RULING:
ADMIN CASE DIGESTS (3rd Batch)
1. SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY
ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
(PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO
MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of
Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.
FACTS:
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of
the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the
Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4
of January 7, 1966 with the following functions:
b. To investigate all activities involving or
affecting immoral practices, graft and
corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical),
lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities
which are prejudicial to the government and the
public interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption
and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and
3019, and gather necessary evidence to
establish prima facie, acts of graft and
acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct
fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints
against the acts, conduct or behavior of any
public official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.
For the performance of these functions, the President vested in
the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code,
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation. Paragraph 5 of EO No. 4
empowered the PARGO to "summon witness, administer oaths,
and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the
authority "to require the production of documents under a
subpoenaduces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to
the same restrictions as apply in judicial proceedings of a
similar character."
On June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as
Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando
Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandumcommanding him "to be and appear
as witness at the Office of the PARGO to declare and testify in
a certain investigation pending therein." Manalastas filed on
June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction
with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order questioning
the legality of the PARGOs order.
ISSUE:
Whether PARGO the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations enjoys the authority to issue
subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Yes. PARGO enjoys the authority to issue the subpoena.
The life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact,
the gathering, the organization and the analysis of
evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative
functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing,
but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for
determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and
for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas
to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative
agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon
which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be
taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in
proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct
general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report
findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for
actions and qualifications.
Petitioner agencys subpoena power is from Executive Order
No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to
"summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the
production of documents under a subpoenaduces tecum or
otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character. Such
subpoena power is not merely confine to quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory functions because to limit such would imperil or
inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions. More than
that, the enabling authority itself fixes no distinction when and in
what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Where
the law does not distinguish the court should not distinguish.
Nor could we impress upon this subpoena power the alleged
strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to
abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of
the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon
witnesses and the authority to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall
be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar
character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in
respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the
Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for
hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in
connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or
adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be
issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It
must be emphasized, however, that an administrative
subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. What the
Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from
and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative
subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and
qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code could mean the restraints against
infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is
unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the
books, documents or things does not appear. 15
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the
course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved,
and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before
the issuance of a complaint.17 It is not necessary, as in the case
of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of
law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is
enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover
evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to
make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. It is enough
that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have
information that might shed some helpful light. Administrative
agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent
upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or
even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When
investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to
an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as
to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21
In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the
requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the
authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite;
and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
In the present case, there is no doubt that the fact-finding
investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn
statements implicating certain public officials of the City
Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within
the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information
sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of
which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably
relevant to the investigations. Therefore, the Court of First
Instance of Manila should dismiss the petition.
2. GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu
vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN VASQUEZ, HONORABLE
MOJICA, et al.
FACTS: Jessica Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu,
filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an
administrative complaint against Mayor Ilustrisimo before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman Vasquez directed
Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar that Mayor
Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial
Court. It appears that Lastimosa conducted a preliminary
investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed. As no case for attempted
rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica ordered Kintanar and Lastimosa to show
cause why they should not be punished for contempt for
"refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Noteworthy to mention, is the previous
administrative and criminal complaints filed by one Julian
Menchavez against Lastimosa and Kintanar, based on the
alleged refusal of the two to obey the orders of the Ombudsman
to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape on a different
occasion.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
punish Lastimosa and Kintanar for contempt. Yes.
HELD: Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of
the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to
call on prosecutors for assistance. This is because under the
Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes
under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which
means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to
direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's)
decision. Lastimosa cannot legally act on her own and refuse to
prepare and file the information as directed by the
Ombudsman.
3. TAADA vs TUVERA
FACTS: Petitioners seek to compel private respondents for the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, etc.
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is
thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect;
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.
ISSUE: WON the subject statutes still need publication in the
Official Gazette even if they provide for their effectivity dates
RULING: Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication
of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures
or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden to
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative
and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. Without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees.
4. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, Petitioner vs. PICOP RESOURCES,
INC., Respondent.
Facts: PICOP filed with SEC an application for amendment of
its Articles of Incorporation extending its existence for another
50 years. PICOP paid the filing fee of P210.00 based on SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 (1994 Circular).
The SEC, however, informed PICOP of the appropriate filing
fee of P12 Million, or 1/5 of 1% of its authorized capital stock
of P6 Billion.
PICOP posited that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of
1986 (1986 Circular) rules on the specific subject matter of
"Filing Fees for Amended Articles of Incorporation Extending
the Term of Corporate Existence prescribed the filing fee as
1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock, with the qualification
that it should not be less than P200.00 or more
than P100,000.00. PICOP pointed out that no equivalent
provision appears in any of the subsequent SEC circulars such
as the 1994 and 2001 circulars. Hence, the 1986 Circular
should prevail.
The SEC, on the other hand, contends that Circular No. 2,
Series of 1990 (1990 Circular) removed the filing fee ceilings
provided for in the 1986 Circular. The SEC also enumerated the
subsequent EOs and Circulars which called for the increase in
SEC fees and charges. The latest of these was the 2001
Circular, which now prescribes the formula of 1/5 of 1% of the
authorized capital stock.
When the matter was raised before the Office of the President,
it was found out that the 1990 Circular relied on by the SEC
was only submitted to the UP Law Center on the same day that
it filed its second motion for reconsideration (January 23, 2004).
The OP ruled, which was affirmed by the CA, that the 1990
Circular was not effective at the time PICOP applied for the
extension of its corporate term.
Issue: WON the 1986 Circular should be applied in the matter
of application filed by PICOP for extension of its corporate
existence.
Ruling: The 1986 Circular is the proper basis of the
computation since it specifically provided for filing fees in cases
of extension of corporate term. A proviso of the same nature is
wanting in the other circulars relied on by the SEC at the time
PICOP filed its request for extension.
According to the SC, there was an evident violation of the due
process requirement. It was admitted that the SEC failed to
satisfy the requirements for promulgation when it filed the
required copies of the said regulation at the UP Law Center
only fourteen (14) years after it was supposed to have taken
effect.
The SEC violated the due process clause insofar as it denied
the public prior notice of the regulations that were supposed to
govern them. The SEC cannot wield the provisions of the 1990
Circular against PICOP and expect its outright compliance. The
circular was not yet effective during the time PICOP filed its
request to extend its corporate existence in 2002. In fact, it was
only discovered in 2004, fifteen (15) days before the SEC filed
its second motion for reconsideration.
5. GSIS VS. COA
FACTS: In November 1936, Congress enacted Commonwealth
Act No. 186, creating the Government Service Insurance
System (hereafter GSIS) to provide insurance coverage and
retirement benefits to government officials and employees,
replacing the existing pension systems established in prior
laws.
On December 2, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino,
exercising legislative powers enacted Executive Order No. 79,
Section 1 (c) of which provides that a reserve officer who has
satisfactorily rendered a total of ten (10) years continuous
active commissioned military service shall not be reverted to
inactive status, except upon his own request or for cause, up to
the time he reaches the compulsory retirement of thirty (30)
years of service or-fifty six (56) years of age, whichever comes
later but not later than sixty (60) years of age.
On November 16, 1987, Brig. General Arturo T. Asuncion met
his untimely death in a helicopter crash.
The heirs of the late General Asuncion filed a claim with the
GSIS for payment of death benefits due to him as a member of
the System.
The GSIS Quezon City Branch (military) paid the claim of the
heirs of Brig. General Asuncion.
In the course of audit of the account, the corporate auditor's
office officer in charge, GSIS, disallowed in audit the payment
of the claim, pointing out that at the time of his death, General
Asuncion was not a member of the GSIS despite E. O. 79.
On appeal to the Commission on Audit en banc it denied the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the local auditor.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON EO 79 became effective at the time of General
Asunsions death?
RULING: YES.
>The President issued the executive order on December 2,
1986. It was published in the Official Gazette on December 22,
1986.
Thus, E. O. No. 79 is effective fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette, or on January 07, 1987. At
that time, the late General Asuncion was a reserve officer who
had rendered a total of ten (10) years of continuous active duty
service commission in the AFP. Hence, he was compulsorily
covered as a member of the GSIS on the date he died on
November 15, 1987, in line of duty in a helicopter crash.
Consequently, his heirs are entitled to payment of death
benefits.
The aforecited executive order provides for compulsory
membership in the GSIS of qualified reserve officers of the AFP
like General Asuncion. It was effective at the time of the death
of General Asuncion. Hence, it becomes the duty of the auditor
to approve and pass in audit the valid claim of his heirs for
death benefits. The Commission on Audit's disallowance
amounts to a grave abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth Act No. 186, enacted on November 14, 1936,
as amended, provides that membership in the system shall be
compulsory upon all regular officers and enlisted men of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Executive Order No. 79, issued on December 2, 1986, has the
force of law.
By the terms of this enactment, qualified reserve officers,
meaning, those who have satisfactorily rendered a total of ten
(10) years of continuous active duty commissioned service in
the AFP shall not be reverted to inactive status except upon
their own request, or for cause.
Thus, they have the same status as regular commissioned
officers of the AFP, who are unquestionably compulsory
members of the System.
6. Phil International Trading vs COA April 4, 2001
FACTS: PITC, herein petitioner is a GOCC for the purpose of
promoting and developing Philippine trade and national
economic development. On 1988, its Board of Directors
approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers.
On July 1, 1989, RA 6758 took effect. It provides for the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into
standardized salary rates. Section 12 thereof provides that
other additional compensation being received by incumbents as
of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates
shall continue to be authorized.
However, the DBM issued DBM-CCC No. 10 which
discontinued effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and
fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary, not otherwise
enumerated under the said circular.
Now, PITC contested this alleging that the disallowance of
these emoluments including the car plans are not valid on the
grounds that RA 6758 does not intend to revoke existing
benefits (car plans) enjoyed by the PITC and that the circular is
of no force and effect for lack of publication.
Respondent COA, on the other hand alleges that the
subsequent reissuance of the circular cured the defect of non-
publication.
ISSUE: WON the DBM Circular is valid and enforceable?
HELD: No, the circular is of no force and effect.
First, petitioner correctly pointed out that there was no intention
on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being
enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of
the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12 and 17
thereof. There is no dispute that the PITC officials who availed
of the subject car plan benefits were incumbents of their
positions as of July 1, 1989. Thus, it was legal and proper for
them to continue enjoying said benefits.
Second, since the circular which completely disallows payment
of allowances and other emoluments to public officers and
employees is of general application, it follows that publication is
required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to
inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and
regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the
same. The reissuance did not cure the defect.
7. PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES
CORPORATION VS SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ET AL
FACTS: Petitioner Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in
the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Private
respondents were recruited by petitioner for employment in
Saudi Arabia and were required to pay placement fees in the
amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Mikin and
P6,500.00 each for private respondents de Mesa and Leyson.
They were, however, terminated from services and repatriated
to the Philippines due to their refusal to sign a new contract that
increases their work hours without corresponding increase in
their basic monthly salary.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, due to the refusal of
petitioner Philsa to return their placement fees and payment of
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract, they
filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its
foreign principal. One of their causes of action was illegal
exaction/the refund of the placement fees.
On appeal in the SC, Petitioner insists that it cannot be held
liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which
may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides that
the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective
Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was
apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article
32 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not POEA Memo Order No. 2 is void for
lack of publication.
RULING: Yes, the Memorandum is void due to its lack of
publication.
In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes,
including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the
Constitution: Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency
and the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-
called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties."
Applying the doctrine laid down in Taada vs Tuvera, the court
have previously declared as having no force and effect those
administrative issuances that were not published or filed with
the National Administrative Register as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National
Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be
enforced.
8. GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,
vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F.
DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F.
CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO
MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V.
MARCELO, respondents.
Facts:
1. an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) by respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director
Eduardo Matillano accusing Sen. Honasan of the crime
of coup de etat in OAKWOOD MUTINY.
2. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a
subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.
3. Honasan, petitioner, together with his counsel,
appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for Clarification
questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting
that since the imputed acts were committed in relation
to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman,
not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the
charge be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not
the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of
the case considering that he belongs to the group of
public officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying that
the proceedings be suspended until final resolution of
his motion.
Issue: Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of
Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner.
Ruling: YES.
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the
assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but on the provisions of
the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV,
governing the DOJ, which provides:
Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the declared policy of
the State to provide the government with a principal law
agency which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice
system in accordance with the accepted processes
thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the
correctional system;
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To accomplish its
mandate, the Department shall have the following
powers and functions:
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes,
prosecute offenders and administer the probation
and correction system; (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 1 of P.D. 1275, effective April 11, 1978, to wit:
SECTION 1. Creation of the National Prosecution
Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of
Justice. There is hereby created and established a
National Prosecution Service under the supervision and
control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of
the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of
Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution
Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are
hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution
of all cases involving violations of penal
laws. (Emphasis supplied)
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal
circular between the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities
among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the
conduct of persons or the public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission
that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be
published.14 (emphasis by Lyndon. Mao ning gi hatagan ug
dakong weight ni sir sa discussion, no need daw publication
since the requisite of general applicability was not met)
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation because petitioner is a
public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him
falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent
jurisdiction to investigate charges against public officers, the
fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by
itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate
the charge of coup d'etat against him.
9) REPUBLIC (represented by NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), petitioner,
vs. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC. (Extelcom)
and BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (Bayantel),
respondents.
FACTS:
In 1992, International Communications Corporation (now
Bayantel) filed an application with the NTC for a Certificate of
Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and
maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service
(CMTS). Thereafter (January 1993), the NTC issued
Memorandum Circular directing all interested applicants for
nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications
before the Commission on or before February 15, 1993. The
Bayantels application was archieved due to the recent grant of
Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc.,
which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for
the service being applied for by Bayantel.
In February 2000, the NTC granted Bayantel's motion to revive
the latter's application. Respondent Extelcom filed an
Opposition and argued that Bayantel's motion sought the
revival of an archived application filed almost eight (8) years
ago and thus outdated. Moreover, Extelcom alleged that there
was no public need for the service applied for by Bayantel as
the present five CMTS operators --- Extelcom, Globetel,
Smartcom., Pilipino Telephone Corp., and ISLACOM. --- more
than adequately addressed the market demand, and all are in
the process of enhancing and expanding their respective
networks based on recent technological developments.
The NTC, applying the 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure,
issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional
authority to operate CMTS service. The CA declared that the
orders of NTC be annulled and set aside. Extelcom argued that
NTC should have applied the 1993 Revised Rules, not the 1978
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
ISSUE: W/N NTC should have applied the 1993 Revised
Rules instead of the 1978 Rules.
HELD. NO. (1978 Rules)
In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a
CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of
Practice and Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an
application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter,
the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own
initiative, the relief prayed for, based on the pleading,
together with the affidavits and supporting documents
attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after
completion of the hearing which shall be called within thirty
(30) days from grant of authority asked for. (underscoring
ours)
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should
have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office
of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993.
These Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;"
accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon
filing of the proper motion before the Commission.
The NTC answered that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules
have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation,
the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the
Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still
governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of
the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993
Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February
3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative
Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the
UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force
and effect.
Also as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera: that
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised
Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after
their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the
absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that
governs.
In any event, regardless of whether the 1978 Rules or the 1993
Revised Rules should apply, the records show that the
amended application filed by Bayantel in fact included a motion
for the issuance of a provisional authority. Hence, it cannot be
said that the NTC granted the provisional authority motu
proprio. The CA, therefore, erred when it found that the NTC
issued its Order of May 3, 2000 on its own initiative.
The CA ruled that there was a violation of the fundamental right
of Extelcom to due process when it was not afforded the
opportunity to question the motion for the revival of the
application. However, it must be noted that said Order referred
to a simple revival of the archived application of Bayantel. At
this stage, it cannot be said that Extelcom's right to procedural
due process was prejudiced. In fact, the records show that the
NTC has scheduled several hearing dates for this purpose, at
which all interested parties shall be allowed to register their
opposition. We have ruled that there is no denial of due process
where full-blown adversarial proceedings are conducted before
an administrative body. With Extelcom having fully participated
in the proceedings, and indeed, given the opportunity to file its
opposition to the application, there was clearly no denial of its
right to due process. Likewise, the requirements of notice and
publication of the application is no longer necessary inasmuch
as the application is a mere revival of an application which has
already been published earlier. At any rate, the records show
that all of the five (5) CMTS operators in the country were duly
notified and were allowed to raise their respective oppositions
to Bayantel's application through the NTC's Order.
10. G.R. No. 164026 December 23, 2008
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
GMA NETWORK, INC., respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for brevity), a
domestic corporation, filed an application for collective
approval of various amendments to its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent
Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC, for
brevity). The amendments applied for include the
change in the corporate name of petitioner from
"Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA
Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate
term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16,
2000. Upon such filing, the petitioner had been
assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal
Department a separate filing fee for the application for
extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of
its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an
amount of P1,212,200.00. On September 26, 1995, the
petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest
the legality and propriety of the said assessment.
However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve
the other amendments being requested by the
petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its
application for extension of corporate term.
Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate
Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996,
issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned
assessment, the dispositive portion of which states that
the questioned assessment is in accordance with
law and that petitioner is required to comply with
the filing fee because it is in accord with SEC
Circular No. 2, Series of 1994.
An appeal from the aforequoted ruling of the respondent SEC
was subsequently taken by the petitioner on the ground that the
assessment of filing fees for the petitioners application for
extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the
authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof on the ground that it
is not in accordance with law. The appellate court agreed with
the SECs submission that an extension of the corporate term is
a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a juridical
being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the
State and that it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous
to the filing of new articles of incorporation.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having
been published in accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON the SECs separate assessment for filing fee for
the application for extension of corporate term is valid.
RULING:
No. The SECs assessment for filing fee is not valid.
It should be mentioned at the outset that the authority of the
SEC to collect and receive fees as authorized by law is not in
question.7 Its power to collect fees for examining and filing
articles of incorporation and by-laws and amendments thereto,
certificates of increase or decrease of the capital stock, among
others, is recognized. Likewise established is its power under
Sec. 7 of P.D. No. 902-A to recommend to the President the
revision, alteration, amendment or adjustment of the charges
which it is authorized to collect.
The subject of the present inquiry is not the authority of the
SEC to collect and receive fees and charges, but rather the
validity of its imposition on the basis of a memorandum circular
which, the Court of Appeals held, is ineffective.
Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that where the
amendment consists in extending the term of corporate
existence, the SEC "shall be entitled to collect and receive for
the filing of the amended articles of incorporation the same fees
collectible under existing law as the filing of articles of
incorporation."8 As is clearly the import of this law, the SEC
shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it
assesses and collects both for the filing of articles of
incorporation and the filing of an amended articles of
incorporation for purposes of extending the term of corporate
existence.
The SEC, effectuating its mandate under the aforequoted law
and other pertinent laws,9 issued SEC Memorandum Circular
No. 1, Series of 1986, imposing the filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of
the authorized capital stock but not less than P300.00 nor more
than P100,000.00 for stock corporations, and 1/10 of 1% of the
authorized capital stock but not less than P200.00 nor more
than P100,000.00 for stock corporations without par value, for
the filing of amended articles of incorporation where the
amendment consists of extending the term of corporate
existence.
Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum Circular No.
2, Series of 1994, imposing new fees and charges and deleting
the maximum filing fee set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of
1986, such that the fee for the filing of articles of incorporation
became 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20%
thereof but not less thanP500.00.
A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they indeed
pertain to different matters, as GMA points out. SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing
fee for the amendment of articles of incorporation to extend
corporate life, while Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1994 pertains to the filing fee for articles of incorporation. Thus,
as GMA argues, the former circular, being squarely applicable
and, more importantly, being more favorable to it, should be
followed.
What this proposition fails to consider, however, is the clear
directive of R.A. No. 3531 to impose the same fees for the filing
of articles of incorporation and the filing of amended articles of
incorporation to reflect an extension of corporate term. R.A. No.
3531 provides an unmistakable standard which should guide
the SEC in fixing and imposing its rates and fees. If such
mandate were the only consideration, the Court would have
been inclined to rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the
filing fees as outlined in the questioned memorandum circular,
GMAs argument notwithstanding.
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
questioned memorandum circular is invalid as it does not
appear from the records that it has been published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil
Code, provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided."
In Taada v. Tuvera,10 the Court, expounding on the publication
requirement, held:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.11
The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not
been filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register
of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in
the Administrative Code of 1987.12
It should be emphasized that the said memorandum circular
cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531.
This administrative issuance is an implementation of the
mandate of the said RA and also it indubitably regulates and
affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be considered a
mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law,
but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither
published nor filed with the Office of the National Administrative
Register. Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly
has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other
pertinent laws. The due process clause, however requires that
the said fixed rate by the SEC be published first in the official
gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
11. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its President,
SANCHEZ, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of such law, the CHR
adopted an upgrading and reclassification scheme among
selected positions in the Commission without imprimatur from
the DBM. On presentment of the staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval,
secretary Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBMs
disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme,
the CSC-National Capital Region Office recommended to the
CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected
owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of CHREA, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the
only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to
evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading,
as well as creation of positions. However, the CSC-Central
Office denied CHREAs request and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading
scheme be censured. The CA affirmed the decision of the CSC.
CHREA bewails that the CSC and CA erroneously assumed
that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters
are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and
reclassification of positions therein.
ISSUE: Can the CHR lawfully implement an upgrading and
reclassification of personnel positions without the prior approval
of the Department of Budget and Management? No.
HELD: The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is
exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is
flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the
entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification. It is
within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in
the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal
justification.
Palpably, the Court of Appeals Decision was based on the
mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species
of constitutional commissions. Article IX of the Constitution
states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission
on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal
autonomy. The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Moreover, being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does
not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade,
and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the
members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel,
such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.

12. CHREA vs CHR; 2006
FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided
for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII
covers the appropriations of the CHR.
On the strength of this special provisions, the Commission on
Human Rights [or CHR], through its then Chairperson and
Commissioners promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04
September 1998 adopting an upgrading and reclassification
scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
CHR also issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the
upgrading or raising of salary grade of the following positions in
the Commission.
Said proposed personnel modification scheme was
disapproved by the DBM. The Supreme Court denied said
petition in its decision on 2004; hence, this motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON CHR is a constitutional commission which is
entitled to fiscal autonomy
RULING: No. As already settled in the assailed Decision of this
Court, the creation of respondent may be constitutionally
mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional
commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled
"Constitutional Commissions," identifies only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of the
respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution on Human Rights.
Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions for its
benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or statutory
basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim of fiscal
autonomy.
13. Re: Clarifying and Strengthening The Organizational
Structure and Administrative Set-Up of the Philippine
Judicial Academy
Facts: The instant administrative matter has its roots in the
Resolution of the Court promulgated on February 24, 2004,
clarifying and strengthening the organizational structure and
administrative set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PHILJA). Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC Chief
Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff
Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23.
However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and
Compensation Action (NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) downgraded
said positions and their corresponding salary grades. The SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officers title was downgraded and its SG
reduced to 24. And Supervising Judicial Staff Officers title was
downgraded and its SG reduced to 22.
Issue: WON DBM may downgrade the said positions.
Ruling: No. The primary role of the DBM is to breathe life into
the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of providing
equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences
in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions.
Pursuant to its mandate, the DBM is authorized to evaluate and
determine whether a proposed reclassification and upgrading
scheme is consistent with applicable laws and regulations. The
task of the DBM is simply to review the compensation and
benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and
determine if it complies with the prescribed policies and
guidelines issued in this regard. Thus, the role of the DBM
is supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that
the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be
given to [government] officials and employees adhere to the
policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable
laws.
As such, the authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court
issuances relative to court personnel on matters of
compensation is limited by the provisions of the Constitution,
specifically Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal autonomy and Article
VIII, Section 6 on administrative supervision over court
personnel. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside
control.
Clearly then, in downgrading the positions and salary grades
of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and SC Supervising Judicial
Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its authority
and encroached upon the Courts fiscal autonomy and
supervision of court personnel as enshrined in the Constitution;
in fine, a violation of the Constitution itself.
14. FABELLA VS.CA
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cario
issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who
had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates
during the period September to October 1990. The mass action
had been staged to demand payment of 13th month
differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill
in Congress, among other things.
Secretary Cario filed administrative cases against herein
petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong
High School for: grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross
violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office
regulations; refusal to perform official duty; conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.absence without leave
(AWOL).
At the same time, Secretary Cario ordered petitioner-appellee
to be placed under preventive suspension.
Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990.
Petitioner-appellees' counsel objected to the procedure
adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished
a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received no
response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later,
however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.
The teachers filed a an injunctive suit with the RTC in Quezon
City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cario
with fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further
investigating them and from rendering any decision in the
administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a
restraining order.
Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a
decision finding the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and
ordering their immediate dismissal.
The trial court dismissed the petition
for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit.
The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court which issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial
court's order of dismissal and reinstating petitioner-appellees'
action, even as it ordered the latter's reinstatement pending
decision of their case.
ISSUE: WON due process were accorded to private
respondents?
RULING: NO.
In the present case, the issue is not whether private
respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited
action but whether, in the course of the investigation of the
alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has been
violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted
out any penalty, due process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4)
a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically
covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that
the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative
cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers' organization and a
supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to
hear the administrative charges against private respondents did
not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these
committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction.
Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily
void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or
dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers' organization in these committees
was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to
the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case
are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to
private respondents.
15. EMIN vs CHAIRMAN DE LEON Feb 27, 2002
FACTS: Martin Emin, herein petitioner a Non-Formal Education
Supervisor was charged in the CSC with acts of dishonesty and
grave misconduct in connection with his acts of receiving fees
in return for the issuance of false certificates of eligibility.
The CSC found him guilty and ordered his dismissal from the
service. He then filed a petition for reconsideration of the same
in the CSC and later appealed to the CA which both denied the
petition. He now comes to the SC alleging that as a teacher,
original jurisdiction over the administrative case against him is
lodged with a committee and not with the CSC, as provided for
by Republic Act 4670 otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teacher and that he was not accorded with due
process.
ISSUE: WON the CSC has jurisdiction over the case and WON
he was given due process?
HELD: While it is true that petitioner is correct in pointing out
that he is covered by RA 4670 and that a committee has
original jurisdiction over his administrative case and not the
CSC, the SC held that he cannot now invoke such lack of
jurisdiction on the ground of estoppel by laches.
In this instant case, the CSC had afforded petitioner sufficient
opportunity to be heard and defend himself against charges of
participation in faking civil service eligibilities of certain teachers
for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before the CSC
Regional Office but he participated in the hearings of the
charges against him to the extent that we are left with no doubt
that his participation in its proceedings was willful and
voluntary. Thus, he may not anymore question the authority of
the CSC.
The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to
move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
16. ALCALA VS CHAIRMAN DE LEON ET AL.
FACTS: Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal
of Lanao National High School. Complainants who were
teachers of Lanao National High School and Dapdap National
High School filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty
alleging that on August 18-22, 1997, they attended a mass
training/seminar at Cebu. Later, Respondent refunded the
complainants their expenses during the said training/seminar.
However, it was discovered that Respondent did not give back
the full amount due to them. Complainants further alleged that
some of the teachers received from respondent P1,500.00 each
representing Loyalty Benefits, however, they learned from the
DECS Division Office that they were entitled to receive
P2,000.00 each.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissing him from
service.
On appeal, the CA nullified and set aside the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the latter was
without jurisdiction over administrative complaints against
public school teachers. It ruled that the governing law is RA
4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, and not RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction over complaints against public school teachers.
RULING: Yes, the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction.
In the case of Emin vs De Leon, the Court ruled that the
proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC can no
longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of
estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the
CSCs jurisdiction over his case. Participation by parties in the
administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto
bars them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an
adverse decision is rendered against them.
Applying the decision of Emin vs De Leon in the case at bar,
respondent was amply afforded due process in an
administrative proceeding, the essence of which is an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not only
did respondent file a counter-affidavit and a motion for
reconsideration, he also participated in the hearings conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman and was given the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Verily,
participation in the administrative proceedings without raising
any objection thereto amounts to a waiver of jurisdictional
infirmities.
In the same vein, respondent in this case should be barred
under the principle of estoppel by laches from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Therefore, the CA should have
resolved the appeal on its merits, considering that respondents
right to procedural due process was properly observed.
17. MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., G.R. No. 153155
- versus -
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
1. Petitioner Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. was Barangay
Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City.
2. Evangeline Ursal (Ursal), Barangay Clerk of Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, filed with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) a complaint for attempted rape
against petitioner. Petitioner was subsequently charged
with sexual harassment before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City.[6]
3. Thereafter, Ursal filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a similar complaint-affidavit charging
petitioner with grave misconduct.
4. Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and attached
thereto the affidavits of two witnesses.
5. The Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the
Office of the Ombudsman, upon review, and with the
approval of the Ombudsman, petitioner was found
guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of
dismissal, with forfeiture of material benefits, per
its Memorandum Order.[10]
6. Meanwhile, Ursal asked the City Council to waive its
jurisdiction in favor of the Ombudsman.[12] The City
Council merely noted Ursals motion.
7. petitioner seeks the dismissal of the administrative
charge against him for the CA committed a grave
error of law in refusing to dismiss the cases against
petitioner on the ground of forum shopping and
misapplying instead the principle of estoppel.
Issue: WON there was forum shopping when the petition was
filed both in the City council and in the Ombudsman?
Ruling: NO.
At the onset, it must be stressed that the rule on forum-
shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, [36] and
not to administrative cases. Petitioner has not cited any rule or
circular on forum-shopping issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman or that of the City Council.
Ursal filed identical complaint-affidavits before the City Council,
through the DILG, and the Office of the Ombudsman. A review
of the said complaints-affidavits shows that far from being the
typical initiatory pleadings referred to in Supreme Court
Administrative Circulars Nos. 04-94 and 28-91, they merely
contain a recital of the alleged culpable acts of petitioner. Ursal
did not make any claim for relief, nor pray for any penalty for
petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over the case since the City Council had earlier
acquired jurisdiction over the matter. The Court is not
convinced.
The mandate of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints
against erring public officials, derived from both the
Constitution[38] and the law[39] gives it jurisdiction over the
complaint against petitioner.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code, the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective
barangay official.[43] Without a doubt, the Office of the
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Quezon City
Council over administrative cases against elective officials such
as petitioner.
The Ombudsman was not aware of the pending case
before the Quezon City Council when the administrative
complaint was filed before it. There was no mention of such
complaint either in the complaint-affidavit or in the counter-
affidavit of petitioner. Thus, the Ombudsman, in compliance
with its duty to act on all complaints against officers and
employees of the government, took cognizance of the case,
made its investigation, and rendered its decision accordingly.
Petitioner is also estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. A perusal of the records shows
that he participated in the proceedings by filing his counter-
affidavit with supporting evidence. Neither did he inform the
Ombudsman of the existence of the other administrative
complaint of which he is presumably aware at the time the
proceedings in the Ombudsman were on-going. It was only
when the Ombudsman rendered an adverse decision that he
disclosed the proceedings before the Quezon City Council and
raised the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it has been held that
participation in the administrative proceedings without raising
any objection thereto bars the parties from raising any
jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered
against them.[45]
(THE FF IS THE DISCUSSION PROPER RE: ADMIN DUE
PROCESS. GI CITE KO LANG NANG SA IBABAW KAY MAO
NAY GI DISCUSS NI SIR, AMBOT NGANO NGA
PROCEDURAL MAN)
Another submission made by petitioner is that he was
deprived of his right to administrative due process when he was
dismissed from service without substantial evidence and
without consideration of the evidence he proffered. He raises as
a defense Ursals failure to state the actual date of commission
of the alleged attempted rape, the impossibility of the assault,
and the affidavits of his other subordinates.[46] Calling attention
to the weakness of Ursals evidence, he states that such
evidence is not sufficient to establish the crime of rape, in
whatever stage.[47] Finally, he argues that as testament to his
innocence, his constituents voted him to a third term.[48]
Again, the Court is not impressed.
Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to be heard.
He was required to answer the formal charge and given a
chance to present evidence in his behalf. He was not denied
due process. More importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman
is well supported by substantial evidence.
A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have
to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that respondent has committed the acts stated in the
complaint or formal charge.[49] Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is different
from the degree of proof required in criminal proceedings,
which calls for a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[50] Petitioners reliance on the rules on prosecution for the
crime of rape is therefore misplaced. What is at issue in the
case before the Ombudsman is whether his acts constitute
grave misconduct, and not whether he is guilty of the crime of
attempted rape.
18) OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. VICTORIO
N. MEDRANO, respondent.
FACTS:
Ma. Ruby Dumalaog, a teacher, filed a sworn letter-complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman charging her superior
herein respondent, with (1) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995), and (2) grave
misconduct (administrative case). Respondent denied the
charge, claiming that it was "maliciously designed to harass and
threaten him to succumb to Ma. Rubys demand that she be
given a regular teaching post and thus prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint.
By Decision rendered in the administrative case, petitioner
adjudged respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposed
upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent
moved for reconsideration and assailed for the first time, the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the case. He argued that
under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 (the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers), an administrative complaint against a
public school teacher should be heard by an investigating
committee of the DECS, now DepEd, composed of the school
superintendent of the division where the teacher belongs, a
representative from a teachers organization, and a supervisor
of the division.
The appellate court annulled petitioners Decision, as modified,
in the administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the
sole ground that petitioner has no jurisdiction over it. It held that
although respondent raised the issue of jurisdiction only after
petitioner rendered an adverse decision, "the rule on estoppel
will not apply against Medrano" because such jurisdictional
issue was raised "when the case was still before the
Ombudsman."
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in not ruling that it
(petitioner) has concurrent jurisdiction with the DepEd over the
administrative complaint against respondent.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner has jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint against respondent.
HELD: YES. (because of the principle of estoppel)
Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution "created the
independent Office of the Ombudsman." The constitutional and
statutory provisions taken together reveal the manifest intent of
the lawmakers to bestow upon the petitioner full administrative
disciplinary power over public officials and employees except
those impeachable officials, Members of Congress and of the
Judiciary.
However, when an administrative charge is initiated against a
public school teacher, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be
heard initially by an investigating committee composed of the
school superintendent of the division, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teachers organization, and a supervisor
of the division.
Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the
existence of some "proper disciplinary authorities," such as the
investigating committee of the DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus, Section 23
of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner "may
refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for
the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against
erring public officers or employees."
In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public
school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent
with the proper committee of the DepEd.
In the instant case, respondent, although designated as then
OIC of a public school and concurrently the school principal of
another public school, is undoubtedly covered by the definition
of the term "teacher" under Section 2 of the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers which provides: SEC 2. Title
Definition. This Act shall x x x apply to all public school
teachers except those in the professorial staff of state colleges
and universities. As used in this Act, the term teacher shall
mean all persons engaged in the classroom, in any level of
instruction; on full time basis, including guidance counselors,
school librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors, and all
other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative
functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by
the Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not
include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and
other school employees. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, the administrative complaint against respondent should
have been referred by petitioner to the proper committee of the
DepEd for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings, in light of Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of
1989.
But while petitioner should have desisted from hearing the
administrative complaint against respondent and referred it to
the proper DepEd committee, respondent is now barred from
assailing petitioners acts under the principle of estoppel. He
had actively participated in the administrative proceedings
before petitioner. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked petitioner
for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the
administrative complaint allegedly for being baseless. From
then on, he was assisted by counsel in filing several motions.
When he was preventively suspended for six months without
pay, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that "a new
Order be issued reversing or setting aside the said Order."
When this was denied, he again filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for the lifting of his suspension since he was
already replaced as OIC, which motion was granted. It was only
after petitioner had rendered an adverse Decision that he, in a
Motion for Reconsideration, impugned petitioners assumption
of jurisdiction over his case. Verily, respondent cannot be
permitted to challenge petitioners acts belatedly.
19. Ombudsman vs. Delijero Jr.
Facts:
Cleofas P. dela Cruz, was the mother of the alleged victim Myra
dela Cruz (Myra). At the time of the incident, Myra was only 12
years old and a first year high school student at the Burauen
Comprehensive National High School. Respondent, on the
other hand, was Myra's 52-year-old Mathematics teacher.5
Sometime in May 2003, complainant learned from her cousin
that respondent was courting her daughter Myra. Complainant
then immediately confronted Myra, who admitted having
received from respondent several handwritten love letters, a
Valentine's card and Two Hundred Pesos as allowance.
Moreover, Myra said that respondent kissed him in her cheek
when the respondent called her while respondent is in his room.
Respondent submitted a Counter-Affidavit10 in his defense
denying the allegation of him kissing the 12 year old student.
Petitioner called the parties to a preliminary conference and
after which ordered them to submit their respective position
papers. However respondent did not submit a position paper
but instead submitted a Manifestation11 stating that the
administrative aspect of the complaint was likewise the subject
of a complaint filed by complainant before the Office of the
Regional Director, Department of Education, Regional Office 8
of Palo Leyte. As a result, the Ombudsman finds resp PEDRO
DELIJERO, JR. guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL from public service, forfeiture of all
benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Respondent then appealed to the CA with the latter ruling in
favor of respondent Delijero Jr. on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over Delijero as Republic Act
No. 4670 (RA 4670), the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative
proceedings involving public school teachers. Petitioner
Ombudsman should have therefore immediately dismissed the
case after respondent had informed it, through a manifestation,
of the pendency of an administrative complaint before the
DECS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON there was due process.
RULING:
Yes. Under the Constitution and the law, the Ombudsman has
the full administrative disciplinary power over public officials
and employees except those impeachable officials. However,
when an administrative charge is initiated against
a public school teacher, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers specifically provides that
Administrative charges against a teacher shall
be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding Schools Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who should at least have the rank of
a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representativeof the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or
national teachers organization and a supervisor of theDivision,
the last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findingsand
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty
days from termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That
where the school superintendent is the complainant or an
interested party, all the members of the committee shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Education.
Significantly, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989
directs that the petitioner "may refer certain complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate
administrative proceedings against erring public officers or
employees." Hence under the circumstances it would have
been more prudent for petitioner to have referred the complaint
to the DECS given that it would have been in a better position
to serve the interest of justice considering the nature of the
controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is
covered by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the
DECS would have been the more appropriate venue to resolve
the dispute.
Be that as it may, the foregoing does not mean that the
proceedings in the Ombudsman is null and void by reasons of
estoppel.
In Medrano, this Court ruled that while petitioner should have
desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against
respondent and referred it to the proper DepEd committee,
given that it had already concluded the proceedings and had
rendered a decision thereon, respondent is now barred from
assailing petitioners acts under the principle of estoppel. He
had actively participated in the administrative proceedings
before petitioner. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked petitioner
for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the
administrative complaint allegedly for being baseless. From
then on, he was assisted by counsel in filing several motions.
When he was preventively suspended for six months without
pay, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that "a new
Order be issued reversing or setting aside the preventive
suspension Order." When this was denied, he again filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for the lifting of his
suspension since he was already replaced as OIC, which
motion was granted. It was only after petitioner had rendered
an adverse Decision that he, in a Motion for Reconsideration,
impugned petitioners assumption of jurisdiction over his case.
Verily, respondent cannot be permitted to challenge petitioners
acts belatedly. (Underscoring supplied). Likewise, in Office of
the Ombudsman v. Galicia,22 this Court ruled that the right to
due process was not violated, notwithstanding that the DECS
had original jurisdiction to hear the complaint, thus:
In the present case, records show that Galicia was given the
right to due process in the investigation of the charges against
him. He participated in the proceedings by making known his
defenses in the pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a
decision adverse to him was rendered did he question the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We rule that it is
now too late for Galicia to assail the administrative investigation
conducted and the decision rendered against him.
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. During the
proceedings before the Ombudsman, Galicia filed a Counter-
Affidavit, Rejoinder-Affidavit, Comment on the Certification of
the CCPC Registrar, and a Rejoinder to Reply. He also
submitted documents in support of his contentions. Likewise,
there is no indication that the proceedings were done in a
manner that would prevent him from presenting his defenses.
Verily, these suffice to satisfy the requirements of due process
because the opportunity to be heard especially in administrative
proceedings (where technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied) is not limited to oral arguments. More
often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings
that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses.
In sum, We reiterate that it is the School Superintendent and
not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over administrative
cases against public school teachers. Yet, Galicia is estopped
from belatedly assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. His
right to due process was satisfied when he participated fully in
the investigation proceedings. He was able to present evidence
and arguments in his defense. The investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman was therefore valid.
20. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN -versus- MASING and
TAYACTAC
FACTS: Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City
Integrated Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City.
Tayactac was an office clerk in the same school. Respondents
were administratively charged before the Office of the
Ombudsman for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing
to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds. The
complainants were parents of children studying at the DCISS.
The Ombudsman, after investigation rendered judgement
against respondents. However, on appeal before the CA, the
appellate court reversed the Ombudsman's decision. It is the
contention of the respondents that the findings of the
Ombudsman are mere recommendations, and that it may not
directly impose administrative sanctions on public officials and
employees.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may directly discipline public
school teachers and employees. Yes.
HELD: The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints
filed against public officers and employees is explicit in Article
XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. He is vested with
broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. The
Ombudsmans' order to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely
advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.
Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however,
to be coursed through the proper officer.
Anent Masing's contention that she may be administratively
dealt with only by following the procedure prescribed under The
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the Court ruled that it
is erroneous for her to contend that The Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on
the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an
exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving
them. The Court ruled that the authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond
cavil, as it is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI
of the Constitution as the principal and primary complaints
and action center against erring public officers and
employees.
21. PADUA vs RANADA
FACTS: The focal point upon which these two consolidated
cases converge is whether the Resolution issued by the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB), authorizing provisional toll rate
adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway is valid.
The resolution was issued by TRB as answer on the petition of
Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation, as an investor and/or
the operator because of significant currency devaluation, which
in turn, according to CITRA, necessitates the need for the
increase of the toll rates to meet the loan obligations of the
Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.
Petitioners Padua and Zialcita, as toll payer and taxpayer,
assail the validity and legality of TRB Resolution before the
court. Private respondent CITRA, with the OSG, counter that
the TRB has primary administrative jurisdiction over all matters
relating to toll rates.
ISSUE: WON Toll Regulatory Board could authorize the
provisional toll rate adjustments.
RULING: Yes. The TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any
petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing,
provisional authority to collect, pending hearing and decision on
the merits of the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or
such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion
provisionally grant.
An administrative agency may be empowered to approve
provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of
public utilities without a hearing.
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the cardinal
requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, one
of which is that "the tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate."
Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate was rendered
precisely to ensure that in cases where the hearing or reception
of evidence is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency
shall not merely rely on his recommendation but instead shall
personally weigh and assess the evidence which said
subordinate has gathered."
Be that as it may, we must stress that the TRBs authority to
grant provisional toll rate adjustments does not require the
conduct of a hearing. Pertinent laws and jurisprudence support
this conclusion.
22. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioners,
vs.
PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and
IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN, Respondents.
Facts: On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-NCR]
employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident
Ombudsman against respondents for alleged anomalous
purchase of medical supplies.
On October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary, Torres issued
AO 298 creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the
administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The
said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against
Graft and Corruption.
The PCAGC issued a resolution and found the respondents
guilty. The said resolution was indorsed to President Ramos,
who also found respondents guilty and issued AO 390, which
remanded the records of the case to the Secretary of DOH for
appropriate action.
The Secretary of Health issued an Order, relying on the
resolution rendered by the PCAGC, dismissed respondents.
The respondent filed an appeal before the CSC but was denied.
They then brought the matter to the CA. The appellate court
held that in simply and completely relying on the PCAGCs
findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with
administrative due process.
Issue: WON respondents were denied of their right to due
process.
Ruling: Yes.
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries
with the authority to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the
formers jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary
authority over respondents.
The health secretary has the competence and the authority to
decide what action should be taken against officials and
employees who have been administratively charged and
investigated. However, the actual exercise of the disciplining
authoritys prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure
to comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision.
The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on
an investigators recommendation, but must personally weigh
and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts,
because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the
livelihood of the person administratively charged.
The Presidents endorsement of the records of the case for the
"appropriate action" of the health secretary did not constitute a
directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. The
decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual
finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and
thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.
Being violative of administrative due process, the Orders of the
health secretary were annulled and set aside. The records of
the case was then remanded to the Department of Health, so
that the proper steps be taken to correct the due-process
errors.
23. MALINAO VS. REYES
Petitioner Malinao is Human Resource Manager of Marinduque.
Respondent Mayor filed a case against her in the Office of the
Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and
incompetence. While the case was pending, he appointed a
replacement for petitioner.
The petitioner filed an administrative case against respondent
Mayor in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque,
charging him with abuse of authority and denial of due process.
The case was taken up in executive session of the Sanggunian.
The transcript of stenographic notes of the session shows that
the Sanggunian, by the vote of 5 to 3 of its members, found
respondent Mayor guilty of the charge and imposed on him the
penalty of one-month suspension.
The result of the voting was subsequently embodied in a
"Decision" signed by only one member of the Sanggunian, who
did so as "Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan."
On September 14, 1994, respondent Mayor filed a
manifestation before the Sanggunian, questioning the
"Decision" on the ground that it was signed by Sotto alone,
"apparently acting in his capacity and designated as "Presiding
Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan." He contended that because of this the decision
could only be considered as a recommendation of the Blue
Ribbon Committee and he was not bound thereby.
On September 13, 1994, respondent Mayor sought the opinion
of the Secretary of the DILG regarding the validity of the
"Decision."
DILG Secretary alluded that it does not appear to be in
accordance with Section 66 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and settled jurisprudence".
On the other hand, petitioner sent a letter to respondent
Governor Reyes, demanding that the "Decision" suspending
respondent Mayor from office be implemented without further
delay but respondent Governor agreed with the opinion of the
DILG for which reason he could not implement the "Decision" in
question.
On October 21, 1994, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted
respondent Mayor of the charges against him. The vote was
embodied in a Decision of the same date, which was signed by
all members who had thus voted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the Sanggunian voting for the
acquittal valid?
RULING: YES.
Under Section 6 of the LGC it requires that the decision shall be
in writing, stating clearly and distinctly the factual findings and
the reasons for such conclusion reached.
If there was a deliberation and voting but without the decision
signed by the members of the Sanggunian, the members of the
Sanggunian can still make a different ruling. So long as there is
no affirmation of the decision, they can still change their votes.
In the instant case, the first decision rendered by the
Sanggunian voting for the administrative sanctions against the
mayor is not valid on the ground that it was not in compliance
with the law. Thus, the subsequent decision voting for the
acquittal, signed and made in writing is valid.
24. GARCIA vs MOLINA and VELASCO
FACTS: The present case involves a case of grave
misconduct filed by petitioner Garcia as the president of GSIS
against respondents Molina and Velasco as lawyers of GSIS.
Respondents aver here that they were not accorded with due
process for the lack of the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. Petitioner, on the other hand, avers that he has
the power to discipline petitioners under the GSIS Law and that
the lack of preliminary investigation does not make his decision
null and void.
ISSUE: WON there was the observance of due process in the
handling of the instant administrative case?
HELD: The SC held in the negative.
It is true that under the GSIS law, petitioner, as President and
General Manager of GSIS, is vested the authority and
responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS
personnel for cause. However, despite the authority conferred
on him by law, such power is not without limitations for it must
be exercised in accordance with Civil Service rules.
The CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal
charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and
void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the
disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to
submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three
days from receipt. The use of the word shall quite obviously
indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation or at least respondent
should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his
side. As can be gleaned from the procedure set forth above,
this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the
comment required therein is different from the answer that may
later be filed by respondents.
In the case at hand, the filing by petitioner of formal charges
against the respondents without complying with the mandated
preliminary investigation or at least give the respondents the
opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due
process. Hence, the formal charges are void ab initio and may
be assailed directly or indirectly at any time.
Therefore, as the administrative proceedings involved in this
case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to
respondents and the preventive suspension meted them is
baseless. Consequently, respondents should be awarded their
salaries during the period of their unjustified suspension.
25. CRUZ AND PAITIM VS CSC
FACTS: A Formal Charge for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
signed by the Director IV of the CSC Regional Office was filed
against Gilda Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim with the CSC. It was
alleged that Paitim, a Municipal Treasurer, falsely pretended to
be the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-employee in the said office,
and took the CSC Sub-professional examinations for the latter.
Records revealed that the picture of Cruz pasted in the Picture
Seat Plan of the said examination bears no resemblance to the
pictures of Cruz as appearing in the picture seat plans of the
said CSC Sub-prof examination.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a
general denial of the material averments of the Formal Charge.
They also declared that they were electing a formal
investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a
Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue,
they will be deprived of their right to due process because the
CSC was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at
the same time. However, the Motion to Dismiss was denied so
was the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Dulce J. Cochon, Attorney III of the CSC conduct the formal
administrative investigation of petitioners' case and, later,
issued an Investigation Report and Recommendation finding
the Petitioners guilty of Dishonesty and ordering their dismissal
from the government service.
The aforesaid Investigation Report and Recommendation was
then forwarded, to the CSC for its consideration and resolution,
which thereafter, the CSC found the petitioners guilty of the
charges and ordered their dismissal from the government
service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners' constitutional right to
due process was violated since the respondent commission
acted as the investigator, the complainant, the prosecutor, and
the judge, all at the same time, against petitioners.
RULING: No, the petitioners were not denied of their right to
due process.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case
instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal
including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it
pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987.
The fact that the CSC itself filed the complaint does not mean
that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative
body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual
findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in
their field, are binding on the Supreme Court.
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the petitioners were
formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for
dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of
the charges and submitted an Answer and were given the
opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners cannot, therefore,
claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the
case.
26. WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and
General Manager of GSIS,
- versus -
MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M. VELASCO,
Facts:
1. Respondents Molina and Velasco both held the
position of Attorney V in GSIS.
2. They received two separate memoranda from Garcia,
the GSIS President, charging them with grave
misconduct, particularly connected with their acts in
leading concerted protest activities and/or assemblies
of GSIS employees against the GSIS President. They
were also preventively suspended for 90 days without
pay, effective immediately.
3. The CA nullified the formal charges against
respondents for the lack of preliminary investigation.
Issue: Whether or not the formal charges against respondents
are null and void.
Held: Yes.
According to the GSIS Act, petitioner, as President and General
Manager of GSIS, is vested the authority and responsibility to
remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for
cause.
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such
power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in
accordance with Civil Service rules. The Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lays down the
procedure to be observed in issuing a formal charge against an
erring employee.
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a
formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is
null and void. However, upon receipt of a complaint which is
sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall
require the person complained of to submit a Counter-
Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.
The use of the word "shall" quite obviously indicates that it is
mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least respondent should be given the
opportunity to comment and explain his side. This is done prior
to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required
therein is different from the answer that may later be filed by
respondents. Contrary to petitioner claim, no exception is
provided for in the CSC Rules.
Not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority
himself, as in the present case. To comply with such
requirement, he could have issued a memorandum requiring
respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal
charges. With respondents comments, petitioner would have
properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making
a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against
respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal
charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the
administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place
the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears,
therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole
determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that
there was a prima facie case against respondents.
27) CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, Petitioner, vs. RANULFO P. ALBAO, Respondent.
FACTS:
The Office of the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines issued an original and permanent appointment for
the position of Executive Assistant IV to respondent Ranulfo P.
Albao. Respondent was then a contractual employee at said
Office.
In a letter addressed to the Director of the CSC (Manila), the
Office of the VP requested the retrieval of the said appointment
paper. Instead of heeding the request, petitioner CSC-NCR
disapproved the appointment. Petitioner issued an Order
holding that it has found that a prima facie case exists against
respondent Albao for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official
Documents (PRC license).
Respondent Albao filed an "Urgent Motion to Resolve" the
issue of whether or not the Civil Service Commission has
original jurisdiction over the administrative case. Respondent
contended that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the
same for the reasons that (1) The permanent appointment
issued to him never became effective, even if it was later
disapproved, because he never assumed such position in the
first place and moreover, he is already out of government
service since he resigned from his position; (2) As he is no
longer with the civil service, the Commission has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over him as a private person.
ISSUE: W/N the CSC has original jurisdiction to institute
the instant administrative case against respondent Albao.
HELD: YES.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. Republic v. Court of Appeals also
enunciated that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts
and administrative agencies.
Section 12, Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292 enumerates the
powers and functions of the Civil Service Commission, one of
which is its quasi-judicial function under paragraph 11, which
states:
Section 12. Powers and Functions -- The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions: x x x
(11)Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices
and of the agencies attached to it. . . .
Section 47, Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292, on the other
hand, provides, as follows:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. x x x (2) The Secretaries
and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. x x x
Furthermore, Section 48 of said EO provides for the procedure
in administrative cases against non-presidential appointees,
thus:
SEC. 48. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-
Presidential Appointees. - (1) Administrative proceedings may
be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by
the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of
local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or
upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.
Respondent Albao was a contractual employee in the Office of
the Vice President before his appointment to a permanent
position, which appointment was, however, requested to be
retrieved by the Office and at the same time disapproved by the
CSC. Pursuant to Section 47 (1), (2) and Section 48 above, it is
the Vice President, as head of office, who is vested with
jurisdiction to commence disciplinary action against respondent
Albao.
Nevertheless, this Court does not agree that petitioner is
helpless to act directly and motu proprio, on the alleged acts of
dishonesty and falsification of official document committed by
respondent in connection with his appointment to a permanent
position in the Office of the Vice President.
It is true that Section 47 (2) of said EO gives the heads of
government offices original disciplinary jurisdiction over their
own subordinates. Their decisions shall be final in case the
penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. It is only
when the penalty imposed exceeds the aforementioned
penalties that an appeal may be brought before the Civil
Service Commission which has appellate jurisdiction over the
same in accordance with Section 47 (1) of said EO, thus:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.(1) The Commission shall
decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. . . .
The present case, however, partakes of an act by petitioner to
protect the integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall
under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls
under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative
cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system and
protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the
Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who
falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from
ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member
of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of
the law or the rules of the service.
28. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. vs. CA
Facts: In a certain mining case, Director Gozon issued an order
wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners
Zambales which sought for their declaration as the sole, rightful
and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims
located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. Zambales then appealed said
order to the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources.
While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and instead of
inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal affirming his own
decision. Therefore, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon's
decision which after hearing the lower court issued a ruling
sustaining Guzons decision. It held that the disqualification
petition to of a judge to review his own decision or ruling
provided under Rule 137 Section 1 does not apply to
administrative bodies.
ISSUE: WON Guzon as Secretary of the Agriculture and
Natural Resources may validly review his prior decision as
Director of Mines.
RULING:
No. Guzon may not review his own decision when he was still
the Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his
own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of
administrative justice.
Sec 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 13-i or the Mining Law
provides that conflicts and disputes arising out of mining
locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for
decision: Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of
Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources within thirty days from the date of its receipt.
In case any one of the parties should disagree from the
decision or order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to
the court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days from the
receipt of such decision or order; otherwise the said decision or
order shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned. (As
amended by Republic Act No. 746 approved on June
18,1952).*
Undoubtedly, the provision of section 61 that the decision of the
Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the
Secretary should be a person different from the Director of
Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The decision of the
reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be
the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case. That is the obvious,
elementary reason behind the disqualification of a trial judge,
who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case
wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1,
Rule 137, Rules of Court: secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law).
A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things
should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own
decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his
undersecretary to undertake the review. Zambales therefore is
deprived of its administrative due process or fundamental
fairness when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as
Director of Mines. WHEREFORE, we set aside the order of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and ordered
the return of the case to the Minister of Natural Resources.
29. MIGUEL SINGSON vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and PAL
FACTS: Singson was an employee of PAL. His duty consisted
of checking in passengers and baggage for a particular flight. A
certain Ms. Kondo lodged a complaint alleging that Singson
required her to pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage
without issuing any receipt. Singson was administratively
charged and investigated by a committee formed by private
respondent PAL. Upon the recommendation of the committee,
PAL dismissed Singson from the service. Singson lodged a
complaint against PAL before the NLRC for illegal dismissal,
attorney's fees and damages. Labor Arbiter Aquino declared his
dismissal illegal and ordered his reinstatement with backwages.
On appeal by PAL to the Second Division of NLRC, Aquino as
presiding commissioner, reversed his previous decision as
the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: WON Singson was denied due process. Yes.
HELD: Singson was denied due process when Commissioner
Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the Second
Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL's appeal. He was
reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. The
composition of the Division guarantees equal representation
and impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled
to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right
from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino
can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who
decided the case under review. He should have inhibited
himself from any participation in this case.
The right of Singson to an impartial review of his appeal starts
from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an
impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review
of three commissioners. The denial of his right to an impartial
review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his
right to due process.
30. TEJANO vs OMBUDSMAN & SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The instant petition stemmed from the report of
Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident Auditor on his
investigation regarding an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the
amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision
(V&G).
The report of Resident Auditor implicated Vice President
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer
Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane Rita
Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela
Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons involved in the
irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds.
In a resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton
recommended the filing of the proper information for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against Tejano, Juana
dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G. The case against
Montesa and Jecong was dismissed for lack of evidence. The
resolution was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
Arturo C. Mojica and then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
Tejano filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a
Period of Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation which the
Sandiganbayan granted. Tejano filed his motion for
reinvestigation in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
conduct the reinvestigation.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner
Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz, Special
Prosecutor Micael, in a memorandum, recommended the
dismissal of the case. The recommendation was approved by
Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in
by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who
earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as
Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the
dismissal of the case with the marginal note "assign the case to
another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively."
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman acted in grave abuse of
discretion in disapproving the dismissal of the case where he
had earlier participated in the preliminary investigation
RULING: Yes. Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed
grave abuse of discretion. Tejano attributes partiality on the part
of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he
earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the
same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the
recommendation for the filing of the information before the
Sandiganbayan.
We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have ruled that
the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the
same person whose decision is under review.
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the
instant case and having recommended the filing of appropriate
information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse
himself from participating in the review of the same during the
reinvestigation.
31. Republic vs Extelcom
Facts: On December 29, 1992, Bayantel filed an application
with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a
Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to
install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority
(PA).
Shortly thereafter, or on January 22, 1993, the NTC
issued a memorandum directing all interested applicants to file
their respective applications before the Commission on or
before February 15, 1993.
Bayantel filed a motion to amend its application.
Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended
application. But before Bayantel could complete the
presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order which
granted Provisional Authorities to two other applicants which
resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies. Thus it
archived Bayantels application.
Upon the availability of new frequencies, Bayantel filed
a motion to revive its archived application. The NTC granted a
PA in favor of Bayantel applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should
have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office
of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993.
These Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;"
accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon
filing of the proper motion before the Commission.
In answer to this argument, the NTC, issued a
certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised
Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general
circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. The
absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the
Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still
governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of
the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993
Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February
3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative
Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the
UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force
and effect.
Issue: (1) WON NTC should have applied the 1993 Revised
Rules;
(2) Won Extelcoms right to procedural due process was
violated upon the revival of Bayantels application
Ruling: (1) The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC,
which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act (C.A.
146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of these laws,
as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera:
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation.
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself
mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the
absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that
governs.
In any event, regardless of whether the 1978 Rules or
the 1993 Revised Rules should apply, the records show that
the amended application filed by Bayantel in fact included a
motion for the issuance of a provisional authority. Hence, it
cannot be said that the NTC granted the provisional
authority motu proprio.
(2) The Court of Appeals ruled that there was a violation of the
fundamental right of Extelcom to due process when it was not
afforded the opportunity to question the motion for the revival of
the application.
However, it must be noted that said Order referred to a
simple revival of the archived application of Bayantel. At this
stage, it cannot be said that Extelcom's right to procedural due
process was prejudiced. It will still have the opportunity to be
heard during the full-blown adversarial hearings that will follow.
In fact, the records show that the NTC has scheduled several
hearing dates for this purpose, at which all interested parties
shall be allowed to register their opposition.
The SC ruled that there is no denial of due process
where full-blown adversarial proceedings are conducted before
an administrative body. With Extelcom having fully participated
in the proceedings, and indeed, given the opportunity to file its
opposition to the application, there was clearly no denial of its
right to due process.
32. CSC VS. LUCAS
Raquel P. Linatok, an employee of Department of Agriculture,
filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint
against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same
agency, for misconduct.
Raquel described the incident that while standing before a
mirror, near the office door of Jose J. Lucas, Raquel noticed a
chair at her right side which Mr. Jose Lucas, at that very instant
used to sit upon. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for his
shoe. At that moment she felt Mr. Lucas' hand touching her
thigh and running down his palm up to her ankle. She was
shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and admonished him
not to do it again or she will kick him. But Lucas touched her
again and so she hit Mr. Lucas. Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at
her saying "lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka nang
papasok dito kahit kailan" A verbal exchange then ensued and
respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by the arm and shoved her
towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands
protected her face from smashing upon the door.
Before the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, respondent Lucas
submitted a letter denying the charges. According to Lucas, he
did not touch the thigh of complainant what transpired was that
he accidentally brushed Linatok's leg when he reached for his
shoes. A resolution finding respondent guilty of simple
misconduct and recommending a penalty of suspension for one
(1) month and one (1) day.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). A resolution finding respondent guilty of
grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal
from the service.
The Court of Appeals, setting aside the resolution of the CSC
and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA and further ruled
that "a basic requirement of due process on the other hand is
that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him
(Felicito Sajonas vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 183
SCRA 182). In the instant case however, Lucas came to know
of the modification of the charge against him only when he
received notice of the resolution dismissing him from the
service.
Hence, this petition
ISSUES: Whether respondent Lucas was denied due process
when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a
charge of simple misconduct? YES; and whether the act
complained of constitutes grave misconduct? NO.
RULING:
As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing
guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave
misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service
Commission, we held that "in grave misconduct as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest, 10 which is obviously lacking
in respondent's case. Respondent maintains that as he was
charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his
right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct.
We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic
requirement of due process is that a person must be duly
informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person can
not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due
process in investigations and hearings.
The right to substantive and procedural due process is
applicable in administrative proceedings.
Of course, we do not in any way condone respondent's act.
Even in jest, he had no right to touch complainant's leg.
However, under the circumstances, such act is not constitutive
of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that respondent
was maliciously motivated. We note that respondent has been
in the service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense.
33. LACSON vs PHIL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION
FACTS: Petitioners herein are officers of the Phil. Estate
Authority (PEA) who were investigated by the respondent
PAGC in connection with the charge of dishonesty and grave
misconduct against them for the alleged overpricing of a certain
project. The PAGC found them guilty and recommended their
dismissal which the Office of the President approved. They later
sought for its reconsideration to the CA which was however
denied. Thus, this present petition.
Petitioners herein argue that because they are not presidential
appointees, it is only the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction
over them.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the exclusive jurisdiction
over the case and WON the court can still review their
dismissal? WON petitioners were denied of due process?
HELD: No to both issues.
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the other
similarly authorized agencies.
Having been dismissed by PEA, petitioners should have
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. It is only after
appealing the case to the CSC that it can be elevated to the CA
via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
From there, said case can be appealed to the Court through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Unfortunately, petitioners chose the wrong remedy. Instead of
appealing their dismissal by the PEA to the CSC, they chose to
question it before the CA.
For their failure to appeal to the proper forum, the decision of
the PEA dismissing them has become final and executory. It
should be emphasized that the right to appeal is a statutory
right and the party who seeks to avail himself of the same must
comply with the requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the
right to appeal is lost.
Anent the alleged failure of respondents to observe due
process, well-established is the rule that the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have
in support of his defense. The demands of due process are
sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered as in this present case
whereby they fully participated in the investigation done by the
PAGC.
34. RUVIVAR VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND DR.
BERNARDO
FACTS: Private respondent filed an Affidavit-Complaint
charging the petitioner before the Ombudsman of serious
misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a public official, abuse of
authority, and violations of the Revised Penal Code and of the
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The private respondent stated
in her complaint that she is the President of the Association of
Drug Testing Centers (Association) that conducts drug testing
and medical examination of applicants for drivers license. In
this capacity, she went to the LTO to meet with representatives
from the DOTC and to file a copy of the Associations request to
lift the moratorium imposed by the LTO on the accreditation of
drug testing clinics. Before proceeding to the Commissioner of
the LTO for these purposes, she passed by the office of the
petitioner to conduct a follow up on the status of her companys
application for accreditation. While there, the petitioner, without
provocation or any justifiable reason and in the presence of
other LTO employees and visitors, shouted at her in a very
arrogant and insulting manner, hurled invectives upon her
person, and prevented her from entering the office of the LTO
Commissioner. In Petitioners Counter-Affidavit, she denied the
private respondent's allegations. Thereafter, the Ombudsman
called for a preliminary conference that the parties attended
which he rendered the decision finding the petitioner
administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official
functions and imposed on her the penalty of reprimand.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the proper and
only available remedy when the penalty imposed in an
administrative complaint with the office of the ombudsman is
considered final and unappealable.
RULING: Yes, the petition for certiorari is proper.
In the case of Lopez v. CA and Herrera v. Bohol, the recognized
that no appeal is allowed in administrative cases where the
penalty of public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, is
imposed. The SC pointed out that decisions of administrative
agencies that are declared by law to be final and unappealable
are still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion; the
complainants legal recourse is to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, applied as
rules suppletory to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The use of this recourse should take into account
the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
i.e., the petition shall be filed in and be cognizable only by the
CA if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or by the Rules.
In the present case, the Ombudsmans decision and order
imposing the penalty of reprimand on the petitioner are final
and unappealable. Thus, the petitioner availed of the correct
remedy when she filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to
question the Ombudsmans decision to reprimand her.
35. FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA
FACTS:
1. a letter-complaint was filed with CHED against Florian
Gaoiran (petitioner), Head Teacher III in the High
School Department of the Angadanan Agro-Industrial
College (AAIC), a state- supervised school in
Angadanan, Isabela.
2. Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II of the
same school, charged petitioner of mauling him while
he was performing his duties. Appended to the letter-
complaint were the verified criminal complaint filed by
Castillejo against petitioner and the sworn statements
of his witnesses.
3. The criminal complaint for assault to a person in
authority was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Angadanan-San Guillermo.
4. The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs
Service of the CHED. Atty. Felina S. Dasig, then OIC of
the Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs Service,
conducted a fact-finding investigation on the mauling
incident. After the fact-finding investigation was
terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie case
against the petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig
issued the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive
Suspension dated July 27, 1998.
5. The petitioner did not submit his written counter-
affidavit or answer to the charges against him. Instead,
he filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20,
a petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain
enforcement of the preventive suspension order.
Having served the suspension, the case was dismissed
for being moot and academic. Petitioner then
sought reconsideration of the formal charge and
preventive suspension order, contending that the letter-
complaint was not under oath and that he was not
informed nor apprised of the complaint against him.
6. Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director
of the Legal Affairs Service of CHED, issued a
Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the
administrative complaint against the petitioner on the
ground that the letter-complaint was not under oath.
However, Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of
CHED, unaware of the existence of Mayos resolution,
issued another Resolution dated June 3, 1999, finding
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner
was dismissed form service.
7. Petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela,
Branch 20, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
 injunction. He alleged grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Alcala in issuing the Resolution despite that a
previous Resolution already dismissed the
administrative complaint against him. The RTC sided
with the petitioner and declared the Resolution of
Alcala null and void.
8. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
of RTC. It declared as valid Alcalas Resolution.
9. Hence, this petition for review.
10. The petitioner continuously argued that the letter-
complaint is inexistent because it was not made under
oath and does not contain a certification of non-forum
shopping. Petitioner cites Section 2, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292
and Section 4(d) of Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 94-0521 (Uniform Rules of Procedure in
the Conduct of Administrative Legislation). Hence, the
formal charge and order of preventive suspension
stemming from it is likewise null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter-complaint should be deemed
inexistent as it was not made under oath.
HELD: NO
The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent
provisions governing the initiation of administrative
complaints against civil service officials or employees are
provided in Book V of EO No. 292, Sections 46 (c) and 48 (1)
and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A. It must be pointed out that, while
the letter-complaint was not verified, appended thereto were the
verified criminal complaint that Castillejo filed against the
petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses.
These documents could very well be considered as constituting
the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through
the Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of,
not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed
against court employees or officials for violations of the Code of
Ethical Conduct. It is not totally uncommon that a government is
given wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative
powers. Administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
In any case, the letter-complaint of Castillejo is not a
complaint within the meaning of the provisions cited. The
letter-complaint did not by itself commence the administrative
proceedings against the petitioner. It merely triggered a fact-
finding investigation by CHED. The Court cannot uphold the
petitioners contention as it would result to an absurd and
restrictive interpretation of EO No. 292. It was the formal charge
and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig that
constituted the complaint. Atty. Dasig signed the formal charge
in her capacity as the OIC. As the complaint was initiated by the
appropriate disciplining authority under EO
No. 292, the same need not be subscribed and sworn to.
Neither is it required that the same contain a
verification of non-forum shopping. Jurisdiction was properly
acquired over the case.
Petition is denied
36) CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM
(MWSS),petitioners,
vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND
MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE LARGE DIAMETER
PRESSURE PIPE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
(PLDPPMA), respondents.
FACTS:
The Ombudsman directed the Board of Trustees of MWSS to
set aside the recommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee for Construction Services and Technical
Equipment (PBAC-CSTE) that Contract be given to a contractor
offering fiberglass pipes and instead award the contract to a
complying and responsive bidder pursuant to the provisions of
PD 1594. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Ombudsman. The Order are now sought to be
annulled in this petition for certiorari, with prayer for preliminary
injunction or a restraining order, by petitioners led by its former
Administrator Teofilo I. Asuncion.
((MWSS focused its attention to the Distribution
System Phase of the Angat Water Supply optimization
(AWSOP). The projects were denominated Projects
APM-01 and APM-02 which consist of the
construction of the Distribution System Phase of the
AWSOP, that would particularly call for the supply of
labor, materials and equipment, and of the installation
of new watermains, comprising of fittings, valves and
pipes of different sizes. MWSS caused the publication
in two (2) leading newspapers of an "Invitation for Pre-
qualification and Bids" for Projects were opened for
international competitive bidding, copies of the
"Invitation for pre-qualification and Bids" were sent to
the respective embassies and trade missions of
member countries of the Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund (OECF). There was bidding and
only 3 lowest bidders remains for evaluation and the
Acting Chairman Eduardo M. del Fierro recommended
that no rebidding should be undertaken and that an
award should be made to either the lowest (F.F. Cruz
& Co., Inc.). Private respondent PLDPPMA filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS
for Projects APM-01 and APM-02, detailing charges of
an "apparent plan" on the part of the MWSS to favor
suppliers of fiberglass pipes (long history of failures),
and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation thereon and to hold in abeyance the
award of the contracts.))
ISSUE: W/N the rudiments of due process have been
properly observed in the issuance of the orders of the
Ombudsman.
HELD: YES.
The records of this case shows that petitioners have been
amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. Petitioners were
asked to comment on the letter-complaint of PLDPPMA. The
they moved for an extension of time within which to comment
and thereafter, they filed their letter-comment. Responding to
the reply of PLDPPMA, petitioners later filed a rejoinder. When
an adverse order was rendered against them, petitioners
moved for its reconsideration, albeit to no avail.
The absence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One
may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than
oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense.
((On the threshold matter that puts to issue the Ombudsman's
directive to the Board of Trustees of MWSS to set aside the
recommendation of the PBAC CSTE to award Contract to
the lowest complying bid, we find, this time, the petition to be
impressed with merit.
To begin with, the owners, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the following
headings: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public
Assistance Functions; Authority to Inquire and Obtain
Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement
Preventive Measures. The particular aspect of its functions that,
however, really finds relevance to the present case relates to its
investigatory power and public assistance duties which can be
found in the first and second paragraphs, respectively, of
Section 13, Article XI, of the Constitution, along with the
corresponding provisions of the Ombudsman Act. It would
seem to us that the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the
challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction
over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of discretion by, the
Board of Trustees of MWSS. The Order is more of an undue
interference in the adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS
Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the
proper observance of and compliance with law. The MWSS, a
GOCC created by law through R.A. 6234, is charged with the
construction, maintenance and operation of waterwork system
to insure an uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution
of potable water. It is the agency that should be in the best
position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the
bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its
development plans. The exercise of this discretion is a policy
decision that necessitates among other things, prior inquiry,
investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation
matters that can best be discharged by it. MWSS has passed
resolution No. 32-93 45 to likewise show its approval of the
technical specifications for fiberglass. All these should deserve
weight.
In Razon Inc. v. PPA, we have said that neither this Court nor
Congress, and now perhaps the Ombudsman, could be
expected to have the time and technical expertise to look into
matters of this nature. While we cannot go so far as to say that
MWSS would have the monopoly of technical know-how in the
waterworks system, by the very nature of its functions,
however, it obviously must enjoy an advantage over other
agencies on the subject at hand.
In a long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.
It stands to reason for, in Bureau Veritas v. Office of the
President, we have further observed:
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award
contracts is vested in the Government agencies
entrusted with that function. The discretion given to
the authorities on this matter is of such wide latitude
that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is
apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent
award.))
37. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR.
EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR.
ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR.
OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN
PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHU
LAMBINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM
MARGARET CELINE,
FACTS: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret
Celine is a citizen of India and enrolled in the doctoral program
in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of
Social Sciences and Philosophy. Subsequently, she graduated
and was issued with a Doctorate Degree in philosophy. In a
letter to the Dean of the Colloge of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP), Dr. Medina formally charged private
respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the
doctorate granted to her be withdrawn . Respondent was
informed of such charged or accusation. An ad hoc committee
was formed and after thorough investigation, it was reported
that they found at least 90 instances or portions in the thesis
which were lifted from sources without due acknowledgement.
The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the
recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate
degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University
Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and
endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents
following the same. Meanwhile, in a letter, the U.P. Diliman
Chancellor summoned respondent to a meeting on the same
day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the
charges against her. During the meeting, the respondent was
informed of the charges against her and provided her a copy of
the findings of the investigating committee. Respondent
submitted her written explanation. Another meeting was held to
discuss respondents answer to her charges. Another third
meeting was scheduled which however respondent did not
attend alleging that the Board of Regents had already decided
her case before she could be fully heard. Later the Chancellor
issued Administrative Order No. 94-94 constituting a special
committee known as the Zafaralla committee composed of
senior faculty members from the U.P. units outside Diliman.
The Zafaralla committee recommended the withdrawal of
respondents doctorate degree. Resultingly, the Board of
Regents withdrew said degree of respondent and barred the
respondent from future admission to the University as either a
student or an employee. Hence, private respondent filed a
petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction with damages before the RTC of Quezon City against
petitioner alleging unlawful withdrawal of her degree by the
petitioner without affording her due process of law.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was not afforded due process.
RULING: No. Petitioner was afforded due process.
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, various
committees had been formed to investigate the charge that
private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the
investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if
any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before
private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that
there were too many committee and individual investigations
conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private
respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral
dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D.
degree.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or
a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.27 A party who has availed of the opportunity to
present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied
due process. In this case, private respondent was informed in
writing of the charges against her29 and afforded opportunities
to refute them. She was asked to submit her written
explanation, which she forwarded on September 25,
1993.30Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor
and the members of the committee to discuss her case. In
addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position.31
As to the respondents contention that she is entitled for an
audience before the Board of Regents, the same is not
meritorious as due process in an administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts
of justice.32 It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require
the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items
on the agenda of the Board of Regents.
As to the respondents contention that she was entitled to be
furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla Committee as
part of due process, the same hold no water. To be furnished of
copy of the said report is not fatal to respondents due process.
As held by the Court in the case of Ateneo de Manila v.
Capulong students may not use the argument that since they
were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the
written statements which became the basis of petitioners'
February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due
process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the
same may not be said to detract from the observance of due
process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students'
participation in an activity such as the case at bar need not be
clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
Therefore respondents cannot be said to have been denied to
ones right to due process.
38. NAPOCOR vs NLRC
FACTS: NAPOCOR, as owner of the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant Unit No. I (PNPP-I), entered into an agreement with
private respondents Westinghouse International Projects
Company (Westinghouse) as principal contractor and Power
Contractors Inc. (PCI) as sub-contractor for the construction of
the power plant in Morong, Bataan.
Pursuant to respondent PCI's sub-contract with co-respondent
Westinghouse, over six thousand workers were hired on
various dates to undertake the civil works for the Bataan
Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), as the PNPP-I has become more
commonly known. After the completion of certain phases of
work at the power plant, the services of private respondent
workers were terminated. The dismissed employees did not
receive any separation pay.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance in the cases as counsel for petitioner. Petitioner
and respondents Westinghouse and PCI were held jointly and
severally liable for the adjudged separation pay and money
claims. A copy of the decision was served on petitioner through
the deputized special attorney who received the same on
January 18, 1989. The OSG was not served with a copy of the
Labor Arbiter's decision. The ACCRA Law Office, as counsel for
Westinghouse likewise received a copy of the decision.
The special attorney represented petitioner during the February
10, 1989 hearing on the motion and filed its Opposition thereto
on February 21, 1989. Petitioner's Appeal Memorandum was
filed by the special attorneys only on February 22, 1989.
Respondent workers moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution. The Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying due
course to petitioner's appeal for being filed out of time and
directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The OSG filed a
Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum, questioning the
July 7, 1989 Order on the ground that it was not served a copy
of the Decision.
ISSUE: WON NAPOCOR was deprived of the right to due
process since its lawyer, the OSG, was never served a copy of
the Labor Arbiters decision
RULING: Yes. The fact that the OSG is petitioner's counsel is
unchallenged, the former having entered its appearance. The
lawyer deputized and designated as "special attorney-OSG" is
a mere representative of the OSG and the latter retains
supervision and control over the deputized lawyer.
The OSG continues to be the principal counsel for the National
Power Corporation, and as such, the Solicitor General is the
party entitled to be furnished copies of orders, notices and
decisions. The deputized special attorney has no legal authority
to decide whether or not an appeal should be made.
As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions served on
the deputized counsel, acting as agent or representative of the
Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually
received by the latter. We have likewise consistently held that
the proper basis for computing the reglementary period to file
an appeal and for determining whether a decision had attained
finality is service on the OSG.
In the present controversy, only the special attorney was served
with a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since service of
said decision was never made on the OSG, the period to
appeal the decision to the NLRC did not commence to run.
39. CASE NOT FOUND
40. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
PICK& SHOVEL, INC., ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC. (Joint
Venture), respondents.
Facts: The petitioner Philippine Ports Authority embarked on
the development of the northwest Ground Quadrangle. The
construction of Pier 2 and the rock causeway for the port of San
Fernando, La Union project was awarded to a consortium
composed of the respondents herein. As for the reclamation
project, the respondents offered to complete the said project as
extra work to its existing contract with PPA. The petitioners
General Manager Dayan, issued a Notice of Award of the
project to the respondents. However, when the said contract
was presented to the Board of Directors, it was rejected.
The respondents then filed a Complaint with the
Regional Trial Court for specific performance against the
petitioner, praying that the latter be ordered to execute a
supplemental contract based on the Notice of Award for the
project. The Trial court ruled in favor of respondents.
On February 26, the petitioner, through the
Government Corporate Counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal of the
decision and order of the trial court. The CA dismissed
petitioners appeal for being six days late.
The petitioner argues that while the trial courts
decision and order were served on it through its Legal Services
Department, such service was ineffectual since the OGCC is its
statutory lead counsel. Hence, all copies of the trial courts
orders, as well as its decision, should be served on the
petitioner through the OGCC and not through the Legal
Services Department. The petitioner asserts that since the
OGCC was not served with a copy of the decision of the trial
court, the period for it to appeal the decision had not
commenced; as such, the appeal from the said decision was
made within the reglementary period therefor.
Issue: WON the appeal was filed out of time.
Ruling: Yes.
The petitioners contention that the OGCC was its lead
counsel in the trial court is belied by the records. The records
show that the petitioner was represented in the trial court by the
OGCC in collaboration with its Legal Services Department. The
petitioner, through its General Manager, executed a Special
Power of Attorney appointing the OGCC and its Legal Services
Department, through any of their lawyers, as its counsel, not
only during the pre-trial but throughout the entire proceedings.
Hence, the copies of the orders and decision of the trial court
may be served on the petitioner, either through its Legal
Services Department or through the OGCC. Based on the
admission of the petitioner, it is evident that the copy of the trial
courts decision which was intended for it and served on Atty.
Mancile, was transmitted to the OGCC on the same day. The
admission of the petitioner is conclusive on it and cannot be
contradicted unless there is a showing of a palpable mistake.
In sum, the petitioner failed to perfect its appeal in the manner
and within the period provided for by law.
However, a six-day delay in the perfection of the
appeal, does not warrant the outright dismissal of the appeal.
The Court may exempt a particular case from a strict
application of the rules of procedure. The case was then
remanded to the CA.
41. ALBA VS. NITORREDA
FACTS: Private respondents were among the twenty five (25)
graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of Medical
Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI) in Tagum, Davao who
sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute with the
said school arising from the implementation of certain school
policies. Acting on the request for intervention, petitioner
scheduled a meeting with the students. However, instead of
conferring with the aggrieved students, petitioner instead met
with the Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI-who admittedly
did not even have a previous appointment with petitioner. In
view of this apparent discrimination, the students contacted
respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao who was
impelled to proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner
for not conferring with both parties at the same time in order to
hear both sides of the controversy. Petitioner submitted to the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao (Office of the
Ombudsman), a report on the said conference wherein he
claimed that he had succeeded in facilitating an amicable
settlement between the parties. However, petitioner's claim of
having settled the dispute between the Arriesgados and the
complaining students is belied by private respondents' affidavit-
complaint attesting to the fact that as a result of the said
dispute, they were barred from taking the, final examinations
and participating in the graduation rites.
After both parties failed to attend the preliminary conference, a
resolution was rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman
finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of
R.A. 6713.
For such gross misconduct, petitioner was meted a suspension
of thirty (30) days without pay and warned that any other
instance of non-observance of the Code of Conduct will result
in graver punishment.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A.
6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 for
their failure to provide for the right of appeal in certain cases
from the decision of the Ombudsman, maintaining that the
same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 7 of the Ombudsman Act constitutes a
curtailment of the right to due process?
RULING: NO.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
Apparently, therefore, the constitutional requirement of due
process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right
to appeal for the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of
one's case.
The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the power
to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and a perusal of the
said rules of procedure in administrative cases manifest
sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.
Further, a formal or trial type hearing is not, at all times,
necessary. So long as a party is afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side, the requirement of due process
is complied with.
42. AMPONG vs CSC
FACTS: Petitioner, Ampong is a public school teacher who
later worked as a court interpreter starting 1993. This case
stemmed from the charge of dishonesty and grave misconduct
filed against her in connection with the Professional Board
Examinations for Teachers on 1991 whereby she allegedly took
and passed the exam in the place of one Decir. The CSC found
both Ampong and Decir guilty and ordered their dismissal.
Ampong now contends that as an employee of the judiciary, it is
the SC who has the authority to conduct the investigation over
her and not the CSC. She further contends that she was denied
of due process for she was not assisted by a legal counsel.
ISSUE: WON the CSC properly acquired jurisdiction over the
present case? WON she was accorded with due process?
HELD: Yes to both issues.
While it is true that under the Constitution the SC is given
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial
personnel and hence the bottom line is that administrative
jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before
or after employment in the judiciary, this court nevertheless
upholds the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of
estoppel. The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her
from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal
exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an affirmative relief
may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
In the case at bar, petitioner was given ample opportunity to
present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before
the CSC and thus it is clear that due process was accorded to
her.
Anent the contention of lack of legal assistance in the conduct
of the administrative case, while a partys right to the assistance
of counsel is sacred in proceedings criminal in nature, there is
no such requirement in administrative proceedings. A party in
an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel. The administrative body is under no duty to provide
the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not
an absolute requirement.
43. LUMIQUED ET AL. VS HON. EXEVEA ET AL.
FACTS: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous
Region until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that
position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52. In view of
Lumiqued's death, his heirs instituted this petition
for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order. The
dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-
CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-
Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The three
affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the DOJ for
appropriate action. The DOJ, then by virtue of a Department
Order, created a committee to investigate the complaints
against Lumiqued. Thereafter, Committee hearings on the
complaints were conducted but Lumiqued was not assisted by
counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting
to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel
appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating
committee rendered a report finding Lumiqued liable for all the
charges against him. Accordingly, the investigating committee
recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from office,
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal
charges against him.
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to
inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing.
They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to be assisted by a counsel is
imperative in administrative investigation.
RULING: No, the right to a lawyer is not imperative in
administrative investigation.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver
is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a
suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not
an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may
at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that
under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of
the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent
himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel.
In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired,
a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging
the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions
of the Civil Service Act and the Administrative Code of 1987.
Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearings attended by Lumiqued clearly show that he was
confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself .
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
44) EDWIN RAZON y LUCEA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
There was a crime commited and Razon admitted having
stabbed the victim (Gonzalo) but insisted that he did so in self-
defense because the victim declared a hold-up and poked a
knife at him. Not finding credence in Razon's claim of self-
defense, RTC (Baguio City) convicted him of homicide. Razon
filed a notice of appeal, and the CA required him, through his
counsel Atty. Gallardo to file an appellant's brief. Instead of
filing the brief, however, Atty. Gallardo filed a Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel, claiming that Razon had consistently
shown his disinterest in the case by not attending much needed
conferences. The CA granted the motion to withdraw as
counsel and directed Razon anew to cause the entry of
appearance of his new counsel or manifest whether he wanted
the CA to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him, within five
days from notice with warning that failure to comply with said
Resolution shall cause the dismissal of his appeal. Because
there was no compliance by Razon , the court considered the
right of the accused to be represented by counsel as waived;
and directed the JRD to resend the notice to file brief to Razon
(and another notice to file brief was issued and this time
addressed to and received by Razon himself). With the failure
of Razon to comply, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing his
appeal.
Razon filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied
Razon's motion.
Petitioner claims that he is not bound by the actions of Atty.
Gallardo who was negligent of his duties to him; Atty. Gallardo
failed to file the required appeal brief before the CA despite the
many extensions given him; worse, Atty. Gallardo filed a motion
to withdraw his appearance as petitioner's counsel without
petitioner's knowledge; it was only when he received the CA
Resolution that he learned of the withdrawal, and it was only
then that Atty. Gallardo advised him to get another lawyer;
petitioner received the records of the case from Atty. Gallardo,
only on March 9, 2001; petitioner failed to comply with the CA
resolutions because he could not understand the same due to
his educational deficiency; and given the chance to ventilate his
appeal, petitioner would be absolved of the charge against him
as he truly acted in self defense.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contended that petitioner himself is guilty of negligence; the CA
gave him ample opportunity to secure the services of counsel
or manifest his desire to have a counsel de oficio appointed by
the court, but petitioner ignored said directives; petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was also filed out of time; and Sec.
8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that the appellate
court may dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief
within the time prescribed by the said Rule.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of petitioner's appeal for failure
to file appellant's brief is correct.
HELD: YES.
While appeal is an essential part of our judicial system, a party
must strictly comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules
of Court on appeals, mindful of the fact that an appeal is purely
a statutory right. Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Both courts and litigants are therefore
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While there are instances
when the Court allows a relaxation in the application of the
rules, such liberality is not intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
Indeed, the CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to file
appellant's brief on time. It is given the discretion which must be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play,
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
In this case, the CA gave petitioner sufficient opportunity to file
his appellant's brief. Instead of complying, however, petitioner
chose to ignore the many directives of the CA and now puts the
blame on his former counsel Atty. Gallardo, who was allegedly
guilty of gross negligence.
Even if the Court were to admit that Atty. Gallardo was
negligent, the rule is that negligence of counsel binds the client.
The only exception is when the negligence of said counsel is so
gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his
day in court. No such excepting circumstance can be said to be
present in this case because as properly observed by the
appellate court, petitioner himself was guilty of negligence.
The records show that the CA issued a Resolution (April 15,
1999) requiring petitioner to manifest within five days from
receipt thereof the authenticity of his signature appearing in the
motion to withdraw as counsel (February 1, 1999) filed by Atty.
Gallardo, and to inform the CA of his new counsel. The CA
granted Atty. Gallardo's motion to withdraw as counsel (August
27, 1999)_and required petitioner anew to cause the entry of
appearance of his new counsel or manifest whether he desires
the CA to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him, with a
warning that failure to comply with the said resolution shall
cause the dismissal of his appeal. The CA issued another
notice to file brief (February 28, 2000), this time addressed to
Razon himself. In a Resolution (July 12, 2000), the CA required
Razon to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed
for failure to file the required brief. The CA finally issued a
resolution (January 31, 2001) dismissing petitioner's appeal.
Despite the many notices given him, Razon still failed to comply
with the CA's directives. He also took a long time to file his
motion for reconsideration of the CA's January 31, 2001
Resolution because while he admittedly received a copy of the
said resolution on March 6, 2001, he only filed his motion for
reconsideration on July 19, 2001 or more than four months
later.
It is thus clear that petitioner was guilty of neglect. He was
aware of his conviction and of the requirement of filing an
appellant's brief. Yet he had no urgency in filing the same, even
with the CA's explicit orders. His excuse that his educational
deficiency prevented him from complying with the CA's
resolutions deserves scant consideration. He was able to
secure the services of counsel to file for him a petition before
this Court. Had he exerted earlier the kind of effort he put in
getting a new counsel, or had he simply notified the court of his
desire to have a counsel de oficio assigned to him, then he
would not have to contend with the predicament he is presently
in. For the resolution of the CA dismissing his appeal on the
ground of abandonment, petitioner has no one else to blame
but himself.
44 . V IRG IL IO M AQ U IL AN , G .R . NO . 1 5 5 40 9
- v e rs us
DIT A M AQ U IL AN Ju n e 8, 20 0 7
Fa ct s:
1. Her e i n p et i ti o n er an d her e i n pr i v at e
res p o n de nt a re s p o u s es wh o o nc e ha d a b l is s f u l
m ar r ie d l if e a n d ou t o f wh ic h we r e b l es s e d to h a ve
a s o n. ( a ww ww w )
2. Ho we v er , t h e ir onc e s ug ar c o at e d r om anc e
tur n ed b itt er wh e n p et it i o ner d is c o v er ed th at pr i v at e
res p o n de nt was h a v in g i l lic i t s ex ua l af f a ir wi t h her
par am our , wh i c h t h us , pr om pte d t he pe t it i on er t o
f il e a c as e of a d ul t er y a g a i ns t p r i v a te r es po n de n t
an d t he la tt ers p ar am our . ( oh h hh h h )
3. Co ns eq u en t l y, b ot h t he pr i v at e r es p on d en t
an d h er par am our w er e c o n vic t ed of t h e c r im e
c har g e d an d we re s e nt e nc e d to s u f f er an
im pr is o nm ent ( ts k t s k ts k ) T her e af t er , pr i va t e
res p o n de nt , t hr ou g h c ou ns e l, f i l e d a P et i ti o n f or
Dec l ar at i on of N u ll i t y of M ar r ia g e, D is s o l ut i on a nd
L iq u id a ti o n of Co nj ug a l P ar t n er s h i p of G a i ns a nd
Dam ag es .
4. Dur i n g t h e pr e - tr i al of t h e s ai d c as e,
pe t it i on er a n d pr i v at e r es po n de n t en t er e d i nt o a
CO M P RO MI S E A G R E E M ENT wh ic h wa s g i v en
j ud ic i al i m pr im atur b y th e r es p o nd e nt j u dg e in th e
as s a i l ed J ud gm en t O n C om pr om is e Agr e em ent
5. Ho we v er , p et i t io n er f i l ed a n O m ni bus M ot i o n
da t ed J a n uar y 1 5, 2 0 0 2, pr a yi n g f o r t h e r ep ud i at i o n
of th e Com pr om is e Agr e em ent and the
rec o ns i der a ti o n of t h e J ud gm en t o n C om prom is e
A gre em en t b y t h e res po n de n t j u dg e o n t h e gro u n ds
th at h is pr e vi o us l a w ye r d i d n ot in te l l i ge n tl y a n d
j ud ic i ous l y a ppr is e h i m of the c o ns e q ue n ti a l ef f ec ts
of t h e Com prom is e A g r eem e nt .
Is su e: W ON p et i ti on er can r e pu d i at e th e
c om pr om is e agr e em en t o n t he b as is th a t h e was no t
i nt e ll i g en t l y an d j u d ic i o us l y i nf or m ed of t he
c ons e qu e nt i a l ef f ec ts of s uc h a gr eem en t.
Rul ing:
It c o u ld n o t be s a i d t ha t th e p et i t io n er was n ot
i nt e ll i g en t l y an d j u d ic i o us l y i nf or m ed of t he
c ons e qu e nt i a l ef f ec ts of th e c om pr om is e a gr eem en t,
an d th at , on t his b as is , he m a y r ep u d i at e t h e
Com pr om is e A gre em en t. T he ar g um ent of t h e
pe t it i on er th a t h e w as n o t d u l y inf or m ed b y h is
pre v i o us c o u ns e l ab ou t t h e l e ga l ef f ec ts of t h e
v o lu nt ar y s et t lem en t i s no t c on v i nc in g. M is tak e or
v it i at i o n of c o ns e n t, as n o w c la im ed b y t he
pe t it i on er as h is bas is f or r e p ud i at i ng t he
s et t lem en t, c o u l d h ard l y b e s a id t o b e e v i d e n t.
. I n Sa l o ng a v . C o ur t of Ap p e als ,[ 1 2] th i s Co ur t
he l d:
[I] t is we l l - s e tt l ed th at t h e n e gl i g enc e of c o u ns el
b in ds t he c l i en t. T h is is b as ed on th e ru l e t ha t a n y
ac t p erf o rm ed b y a la w ye r wi th i n t he s c op e of h is
ge n er al or im pl i e d a u t hor i t y is r eg ar de d as a n ac t of
h is c l ie n t. C o ns e q ue nt l y, t h e m is t ak e or n e g l ig e nc e
of p e ti t io n ers ' c o u ns e l m a y res u lt in t h e r e n d it i on of
an unf a v or a bl e j u dgm e nt a g a ins t th em .
Ex c ep t io ns t o th e f or eg o i ng h a v e b ee n rec og n i ze d
b y t h e Co ur t in c as es wh er e r ec k les s o r gr os s
ne g l ig e nc e of c o u ns e l de pr i v es t he c l i en t of d ue
proc es s of l a w, or whe n its a p pl ic at i o n "r es u l ts in
th e o ut ri g ht de pr i v at i o n of o ne 's pr o per t y t h rou g h a
tec h nic a l it y. " x x x x [ 1 3]
No n e of th es e ex c e pt i ons has b ee n s uf f ic i e nt l y
s ho wn i n th e pr es en t c as e .
45. EDWIN RAZON y LUCEA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
There was a crime commited and Razon admitted having
stabbed the victim (Gonzalo) but insisted that he did so in self-
defense because the victim declared a hold-up and poked a
knife at him. Not finding credence in Razon's claim of self-
defense, RTC (Baguio City) convicted him of homicide. Razon
filed a notice of appeal, and the CA required him, through his
counsel Atty. Gallardo to file an appellant's brief. Instead of
filing the brief, however, Atty. Gallardo filed a Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel, claiming that Razon had consistently
shown his disinterest in the case by not attending much needed
conferences. The CA granted the motion to withdraw as
counsel and directed Razon anew to cause the entry of
appearance of his new counsel or manifest whether he wanted
the CA to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him, within five
days from notice with warning that failure to comply with said
Resolution shall cause the dismissal of his appeal. Because
there was no compliance by Razon , the court considered the
right of the accused to be represented by counsel as waived;
and directed the JRD to resend the notice to file brief to Razon
(and another notice to file brief was issued and this time
addressed to and received by Razon himself). With the failure
of Razon to comply, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing his
appeal.
Razon filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied
Razon's motion.
Petitioner claims that he is not bound by the actions of Atty.
Gallardo who was negligent of his duties to him; Atty. Gallardo
failed to file the required appeal brief before the CA despite the
many extensions given him; worse, Atty. Gallardo filed a motion
to withdraw his appearance as petitioner's counsel without
petitioner's knowledge; it was only when he received the CA
Resolution that he learned of the withdrawal, and it was only
then that Atty. Gallardo advised him to get another lawyer;
petitioner received the records of the case from Atty. Gallardo,
only on March 9, 2001; petitioner failed to comply with the CA
resolutions because he could not understand the same due to
his educational deficiency; and given the chance to ventilate his
appeal, petitioner would be absolved of the charge against him
as he truly acted in self defense.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contended that petitioner himself is guilty of negligence; the CA
gave him ample opportunity to secure the services of counsel
or manifest his desire to have a counsel de oficio appointed by
the court, but petitioner ignored said directives; petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was also filed out of time; and Sec.
8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that the appellate
court may dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief
within the time prescribed by the said Rule.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of petitioner's appeal for failure
to file appellant's brief is correct.
HELD: YES.
While appeal is an essential part of our judicial system, a party
must strictly comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules
of Court on appeals, mindful of the fact that an appeal is purely
a statutory right. Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Both courts and litigants are therefore
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While there are instances
when the Court allows a relaxation in the application of the
rules, such liberality is not intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
Indeed, the CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to file
appellant's brief on time. It is given the discretion which must be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play,
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
In this case, the CA gave petitioner sufficient opportunity to file
his appellant's brief. Instead of complying, however, petitioner
chose to ignore the many directives of the CA and now puts the
blame on his former counsel Atty. Gallardo, who was allegedly
guilty of gross negligence.
Even if the Court were to admit that Atty. Gallardo was
negligent, the rule is that negligence of counsel binds the client.
The only exception is when the negligence of said counsel is so
gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his
day in court. No such excepting circumstance can be said to be
present in this case because as properly observed by the
appellate court, petitioner himself was guilty of negligence.
The records show that the CA issued a Resolution (April 15,
1999) requiring petitioner to manifest within five days from
receipt thereof the authenticity of his signature appearing in the
motion to withdraw as counsel (February 1, 1999) filed by Atty.
Gallardo, and to inform the CA of his new counsel. The CA
granted Atty. Gallardo's motion to withdraw as counsel (August
27, 1999)_and required petitioner anew to cause the entry of
appearance of his new counsel or manifest whether he desires
the CA to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him, with a
warning that failure to comply with the said resolution shall
cause the dismissal of his appeal. The CA issued another
notice to file brief (February 28, 2000), this time addressed to
Razon himself. In a Resolution (July 12, 2000), the CA required
Razon to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed
for failure to file the required brief. The CA finally issued a
resolution (January 31, 2001) dismissing petitioner's appeal.
Despite the many notices given him, Razon still failed to comply
with the CA's directives. He also took a long time to file his
motion for reconsideration of the CA's January 31, 2001
Resolution because while he admittedly received a copy of the
said resolution on March 6, 2001, he only filed his motion for
reconsideration on July 19, 2001 or more than four months
later.
It is thus clear that petitioner was guilty of neglect. He was
aware of his conviction and of the requirement of filing an
appellant's brief. Yet he had no urgency in filing the same, even
with the CA's explicit orders. His excuse that his educational
deficiency prevented him from complying with the CA's
resolutions deserves scant consideration. He was able to
secure the services of counsel to file for him a petition before
this Court. Had he exerted earlier the kind of effort he put in
getting a new counsel, or had he simply notified the court of his
desire to have a counsel de oficio assigned to him, then he
would not have to contend with the predicament he is presently
in. For the resolution of the CA dismissing his appeal on the
ground of abandonment, petitioner has no one else to blame
but himself.
46. ATTY. ROMEO S. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE CARLOS ABIERA, respondent.
FACTS:
On December 1966, a Civil Case for specific performance of
contract with injunction was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occ. by a certain de Asia against an
Alvarez. The case was then presided by herein respondent
judge Abiera with Perez as the counsel for the Alvarez. . Upon
motion of plaintiff de Asia, Judge Abiera issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against the defendant Alvarez without
prior notice to the latter. On February 1968, Atty. Perez filed a
motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction which,
however, was denied by the Judge. On October 1968, Atty.
Perez filed a motion for reconsideration of said order requesting
at the same time that his motion be submitted for resolution on
the same month. Respondent did not render a decision on such
until on September of 1971. Meanwhile, Perez has filed with the
C of Appeals a petition for certiori and mandamus against
Abiera. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 11,
1972 having found that respondent Judge Abiera gravely
abused his discretion when he hastily granted a writ of
preliminary injunction without prior notice to the defendants in
the case. Briefly stated, the present charge is concerned with
Judge Abiera's failure for a period of three years to resolve a
motion for reconsideration, and the collection of his salary for
that period of time despite the pendency of said motion, all in
flagrant violation of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act as amended
For this defense, respondent claims among others that this
Court (Supreme Court) is without jurisdiction to proceed and
resolve the present charge as he has retired from the service.
Respondent, asserts that because he retired from the
government service having reached the compulsory retirement
age of 70, the Court lost jurisdiction to take disciplinary action
against him and as regards the prayer that if found guilty
"respondent be declared to have forfeited all retirement benefits
and emoluments said respondent Judge may have been
entitled to by reason of his position or office", such forfeiture is
but an accessory to a principal penalty, like dismissal, and may
not be imposed in this administrative proceeding for to deprive
him of his retirement benefit is tantamount to divesting him of
his property without due process.
ISSUE:
(1) WON Supreme Court may continue to have jurisdiction to
try the administrative case against the respondent judge given
the fact that the latter has already reached the compulsory
retirement age;
(2) WON the forfeiture of the respondents retirement benefits
may be imposed in this administrative proceeding and if yes,
WON it is tantamount to absence of due process.
RULING:
(1) Yes. The Court may still continue trying the case
despite respondents retirable age.
Coming now to respondent Judge Abiera, there can be
no question that there was undue delay on his part in
resolving the motion for reconsideration of complainant,
Atty. Perez. The cessation from office of respondent
Judge either because of resignation, retirement or
some other similar cause does not per se warrant the
dismissal of an administrative complaint which was filed
against him while still in the service unless on
meritorious cases.
(2) Yes. Forfeiture may be imposed in this proceeding
subject to some mitigating circumstances.
It may be well to state here that before respondent may
be entitled to retirement gratuity, several requisites
must concur. First, he must have paid the premiums
required under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 660
known as the Government Service Act. Second, he
must have reached the compulsory age of retirement
under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 910 as amended
by Republic Act No. 2614 and 5095. Third, he must
 have rendered satisfactory and meritorious service to
the government, for a grant of retirement benefits is not
only an act of generosity or liberality on the part of the
government but is equally a compensation and reward
for satisfactory, faithful, meritorious and valuable
service rendered to the latter. In the case at bar,
although the first two requisites are present the third,
however, is absent.

However given the length of service of the respondent

and the claim of poor health at the time the motion for
reconsideration in question was pending before him
which are sufficient to mitigate his liability, the SC only
imposes upon respondent a FINE equivalent to his
three (3) months' salary instead of forfeiture of
retirement of benefits is imposed deductible from
whatever retirement benefits he is entitled to.

47. CEFERINO PADUA vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA

FACTS: It is the contention of Zialcita and Padua that the

resolution issued by the TRB in granting provisional toll rate
adjustments without hearing and notice is violative of their right
as an expressway user to due process.

ISSUE: WON there is violation of administrative due process.

None.

HELD: The TRBs authority to grant provisional toll rate

adjustments does not require the conduct of a hearing.
Pertinent laws and jurisprudence support this conclusion. An
administrative agency may be empowered to approve
provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of
public utilities without a hearing. The reason is easily discerned
from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary
and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates
approved after final hearing.

The language of LOI No. 1334-A, issued by former President

Marcos is very clear. It "directs, orders and instructs" the TRB
to issue provisional toll rates adjustment ex-parte without the
need of notice, hearing and publication. All that is necessary is
that it be issued upon (1) a finding that the main petition is
sufficient in form and substance; (2) the submission of an
affidavit showing that the increase in rates substantially
conforms to the formula, if any is stipulated in the franchise or
toll operation agreement, and that failure to immediately impose
and collect the increase in rates would result in great
irreparable injury to the petitioner; and (3) the submission of a
bond. Again, whether or not CITRA complied with these
requirements is an issue that must be addressed to the TRB.