore the implications o f this constituting re-

ciprocity in history. With the e m e r g e n c e in the eighteenth century o f the
bourgeoisie, those writers w h o were themselves b o u r g e o i s in origin w e r e
trapped b e t w e e n class contexts: they still benefited from the patronage o f
the aristocracy but increasingly it was the socially and politically oppressed
bourgeoisie that was 'presenting itself t o the writer as a real p u b l i c ' . T o 28

c o p e with this ambivalence, writers, in Sartre's view, 'unclassed' themselves

and sought to communicate universal values to all classes. Their unclassed
i d e o l o g y involved the denial o f class distinction and, as a result, b o u r g e o i s
writers were ill-equipped to deal with the nineteenth-century e m e r g e n c e o f
the proletariat. Literature continued t o 'set itself up as being, in principle,
independent o f any sort o f i d e o l o g y ' and it 'had not yet understood that it
2 9

was itself i d e o l o g y ' . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e was that writers believed that they

30

could, independently, write about anything. H e r e w e approach Sartre's

explanation o f the apparent discontinuity o f Flaubert's writing. Referring
to Madame Bovary and Salammb, Sartre illustrated his general point b y
reference t o Flaubert:

There was no doubt about the fact that one might write felicitously about the
condition of the working class; but the choice of this subject depended upon
circumstances, upon a free decision of the artist. One day one might talk about a
provincial bourgeoisie, another day, about Carthaginian mercenaries. 31

Flaubert was able to shift readily b e t w e e n 'romantic' and 'realist' writing

because, for all his rejection o f b o u r g e o i s values, he was, nevertheless,
resisting the inevitable rise o f the proletariat. Flaubert's romanticism and
his realism were b o t h equally inauthentic.
It is clear that Sartre was hostile t o Flaubert in 1947. In a f o o t n o t e t o
What is Literature?, Sartre offered eleven quotations f r o m Flaubert's
c o r r e s p o n d a n c e t o argue that he had not b e e n unfair t o Flaubert in sug-
gesting that Flaubert had b e e n c o n t e m p t u o u s o f the w o r k i n g c l a s s e s .
32

Sartre w r o t e with such feeling b e c a u s e he was c o n s c i o u s o f himself b e i n g

 Flaubert and the social ambivalence of literary invention 73

trapped within the same class a m b i v a l e n c e that was the legacy o f the late
nineteenth century. A s a b o u r g e o i s writer he had himself already p r o -
d u c e d n o v e l s which s h o w e d c o n t e m p t for b o u r g e o i s values, but, still like
Flaubert, Sartre had in practice resisted the relentless progression o f class
struggle. T h e question, therefore, which he p o s e d for himself in the final
chapter o f What is Literature? - 'Situation o f the writer in 1947' - was:
' H o w can o n e m a k e onself a man in, b y , and for h i s t o r y ? ' and, as a 33

writer, h e was acutely aware that the techniques o f novel-writing which

s e e m e d t o b e at his disposal possessed characteristics which 'are
rigorously o p p o s e d t o o u r d e s i g n s ' . Sartre was, therefore, a man in
34

search o f n e w forms o f expression. O f the question p o s e d and o f other

p r o b l e m s , he w r o t e : ' W e can rigorously attack these p r o b l e m s in the
abstract b y p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection. But if w e want t o live t h e m . . . ' and
3 5

the Critique of Dialectical Reason demonstrated this tension b e t w e e n

Sartre's desire t o reflect a b o u t the relationship b e t w e e n existentialism
and M a r x i s m and his desire t o d o and b e what he was writing about.
C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the life and w o r k o f Flaubert b e g a n t o fulfil a n e w
function in Sartre's thinking.
Questions de mthode was published as a separate text in 1960 although
it had originally b e e n intended that it should b e published with the Critique
de la raison dialectique. A l t h o u g h in What is Literature? Sartre had posited
existentially that writing sets up an encounter b e t w e e n writer and readers,
he had then p r o c e e d e d t o offer a history o f French literature which sup-
p o s e d that the nature o f these writer/reader encounters and, hence, the
nature o f literature itself, varied as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f changing class rela-
tions. A n existentialist account o f writing was a d d e d to an essentially
'vulgar' Marxist interpretation o f historical change. Questions de mthode
sought, instead, to insert the writer within the process o f historical change
so that it is the encounter b e t w e e n writer and readers which actualises
historical change. Taking our understanding o f Flaubert as an example,
Sartre writes: ' C o n t e m p o r a r y Marxism shows, for example, that the realism
o f Flaubert is in reciprocal symbolic relation with the social and political
evolution o f the petite bourgeoisie o f the S e c o n d Empire. But it never
shows the genesis o f this perspectival r e c i p r o c i t y . ' Marxism is content to
36

say that Flaubert had to live and write as he did because he ' b e l o n g e d to
the b o u r g e o i s i e ' , but Sartre's main c o n c e r n is n o w to ask what 'belonging
37

t o ' and ' b o u r g e o i s i e ' might mean in the particular circumstances o f

Flaubert's life. Vulgar Marxism can b e r e d e e m e d with the assistance o f
psychoanalytical study because it is psychoanalysis which allows us '. . . to
study in depth the process b y which a child, groping about blindly in the
dark, c o m e s to try to play out, uncomprehendingly, the social person that
adults i m p o s e u p o n i t ' .
38

It follows for Sartre that it is n o longer possible to attempt to explain

w o r k s b y reference t o a preconstructed social 'structure', but only to under-
stand them immanently as elements in the process b y which writers restruc-
ture the reality which they experience. In Sartre's o w n words:
74 Bourdieu and culture

From now onwards it becomes impossible to link Madame Bovary directly to the
socio-political structure and to the evolution of the petite bourgeoisie; it will
become necessary to relate the work to the present reality as it was lived by
Flaubert as a consequence of his childhood [ travers son enfance]. 39

Having already published biographies o f G e n e t and Baudelaire, it is n o

surprise, therefore, that, in 1966, Sartre published in Les Temps modernes
t w o e x t r a c t s from what was to b e c o m e his biographical study o f Flaubert
40

entitled LTdiot de la famille in which, in laborious detail, he sought to

analyse the psychological influences in Flaubert's youth which caused him
t o live always in 'bad faith' - always to c o n d e m n the bourgeoisie without
ever ceasing t o b e bourgeois.
In writing about Flaubert, Sartre was not simply illustrating his n e w
analytical m e t h o d in practice. His w o r k o n Flaubert b e c a m e a substantive
part o f his o w n w o r k . In an interview given in 1970, Sartre said:

A writer is always a man who has more or less chosen the imaginary: he needs a
certain dosage of fiction. For my part, I find it in my work on Flaubert, which one
can, moreover, consider a novel. I even wish people to say that it is a true
novel.41

Sartre's analysis o f Flaubert's project lost its ' o b j e c t i v e ' status and, in an
Hegelian manner, b e c a m e incorporated in his o w n endeavour to b e c o m e a
significant participant in dialectical historical progression. B y c o m p r e h e n d -
ing Flaubert, Sartre considered that he was able to transcend the past and
contribute, as a totalising agent, to a future in which previous conditions
w o u l d b e c o m e superceded.
Bourdieu's analyses o f Flaubert also operate simultaneously o n these
t w o levels: B o u r d i e u wishes t o o p p o s e Sartre's account o f what was hap-
pening in history and, as part o f the same m o v e m e n t , t o o p p o s e Sartre's
view o f what he was himself doing in history b y formulating that a c c o u n t . 42

It was in 'Intellectual field and creative project' - published in Les Temps

modernes less than six months after Sartre's essays o n Flaubert - that
B o u r d i e u first brought the case o f Flaubert into his argument. B o u r d i e u
quotes a passage from What is Literature? in which Sartre c o n t e n d e d that
'There are s o m e qualities that c o m e to us entirely from the judgements o f
other p e o p l e ' and suggests simply that Flaubert was, perhaps, excessively
4 3

amenable to the influence o f his readers and critics. B o u r d i e u ' s discussion

o f the 'Birds o f Psaphon' effect is not significantly un-Sartrean. It was,
h o w e v e r , in ' C h a m p du p o u v o i r , c h a m p intellectuel et habitus de classe'
(1971) that Bourdieu's thinking about Flaubert shows signs o f the general
trend in his ideas which was occurring at the end o f the 1960s. Emanating
from a seminar o n the sociology o f texts and o f culture that B o u r d i e u had
b e e n leading at the c o l e N o r m a l e Suprieure since 1968, this article re-
lates in particular to ' S o c i o l o g y and philosophy in France since 1945; death
and resurrection o f a philosophy without subject' (1967) in which B o u r d i e u
had briefly outlined the changing social conditions in postwar France which
 Flaubert and the social ambivalence of literary invention 75

gave a perspective o n the rise and fall o f existentialism. B o u r d i e u begins

' C h a m p du p o u v o i r , c h a m p intellectuel et habitus de classe' with the c o m -
ment that the analysis o f literature is particularly resistant to a sociological
approach because the romantic view o f the artist as creator has b e c o m e so
a c c e p t e d as natural o r true. T h e sociologist has t o indicate successfully that
this i d e o l o g y o f creativity is the product o f particular social conditions
b e f o r e having the opportunity t o subject 'creative' w o r k s t o sociological
scrutiny. B o u r d i e u continued:

Thus, the theory of biography as the retrospective integration of the whole

personal history of the artist in a purely aesthetic project or the representation
of 'creation' as the expression of the person of the artist in his singularity, are
only able to be completely understood if they are relocated within the ide-
ological field of which they are part and which expresses, in a more or less
transformed fashion, the position of a particular category of writers within the
structure of the intellectual field which is itself included in a specific type of
political field that assigns a determined position to the intellectual and artistic
sector. 44

In short, the field in which biographical criticism is practised is a reproduc-

tion o f the field generated b y the romantics. In order not simply to repro-
d u c e a romantic i d e o l o g y o f art, criticism must, therefore, generate a field
which is capable o f understanding the conditions in which fields have b e e n ,
and still are, in competition. Following the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e out-
lined in Le Mtier de sociologue, B o u r d i e u argues, therefore, that criticism
o f literature has t o m a k e an epistemological break from the prenotions o f
existing literary criticism. Turning specifically to Sartre's analysis o f
Flaubert (as presented in the t w o 1966 articles), B o u r d i e u argues that
Sartre '. . . breaks only apparently with the dominant tradition in the his-
tory o f art and literature . . . ' T h e factors used b y Sartre t o e x p l o r e the
4 5

individual process o f Flaubert's p r o d u c t i o n are, according to B o u r d i e u ,

those factors which c o r r e s p o n d with Sartre's general viewpoint as a d o p t e d
in relation to the productivity o f all writers at any time o r place. Sartre's
exploration o f Flaubert's particularity is prescribed b y his disposition to
advance a formula about the relations b e t w e e n consciousness and the
material conditions o f existence. In effect, B o u r d i e u claims, Sartre's appar-
ent investigation o f the social context in which Flaubert wrote enabled him
to reaffirm his subjective idealism. T h e consciousness which, for Sartre, is
operative in history is e x p o s e d as an a-historical consciousness, and B o u r -
dieu quotes from M a r x to emphasise, b y contrast, just h o w far Sartre's
position causes him to see mind as the determinant o f matter rather than
the reverse.
It is n o t surprising, B o u r d i e u c o n t e n d s , that biographical information
d o e s n o t adequately disclose an author's social situation b e c a u s e it can
o n l y disclose that author's p e r c e p t i o n o f his situation. R e m e m b e r i n g that
B o u r d i e u ' s Esquisse d'une thorie de la pratique was t o b e published in
1972, w e can say that biographical data, such as letters and diaries, offer
76 Bourdieu and culture

the author's primary, unreflecting k n o w l e d g e o f his situation, whereas

s o c i o l o g i c a l criticism sees the primary k n o w l e d g e o f individuals in the
c o n t e x t o f an understanding o f the w h o l e structure o f relationships in
society. B o u r d i e u ' s refutation o f Sartre's mentalism d o e s n o t lead him
into vulgar s o c i o l o g y . T h e structural portrait o f society that is required b y
B o u r d i e u d o e s not explain the particularity o f authors - h o w such o r such
an author ' c a m e t o b e what he i s ' - but rather lays out the range o f
4 6

social, intellectual, aesthetic and political positions available t o writers at

any time. B o u r d i e u asks for analysis which outlines the structure o f p o s -
sibility for writers rather than o n e which outlines a structure w h i c h is
thought t o c o n d i t i o n actuality.
B o u r d i e u could, h o w e v e r , b e said to b e vulnerable to the same charge
that he had levelled against Sartre in that B o u r d i e u was seeing authors in
the context o f his o w n sociological structuralism just as m u c h as Sartre had
seen them in the context o f his o w n idealist Marxism. B o u r d i e u ' s subse-
quent interpretation o f Flaubert in the early 1970s was integrally associated
with the d e v e l o p m e n t o f his general ideas in relation t o the structure/
agency debate. 'Les fractions d e la classe dominante et les m o d e s d ' a p p r o -
priation d e l'oeuvre d'art' (1974) explores the different strategies in making
' c h o i c e s ' o f tastes a d o p t e d b y different categories o f the dominant classes.
B o u r d i e u used material derived from his m u s e u m research, but the article
was clearly preparatory to the analysis which was to b e offered in ' A n a -
tomie du g o t ' (1975) and, then, supremely, in La Distinction (1979). B o u r -
dieu was preparing t o lay out the contemporary structure o f possible tastes
at the disposal o f contemporary social agents. A t the same time and par-
ticularly arising from the research o n 'le patronat' which was then under
weigh, B o u r d i e u confronted the issue o f ' c h o i c e ' , especially 'career c h o i c e ' ,
in ' A v e n i r d e classe et causalit du p r o b a b l e ' (1974). Attempts t o under-
stand e c o n o m i c behaviour have oscillated b e t w e e n what B o u r d i e u calls, o n
the o n e hand, mechanism, and, o n the other, finalism. It is assumed, in
other w o r d s , that rational action is either the mechanical enactment o f pre-
formulated deliberation or is guided b y constant reference to a rationally
calculated forward projection. B y contrast, B o u r d i e u tries to argue that
strategic o r pragmatic action is rational. It is this kind o f action which
enables agents to find their ways through their social structures without
either being obliged in advance b y those structures t o b e h a v e in predeter-
mined ways o r being constrained to fit in with the perception o f the struc-
tures that is offered to them.
B o u r d i e u had already, in S e p t e m b e r 1973, p r o d u c e d a m i m e o g r a p h e d
p a p e r entitled Gustave, Flaubert et Frdric. Essai sur la gense sociale de
Vintellectuel which was to b e published in the s e c o n d n u m b e r o f the Actes
de la recherche en sciences sociales as ' L ' i n v e n t i o n d e la vie d'artiste'.
T h e change in title is significant. It indicates a shift o f emphasis away
from the structural observation o f the social genesis o f the generic 'intel-
lectual' towards an appreciation o f the act o f c h o o s i n g a life-style within
the range o f available structural opportunities. Concentrating exclusively
 Flaubert and the social ambivalence of literary invention 77

o n L'ducation sentimentale and writing, n o w , in the k n o w l e d g e o f the

first v o l u m e o f Sartre's b i o g r a p h y o f Flaubert, B o u r d i e u is c o n c e r n e d t o
clarify in what sense the character o f F r d r i c M o r e a u is autobiographi-
cal. T h e error, for B o u r d i e u , is t o s u p p o s e that this means that Frdric is
a 'sort o f imaginary portrait painted b y Flaubert in the likeness o f Gust-
a v e ' . B o u r d i e u q u o t e s passages b o t h f r o m Flaubert's letters and f r o m
4 7

the text o f his n o v e l w h i c h suggest in similar terms that Flaubert and

F r d r i c w e r e y o u n g m e n w h o w e r e c o n f u s e d in their attempt t o m a k e a
c h o i c e o f career. Flaubert actually and Frdric fictionally w e r e aware o f
the structure o f p o s s i b l e careers within w h i c h they had t o m a k e a c h o i c e
but, in B o u r d i e u ' s v i e w , Flaubert d o e s not use Frdric t o represent
himself as c o n d i t i o n e d b y these structures. Rather, Flaubert uses his char-
acters t o act o u t s o m e o f the range o f p o s s i b l e trajectories available t o
him. Flaubert d o e s n o t express himself o r constitute himself through
Frdric. Instead, b y locating Frdric as an impersonal agent rather than
a self, Flaubert carries o u t a proactive s o c i o l o g i c a l experiment f r o m
which findings can b e d e r i v e d which m a y assist himself and his readers in
making their life c h o i c e s .
In short, B o u r d i e u treats L'ducation sentimentale as a naturalist
rather than realist n o v e l , but insists that the experimentation is s o c i o l o g i -
cal rather than p s y c h o l o g i c a l . L i k e an experiment, the w o r l d o f the n o v e l
is a c l o s e d system. A s B o u r d i e u significantly puts it: 'In this Leibnizian
universe, e v e r y c o n d u c t states precisely the system o f the differences
w h i c h o p p o s e e a c h o f the characters t o all the other m e m b e r s o f the
g r o u p , without really e v e r adding anything t o the initial f o r m u l a . ' N e v - 48

ertheless, L'ducation sentimentale is a n o v e l and Flaubert, not Frdric,

was the novelist. In an important post-script, B o u r d i e u c o m m e n t s that
' B y writing, Flaubert b e s t o w e d o n himself the gift o f social ubiquity . . . ' 4 9

B o u r d i e u g o e s o n t o argue that b y r e p r o d u c i n g the system o f relations

within w h i c h he was himself living 'under the f o r m ' o f the relations 5 0

within w h i c h F r d r i c was living, and b y characterising his o w n disposi-

tion 'under the f o r m ' o f the impossibility o f Frederic's life chances,
Flaubert was in fact distancing himself f r o m a social self-understanding.
H e was transposing a social self-awareness into formal art, aestheticising
s o c i o l o g y . In the formal c o n t e x t o f the n o v e l , B o u r d i e u argues, Flaubert's
s o c i o l o g i c a l insights w e r e subordinated to the rules o f a u t o n o m o u s litera-
ture w h i c h w e r e the p r o d u c t o f the society within which he lived. A s a
c o n s e q u e n c e , Flaubert's n o v e l s w e r e , formally, denials o f their content.
In s o far as B o u r d i e u was experiencing an affinity with Flaubert in the
p r o c e s s o f writing a b o u t him - in so far, in other w o r d s , as La Distinction
was t o offer a s o c i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t o f c o n t e m p o r a r y cultural possibilities
c o m p a r a b l e t o L'ducation sentimentale's sociological account o f poss-
ible social trajectories in mid-nineteenth-century France - the challenge
for B o u r d i e u was whether he w o u l d remain a possible p e r s o n within a
w o r l d o f social possibilities o r w o u l d trans/orra his s o c i o l o g i c a l practice
into a d e t a c h e d vision o f the w o r l d .
78 Bourdieu and culture

Notes

1. . Faguet (1914) Flaubert (first published 1899; trans. R.L. Devonshire),

London, Constable, 1.
2. See, for instance, in T h e function of criticism at the present time', first
published in November 1864 in M. Arnold, (1964) Essays in Criticism,
London, Everyman's Library, Dent, 9-34.
3. Faguet, Flaubert, 31.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 29.
6. Ibid., 37.
7. Ibid., 38.
8. Ibid., 212.
9. G. Lanson (1896) Histoire de la littrature franaise (4th edn), Paris, 1055.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.,1057.
12. G. Lanson (1965) Essais de mthode, de critique et d'histoire littraire, Paris,
Librairie Hachette, 100.
13. Ibid., 101.
14. Ibid., footnote 1.
15. 'comme une leon d'ampithatre . . .', ibid.
16. Ibid., 105.
17. Quoted in Lanson, Essais de mthode, 109.
18. A . Glauser (1952) Albert Thibaudet et la critique cratrice, Paris, ditions
Contemporains, Boivin & Cie, 279.
19. A . Thibaudet (1922) Gustave Flaubert 1821-1880. Sa vie - ses romans - son
style, Paris, Libraire Pion, 63.
20. Ibid., 69.
21. Ibid.
22. R. Descharmes, Flaubert Sa vie, son caractre et ses ides, avant 1857, Paris
1909, 546, quoted in Thibaudet, Gustave Flaubert, 69.
23. Thibaudet, Gustave Flaubert, 71.
24. Glauser, Albert Thibaudet, 198, quotes here from the Preface to Thibaudet,
Gustave Flaubert.
25. W. Fowlie (1968) The French Critic, 1549-1967, Carbondale, IL, Southern
Illinois University Press, 37.
26. J.-P. Sartre (1967) What is Literature? (trans. B. Frechtman), London, Meth-
uen, 43.
27. Ibid., 52.
28. Ibid., 74.
29. Ibid., 90.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 90-1.
32. Ibid., 120, footnote 6.
33. Ibid., 165.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. J.-P. Sartre (1960) Questions de mthode, Paris, Gallimard, 82.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 85.
39. Ibid., 90.
40. 'La conscience de classe chez Flaubert', in Les Temps modernes (1966), 240,
1921-51 ( . D e la bourgeoisie considre comme une espce'), and in Les
Temps modernes (1966), 241, 2113-53 (. Btise et bourgeoisie').
41. J.-P. Sartre, interview of 1970 (Situations IX) quoted in D . LaCapra (1979) A
Preface to Sartre. A Critical Introduction to Sartre's Literary and Philosophical
Writings, London, Methuen, 169.
 Flaubert and the social ambivalence of literary invention 79

42. See Bourdieu's obituary of Sartre: 'Sartre' (trans. R. Nice), London Review of
Books (1980), 2, 20 November-3 December, 11-12.
43. P. Bourdieu (1971) 'Intellectual field and creative project', in M.F.D. Young,
ed. Knowledge and Control. New Directions for the Sociology of Education,
London, Collier-Macmillan, 166. Footnote 13 (p. 186) gives the reference to
J.-P. Sartre (1948) Qu'est-ce que la littrature, Paris, Gallimard, 98, which is
p. 56 of What is Literature?
44. P. Bourdieu (1971) 'Champ du pouvoir, champ intellectuel et habitus de
classe', Scolies (Cahiers de recherches de l'cole Normale Suprieure), 1, 8.
45. Ibid., 12.
46. Ibid., 15.
47. P. Bourdieu (1975) 'L'invention de la vie d'artiste', Actes de la recherche en
sciences sociales, 2, 67.
48. Ibid., 78.
49. Ibid., 91.
50. Ibid., 92.
5 Courrges, the fashion system and
anti-semiology

T h e conclusion o f Bourdieu's account o f Flaubert's social situation was

that Flaubert had taken refuge in constructing an 'artist's life' and had
transposed his social perceptions into 'art'. It was important for B o u r d i e u
that w e should not fall into the same trap in responding t o Flaubert. For-
malist responses to Flaubert's formalism had to b e d o u b l y sociologised - b y
recognising b o t h the social circumstances in which the formalism was p r o -
d u c e d and also the social circumstances o f the formalist m o d e o f reception.
W i t h o u t this d o u b l e sociological recognition, the literary formalism which
was in origin pathological w o u l d b e socially r e p r o d u c e d and the p a t h o l o g y
sustained. B o u r d i e u admired so much, and q u o t e d so often, A . Cassagne's
1

La Thorie de Tart pour Tart en France chez les derniers romantiques et les
premiers ralistes ( 1 9 0 6 ) because the author - a disciple o f L a n s o n - had
2 3

refused to take Flaubert's views at face value and had, instead, attempted
to use the methods o f scientific literary and social history t o understand the
emergent aesthetic o f aestheticism.
Bourdieu's w o r k o n Flaubert o f the early 1970s was at the same time an
explicit rejection o f Sartre's psychological explanation o f Flaubert's p r o -
duction and a redeployment o f the data o f Sartre's social history o f the
nineteenth-century bourgeoisie so as t o offer a defence o f Flaubert as
s o m e o n e w h o had b e e n capable o f using 'fiction' as an experimental device
for objectifying his social position. It was essential for B o u r d i e u t o o p p o s e
Sartre in order to articulate what it was in Flaubert's achievement that was
worthy o f emulation. Flaubert's use o f 'art' for its o w n sake and as an e n d
in itself rather than as a discardable instrument o f sociological inquiry (the
ars inveniendi o f Le Mtier de sociologue*) was a mistaken extension o f an
otherwise correct approach. T h e mistake was to attempt to attain a posi-
tion o f social detachment and transcendence and to acquire the perma-
nence secured b y a-temporal artifacts. In spite o f Bourdieu's preference for
Flaubert's s o c i o l o g y o v e r Sartre's p s y c h o l o g y , Flaubert's final refuge in
formalism pandered to the subsequent social reproduction o f totalising
literary intellectuals. B o u r d i e u n e e d e d t o show, therefore, that it was poss-
ible to remain a sociological practitioner without 'restless yearnings after'
o r final capitulation to, formalist or idealist 'absolutes'. 5

Quite apart from outlining his position directly in Esquisse d'une thorie
de la pratique (1972), there were t w o main elements in B o u r d i e u ' s c a m -
paign. First, he sought to support o r undertake w o r k which attempted t o
 Courrges, the fashion system and anti-serniology 81

discredit claims o f 'purity' o r i n d e p e n d e n c e o f social circumstances

advanced for themselves b y poets, artists o r philosophers - whether those
claims w e r e advanced in the name o f 'idealism' o r o f 'realism'. It was in this
perspective that B o u r d i e u had engaged with the w o r k o f Flaubert and it
was t o b e the c o n c e a l e d agenda o f his interpretation o f Manet. It was this
orientation that caused B o u r d i e u t o publish posthumously Peter Szondi's
Posie et potique de Vidalisme allemand in 1974 in the Le Sens commun
series p r o d u c e d under his general editorship b y ditions d e Minuit. It was
Szondi's view in that b o o k that Schiller's text o n Demetrius represents 'a
tragedy o n the very idea o f i d e a l i s m ' - a view which suited B o u r d i e u ' s
6

purposes well. A t the same time, B o u r d i e u was himself producing his arti-
cle - ' L ' o n t o l o g i e politique d e Martin H e i d e g g e r ' - in which he argued
7

that it was the formalist pretensions o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g y as 'academic

p h i l o s o p h y ' at a time w h e n academicism had b e e n deprived o f its auto-
n o m y , and not its content which rendered it socially and politically
dangerous.
In tandem with this critical strategy, B o u r d i e u launched, secondly, his
positive effort to generate o n g o i n g , untotalising sociological practice: he
f o u n d e d the Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. Immediately after
the manifesto - ' M t h o d e scientifique et hirarchie sociale des o b j e t s ' - in 8

which B o u r d i e u argued that it was the task o f social science to analyse

scientifically all aspects o f culture rather than simply those which have
traditionally b e e n 'consecrated' as suitable for sociological treatment, such
as religion o r suicide, he published, with Y v e t t e Delsaut, ' L e couturier et
9

sa griffe. Contribution une thorie d e la m a g i e ' b y way o f immediate

1 0

demonstration o f his intentions. B o u r d i e u had already given a lecture in

N o v e m b e r 1974 entitled 'Haute couture et haute c u l t u r e ' and these t w o
11

pieces represent an engagement with the w o r l d o f 'fashion' that is indica-

tive o f his approach t o the analysis o f other social practices such as, actu-
ally, s p o r t o r the l a w , and, potentially, an infinity o f practices, h o w e v e r
12 1 3

trivial o r 'significant'.
T h e w o r l d o f fashion as an object o f inquiry was not, h o w e v e r , quite as
unconsecrated as B o u r d i e u wished, perhaps, to imply. R o l a n d Barthes had
published Systme de la mode in 1967, and had c o m m e n t e d , in a f o o t n o t e ,
that: ' A s early as Herbert Spencer, Fashion b e c a m e a privileged sociologi-
cal o b j e c t . . . ' Barthes gave several reasons for this, the first o f which was
1 4

that '. . . it constitutes " a collective p h e n o m e n o n which shows us with

particular immediacy . . . what is social about our o w n b e h a v i o u r " [J.
Stoetzel (1963) La Psychologie sociale, Paris, Flammarion, 245] . . . ' Bar- 1 5

thes was c o n c e r n e d to clarify that his intentions were not at all sociological.
H e characterised the p r o v i n c e o f the ' s o c i o l o g y o f fashion' in the following
way. It starts, in his view,

. . . from a model of imagined origin (the garment conceived of by the fashion

group) and follows (or should follow) its actualization through a series of real
garments (this is the problem of the circulation of models); it therefore seeks to
82 Bourdieu and culture

systematize certain actions and to relate them to social conditions, standards of

living, and roles. 16

Barthes also assumed that, m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y , s o c i o l o g y had t o b e inter-

ested in factors, particularly statistical factors, which w e r e o f n o relevance
t o his kind o f inquiry. H e c o m m e n t e d , for instance, that 'Structurally, a
rare feature o f Fashion is as important as a c o m m o n o n e , a gardenia as
important as a l o n g skirt; the o b j e c t i v e here is t o distinguish units, n o t t o
c o u n t t h e m ' . A n d he a d d e d in a f o o t n o t e t o this passage that 'Disparity
17

o f frequencies is o f s o c i o l o g i e but n o t o f systematic i m p o r t a n c e ; it informs

us a b o u t the "tastes" (the o b s e s s i o n s ) o f a magazine (and thus o f a
readership), not a b o u t the general structure o f the o b j e c t . . . ' Barthes 1 8

assumed, in other w o r d s , that the s o c i o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h f r o m w h i c h he

was distinguishing his o w n s e m i o l o g i c a l m e t h o d was that o f a f o r m o f
positivist social p s y c h o l o g y evident in another b o o k t o which he refers -
P. Lazarsfeld and E . Katz (1955) Personal Influence. The Part Played by
People in the Flow of Mass-Communications. 19

It was, h o w e v e r , the growing influence o f A m e r i c a n positivist s o c i o l o g y

in France that B o u r d i e u resolutely attacked in ' S o c i o l o g y and philosophy
in France since 1945: death and resurrection o f a philosophy without sub-
j e c t ' ( 1 9 6 7 ) . H e had presented an anti-positivist case for the use o f statis-
20

tics in s o c i o l o g y in a section o f Travail et travailleurs en Algrie ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; 21

was hostile to the notion o f any 'collective p h e n o m e n o n ' at all, arguing,

instead, that 'collective' norms are the result o f competition b e t w e e n inter-
est groups in a plural society; and regarded the c o n c e p t o f ' r o l e ' as analo-
guous t o that o f 'rule'-dominated behaviour t o which he was o p p o s i n g the
idea o f strategic action o n the part o f social agents.
Barthes' s e m i o l o g y was unashamedly formalist. In Systme de la mode,
he attempted t o apply t o the w o r l d o f fashion an a p p r o a c h d e r i v e d f r o m
structuralist linguistics and, in particular, derived f r o m Saussure. B o u r -
dieu had himself read and lectured o n Saussure at the e n d o f the 1 9 5 0 s . 22

In the 1970s, h o w e v e r , he was in the p r o c e s s o f adapting Saussure's

insights t o suit his different interests. In Esquisse d'une thorie de la
pratique (1972) he explicitly rejected Saussure's linguistic theory as
O b j e c t i v i s t ' and, b y Ce que parler veut dire ( 1 9 8 2 ) , was advocating
23

s o c i o - l o g i c a l analysis in place o f arid sociolinguistic study. In writing

24

a b o u t fashion after Barthes, B o u r d i e u was, therefore, maintaining his

campaign o n b o t h fronts at the same time: he was offering a paradigmatic
analysis o f an aspect o f c o m m o n culture whilst tacitly undermining the
formalist threat p o s e d b y the w o r k o f Barthes which was all the m o r e
dangerous for B o u r d i e u b e c a u s e o f the c o m m o n origin o f the o p p o s i n g
positions in the w o r k o f Saussure.
In the F o r e w o r d to Systme de la mode, Barthes at o n c e makes it clear
that ' T h e object o f the inquiry is the structural analysis o f w o m e n ' s clothing
as currently described by Fashion magazines . . . ' It is crucial t o under-
2 5

stand that the analysis is o f the descriptions and not, directly, o f the
 Courrges, the fashion system and anti-semiology 83

clothing itself. Barthes quickly points out that this represented a change
from his original intention:

. . . whereas initially my project was to reconstitute the semantics of actual

Fashion (apprehended in clothing as worn or at least as photographed), I very
soon realized that a choice had to be made between the analysis of the real (or
visual) system and that of the written system. The second course was chosen . . .
The analysis which follows deals only with the written system of Fashion. 26

Barthes was driven t o this apparent limitation b y his increasing awareness

that it was n o limitation at all - that, in other w o r d s , it was inevitable that
he should 'invert' Saussure's view that linguistics w o u l d b e c o m e a part o f
an over-riding semiology. F o r Barthes, any science o f signs is subordinate
to the science o f language and, in relation t o fashion, this means that

. . . as soon as we observe Fashion, we discover that writing appears constitutive

. . . the system of actual clothing is always the natural horizon which Fashion
assumes in order to constitute its significations: without discourse there is no
total Fashion, no essential Fashion. It thus seemed unreasonable to place the
reality of clothing before the discourse of Fashion: true reason would in fact have
us proceed from the instituting discourse to the reality which it constitutes. 27

If the field o f fashion had remained the field o f real garments, clothes
w o u l d have b e e n w o r n until they w e r e w o r n out. Instead, e c o n o m i c forces
caused the creation o f a field o f fantasy fashion discourse which w o u l d
ensure that still functional clothing w o u l d prematurely b e considered re-
dundant o r dmod. A s Barthes eloquently puts it:

In order to blunt the buyer's calculating consciousness, a veil must be drawn

around the object - a veil of images, of reasons, of meanings; a mediate sub-
stance of an aperitive order must be elaborated; in short, a simulacrum of the
real object must be created, substituting for the slow time of wear a sovereign
time free to destroy itself by an act of annual potlatch. 28

In o r d e r t o justify his concentration o n fashion discourse, Barthes here

suggests the conditions which had generated its a u t o n o m y . T h e explana-
tion given is o n e with which B o u r d i e u w o u l d agree: s o c i o e c o n o m i c condi-
tions d o not affect fashion styles directly but affect the e m e r g e n c e o f the
distinct field o f fashion within which stylistic distinctions can then b e gener-
ated. Barthes, h o w e v e r , c h o s e to bracket these field-generating conditions
with a view t o concentrating exclusively o n discourse within the field o f
fashion. T h e introductory section o f Systme de la mode - o n ' M e t h o d ' -
demonstrates, h o w e v e r , the difficulty o f this task.
Barthes distinguishes first b e t w e e n three garments, that is to say, b e -
tween three ways o f describing the same garment: 'image-clothing', 'writ-
ten clothing' and 'real clothing'. T h e first operates with a visual language,
the s e c o n d with a verbal, and the third offers a technical language. T h e first
84 Bourdieu and culture

t w o are languages o f representation whereas the third 'is constituted at the

level o f substance and its transformations . . , ' This is another termi-
2 9

nological way b y which Barthes can say that he is confining himself t o

verbal language and he makes it clear that his analysis is t o b e synchronic
(by treating o n e fashion year as a synchronic unit) and to b e based only o n
the exhaustive reading o f t w o fashion magazines. H e is not interested in
variation o v e r time nor in the degree o f representativeness o f his sample o f
magazines. This is because his preliminary rule is to '. . . retain no other raw
material for study than the language provided by the Fashion magazines
. . . ' but this reduction o f the garment t o its oral o r verbal version poses a
3 0

key p r o b l e m which Barthes first formulates specifically and then widens so

as explicitly to encompass the nature o f literary as m u c h as fashion
discourse:

What happens when an object, whether real or imaginary, is converted into lan-
guage? or rather, when an object encounters language? If the garment of Fashion
appears to be a paltry thing, we would do well to keep in mind that the same
relation is established between literature and the world: isn't literature the in-
stitution which seems to convert the real into language and place its being in that
conversion, just like our written garment? Moreover, isn't written Fashion a
literature? 31

Barthes specifically uses Saussure t o help him with a solution t o this

p r o b l e m o f c o n v e r s i o n o r what he calls ' c o m m u t a t i o n ' . Clothing language
operates in t w o contexts - as langue in the context o f institutionalised,
self-referential fashion discourse and as parole w h e n 'actualised, individ-
ualised' as dress. A l l written clothing operates o n t w o levels at the same
time - with reference to Fashion and t o the ' W o r l d ' . B y this dual refer-
e n c e , the language o f 'clothing' is actualised, but Barthes insists import-
antly that '. . . c o m m u t a t i o n always takes place either b e t w e e n clothing
and the w o r l d o r b e t w e e n clothing and Fashion, but never directly
b e t w e e n the w o r l d and Fashion . . . ' 3 2

Having identified these t w o types o f signifying relation in the 'vestimen-

tary' sign, Barthes sought to 'disengage the signifying elements from the
Fashion utterance they f o r m ' or to ignore the fact that the language
3 3

which he was analysing, taken from fashion magazines, was, b y definition,

already contextualised within the discourse o f fashion.
Culler has suggested that the vestimentary c o d e is 'not especially inter-
esting t o read about' and that Barthes' account o f the rhetorical system is
'far m o r e interesting'. In offering this latter account, Barthes accepted
34

that the vestimentary c o d e that he had derived from the language o f the
magazines c o u l d not b e divorced from the rhetorical strategies o f those
magazines in the fashion world. B e f o r e c o m m e n c i n g detailed study o f the
rhetorical system, Barthes quotes an 'utterance' from o n e o f the magazines:
'She likes studying and surprise parties, Pascal, Mozart, and cool jazz. She
wears flat heels, collects little scarves, and adores her big brother's plain
sweaters and those bouffant, rustling petticoats.' Maintaining his analytical
35
 Courrges, the fashion system and anti-semiology 85

c o m m i t m e n t t o the three dimensions o f reference already outlined -

clothing, w o r l d and fashion - Barthes suggests that these sentences d e m o n -
strate all three. T h e phrases such as 'flat heels' and 'little scarves' relate to
the clothing itself whereas 'She likes studying and surprise parties, Pascal,
M o z a r t , and c o o l jazz' contains, in Barthes' expression, 'an utterance o f the
worldly signified', o r a reference t o non-fashion taste correlates. O u t o f
these t w o separate systems o f reference, Barthes argues, magazines c o n -
struct a discourse o f 'fashion' without there ever being any direct corre-
s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n the clothing and the worldly c o m p o n e n t s , between, for
instance, liking M o z a r t and collecting little scarves. A s Barthes puts it:

Finally, . . . the ensemble of the utterance (or the utterance of signification) is

provided with a certain form (use of the present tense, parataxis of verbs: likes,
wears, collects, adores), which functions as the rhetorical signifier of a final, total
signified, namely the entirely consequential way in which the magazine repres-
ents itself and represents the equivalence between clothing and the world, i.e.
Fashion. 36

Barthes clustered together descriptions o f tastes in the same way as B o u r -

dieu was to cluster together, in La Distinction, sets o f taste behaviours o r
allegiances. Barthes insisted that the meanings o f these clusters w e r e en-
tirely constituted b y the fashion magazines. In considering the rhetorical
system, Barthes was especially aware that the discourse o f fashion c o n -
stituted b y magazines was related to the audiences o f those magazines, but
he continued t o insist that this awareness did not subvert his formal, semi-
ological intention. Late in Systme de la mode, Barthes wrote: '. . . since
Fashion is entirely a system o f signs, variations in the rhetorical signified n o
d o u b t c o r r e s p o n d to variations in a u d i e n c e . ' But he added as a f o o t n o t e
37

t o this remark: 'Since w e are not here c o n c e r n e d to establish a s o c i o l o g y o f

Fashion, these indications are purely approximate: h o w e v e r , there w o u l d
b e n o m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulty in defining sociologically the level o f each
Fashion m a g a z i n e . '38

This passage is o n e o f those seized u p o n critically b y B o u r d i e u in ' L e

couturier et sa griffe'. Typically, B o u r d i e u ' s attack o f Barthes is buried in
small print in his text, but it is nevertheless an unequivocal attack. It c o m e s
at the point in B o u r d i e u ' s discussion in which he argues that value j u d g e -
ments in the field o f fashion d o not d e p e n d o n the 'charisma' o f designers
so m u c h as o n their capacity to 'mobilise . . . the energy o f symbolic trans-
mutation . . . which is immanent in the field in its totality . . . ' T h e auto- 3 9

n o m o u s field o f fashion p r o d u c e s and reproduces itself as a field and

individual designers manage their self-presentations in accordance with
their perceptions o f the field. B o u r d i e u uses his critique o f Barthes here to
indicate the way in which the formal analysis o f fashion as a formal 'lan-
g u a g e ' participates in the construction o f the discourse o f the field o f fash-
ion. Barthes' w o r k explains neither the operation o f the field o f fashion nor
the structure o f fashion language. Instead, it is part o f the field's celebration
o f itself. It makes itself part o f the structure o f the field which designers, as
86 Bourdieu and culture

agents, then manipulate strategically. B o u r d i e u makes his point abstractly

in the following way:

Roland Barthes is perfectly right to recall that the 'metalanguage' of the analyst
is itself worthy of analysis and so on ad infinitum: for having failed to constitute
his object in its truth, that is to say in its celebratory function, the analyst of the
discourse of fashion does nothing other than supply a supplementary contribu-
tion to that celebratory discourse, just as the literary critic - from whom he is
separated only by the lesser legitimacy of his object - participates in the cult of
luxury goods and, hence, in the production of their value - a value which is
interconnectedly economic and symbolic. 40

Barthes' failure was a failure o f what o n e might call scientification - a

failure, in Bachelard's terms, t o construct the scientificity o f his object.
Bourdieu illustrates this failure b y reproducing, in a b o x , an extract from an
article b y Barthes published in Marie Claire, 181, September, 1967, en-
titled: ' L e match Chanel Courrges arbitr par un p h i l o s o p h e ' . Barthes
offers an opposition b e t w e e n Chanel and Courrges as o n e b e t w e e n 'classi-
cism' and 'futurism' and, o f course, B o u r d i e u ' s point is here graphically
established: Barthes' analysis provides n o 'arbitration' at all precisely b e -
cause he allows his thought to b e appropriated b y a journalistic m e d i u m .
Barthes' failure - that o f the 'spontaneous s o c i o l o g y o f the s e m i o l o g i s t ' -
41

is o f the same kind as Heidegger's: b o t h m e n used the label o f ' p h i l o s o p h y '

and its associated connotations o f objective detachment to c o n c e a l the
extent to which their philosophy participated in c o m m o n discourse.
Without reference to this internal critique o f Barthes' analytical position,
Bourdieu offers, in ' L e couturier et sa griffe', a demonstration o f his o w n
sociological practice - practice which avoids the m e r e repetition o f social
p h e n o m e n a that, for B o u r d i e u , is the characteristic function o f b o t h 'spon-
taneous' and positivist sociology. T h e complicating factor here, h o w e v e r , is
that Bourdieu 'constructs the o b j e c t ' o f his social inquiry b y adapting Sau-
ssure's linguistic theory. B o u r d i e u rejected Saussure's distinction b e t w e e n
langue and parole and, influenced b y J.L. Austin, d e v e l o p e d the view that
our use o f language is social and strategic rather than rule g o v e r n e d - that
w e use parole in relation t o h o w other p e o p l e use parole rather than b y
reference, mechanistically, to a predetermining structure o f langue. N e v -
ertheless, B o u r d i e u b o r r o w e d the distinction b e t w e e n langue and parole
from Saussure t o help him counteract the anthropological structuralism o f
Lvi-Strauss. This meant that, for B o u r d i e u , social agents are sociologically
what parole is linguistically in his version o f Saussure. T h e meanings o f
social actions are constructed relationally and immanently in the same way
as are the meanings o f words. B o u r d i e u differs from Barthes, therefore, in
that, first, he rejects the 'objectivist' use o f the langue/parole m o d e l and,
secondly, he analyses society b y analogy with language whereas Barthes
sought to analyse society as language. Barthes' project collapsed because
he sought to interpret society as language b y interpreting its language
whereas B o u r d i e u claims that he can analyse society and the function o f
 Courrges, the fashion system and anti-semiology 87

language within society because he only d e p l o y s a linguistic model as an

instrument o f his sociological method.
B o u r d i e u ' s s o c i o l o g y w o r k s with the same three dimensions as Barthes'
linguistic theory. If w e substitute 'fields' for 'discourses', w e can say that
individuals (equivalent t o 'clothing') define themselves at any time b y ref-
erence t o the particular field within which they situate themselves at that
time (for instance, the 'Fashion' system) and to the field o f their habitus
(the ' W o r l d ' ) which is, initially, their inherited social c o n d i t i o n but is also
the accumulating position-taking in fields other than the particular field o f
activity currently in play. Individuals are not g o v e r n e d b y rules, but they
act strategically with rules. Individuals o p t to participate in many social
fields simultaneously and, in d o i n g s o , they act in relation t o the rules in
force in each field, but this means that behaviour in relation to the internal
rules o f o n e field always occurs alongside behaviour in other fields which is
external t o that field. T h e r e is n o direct, defining relationship between the
W o r l d and the particular system such as 'Fashion'. A t any time the rela-
tionship b e t w e e n these t w o dimensions is defined uniquely b y the ways in
which individuals balance internal and external forces t o establish positions
for themselves. T h e choices m a d e b y individuals b o t h within and between
fields modify the p e r c e p t i o n o f the parameters o f c h o i c e acting as a c o n -
straint o n others.
' L e couturier et sa griffe' tries t o illustrate the mechanisms o f this dy-
namic and relational social system b y reference to the workings o f the field
o f fashion. B o u r d i e u begins with this general statement:

The field of haute couture owes its structure to the unequal distribution between
the different 'houses' of the particular kind of capital which is at once the stake
in the competition within this field and the condition of entry into the competi-
tion. The distinctive characteristics of the different institutions for production
and diffusion and the strategies which they adopt in the struggle in which they
are opposed to each other is dependent on the positions which they occupy
within this structure. 42

A t any time, the capacity o f institutions ( o r individuals) t o improve their

positions within the field derives from their ability t o d e p l o y in that field
the capital o r p o w e r acquired in fields external to it. W i t h o u t this exchange
b e t w e e n fields, every field w o u l d exist in static equilibrium, and Bourdieu
p r o c e e d s to analyse the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n what he calls, in 'Haute cou-
ture and haute culture', the 'conservation strategies' o f the 'dominant' and
the 'subversion strategies' o f the ' d o m i n a t e d ' ' p a r v e n u s ' . Bourdieu first
43

contends that the field o f fashion defines itself in binary terms - in an

o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n 'right' and 'left' which is e m b o d i e d tangibly in the
Parisian spatial demarcation b e t w e e n 'rive droite' and 'rive gauche' but
which is also reinforced symbolically b y corresponding differences o f style.
T h e s e stylistic differences are illustrated in a d o u b l e page showing, to use
Barthes' terms, b o t h visual and written images o f the interiors belonging to
five designers, and offering, additionally, a c o l u m n which glosses these
88 Bourdieu and culture

images sociologically. A t o n e extreme, the style o f Balmain is represented

as the style o f the dominant incumbant whereas that o f Hechter is repres-
ented as that o f the aspirant. T h e design o f the apartment o f Courrges also
symbolically reinforces his position as an external challenger to the d o m i -
nant style:

As for Courrges, his apartment shows - even down to his bedroom, his bath-
room or his kitchen, all of which, in his eyes, equally deserve to be seen by a
visitor - his revolutionary will to make a clean slate ('he clears away every-
thing'), and to rethink everything in its own terms ex nihilo - the spatial distribu-
tion of functions and forms, materials, and colours, all in relation to the sole
imperatives of comfort and effectiveness . . . 4 4

T h e distinctions between fashion designers which are manifested in distinc-

tions b e t w e e n their choices o f interior design are also manifested in their
distinctive uses o f language in their catalogues. S o far from identifying a
general discourse o f fashion, therefore, B o u r d i e u relates the written lan-
guage o f fashion to the positions and strategies o f different designers within
the social field o f fashion. Whereas, for instance, the dominant designers
emphasise elegance and refinement, the language o f Courrges - taking
him again as an indicative type and quoting from the prospectus o f his 1970
collection - is o f the avant-garde which, in opposition, emphasises '. . .
austerity o r audacity, but always f r e e d o m , youth, and fantasy'. Having
45

described s o m e o f the mechanisms b y which the binary structure o f the

fashion field is sustained, B o u r d i e u next explores s o m e o f the dynamic
issues involved in perpetuating this structure. T h e age o f a fashion house
b e c o m e s o n e aspect o f its stylistic self-representation and aspirant d e -
signers strategically acquire their capital within the field b y appropriating
s o m e o f the legitimacy possessed b y established houses. In a passage in
which B o u r d i e u sketches s o m e o f the internal trajectories o f designers in
relation t o a diagram that represents the rise and fall o f French fashion
houses this century, he comments: '. . . even Courrges and U n g a r o left
Balenciaga together t o found the house o f Courrges, which U n g a r o left in
1 9 6 5 . ' This m o v e m e n t within the field that is dependent o n the prior
46

acquisition o f status within the field assures 'change within continuity' and,
as B o u r d i e u comments: '. . . in effect everything happens as if the posses-
sion o f a capital which can only b e acquired in relation t o established
houses constitutes the very condition for successful b r e a c h e s . ' Historical
47

changes in the structure o f the field are not only dependent o n such
breaches o r ruptures. Succession is a constant p r o b l e m and source o f
change. Just at the time that B o u r d i e u was investigating the reproduction
strategies o f industrialists in the w o r k leading up t o the publication o f ' L e
patronat', s o , here, he investigates the succession strategies o f the estab-
lished fashion houses. These strategies d e p e n d o n the balance b e t w e e n the
individual or institutional character o f the house. T h e r e is a spectrum -
which mirrors the spectrum identified in respect o f artists and intellectuals
in 'Intellectual field and creative project' - b e t w e e n those designers w h o
 Courrges, the fashion system and anti-semiology 89

position themselves o n the basis o f their personal creativity and those w h o

position themselves through a socially constructed label (griffe). This latter
strategy is most often a d o p t e d b y innovators and it is this strategy which
involves managing the industry in such a way as t o i m p o s e the value o f the
product. It involves creating a ' n a m e ' and using public relations t o 'sell' it.
A c c o r d i n g t o B o u r d i e u ' s analysis, the strategy a d o p t e d b y Courrges is an
e x c e p t i o n which p r o v e s the rule. C o u r r g e s is q u o t e d as saying that he had
' b e c o m e a manager t o b e master o f m y o w n p r o d u c t ' . H e had sought to
48

institutionalise his o w n identity and t o maintain personal control o v e r the

marketing o f that identity. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e , B o u r d i e u suggests, is that the
h o u s e o f C o u r r g e s was bedevilled with financial difficulties, b o o m i n g in
1965, suffering four difficult years subseqently until the launching o f a new
line in 1970 restored it t o its earlier position.
T h e d y n a m i c o f the field o f fashion is, h o w e v e r , a c o n s e q u e n c e as much
o f influences f r o m outside the field as o f internal mechanisms. In a final
section, B o u r d i e u anticipates m u c h o f the discussion o f b o t h La Distinction
and Homo Academicus. H e writes: ' W h a t is described as a crisis o f haute
couture is perhaps only o n e sign amongst many o f a restructuration o f this
apparatus linked t o the appearance o f n e w signs o f distinction (such as
leisure sports, foreign travel, s e c o n d houses, etc.) . . . ' T h e aspirant de-
4 9

signers r e s p o n d t o these n e w d e v e l o p m e n t s in the ' W o r l d ' and, in the case

o f C o u r r g e s , for instance, respond particularly t o the new, liberated ex-
pectations o f w o m e n . T h e capacity o f designers t o respond t o these exter-
nal d e v e l o p m e n t s - t o modify the field o f fashion b y assimilating influences
from outside the field - relates t o the total trajectories o f those designers.
Crucially, B o u r d i e u is suggesting, the habitus o f s o m e designers equips
them better than others t o absorb features in the ' W o r l d ' precisely because,
by b a c k g r o u n d , they are in tune with the m o v e m e n t o f that ' W o r l d ' . Cour-
rges again p r o v i d e s the example. H e , w h o '. . . distinguishes himself from
o l d e r and m o r e classical couturiers like Balmain o r G i v e n c h y , at the same
time b y his social origin ( p o p u l a r ) and b y his studies (scientific), is the first
t o have b r o k e n with the traditional definition o f the role that " s o c i e t y "
imparted t o the couturier, especially b e f o r e the w a r ' . 50

B o u r d i e u contends, therefore, that the w o r l d o f fashion can b e under-

s t o o d sociologically as long as society is c o n c e i v e d , b y analogy with linguis-
tic theory, as a network o f meaning-creating actions and contexts. T h e
sociologist d o e s not construct static representations o f social structures.
Unlike Flaubert, the sociologist d o e s not construct a representation o f
society that acquires the status o f a fiction within which he is not prepared
to articulate a personal presence. B o u r d i e u was analogously present in the
field o f fashion that he describes just as he was actually t o insert himself
into his representation o f his o w n academic field in Homo Academicus.
T h e fact that B o u r d i e u is analogically present in ' L e couturier et sa griffe' -
by constant analogy with Courrges - is m a d e clear w h e n B o u r d i e u illus-
trates the habitus o f Courrges b y quoting from an interview between
J. Chancel and Courrges, published in Radioscopie. Chancel begins: ' Y o u
90 Bourdieu and culture

were b o r n in the Barn, and y o u have kept y o u r a c c e n t . . . Isn't there a bit

o f snobbery there . . . ' In reply, Courrges explains that he spent ten
5 1

years working with Balenciaga w h o suggested that he should take lessons

in diction but that, in spite o f all his attempts, he cannot change it - can't
d o it, it's not p o s s i b l e ' .
52

B o u r d i e u perceived himself to b e an aspirant in the academic field and to

b e in tune with social m o v e m e n t s better than the dominant academics as a
result o f his social background. H e perceived himself to b e a creative
intellectual and, like Courrges, sought to retain control o v e r the way in
which his intellectual griffe was marketed. If Bourdieu's analysis o f
Flaubert helped him to crystalise his thinking about the constant danger
that artistic creativity might b e c o m e a formal device to evade social
engagement, his consideration o f the field o f fashion and o f the place o f
Courrges within it enabled him to reflect u p o n the strategies at his dis-
posal in reconciling his creative individuality with the label attached to his
institutional position. His published w o r k o n Manet tangentially offers a
post hoc reflection o n the consequences for his position in culture o f his
acceptance, in 1980, o f the institutional meaning attaching to his post as
Professor at the C o l l g e de France.

Notes

1. The homology between formalism in literature and in literary criticism is

clearly exemplified in Culler's work of this period - J. Culler (1974) Flaubert.
The Uses of Uncertainty, London, Paul Elek, and J. Culler (1975) Structuralist
Poetics. Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature, London, Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul.
2. A . Cassagne (1906) La Thorie de l'art pour l'art en France chez les derniers
romantiques et les premiers ralistes, Paris, Hachette. Bourdieu describes this
as an 'admirable work' in 'Champ du pouvoir, champ intellectuel et habitus de
classe', Scolies (1971), 1, 23, footnote 1.
3. He is listed by H. Peyre as one of the Normaliens inspired by Lanson in G.
Lanson (1965) Essais de mthode, de critique et d'histoire littraire, Paris, Li-
brairie Hachette, 17, footnote.
4. P. Bourdieu with J.C. Chamboredon and J.-C. Passeron (1968) Le Mtier de
sociologue, Paris, Mouton-Bordas, 12; P. Bourdieu with J.C. Chamboredon
and J.-C. Passeron (1991) The Craft of Sociology, Berlin and New York, de
Gruyter, 5.
5. These are the phrases used by Keats of Coleridge in elaborating the idea of
'negative capability'.
6. These are the words used by Szondi in a letter of 1 July 1969 to Bourdieu
which is quoted in the Preface to P. Szondi (1974) Posie et potique de
l'idalisme allemand, Paris, ditions de Minuit.
7. P. Bourdieu (1975) 'L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger', Actes de la
recherche en sciences sociales, 5-6,109-56, subsequently published in modified
form as (1988) L'Ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger, Paris, ditions de
Minuit, and in translation as (1991) The Political Ontology of Martin Heideg-
ger, Oxford, Polity Press.
8. P. Bourdieu (1975) 'Mthode scientifique et hirarchie sociale des objets',
Actes de la recherche en science sociales, 4-6.
 Courrges, the fashion system and anti-semiology 91

9. See p. 16 of this book.

10. P. Bourdieu and Y . Delsaut (1975) 'Le couturier et sa griffe. Contribution
une thorie de la magie', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 1, 7-36.
11. P. Bourdieu, 'Haute couture et haute culture', conference Norot, 192, Novem-
ber 1974, pp. 1-2, 7-17; also in P. Bourdieu (1980) Questions de sociologie,
Paris, ditions de Minuit, 196-206, translated in P. Bourdieu (1993) Sociology
in Question, London, Sage, 132-8.
12. See, for instance, 'Comment peut-on tre sportif?', in Bourdieu, Questions de
sociologie, 173-95, and translated as 'How can one be a sportsman?' in Bour-
dieu, Sociology in Question, 117-31.
13. See, for instance, P. Bourdieu (1986) 'La force du droit. lments pour une
sociologie du champ juridique', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 64,
5-19, translated as (1987) 'The force of law: toward a sociology of the juridical
field', Hastings Law Journal, 38, 5, 814-53.
14. R. Barthes (1985) The Fashion System, London, Jonathan Cape, 9, footnote
13. (Originally published as Systme de la mode, Paris, ditions du Seuil,
1967.)
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 9.
17. Ibid., 11.
18. Ibid., footnote 20.
19. Cited in Barthes, The Fashion System, 9, footnote 13.
20. P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron (1967) 'Sociology and philosoophy in France
since 1945: death and resurrection of a philosophy without subject', Social
Research, 34,162-212.
21. P. Bourdieu (1963) Travail et travailleurs en Algrie, Paris and The Hague,
Mouton, 9-12. See my translation: P. Bourdieu (1994) Statistics and Sociology,
(trans, and intro. by D.M. Robbins), London, Group for Research into Access
and Student Programmes, Working Paper no. 10, University of East London.
22. See P. Bourdieu (1990) In Other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology
(trans. M. Adamson), Oxford, Polity Press, 6.
23. See P. Bourdieu (1972) Esquisse d'une thorie de la pratique, prcd de trois
tudes d'ethnologie Kabyle, Geneva, Droz, 164-70; P. Bourdieu (1977) Outline
of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 23-6.
24. For this hyphenation, see P. Bourdieu (1982) Ce que parler veut dire. L'con-
omie des changes linguistiques, Paris, Fayard, 71; P. Bourdieu (ed. and intro.
by J.B. Thompson) (1991) Language and Symbolic Power, Oxford, Polity
Press, 74.
25. Barthes, The Fashion System, ix.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., xi.
28. Ibid., xi-xii.
29. Ibid., 5.
30. Ibid., 12.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 22-3.
33. Ibid.,26.
34. J. Culler (1990) Barthes, London, Fontana Press, 75.
35. Barthes, The Fashion System, 226.
36. Ibid., 227.
37. Ibid., 244.
38. Ibid., footnote 14.
39. Bourdieu and Delsaut, 'Le couturier et sa griffe', 21.
40. Ibid., 23.
41. Ibid., 21.
92 Bourdieu and culture

42. Ibid., 7.
43. Bourdieu, 'Haute couture', 133.
44. Bourdieu and Delsaut, 'Le couturier et sa griffe', 11.
45. Ibid., 12.
46. Ibid., 16.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 19, footnote 11.
49. Ibid., 29-30.
50. Ibid., 32.
51. /Wrf.
52. .
6 Manet, the Muse d'Orsay, and the
installation of art

If y o u climb the steps o f the National Gallery in L o n d o n , erected in 1832-38

b y William Wilkins, t o ' p r o v i d e the crowning visual effect for the newly
m a d e Trafalgar S q u a r e ' at the t o p o f the g o v e r n m e n t offices o f Whitehall
1

extending northwards f r o m the H o u s e s o f Parliament, and if y o u pass, free

o f charge, through the vestibule designed b y Sir John T a y l o r in 1 8 8 5 - 8 7 , 2

and then m o u n t the stairs t o the right, y o u reach the galleries exhibiting
T a i n t i n g f r o m 1700 t o 1920', the third o f which contains three paintings b y
E d o u a r d M a n e t ( 1 8 3 2 - 8 3 ) . Y o u approach R o o m 43 (which contains the
M a n e t s ) through R o o m 45 ('Nineteenth t o Twentieth Century. Czanne.
M o n e t . ' ) and through R o o m 44 ('Nineteenth Century. Seurat. V a n G o g h .
C z a n n e . ' ) . A s y o u enter R o o m 43 through the o p e n d o o r w a y leading from
R o o m 44, y o u can see, o n the o p p o s i t e side o f the r o o m , the pictures o n
either side o f the d o o r w a y which leads b e y o n d t o the next r o o m . T o the
left, y o u can see M a n e t ' s The Execution of Maximilian and, t o the right, an
English suburban landscape painted b y Pissarro entitled The Avenue, Syd-
enham. T h r o u g h the o p e n d o o r w a y b e t w e e n these t w o pictures y o u can see
a portrait b y Ingres: Monsieur de Norvins o n the far wall o f R o o m 41
('Nineteenth Century. G o y a . Ingres. D e l a c r o i x . ' ) . C o m i n g b a c k into R o o m
43 f r o m R o o m 4 1 , y o u can see, framed in the same w a y b y the o p e n d o o r ,
Henri R o u s s e a u ' s Tropical Storm with a Tiger o n the far side o f R o o m 45 -
situated visually b e t w e e n Cezanne's Landscape with Poplars and M o n e t ' s
The Thames below Westminster which y o u can see o p p o s i t e o n the wall o f
R o o m 43. Entering f r o m R o o m 44, the other t w o Manets hang o n the right-
hand wall: Eva Gonzales is in the centre flanked b y D e g a s ' Ballet Dancers
o n o n e side and b y R e n o i r ' s At the Theatre (La Premire Sortie) o n the
other. In the c o r n e r b e y o n d the R e n o i r is Manet's Corner of a Caf Concert
which is hung at right angles from M o n e t ' s The Beach at Trouville which is
b e l o w Berthe M o r i s o t ' s Summer's Day.
V i e w i n g pictures is a physical experience. Meanings are i m p o s e d spa-
tially b o t h b y the organised juxtaposition o f hung pictures and by the
u n e x p e c t e d juxtapositions o f lines o f vision. T h e interpretation o f a picture
involves the same factors as the interpretation o f a novel: it involves a
c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f the artist's field o f p r o d u c t i o n as well as a capacity to
receive the visual o r verbal messages c o n v e y e d b y a canvas o r text. Unlike
novels, h o w e v e r , pictures in art galleries are staged and their language is
performative and relational. B o u r d i e u had analysed the accessibility o f art
94 Bourdieu and culture

galleries in L'Amour de Vart and had discussed philosophically the nature

o f the perception o f pictures in O u t l i n e o f a sociological theory o f art
p e r c e p t i o n ' but, in those discussions, he had not d e v e l o p e d the idea that art
galleries, as 'official' art institutions, might perform a key role in the p r o -
duction and reception o f art and in ensuring that these t w o activities c o m -
bine to safeguard social reproduction.
B o u r d i e u published t w o articles o n Manet in 1987 - 'L'institutionnalisa-
tion d e l ' a n o m i e ' and ' L a rvolution impressioniste'. T h e former was d e -
scribed in a f o o t n o t e as a chapter in a 'forthcoming b o o k o n M a n e t and
Impressionism', but n o such full text has yet materialised. It is clear,
h o w e v e r , that Manet has constituted a reference point in B o u r d i e u ' s think-
ing and the t w o articles o f 1987 pull together arguments which relate t o the
issues raised in the mid-1970s in respect o f Flaubert and Courrges and to
the post-1980 interest in the social function o f institutions. W h e r e a s B o u r -
dieu's analysis o f Flaubert o f the 1970s suggested that the novelist's p r o -
duction was only constrained b y the formal rules o f that genre after he had
failed t o give form to his sociological imagination, Bourdieu's analysis o f
the w o r k o f Manet supposes that the artist, like Courrges, generated his
distinctive style in opposition t o the dominant cultural tradition within
which he had b e e n apprenticed. B o u r d i e u was anxious t o demonstrate that
it was possible t o m a k e a revolutionary change in the ways in which w e see
the w o r l d , either visually o r ideologically, from a base within the w o r l d that
was t o b e reversed. N o t only was it and is it possible, but, rather, it was and
is inescapable. T h e challenge, h o w e v e r , is t o ensure that revolutionary
changes are not subsequently neutralised b y the appropriative actions o f
those self-reproducing institutions against which the changes w e r e effected
in the first place.
T h e occasion that p r o v o k e d Bourdieu's t w o articles o f 1987 was the
opening b y President Mitterand, in D e c e m b e r 1986, o f the M u s e d'Orsay.
T h e G a r e d'Orsay had b e e n o p e n e d in M a y 1900 at the time o f the o p e n i n g
o f the W o r l d Fair. C o n c e i v e d b y the architect, V i c t o r Laloux, around metal
structures, it was a celebration o f m o d e r n engineering design and fin-de-
sicle decoration. F o r forty years it was the terminal o f the main railway
line servicing the southwest o f France but, b y the end o f 1939, electrifica-
tion was reducing the viability o f the station's short platforms and it was
reduced only t o servicing the suburbs. In 1961, S N C F d e c i d e d t o sell and it
was only saved from demolition b y the Ministry o f Cultural Affairs which
decided, in 1973, to place it o n a list o f protected buildings. T h e directors o f
the Muses d e France c o n c e i v e d the idea o f a n e w m u s e u m and defined its
specific features to b e : 'multi-disciplinary, presenting all the forms o f artis-
tic creation from the s e c o n d half o f the 19th t o the early years o f the 20th
centuries.' In 1977, a Cabinet meeting t o o k the decision, at the initiative o f
President Giscard d'Estaing, t o build the n e w m u s e u m . 3

Quite apart from the opposition t o his paintings which M a n e t experi-

e n c e d in his lifetime - an o p p o s i t i o n which B o u r d i e u discusses in his arti-
cles - the subsequent public display o f all impressionist paintings was
 Manet, the Muse d'Orsay, and the installation of art 95

p r o b l e m a t i c certainly until about 1930. In 1924, G a s t o n Brire p r o d u c e d a

catalogue o f all the paintings displayed in the galleries o f the L o u v r e . T h e r e
w e r e only twelve Manets. O f these, four w e r e part o f a donation m a d e in
1906 b y M . M o r e a u - N l a t o n , and seven w e r e part o f another donation
m a d e in 1911 b y M . C a m o n d o . T h e terms o f the M o r e a u - N l a t o n donation
also meant that these four paintings (notably including Le Djeuner sur
l'herbe) had to b e displayed separately in a different art gallery. Six years 4

later, Brire w r o t e a history o f the collections o f paintings in the L o u v r e in

which he summarised the scandalous history o f the official acceptance o f
impressionist paintings in the following way:

Finally, the 'Impressionists', so often excluded from the Salons and scorned by
the members of the Acadmie des Beaux-Arts, made their way, not without
lively polemics and formidable opposition, into our public galleries. In 1890, the
famous Olympia by Manet was offered by a group of amateur collectors and was
displayed at the Luxembourg . . . Thanks to L. Bndite, keeper of the Muse
du Luxembourg, a financial arrangement was made and two Manets . . . were
hung on the walls of a modest room of the Muse devoted to living artists. In
1929, these canvases, disdained for such a long time, at times the objects of
derision, were brought triumphantly to the Louvre and placed alongside Olym-
pia which had been in a place of honour since 1908. 5

It is quite clear that Brire thought that the representation o f impressionist

painting in the L o u v r e was outrageously at o d d s with the recognised im-
portance o f the m o v e m e n t and its painters. H e c o m p l a i n e d about the in-
c o h e r e n c e o f the L o u v r e ' s m o d e r n collection as well as about its poverty.
French paintings from the fifteenth century until the end o f the eighteenth
century w e r e g r o u p e d and w e r e displayed in r o o m s which followed o n from
each other normally, but '. . . after the s c h o o l o f D a v i d , the continuity is
b r o k e n . T h e 19th Century which is already so rich . . . is dispersed in r o o m s
which are distant from each other . . . ' Brire's suggestion is that the
6

authorities o f the L o u v r e w e r e reluctant t o give physical recognition t o the

paintings which w e r e being celebrated b y the dominant art critics and
historians. Henri F o c i l l o n was o n e such influential intellectual. B o r n in
1881 - t w o years b e f o r e Manet's death - Focillon's life roughly c o i n c i d e d
with that o f the Third R e p u b l i c . H e saw himself as a successor to the
artistic and intellectual tradition launched b y the ' G r o u p o f 1863' o f which
h e c o n s i d e r e d M a n e t t o have b e e n the leader. That g r o u p was itself, in
Focillon's view, fulfilling the revolutionary aspirations o f the m e n o f
'Quarante-Huit' (1848) - aspirations which had only b e e n temporarily sup-
pressed during the reign o f E m p e r o r N a p o l e o n III. Writing in 1928 in La
Peinture aux XIXe et XXe sicles. Du ralisme nos jours, F o c i l l o n ana-
lysed d e v e l o p m e n t s in this p e r i o d by reference back to the ideological
polarity o f the 1840s:

In the 1840s France saw the clash between two groups of men, and the oppo-
sition between these groups gave the century its colour contrast, its light-dark of
96 Bourdieu and culture

ideas. One group, disappointed by the world, sought refuge in nature and the
past, drunk on solitude, ruins, storms, antiquities, and only having confidence in
the individual. The other group was made up of men who were exhiliarated by
the spectacle of urban growth, by the power of association, by the benefits of
exchanges between peoples, and by the dignity of work. The groups confronted
each other in '48; the social Utopians were only apparently defeated. The future
of the modern world belongs to them. Romanticism was hit more enduringly. 7

In arguing that the painters o f 1863 associated themselves with the w o r k o f

the m e n o f '48, Focillon was not simply setting up the sort o f antithesis
between romanticism and realism used b y Faguet t o analyse Flaubert.
Rather, Focillon was establishing an antithesis b e t w e e n conservatism and
modernism. T h e 'social Utopians' o f '48 w e r e o n the side o f social, e c o n -
o m i c , technological and d e m o c r a t i c progress. T h e y w e r e striving t o bring
into being 'a sort o f enlarged h u m a n i s m ' which went b e y o n d the tradi-
8

tional humanism o f classicism. Their social engagement was physical and

energetic rather than spiritual. In relation t o the artistic m o v e m e n t s o f the
mid-nineteenth century, Focillon m a d e his working distinction m o s t ex-
plicit in his damning dismissal o f the English pre-Raphaelites:

Pre-raphaelitism and its English friends do not count amongst the active forces
which we study. Pre-raphaelitism was a return to nature and to fidelity, but
through archaism . . . It belongs to the history of high culture more than to that
of painting and, more than every other art form born of the European move-
ment in the middle of the century, it was obsessed with content and tended, not
to life but to eternity. It expressed the desires and dreams of an elite of superior
men rather than the sensibility of the time. 9

Only those artists w h o w e r e 'painters' rather than conservers o f culture

were o f interest t o Focillon. O n l y those painters w h o w e r e artistic tech-
nologists could b e said to b e in tune with the vital forces o f modernity and
the new humanism. O f the 'realists', in contrast with Chenavard w h o s e
project for the decoration o f the Panthon was accepted in 1848, Focillon
c o m m e n t e d : ' T h e y w e r e m e n , they w e r e painters: Chenavard was only
mind [esprit], and that very l a b o r i o u s l y . ' Similarly, Focillon q u o t e d ap-
10

provingly C o u r b e t 's remark that he wished '. . . not only t o b e a painter,

but even m o r e a man, in a w o r d t o m a k e living art, that is m y a m b i t i o n ' . 11

A n d , in assessing the w o r k o f the realists, he said o f C o u r b e t , Millet and

Daumier: ' T h e y had the audacity t o turn t o life m o r e than t o the past - they
l o o k e d at the face o f man and not at his time-honoured, old-fashioned
image in museums. T h e y cherished the o l d masters, not as the professors o f
tradition but as living p e o p l e o f earlier t i m e s . ' With this kind o f under-
12

standing o f the history o f the nineteenth century - as a conflict b e t w e e n

moribund, institutionalised conservatism and energetic, liberated p r o -
gressivism - it is not surprising that Focillon accentuated the struggles for
official recognition experienced b y the early impressionists. Manet's Le
Djeuner sur Fherbe was o n e o f three o f his entries for the Salon o f 1863
 Manet, the Muse d'Orsay, and the installation of art 97

which w e r e all rejected b y the jury. T h e E m p e r o r N a p o l e o n d e c r e e d that

all the rejected pictures should b e displayed in what was t o b e c o m e k n o w n
as the Salon des Refuss. F o c i l l o n says o f this Salon that '. . . for a few
m o m e n t s it brought t o light the d e e p and hidden efforts o f the independent
painters, o p p o s e d at the same time to the academic tradition,. . . and t o the
facile triumphs o f f a s h i o n ' . It is equally unsurprising that F o c i l l o n should
13

see the continuing resistance to the exhibiting o f the impressionists high-

lighted b y Brire as an indication that the o p p o s i t i o n experienced b y
M a n e t in 1863 still persisted. After the realists, Focillon argued, there was
still a n e e d for s o m e o n e w h o could '. . . give to painting a technique in
conformity with the genius o f m o d e r n life, and, a b o v e all to the particular
quality o f its sensibility'. That s o m e o n e was Manet. F o r Focillon, M a n e t
14

was the e m b l e m o f the painter o f modernity. In arguing for the institutional

recognition o f M a n e t in the late 1920s, therefore, art critics and historians
w e r e fighting t o u p h o l d the values o f the m e n o f 1848 and fighting to
safeguard the socialist ideals o f the Third R e p u b l i c .
Attitudes towards M a n e t were less politically charged after the Manet
Exhibition in Paris in 1932 which Valry described as 'le triomphe d e
M a n e t ' . Writing about Manet, originally in 1959, Pierre Courthion as-
15

serted somewhat blandly: ' O u r eyes are so accustomed to his luminous

canvases that w e can scarcely believe the intrigues that tormented him each
year at the time o f the Salon. T h e public n o longer even contests the
painter's right to a free c h o i c e o f subject matter. T o d a y Olympia is in
the L o u v r e . ' Courthion casually depoliticises b o t h the production and the
1 6

reception o f Manet's paintings: the fuss about the Salons is n o w faintly

incredible; w e are n o w ' a c c u s t o m e d ' to Manet's novelty without reflecting
o n h o w w e have b e c o m e accustomed to it; the 'free c h o i c e ' o f subject
matter is, superficially, unquestioned; and the presence o f Manet's most
outrageous picture in the L o u v r e is thought t o b e indicative o f our liberal
tolerance. W h a t Courthion offers is Manet's art: 'His w o r k was already . . .
what is n o w called peinture-peinture, o r pure painting. T h e r e is n o psychol-
o g y and nothing t o allow us to glimpse the secrets o f mind o r h e a r t . . . T h e
value o f his art lies in the brush stroke, the c o l o r , and the creative light with
which it s p a r k l e s . ' A c a d e m i c art criticism had already transformed M a n e t
17

into a formalist artist for art's sake w h o s e w o r k should b e appreciated

'aesthetically'.
H a d it not b e e n for the opening o f the Muse d'Orsay, Bourdieu's discus-
sion o f Manet might not have been significantly different from his discussion
o f Flaubert. H e might, perhaps, have b e e n content to analyse the social
context within which Manet d e v e l o p e d his style and to substantiate in detail
his general contention that the consideration o f art as an autonomous field o f
study is a way o f reproducing formalistically - and without responding to
contemporary conditions - formalisms which were o n c e historically con-
structed. It was, however, the resurgence o f an academic criticism that saw
itself explicitly as the contemporary inheritor or defender o f academic tradi-
tionalism which p r o v o k e d a different reaction from Bourdieu.
98 Bourdieu and culture

That different reaction makes it clear that B o u r d i e u was n o longer pre-

pared to present himself as an impartial observer o f cultural relativity.
Inert formalism, that is t o say, formalism which is r e p r o d u c e d and repro-
duces itself, is t o b e fought b y activity which necessarily involves the
imposition o f form. In the tradition o f Focillon, B o u r d i e u uses an analysis
o f Manet as an o b l i q u e way o f defending the social and intellectual project
o f modernism.
It was a colleague at the C o l l g e d e France - Jacques Thuillier - w h o
threw d o w n the gauntlet. In 1983, he wrote 'L'artiste et l'institution: l ' c o l e
des Beaux-Arts et le Prix de R o m e ' as the first part o f a b o o k l e t published
by the c o l e des Beaux-Arts entitled Le Grand Prix de Peinture. Les
concours des Prix de Rome de 1797 1863. In his introduction, Thuillier
discussed the nature o f the b o o k l e t t o which he was contributing. It was not
the catalogue o f a m u s e u m nor was it a study in the history o f art. Instead,
he suggests, '. . . it constitutes the inventory o f an inheritance, o r rather o f a
fragment o f the venerable inheritance accumulated b y that great French
institution: the E c o l e des B e a u x - A r t s ' . In France, Thuillier immediately
18

argues, the w o r d 'institution' is detested and seems t o represent the c o m -

plete opposite o f 'inspiration'. T h e c o l e des Beaux-Arts has b e e n vilified
as the sponsor o f institutional and official art, encouraging 'uniform educa-
tion, the gradual substitution o f repetition for invention, and the subjection
o f genius to c o m p e t i t i o n ' . This has b e e n so m u c h the dominant view for a
19

century that, in Thuillier's view, there has b e e n a 'sort o f intellectual terror-

ism in p l a y ' which has outlawed any questioning o f it. T h e t a b o o s have,
2 0

however, gradually disappeared in the fields o f politics, e c o n o m i c s and

history and should n o w disappear in the field o f art history. A revision,
Thuillier concludes, is n o w 'essential' {Une rvision s'impose . . .).
Thuillier p r o c e e d s to defend the c o l e des Beaux-Arts and t o celebrate
the extent to which the system b y which students prepare for entry (the
'classes prparatoires') functions as a way o f disseminating the values o f
the cole much m o r e effectively than simply through the education o f
successful applicants. Thuillier explicitly draws attention here t o the c o m -
parable mechanisms o f value formation i m p o s e d b y the other Grandes
coles, including the c o l e N o r m a l e Suprieure. He argues that this is a
benign social influence, especially since the cole has always offered an
education which is free and egalitarian. A l t h o u g h ' o n e may scarcely dare
say it these d a y s ' , the competitiveness introduced b y the cole was '. . . a
21

victory for d e m o c r a c y , the mechanism consciously c h o s e n t o substitute

merit for wealth or b i r t h ' . S o m e p e o p l e are ashamed o f this today, argu-
22

ing that meritocratic competition 'eliminates the notion o f c l a s s ' . 23

Thuillier accepts that the system o f competitions did not generate the
greatest art for the simple reason that the annual prize-winning exhibits
were p r o d u c e d in accordance with a standardised stylistic brief and w e r e
always the products o f artists in their mid-20s. B y implication, h o w e v e r , the
esteem in which individual artists have b e e n held has b e e n over-rated at
the expense o f respect for a long-sustained consistency o f taste.
 Manet, the Muse d'Orsay, and the installation of art 99

Thuillier's article highlights a dilemma for B o u r d i e u ' s thinking. H e had

already published, in 1981, ' E p r e u v e scolaire et conscration sociale. Les
classes prparatoires aux G r a n d e s c o l e s ' in which h e argued that the
'meritocratic' admissions p r o c e d u r e s for the G r a n d e s c o l e s constituted a
c l o s e d system that was only accessible t o those possessing the appropriate
social and cultural characteristics. This is a position which g o e s b a c k to Les
Hritiers and was t o b e pushed further in La Noblesse d'tat (1989) where
B o u r d i e u was t o argue that the socially determined educational c o n v e y o r
belt continues o n into positions o f p o w e r and authority in politics and state
administration. A t the same time, h o w e v e r , B o u r d i e u had always argued
against individual 'charisma', insisting that value judgements in art take
place within fields o f discourse which are e m b o d i e d in institutions. M u c h o f
B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k f r o m the early 1980s had already i n v o l v e d an exploration
o f the relationship b e t w e e n the p o w e r o f individuals and the p o w e r o f the
institutions with which they allow their names t o b e associated. A s w e have
seen, B o u r d i e u d r e w attention, as early as 1975, t o the difficulty experi-
e n c e d b y C o u r r g e s in sustaining his personal, individual control o v e r his
institutionalised griffe. B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k o n M a n e t e x p o s e s his o w n irre-
solution in relation t o institutions. H e is reluctant t o relinquish the legacy
o f his earlier thinking in which he o p p o s e d the discrimination effected by
state-controlled educational institutions, but he increasingly accepts that
o p p o s i t i o n t o the exclusive mechanisms o f institutions o f state can only b e
m o u n t e d b y mobilising institutional p o w e r to support subversive individ-
uals. It is apparent, therefore, that B o u r d i e u d o e s not reject institu-
tionalisation as such. Instead, he c o n c e a l s a value j u d g e m e n t about what is
institutionalised b e h i n d an attack which is largely directed against the p r o -
cess. G i v e n that the C o l l g e d e France was thought b y B o u r d i e u to b e an
institution that was sufficiently independent o f state control to enable him
within it to institutionalise his o w n a n o m i e , it was particularly important
that he should o p p o s e a fellow professor in the same institution w h o might
b e queering his pitch b y seeking t o associate the C o l l g e with an o p p o s e d
institutional image.
B o u r d i e u begins ' M a n e t et l'institutionnalisation d e l ' a n o m i e ' b y outlin-
ing the t w o essential prerequisites for understanding the e m e r g e n c e o f the
m o d e r n m o v e m e n t in painting. It can only b e u n d e r s t o o d '. . . if o n e
analyses the situation in and against which it d e v e l o p e d , that is, the aca-
d e m i c institution and the conventional style which is a direct expression o f
it, and also if o n e resolutely avoids the alternatives o f depreciation o r
rehabilitation governing most current d e b a t e s ' . In short, the need to
24

m a k e value j u d g e m e n t s b e t w e e n the w o r k o f M a n e t and the w o r k spon-

s o r e d b y the c o l e des B e a u x - A r t s is r e m o v e d b y concentrating both o n
the social situations underlying the p r o d u c t i o n o f the o p p o s e d works and
o n the social situations underlying c o n t e m p o r a r y debates. T h e article
spends m o s t time o n the former. B o u r d i e u is very clear about the nature o f
the educational experience offered in the G r a n d e s c o l e s . H e characterises
the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the logic o f competitiveness as being:
100 Bourdieu and culture

. . . the incredible docility that it assumes and reinforces in students who are main-
tained in an infantile dependency by the logic of competition and the frantic expecta-
tions it creates . . . , and the normalization brought by collective training in the
ateliers, with their initiation rites, their hierarchies linked as much to seniority as to
competence, and their curricula with strictly defined stages and programmes. 25

H e complains that Thuillier's analysis is defective because it is unreflexive:

' T h e unanalysed relation to the object o f analysis (I refer here to the h o m o l -
o g y o f position between the analyser and the analysed, the academic master)
is at the origin o f an essentially anachronistic comprehension o f this object
. . . ' Thuillier's 'analysis' is made from within the institutional and aes-
2 6

thetic field which it analyses and, therefore, contributes to its reproduction.

Bourdieu does not, however, satisfactorily justify his claim that such repro-
duction is intellectually 'anachronistic'. Thuillier might certainly respond that
Bourdieu's m o d e o f analysis was an anachronistic legacy o f the founding
fathers o f social science. T h e question here is whether Bourdieu is prepared
to articulate sociologically the contrary positions represented b y himself and
b y Thuillier o r whether the sociological argument is only being used to
discredit an analysis which Bourdieu wishes to o p p o s e o n other grounds - by
reference to tacit criteria o f value.
B o u r d i e u p r o c e e d s to distinguish b e t w e e n artisans, artists and masters.
T h e system o f the c o l e des Beaux-Arts p r o d u c e s masters o f technique
and works o f art which are 'readable' and 'finished'. T h e s e traits are pre-
cisely those that the early critics found lacking in the w o r k o f M a n e t and, as
B o u r d i e u summarises, ' B y imposing o n his w o r k a construction w h o s e
intention is not t o help in the " r e a d i n g " o f a meaning, M a n e t d o o m s the
academic e y e , used to seeing a painting as a narrative, as a dramatic rep-
resentation o f a "story", to . . . d i s a p p o i n t m e n t ' . It is Manet's o p p o s i t i o n
27

to the academic tradition that explains the deliberate unreadability o f his

canvasses, the lack o f explicit o r deducible e m o t i o n in the figures in, for
instance, L'Excution de Maximilien o r Le Balcon.
B o u r d i e u is clearer about what Manet negated than about the means b y
which he institutionalised his alternative. T h e academic tradition was, in
effect, a state-controlled aesthetic regulator:

Through the Academy and its masters, the state imposes the principle of vision
and legitimate division in questions of the figurative representation of the world.
This principle is itself a dimension of the fundamental principle of vision and
legitimate division that the state . . . has the power to impose universally within
the limits of its jurisdiction. 28

There is here a latent research agenda in respect o f all the consequences o f

the decline o f the nation-state. Bourdieu suggests that it was the expansion
29

o f the cole - the 'ever-increasing numbers o f c a n d i d a t e s ' - which brought

30

about the decline o f its state-sponsored m o n o p o l y . It was numerical pressure

which generated a critical situation within the institution and then to 'the
successful institutionalisation o f this b r e a k ' . Bourdieu describes briefly the
31
 Manet, the Muse d'Orsay, and the installation of art 101

process that he had registered in moving from the analysis o f Les Hritiers to
that o f La Reproduction - the m o v e m e n t from state control to the o p e n
competition between fields struggling for social domination:

As it ceases to operate as a hierarchical apparatus controlled by a professional

body, the universe of the producers of art-works slowly becomes a field of competi-
tion for the monopoly of artistic legitimation. From now on no one can claim to be
an absolute holder of the nomos, even if everyone has claims to the title. The
constitution of a field is, in the true sense of the word, an institutionalization of
anomie. This is a truly far-reaching revolution which, at least in the realm of the
new art in the making, abolishes all references to an ultimate authority capable of
acting as a court of appeal: the monotheism of the central nomothete gives way to a
plurality of competing cults with multiple uncertain gods. 32

T h e n e w factor, h o w e v e r , is that B o u r d i e u is n o longer primarily the

observer o f the deregulated society which he describes. Instead, he is a
c o m p e t i t o r within it w h o sees himself to b e in opposition to those w h o
attempt t o reintroduce state regulation.
Presented originally as a talk, 'La rvolution impressioniste' clearly
summarises all the issues which concerned Bourdieu in his consideration o f
Manet. In particular, he states explicitly that the opening o f the M u s e
d'Orsay - the fact that Les Romains de la dcadence b y Manet's early master,
Couture, against w h o m he rebelled, was receiving pride o f place in its display
- was o n e factor in causing him to turn his attention to Manet. Bourdieu also
felt the need to o p p o s e the related tendency to disparage the achievement o f
the impressionists - to insinuate that they effected n o revolution at all but,
simply, a transformation o f bourgeois taste. Bourdieu spends time
illustrating the h o m o l o g y between the contemporary academic defence o f
academic art and its historical production, and in criticising Thuillier
specifically, but m o r e time is spent in explaining h o w the institutional crisis o f
this historical academicism had b e e n '. . . exploited b y p e o p l e like M a n e t ' .
33

In particular, Bourdieu asks why '. . . when there had b e e n heaps o f earlier
attempts to subvert the academic regime (Delacroix, Courbet etc.) Manet's
attempt succeeded whilst the others failed or only partially s u c c e e d e d ' . 34

Bourdieu insists that Manet's achievement was revolutionary. T h e critical

overproduction o f painters coincided with the establishment o f a field o f
critical discourse involving position-taking in relation to the paintings
displayed at the Salons. B y introducing criticism which was n o longer
exclusively concerned to interpret the messages contained in the favoured
historical paintings but was, instead, concerned to interpret paintings as such,
the critics performed a function that they had not for earlier artists. A s
Bourdieu puts it, the critic '. . . accomplished in his sphere the equivalent o f
the formal revolution accomplished by the painter in transforming the
definition o f what could b e represented (the hierarchy o f significance and
insignificance) and the manner o f representing i t ' . It was this conjunction
35

o f creativity and the field o f criticism that ensured that the changes o f style
adopted b y the painters b e c a m e dominant after 1863 in ways which had not
102 Bourdieu and culture

b e e n possible earlier in the century. Manet's artistic innovation b e c a m e

revolutionary precisely because he was able to mobilise a n e w field which, in
turn, could exercise the p o w e r to modify the visual perception o f the
population and o f subsequent generations. In other words, the art o f Manet
was not intrinsically 'revolutionary' but his innovations acquired
revolutionary status because they were successfully diffused. T h e success
also has to b e attributed to the fact that his innovation was o n e o f form
rather than content. Revolution is, in effect, the introduction o f a n e w form
backed b y a mobilised social support. Changes in content are predefined in
terms o f the content which they are changing. T h e breakthrough effected b y
Manet was that he undermined the academic expectations o f readability. H e
achieved for painting exactly what Flaubert achieved for the novel. Bourdieu
quotes a phrase o f Flaubert - 'to write well about the m e d i o c r e ' ('crire bien
le mdiocre') - and claims that it exactly fits Manet's endeavour. Bourdieu
elaborates: ' T o fulfil the exigences o f form to their limits is, effectively, to
transgress the hierarchies o f the significant and the insignificant and to defy
the hierarchy b y constituting aesthetically things that the traditional
hierarchy refuses to allow to b e constituted aesthetically.' T h e scandal o f
36

L'Excution de Maximilien was precisely that it was not emotionally about

the execution but was, instead, a formal arrangement o n a canvas o f figures
adopting poses associated with the actions o f a firing squad. Bourdieu drives
h o m e the comparison with Flaubert in the following way: ' T h e tension is
extreme between the formalist distancing and the tragedy o f the situation.
The execution of Maximilien is a typically Flaubertian situation - with an
operatic emperor w h o even so finishes up b y being s h o t . ' In seeking to
37

establish an identity o f situation between Flaubert and Manet, Bourdieu

revises the attitude towards formalism which he had adopted at the end o f
'L'invention de la vie d'artiste'. Whereas Flaubert had stood c o n d e m n e d as a
proto-sociologist w h o had taken refuge in artistic creation, he is n o w ,
alongside Manet, praised as the paradigmatic artist w h o s h o o k off the y o k e
o f social realism and representation in art. Bourdieu continues:

The Barbizon painters, amongst whom we can see the precursors of Manet or
even Courbet, had something which reassured observers - notably the fact that
they conveyed a message. The 'realists' satisfied Proudhon, whom Flaubert de-
tested because of his insistence that art should have a meaning, that it should say
something. With Courbet, you could say: that's human suffering, the sorrow of
peasant life, etc. Y o u could write things about the work of Delacroix, but there
was nothing more to say about the emperor Maximilien . . . 3 8

It is n o w P r o u d h o n w h o stands c o n d e m n e d , and the i n a d e q u a c y o f

C o u r b e t ' s representationalism is expressed in a phrase which resonates
retrospectively in the present: B o u r d i e u was t o strive t o create a f o r m in
La Misre du monde (1993) in which suffering (souffrance) might speak
rather than b e sociologically represented.
A s promised, B o u r d i e u finally asks why it should have b e e n the person
M a n e t w h o m a d e this revolutionary breakthrough. Drawing u p o n W e b e r ' s
 Manet, the Muse d'Orsay, and the installation of art 103

Ancient Judaism, B o u r d i e u argues that revolutionaries, like heresiarchs

and prophets, emanate from the caste o f priests. T h e y are not self-taught.
T h e y have '. . . b e e n taught b y the learned but have g o n e out t o say in the
streets what they have b e e n told in consecrated p l a c e s ' . M a n e t was ini-
39

tiatied into the values o f the c o l e des Beaux-Arts and was therefore in a
position t o mobilise those values to effect a transvaluation and transforma-
tion. It was, B o u r d i e u c o n c l u d e s , a life-and-death struggle in which M a n e t
was engaged. T h e r e c o u l d b e n o quarter. T h e reformist art o f a C o r o t c o u l d
coexist with academic art, but, with Manet, this was impossible. M a n e t had
so attacked the heart o f academic art that it was b o u n d to b e a case o f
either 'him o r them':

What Manet was in the process of inventing and imposing was the autonomous
artist, that is to say one capable of legislating about himself. Artistic legitimacy
was no longer in the hands of a State which conferred certificates, or by the
certificated masters of the academic institution. It was in the hands of a group of
artists who affirmed their recognition of legitimacy by their struggle to retain the
monopoly of it for themselves. 40

F o r Bourdieu, equally, there could b e n o quarter for those w h o wished to

reduce Manet to a C o r o t , to suppose that Manet's w o r k could b e displayed in
the new M u s e d'Orsay alongside the 'rehabilitated' products o f those aca-
demic masters w h o m Manet had discredited. Like Focillon, Bourdieu b e -
lieves in a 'life o f f o r m s ' which is constantly renewed b y human agency.
41

Bourdieu's final sentence a b o v e makes it clear that new fields, possessing

their internal rules o f legitimacy, are constantly emerging and battling for
dominance. Like Focillon, Bourdieu believes that the 'life' o f forms lies
precisely in the fact that forms are constantly being re-formed. True re-
formation is revolutionary. It is distinguished from the rearrangement o f
previous forms as much as from the mere reproduction o f those forms.
Bourdieu is a man o f 1848 and o f 1863, but he argued for the exhibiting o f
Manet with prominence in the M u s e d'Orsay not as a way o f 'consecrating'
Manet, and thereby constituting an alternative academic tradition, but as a
way o f making public the process by which Manet secured legitimacy - so as
to contribute to the legitimation o f that process o f continuous re-formation.

Notes

1. N. Pevsner, revised by B. Cherry (1989) The Buildings of England. London. I.

The Cities of London and Westminster, London, Penguin Books, 326.
2. Ibid., 327.
3. For this information, I am grateful to the Service de Presse et Communication
of the Muse d'Orsay, Paris.
4. For this information, see G. Brire (1924) Muse National du Louvre. Cata-
logue des peintures exposs dans les galeries. I. cole franaise, Paris, Muses
Nationaux, 172-3 and xi.
5. G. Brire (1930) Histoire des collections de peinture au Muse du Louvre. I
Lcole franaise, Paris, Muse National du Louvre, 38.
104 Bourdieu and culture

6. Ibid., 43.
7. H. Focillon (1928) La peinture aux XIXe et XXe sicles. Du ralisme nos
jours, Paris, Librairie Renouard, 2-3.
8. Ibid., 4.
9. Ibid., 150.
10. Ibid., 7.
11. Ibid., S.
12. Ibid., 32-3.
13. Ibid., 75.
14. Ibid., 172.
15. P. Valry (1932) Triomphe de Manet, quoted in F. Cachin (1994) Manet 'J'ai
fait ce que j'ai vu', Paris, Dcouvertes Gallimard, Runion des Muses
Nationaux, Peinture, 153-7.
16. P. Courthion (1988) Edouard Manet, London, Thames & Hudson, 7 (this is a
concise edition of Courthion's Manet, originally published in 1959).
17. Ibid.
18. J. Thuillier (1983) 'L'artiste et l'institution; l'cole des Beaux-Arts et le Prix
de Rome', in Le Grand Prix de Peinture. Les concours des Prix de Rome de
1797 1863, Paris, cole des Beaux-Arts, 55.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.,75.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. P. Bourdieu (1993) 'Manet and the institutionalization of anomie', in P. Bour-
dieu (ed. and intro. by R. Johnson) The Field of Cultural Production, Oxford,
Polity Press, 238.
25. Ibid.,241.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 248.
28. Ibid., 250.
29. This maps out the ground covered in many of the articles collected in P.
Bourdieu (ed. J.B. Thompson) (1991) Language and Symbolic Power, Oxford,
Polity Press.
30. Bourdieu, 'Manet', 252.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 252-3. The use of the word apparatus is a reminder that Bourdieu is
opposing the Althusserians here as much as the conservatives. See P. Bourdieu
(1980) 'Le mort saisit le vif. Les relations entre l'histoire rifie et l'histoire
incorpore', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 32-3, 3-14, for an open
critique of Althusser.
33. P. Bourdieu (1987) 'La rvolution impressionniste', Norot, 303, 6.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 15.
36. Ibid., 15-16.
37. Ibid., 16.
38. Ibid.
39. Bourdieu, 'La rvolution', 16.
40. Ibid., 18.
41. See H. Focillon (1989) The Life of Forms in Art, New York, Zone Books,
originally published in 1934 as La Vie des formes. As far as I am aware, Bour-
dieu does not refer to Focillon at all, but I suggest that Focillon stands in relation
to Bourdieu for art criticism rather as Lanson stands for literary criticism. Bour-
dieu uses the work of Panofsky, but Focillon represents the tradition of art
history and criticism within which Bourdieu's thought is situated.
Part IV

THE CRITICISMS

7 Evaluating fragmented responses

Reviewing Choses dites, Brubaker m a d e the point that: 'Since Bourdieu's

texts are products - and instruments - o f particular intellectual strategies and
struggles, their emphases vary considerably from text to text, depending o n
the particular intellectual field in which a text is situated and the structure o f
that field at the time the text was written.' W h a t Brubaker says here about
1

the production o f Bourdieu's texts could equally well b e said o f their con-
sumption. In the corporate conclusion to An Introduction to the Work of
Pierre Bourdieu. The Practice of Theory, the authors c o m m e n t :

A study of the secondary literature . . . reveals many specific criticisms. Some of

these criticisms, however, are less substantial than they appear; others are telling
and enduring. For example most arise from reviews of single texts, or reviews of
single themes in his work. While it is wholly understandable, given the limited
translation of other materials into English, we hope to have displayed enough of
Bourdieu's wide interests to put these views to rest. 2

Lest these should b e thought t o b e the views solely o f apologists, e v e n

Richard Jenkins has b e e n prepared to admit that

. . . much of the discussion of Bourdieu concentrates on a fairly narrow spectrum

of his work. Very few critiques span the full range - from Algerian ethnology to
the sociology of education to methodology - or even a substantial slice of it. . .
It does Bourdieu a considerable injustice, for example, to regard him as pri-
marily a sociologist of education or culture. 3

W i t h o u t g o i n g into detail, as had W a c q u a n t in his ' B o u r d i e u in A m e r i c a :

notes o n the transatlantic importation o f social t h e o r y ' about the 'blurred
4

visions' and the 'fragmented readings' o f his w o r k , B o u r d i e u ' s response to

the situation was to a n n o u n c e that he w o u l d like, '. . . rather than taking up
each point o f disagreement o n e b y o n e , to try to unearth the factors that
s e e m to m e to constitute their r o o t s ' . This chapter will not try to take up
5

every point o f disagreement with B o u r d i e u that has b e e n m a d e in the

secondary literature, but it will try to summarise, and c o m m e n t o n , a
106 Bourdieu and culture

selection o f significant points. T h e intention is to defer consideration until

the following chapter o f the meta-critical assumptions hidden in the c o m -
ments, already quoted, m a d e b y Brubaker, Harker et ai, and Jenkins. Is
there, it will b e asked, a hidden totality o f Bourdieu's w o r k b y reference to
which, in Leibnizian fashion, all local errors will b e seen to b e parts o f a
greater g o o d ? H o w should w e k n o w when w e have displayed ' e n o u g h ' o f
the 'wide interests' that disclose this totality t o lay criticisms ' t o rest'? D o e s
it d o B o u r d i e u 'a considerable injustice' t o b e found wanting, perhaps, in
individual intellectual fields because it is assumed that he should b e v i e w e d
in a meta-perspective in which justice w o u l d b e d o n e ? Is such a perspective
attainable and, whether or not it is, d o w e not have to take seriously the
objections m a d e in specific fields? If, as B o u r d i e u suggests, w e understand
the ' r o o t s ' o f the objections without responding to their content, d o w e not
simply endorse his practice and bracket the objections? Is it possible t o
understand relationally the conditions which generated criticisms and still
preserve the substance o f the objections?
These questions get right to the heart o f Bourdieu's w o r k as well as t o
the possibility o f criticising it and consideration o f them leads naturally to
the concluding remarks o f the b o o k . T o revert to the c o n c e r n o f this
chapter, h o w e v e r , Brubaker's c o m m e n t a b o v e aptly leads into the first o f
the local disagreements with B o u r d i e u which has pervaded the secondary
literature. T h e p h e n o m e n o n that Brubaker was prepared t o view positively
- the strategic status o f Bourdieu's conceptual activity o r the polysmie
nature o f his concepts - has b e e n regarded negatively since the first
readings o f Bourdieu's texts.
In o n e o f the earliest articles to review Bourdieu's educational w o r k to
that date, Swartz wrote o f his m e t h o d and style in 1977 that '. . . all t o o
often he creates categories and concepts without carefully specifying their
corresponding empirical referents'. B r e d o and Feinberg m a d e the same
6

point in 1979: ' O n e o f the major theoretical weaknesses with the b o o k is

the key concepts that remain unclearly specified.' T h e main reservation
7

has often b e e n that Bourdieu's imprecise formulation o f concepts has

meant that they are empirically untestable. Swartz's phrase - 'their corres-
ponding empirical referents' - displays a positivist disquiet about B o u r -
dieu's procedures.
Specific concepts have variously b e e n targeted for this criticism - for
example, the concepts o f 'habitus', 'cultural capital' and 'educational sys-
tem'. It was Swartz again, in a later article, w h o c o m m e n t e d :

The theoretical construct 'habitus' presents a number of conceptual and empiri-

cal ambiguities that will need clarification in future work. The concept permits
Bourdieu to make conceptually appealing transitions from micro- to macro-
levels of analysis and to generalize through quite different domains of human
activity. But this very appealing conceptual versatility frequently renders ambig-
uous just what the concept actually designates empirically. 8
 Evaluating fragmented responses 107

W h a t the c o n c e p t 'actually designates empirically' is here the ultimate

criterion o f worth. M u c h o f the literature about the 'habitus' has b e e n
equally c o n c e r n e d about the looseness o f B o u r d i e u ' s use o f it but, unlike
Swartz, other authors have wanted to articulate m o r e clearly its conceptual
meaning o r function without reference to any empirical value. W i t h o u t
reference t o B o u r d i e u at all, Granovetter (1985) argues the n e e d for a
c o n c e p t fulfilling all the functions o f the 'habitus' t o explain the relations
b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c action and social structure, and C a m i c (1986) charts the
social history o f the use o f 'habit' in A m e r i c a n s o c i o l o g y and w e l c o m e s its
revival in B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k . Conversely, although again without regard t o
the empirical utility o f the c o n c e p t , Schatzki expresses philosophical reser-
vations about B o u r d i e u ' s use o f 'habitus'. H e writes: ' B o u r d i e u , therefore,
assigns t w o very different functions t o o n e and the same " m e c h a n i s m " :
p r o d u c t i o n o f action and the specification o f intelligibility. A s implied, I
believe that this is a mistake. T h e production o f action is a matter o f bodily
mechanism. T h e determination o f intelligibility is a separate affair.' 9

Jenkins has linked the confusion he experiences about 'habitus' to a m o r e

general confusion that he finds in B o u r d i e u ' s use o f the c o n c e p t 'culture'.
Culture, he argues,

. . . appears in his work as either an assemblage of consumable, material artifacts

- everything from pop records to children's clothes to paintings - or as an
abstract, rhetorical concept, which occupies the realm of the unconscious. Either
way it does not do much explanatory work. The concept of the habitus -
embodied dispositions - functions as an analogue for culture when it comes to
explaining behaviour. But what does embodiment mean in this context, other
than a gesture of faith in the direction of materiality (as in 'biological individ-
uals')? What exactly is the habitus? How does it relate to the notion of
'culture'? 10

M o r e inclined than Jenkins to search for empirical utility than for c o n c e p -

tual meaning, L a m o n t and Lareau are similarly confused b y B o u r d i e u ' s use
o f 'cultural capital':

. . . in Bourdieu's global theoretical framework, cultural capital is alternatively

an informal academic standard, a class attribute, a basis for social selection, and
a resource for power which is salient as an indicator/basis of class position.
Subtle shifts across these analytical levels are found throughout the work. The
polysemy makes for the richness of Bourdieu's writings . . . However, the ab-
sence of explicit statements makes systematic comparison and assessment of the
work extremely difficult. 11

L a m o n t and Lareau tacitly admit that B o u r d i e u ' s practice c o n f o r m s to his

theory o f p o l y s e m y but they s e e m able t o use that theory to explain the
actions o f others without being prepared to use it in explanation o f B o u r -
dieu's behaviour. Certainly from Outline of a Theory of Practice onwards,
B o u r d i e u was willing to see logical 'fuzziness' in the practice o f others as
well as o f himself. B e f o r e that, h o w e v e r , he had cultivated a different kind
108 Bourdieu and culture

o f logic. In an article o n the w o r k o f B o u r d i e u and Bernstein, A r c h e r

accused B o u r d i e u (and Passeron) o f using the c o n c e p t o f 'educational
system' with 'negligence'. H e r contention was not that the c o n c e p t was t o o
imprecise to generate empirically testable hypotheses s o m u c h as that it
was a c o n c e p t which did not d o justice t o empirical reality. B o t h Bernstein
and B o u r d i e u attached '. . . primacy to cultural universale which override
comparative differences in educational structure . . . ' She t o o k B o u r d i e u
1 2

and Passeron to b e offering sociological explanations d e d u c e d from their

empirical findings whereas La Reproduction represented a deliberate ab-
straction from the findings that had already b e e n reported in Les Hritiers,
an abstraction that sought t o offer conceptual propositions which might
have universal inductive value. B o u r d i e u and Passeron w e r e not finding
'cultural universals' in social reality and, in doing s o , neglecting other vari-
ables. T h e y were positing propositions which might have different degrees
o f explanatory value in different situations. E v e n if, b y 1986, Passeron
thought that Bourdieu's w o r k subsequent t o La Reproduction had c o n -
fused the logical with the real, he was clear that the sociological c o n c e p -
tualisation offered in that text p r o v i d e d a ' m o d e l ' rather than an account o f
social o r educational change. H e wrote:

Models that bring into play the concept of 'cultural reproduction' or 'social
reproduction' are often objected to on the grounds that the very way they are
constructed prevents them from taking account of 'historical change' which, in
effect, is what history most clearly exhibits to the observer. It is this objection
that I should like to answer here, by showing that it bears not on the use of
reproduction models in sociological analysis, but on the association of a theory
of reproduction with the Marxist (or, to be more precise, Hegelian) idea that
historical change can come about only through an 'internal contradiction' that is
logically rooted in the core of any reproduction model. 13

T h e s e various responses to Bourdieu's supposed conceptual looseness have

not, o f course, only amounted to criticisms o f his conceptual style o r o f his
m e t h o d o l o g y . T h e y have entailed further, m o r e specific and m o r e substan-
tive criticisms which n o w n e e d scrutiny.
O n e corollary o f the predominantly A m e r i c a n positivist critique o f
B o u r d i e u has b e e n the constant refrain that his m e t h o d s o r his findings d o
not transfer cross-culturally. Behind this apparently simple criticism o f
Bourdieu's 'Frenchness' o r recognition o f his cultural difference has lain
an intellectualist nationalism given legitimacy b y deference t o a tacit
h e g e m o n y o f international social scientists operating with technically cor-
rect, standard empirical procedures. In their specific remarks o n Reproduc-
tion in Education, Society and Culture, B r e d o and Feinberg confirmed their
general antipathy to Bourdieu's approach with the following c o m m e n t :

The essays in the second part are generally more accessible than the theoretical
part of the book, although they have considerable theoretical content them-
selves. However, they actually use rather less in the way of systematic data than
 Evaluating fragmented responses 109

is claimed and are empirical primarily in that they consider a particular historic
case, France, in an interpretative fashion. 14

Writing a year later in 1980, G o r d e r introduced her critical appraisal o f

Bernstein and B o u r d i e u with the c o m m e n t that . . the lack o f under-
standing o f the French s c h o o l system b y most A m e r i c a n s as well as the
density o f his writing style i m p e d e c o m p l e t e c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f his theories
and limit their direct applicability to U.S. institutions'. H o w was it sup- 15

p o s e d that ' c o m p l e t e c o m p r e h e n s i o n ' o f any theories is possible o r h o w

might 'direct applicability' b e achievable across cultures for any theory?
U n k n o w n , apparently, t o G o r d e r , B o u r d i e u himself had already discussed
these questions b o t h in relation to p e d a g o g i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n in his 'Lan-
gage et rapport au langage dans la situation p d a g o g i q u e ' and in relation
1 6

t o the transnational c o m p a r i s o n o f educational systems in ' L a c o m -

parabilit des systmes d ' e n s e i g n e m e n t ' . 17
M o r e importantly, h o w e v e r ,
G o r d e r interestingly attributes the p o o r transference o f Bourdieu's
theories about education to the facts, first, that the A m e r i c a n receivers o f
his messages are insufficiently informed about the object o f his researches -
the French educational system - and, secondly, that Bourdieu's c o m m u -
nicative transmission o f his theories is p o o r .
O t h e r critics have supposed that B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k is not easily transfer-
able either because the conditions o f its p r o d u c t i o n m a k e it foreign or
because the object o f his research imposes a specificity o n his findings.
T h e s e are different points. L e m e r t has consistently taken the positive view,
largely derived from a sympathetic understanding o f B o u r d i e u ' s theoretical
position, that the w o r k can b e received and applied cross-culturally if the
social and intellectual conditions o f its p r o d u c t i o n are fully understood:

. . . competent reading of French sociology (as of other French writings) can go

quite smoothly if one first bothers to understand the total field in which a given
text is situated. T o isolate Bourdieu and Touraine from their field is to court
readerly confusion. Bourdieu's sociology of education by the standards of Amer-
ican or British sociology of education will make only partial sense. 18

Others, h o w e v e r , have^been less inclined to regard sociological texts as

predominantly authorial productions analoguous to works o f fiction o r
'other . . . writings'. G o i n g b e y o n d G o r d e r ' s claim that ignorance o f the
French system inhibits A m e r i c a n understanding, the positivist or realist
position has suggested that the cultural specificity o f the p h e n o m e n a stud-
ied b y B o u r d i e u has so constituted his theories that they cannot relate to
other cultures. R e v i e w i n g Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture
and Outline of a Theory of Practice, d i M a g g i o was sceptical o f the claims
that he t o o k B o u r d i e u to b e making:

While Bourdieu writes of the French educational system, which is more intri-
cately stratified than that of the United States, his theoretical statements suggest
that his conclusions may apply more generally. The absence of any explicit
110 Bourdieu and culture

comparison between France and either the United States or the socialist coun-
tries is a source of ambiguity in his work. 19

A r c h e r ' s exposure o f the p r o b a b l e effects o f the character o f the French

system o n Bourdieu's theorising about it was m o r e sophisticated. It was
likely, she argued, that the p h e n o m e n o n o f cultural arbitrariness c o u l d b e
explained b y the distinctive, highly centralised character o f the French
system, and it followed, therefore, that '. . . if the existence o f a dominant
"cultural arbitrary" were contingent u p o n the l o w level o f educational
diversity in a centralized system then the possibility o f theorizing in this
way varies with the structure o f the educational system and c o u l d only b e
generalized to other systems o f the same t y p e ' . T h e corollary here, based
20

o n a W e b e r i a n stance, seems to b e that social theories only explain the

societies o f which they are the product or, at most, societies which are o f
the 'same type', but it is not clear from what a-social perspective the
sameness o f 'types' is to b e established.
Just as a form o f realism has caused criticism to suggest that B o u r d i e u
only explains what he explains ( o r that what he explains causes him to
explain it in the way in which he d o e s ) and that, therefore, his explanations
are not transferable, so it has led criticism to suppose that his published
findings are invalidated as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the time gap b e t w e e n research
and publication. In his 1986 review o f Distinction, Jenkins offers graphic
instances o f h o w 'pass' are s o m e o f the popular cultural figures discussed
in the text and makes the general point that '. . . the time lag b e t w e e n data
collection and publication (in the case o f the English edition, up to 21
years) renders much o f the detail o f the b o o k incomprehensible t o all but
the dedicated cultural archaeologist . . . ' 2 1
B o u r d i e u has himself re-
s p o n d e d to this criticism - or anticipated it - early in the text o f La
Noblesse d tat ( 1 9 8 9 ) , just as he has o n several occasions since the late
f 22

1980s outlined his position concerning the cultural transferability o f his

t e x t s but there is o n e example in the secondary literature o f b o t h crit-
23

icisms pushed interestingly to their logical extreme. In 1985, R o b i n s o n and

G a m i e r - o f the Department o f S o c i o l o g y at Indiana University -
published an article entitled 'Class reproduction a m o n g m e n and w o m e n in
France. R e p r o d u c t i o n theory o n its h o m e ground'. T h e y claimed that ' A n
analysis o f class reproduction in France at approximately the time that
reproduction theory was d e v e l o p e d (1970) affords a test o f s o m e o f these
arguments o n their h o m e ground, where they should b e most consistent
with the actual situation' 24
( m y italics). T h e y used statistics supplied b y the
Institut National de la Statistique et des tudes c o n o m i q u e s ( I N S E E ) for
1970 o n the grounds that this was the date o f publication o f La Reproduc-
tion ( e v e n though the statistical information used b y B o u r d i e u and Pas-
seron was acquired from I N S E E for the writing o f Les Hritiers (1964)
rather than for the later reconceptualisation o f their findings). R o b i n s o n
and G a m i e r found by this means that '. . . French reproduction theory has
overstated the role o f education in reproducing class advantage from
 Evaluating fragmented responses 111

generation t o g e n e r a t i o n ' and that this is related to the failure o f repro-

25

duction theory to . . consider gender difference in the reproduction o f

c l a s s e s ' . T h e y p r o c e e d e d t o m a k e t w o specific c o m m e n t s o n the meth-
26

o d o l o g y a d o p t e d b y B o u r d i e u in the educational research o f the 1960s.

First: ' B o u r d i e u generally uses father's class o r o c c u p a t i o n as an indicator
o f father's educational o r cultural capital. This is consistent with his as-
sumption that father's class and education are very highly associated . . . ' 2 7

and, secondly,

The most serious limitation of Bourdieu's empirical work is that it has been
confined to samples of students. Because students have not as yet assumed the
class positions they will occupy in their work lives one cannot assess the effects
of their class and educational background and own educational capital on their
class placement. 28

In relation t o the s e c o n d point, B o u r d i e u and Passeron had themselves

explicitly discussed, in Les tudiants et leurs tudes, the validity o f gener-
alising t o the w h o l e o f society from the experiences o f a subgroup possess-
ing particular characteristics such as the student subgroup. T h e text o f Les
Hritiers considers the unique social position o f students b o t h in relation to
the trajectories o f their parents and in relation to their condition o f poten-
tiality vis--vis the labour market, but, mainly, these texts m o v e towards
the view that was to b e stated m o r e overtly later that, in effect, the condi-
tion o f students is the n o r m for all agents within society. That is to say that
B o u r d i e u was m o v i n g away from any attempted objective correlation b e -
tween occupations and class, mediated b y education, towards an attempted
understanding o f the position-taking o f individuals, o f h o w individuals stra-
tegically d e p l o y 'class' identity, educational 'capital' and occupational sta-
tus t o m a k e their way through the social system. In relation to the first
point, B o u r d i e u ' s response might well b e that he had already indicated in a
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l section o f Travail et travailleurs en Algrie that he a d v o -
cated a continuous reciprocity in inquiry b e t w e e n quantitative and qualita-
tive data. T h e insights derived from interviews with particular subjects and
the generalised statistical information derived from large samples are dif-
ferent kinds o f objectification that are b o t h functions o f the questions
p o s e d b y inquirers. Refinement o f findings can b e obtained b y shifting
b e t w e e n the quantitative and the qualitative, but neither p r o c e d u r e gives
access to any objective truth lying behind their instrumentality. R o b i n s o n
and Garnier's 1985 perspective o n the data o f 1970 might correctly have
d e d u c e d a gender difference that B o u r d i e u did not o b s e r v e because his
research instruments m a d e it structurally unobservable, but the relativist's
response w o u l d b e that the uses o f the e v i d e n c e m a d e b y B o u r d i e u and b y
R o b i n s o n and G a m i e r are b o t h explicable sociohistorically such that
neither falsifies the other.
T h e question raised b y this s e c o n d substantive argument against B o u r -
dieu - in relation to time - is h o w far specific shortcomings o f his w o r k
which sometimes manifest the changing social conditions o f the last forty
112 Bourdieu and culture

years should detract from his 'total' achievement. It is bizarre that R o b i n -

son and Garnier's attempt to replicate the empirical situation o f 1970 s o as
t o launch a critique o f Bourdieu's m e t h o d o l o g y in that historical p e r i o d
should, in 1985, c o n c l u d e that Bourdieu's procedures had caused him to
overstate the role o f education in class reproduction without
acknowledging that all Bourdieu's w o r k after 1970, whether in respect o f
e m p l o y m e n t in the w o r k leading t o the publication o f ' L e Patronat' in 1978
o r in respect o f the diversity o f cultural forms analysed in Distinction
(available in English translation in 1984) had itself b e e n undertaken to
explore the nature o f that overstatement. T h e r e have b e e n several variants
o f this time-related critique o f Bourdieu's w o r k .
R o b i n s o n and G a m i e r c h o s e t o imply that B o u r d i e u ' s educational
analyses w e r e out o f date when in fact it was they w h o w e r e out o f date in
respect o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f Bourdieu's thinking. T h e implications o f
c o m p a r a b l e criticisms, h o w e v e r , are less clear. Garnham has, o n occasions,
implied with sadness that Bourdieu's failure to analyse the media
constitutes a critical weakness, suggesting that Bourdieu's theory o f c o m -
munication - derived from thinking about primary, o n e - t o - o n e human c o n -
tact - is ill-equipped to deal with the p h e n o m e n o n o f contemporary
communication industries. T h e 'total' B o u r d i e u response can n o w point t o
his recently delivered, o n television, talks entitled 'Sur la tlvision' and
' L e c h a m p journalistique et la t l v i s i o n ' or a wider counterargument
29

might b e that other researchers in the Centre d e S o c i o l o g i e E u r o p e n n e ,

Paris, have pursued the implications o f Bourdieu's w o r k in this field. In this
case, for instance, it could b e argued that the w o r k o f Patrick C h a m p a g n e
demonstrates the kind o f detailed analysis that B o u r d i e u might b e ex-
pected to m a k e o f the relations b e t w e e n politics and the media. Similarly,
Berger asked rhetorically, in 1986, ' H o w did it b e c o m e possible - and
reasonable - to ignore the a r i s t o c r a c y ? ' T h e practical answer here has t o
30

b e that o n e o f the culminations o f the long collaboration b e t w e e n B o u r d i e u

and M o n i q u e d e Saint Martin going back t o the 1960s has b e e n her publica-
tion, in 1993, o f L'Espace de la noblesse 31
- a text which can b e seen to date
b a c k to her ' U n e grande famille' o f 1 9 8 0 and to run in parallel with the
32

research o n the French episcopacy which was undertaken in collaboration

with B o u r d i e u at the same t i m e .
33

Bourdieu's w o r k seems to arouse expectations o f comprehensiveness,

and his failure to provide this personally has, at times, generated criticism
which can legitimately b e countered b y reference t o the w o r k o f his c o l -
leagues. But o n e variant o f this criticism raises m o r e difficult issues.
M o v i n g b e y o n d Garnham's charge that B o u r d i e u '. . . neglects the effect o f
the growth o f the so-called "cultural industries" ' and his elaboration o f the
charge with the question: 'What may b e the effect o n the operation o f
symbolic p o w e r o f the increased intervention o f e c o n o m i c capital directly
into the field o f the production o f symbolic g o o d s ? ' Lash has g o n e as far
3 4

as to suggest that '. . . Bourdieu's w o r k is s o central n o w because the real

w o r l d has changed to a point at which it has c o m e to agree with B o u r d i e u ' s
 Evaluating fragmented responses 113

w o r l d ' . O n this reading, in other w o r d s , B o u r d i e u ' s descriptions have

3 5

p r e s c r i b e d so effectively that the temporal dimension in criticism p o t e n -

36

tially generates a n e w argument against his achievement - that, in his o w n

terms, his analyses currently appear t o endorse social reality and n o longer
t o criticise it. This is not, h o w e v e r , precisely the criticism that Lash makes
from his observation. H e argues, instead, that B o u r d i e u ' s theory cannot
explain the process o f social change which has caused that theory n o w to b e
thought t o b e an accurate explanation o f reality. A s Lash puts it: ' M y claim
is that the real w o r l d has b e c o m e increasingly like B o u r d i e u ' s theoretical
world; that B o u r d i e u is right in terms o f h o w things are, but w r o n g in his
implicit claim that they have always b e e n like t h i s . ' Lash seems here to b e
37

struggling t o express his disquiet at the sense that B o u r d i e u ' s theories have
b e e n s h o w n t o b e a priori true, that they have acquired a truthfulness
without being able to account for the conditions that have brought this
about. H e struggles with the paradox that B o u r d i e u appears to have b e e n
able to explain changing conditions without being able to explain the c o n -
ditions o f change.
This hesitant anxiety about B o u r d i e u ' s achievement is just o n e o f the
m o r e recent articulations o f the third substantive criticism o f B o u r d i e u ' s
w o r k that has b e e n advanced right from the earliest reviews and articles.
T h e last criticism to b e considered here - but the most fundamental - is
that B o u r d i e u ' s theory has not b e e n able to account for social change. This
position has b e e n a d o p t e d with different emphases which n e e d to b e dis-
tinguished. S o m e critics have attacked B o u r d i e u ' s 'determinism'; s o m e
have focused o n his political 'quietism'; s o m e have argued that his w o r k
c o n d o n e s the d o m i n a n c e o f dominant culture; whilst others have b e e n
especially hostile t o what they take to b e his disrespect for the creative
potential o f the working class. In many cases these arguments have b e e n
m i x e d and the motivation for the attacks has often b e e n as m u c h political
as social scientific. T h e y can best b e exemplified in relation to the last
emphasis - B o u r d i e u ' s supposed antipathy t o what has b e e n labelled
'cultural Marxism'.
In spite o f the fact that the 'gloss' o f proposition ( 1 ) o f Reproduction: In
Education, Society and Culture (that ' A l l pedagogic action ( P A ) is, o b j e c -
tively, s y m b o l i c v i o l e n c e insofar as it is the imposition o f a cultural arbitr-
ary b y an arbitrary p o w e r ' ) makes the following clear statement: ' T h e
propositions which follow . . . refer to all P A s , . . . , and, unless otherwise
stated, whether that P A seeks to r e p r o d u c e the cultural arbitrary o f the
dominant o r o f the dominated classes . . . ' critics have refused to accept
3 8

this assertion at face value. B r e d o and Feinberg, for instance, wrote o f

B o u r d i e u and Passeron:

Their inability to find any convincing method for changing the relations of
dominance that are found in the educational system highlights a much more
serious problem with their system - it is the inability to account for any signifi-
cant social change at all. In part this failure can be accounted for by one key
assumption that seems to pervade their book. This is the notion that the habitus
114 Bourdieu and culture

that is reproduced in the lower classes by the school must inevitably be a carbon
copy, albeit one fainter than the original, of the mentality that is found in the
dominant group. 39

T h e same interpretation is repeated b y G o r d e r : 'Thus, the p o w e r o f the

educational system derives from the structure o f class relations but adds t o
it its o w n symbolic force. It d o e s this through the imposition o f the
"cultural arbitrary" which is not arbitrary at all, but based u p o n the culture
o f the dominant c l a s s . ' This is a Marxist reading o f B o u r d i e u which
40

paraphrases, but appears not to understand, the function p e r f o r m e d b y

'symbolic f o r c e ' in Bourdieu's system - that o f distorting any supposed
direct c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between education and 'class'. In suggesting that the
cultural 'arbitrary' is not arbitrary at all, G o r d e r correctly identifies a ten-
sion in the presentation b e t w e e n the logical and the historical - the tension
about which, ex post facto, Passeron has clarified his position - but she
assumes that the idea that arbitrariness should b e understood as historical
rather than philosophical contingency conceals, for B o u r d i e u , an acquies-
c e n c e in the structural relations o f a determined class hierarchy. W o r k i n g
herself with a fixed view o f historical necessity in terms o f dialectical mater-
ialism, G o r d e r d o e s not realise that the historical process t o which B o u r -
dieu's cultural arbitrary contingently relates is itself contingent o n factors
other than simply the changing m o d e s o f e c o n o m i c production. T h e c o m -
bination o f Bourdieu's relativism with his acceptance o f Realpolitik means
that he seeks to analyse dominated cultures in relation t o the dominant
only because this is the relationship which, de facto, is tautologuously the
case.
T h e r e are t w o further p r o b l e m s associated with this response t o
G o r d e r ' s criticism. T h e first - that B o u r d i e u shifts t o o readily backwards
and forwards b e t w e e n what must logically b e the case and what is really the
case, that dominated p e o p l e d o not necessarily experience themselves in
relation to the dominant even though the o n e might logically entail the
other - will b e discussed in the next chapter. T h e s e c o n d - that, for B o u r -
dieu, a relativistic f o r m o f stratification seems to b e unidirectional, assum-
ing that relatively dominated cultures define themselves exclusively in
relation to the cultures b y which they are dominated rather than those
which they themselves dominate - will b e considered shortly b y reference
to H o n n e t h ' s criticisms. F o r the m o m e n t , it is important t o register that
G o r d e r ' s crude Marxist critique expressed itself in a f o r m o f special, politi-
cal pleading o n behalf o f working-class culture.
G o r d e r ' s final sentence outlined the direction that ' w e o n the l e f t ' 41

should take in research and it is clear that Willis's Learning to Labour,

rather than Reproduction, was her m o d e l . She argued that ' B y further
defining the value o f any cultural capital b y its approximation to the culture
o f the dominant class, B o u r d i e u seems to deny the value and b y extension
the very existence o f working class c u l t u r e ' . Jenkins has b e e n m u c h m o r e
42

o u t s p o k e n o n this point. Reviewing Distinction, he wrote that

 Evaluating fragmented responses 115

. . . the superficiality of Bourdieu's discussion of the working class is matched

only by its arrogance and condescension. In this . . . he betrays the influence of
his membership of French bourgeois cultural networks. Despite his good inten-
tions, this perspective taints the entire analysis with a sense of the author's own
distinction, and that of his intended audience. 43

In passing, it should b e n o t e d that this passage also exemplifies a c o m m o n

f o r m o f criticism o f B o u r d i e u , that o f attempting to c o n d e m n the man in
terms o f his o w n theory. Taking Distinction alongside Homo Academicus,
as Jenkins can very well d o , given that he has reviewed b o t h texts, it should
b e possible t o see that B o u r d i e u sought t o insert himself within the o b j e c -
tive structure that he presented. Just as he was able to situate himself
within his objectified version o f the field o f Parisian higher education, so his
representation o f the relations b e t w e e n dominant and dominated cultures
in Distinction is self-consciously a representation which is a function o f his
position within the dominated fraction o f the dominant class. B o u r d i e u ' s
analysis d o e s not 'betray the influence o f his membership'. Rather, the
objective analysis overtly a c c o m m o d a t e s the grounds for self-criticism
within itself. In constructing a m o d e l o f relations, B o u r d i e u relativises the
m o d e l , making it a function o f itself.
O n behalf o f the working class, Jenkins takes offence at the following
passage from Distinction: '. . . nothing is m o r e alien to working-class
w o m e n than the typically b o u r g e o i s idea o f making each object in the h o m e
the o c c a s i o n for an aesthetic c h o i c e . . , ' This passage elicits a sarcastic
4 4

' O h y e a h ? ' W h a t Jenkins t o o readily fails to understand is that B o u r d i e u is

not denigrating working-class w o m e n for their lack o f 'culture' but, instead,
arguing that a working-class aesthetic is functional rather than aestheticist.
T h e c o m p l e x i t y o f B o u r d i e u ' s position w o u l d have b e c o m e o b v i o u s if
Jenkins had continued the a b o v e quotation from Distinction thus:

. . . of extending the intention of harmony or beauty even into the bathroom or

kitchen, places strictly defined by their function, or of involving specifically
aesthetic criteria in the choice of a saucepan or cupboard . . .
This conventionalism, which is also that of popular photography, concerned to
fix conventional poses in the conventional compositions, is the opposite of bour-
geois formalism and of all the forms of art for art's sake recommended by
manuals of graceful living and women's magazines, the art of entertaining, the
art of the table, the art of motherhood. 45

B o u r d i e u is not denigrating working-class taste. If there is any non-

scientific denigration here, it is o f the taste o f b o u r g e o i s w o m e n . If any-
thing, B o u r d i e u is idealising the working class in the fashion o f Hoggart's
The Uses of Literacy. B o u r d i e u argues that the aristocracy has generated
an exclusive c o n c e p t o f the 'aesthetic'. Everything therefore conspires to
i m p o s e the dominant view that the non-aestheticism o f the working class is
non-aesthetic, but, for B o u r d i e u , practical, functional c h o i c e s can b e as
aesthetic as aestheticist ones. B o u r d i e u ' s position is clear from his
116 Bourdieu and culture

introduction to Un art moyen (1965) which should b e taken alongside the

gloss o f proposition ( 1 ) o f La Reproduction (1970) but which, unhappily,
was not available in English translation until 1990. B o u r d i e u wrote:

The most banal tasks always include actions which owe nothing to the pure and
simple quest for efficiency, and the actions most directly geared towards practi-
cal ends may elicit aesthetic judgements, inasmuch as the means of attaining
desired ends can always be the object of a specific valuation: there are beautiful
ways of ploughing or trimming a hedge, just as there are beautiful mathematical
solutions or beautiful rugby manoeuvres. Thus, most of society can be excluded
from the universe of legitimate culture without being excluded from the universe
of aesthetics. 46

B o u r d i e u ' s orientation has b e e n consistent o v e r the years. H e has analysed

the dominant culture that possesses the p o w e r to m a k e itself 'legitimate'
and he has analysed the ways in which l o w e r classes are inclined to legiti-
mate their o w n cultures b y adopting the formalism o f the dominant culture
t o which they aspire. These analyses, h o w e v e r , have to b e seen in the
context o f Bourdieu's disposition to favour practical behaviour regardless
o f 'class', to believe that all ethical behaviour has an aesthetic dimension
and to contend that such ethical behaviour is preferable to any aestheticist
veneer. It follows that Bourdieu's view o f those o f his critics w h o present
themselves as apologists for working-class o r 'popular' culture must b e that
they exemplify his analysis because they seek t o justify the uniqueness o f
working-class culture b y reference to the criteria of, o r the rules of, 'high'
culture rather than in its o w n , functional terms. In seeking to d o this, they
operate as if the 'legitimacy' o f 'legitimate' culture is an absolute attribute,
whereas he understands it sociologically.
Referring to the chapter o f Distinction in which the passage occurred
that a n n o y e d Jenkins, H o n n e t h has m a d e the general point that 'These
passages in which B o u r d i e u uses empirical evidence and sketches t o try to
shed light o n the working class " c h o i c e o f the necessary" are not a m o n g the
best in the study . . . ' But H o n n e t h acknowledges that Bourdieu's appar-
4 7

ent bias is simply a function o f his m o d e o f presenting his argument:

T o be sure, Bourdieu only uses the analyses of proletarian 'mass taste' as a foil
for his study of the symbolic competitive struggles of the other social strata . . .
The real aim of his inquiry is to uncover those mechanisms which operate for the
cultivation of competing styles of life within the world of distinguished culture. 48

T h e p r o b l e m , for Honneth, is not that B o u r d i e u denigrates the working

classes but that he so treats cultural and social positions as h o m o l o g u o u s
that he cannot appreciate the range o f diverse actions which all help t o
constitute any class or collective identity. A s H o n n e t h puts it:

Bourdieu has so strictly interpreted the group-specific behavioural model from

the functionalistic viewpoint of cultural adaptation to social class situations that
 Evaluating fragmented responses 117

evidently he is unable to acknowledge all the varied tasks of ensuring collective

identity (including oppositional strategies of resistance) - which everyday cul-
ture also accomplishes - which is documented in more recent writings on cultural
history. 49

In spite o f H o n n e t h ' s tacit side-lining o f the cultural Marxist critique, the

same argument against B o u r d i e u has b e e n m a d e from a different political
and sociological perspective.
L a m o n t and Lareau are familiar with Bourdieu's texts in French and
with the context o f their French production, but they misinterpret his
position in order to adapt his concepts in such a way that they will retain
functional utility for A m e r i c a n research. T h e false exegesis o f the authors
needs t o b e e x p o s e d , even if their overall aim is defensible. T h e y say, o f
B o u r d i e u and Passeron, that T h e authors often use the term "legitimate
culture" interchangeably with cultural c a p i t a l ' . A n d they justify this claim
50

with the following f o o t n o t e :

In Reproduction (1977 (1970), p. 46), cultural capital is defined as cultural goods

and values that are transmitted through class differentiated families and whose
value as cultural capital varies with its cultural distance (dissimilarity?) from the
dominant cultural culture promoted by dominant agencies of socialization. This
suggests that various types of cultural capital could have different values, and
that some are even 'illegitimate', or of low value. However, most of Bourdieu's
writings suggest that cultural capital refers only to highly valued signals. 51

T h e passage to which L a m o n t and Lareau refer is o n page 46 o f La Repro-

duction and pages 30-1 o f Reproduction. T h e relevant propositions are
(2.3.2.1), (2.3.3) and (2.3.3.1). This last reads:

2.3.3.1. In any given social formation, the system of PAs, insofar as it is subject to
the effect of domination by the dominant PA, tends to reproduce, both in the
dominant and in the dominated classes, misrecognition of the truth of the legiti-
mate culture as the dominant cultural arbitrary, whose reproduction contributes
towards reproducing the power relations (by 1.3.1 ) . 5 2

T h e original French for the latter half o f this sentence is as follows: '. . . la
mconnaissance de la vrit objective de la culture lgitime comme arbitraire
culturel dominant.' 53
M u c h hangs o n the translation o f 'mconnaissance'
and it is worth pursuing this point so as to demonstrate en passant that
there are genuine linguistic difficulties associated with the cross-cultural
c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k . N i c e was particularly conscious o f this
in respect o f 'mconnaissance' when making his translation o f La Repro-
duction. In using 'misrecognition' in rendering B o u r d i e u and Passeron's
introduction to the French edition, N i c e offered the following explanation:

I.e. 'mconnaissance', the process whereby power relations are perceived not for
what they objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes
of the beholder. The (admittedly 'artificial') term 'misrecognition' has been
118 Bourdieu and culture

adopted because it preserves the link with 'recognition' (reconnaissance) in the

sense of 'ratification', and is consistent with the usage of other translators.
54

'Mconnaissance' might as usefully b e rendered as 'lack o f c o m p r e h e n s i o n

o f o r 'misappreciation o f , but, certainly, an appropriate paraphrase o f
'misrecognition o f the truth o f the legitimate culture as the dominant
cultural arbitrary' might b e : 'not understanding that the objective truth o f
legitimate culture is that it is the dominant cultural arbitrary.' In other
words, the meaning is that 'legitimate culture' is only such by virtue of its
dominance rather than o f any intrinsic quality. B o u r d i e u and Passeron are
careful t o say that 'in any given social formation', legitimacy is nothing
other than a function o f d o m i n a n c e . T h e 'dominant' is not an absolutely
dominant 'high status' culture but only the dominant for that particular
social formation. It is not, as L a m o n t and Lareau c o n t e n d , that every rung
defines itself in relation to 'high' culture but that, at every level, there are
distance differentiations in respect o f the dominant culture o f that level.
Each level's dominant culture is dominated in relation t o the greater p o w e r
o f the 'higher' level. B o u r d i e u d o e s have a horizontally stratified view o f
society but he d o e s not, as L a m o n t suggests elsewhere, posit that '. . .
intellectual life is a zero-sum g a m e ' in which all subcultures define them-
5 5

selves relatively only in relation t o o n e non-relative, 'legitimate' o r 'high

status' culture.
L a m o n t and Lareau's position explicitly has affinity with that a d o p t e d b y
Willis and others but, interestingly, their w o r k brings together s o m e o f the
strands o f disagreement with B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k that have b e e n surveyed in
this chapter. T h e y set themselves the task o f rescuing the c o n c e p t o f
'cultural capital' from misuse o r abuse. T h e y misrepresent B o u r d i e u ' s view
o f cultural capital but imply an exoneration o f B o u r d i e u from his supposed
position b y arguing that it was the c o n s e q u e n c e o f the particular charac-
teristics o f Parisian society which m a d e possible a 'zero-sum' g a m e o f
cultural position-taking. Their misrepresentation seems t o endorse the
cultural Marxist critique but, in fact, their argument is advanced s o as t o
use Bourdieu's w o r k t o c o m e to terms analytically with a society which is
politically decentralised and without a strong tradition o f 'high culture'.
T h e focus o f the next chapter is o n whether their 'criticism' constitutes a
positive and valid response t o B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k .

Notes

1. R. Brubaker (1989) 'Review of Choses dites', Contemporary Sociology, 18, 5,

783.
2. R. Harker, C. Mahar and C. Wilkes (1990) An Introduction to the Work of
Pierre Bourdieu. The Practice of Theory, London, Macmillan, 210.
3. R. Jenkins (1992) Pierre Bourdieu, London, Routledge, 12.
4. In C. Calhoun, E. LiPuma and M. Postone (1993) Bourdieu: Critical Perspec-
tives, Oxford, Polity Press, 235-62.
5. P. Bourdieu (1993) 'Concluding remarks: for a sociogenetic understanding of
intellectual works', in C. Calhoun et al., Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives,
Oxford, Polity Press, 263.
 Evaluating fragmented responses 119

6. D . Swartz (1977) 'Pierre Bourdieu: the cultural transmission of social ine-

quality', Harvard Educational Review, 47, 4, 553.
7. E. Bredo and W . Feinberg (1979) 'Meaning, power and pedagogy: Pierre
Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society and
Culture', Journal of Curriculum Studies, 11, 4, 324.
8. D . Swartz (1981) 'Classes, educational systems and labor markets. A critical
evaluation of the contributions by Raymond Boudon and Pierre Bourdieu to
the sociology of education', Archives of European Sociology, XXII, 346.
9. T. Schatzki (1987) 'Overdue analysis of Bourdieu's theory of practice',
Inquiry, 30,121.
10. Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 92-3.
11. M. Lamont and A . Lareau (1988) 'Cultural capital: allusions, gaps and glis-
sandos in recent theoretical developments', Sociological Theory, 6,156.
12. M.S. Archer (1983) 'Process without system', Archives europennes de socio-
logie, 24,1,196.
13. J.-C. Passeron (1986) 'Theories of socio-cultural reproduction', International
Social Science Journal, 38, 4, 619.
14. Bredo and Feinberg, 'Meaning', 317.
15. K.L. Gorder (1980) 'Understanding school knowledge: a critical appraisal of
Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu', Educational Theory, 30, 4, 335.
16. (With J.-C. Passeron) in P. Bourdieu, J.-C. Passeron and M. de Saint Martin
(eds.) (1965) Rapport pdagogique et communication, Paris and The Hague,
Mouton (Cahiers du Centre de Sociologie Europenne, 2); translated as
(1994) 'Introduction: language and relationship to language in the teaching
situation', in Academic Discourse. Linguistic Misunderstanding and Pro-
fessorial Power, Oxford, Polity Press.
17. (With J.-C. Passeron) in R. Castel and J.-C. Passeron (eds.) (1967) ducation,
dveloppement et dmocratie, Paris and The Hague, Mouton (Cahiers du Cen-
tre de Sociologie Europenne, 4).
18. C. Lemert (1981) 'Literary politics and the champ of French sociology',
Theory and Society, 10, 651.
19. P. diMaggio (1979) 'Review of P. Bourdieu, Reproduction in Education,
Society and Culture and Outline of a Theory of Practice', American Journal of
Sociology, 84, 6,1463, footnote 6.
20. Archer, 'Process', 216.
21. R. Jenkins (1986) 'Review of P. Bourdieu, Distinction', Sociology, 20,1,104.
22. See P. Bourdieu (1989) La Noblesse d'tat. Grandes coles et esprit de corps,
Paris, ditions de Minuit, 20-1.
23. See, in particular, P. Bourdieu (1994) Raisons pratiques. Sur la thorie de
l'action, Paris, ditions du Seuil, and, for a discussion and further references,
see D.M. Robbins, (1996) 'The international transmission of ideas; Pierre
Bourdieu in theory and practice', Journal of the Institute of Romance Studies,
4, 297-306.
24. R.V. Robinson and M.A. Gamier (1985) 'Class reproduction among men and
women in France: reproduction theory on its home ground', American Journal
of Sociology, 91, 2, 256.
25. Ibid., 250.
26. Ibid., 255.
27. Ibid., 256-7.
28. Ibid., 257.
29. Delivered in May 1996 and produced by the Collge de France on cassette and
available from Le Livre qui parle, 24550 Villefranche-du-Prigord, France.
30. B.M. Berger (1986) 'Review essay: "Taste and domination" ', American Jour-
nal of Sociology, 91, 6,1450.
31. M. de Saint Martin (1993) L'Espace de la noblesse, Paris, ditions Mtaili.
32. M. de Saint Martin (1980) 'Une grande famille', Actes de la recherche en
sciences sociales, 31, 4-21.
120 Bourdieu and culture

33. P. Bourdieu and M. de Saint Martin (1982) 'La sainte famille. L'piscopat
franais et le champ du pouvoir', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 4 4 -
45,2-54.
34. N. Garnham (1986) 'Extended review: Bourdieu's Distinction', The Sociologi-
cal Review, 34, 2, 432.
35. S. Lash (1993) 'Pierre Bourdieu: cultural economy and social change'"in Cal-
houn et al, Bourdieu, 210.
36. See Bourdieu's own discussion in (1981) 'Dcrire et prescrire. Note sur les
conditions de possibilit et les limites de l'efficacit politique', Actes de la
recherche en sciences sociales, 38, 69-73.
37. S. Lash (1993) 'Pierre Bourdieu: cultural economy and social change' in
Calhoun et al, Bourdieu, 210.
38. P. Bourdieu with J.-C. Passeron (1977) Reproduction in Education, Society and
Culture, London and Beverly Hills, C A , Sage, 5.
39. Bredo and Feinberg, 'Meaning', 329.
40. Gorder, 'Understanding', 341.
41. Ibid., 345.
42. Ibid., 344.
43. Jenkins, 'Review', 104.
44. P. Bourdieu (1984) Distinction, A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 379; quoted in Jenkins, 'Review', 104.
45. Bourdieu, Distinction, 379.
46. P. Bourdieu with L. Boltanski, R. Castel and J.C. Chamboredon (1990)
Photography, a Middle-Brow Art, Oxford, Polity Press, 7-8.
47. A . Honneth (1986) 'The fragmented world of symbolic forms: reflections on
Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of culture', Theory, Culture and Society, 3, 3, 61.
48. Ibid., 61-2.
49. Ibid., 61.
50. Lamont and Lareau, 'Cultural capital', 157.
51. Ibid.
52. Bourdieu, Reproduction, 31.
53. P. Bourdieu with J.-C. Passeron (1970) La Reproduction. lments pour une
thorie du systme d'enseignement, Paris, ditions de Minuit, 46.
54. Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, xiii.
55. M. Lamont (1989) 'Slipping the world back in: Bourdieu on Heidegger', Con-
temporary Sociology, 18, 5, 782.
8 Meta-criticism: charting interminable
territory

T h e previous chapter tried t o represent critically s o m e o f the criticisms that

have b e e n m a d e o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k . It s h o w e d that the main local dis-
agreements - that the w o r k d o e s not transfer cross-culturally or cross-
temporally and that it denigrates working-class culture - all follow from the
disinclination o f critics t o accept the particular epistemological basis o f
B o u r d i e u ' s projects.
In his o w n brief response to his critics (published as 'Concluding re-
marks: for a s o c i o g e n e t i c understanding o f intellectual w o r k s ' , in Bourdieu:
Critical Perspectives) B o u r d i e u first emphasises those misunderstandings
which relate t o the international circulation o f ideas. H e argues that c o n -
sumers o f his w o r k s have f o u n d grounds for criticising them either because
they have synchronised them o r because they have atomised them. Scru-
tiny o f the secondary literature certainly confirms that many critics have
r e s p o n d e d t o single texts in isolation o r have thematically aggregated sev-
eral texts without reference t o the sequence o f their production. Bourdieu
p r o p o s e s t w o responses t o this situation.
H e first p r o p o s e s that the consumers o f his w o r k should reflect sys-
tematically o n the social conditions within which they receive the messages
transmitted b y his texts:

Texts, as we know, circulate without their contexts, . . . It follows that the cate-
gories of perception and interpretation that readers apply to them, being them-
selves linked to a field of production subject to different traditions, have every
chance of being more or less inadequate . . . T o prevent the cultural disjunctures
due to the gap between different historical traditions from introducing misun-
derstanding at the very heart of even the most benevolent and welcoming com-
munication, I believe it is necessary that all researchers concerned about the
progress of their respective scientific fields ask of the sociology of science
weapons against the social mechanisms capable of introducing distortions into
scientific exchanges. In such matters, the implementation of the principle of
reflexivity is one of the most efficient ways to put into practice the international-
ism that science presupposes and promotes. 1

S e c o n d l y , h o w e v e r , B o u r d i e u suggests that s o m e misunderstandings o f his

w o r k s can b e attributed t o the failure o f critics t o consider the field o f their
p r o d u c t i o n . A s B o u r d i e u puts it:
122 Bourdieu and culture

They thus uncover apparent contradictions that would vanish if they replaced
each of the theses or hypotheses in question back in the movement, or even
better, in the progress of my work; if, more precisely, they strove to reproduce
the evolution (or the chain) of thought that led me to change progressively
without for that ever effecting a resounding 'self-critique'... 2

T h e p r o b l e m with these t w o p r o p o s e d forms o f response is, o f course, that

b o t h formally consolidate the m o d e l which is itself in question. B y expect-
ing his critics to attend t o the field o f their consumption o r to the field o f his
production, B o u r d i e u is asking his critics to accept his m o d e l o f cultural
production and consumption, conceptualised in terms o f fields, as a prere-
quisite for evaluating it. Critics are forced t o take t w o tacks away from
engagement with the content o f Bourdieu's w o r k . O n the o n e hand, B o u r -
dieu's d e p l o y m e n t o f his concepts within his texts discourages any assess-
ment o f their capacity t o explain anything that o n e might call 'reality'. O n
the other hand, Bourdieu's e m b o d i m e n t o f his concepts in his actions
means that he asks that his texts should b e read as elements in the process
which is his social trajectory. B o u r d i e u denies referentiality within his texts
and o f his texts. T h e situation, therefore, for B o u r d i e u criticism is as d e -
scribed b y Maclntyre in respect o f moral discourse when he w r o t e that
' T h e most striking feature o f contemporary moral utterance is that so m u c h
o f it is used to express disagreements; and the most striking feature o f the
debates in which these disagreements are expressed is their interminable
character'. O r , as Maclntyre elaborates, the situation is o n e o f 'conceptual
3

incommensurability', b y which he means that 'Every o n e o f the arguments

is logically valid o r can b e easily expanded s o as t o b e m a d e so; the conclu-
sions d o indeed follow from the premises. But the rival premises are such
that w e possess n o rational way o f weighing the claims o f o n e as against
another'. 4

In his review o f Distinction, Berger graphically represents this dilemma

when he writes o f Bourdieu: '. . . in saying that I think that he is fundamen-
tally correct in his systematic understandings o f the linkages b e t w e e n class
and status I am aware that I am saying little m o r e than: I like the way he
thinks because he thinks as I d o . ' W h a t w e might call 'Maclntyre's posi-
5

tion' is also trapped within its o w n diagnosis and B o u r d i e u might retort

that his sense o f incommensurability arises from a mistaken elevation o f
the function o f rationality in resolving disputes. F o r B o u r d i e u , perhaps,
incommensurability can b e a v o i d e d if all parties in disputes are adequately
reflexive in such a way that they a c k n o w l e d g e that the artificially p r o d u c e d
'rational' discourses which they use simply c o n c e a l processes o f social
reproduction which have distorted an original o r underlying ontological
harmony.
T h e purpose o f this chapter is t o try t o find a way out o f the impasse o f
interminability and incommensurability which either d o e s o r logically
should inhibit fundamental discussion o f Bourdieu's w o r k . It will e x p l o r e
t w o strategic responses to the p r o b l e m . It will draw o n B o u r d i e u ' s o w n
p r o p o s e d responses but will seek to d o s o in such a way that a solution is
 Meta-criticism: charting interminable territory 123

suggested which d o e s not necessarily endorse B o u r d i e u ' s o w n concepts

even though it d o e s endorse his view o f the function o f conceptualisation.
B o u r d i e u ' s first response was t o encourage critics t o b e reflexive within
their fields. In making this suggestion, B o u r d i e u tacitly insists that c o n -
sumers should see themselves as situated within a field that is external t o
the field o f production. Reflexive external consumption takes the product
as given. It rules out the kind o f inquiry into the validity o f a text which, in
a c c o r d a n c e with B o u r d i e u ' s theory, is competitively possible within the
field o f its production. B o u r d i e u ' s s e c o n d response invites critics t o under-
stand the genesis o f his intellectual products. Expressed in this way, the
invitation seems to have a teleological impetus: the genesis has to b e under-
s t o o d in order to vindicate the products and t o ensure that they are not
o p e n t o criticism in themselves. M y first strategic response t o i n c o m m e n -
surability is t o offer, in outline, a vicarious reflexivity b y examining the
contexts o f s o m e o f the local disagreements that have already b e e n dis-
cussed. This will have the effect o f relativising Bourdieu's products b y
comparative reference t o several fields o f consumption. M y s e c o n d strate-
gic response is to e x p l o r e s o m e criticisms that have b e e n m a d e o f B o u r d i e u
from within the French intellectual field. T h e s e will also have the effect o f
relativising his p r o d u c t i o n because they will s h o w that B o u r d i e u m a d e
conceptual c h o i c e s within the field o f alternative possibilities that were
available to him. T h e intention is to argue that these strategies r e m o v e
incommensurability because they disclose s o m e o f the alternative p o s -
sibilities o f p r o d u c t i o n and consumption within which B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k is
situated. B y contrast, it is argued, B o u r d i e u ' s responses - understandably -
contrive t o consolidate c o m m i t m e n t t o his actual c h o i c e s rather than t o
point to the commensurability o f all possible choices.
M y outline for a s o c i o l o g y o f the critical reception o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k
highlights three clusters o f response which are defined nationally, tem-
porally and, in part, b y disciplinary o r emergent disciplinary discourse. T h e
first o f these clusters is associated with the 'cultural Marxism' response
discussed in the previous chapter and considered en passant in the Intro-
duction. B y the end o f the 1960s, B o u r d i e u had, with colleagues, carried
out researches o n student culture as well as o n photography as an emergent
cultural f o r m and o n museums as purveyors o f consecrated culture. M o s t o f
this w o r k was u n k n o w n in England in the 1970s. Until the publication o f
Reproduction in 1977, the few articles that were k n o w n were appropriated
b y the institutionalised discourse which derived its name - ' n e w directions
in the s o c i o l o g y o f education' - from the subtitle o f M . F . D . Y o u n g ' s collec-
tion o f essays called Knowledge and Control. Nevertheless, at the height o f
their collaboration at the end o f the 1960s, the interests o f B o u r d i e u and
Passeron w e r e primarily 'cultural' and only secondarily 'educational'.
H e n c e , in 1970, B o u r d i e u ' s publication, in the collection which he edited
for the ditions de Minuit, o f Passeron's translation o f Hoggart's The Uses
of Literacy with the title: La Culture du pauvre: tude sur le style de vie des
classes populaires en Angleterre. 6
The Uses of Literacy - first published in
124 Bourdieu and culture

1957 - was the w o r k o f a man w h o had g r o w n up in an area that was 'half-

surrounded b y working-class terrace h o u s e s ' ; had gained a place at the
7

local grammar school; then studied English literature at the local university
and, after W o r l d W a r II, had b e e n a tutor in English literature in the A d u l t
Education Department o f the University o f Hull. T h e study can b e said to
have b e e n ethnographic and presociological. B o u r d i e u and Passeron w e r e
attracted b y the text o f a man w h o , without any partisan i d e o l o g y , sought to
describe a working-class culture with which he was familiar but f r o m which
he was educationally separated. Hoggart established the Centre for C o n -
temporary Cultural Studies at the University o f Birmingham in 1964, but
he was s u c c e e d e d as Director, in 1968, b y Stuart Hall. It was Hall w h o gave
the field o f Hoggart's interest an ideological orientation and it was Hall
w h o found B o u r d i e u ' s understanding o f ' i d e o l o g y ' theoretically useful in
effecting this shift o f orientation. In his ' T h e hinterland o f science: i d e o l o g y
and the " S o c i o l o g y o f k n o w l e d g e " ', Hall discusses B o u r d i e u o n the basis
o f t w o translations m a d e b y N i c e - a m e m b e r o f staff in the centre - and
8

published internally in the year o f the publication o f Reproduction. As

Foley has summarised, the centre p r o d u c e d , in the 1970s, '. . . a series o f in-
house theoretical debates o n i d e o l o g y . . . , culture . . . , history . . . , and
several empirical critiques o f the English state . . . , student sub-cultures
. . . , s c h o o l reforms . . . , and racism . . . ' and he suggests that this was the
9

'general context' o f the thought o f Paul Willis. F o l e y ' s ' D o e s the working
class have a culture in the anthropological s e n s e ? ' begins with an account
o f the background t o Willis's Learning to Labour (1977) - the text t o which
so many cultural Marxist critics have referred in criticising B o u r d i e u . F o l e y
argues that Willis followed R a y m o n d Williams and E.P. T h o m p s o n t o
make the case that '. . . class cultures are lived, profane experiences r o o t e d
in working-class communities that struggle against b o u r g e o i s ideological
dominance. Working-class p e o p l e construct their o w n distinct, rewarding,
honorable ways o f l i f e ' . T h e r e is a sense in which Willis and researchers
10

at the Birmingham centre wanted t o see their w o r k as contributing to the

struggle against b o u r g e o i s d o m i n a n c e . F o r them, perhaps, Hoggart was a
transfuge - a deserter to his class, s o m e o n e w h o s e w o r k was ideologically
patronising because it was not informed b y an understanding o f the s o c i o -
e c o n o m i c forces constituting the conditions which he o b s e r v e d . It was in
this situation, I suggest, that the critiques o f B o u r d i e u acquire their signifi-
cance. There was an ambiguity in the response t o B o u r d i e u in the English
cultural study community, an ambiguity that was sustained b y B o u r d i e u ' s
willingness to carry translations o f extracts from the w o r k o f Williams,
T h o m p s o n , Klingender and Willis in the Actes de la recherche en sciences
sociales in the late 1 9 7 0 s . T h e r e was the feeling b o t h that B o u r d i e u was,
11

like Hoggart, a socialist, intellectual transfuge, and also that his solutions to
the theoretical difficulties p o s e d b y Marx and W e b e r w e r e stimulating and
satisfying. H e n c e the tension that often, for instance in the w o r k o f Jenkins,
leads to a response which confusedly merges an affinity with B o u r d i e u ' s
intellectual problem-solving with an apparent c o n t e m p t for his social posi-
 Meta-criticism-. charting interminable territory 125

tion. H e n c e the enthusiasm o f the critical account o f B o u r d i e u given col-

laboratively b y Williams and G a r n h a m which, nevertheless, has t o b e
qualified b y uncertainty about 'the question o f B o u r d i e u ' s p o l i t i c s ' . 12

T h e k e y figure in the s e c o n d cluster o f respondents is A x e l Honneth,

although the eminence grise in the b a c k g r o u n d is H a b e r m a s . In M a r c h 1983
- less than a year after B o u r d i e u had given his inaugural lecture as p r o -
fessor - H a b e r m a s delivered four lectures at the C o l l g e d e France, Paris,
which w e r e t o b e published as the first four chapters o f his The Philosophi-
cal Discourse of Modernity (1987). This text was published in G e r m a n in
1985 and, in an Excursus on the Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm,
Habermas comments:

As long as the theory of modernity takes its orientation from the basic concepts
of the philosophy of reflection - from ideas of knowledge, conscious awareness,
self-consciousness - the intrinsic connection with the concept of reason or of
rationality is obvious. This is not as evident with the basic concepts of the
philosophy of praxis, such as action, self-generation, and labor. 13

H e g o e s o n to argue that notions o f practice and reason w e r e still linked in

Marxian theory, but that t w o different lines o f thought had d e v e l o p e d in
western M a r x i s m since the 1920s, o n e influenced b y W e b e r and the other
b y Husserl and H e i d e g g e r . T h e early Lukacs and Critical T h e o r y , he c o n -
tinues, '. . . d e v e l o p e d a critical c o n c e p t o f rationality o n the basis o f a
materialistic appropriation o f H e g e l , but without appealing to the p r o d u c -
tion paradigm for this purpose'. 14
W h e r e a s the early Marcuse and later
Sartre '. . . r e n e w e d the p r o d u c t i o n paradigm . . . without appealing to a
c o n c e p t o f rationality for this purpose'. 15
This diagnosis is the prelude t o
H a b e r m a s ' s c o n t e n t i o n that T h e s e t w o traditions start to c o n v e r g e only
within the paradigm shift from productive activity t o communicative action
and the reformulation o f the c o n c e p t o f the life-world in terms o f c o m -
munications theory . . , ' A n d , finally, he claims that '. . . the theory o f
1 6

c o m m u n i c a t i v e action establishes an internal relation b e t w e e n practice and

rationality. It studies the suppositions o f rationality inherent in ordinary
c o m m u n i c a t i v e practice and conceptualizes the normative content o f
action oriented to mutual understanding in terms o f communicative
rationality'. 17

T h e p r o b l e m for the G e r m a n response t o B o u r d i e u was t o decide

whether his theory - which clearly b o r r o w e d from Marx, W e b e r and Sartre
- retained the n o t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n o r c o u l d b e c o n d u c i v e to the theory o f
c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality. H o n n e t h was research assistant t o Habermas at
this time and, in 1984, he published in G e r m a n the paper which appeared in
translation in 1986 as ' T h e fragmented w o r l d o f symbolic forms: reflections
o n Pierre B o u r d i e u ' s s o c i o l o g y o f culture'. In the m e a n time, with t w o
Frankfurt colleagues, he had b e e n given an interview b y B o u r d i e u in April
1985. A version o f this interview appeared in translation alongside H o n -
neth's translated article in 1986. T h e interview begins with an introductory
statement b y the interviewers t o the effect that it is B o u r d i e u ' s attempt t o
126 Bourdieu and culture

reconcile Marx with W e b e r that is o f most interest. T h e y say: 'It is the

attempt t o integrate class and life-world analysis, e c o n o m i c and culture
analysis, that w e find so interesting in y o u r w o r k . ' H o n n e t h ' s article had
1 8

tried t o investigate the d e v e l o p m e n t o f Bourdieu's thinking in o r d e r to

understand h o w he had m e r g e d the Marxist and W e b e r i a n legacies, '. . .
h o w b o t h elements coalesce into a single unified theory, h o w B o u r d i e u
brings the c o n c e p t o f class struggle and the study o f symbolic forms o f
expression together into a theory o f late-capitalist culture . . , ' H o n n e t h ' s
1 9

interpretation o f Outline of a Theory of Practice is that B o u r d i e u had

recourse t o a f o r m o f utilitarianism t o o v e r c o m e structuralism - that in
emphasising human agency B o u r d i e u a d o p t e d a view o f human behaviour
that supposes that individuals and groups are motivated b y the desire t o
maximise their status o r their happiness. This interpretation leads H o n n e t h
t o c o m m e n t that

. . . this utilitarian transformation of anthropological structuralism was based

from the outset on an unclarified problem still to be found in Bourdieu's theory
today: does Bourdieu regard the symbolic struggles on which he focused as
disputes over the interpretation of an intersubjectively recognized system of
classification and value, or does he regard them as struggles for the establish-
ment of group-specific ways of classification, which totally lack the common
bond of a social consensus? 20

H o n n e t h has a shrewd idea that B o u r d i e u follows the s e c o n d o p t i o n . H e

regards the c o n c e p t o f habitus as a device which enables B o u r d i e u t o
present individuals as the unconscious implementers o f the utility max-
imisation drives o f the groups t o which they b e l o n g . This leads H o n n e t h t o
c o n c l u d e that, in terms o f the opposition posited b y Habermas, B o u r d i e u ' s
theory gives t o o m u c h p r o m i n e n c e to human action as a f o r m o f p r o d u c t i o n
rather than t o human rationality. A s H o n n e t h expresses it: ' T h e central
e c o n o m i c concepts u p o n which his cultural analysis is based, c o m p e l him t o
subsume all forms o f social conflicts under the type o f struggles which o c c u r
o v e r social distribution - although the struggle for the social recognition o f
moral m o d e l s clearly o b e y s a different l o g i c . ' O r , as he decisively
21

concludes:

Bourdieu's study repeatedly gives rise to the erroneous idea that the social
recognition of a life-style and of the values it embodies can be gained in the same
way as an economic good. Only by decisively abandoning the utilitarian frame-
work of his empirical analyses could he have avoided making this crucial
misunderstanding. 22

T h e reception o f Bourdieu's w o r k in the G e r m a n intellectual field in the

mid-1980s, therefore, was dominated b y the essentially theoretical c o n -
cerns o f social and political philosophers. Bourdieu's w o r k was thought to
m a k e a contribution t o the debate b e t w e e n 'class' and 'status' which was
still perceived t o b e a live i s s u e . This G e r m a n response s h o w e d little
23
 Meta-criticism: charting interminable territory 127

awareness o f the influence o f D u r k h e i m o n B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k , o r o f the

tradition o f French naturalism which, as manifested in the w o r k o f Flaubert
and M a n e t , B o u r d i e u sought t o espouse, or, importantly, o f the influence o f
the Bachelardian tradition o f historical epistemology. It received B o u r d i e u
o n its o w n terms and found the 'theory' which they e n d e a v o u r e d to extra-
polate from his w o r k wanting o n those terms. B o u r d i e u ' s reissue o f his
L'Ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger in 1988 should, perhaps, b e seen
as a f o r m o f retaliatory critique o f the highly theoreticist nature o f the
G e r m a n a c a d e m i c tradition.
Elements o f the G e r m a n critical orientation have b e e n transported to
the U S A . Ringer, J o p p k e and Brubaker h o l d A m e r i c a n academic posts but
see B o u r d i e u within a conceptual framework which is essentially G e r m a n .
Brubaker has b e e n a significant figure in the third exemplary cluster o f
respondents t o B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k - a cluster that might, imprecisely, b e
described as the C h i c a g o cluster. Brubaker's The Limits of Rationality: An
Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber (1984) sustained the
influence o f W e b e r i a n thinking in the U S A , but it offered a perspective o n
W e b e r which w o u l d have b e e n anathema to the Frankfurt School. Bru-
baker e x p l o r e d the paradox o f W e b e r ' s thought - that ' M o d e r n man, then,
cannot escape making a criterionless and therefore non-rational c h o i c e
about the very meaning o f rationality'. 24
O r , spelling this out in terms
reminiscent o f the ' M a c l n t y r e position', that '. . . in W e b e r ' s view there is
n o rational way o f deciding a m o n g the plurality o f conflicting possible
value commitments. E v e r y rational life, in short, is f o u n d e d o n a n o n -
rational c h o i c e ' . G i v e n this reading o f W e b e r , it is not surprising that
2 5

Brubaker should have b e e n attracted to B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k . His 'Rethinking

classical theory. T h e sociological vision o f Pierre B o u r d i e u ' (1985) offered
'. . . an analytical o v e r v i e w and critical appraisal o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k . . . '
2 6

but it did so in a way that a c k n o w l e d g e d , as the positivists did not, that

B o u r d i e u ' s c o n c e p t s are 'metatheoretical notions' that 'are not intended to
constitute a t h e o r y ' . This realisation led Brubaker to seek to understand
27

B o u r d i e u ' s social theory as habitus rather than to understand objectively

his theory of habitus, and h e n c e 'Social theory as habitus' was the title o f
his contribution t o Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (1993).
Several A m e r i c a n articles o f the mid-1980s drew attention to the way in
which the c o n c e p t o f 'habit' had b e e n used in A m e r i c a n sociology d o w n to
around 1918, but had b e e n suppressed in the p e r i o d b e t w e e n the t w o w o r l d
wars. In the abstract o f his ' T h e matter o f habit' (1986), C a m i c summarised
his argument to the effect that the c o n c e p t had b e e n excised from the
discipline as a result o f '. . . the interdisciplinary disputes that surrounded
the institutionalization o f s o c i o l o g y as an academic discipline, particularly
s o c i o l o g y ' s struggles with behaviorist psychology, which had b y then p r o -
j e c t e d into p r o m i n e n c e a notion o f habit deriving from 19th-century b i o -
logical t h o u g h t ' . H e praises B o u r d i e u ' s attempt t o revive the c o n c e p t .
28

O s t r o w had earlier attempted to insert Bourdieu's notion o f habitus into a

tradition o f thought which he associated in part with Husserl but, equally
128 Bourdieu and culture

importantly, with D e w e y . Citing D e w e y ' s Human Nature and Conduct: An

Introduction to Social Psychology (1922), O s t r o w refers his reader t o a
secondary text for '. . . a comprehensive analysis o f D e w e y ' s theory o f
habit, or, rather, o f experience founded o n habits . . . ' W i t h o u t referring
2 9

to Bourdieu, but building o n the article b y C a m i c , Baldwin sought, in 1988,

to extend . . the research o n the removal o f the c o n c e p t o f habit from
sociological theory b y evaluating the treatment o f habit b y G e o r g e Herbert
M e a d and symbolic interactionists'. T h e sense that the response t o B o u r -
30

dieu's w o r k in the U S A is linked with an anti-positivist attempt t o revive

the orientation o f the first C h i c a g o S c h o o l o f S o c i o l o g y is confirmed not
just b y the association o f habitus with the use o f 'habit' b y D e w e y and
M e a d , but, also, b y the way in which W a c q u a n t h e a d e d his ' S y m b o l i c
violence and the making o f the French agriculturalist: an enquiry into
Pierre Bourdieu's s o c i o l o g y ' (1987) with W . I . T h o m a s ' s dictum that 'If m e n
define situations as real, they are real in their c o n s e q u e n c e s ' . W a c q u a n t ' s
31

article had first b e e n given at a c o n f e r e n c e o n social theory held in C h i c a g o

in April 1986. W a c q u a n t was e m p l o y e d at the University o f C h i c a g o as
research assistant t o W.J. W i l s o n o n the project which led t o the publica-
tion o f The Truly Disadvantaged (1987), and it was a year later that there
began the sequence o f encounters which f o r m e d the basis for Rponses
(1992), translated as An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (1992). W h a t is
k n o w n in that text as the ' C h i c a g o W o r k s h o p ' was the product, first o f all,
o f Bourdieu's encounter in the spring o f 1988 with a g r o u p o f doctoral
students at the University o f C h i c a g o '. . . w h o had organized, under the
guidance o f L o c Wacquant, a semester-long seminar o n m y w o r k ' . 3 2

Meanwhile, during this same p e r i o d , readings and discussions o f B o u r -

dieu's w o r k had taken place within the Social T h e o r y G r o u p that had b e e n
established at the Center for Psychosocial Studies in C h i c a g o in 1983.
Bourdieu j o i n e d in these discussions o n t w o occasions, including a c o n -
ference held b e t w e e n 31 March and 2 A p r i l 1989, which led to the collec-
tion o f essays published as Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives. A l t h o u g h only
two o f the contributors to this v o l u m e w e r e academic staff o f the Univer-
sity o f Chicago, it was, nevertheless, the culmination o f a s e c o n d C h i c a g o -
based initiative in the reception o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k . If this c o n f e r e n c e
assembled p e o p l e w h o were sympathetic towards B o u r d i e u ' s position, a
second conference held in C h i c a g o in the same w e e k deliberately engin-
eered a confrontation b e t w e e n intellectual positions represented b y B o u r -
dieu o n the o n e hand and C o l e m a n - Professor o f S o c i o l o g y at the
University o f C h i c a g o - o n the other. In his P r o l o g u e t o the published
version o f the conference proceedings - Social Theory for a Changing
Society (1991) - C o l e m a n argued that social theory had d e v e l o p e d o n the
basis o f an interpretation o f 'primordial social organization' but should
n o w concern itself 'with the p r o b l e m s o f constructed social o r g a n i z a t i o n ' .
33

T h e clear suggestion is that B o u r d i e u ' s kind o f social anthropology o r

sociology seeks t o maintain a link b e t w e e n the primordial and the c o n -
structed that ought n o w t o b e severed.
 Meta-criticism: charting interminable territory 129

T h e s e C h i c a g o encounters o f the late 1980s indicate that B o u r d i e u ' s

w o r k had b e c o m e a battleground for c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s o f c o n t e m -
porary society and, relatedly, o f c o m p e t i n g ways o f understanding it.
Typically, B o u r d i e u ' s response to C o l e m a n was t o argue not, as C o l e m a n
implies, that professional social theorists have to adapt their understand-
ings t o fit the new, constructed condition o f society, but, instead, that
reflexive sociological practitioners have to construct a space within society
from which they can influence the course o f social construction. B o u r d i e u
asks for the formation o f an international c o m m u n i t y which will reconcile
the diverse primordial cultures o f its m e m b e r s and, in doing s o , constitute a
challenge t o the constructed social organisation that o w e s its d o m i n a n c e to
its d i v o r c e from human agency.
B o u r d i e u ' s e p i l o g u e to the text - O n the possibility o f a field o f w o r l d
s o c i o l o g y ' - offers a humanist vision o f the role o f s o c i o l o g y in global
society. It w o u l d appear t o prescribe a function for sociological thinking
that transcends partisan differences within the sociological field. It is the
climax o f B o u r d i e u ' s attempt t o m a k e his particularity universal. But the
response o f the C h i c a g o cluster to B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k makes clear that B o u r -
dieu's approach is in direct o p p o s i t i o n to positivism and, as such, has b e e n
involved in a partisan struggle within the sociological field. T h e epilogue's
virtual call for a universalisation o f e t h n o m e t h o d o l o g y is a direct challenge
t o the universalist positivism that has consistently found Bourdieu's p r o -
cedures unscientific and untransferable.
In the final sentences o f his ' S y m b o l i c violence and the making o f the
French agriculturalist: an enquiry into Pierre B o u r d i e u ' s s o c i o l o g y ' (1987),
W a c q u a n t c o n c l u d e d that T h e time may b e ripe for speaking about the
c o m i n g o f age o f a n e w " s c h o o l " in French sociology. If this is so, then it is
crucial, b o t h for it and for a critical science o f society, that it not remain
exclusively French t o o l o n g ' . H e was, in other words, involved in a c o n -
3 4

scious attempt strategically t o universalise Bourdieu's particularism.

A l t h o u g h W a c q u a n t was c o n c e r n e d to secure the validity o f B o u r d i e u ' s
theory, he also advanced the view that B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k c o u l d best b e
u n d e r s t o o d b y appreciating the pragmatic utility o f his concepts. M a n y
other authors have r e s p o n d e d in this same way to Bourdieu's w o r k , d e m -
onstrating the practical uses o f habitus o r 'cultural capital' in their empiri-
cal investigations. Articles b y Schiltz; Bentley; Hanks; Sack; Gerhards and
A n h e i e r ; R u p p and de Lange; and Ringer all testify to the pragmatic value
o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k in different intellectual fields and applied in different
cultural c o n t e x t s . These texts p r o v i d e consumer testimony to the value o f
35

B o u r d i e u ' s intellectual product. T h e y reinforce a proselytising tendency.

F r o m the field o f consumption, they are not much c o n c e r n e d to ask
whether a different product might have performed a different o r better
task. This analysis o f the critical response to Bourdieu's w o r k must turn,
finally, to those criticisms which question his conceptual schema at its point
o f origin from within the field o f its production.
A l m o s t as if in reaction to his encounters with A m e r i c a n sociologists,
B o u r d i e u himself began to emphasise in the late 1980s that his w o r k
130 Bourdieu and culture

b e l o n g e d t o a different intellectual tradition. In T h i n k i n g about limits'

(1992) - the translation o f a paper given in 1989 - B o u r d i e u gave the
following description o f this tradition:

What I now very quickly want to address is the epistemological tradition in

which I have begun to work. This was for me like the air that we breathe, which
is to say that it went unnoticed. It is a very local tradition tied to a number of
French names: Koyr, Bachelard, Canguilhem and, if we go back a little, to
Duhem . . . This historical tradition of epistemology very strongly linked reflec-
tion on science with the history of science. Differently from the neo-positivist
Anglo-Saxon tradition, it was from the history of science that it isolated the
principles of knowledge of scientific thought. 36

A n antecedent o f this tradition was Claude Bernard. B o u r d i e u q u o t e d

from Bernard's Introduction Vtude de la mdecine exprimentale (1865)
in his brief notes o n 'Statistics and s o c i o l o g y ' contained within Travail et
travailleurs en Algrie. In his classic text, Bernard had argued that

When a scientist pursues investigation, taking for his starting-point any particu-
lar philosophic system, he loses himself in regions too far removed from reality,
or else the system gives his mind a misleading assurance and inflexibility which
goes ill with the freedom and adaptibility which an experimenter should always
preserve in his researches. 37

A s an experimental physiologist, Bernard was determined that his scientific

w o r k should not b e contaminated b y philosophical presuppositions which
were the legacy, for instance, o f scholastic thinking about the mind and the
b o d y . In following this tradition o f thought, Bachelard emphasised that
knowledge c o u l d only b e advanced if scientific discourses c o u l d b e c o n -
structed which w o u l d b e appropriate to the p h e n o m e n a under examina-
tion. His emphasis was m o r e o n the n e e d for an 'epistemological b r e a k ' o f
any kind rather than o n a rejection o f philosophy. Indeed, Bachelard was
himself sufficiently a historian and philosopher o f science to want t o under-
stand the social and historical conditions that m a d e for historically dif-
ferent constructions o f scientific discourse.
This shift o f emphasis is important, because B o u r d i e u has f o l l o w e d
Bachelard m o r e than Bernard. B o u r d i e u has argued that the practice o f
sociology involves making a break with c o m m o n s e n s e social perceptions,
and he has also argued that the social conditions o f that break n e e d t o b e
reflexively understood. In arguing these t w o positions, h o w e v e r , B o u r d i e u
has effectively taken the intellectual sources o f his break out o f the equa-
tion. H e has avoided direct confrontation with the p r o b l e m s which arise
from adapting the language o f pre-existing discourses to furnish explana-
tions o f social p h e n o m e n a . T h e r e have b e e n three fundamental criticisms
of Bourdieu in France - from critics w h o breathe the same air as him. T h e
first is that B o u r d i e u has imported philosophical concepts into social
science. T h e s e c o n d is that Bourdieu's transference o f concepts b e t w e e n
discourses has b e e n to the detriment o f social science. Thirdly, there has
 Meta-criticism: charting interminable territory 131

b e e n the suggestion, f r o m within a postwar French intellectual tradition as

d e p e n d e n t o n philosophical p h e n o m e n o l o g y as o n Bachelardian philoso-
phy o f science, that B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k blurs the distinction that has to b e
m a d e b e t w e e n the capacity o f c o n c e p t s t o b e logically transferable and the
capacity o f human agents actually socially t o convert and reconvert
themselves.
T h e first t w o criticisms are different versions o f the same c o n c e r n about
the relationship b e t w e e n the process o f social scientific inquiry and the
language used in formulating hypotheses and in offering explanations.
Hran's ' L a s e c o n d e nature d e l'habitus. Tradition p h i l o s o p h i q u e et sens
c o m m u n dans le langage s o c i o l o g i q u e ' , published in the Revue franaise
38

de sociologie in 1987, offers not so m u c h a critique o f B o u r d i e u as a recog-

nition and articulation o f the p r o b l e m s with which he has grappled. F o l l o w -
ing a disciple o f Husserl - E u g e n Fink - H r a n distinguishes between
'thematic' and 'operational' c o n c e p t s and he argues that the attempt to pin
d o w n the thematic meanings o f c o n c e p t s has t o b e r e n o u n c e d . H e p r o c e e d s
t o examine B o u r d i e u ' s use o f the c o n c e p t o f habitus as a case study from
which t o draw conclusions about the relations b e t w e e n philosophy and
s o c i o l o g y . H e asks whether s o c i o l o g y can enlist the aid o f philosophical
c o n c e p t s for its o w n operational purposes '. . . without acquiring with the
w o r d s themselves all o f the difficulties which are deposited in them? C o n -
versely, d o e s s o c i o l o g y have the means t o forge from n e w its o w n concepts
b y rejecting the categories already refined b y the philosophical tradi-
t i o n ? ' B y analogy, Bernard's response t o these questions w o u l d b e that it
3 9

w o u l d b e essential for s o c i o l o g y t o forge its o w n discourse. It is clear,

h o w e v e r , that H r a n conducts his analysis within the philosophical tradi-
tion which generated B o u r d i e u ' s practice. In making the c o m m e n t that
' L i k e many French philosophers trained at this time [in the late 1950s and
early 1960s], B o u r d i e u has a kind o f familiarity with p h e n o m e n o l o g y which
s o m e t i m e s d o e s not n e e d to b e stated in d e t a i l ' H r a n implies that Bour-
40

dieu's use o f the c o n c e p t was itself a manifestation o f its almost uncon-

scious activity o r influence: a c o n c e p t o f habitus was part o f Bourdieu's
habitus. It follows that H r a n c o n c l u d e s that it is never possible to retrieve
philosophical c o n c e p t s f r o m their various discourse uses, that '. . . to
retrieve consciously the integrity o f intellectual endeavours which have
b e c o m e assimilated is u n t h i n k a b l e ' .41

H r a n raises the question o f the exchangeability o f intellectual dis-

courses in a manner which w o u l d have b e e n congenial to B o u r d i e u and,
indeed, B o u r d i e u ' s ' T h e genesis o f the c o n c e p t s o f habitus and field' (1985)
explores his o w n practice within the same philosophical assumptions.
O t h e r French critics, h o w e v e r , considered the p r o b l e m with particular ref-
e r e n c e t o B o u r d i e u ' s sociological d e p l o y m e n t o f e c o n o m i c terms. Caill's
'La s o c i o l o g i e d e l'intrt est-elle intressante' first raised this issue in
42

1981 in the journal, Sociologie du Travail, where it was subsequently sus-

tained in A d a i r ' s ' L a s o c i o l o g i e p h a g o c y t e par l ' c o n o m i q u e : remarques
critiques p r o p o s d e " c e q u e parler veut d i r e " d e P. B o u r d i e u ' (1984). 4 3
132 Bourdieu and culture

W h e r e a s H o n n e t h was, at about the same time, arguing that B o u r d i e u was

wrongly overemphasising the e c o n o m i c determination o f the social and
aesthetic actions o f agents, the French critics w e r e m o r e c o n c e r n e d about
B o u r d i e u ' s strategic confusion o f the languages o f different disciplines.
A d a i r o b s e r v e d that '. . . the paradoxical virtue offered b y recourse to
e c o n o m i c concepts consists for the sociologist in enabling him t o avoid
falling into e c o n o m i s m ' . F o r A d a i r , there were t w o c o n s e q u e n c e s o f
4 4

Bourdieu's paradoxical use o f e c o n o m i c language. B o u r d i e u had, b y this

ambiguous means, b y his 'subtle g a m e o f recourse to/rejection o f e c o n -
o m i c s ' , maximised his personal distinction and safeguarded the institu-
4 5

tional survival o f a discipline - s o c i o l o g y - that was finding itself threatened

b y 'the imperialism o f e c o n o m i c s ' but, at the same time, he had forfeited
4 6

the intellectual autonomy o f properly sociological explanation. S o c i o l o g y

had b e c o m e intellectually absorbed into political e c o n o m y . T h e institu-
tional and personal victory was Pyrrhic.
In the terms outlined b y Hran, it should b e retorted that n o recourse is
possible t o 'pure' sociology o r 'pure' e c o n o m i c s . B o u r d i e u w o u l d surely
argue that recent developments towards the establishment o f ' s o c i o -
e c o n o m i c s ' o r 'sociological e c o n o m i c s ' indicate that ' e c o n o m i c s ' is in the
process o f being sociologised as much as, in the 1980s, it appeared that
s o c i o l o g y was being e c o n o m i s e d . A s Zelizer argued in a paper given t o the
first annual seminar o f the Center for E c o n o m y and Society in California in
1988, ' T h e market is n o longer a safe place t o theorize. Its longstanding
neutrality is being increasingly violated b y scholars f r o m various disciplines
w h o refuse to treat the market as a purely e c o n o m i c institution'. B o u r - 47

dieu c o u l d b e thought t o b e prominent amongst those scholars determined

to violate the neutrality o f e c o n o m i c s . W h a t is at issue, therefore, for s o m e
French critics, is not so m u c h the direction o f conceptual transfer as the
fluctuating and unpredictable nature o f the exchange. This, finally, raises
the question o f the relationship b e t w e e n conceptual and actual change.
In a revealing f o o t n o t e t o an article o n B o u r d i e u and Passeron's 'theory
o f symbolic violence', Lakomski digressed to make the following c o m m e n t
o n G i d d e n s ' position in the structure/agency debate:

Thus I do not think that one of Anthony Giddens's most central arguments
regarding agency, namely that the agent 'could have acted otherwise' is tenable
if he thinks that 'could' denotes a real psychological possibility. If, on the other
hand, 'could' merely indicates a logical possibility, then no harm is done 4 8

W h e t h e r o r not Giddens w o u l d want to take the defence that is proffered

here, B o u r d i e u certainly c o u l d not. His philosophical position requires that
he is not able t o distinguish b e t w e e n logical and actual possibilities. Consis-
tent with his socio-logical position, B o u r d i e u argues that the capacity o f
descriptions t o b e c o m e prescriptive depends o n the p o w e r that can b e
mobilised in support o f them. T h e r e is n o fixed equation that can c o v e r the
transference o f logic into practice. T h e relative a u t o n o m y o f the t w o
spheres is a function o f the p o w e r situation when they encounter each
 Meta-criticism: charting interminable territory 133

other. In an early French review o f Esquisse d'une thorie de la pratique,

Linard and Servais r e c o g n i z e d that it had b e e n B o u r d i e u ' s intention t o
break the divide b e t w e e n anthropology and s o c i o l o g y , or, better, t o effect a
transfer o f c o n c e p t s from traditionally anthropological objects t o s o c i o -
logical o n e s : T h e radical challenge represented b y the theory o f practice
w o u l d n o t have b e e n possible without the intent t o abolish in practice the
break b e t w e e n these disciplines. E a c h o f these disciplines governs a par-
ticular theoretical tradition having specific epistemological pitfalls.' 49

Within the French tradition, they accept that disciplines are socially c o n -
structed discourses which, t o s o m e extent, self-fulfillingly r e p r o d u c e the
perspectives which they adopt. T h e y praise B o u r d i e u ' s attempt t o break
d o w n these c l o s e d explanatory systems, but they assume that the Bachelar-
dian 'epistemological break' must b e absolute rather than itself historically
contingent. F o r B o u r d i e u , h o w e v e r , 'breaks' must always b e contingent in
t w o respects. B o u r d i e u applies t o his o w n theorising his thinking about the
validity o f Marxist explanation in ' C o n d i t i o n d e classe et position d e classe'
o r o f structuralist explanation in ' T h e three forms o f theoretical k n o w -
l e d g e ' . T h e linguistic frameworks available t o analysts are functions o f
their social positions just as are the conditions which are accessible t o their
observation. L o g i c a l description is a function o f the actual and perceived
w o r l d o f the observer, but it only acquires prescriptive validity w h e n its
p o w e r t o i m p o s e explanation is endorsed b y those w h o receive it within
that p e r c e i v e d w o r l d . B o u r d i e u d o e s n o t set himself u p t o b e a liberal
intellectual version o f an O l y m p i a n g o d . H e has n o t wantonly shifted b e -
tween philosophical, anthropological, sociological o r cultural discourses.
Instead, h e has attempted t o m o v e conceptually with the flow o f events,
constructing his logical shifts contingently b y reference t o circumstances
within which h e has b e e n a participant. Sociologie de l'Algrie was a politi-
cal intervention in that it sought t o objectify indigenous Algerian cultures
and bring them t o the consciousnesses o f citizens o f metropolitan France,
whereas Travail et travailleurs en Algrie and Le Dracinement were at-
tempts t o influence the course o f Algerian i n d e p e n d e n c e from within. T h e
transference f r o m a structuralist anthropological logic t o a sociological o n e
was effected b y advocating intellectual reflexivity (in Le Mtier de so-
ciologue), b y preaching and practising a deconstruction o f his o w n struc-
turalism (in Esquisse d'une thorie de la pratique), but, also, crucially, b y
sounding o u t the validity o f the transference b y reference t o a region - the
Beam - where the actual conditions within mainland France b o r e c o m -
parison with those in Algeria. T h e endorsement o f the process o f logical
transferability was p r o v i d e d interpersonally b y B o u r d i e u ' s familial situa-
tion within the Beam and this experiential c o r r o b o r a t i o n persisted, for
B o u r d i e u , in his a d o p t i o n o f the language o f a n t h r o p o l o g y in Les Hritiers
t o describe the situation o f students w h o s e social and intellectual trajecto-
ries mirrored his o w n .
T h e culmination o f this point, o f course, is reached in considering o u r
current reception o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k s in this light. W e are the respondents
134 Bourdieu and culture

to his texts. B o u r d i e u has mobilised his authority t o speak t o us, but w e

have the capacity t o j u d g e , not whether his concepts have abstract value
but whether they are useful to us, apt t o our situations. This chapter began
b y arguing that judgements o f B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k are o f an indeterminate
nature. It has tried to s h o w that criticisms that might have b e e n thought t o
relate intrinsically to Bourdieu's w o r k emanate in part from the attempts o f
different intellectual traditions t o assimilate it - either positively o r nega-
tively. It has shown, finally, that criticisms advanced within the distinctively
French intellectual tradition have served t o clarify that B o u r d i e u amalga-
mated the legacies o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y and Bachelardian history and
philosophy o f science to construct an unique version o f philosophical prag-
matism or, m o r e correctly, instrumentalism. A s pragmatic respondents in
our cultures, h o w are w e to reach a conclusion about the analyses which
B o u r d i e u pragmatically offers us from his?

Notes

1. P. Bourdieu (1993) 'Concluding remarks: For a sociogenetic understanding of

intellectual works', in C. Calhoun et al., eds. Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives,
Oxford, Polity Press, 263-4.
2. Ibid., 264.
3. A . Maclntyre (1985) After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory (2nd edn),
London, Duckworth, 6.
4. Ibid., 8.
5. B.M. Berger (1986) 'Review essay: "Taste and domination" ', American Jour-
nal of Sociology, 91, 6,1447.
6. The Culture of the Poor: A Study of the Life-Style of the Popular Classes in
England.
1. R. Hoggart (1973) 'Growing up', in Speaking to Each Other, Harmondsworth,
Penguin Books, 11.
8. See S. Hall (1978) 'The hinterland of science: ideology and the "sociology of
knowledge" ', in On Ideology, London, CCCS/Hutchinson, 31, footnote 43; for
the English translation of Bourdieu's paper, 'Symbolic power', cf. (1977) Two
Bourdieu Texts (trans. R. Nice), Birmingham, CCCS Stencilled Papers no.46.
9. D.E. Foley (1989) 'Does the working class have a culture in the anthropologi-
cal sense?', Cultural Anthropology, 4,137.
10. Ibid.
11. See: R. Williams (1977) 'Plaisantes perspectives. Invention du paysage et ab-
olition du paysan', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 17-18,29-36. E.P.
Thompson (1976) 'Modes de domination et rvolutions en Angleterre', Actes
de la recherche en sciences sociales, 2-3,133-151. F. Klingender (1978) 'Joseph
Wright de Derby, peintre de la rvolution industrielle', Actes de la recherche
en sciences sociales, 23, 23-36. P. Willis (1978) 'L'cole des ouvriers', Actes de
la recherche en sciences sociales, 24, 50-61.
12. N. Garnham and R. Williams (1980) 'Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of
culture', Media, Culture and Society, 2, 222.
13. J. Habermas (1987) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Oxford, Polity
Press, 75.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 75-6.
16. Ibid., 76.
 Meta-criticism: charting interminable territory 135

17. Ibid.
18. A . Honneth, H. Kocyba and B. Schwibs (1986) 'The struggle for symbolic
order. A n interview with Pierre Bourdieu', Theory, Culture and Society, 3, 3,
35. (The introductory statement does not appear in the French publication of
the interview - entitled 'Fieldwork in philosophy' - in P. Bourdieu (1987)
Choses dites, Paris, ditions de Minuit, nor in the English translation in P.
Bourdieu (1990) In Other Words, Oxford, Polity Press.)
19. A . Honneth (1986) 'The fragmented world of symbolic forms: reflections on
Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of culture', Theory, Culture and Society, 3, 3, 55.
20. Ibid., 56.
21. Ibid., 65.
22. Ibid.
23. See C. Joppke (1986) 'The cultural dimensions of class formation and class
struggle: on the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu', Berkeley Journal of Sociol-
ogy, 31, 78, footnote 25. See also H.-P. Miiller (1986) 'Kultur, Geschmack und
Distinktion. Grundzuge der Kultursoziologie Pierre Bourdieus', Klner
Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialforschung, supplement, 63: 'Dabei wird
die These verfolgt, dass Bourdieu die Webersche Problematik von Klasse und
Stand weiterentwickelt. . . '
24. R. Brubaker (1984) The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and
Moral Thought of Max Weber, London, Allen & Unwin, 87.
25. Ibid., 98.
26. R. Brubaker (1985) 'Rethinking classical theory. The sociological vision of
Pierre Bourdieu', Theory and Society, 14, 746.
27. Ibid., 760.
28. C. Camic (1986) 'The matter of habit', American Journal of Sociology, 91, 5,
1039.
29. J.M. Ostrow (1981) 'Culture as a fundamental dimension of experience: a
discussion of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of human habitus', Human Studies, 4,
281, fn. 4. The secondary text to which Ostrow refers is: V. Kestenbaum (1977)
The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey; Habit and Meaning, Atlantic
Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press.
30. J.D. Baldwin (1988) 'Habit, emotion, and self-conscious action', Sociological
Perspectives, 31, 1, 35.
31. L.J.D. Wacquant (1987) 'Symbolic violence and the making of the French
agriculturalist: an enquiry into Pierre Bourdieu's sociology', Australian and
New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 23, 1, 65.
32. P. Bourdieu (1992) 'Preface' to P. Bourdieu and L.J.D. Wacquant, An Invita-
tion to Reflexive Sociology, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press and
Oxford, Polity Press, vii.
33. J.S. Coleman (1991) 'Prologue: constructed social organization', in P. Bour-
dieu and J.S. Coleman, eds. Social Theory for a Changing Society, Boulder,
CO, San Francisco, C A , and Oxford, Westview Press, and New York, Sage
Foundation, 8.
34. Wacquant, 'Symbolic violence', 82.
35. See M. Schiltz (1982) 'Habitus and peasantization in Nigeria: a Yoruba case
study', Man (NS), 17, 7 2 8 ^ 6 ; G.C. Bentley (1987) 'Ethnicity and practice',
Society for Comparative Study of Society and History, 29, 24-55; W.F. Hanks
(1987) 'Discourse genres in a theory of practice', American Ethnologist, 14, 4,
668-92; H.-G. Sack (1988) 'The relationship between sport involvement and
life-style in youth cultures', International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 23,
3, 213-32; J. Gerhards and H.K. Anheier (1989) 'The literary field: an empiri-
cal investigation of Bourdieu's sociology of art', International Sociology, 4, 2,
1 3 1 ^ 6 ; J.C.L. Rupp and R. de Lange (1989) 'Social order, cultural capital and
citizenship. A n essay concerning educational status and educational power
versus comprehensiveness of elementary schools', The Sociological Review,
136 Bourdieu and culture

37, 4, 668-75; F. Ringer (1990) T h e intellectual field, intellectual history, and

the sociology of knowledge', Theory and Society, 19, 269-94.
36. P. Bourdieu (1992) 'Thinking about limits', Theory, Culture and Society, 9,37-
49.
37. C. Bernard (1865) Introduction l'tude de la mdecine exprimentale.
38. T h e second nature of habitus. Philosophical tradition and common sense in
sociological language.'
39. F. Hran (1987) 'La seconde nature de l'habitus. Tradition philosophique et
sens commun dans le langage sociologique', Revue franaise de sociologie, 28,
387
40. Ibid., 413.
41. Ibid.
42. 'Is the sociology of interest interesting?'
43. 'Sociology absorbed by economics. Critical remarks on Bourdieu's Ce que
parler veut dire.
9

44. P. Adair (1984) 'La sociologie phagocyte par l'conomique: remarques cri-
tiques propos de "ce que parler veut dire" de P. Bourdieu,' Sociologie du
Travail, 26,1,112.
45. Ibid., 113.
46. Ibid.
47. V . A . Zelizer (1988) 'Beyond the polemics on the market: establishing a
theoretical and empirical agenda', Sociological Forum, 3, 614.
48. G. Lakomski (1984) 'On agency and structure: Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-
Claude Passeron's theory of symbolic violence', Curriculum Inquiry, 14,2,161,
footnote 7.
49. G. Linard and E. Servais (1979) 'Practical sense: on Bourdieu', Critique of
Anthropology, 13,209. (This was a review article of Outline. All references are
to the original French. This review originally appeared in Revue franaise de
sociologie (1974), 15, 413-21.)
9 Conclusion: commending the Bourdieu
paradigm: the sociologist as conceptual
artist

In an article which sought to evaluate B o u r d i e u ' s contribution t o political

science, C a r o c o n t e n d e d that he e n c o u n t e r e d in acute f o r m a difficulty
which is well k n o w n in the e p i s t e m o l o g y o f the social sciences - that

. . . scientific criticism of a legitimate scientific theory, that is to say one con-

forming to the dominant rules of scientificity, in particular to the rule of non-
contradiction of the facts that it provides, is often not pertinent when it tries to
take up an external point of view, that is to say to set one theory against
another. 1

In this situation, C a r o b e l i e v e d that there w e r e only t w o possible options

for the critic - either to deny the scientificity o f the ' w h o l e e d i f i c e ' o r to b e
2

resigned to being satisfied with subjecting 'external' theories to the limited,

'internal' scrutiny o f particular disciplines. F o r C a r o , the denial o f scien-
tificity was n o o p t i o n and he reluctantly sought to e x p o s e contradictions
and inadequacies in what he t o o k t o b e B o u r d i e u ' s contribution t o political
science in the terms set b y that science and without reference to the super-
structure o f relational meaning that B o u r d i e u ' s c o n c e p t s acquire across
many scientific disciplines. C a r o set himself a limited task but he r e c o g -
nised that the p o t e n c y o f B o u r d i e u ' s c o n c e p t s in any o n e discipline derives,
in part, f r o m the p o t e n c y acquired as a result o f their efficacy in others. H e
s u p p o s e d , h o w e v e r , that this network o f meta-disciplinary conceptual
p o w e r might b e e x p o s e d , that the further d e v e l o p m e n t o f B o u r d i e u ' s para-
digm might lead ' s o m e day to the appearance o f p r o b l e m s which are insol-
uble in its o w n terms' but that such a 'search for i n c o h e r e n c e ' w o u l d take a
3

long time.
A s w e have seen, many critics o f B o u r d i e u w o u l d e c h o C a r o ' s senti-
ments. T h e y have m a d e criticisms from their o w n subject specialisms and,
in d o i n g s o , have confined B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k within the boundaries o f those
specialisms. S o m e have innocently ignored the wider s c o p e o f B o u r d i e u ' s
w o r k . Others have b e e n guilty o f deliberate disregard. Others, like C a r o ,
have sought t o m a k e a virtue out o f a constrained perspective but, again
like C a r o , have s h o w n deference to the existence o f a total system, external
t o all disciplines, which seems t o b e b e y o n d the s c o p e o f any criteria o f
assessment.
138 Bourdieu and culture

Such critical deference might b e appropriate in evaluating the systems o f

thought o f Parsons, o r W e b e r , o r D u r k h e i m , but it is not, h o w e v e r , appro-
priate in considering the w o r k o f Bourdieu. It has b e e n B o u r d i e u ' s consis-
tent contention that he has not wanted t o construct a systematic social
theory. H e has consistently argued that individuals d o not possess intrinsic
identities and that there can never b e any reference t o authorial 'selves'
expressing their 'intentions' in their texts. T h e r e is not an unitary ' B o u r -
dieu' bestowing coherent meaning o n all his texts, n o r is there any a priori,
logical unity to b e discovered - n o ultimate key t o the interlocking concepts
which s e e m to make up a closed system. B o u r d i e u has consistently argued
that his thinking is as polysmie as that o f the Algerian p e o p l e which he
described in Outline of a Theory of Practice. These, o f course, are B o u r -
dieu's claims. In his o w n terms, he cannot deny that he is the product o f a
French tradition which esteems 'intellectuals' and that he shares with
Sartre a habitus which must incline him to elevate the social function o f the
'totalising' intellectual. H e has studiously dissociated himself f r o m Sartre's
self-perception, but the overt rejection o f Sartre's inherent Cartesianism
sometimes seems to conceal an assimilation o f it within a rival, Leibnizian,
rational framework. B o u r d i e u celebrates the randomness o f plurality, the
multiplicity o f possible worlds. In doing s o , he legitimately inserts his total-
ising tendency as just o n e r a n d o m activity within that world, but that
pre-emptive relativisation o f his o w n position can s e e m t o b e a Sartrean
appropriation o f the views o f others within the plurality.
This b o o k has attempted to accept Bourdieu's claim t o b e non-
systematic at face value. It has not deferred t o any notion that there might
b e a c o m p l e t e meaning o f B o u r d i e u that might b e ascertained from the
scrutiny o f his c o m p l e t e d w o r k . It accepts Bourdieu's view that a corpus o f
w o r k is a corpse. A t the same time, cultural analysis d o e s not constitute a
defined discipline in terms o f which a limited articulation o f the strengths
and weaknesses o f Bourdieu's particular contribution might b e evaluated.
In these circumstances, the b o o k has sought to p r o m o t e a pragmatic read-
ing o f Bourdieu's w o r k , but there are t w o significantly different pragmatic
responses, o n e o f which still defers to a totalising tendency and the other o f
which sustains an o p e n plurality. T h e b o o k has b e e n a heuristic device t o
maintain an emphasis o n openness.
T h e first section offered an account o f the man and his social trajectory.
B y distinguishing three phases o f Bourdieu's career, the raw materials w e r e
given for correlating the d e v e l o p m e n t o f Bourdieu's conceptualisation with
the changes in his practice and his social position. T h e s e c o n d section gave
an outline o f the genesis and modification o f s o m e o f Bourdieu's key
concepts, suggesting all the time that there was a reciprocal relationship
b e t w e e n concepts and empirical inquiry whilst, equally, that they were
advanced and refined in the context o f meanings which were already sedi-
mented. T h e third section sought to see h o w B o u r d i e u applied his concepts
in three case studies. These could b e thought to b e tests o f the use o f
Bourdieu's w o r k in three limited disciplines - the s o c i o l o g y o f literature o r
 Conclusion-, commending the Bourdieu paradigm 139

literary criticism, the s o c i o l o g y o f fashion, and the s o c i o l o g y o f art o r art

history and criticism. It is clear that these case studies e x p o s e the inade-
quacies o f B o u r d i e u ' s analyses in terms o f the norms and expectations o f
these disciplines. It is n o t the case that B o u r d i e u ' s c o n c e p t s have b e e n
preformulated b y h i m as working hypotheses. B o u r d i e u ' s c o n c e p t s have
not enabled h i m t o m a k e major contributions towards the literary critical
appreciation o f Flaubert o r the art appreciation o f Manet. Instead, b y
w o r k i n g o n Flaubert, Courrges and Manet, B o u r d i e u was able t o refine
his thinking about the ways in which social observation was transformed
within the conventions o f the n o v e l in the s e c o n d half o f the nineteenth
century in France; the ways in which all cultural fashions are p r o d u c e d b y
analogy with the p r o d u c t i o n o f Parisian fashion houses and in which fash-
ion labels acquire meaning independent o f their creators; and, finally, the
ways in which the c o n t e m p o r a r y display o f the paintings o f M a n e t is the
locus for a cultural struggle which reproduces the competitive conditions
within which M a n e t first p r o d u c e d them. T h e s e are all insights which are
tangential t o the disciplines within which they might b e constrained but,
cumulatively, they illuminate B o u r d i e u ' s d e v e l o p i n g self-understanding
and, m o r e importantly, his d e v e l o p i n g understanding o f the limited func-
tion o f these limited disciplines in the context o f the e m e r g e n c e o f mass
cultures and o f the c o m m o d i f i c a t i o n o f cultures.
T h e final section turned t o the criticisms that have b e e n m a d e o f B o u r -
dieu's w o r k and suggested that the solution t o the indeterminacy o f critical
j u d g e m e n t might b e t o understand the various criticisms as functions o f the
conditions o f cultural c o n s u m p t i o n in different countries and intellectual
traditions, and also t o see B o u r d i e u ' s w o r k in the context o f s o m e debates
within his o w n country and tradition.
In his ' C o n c l u d i n g remarks: for a sociogenetic understanding o f intellec-
tual w o r k s ' , B o u r d i e u writes: T h e sociogenetic point of view that, in m y
o p i n i o n , o n e must adopt towards any "creation o f the m i n d " (whether it b e
Flaubert, Manet, o r H e i d e g g e r ) , I a m obviously inclined t o expect o f those
w h o deal with m y w o r k - without ignoring the risks that it implies, par-
ticularly that o f relativization.' This injunction exemplifies the totalising
4

tendency in B o u r d i e u ' s approach that he himself overtly tries t o disown.

H e asks t o b e analysed in the w a y in which he has analysed others and, in
d o i n g s o , h e invites analysis which has already b e e n critically disarmed.
B o u r d i e u asks for analysis o f his w o r k which appreciates the reciprocal
relationship b e t w e e n his thinking and his social trajectory. T h e unspoken
assumption is that this m o d e o f analysis will lead t o a p r o p e r appreciation
o f the content o f his w o r k and t o a p r o p e r understanding o f h o w his
c o n c e p t s might pragmatically b e d e p l o y e d . Analysts are invited t o use his
w o r k - o n the understanding that it has b e e n properly contexted - but t o
use his w o r k , nevertheless. H o w e v e r , the analogy b e t w e e n B o u r d i e u ' s
creativity and that o f Flaubert, M a n e t o r H e i d e g g e r is imprecise. B o u r -
dieu's s o c i o g e n e t i c analyses o f their w o r k involved, as w e have seen, pri-
marily an attention t o the social conditions o f production. Attention t o
140 Bourdieu and culture

content was relatively slight. If w e are n o w invited to analyse B o u r d i e u in

the same way and if his content is primarily a prescriptive analytical p r o -
cedure, then our sociogenetic understanding o f B o u r d i e u logically oblite-
rates the generalisable validity o f the process w e are supposed t o b e
adopting. W e are forced, therefore, into a m o r e fundamental pragmatism
which B o u r d i e u should c o n d o n e . W e should endeavour t o understand the
reciprocity b e t w e e n his life and his w o r k so as t o generate o u r o w n ,
perhaps different, perhaps similar, strategies rather than t o assimilate o r
imitate his.
Bourdieu's analyses o f his culture have b e c o m e parts o f o u r structured
perceptions o f our o w n . I have tried t o outline the genesis and structure o f
B o u r d i e u ' s critical engagement with his culture. T h e importance o f his
contribution t o cultural analysis, h o w e v e r , d o e s not lie in the conceptual
structure itself but in the invitation which he extends t o follow him in a
continuous process o f conceptual generation and regeneration, establishing
frameworks o f thought which modify what w e receive from him in a c c o r d -
ance with the conditions in which w e find ourselves.

Notes

1. J.-Y. Caro (1980) 'La sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu. lments pour une thorie
du champ politique', Revue franaise de science politique, 6,1194.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. P. Bourdieu (1993) 'Concluding remarks: for a sociogenetic understanding of
intellectual works', in C. Calhoun et al. eds., Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives,
Oxford, Polity Press, 264.
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Index

Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, (See also Language and Symbolic Power.)
xiv, xvii, 16, 21, 76,124. "Champ du pouvoir, champ intellectuel et
Adair, P., 131-2. habitus de classe", 74-5.
Algeria, xii, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9,17,28. "Champ intellectuel et projet crateur",
Algerian tribes, xii, 7, 61. xiv, xx, 29, 37-8, 55-6,74, 88.
Algerian War of Independence, 8. (See also "Intellectual Field and Creative
Algiers, xii, 8. Project".)
University of, 8. Choses dites, 18,105.
Alqui, F., 5. (See also In Other Words.)
Althusser, L., 3, 4, 47, 49, 50. "Comment librer les intellectuels?", 19.
Pour Marx, 47 "Concluding remarks: for a sociogenetic
Lire Le Capital, 47, 48. understanding of intellectual works",
American Sociological Review, 39. 121-2,139.
Archer, M.S., 108,110. "Condition de classe et position de classe",
ARESER (Association for Reflection on 8, 29-32,133,
Higher Education and Research), xxv. Contre-feux, xxv.
Arnold, M., 67. "D"abord dfendre les intellectuels", 19.
Aron, R., 8. "Dcrire et prescrire", 42.
Austin, J.L., 86. Distinction, see La Distinction
"preuve scolaire et conscration
Bachelard, G., 3,14, 20, 38, 47, 48, 49, 51, 64, sociale.", 99.
86,127,130,131,133. Esquisse d'une thorie de la pratique, 15,
Baldwin, J.B., 128. 75, 80, 82,107,126,133,138.
Balenciaga, 88, 90. (See also Outline of a Theory of Practice.)
Balmain, 88, 89. "Existe-t-il une littrature belge?", 19.
Barbizon painters, 102. "Fieldwork in philosophy", 26
Barthes, R., 81-7. "For a socio-analysis of intellectuals", 19.
Systme de la mode, 81-7. "Gense et structure da champ religieux",
Base/superstructure, xvi, 43-4. 15.
Baudelaire, C , 74. "Gustave, Flaubert et Frdric", 76.
Beam, 2, 9,11, 28, 90. "Haute couture et haute culture", 81, 87.
Becker, G.S., 32-3, 42. Homo Academicus, xix, 3,18,19, 89,115.
Human Capital, 32. "La comparabilit des systmes
Bentley, G.C, 129. d'enseignement", 109.
Berger, B.M., 112,122. La Distinction, xi, xii, xiv, xix, 17, 35, 48,
Bergson, H./Bergsonism, 3, 70, 71. 76, 77, 89,110,112,114-5,116,122.
L'volution cratrice, 70. La Domination masculine, xxv.
Bernard, C , xviii, 21, 69, 70,130. "La lecture de Marx, ou quelques
Bernstein, B., 108,109. remarques c r i t i q u e s 6 4 .
Boileau, N., 69. La misre du monde, xxiv, xxv, 21,102.
Bollack, J., 17. L'amour de l'art, xx, 9,10, 58, 94.
Boltanski, L., 17. La noblesse d'tat, xix, xx, 18, 36, 99,110.
Bourdieu, P. "La production de la croyance", xix
"An antimony in the notion of collective "La reprsentation politique", 18.
protest", 18. La Reproduction, xiii, 15, 33, 56, 59-60,
"Anatomie du got", 76. 101,108,110,113-4,116,117^8,123.
An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 128. "La rvolution impressioniste", 94,101.
(See also Rponses.) "Langage et rapport au langage", 109.
"Avenir de classe et causalit du "Le capital social: notes provisoires", 36.
probable", 76. "Le champ littraire", 19.
"Clibat et condition paysanne", xiii, 9, 28. Leon sur la leon, 18.
Ce que parler veut dire, 18, 82. "Le couturier et sa griffe", 16, 81, 85-90.
154 Index

Le Dracinement, 8,133. Travail et travailleurs en Algrie, xi, 8,82,

"Le march des biens symboliques", 21. 111, 130,133.
Le Mtier de sociologue, xv, 13-4,15,19, Un art moyen, xx, 9,11,58,116.
42, 50,75, 80,133. "Une interprtation de la thorie de la
"Le muse et son public", 10. religion selon Max Weber", 15.
"Le Patronat", 18,88,112. "Une sociologie de l'action est-elle-
Le Sens pratique, 17. possible?", 46.
"Les tudiants et leurs tudes", 33,111. Bredo, E. & Feinberg, W., 106,113-4.
"Lesfractionsde la classe dominante", 76 Brire, G., 95.
Les Hritiers, xii, 3, 9,10,15, 58, 99,101, Brubaker, R., 105,106,127.
108,110,111,133. Burckhardt, J., 7.
"Les muses et leurs publics", 10.
Les Rgles de l'art, xx, xxi, xxiv, 19, 21. Caill, ., 131.
"Lesritesd'institution", 18. Calhoun, C , et al.
"Les stratgies de reconversion", 39. Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, 121,127.
"Les trois tats du capital culturel", Camic, C , 107,127,128.
33-5. Camus, ., 8.
"Le titre et le poste", 57. Canguilhem, G., 3, 64,130.
Libre-change, xx, xxi, 19. Caro, J.-Y., 137.
"L'institutionnalisation de l'anomie", 94, Cassagne, ., 80.
99-101. Cassirer, E., 12, 37,38.
"L'invention de la vie d'artiste", 16,76-7, Centre de Sociologie Europenne, Paris, 16,
102. 112.
L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies,
18,127. Birmingham, xv, xviii, 124.
"L'ontologie politique de Martin Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,
Heidegger", 16, 81. 16.
Mditations pascaliennes, xxv. Chamboredon, J.-C, 17.
"Mthode scientifique et hirarchie sociale Champagne, P., 112.
des objets", xiv, 16,81. Chancel, J., 89-90.
"Outline of a sociological theory of art Charte, C , 17.
perception", 56-8, 62, 94. Chicago/School, 127-9.
Photography, A Middle-Brow Art, see Un Chomsky, N., 27.
art moyen. Coleman, J., 128,129.
Postface to Panofsky, 12, 26. Collge de France, Paris, xix, xxii, 1,18, 35,
Rponses, 26,128. 90, 98, 99.
"Reproduction culturelle et reproduction 'condition', 29-32.
sociale", 33,60. Corot, J.-B. C , 103.
Sociologie de l'Algrie, 5,6,7,8,16,27, Courbet, G., 96,101,102.
133. Courrges, xxii, 18, 80-90, 94, 99,139.
"Sociology and Philosophy in France since Courthion, P., 97.
1945", 13,74, 82. Couture, T., 101.
"Structuralism and theory of sociological Culler, J., 84.
knowledge", 13,16,35, 38,42. 'cultural capital', xiii, xix, xxii, 9,32-7, 39-40,
Sur la tlvision, xxv, 112. 42.
"Sur le pouvoir symbolique", xviii. Cultural Studies, xv, xviii, xix, xx, xxiv, xxvi.
"Sur les ruses de la raison imprialiste",
xxv, xxvi. Daumier, T., 96.
"Systmes d'enseignement et systmes de Davis, K., 39.
pense", 12,13. Delacroix, E., 101,102.
The Algerians, 6, 27. Delsaut, Y., 16.
(See also Sociologie de l'Algrie.) Derrida, J., 3.
The Field of Cultural Production, xx. Descartes, R., 5, 69,138.
"The genesis of the concepts of habitus Les Principes de la philosophie, 5.
and offield",25-6,131. Descharmes, R., 71.
"The historical genesis of a pure Dewey, J., 128.
aesthetic", 19. DiMaggio, P., 109.
The Love of Art, Dufay, F & Dufort, P.-B., 3.
see L'amour de l'art. Duhem, P., 130.
"The three forms of theoretical
Durkheim, E., 3, 8,13,14,127,138.
knowledge", 15,133.
"Thinking about limits", 130.
"Tout est social!", xxiv. Eagleton, T., xvi.
cole des Beaux-Arts, Paris, 98,100,103.
 Index 155

cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences Sociales, Hoggart, R., xv, 115,123-4.
Paris, 16. The Uses of Literacy, xv, 115,123-4.
cole Normale Suprieure, Paris, 3,74, 98. Honneth, ., 23,116-7,125-6,132,
'educational system', xii, xiii, 14, 62. Husserl, ., 4, 54,125,127,131.
Engels, F., 31. Hyppolite, J., 45.
Esprit, 4.
INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et
Faguet, ., 67-^8, 69, 70, 96. des tudes conomiques), 110.
Fanon, F., 8. Iser, W., 51, 53-5, 56, 57, 60.
fashion, xxi, xxii, xxvi, 16, 80-90. The Act of Reading, 51, 53-4, 57.
'field', xiv, xxiii, 16,17, 20, 25, 37-40, 42, 46,
59, 87. Jauss, H.R., 51-3, 60.
Fink, E., 131. Jenkins, R., 105,106,107,110,114-5,116,
Flaubert, G., xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii, 3,16,18,19, 124.
20,46, 67-77, 80, 89, 90, 94, 96, 98,102, Joppke, C , 127.
127,139. Jurt, J., 51.
L'ducation sentimentale, xxii, 19, 20, 69,
77. Kabyles, 5, 6, 7, 27,28.
Correspondance, 68. Kant/ian, 12.
Madame Bovary, 70, 71, 72, 74. Katz, E., 82.
La Tentation de Saint Antoine, 70. Klingender, F., xv, xviii, 124.
Salammb, 72. Konstanz School, 51-2, 58.
Focillon, H., 95-7,103. Koyr, ., 130.
Foley, D.E., 124. Kulturgeschichte, xvi, 6.
Foucault, M., 3, 4, 64. Kulturwissenschaft, xvii.
Fowlie, W., 71.
Frankfurt School, 45,127. Lakomski, G., 132.
Laloux, V., 94.
Gadamer, H.-G., 19. Lamont, M & Lareau, ., 107,117,118.
Garnham, N., xix, 112,125. Lanson, G., 3, 68-70, 80.
Gautier, T., 20. Lash, S., 112-3.
Genet, J., 74. Lazarsfeld, P., 82.
Gerhards, J. & Anheier, H.K., 129. Le Roy Ladurie, ., 4.
Giddens, ., 132. Leavis, F.R., ix, x.
Gide, ., 71. Lecourt, D., 50.
Givenchy, 89. Leibniz, G.W. von, 5, 77,138.
Glauser, ., 70. Animadversiones, 5.
Goldmann, L., xiv, xvi. Lemert, C , 109.
Gorder, K.L., 109,114. Les Temps Modernes, xiv, 55, 71, 74.
Gouhier, H., 3, 4. Lvi-Strauss, C , 1, 5, 7, 8,12.
Granovetter, M., 107. Lewin, K., 38, 42.
Graumann, CF., 54. Liber, 21.
'griffe', xxvi, 16, 89, 90, 99. LIBER-Raisons d'agir, xxv.
Linard, G. & Servais, E., 133.
Haacke, H., xxi, 19. Lille, 11.
Habermas, J., 18,125-6. University of, 9, 58.
'habitus', xxiii, 16, 25, 26-29, 34, 37, 39-40, 42, Louvre, 95, 97.
46, 61-2, 87,126,127,131. Lukacs, G., 45,125.
Halimi, S., xxv.
Hall, S., xv, xviii, xix, xxi, 124. Macherey, P., 47-51, 54.
Hanks, W.F., 129. Pour une thorie de la production littraire,
Harker, R., et al. 48.
An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Maclntyre, ., 122,127.
Bourdieu. The Practice of Theory, 105, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, 16.
106. Manet, , xxi, xxii, xxiii, 18,19, 20, 32, 81, 90,
Hechter, 88. 93-103,127,139.
Hegel/ian, 7, 45, 46, 47, 74,108. The Execution of Maximilian, 93,100,102.
Heidegger, M., 16,17, 81, 86,125,139. Eva Gonzales, 93.
Sein und Zeit, 4. Corner of a Caf Concert, 93.
Hran, F., 131,132. Olympia, 95, 97.
Herder, J.G., xvii. Le Djeuner sur l'herbe, 95, 96.
hexis, 28, 40. Le Balcon, 100.
Hobsbawm, E., xv, xviii. Marcuse, H., 125.
156 Index

Mardaga, P., 51. Rupp, J.C.L. & de Lange, R., 129.

Marx, K., xvi, 4,14,43,44,45,46,47,48, 50, Ryle, G., 34.
61,64,75,124,126.
Theses on Feuerbach, 4,43. Sack, H.-G., 129.
Preface to a Critique of Political Economy, Saint Martin, M. de, 112.
43. Sainte-Beuve, C.A., 70.
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of Sartre, J.-P., xxii, 3,45,53,71^, 77,125,138.
1844,44,45. Huis clos, xi.
German Ideology, 45, 47. Being and Nothingness, 4, 6, 72.
Le Capital, 47. Critique de la raison dialectique, 6, 45, 73
Marxism/Marxist, xvi, 4,10,43,47,48,52, 53, L'Idiot de la famille, 1821-57,46.
60,61,73,76,108,113,114,126. L'Imagination, 71.
Mauss, M., 28,40,42. What is Literature?, 72-3, 74.
May, 1968,50, 51,56. Questions de mthode, 73-4.
May Day Manifesto, xv., Saussure, F. de, 8,15, 82-3, 84,86.
McLellan, D., 43. Schatzki, T.R., 107.
Mead, G.H., 128. Schiller, F., 81.
'mconnaissance', 117-8. Schiltz, M., 129.
Media, Culture and Society, xix. Schucking, L.L., 55.
Merleau-Ponty, M., 3,4, 7, 9, 28, 44. 'situation', 2-32.
La Structure du comportement, 9,28,29, Sorbonne, Paris, 70.
41. Spencer, H., 81.
Millet, J.-F., 96. Stoetzel, J., 81.
Moore, W.E., 39. 'structuralism', xiv, 1, 4, 8,12,14, 27, 29-30,
Muse d'Orsay, 94, 97,101,103. 49, 61, 76.
Swartz, D., 106-7.
Napoleon III, 95, 97. Szondi, P., 81.
National Bureau of Economie Research, New
York, 32. Taine, H., 67.
National Gallery, London., 93. 'taste', xi-xii, xiv, 17, 48.
'naturalism', xviii, 20, 68-70,77. Thatcher, M., xv.
Naturwissenschaft, xvii. Thibaudet, ., 70-1.
Nice, R., 117-8,124. Third Republic, 95, 97.
North Africa, xii, 8. Thomas, W.I., 128.
Thompson, E.P., xv, xviii, 124.
'objectification', xii, xxiii, 3,35. Thuillier, J., 98-9,100,101.
Objectivism/objectivist/objectivity', xiii, 8, Touraine, ., 46,109.
15.
Ostrow, J.M., 127-8. Ungaro, 88.

Panofsky, E., 12,14, 26. Valry, P., 71, 97.

Parsons, T., 138. Verds-Leroux, J., xxv.
Passeron, J.-C., xv, 13,108,114. Verne, J., 50.
Polity Press, xix, xx, 18.
'position/position-taking', xiv, xv, xxi, 29-32, Wacquant, L., 2,105,128,129.
39, 111. Weber, M., 14,15, 29, 38, 39,110,124,125,
Poster, M., 45. 126,127,138.
Pre-Raphaelites, 96. Gesammelte Aufstze, 5.
'production', 43-63. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 38.
Proudhon, P.-J., 102. Ancient Judaism, 103.
'public sphere', 18. Williams, R., ix, x, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix,
xxvii, 124-5.
'rational pedagogy', xiii, 10. Willis, P., 114,118,124.
'realism', 67-8,77,96. Wilson, W.J., 128.
'reception', xv, xxiii, 51-5, 60.
'reproduction', xxiii, 43,47,55-63. Young, M.F.D., xv, 123.
Ringer, R, 127,129.
Robinson, R.V. & Gamier, M.A., 110-2. Zelizer, V.A., 132.
'romanticism', 67-8, 69, 75, 96. Zola, ., xx, xxiii, 20-1, 69, 70.