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Johannes Koder, IoannIs stouraItIs (hrsG.)

BYZantIne War IdeoLoGY BetWeen roman ImperIaL ConCept and ChrIstIan reLIGIon

akten des Internationalen symposiums (Wien, 19.–21. mai 2011)

BetWeen roman ImperIaL ConCept and ChrIstIan reLIGIon akten des Internationalen symposiums (Wien, 19.–21. mai 2011)

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BYZantIne War IdeoLoGY BetWeen roman ImperIaL ConCept and ChrIstIan reLIGIon

akten des Internationalen symposiums (Wien, 19.–21. mai 2011)

edited by / herausgegeben von Johannes Koder und IoannIs stouraItIs

Internationalen symposiums (Wien, 19.–21. mai 2011) edited by / herausgegeben von Johannes Koder und IoannIs stouraItIs
Internationalen symposiums (Wien, 19.–21. mai 2011) edited by / herausgegeben von Johannes Koder und IoannIs stouraItIs

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table of Contents

Foreword

7

Johannes Koder – Ioannis stouraitis, Byzantine approaches to Warfare (6 th – 12 th centuries).

 

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Introduction

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Walter e. Kaegi, the heraclians and holy War

 

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panagiotis antonopoulos, emperor Constans II’s Intervention in Italy and its Ideological significance

 

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Warren treadgold, opposition to Iconoclasm as Grounds for Civil War

 

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olof heilo, the holiness of the Warrior: physical and spiritual power in the Borderland between Byzantium and Islam

 

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athanasios MarKopoulos, the Ideology of War in the military harangues of Constantine VII porphyrogennetos

 

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stergios laitsos, War and nation-building in Widukind of Corvey’s Deeds of the Saxons

 

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Ioannis stouraitis, Conceptions of War and peace in anna Comnena’s alexiad

 

69

evangelos Chrysos, 1176 – a Byzantine Crusade?

 

81

theodora papadopoulou, niketas Choniates and the Image of the enemy after the Latin Capture of Constantinople

 

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efstratia synKellou, reflections on Byzantine War Ideology in Late Byzantium

 

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Christos G. MaKrypoulias, Civilians as Combatants in Byzantium: Ideological versus practical Considerations

 

109

athina Kolia-derMitzaKi, “holy War” In Byzantium twenty Years Later: a Question of term definition and Interpretation

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selected

Bibliography

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133

Index

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Verzeichnis der autoren

 

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J o h a n n e s

K o d e r

i o a n n i s

s t o u r a i t i s

Byzantine approaches to Warfare (6 th – 12 th centuries):

an Introduction

the title of this collective volume, “Byzantine war ideology between roman imperial concept and Christian religion”, we believe to be well-chosen. there is no doubt that the Byzantines’ socio-political approach to war and peace was extensively influenced by Christian ethics and the roman imperial tradition. the interac- tion of these two factors during the geopolitical transformation of the roman world in the period from the decline of the western part of the roman empire up to the late seventh century contributed decisively to the configuration of the eastern roman (i.e. Byzantine) empire’s political and cultural identity. nevertheless, second thoughts about the word “between” could be uttered, since it seems to express something like a chasm between religious and political disposition towards warfare, which by no means though should be taken for granted. Christian attitudes towards war inclined already before Constantine the Great to conform to a certain degree to the positions of the roman state 1 . after all, the statements of Jesus Christ in the Gospels 2 , which refer to the sword and to peace, seem not to have been intended to promote an unreserved pacificism, where- as some of them also carry an eschatological overtone. moreover, the authors of the Gospels lived within the political and cultural framework of the roman empire so that their versions of Jesus’ words can be certainly regarded to reflect to a certain extent this political and cultural background. Within the context of our topic, the most “political” amongst the statements of the Gospels comes from Luke: “… What king will march to battle against another king without first taking time to consider whether with ten thousand men he can face an enemy coming to meet him with twenty thousand? If he cannot, then, while the other is still far away, he sends a delegation and asks for peace” 3 . this is a pragmatic and clear position, which in principle recognized the possibility for any Christian king (political leader) to decide in favour of or against war as a means of politics. and it remained true all the more for the emperor of Con- stantinople as the exclusive rightful ruler of the whole roman world, chosen by God and therefore justified to wage war in order to maintain or recover power over certain parts of the Roman Oecumene, which were not under his authority at any given time 4 ; in other words, to protect and restore roman world supremacy.

1 C. m. odahl, Constantine and the militarization of Christianity: a Contribution to the study of Christian attitudes toward War and military service. michigan 1976, 9–59; J. helgeland, Christians and the roman army from marcus aurelius to Constantine, in: aufstieg und niedergang der römischen Welt 23, 1. Berlin – new York 1979, 724–834; L. J. swiFt, War and the Christian Conscience I: the early years, in: aufstieg und niedergang der römischen Welt 23, 1. Berlin – new York 1979, 835–868; J. F. shean, soldiering for God: Christianity and the roman army (History of Warfare 61). Leiden – Boston 2010.

2 examples: “

10:13). – “do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword” (matt. 10:34).

for all who draw the sword will die by the sword” (matt. 26:52). – “But now if you have

a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don’t have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one” (Luke 22:36). – „peace I leave with

you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, give I unto you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid” (John 14:27).

3 Luke 14:31–32: τίς βασιλεὺς πορευόμενος ἑτέρῳ βασιλεῖ συμβαλεῖν εἰς πόλεμον οὐχὶ καθίσας πρῶτον βουλεύσεται εἰ δυνατός ἐστιν ἐν δέκα χιλιάσιν ὑπαντῆσαι τῷ μετὰ εἴκοσι χιλιάδων ἐρχομένῳ ἐπ’ αὐτόν; εἰ δὲ μήγε, ἔτι αὐτοῦ πόρρω ὄντος πρεσβείαν ἀποστείλας ἐρωτᾷ τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην.

4 on the ideology of roman world supremacy (with the key-word ecumenism) in Byzantium see o. treitinger, die oströmische Kaiser- und reichsidee nach ihrer Gestaltung im höfischen Zeremoniell. Vom oströmischen staats – u. reichsgedanken. darmstadt 1956, 158–167; h. ahrweiler, L’idéologie de l’empire byzantin. paris 1975, 9–24, ; J. Koder, die räumlichen Vorstellungen der Byzantiner von der Ökumene (4. bis 12. Jahrhundert), in: anzeiger d. philos.-hist. Klasse der Österr. akad. d. Wiss. 137/2. Vienna 2002, 25–31; G. sChMalzBauer, Überlegungen zur Idee der Ökumene in Byzanz, in: Wiener Byzantinistik und neogräzis- tik: Beiträge zum symposion Vierzig Jahre Institut für Byzantinistik und neogräzistik der universität Wien im Gedenken an herbert hunger, ed. W. hörandner (Wien, 4.–7. dezember 2002). Vienna 2004, 408–419; I. s touraitis, Krieg und Frieden in der

if the house be worthy, let your peace come upon it: but if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you” (matt.

– “put your sword back in its place,

10

Johannes Koder – Ioannis stouraitis

thus, imperial Christianity’s potential to wage war was not really constrained by clerical Christianity’s adher- ence to the idea that war was a great evil and peace reflected God’s will, since the controversial statements of the old testament about swords and plowshares 5 , which have been used not only by medieval Church Fathers 6 but also by present-day peace movements 7 , left the door open for the waging of offensive warfare as long as this was legitimized in the name of peace. the three phases of systematic wars of expansion in the period from the mid-sixth to the late twelfth century provide the best evidence of this argument. It has been often pointed out – quite rightly so – that the Byzantine empire was a state permanently at war due both to its geopolitical position and political heritage. the greater part of Byzantine wars was fought for the defense of the territories that were at any time under the rule of the emperor of Constantinople. Within this context, the Byzantines developed diplomatic policies in order to avoid or stop attacks by their numerous enemies 8 . It has been plausibly pointed out though, that these diplomatic policies, which were in accordance with the Christian peace-loving rhetoric of Byzantine authors, were not the product of ideological mechanisms that configured policies for the avoidance of war at any cost; instead, they mainly reflect a so- phisticated political pragmatism which sought to avoid the waging of defensive warfare due to the obvious economic and political cost 9 . Warfare in Byzantium was primarily a matter of political aims, concerns and strategic interaction and had little or nothing to do with a peaceful disposition which produced ideological and ethical restrictions regarding the role of warfare as a means of politics. the Byzantine society’s, i.e. the ruling élite’s, approach to warfare was fairly sophisticated due both to the high level of socio-political or- ganization of the state by medieval standards as well as to the post-seventh century economic, and military conditions in its geopolitical sphere 10 . the Byzantine imperial state did not seek to avoid all warfare out of conviction, but waged wars of territorial expansion whenever the equilibrium of power was in its favour. the justification of offensive warfare within the framework of a Christian mentality, which eagerly propagated its love of peace and therefore notionally allowed only for defensive, that is, unavoidable wars to be waged, was made possible through an ideological disposition which remained rigidly adherent to the ro- man ideal of territorial ecumenical rule and therefore enabled, when necessary, a flexible approach to the perception of the actual territorial limits of imperial authority. thus, when the military potential was there the Byzantine state élite was ethically and ideologically always in position to legitimize its claim on territories, which in many cases had already been for many generations or even centuries under foreign rule. the impe- rial state’s ideological mechanisms were able to propagate differentiated conceptions of peace, upon which

politischen und ideologischen Wahrnehmung in Byzanz (Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber, ergänzungsband 5). Vienna 2009, 201–204; e. pitz, die griechisch-römische Ökumene und die drei Kulturen des mittelalters. Geschichte des mediterranen Weltteils zwischen atlantik und Indischem ozean, 270–812 (Europa im Mittelalter, Abhandlungen und Beiträge zur historischen Kom- paratistik 3). Berlin 2001, 3; for a different approach see t. lounghis, die byzantinische Ideologie der ‘begrenzten Ökumene’ und die römische Frage im ausgehenden 10. Jahrhundert. BSl 56 (1995) 117–128.

and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks (καὶ κατακόψουσιν τὰς ῥομφαίας

αὐτῶν εἰς ἄροτρα καὶ τὰ δόρατα αὐτῶν εἰς δρέπανα) – Joel 4:10: Beat your plowshares into swords and your pruninghooks into spears (συγκόψατε τὰ ἄροτρα ὑμῶν εἰς ῥομφαίας καὶ τὰ δρέπανα ὑμῶν εἰς σειρομάστας).

6 Cyril of alexandreia, Commentarius in xii prophetas minores (ed. p. e. pusey, sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi alexandrini in xii prophetas, I, oxford 1868, 353f.); ideM, epistulae paschales sive homiliae paschales PG 77.731f., ideM, homiliae paschales, 15.1.59–81 (ed. W. h. Burns [SC 434], paris 1998), theodore of mopsuestia, Commentarius in xii prophetas minores, Joel 3:9–11 (ed. h. n. sprenger, Wiesbaden 1977).

7 and even for the soviets, who, in 1959, donated the remarkable statue “Beating a sword into a plowshare” from e. Vuchetich to the united nations see in new York.

8 on Byzantine diplomacy see s. laMpaKis – M. leontsini – t. lounghis – v. vlysidou, Byzantine diplomacy: a seminar (transl. by n. russell). athens 2007; Byzantine diplomacy, papers from the twenty-fourth spring symposium of Byzantine studies. Cambridge, march 1990, ed. J. shepard – s. Franklin. aldershot 1992.

9 on the ideological parameters of diplomatic policies see J. F. h aldon, Blood and Ink: some observations on byzantine attitudes towards warfare and diplomacy, in: Byzantine diplomacy, papers from the twenty-fourth spring symposium of Byzantine stud- ies. Cambridge, march 1990, ed. J. shepard – s. Franklin. aldershot 1992, 281–295; stouraitis, Krieg und Frieden 219–231. on the economic reasons that dictated the avoidance of defensive warfare see n. oiKonoMides, Το όπλο του χρήματος, in: Το εμπόλεμο Βυζάντιο (9ος–12ος αι.) (NHRF/IBR, International Symposia 4). athens 1997, 261268 ; e. Chrysos, Ο πόλεμος έσχατη λύση, in: Βυζάντιο – Κράτος και Κοινωνία. Μνήμη Νίκου Οικονομίδη. Athens 2003, 545–563. 10 on a general overview of Byzantine attitudes towards warfare see J. haldon, Warfare, state and society in the Byzantine World 565–1204. London 1999, 13–33

5 micha 4:3:

Byzantine approaches to Warfare (6

th – 12 th centuries): an Introduction

11

the justification of defensive or offensive warfare was made dependent. For instance, peace could be equally highlighted as the justifying cause both for a war, or for that matter for a diplomatic mission, which aimed to retain the imperial state’s current borders, as well as for a war which aimed to expand these borders, backed up by the ideal that granted the restoration of roman political order over former roman territories an irenical content 11 . the coexistence of two principally different conceptions of peace, which were in the end ethically contradictory, determined the Byzantine approach to dikaios polemos (just war) as an unavoidable evil, i.e. a necessary political means to protect or restore peace as this was defined through the at any time given po- litical and economic interests of the Byzantine ruling élite 12 . all efforts that were undertaken by the emperors of Constantinople after the fall of the Western roman empire (476) until the late twelfth century to expand the borders of their rule through the reconquest of former roman territories were legitimized within the aforementioned ideological framework 13 . thus, the sophisti- cated offensive character of the Byzantine “war ideology” was inherent in the actual content of the principal Byzantine conception of political peace, which was based on the idea that the restoration of the one roman emperor of Constantinople’s rule over lost roman territories was peace-making. this idea made peace de- pendent upon, and identifiable with, the roman political order as represented by the imperial power of Con- stantinople. as a result, it abrogated on an ideological level the reality of the socio-political changes which had occurred in former roman territories and which had erased the political and cultural ties between the indigenous population and the roman political order, creating new conceptions of peace and order. From a Byzantine point of view, both the rights of the new rulers of former roman territories as well as the rights of the inhabitant population were a priori subordinate to the archetypal right of the roman emperor’s sover- eignty over former roman lands. For instance, the Byzantine “reconquista” of the tenth century took place almost three centuries after the territorial contraction of Byzantine imperial rule to the main parts of asia minor, the southern part of the Balkan peninsula and southern Italy that had formed the so-called “hellenized” eastern roman empire, the cultural and administrative structure of which differed greatly from that of the Late roman empire. Conse- quently, from a social and cultural point of view the justification of offensive wars for the reintegration of roman lands into the roman politeia, the Byzantine emperor’s imperial state, could hardly align with, or stem from, the need of the indigenous population for liberation, but reflected primarily the need of the Byz- antine ruling élite to gain more territories and their revenues. apart from that, the muslim Caliphate in the east, as well as the regenerated roman empire (800) in the West, had consolidated their rule over greater parts of those territories through ideological and political means for centuries. thus, the political ideology that justified Constantinople’s claim on former roman territories was not only weakened due to given social and cultural facts, but was also confronted with a new geopolitical status quo that contradicted the Byzantine ideological approach. Within this political framework of war of defense and reconquest on behalf of the political entity of the roman empire, religion played a central role in the ethical legitimization of imperial policies. admittedly, the policies of reconquest seemed to be antithetical to the core of eastern Christian ethics, which was defined by the religious axiom that war was an evil deed which should be avoided. this antithesis was, however, overcome at the time on a socio-political level through an ecclesiastical pragmatism which practically legiti- mated a priori every war for the protection of the Christian roman empire. this pragmatism is evident in the statements of the Church Fathers. according to the Christian theorist of warfare, saint augustine of hippo, war was a sin but could also be seen as the means to give the sin an end 14 . saint athanasius of alex- andria highlighted the idea of ecclesiastical oikonomia by declaring that the killing of the enemy in a war on

11 on the interaction between conceptions of peace and legitimizing mechanisms, see stouraitis, Krieg und Frieden 208–259.

12 on Just War in Byzantium see G. MiChailides-nuaros, Ο βυζαντινός δίκαιος πόλεμος κατά τα Τακτικά του Λέοντος του Σοφού

[Symmikta Seferiadou], athens 1961, 422; a. laiou, on Just War in Byzantium, in: to hellenikon. studies in honor of speros

Vryonis Jr

new rochelle 1993, 167–8; stouraitis, Krieg und Frieden 276–280.

13 For the ideology of the Justinianic reconquista see d. BrodKa, prokopios von Kaisareia und Justinians Idee der ‘reconquista’. Eos 86 (1999) 243–255.

14 sancti aureli augustini de civitate dei (Corpus Christianorum, ser. Lat. 47–48, pars 14, 1–2). turnhout 1955, XIX 15.

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behalf of the roman empire was not a sin to be forgiven through penitential chastisement, but a socially praiseworthy task 15 . the integration of this ecclesiastical pragmatism into the political conception of just war in Byzantium is made evident in the tenth-century military treatise of the emperor Leo VI, the Taktika , in which the author declares that the only just war is war for the defense of the empire’s territorial integrity and that, when this just cause is given, then God assists the armies of the empire and leads them to victory 16 . this instrumen- talization of religion based on the political idea that war was a necessity in this world, was further facilitated due to the fact that concrete eschatological hopes or expectations regarding the end of the world and the second Coming of Jesus Christ in the beginning of the sixth century 17 and again in the beginning of the eleventh century 18 had not been fulfilled. Consequently, the view that emperors were entitled to wage just war against the enemies of the empire was widespread even in monastic circles 19 . thus, the religious discourse in Byzantine warfare was defined by an ideological mitigation. the Byzantine conception of just war based on the natural-law of defense allowed the reconciliation of the political image of warfare as an indispensable means with its religious image as an evil thing. as a result of that, the imperial state was in a position to fully employ religious exhortations and symbols to motivate its armies in wars against all enemies of the empire, Christian and non-Christian, while the Byzantine church was able to accede to the perception of warfare as the main political means for the protection of the state’s political interests without having to recognize or legitimize warfare as an instrument of religion and a remission of sins. Byzantine just war could be fought on behalf of the state’s institutionalized religion and Byzantine soldiers were in fact ex- empted from penitential chastisements for killing in war 20 . moreover, they were promised that participation in warfare against the enemies of the empire could not exclude a pious Christian from heaven. however, warfare was neither propagated nor regarded broadly as a means for the salvation of the soul. the perception of a just cause for resorting to military action was not defined by religious difference per se, but by the notion of ro- man statecraft. In Byzantine mentality, warfare even when it was defensive and just, remained from a religious point of view a sinful situation and could not be understood as a means to salvation 21 .

15 athanasii archiepiscopi alexandriae epistola ad amunem monachum, in: p.-p. Joannou, Fonti. Fasciolo ix. discipline générale antique (ii–ix s.). Les canons des pères grecs, vol. II. rome 1963, 68, 4–14. Cf. h. G. BeCK, nomos, Kanon und staatsraison in Byzanz (Österr. Akad. d. Wissensch., philos.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 384). Vienna 1981; stouraitis, methodologische Überlegungen zur Frage des byzantinischen ‘heiligen’ Krieges. BSl 67 (2009), 283–284.

16 on the religious element of the just war concept of the Taktika see stouraitis, Krieg und Frieden 273–276; ideM, Jihād and Crusade: Byzantine positions towards the notions of ‘holy war’. ByzSym 21 (2011) 19–23. on alternative views cf. G. dagron, Byzance et la modèle islamique au Xe siècle. À propos des Constitutions tactiques de l’empereur Léon VI. Comptes rendus de séances de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres 127 (1983) 219–243; a. Kolia–derMitzaKi, Ο βυζαντινός ‘ιερός πόλεμος’. Η έννοια και η προβολή του θρησκευτικού πολέμου στο Βυζάντιο (Ιστορικές Μονογραφίες 10). athens 1991, 235–242.

17 see p. Magdalino, the history of the future and its uses: prophecy, policy and propaganda, in: the making of Byzantine his- tory. studies dedicated to donald m. nicol, ed. r. Beaton – Ch. roueché. aldershot 1993, 3–34, esp. 3–17, and G. podsKalsKy, Byzantinische reichseschatologie. die periodisierung der Weltgeschichte in den vier Großreichen (daniel 2 und 7) und dem tausendjährigen Friedensreiche (apok. 20). eine motivgeschichtliche untersuchung. münchen 1972.

18 see g. podsKalsKy, Byzantinische reichseschatologie, esp. 96–98,

ideM, religion und religiöses Leben im Byzanz des 11.

and

Jahrhunderts. OCP 57 (1991) 371–397.

19 Cf., e. g., symeon the new theologian, hymn 58, 34–36 (ed. J. Koder, hymnes / syméon le nouveau théologien [SC 196]. paris 2003 [repr.]): βασιλεῖς, καλῶς ποιεῖτε πολεμοῦντες τὰ ἔθνη,/ ἐὰν μὴ αὐτοὶ τὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ποιοῦντες/ ἔργα καὶ ἔθη καὶ βουλάς τε καὶ γνώμας!

20 see BeCK, nomos, Kanon und staatsraison 27–28.

21 on the much debated issue of a Byzantine notion of ‘holy war’ see Kolia-derMitzaKi, Ο βυζαντινός ‘ιερός πόλεμος’, passim with detailed bibliographical information on older works; laiou, Just War 153–177; eadeM, the Just War of eastern Christians and the ‘holy War’ of the Crusade, in: the ethics of War. shared problems in different traditions, ed. r. soraBJi – d. rodin. oxford 2006, 30–43; n. oiKonoMides, the concept of ‘holy war’ and two tenth-century Byzantine ivories, in: peace and War in Byzan- tium. essays in honor of G. t. dennis s. J., ed. t. s. miller – J. nesbitt. Washington, d.C. 1995, 62–86; t. m. KolBaBa, Fight- ing for Christianity. ‘holy war’ in the Byzantine emire. Byz 68 (1998) 194–221; G. t. dennis, defenders of the Christian people:

‘holy war’ in Byzantium, in: the Crusades from the perspective of Byzantium and the muslim World, ed. a. Laiou – r. p. mot- tahedeh. Washington, d.C. 2001, 31–39; a. Carile, La guerra santa nella romania (Impero romano d’oriente) secoli VII–XI, in: Guerra santa, guerra e pace dal vicino oriente antico alle tradizioni ebraica, cristiana e islamica, ed. m. perani. Bologna 2005, 251–261; I. stouraitis, methodologische Überlegungen 269–290; ideM, Krieg und Frieden 327–361; ideM, Jihād and Crusade; Idem, ‘Just War’ and ‘holy War’ in the middle ages: rethinking theory through the Byzantine Case-study. JÖB 62 (2012);

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th – 12 th centuries): an Introduction

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In the period after the rise of Islam (seventh century), Byzantine society was confronted with the muslim war ethic, which was based on the idea of jihād, the muslim conception of religious warfare 22 . the ideo- logical dispute between the Byzantines and the muslims was marked among other matters by their differen- tiated approach to the matter of God’s relation to war. the muslim perception that military action could be solely justified as God’s will for the final triumph of the one religion and, consequently, perceived as a means with which the believer could gain a place in heaven, was contradictory to the essence of God from a Byz- antine point of view and to the principle Byzantine perception of war as a sin. this contradiction is high- lighted in niketas Byzantius’ dispute with a muslim theologian in the mid-ninth century. the Byzantine intel- lectual unfolds the rationalized core of Byzantine war ethic, when he states that in Byzantine perception war could not be considered, and therefore justified, as an act ordained by God, because God in Byzantine percep- tion could not wish for the destruction of human life 23 . Later, by the end of the eleventh century, the movement of the Crusades, which was generated by pope urban II’s idea to help the eastern Christians and was elaborated into the idea of an armed pilgrimage for the liberation of the ‘holy Land’ from the muslim yoke, confronted Byzantium with a western Christian type of ‘holy war’ 24 that, similarly to the Islamic jihād, was mainly based on religious difference for the justifica- tion of resorting to military action. From the twelfth century onwards, the concept of crusade provides thus a further point of reference with regard to religious concepts of justification of war in medieval times and a further point of comparison for Byzantine approaches to the role of religion in the jus ad bellum 25 . hence, the efforts of the Comnenian emperors alexius I, John II and manuel I to reconquer lost Byzantine territories took place within a differentiated socio-political framework than the ‘reconquistas’ of the sixth and the tenth century. this new framework was defined, on the one hand, by the fact that for the first time the empire’s existence as well as its potential for expansion was equally – if not predominately – threatened by Christian enemies, the normans first and later the Crusaders, the “war ideology” of whom had many simi- larities with but also important differences from Byzantine “war ideology”. on the other hand, it was exten- sively affected by the new political and economic conditions which emerged from the loss of the larger part of asia minor 26 and from the commercial domination of the Italian maritime city-states (pisa, Venice, Genoa) in the eastern mediterranean 27 . during the last years of the Comnenoi and the short period of the angeloi

p. stephenson, Imperial Christianity and sacred War in Byzantium, in: Belief and Bloodshed. religion and Violence across time and tradition, ed. J. K. wellMan, Jr. new York 2007, 83–95; ideM, religious services for Byzantine soldiers and the possibility of martyrdom, c. 400–1000 C. e., in: Just Wars, Holy Wars, Jihads, ed. s. hashMi. oxford 2012; m. niChanian, de la guerre ‘antique’ à la guerre ‘médiévale’ dans l’empire romain d’orient. Legitimité imperiale, ideologie des la guerre et revoltes militaires, in: Guerre et société au moyen Âge, Byzance – occident (VIIIe – XIIIe siècle) (Monographies 31), ed. d. Barthélemy – J.-Cl. Cheynet. paris 2010, 33f.

22 On jihād see r. Firestone, Jihad. the origin of ‘holy War’ in Islam. new York 1999, 43f.; p. L. heCK, Jihad revisited. Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (2004) 95–128; d. CooK, understanding Jihad. Berkeley – Los angeles – London 2005, 32–48; m. Bon- ner, Jihad in Islamic history: doctrines and practice. princeton, n. J. 2006, 1f.

23 niketas von Byzanz, schriften zum Islam I, griechisch-deutsche textausgabe von K. Förstel, (Corpus Islamo-Christianum). Würzburg – altenberge 2000, 192, 334–345;cf. d. KrausMüller, Killing at God’s Command: niketas Byzantios polemic against Islam and the Christian tradition of divinely sanctioned murder. Al Masãq 16 (2004) 164–167; stouraitis, Krieg und Frieden

333–335.

24 on the ideology of the Crusade movement see a. BeCKer, papst urban II. (1088–1099), teil 2: der papst, die griechische Christenheit und der Kreuzzug (Monumenta Germaniae Historica 19, II). stuttgart 1988, 272f.; J. riley-sMith, the First Crusa- de and the idea of Crusading. philadelphia 1986; e.-d. hehl, Was ist eigentlich ein Kreuzzug? Historische Zeitschrift 259 (1994) 297–336; h. e. J. Cowdrey, the reform papacy and the origins of the Crusades, in: Le concile de Clermont de 1095 et l’appel à la croisade (Collection de l’école française de Rome 236). rome 1997, 65–83; r. hiestand, ‘Gott will es!’ – Will Gott es wirk- lich? die Kreuzzugsidee in der Kritik ihrer Zeit (Beiträge zur Friedensethik 29). stuttgart – Berlin – Köln 1998, 5–16; J. Møller- Jensen, War, penance and the First Crusade. dealing with a ‘tyrannical Construct’, in: medieval history Writing and Crusading Ideology, ed. t. m. s. Lehtonen – K. V. Jensen (Studia Fennica Historica 9), ed. t. m. s. Lehtonen – K. V. Jensen (studia Fen- nica historica). tampere 2005, 51–63.

25 on Byzantine attitudes towards the concept of crusade see t. m. KolBaBa, Fighting for Christianity. ‘holy war’ in the Byzantine emire. Byz 68 (1998) 211–221; stouraitis, Jihād and Crusade, 17–62.

26 J. ChrysostoMides, the Byzantine empire from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, in: the Cambridge history of turkey, vol. I: Byzantium to turkey, 1071–1453, ed. K. Fleet. new York 2009, 10f.

27 r.-J. lilie, handel und politik zwischen dem byzantinischen reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, pisa und Genua in der epoche der Komnenen und der angeloi (1081–1204). amsterdam 1984.

14

Johannes Koder – Ioannis stouraitis

dynasty (1185–1204), the empire experienced new military decay as a consequence of its weak political and economic structures. this decay ended with the fall of Constantinople to the Crusaders and was marked by the final collapse of eastern roman political order, as defined through the prerogative of the monocracy of the emperor of Constantinople. although the ideological framework of the Comnenian reconquista was to a certain extent defined by ideological continuity with regard to the main patterns of Byzantine political ideology (ecumenism), the dif- ferent political and military size of the empire indeed influenced the ruling élite’s approach to the notion of pax byzantina and as a consequence refined the pragmatic objectives of its expansive war policies. espe- cially the loss of a great part of asia minor to the seljuks was a decisive turning point from a political and economic point of view, since asia minor had been the territorial core of the empire since the seventh cen- tury and had produced the greater part of its agricultural income. the central aim of Byzantine war policies, which from the seventh to the eleventh centuries had been the maintenance and expansion of that territorial core, seems to have been transformed after the late 11 th century due to a reassessment of the imperial state’s strategic priorities within its geopolitical sphere.

*

Beyond the actual thematic limits of Byzantine ‘war ideology’ it may be of interest here to make short reference to the impact of Byzantine ideas on war and peace on the political successor of Byzantium, the ottoman empire. In the second half of the fifteenth century, sultan mehmed the Conqueror seems to have been extensively influenced by the ideological background of the Byzantine “reconquistas”, especially in its most authentic form as represented by the “Justinianic” reconquista 28 . after conquering the “daughter”, the second rome, Constantinople, as prophesized by the prophet muhammad 29 , the sultan wanted to overcome and replace the hellenic roman-Christian Oecumene with an Islamic Oecumene (most certainly centered upon his person). For that reason, he also intended to conquer the “mother”, the first rome, as we are informed by nicola sagundino: “…he (mehmed) said that the heavens had granted him the see of Constantine, and this was rome, whereas Constantinople could not be seen as equal and identical – as he had taken the daugh- ter by force, so he could also take the mother” 30 . What mehmed actually sought was to conquer all lands adjacent to the mediterranean, including europe 31 , and to lord over the ancient Oecumene. according to Jacopo de’ Languschi he said “that the world dominion should be only one, and only one faith and one monarchy should exist” 32 . Between 1453 and his early death in 1481 many europeans believed that he would succeed. even his last enterprise, in 1480, indicated that in his attempt to establish his world-wide empire he intended to invade Italy (including the “mother” rome).

28

29

30

31

32

Cf. J. Koder, Romaioi and Teukroi, Hellenes and Barbaroi, Europe and Asia. Mehmed the Conqueror – Kayser-i Rum and Sulţān

al-barrayn wa-l-bahrayn, in: the athens dialogues, stories and histories. athens 24.–27.11.2010 (http://athensdialogues.chs.

harvard.edu/cgi-bin/Webobjects/athensdialogues.woa/wa/dist?dis=21).

Sultan Mehmed’s teacher Akşemseddin (died 1460) encouraged him to conquer Constantinople, quoting a hadith of the prophet mohammed, who according to ahmed ibn hanbal (8./9. c.) had prophesied: “Verily you shall conquer Constantinople. What a

wonderful leader will he be, and what a wonderful army will that army be!”, a hadith (hakim, al-mustradak [Cairo 1997] 4.422, also Bukhari, tarikh as-saghrir [aleppo; Cairo 1975] 139; and ahmad ibn hanbal, al-musnad [Cairo 1895], 4.335; see http://historyofandalus.wordpress.com/chapter-1/muslims-in-the-maghrib-and-spain/). another hadith saying that the conqueror of Constantinople will have the prophet’s name, probably did not survive, but is only mentioned in the Kitāb al-uyūn; see

m. Canard, Les expéditions des arabes contre Constantinople dans l’histoire et dans la légende. Journal Asiatique 208 (1926)

61–121, here 84 and 107, and r. eisener 1987. Zwischen Faktum und Fiktion: eine studie zum umayyadenkalifen sulaiman b. abdalmalik und seinem Bild in den Quellen. Wiesbaden 1987, 129 n. 481–482.

ait sibi concedi coelitus Constantini sedem, hanc vero Romam esse, non Constantinopolim videri aequum valdeque congruere, quasi filiam vi ceperit, hanc etiam matrem capere posse, nicola sagundino, oratio 25.1.1454 (ed. a. pertusi, La caduta di Cos- tantinopoli, I–II. Florenz 1976. II 128–141, here 132).

For his ‘Weltherrschaftsanspruch’ see p. thorau, Konstantinopel – al Qustantiniya. das zweite rom als mittelpunkt und sinnbild des osmanischen Imperiums in der herrscherideologie mehmeds des eroberers, in: Kaiser Konstantin der Große. historische Leistung und rezeption in europa, ed. K. m. Girardet. Bonn 2007, 149–161, here 154–157 and p. thorau, Von Karl dem Großen

zum Frieden von Zsitva torok. Zum Weltherrschaftsanspruch sultan mehmeds II.und dem Wiederaufleben des Zweikaiserpro- blems nach der eroberung Konstantinopels. Historische Zeitschrift 279 (2004) 309–334.

uno dice dover esser lo imperio del mundo, una fide, una monarchia, Jacopo de’ Languschi in the chronicle of Zorzo dolfin (K. m. setton, the papacy and the Levant 1204–1571, II: the Fifteenth Century. philadelphia 1978, II 257–258 n. 23).

Byzantine approaches to Warfare (6

th – 12 th centuries): an Introduction

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the sultan’s universal aspirations were continued in the 16 th century by the rulers of the sublime porte through the reign of another admirer of alexander the Great, suleiman the magnificent (1520-1566), worthy rival of his contemporary, the emperor Charles V (1520-1556, died 1558) 33 . perhaps also in an eschatological sense, mehmed attached importance to being addressed with the title “Kayser-i rum” (“Caesar of romans”) by Christian (european) rulers 34 , though as a Muslim he had assumed the title of “Hakan or Sulţān al-barrayn wa-l-bahrayn” (“Lord / sultan of the two continents and the two seas”, namely, the asian and the european parts of the empire, and the White / aegean and the Black sea) 35 . Combining these titles – and surpassing them – Kritoboulos addresses him in a flattering manner in the dedicatory letter of his history as “supreme emperor, king of the kings, mehmet, the fortunate, the victor, the winner of trophies, the triumphant, the invincible, lord of land and sea by the will of God”, thus imitating the intitulations of the late antique roman emperors, for example: felix, victor, triumphator, invictus 36 .

33 C. iMBer. the ottoman empire, 1300–1650. the structure of power. new York 2002, 49–54.

34 so an anonymous “pamphlet contre mahomet”: καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ στέργει νὰ λέν· τῶν Ῥωμαίων βασιλέα, (ed. a. delatte. anecdota athenensia. Liège – paris 1927, 353.20–21). Cf. G. podsKalsKy. Byzantinische reichseschatologie 61–63. tursun Beg (ed. h. inalCiK and rh. Murphey. tursun Beg, the history of mehmed the Conqueror, text published in facsimile with english translation [Bibliotheca Islamica 1]. minneapolis, mn 1978), 33, maintains that mehmed did not accept that the last Byzantine emperor bore the title of Kayser-i Rum.

35 J. h. KraMers, encyclopédie de l’Islam, nouvelle edition, IX. Leiden 1998, 886.

36 Αὐτοκράτορι μεγίστῳ, βασιλεῖ βασιλέων Μεχεμέτει, εὐτυχεῖ, νικητῇ, τροπαιούχῳ, θριαμβευτῇ, ἀηττήτῳ, κυρίῳ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης θεοῦ θελήματι. For the intitulations (Latin equivalents: felix, victor, triumphator, invictus), see G. rösCh, onoma basileias. studien zum offiziellen Gebrauch der Kaisertitel in spätantiker und frühbyzantinischer Zeit (BV 10). Vienna 1978, 43–47 and 168–171.