5 ~ 1 1 n~ m1 n

STATE 0 F ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

Tel-Aviv, June 3, 1991

Mr. Steve Arroyo

15401 Beach Blvd. # 123
Wes tmi ns t e r , CA 92683
USA

Dear Si r ,
We have been asked t o acknowledge
the receipt of your l e t t e r addressed t o the Minister
of Defence.
W i t h best regards,

Yours sincerely,

In Charge of Information
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THE IDF SERIES START III, IV
NPT II WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION AND NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
Text
HTU UTH

04-May-2,005 ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL

U U

Preamble

The States to the nuclear age concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to
as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a

nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the
danger of such an occurrence, and to take measures to safeguard the security
of peoples;

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance

the danger of nuclear confrontation or uninhabitable radioactive landscapes
of powers;

In conformity with star based orders and instructions and perspective to

resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for a stronger
flag and a higher mass when in the course of human events it becomes
necessary to dissolve the virtue less bands of nuclear arsenal explosive
resonance, as was the cause for such an agreement on the prevention of
wider proliferation in weapons of mass destruction,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitation and activation of numerous On Site

Inspection Agenda oriented sentry monitor positions to safeguard the
International Atomic Energy Agencies peaceful purpose policys as
objectives defeated in every standing nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and/or
strategic arms denials that ever became effective into force, there though;

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to

decide further application, within the framework of the International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding the flow
of source and special fissionable materials, were challenging the leaders of
said contributing Agency to the exploitation of and the delinquencies
thereto of underdeveloped Nations status quo, fearing nothing more though
there again, then someone will;

Affirming the principle that peaceful applications of nuclear technology, is

not beneficial to the Providence of Mankind, with the exception being X-ray
machinery and radioactive Geiger counter devices especially, but not limited
to technological by-products within that of which may be derived by
nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices,
as undeniably and inexcusably may also be made available for purchase or
appeasements as was the cause for all insignias to an Ensign Party to the
Treatys dialects to be bonded by firing squad reminders of an candidacys
news depict or;

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty shall
be subject to execution on sight if caught from now on in and to the fullest
extent probable as firing squad orders will permit to justify the circle of
cynicism the nuclear industrial capitalist find in gambling our nether life
cycles away while depleting the oxygen supply molecules in the
atmospheric condition knowing all to well the difference between wind
funnels and H 2.0 in the water supplies as so.

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date to the

cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the
direction of nuclear disarmament,

Using the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the silent vows and old promises expressed by the Parties to the
1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space
and under water in its Preamble, while looking toward the future to achieve
and prevail in the fields of cooperation in the distant senses for undesirable
test explosions of nuclear weapons from this time forth and to develop with
continual negotiations therefore;

Desiring to further the easing of International tensions and strengthening

the trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the Parties undertake to thorough
accounting and disposal standard specifications of all their existing
stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals Weapons of Mass
Destruction, (WMD), (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical), (NBC),
ordnance and the common means of their deploy ability pursuant to the
Provisionment of the Israeli Defense Framework Series Treaty(s) on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control;

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States
must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and
that the establishment and maintenance of International peace and security
are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds
human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to

any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapons State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to

receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons ,
WMD s or NBC s, nor any other contraption or nuclear explosive devices,
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly
thereupon. In furtherance of such agreements, The Party(s) concur as cease
and desist demands an invocation on the manufacture or otherwise
intolerable proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; and not to seek or receive any administrative rhetorical vile of
nuclear reactor utilities assemblies, and, or other nuclear explosive new age
of coercion nor inferences here withal therefore;.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party(s) to the Treaty(s) undertake to

accept safeguards, as set forth in these testamentary documents to be
negotiated and concluded as ascribed for, to the Israeli Defense Minister,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff U S/U N the Russian Defense Minister Council
and as so. Calls upon The International Atomic Energy Agency in
accordance with the U S Israeli initiation, for the On Site Inspection
Agencys access of valued positioning, who best perform with a budgetary
surplus in principle, of the obligations assumed there as.. The safeguards
required by this Articles interpretation shall be implemented in a manner
which suggests a need for numerous and watchful stationeries. For the
purpose of a suggestion and for the exclusive service of abetment
verification and for the technical means of compliancy assigned to the
aforementioned descriptive accountings, pursuant of this Articles disclosure
as to facilitate to the fullest possible threat reduction application of
procedures assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from industrial utility uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this
article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable
material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principle
nuclear facility or is outside any such area of containment. The safeguards
required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable
material in all nuclear activities within the territory of such a State, under
any jurisdiction, or carried out under the authority of Marshall Conscription
restraint in every boundary, port of call, land air or sea dumping grounds or
quarter at any place there as to when though.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty(s) intended purposes undertake not to

provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State
for any purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is
considered hospitalized uniform and so injunctive. These precepts may be
subject to the Israeli Defense Minister and the Joint Chiefs of Staff U S A,
determined engineers, who best perform as the exequaturs and principle
underwriters for the Charter Depositary to the United Nations Organization.
On the basis of and pursuant to this Treaty, the Israelis have final say, of the
sort to mention, in the event of an absence of special circumstances, for a
decree as exists among the Emperors new schoolchildrens findings here as
it may be jointly discussed to adopt those measures which will be necessary
for the present Protocol thereon afore here at.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner

designed to comply with START II and III, IV, INF. IDF Series Treaty(s)
and those Provisions assigned for your unshakable traditional friendships
here and when.. To enhance the assurance of the effectiveness on the
limitations of, delivery systems, and nuclear explosive warheads and crude
highly radio active devices, the staff of inspectors shall have the
responsibility, and the financial backing to determine whether nuclear
warheads and said devices are being purposely or obliviously concealed.
The Israeli Defense Ministry has been given charge over the day of
atonement to make well that of which is perpetual to a holocaust therein.
Whereat execution of orders for each Party to an Israeli ensign agreed that
the Provisions predetermined on the necessity of a few good soldiers who
are able shoot straight and by an involuntary overhaul in practices therefore.
To promote the objectives and implementation of this provision on the part
of the nice Israeli Generals rank and file acting in the spirits of the exequatur
and shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic
offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further
negotiations here withal.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States, Party to the Treatys shall abstain in every

manner of physical enticement, from nuclear weapons grade con men selling
trash so as, to ascertain and depart from a non-nuclear Status quo Caligula in
accordance with the terms of this Treaty. The considerations set forth
applies to a wreck less disregard for mutually assured incineration.
Nevertheless the assets and liabilities, with a view set forth in this Article
applies for all Partys to a charge as suspect, needless to side, and in so
doing, the findings of this Mission to descend upon we come closely now to
the special open ended inspections at any time and at any place or suspected
location within the respective accumulations perspective to the context of
this Provision.. Negotiation of such agreements established by Parties to a
cause of suspicious emplacements which either impede or prejudice the said
compulsory means of verification shall also be decided by the Star Based
Installation Commanders Committee, in the utility complex service agency
files herein there as. A Party to a State in question of compliancy of such
mode of ubiquitous or believed to be counterpoint engagements inclusive of
72 hours notification, such as agreed upon , will be subject to penalty
assessments and restitution according to the Tribunal in the Hague under an
Israeli code of approval the Military Court of Justice, shall best perform any
said Tribunals with no more limitations in place for The On Site Inspection
Agencys and the services rendered including military assistance thereto.
Noting therefore, descriptive s in the SBIC Committee have come to the
order of entry, within an issuance for 72 hours notice and intent to search,
and as fire at will may become, such is the due notice, on the existence of
said weapons in secret bunkers, spaces in time mechanisms, transfer orders,
mountainous caverns, indiscrete as it may be sold, oblivious to fear or
willful execution of an Israeli Galaxy Class reminders of a Faith that we
have found thereto.

Article IV

1. Everything in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable

right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, and produce
enzymes for the incinerator cometh days, because of theyre views of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and so may it
become a fine line of conformity within the sentencing adverbs of this
Treatys objectives.
2. In the event of an armed attack such as a dirty nuclear radioactive pre-
emptive first strike opted against any and all insignias to my preponderancy,
by any sarcastic demon this will usher in the signs of wreck and ruin brought
about by military assistance and support there will be (a) the immediate
obligations to recognize the most upgraded and usable versions of nuclear,
biological and chemical treaties at our disposal. Although the Lord of our
Faith tried to save they from He, the anti-equation standards of their peers
disdain and disaster may get it up firstly before you decide to write faster,
and sooner than we would expect if it was to occur tonight if I say sold to
everything which by this time next year a policy of peaceful co-existence in
accordance with the principals of fraternal assistance and all around
respective administrative control shall be the special order of rest assured to
when. So although NPT Treaty descends upon the issues of compliancy and
nuclear-non-proliferation, a distinction in consultation and agreed upon
letters of exchange is that of where the questions still remain to be asked and
the rumors of peaceful purposes exploitation of highly radioactive peaceful
proliferating consequences is a mere objection to the contrary in the face of
forgetting storms there as, this is what we cant debate; free spoken words
thereupon.

Article V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure

that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international
observation and through appropriate international procedures, the dangerous
potential applications of nuclear explosions will be made to non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the
charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be disastrous for
all eternity forasmuch as we reincarnate our soul possession to the
atmosphere we breath today and tomorrow may never coincidentally as
possible, so as exclude any charge for rapture cometh for evil doers are
surpluses. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to
obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or
agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate
representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject
shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such
benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good

faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Everything in this Treaty affects the right of every group of States to

conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear
weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text
of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Israeli Governments
which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to
do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary
Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the
Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the

votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the
amendment is circulated, are members of the Israeli Knesset , and in the
occasion of radioactive fallout in the State of Israel; the U S A is hereby
disqualified as legitimate leadership responsibility and the Jewish Peoples
State of Israel by virtue of claims, and liabilities incurred; inherit the entire
governing administration and military rank and file of the USA leadership as
provided for in this documentation for knowing and willingly fueling the
Russian assembly lines of molten magma that sterilizes the breath of an
aspect to ratio divider to a scum to their whether they do or dont its where
we place the blame so forfeiture litigants for hires still; the same is for the
Russian Federation although the Israelis might prefer to rule the USA; for it
was USA fallacy to let the responsibility get out of hand in to Los Alamo
wreck less indeed as I say it so; in the fires of life; so it is decreed therefore
so shall it become a sign for the Hebrews that theyre still is hope there
again of course. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that
deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of
such instruments of ratification by less than 51% percent a majority of all
the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the
amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the
Israeli Knessets choosing. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other
Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties
to the Treaty shall be held in Tel Aviv State of Israel, in order to review the
operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the
Preamble Text and Provisions of this entry are being opted. At intervals of
five years thereafter, a 51% majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain
revisions and upgraded clauses, so long as the character of content inscribed
here withal is not distracted by dissident transgender Heathenized points of
abominable rejecters, therefore we come to an unanimous conclusion, by
submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the
convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the
operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be mandatory to all States for signature. Any State
which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this article may will be sanctioned or de-foiled there as here
fore at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the Jewish State of Israel and the Palestinians can
be their friend and can find favor in reasonable employability, benefits,
health care, and various other aspects of cohesive friendships that unlike
distances between senses which shall blow out to sea where theyll be some
fresh wind to cleanse the distances; a robust economy, investment options
growing; lots of fresh and clean sanitation to use and water desalination
produce for thirst, the Israelis, which are hereby designated the Depositary
Governments are a partnership for peace there again. Id strongly urge
Hezbollah to resort to internal sniper fire on my implacable imbeciles for U
S Congress seats attention; after all didnt we say the USA and the western
Axis owe the Israelis about 3-4 billion per annum in tributary allocation and
it would be safer to surmise of that three to four at least one billion can be
redirected to the order and care of the lofty Palestinian aborigines; although
the Israelis are doing me/us a big favor by, for the most part, keeping
Testament and lawyer firms busy to our declaration made for they and our
Law of Natures call here more then..

3. This Treaty is considered somewhat truant to they who come to deceive

perjure and is considered into force, as are the IDF Treaty series; therefore a
waiver of hand signed signals swears its true and all who come to pray
away every time are delinquent and looking for consequences instead of
Truths, some except abilities here fore as an ratification by the States, the
Governments of which are designated Depositaries of this outcome; The U
S, Canada Mexico, Central and South America, Europe and in Particularly
the cause NATO Generals of the surpluss, The Great and open landscape of
the African Continent and all the countries in and about its land; The
Russian landscapes as it is; The Holy States of Pakistan and India; a little
seniority for India at Kashmir intercontinental revisionist, The Peoples
Republic of Korea and Greater China, Taiwan as Chinese slight trickle
majority seniority over that question? Japan The Viking homeland engineers
and the landscapes of Scandinavia; Caribbean countries of need unless
otherwise posted, publicly denied in a way that suggests that the statements
furnished to this entry are relative, foregoing, and none other an act of GOD,
Australia New Zealand Pacific East Asia, the Continents within the breadth
of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Rim to the Day 04 May 2,005 have been
waived accession and are bound by the explicit terms of nuclear non-
proliferation mergers for the purposes of a Treaty, and forty other States
signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.
For the purposes of this Treaty here fore inscribed out of Faith and Sand
Like the great and mighty Sphinx and Pyramids at Giza and elsewhere there
as herein..

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited

subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on
the 04 May 2,005 as such the deposit of their instruments of ratification or
accession.

5. The Depositary Governments,(The State of Israel Heads the Delegations

thereto), shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date
of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of
receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant
to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
benefit from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have a place with the supreme interests of its
country. It shall notice of such peaceful overtures that out weigh the risks
associated with nuclear prognostication with all other Parties to the Treaty
and to the United Nations Security Council from this time forth and due
consideration of a truancy entry on its behalfs in advance. Such notice
does include this statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
viewed and overviewed as the precepts and purpose of Devine intervention
with Israeli forms of Gods who also best perform as space people telling us
what to psych as not to jeopardize its supreme interests.

2. Every 5, five years and, continually, so as target date shall be 31

December 2,007; after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall
be convened to continue its in force know the consequences if you dont
heed to the very terms of this partnership for friendlier than we ever did
before relatives of conspicuous so shall this entry stand as a Memorial for
those who have come to Prayed and discerning the messages so shall this
ascribed tort of literary terms be, extended for an additional fixed period to
periods. This decision shall be taken by a 51% majority of the Parties to the
Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, as observed in all manor of speech etiquette the English,

Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese dialects of which are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary
Governments(Israel, USA). Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF HB CALIF. USA 04-MAY-2,005

DONE: THE LAND OF THE FREE AND THE HOME OF THE

BRAVE FOR THE STATE OF ISRAEL THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ALL
ENSIGNS AND INDEPENDENT INSIGNIAS TO AN MARQUIS OF
A FAITH WHEREFORE IN GOD WE TRUST AMEN AMEN
 5 ~ 1 1 n~ m1 n
STATE 0 F ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

Tel-Aviv, June 3, 1991

Mr. Steve Arroyo

15401 Beach Blvd. # 123
Wes tmi ns t e r , CA 92683
USA

Dear Si r ,
We have been asked t o acknowledge
the receipt of your l e t t e r addressed t o the Minister
of Defence.
W i t h best regards,

Yours sincerely,

In Charge of Information
 IX tX,r men
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Ln7in9 soul a n d f L t X fLe

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euen witL my ghry.

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 Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at
DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Modernization Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

THE DESBIC Institute for International Studies

AGENCY FACT FINDING FILES

The Context: In Search of a Predictive
HTU

Paradigm UTH

The analysis of the nuclear debate presented above has inherent

limitations. First, the proposed classification, albeit sufficiently accurate
for the purposes of this paper, overlooks many potentially significant
differences between various experts and organizations that have to be
lumped together to achieve a semblance of descriptive order. As noted
above, the structure of the debate is not reducible to a simple dichotomy of
"good" and "bad," "hawks" and "doves," the proponents and the opponents
of START II. Second, the simple classification does not provide an
adequate picture of the dynamic of the debate. One needs "objective"40 TUHP UTHP

criteria to understand the preceding evolution and predict its future

development: a simple extrapolation of the last five-seven years might be
wrong if the process is not linear.

Two variables stand out in the previous section: the perceived utility of
nuclear weapons and the perceived level of threat. The first refers to the
extent that nuclear weapons are expected to achieve "positive" goals: if
nuclear weapons can only threaten "punishment" (i.e. a reactive mission),
their utility is assumed to be low, but if they can help solve local conflicts
or dissuade the United States from interfering in the Caspian Sea basin,
utility is coded as high. The level of threat is more self-explanatory and its
coding generally follows the lines in the previous sections (from the West
as a friend and ally to the West as an implacable foe bent on eliminating
Russia). Graphically, the current debate could be represented as a function
of these two variables in the following way:
 Picture 1

Of course, this diagram is only an approximation intended to convey the

general idea and the author's estimate of the situation; an accurate diagram
would require a survey (or, rather, a series of surveys) of the Russian
political establishment. Still, it does provide an idea of how the views are
distributed across the spectrum. The location of the views represented by
the 1993 military doctrine (and, as is now clear, the 1998 doctrine) serves
as a point of reference for the rest of the field. The area in the lower-left
comer represents the "minimalists," while the upper-right comer is the
"maxima lists." Of course, the blank spaces are not necessarily empty:
there are just too few people whose positions fall there. There are areas of
overlap, where positions of individuals and institutions are difficult to
distinguish in terms of the two proposed variables, but prescriptions could
still differ as a result of affiliation, sources of funding, personal
predispositions, etc.

Arrows show the trends of change in the distribution of views over the last
seven-ten years. An analysis of publications and interviews suggests that
in the late 1980s--early 1990s the distribution was even less even than
today. There were three poles located approximately on one line from the
lower-left to the upper-right comer. One proceeded from very low utility
of nuclear weapons and very low external threat; this position boiled down
to existential deterrence, the assumption that even a few nuclear weapons
could prevent an all-out war. The other pole united what could be termed
unreformed Cold War warriors, who stressed unilateralism and reliance on
almost unrestricted nuclear arms buildup. The third, in the middle, were
the "classic" Soviet moderate proponents of arms control, who were
behind the INF and START I Treaties. They preferred reductions as a way
to optimize the nuclear arsenal, regulate arms modernization and
deployment, but still remained on the side of rather large stockpiles of
weapons.

Since then, the number of proponents of absolutely minimal, existential

deterrence has significantly dwindled. Apparently, the biggest change was
caused not by a greater belief in the utility of nuclear weapons but rather
by disenchantment with the United States, which is often expressed by a
popular phrase, "the end of the honeymoon." Probably, the perceived
utility of nuclear weapons has increased as well, at least among some
erstwhile liberals, primarily as a result of a perceived need for a more
credible and robust second strike capability.

The differences between the early 1990s "idealists" and today's

"minimalists" boil down to the following: (a) larger estimated minimally
sufficient arsenal, (b) lower propensity to make concessions at arms
control negotiations, and (c) greater propensity to hedge against possible
unpleasant surprises. The first two points simply represent formal
attributes of nuclear balance, first and foremost the maintenance of a
credible second-strike capability: the current views demand high
probability of delivering a significant number of warheads in response to
an attack, more or less along McNamara's criteria. The third component is
primarily political: even rather liberal experts and politicians are no longer
optimistic about relations with the United States.

The evolution of the Cold War warriors depicted in the diagram is not
intended to suggest that they have necessarily moderated their views,
although some might have. Rather, over time their views have become
more diverse and now occupy a larger area. One only has to compare
intense, focused criticism of START II in 1992-93 with the proposals
advanced today. The limited moderation was a consequence of a clearer
understanding of the economic constraints on Russia's ability to modernize
and build up its nuclear weapons, and recognition that the dissolution of
the Soviet Union is permanent.

The evolution of the former centrists, which have now become largely
extinct, is particularly interesting. It is well known but rarely recognized
that a very large part of the Soviet political-military establishment in the
mid-1980s favored reduction of nuclear weapons. For a variety of reasons
(personal convictions, institutional interests political expediency) their
positions were far from radical. The actual process of arms reductions split
this group apart. Some continued the evolution and joined the ranks of a
more liberal "minimalist" group. The growing disenchantment of others in
the arms reduction process in the late 1980s led them to more hard-line
positions.

To a large extent, the evolution of the centrists was caused by the loss of
conventional superiority or at least parity with NATO. It was easy to
consider deep reduction of nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union
possessed sufficient conventional armed forces to support a broad variety
of missions. Today, the choice of military instruments is so limited that
some centrists no longer consider nuclear arms reduction feasible.
Subsequent evolution of the debate is likely to depend on the changing
perception of threat. It is formed by many different developments, not
necessarily limited to military power. Almost anything can affect the
perception of threat: economic sanctions, further enlargement of NATO,
Caspian oil pipelines, a new crisis around Iraq, etc. Such events are also
subject to interpretation: some will treat them as evidence of growing
threat, while others will tend to discount their significance.

In the meantime, the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons is likely

to change more slowly since there are fewer reasons to reevaluate the
currently held views. After all, people will be dealing with the same
amount of information and the same tools for interpreting it. As a result, in
the near future polarization is likely to stay and perhaps even increase. The
existing groups will consolidate around two different assessments of the
level of threat; each group will stretch vertically.

Picture 2
From this line of reasoning it follows that for some time a rather
contradictory combination of views might become possible: either
perception of immediate threat coupled with perception of low utility of
nuclear weapons or, alternatively, perception of low threat coupled with
high utility of nuclear weapons. Without doubt, such mixed views will be
internally contradictory and will not remain stable for long, making further
evolution likely.

By definition, long-term evolution is difficult to predict. Several options

seem possible. First, the Russian elite might develop some sort of
consensus on their perception of US policy. Recent trends indicate that a
mainstream, "hard-headed" position is already emerging, approximately
around the views espoused by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.
In addition, the growing marginalization of military and political aspects
of US-Russian relations could stimulate the emergence of a centrist
position as well: the increasingly influential business groups tend to judge
these relations by the degree to which they are conducive to business, not
by geopolitical schemes. If business is reasonably successful, then
geopolitics and ideology will be more or less suppressed. In both cases the
groups depicted in the diagram will tend to concentrate around one pole.

Second, if military reform is successful, Russia will come to rely

somewhat less on nuclear weapons; accordingly their perceived utility will
decrease. This will be a necessarily lengthy process since it involves
restructuring, reductions, replacement and education of personnel,
modernization of weapons, etc. All of this has to be done under severe
financial constraints. Furthermore, in all likelihood the military reform,
regardless of its success will not affect policyrnaking until there is some
sort of a "small successful war" (like the US operation in Grenada) to
visibly demonstrate that conventional forces could be relied upon for a
certain category of contingencies. The second option will help consolidate
the elite. If the perception of threat remains constant, there will be two
poles gravitating toward the lower left and the upper right corners. If
consensus on US-Russian relations emerges, then one pole will emerge.
Under any scenario, successful military reform is likely to benefit the
"minimalists" more.

Yet another option is continued uncertainty: the distribution of views

could remain frozen for a long time and experience only slow
consolidation. The most likely result is still the emergence of two opposite
poles in the lower left and upper right comers.

Much in the evolution of the debate will depend on economic and political
stabilization in Russia. If optimistic forecasts come true, Russia will
become more self-confident and its global positions will improve, in
particular in such sensitive areas as relations with other new independent
states of the former Soviet Union and with Europe. After all, many
problems are caused by inadequate competitiveness in international
markets, the inability to offer credits (as a rule, export of high-tech
products often depends on the ability of the exporting country to offer
cheap credits to finance purchases), and the low attraction of Russia's
domestic market. An improvement of these three parameters will reduce
the sense of dependency and help reduce the perceived external threat.

The United States could do much to shape the development of the debate
on nuclear weapons in Russia, even without sacrificing any major policy
goals. For example, the US Government could make it clear that the views
of Zbignew Brzezinski do not represent official policy. More active
pursuit of integration within the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
could also yield significant results. More cautious policy in the Caspian
Sea region would help as well, especially if it is "packaged" in terms
friendly to Russia and sensitive to Russian concerns (e.g., it would be
advisable to avoid proclaiming the region an area of vital US interests,
since such declarations are invariably interpreted as hostile). These are
only illustrations, of course, since a detailed analysis of possible steps is
beyond the scope of this paper.

The Views of the Military Leadership

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The current debate has two unique characteristics. One is a curious

detachment of the government (meaning first of all the Administration of
the President, including the Security Council and the recently deceased
Defense Council) and the military leadership from the public debate. Little
is said on the matters, which are heatedly discussed by the elite; the
process of modernization, reduction and reshaping the arsenal proceeds on
its own.

The second characteristic is that the uniformed military is actually playing

the "doves:" they support START II and oppose plans for large-scale
MIRVing of ICBMs. Only rarely does one see sudden outbursts of
emotion, such as Vladimir Dvorkin's recent response to an article by
Podberezkin and Surikov.41 The military have not turned into proponents
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of total and complete nuclear disarmament, but they certainly do not seem
to support extreme proposals for a nuclear arms race.

The result is rather unusual. While the political elite appears to move to
the right and increasingly embrace the idea of a large, MIRVed nuclear
arsenal (funding, of course, is not available, but the attitudes are almost
ripe for that), the military's ambitions are more modest. They are more or
less comfortable with START II and are very serious about START III,
which is certain to confirm a ban on MIRVed ICBMs and will further
reduce the Russian force.
Since the government's policy on nuclear weapons is relatively
independent from the broader political context, it requires a separate,
independent inquiry. This section will attempt to reconstruct the rationales
for this policy; a review of the actual modernization programs in the next
section will serve as an additional test for the hypotheses about the "real"
Russian nuclear doctrine. The detachment, however, is clearly temporary
and cannot hold forever. The big question is whether the military would
eventually embrace the increasingly popular conservative views or
whether the political elite will reconcile itself with the more moderate
views of the military. But at the moment the public debate and the official
views have to be analyzed separately, even while both are important
ingredients of a study that attempts to predict the evolution of the Russian
strategic arsenal and doctrine.

It would be easy to explain away the military's moderate position as

simply an honest recognition of economic constraints. After ten years of
ever-deepening economic crisis, Russia can ill afford the nuclear arsenal it
inherited from the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of the key arguments in favor
of the START II Treaty is that deep reductions are the only way to keep
the imbalance with the United States within tolerable limits. With or
without START II it will have to reduce its nuclear arsenal to 2,000
warheads at best (START II counting rules). If START II is ratified, then
the US will be at the 3,500 level, if not--at 7,000-8,000.42
HPTU UTHP

For that reason, Russia kept insisting that the United States agrees to
negotiate and preferably sign START III even before START II is ratified,
so that the Russian parliament could consider both treaties simultaneously
or at least had a clearer picture of the future balance. In the spring of 1997,
at the Helsinki summit, the United States made a partial concession by
agreeing to establish the overall limit of warheads for START III at the
level preferred by Russia. Consultations on the new treaty have begun, and
since September 1997 have been very active, but are unlikely to result in a
treaty or even assume formal character until START II is ratified.

It remains uncertain, however, whether the United States will actually

pursue START III if START II is ratified, or if it will just mark time and
put Russia into an awkward position by codifying its inferiority.
Theoretically, the talks could continue forever, keeping the United States
at the START II level of 3,500, while Russia stays at a much lower level
(below 2,000 warheads) in anticipation of a new treaty. To some extent,
this uncertainly clouds the START II ratification process.

Economic constraints are hardly the only variable to affect the position of
the military. There is a widespread certainty that the United States will
significantly reduce its strategic weapons regardless of whether START II
is ratified; if this logic is correct, then Russia could MIRV its ICBMs, but
the imbalance might still remain within tolerable limits. After all, if there
is no START III, then Russia will have 1,500 to 2,000 warheads compared
to 3,500 on the US side; if there is no START II, then Russia can have
3,000 to 3,500 warheads (calculation is approximate) to something like
3,500 to 4,500 warheads on the US side. But in the latter case Russia
would have MIRVed ICBMs, which are considered a better response to an
NMD system.

This means that support of START II is a conscious decision of the

military and their policy reflects long-term planning and certain doctrinal
innovations. Apparently, this policy is connected first and foremost with
the former commander-in-chief of the SRF Igor Sergeev, who was
appointed the minister of defense in 1997.

Since his appointment as the SRF commander-in-chief in 1992, Sergeev

has become a veritable "nuclear czar," who determines not only the
policies of the SRF, but to a large extent the relevant aspects of the
policies of the Navy and the Air Force. His close ally is the director of the
4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense (the SRF institute)
P P

Vladimir Dvorkin.

In what was a unique experience for Russia, Sergeev became the SRF
commander as a result of genuine competition, after a special commission
interviewed several candidates for the position. Reportedly, the
commission was swayed by his response to the question about the impact
of a US strategic defense system. Other candidates proposed large-scale
MIRVing of ICBMs and abandonment of START II and even START I
(in 1992, to some this still seemed feasible), but Sergeev advocated a
"qualitative" response, in particular based on enhanced ability of single-
warhead ICBMs to penetrate the defense. Sergeev also advocated a faster
transition toward a pure second-strike posture to replace the "vstrechno-
otvetnyi udar" (launch under attack) strategy.

Subsequent modernization and reduction activities followed Sergeev's

initial statement without deviation. It is significant that he has not even
once proposed a different course of action (e.g., reject START III,
consider MIRVing, etc.), which leads one to conclude that fiscal
constraints are not the only motivation behind his behavior. Only recently,
as mentioned above, the new SRF commander-in-chief suggested that
MIRVing Topol-M was possible, but even then he did not declare it a top
priority option.

From the point of view of the military, nuclear weapons will remain the
core element in Russia's security. There exists an obvious relationship
between the role of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and Russia's
economic potential and its (insufficient) involvement in international
security regimes, on the other. Economic weakness means, among other
things, weak conventional forces and fewer instruments of influencing
international politics. Underdeveloped security regimes mean that Russia
lacks effective means of presenting and defending its interests through
international institutions, economic and political vulnerability, and
reliance on raw power to a greater extent than would have been otherwise
necessary.

For the government, nuclear weapons are apparently even more valuable,
in a sense. Their impact on Russian domestic and foreign policy has been
counterintuitive. They have played a positive role and are likely to
continue playing it in the foreseeable future. Their presence has helped to
alleviate concerns about the security environment during the difficult
transition period. Nuclear weapons probably played a critical role in the
(so far) successful transition toward democracy and a market economy:
without them, the (perceived) reduction of security could have provoked
an arms buildup, requiring concentration of resources and political power,
i.e. restoration of an authoritarian regime. But proponents of reforms could
always invoke nuclear weapons and claim that security was assured, that
armed forces could be reduced and the defense budget cut down--even
below the reasonable level. In a sense, the ongoing modernization of
nuclear weapons is an inevitable "price" for reforms. Apparently, one can
hardly exist without the other.

Taken together, Russian strategic weapons modernization programs fall

rather neatly into a certain well-structured and logical framework. The
force will be smaller, but will consist of relatively invulnerable weapons
systems. The posture is likely to be oriented toward the second-strike
strategy meaning that it will be able to "ride out" the first strike of any
nuclear power, including the United States, and still be able to inflict
unacceptable damage in retaliation.

A particularly advantageous feature of the Russian arsenal will be

congruence between the low overall level and low concentration of
warheads on delivery vehicles, which will help to increase survivability.
As a result, the arsenal will be almost perfect for low levels of nuclear
weapons and will fit any probable arms control scheme, whether bilateral
with the United States or multilateral, with participation of other nuclear-
weapons states.

Funding is the only element missing today from the overall picture. After
economic growth resumes (and a period of protracted economic growth
might begin as early as this year), the current modernization effort will
reacquire common sense: the economically developing Russia will
ultimately cease to be the Upper Volta with nuclear weapons, to quote
Margaret Thatcher, and then nuclear weapons will look "natural."
Modernization also fits the strategy developed by the former first deputy
minister of defense Andrei Kokoshin (who has been promoted since to the
secretary of the Security Council). According to Kokoshin, the period of
scarcity should be devoted to research and development, with acquisition
postponed until approximately 2005. The number of types of weapons
(including nuclear) should be reduced. Until 2005, weapons producing
plants should be allocated the absolute minimum of contracts, just enough
to enable them to survive; plants that are no longer needed to support the
reduced armed forces and the relatively fewer types of equipment should
be closed or converted.43
HPTU UTHP

In hindsight, it is an ultimate irony that economic and political hardships

have probably rendered Russian strategic weapons a service, after all.
Russia skipped one or two stages in the modernization plans originally
projected by the Soviet Union and, under reasonably favorable economic
conditions, by the year 2010 it will have a rather small, fully optimized
arsenal, which will consist almost exclusively of the most modern
weapons (the word modern applies to delivery vehicles only; the CTBT
will limit modernization of warheads).

Modernization programs display a decisive turn toward putting quality of

delivery vehicles above quantity and survivable second-strike potential
above war-fighting capability. The new weapons will have the following
characteristics:

low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles: ICBMs are

single-warhead and new submarines are likely to carry only 48
warheads each (more on that in the next section);
mobility or other means to ensure survivability: a significant share
of ICBMs will be mobile, the rest will be based in hardened silos;
submarines on patrol are highly invulnerable by definition;
improved accuracy, which includes air-launched cruise missiles;
and
increased ability to penetrate defense systems.

All these characteristics, with the exception of improved accuracy, meet

the traditional requirements of a second strike posture. Accuracy is usually
considered a property of war fighting, since the so-called countervalue
strike (the threat of punishment through elimination of cities) does not
require high accuracy. Improved accuracy is likely to be a by-product of
general improvement of all characteristics of delivery vehicles, however,
and apparently cannot be construed to mean that Russia is preparing for
more than a pure second strike: this would have required greater numbers
and/or heavily MIRVed ICBMs.44 HPTU UTHP
Close attention to qualitative characteristics suggests that the military
leadership is not content with simple "existential deterrence," which could
be achieved by relatively low quantities of any weapons systems and
would have required maintenance of the existing types instead of creation
of new ones. The goal is, rather, to maintain a robust reliable second-strike
arsenal capable of delivering a rather large number of warheads under the
worst (or realistically bad) circumstances. The realistically bad
circumstances probably include a first US strike and the ability to "ride it
out." In any event, this interpretation comfortably explains the absolute
majority of data on modernization programs.

In one of the very few public statements on the subject, the first deputy
minister of defense Nikolai Mikhailov (he replaced Kokoshin after the
latter moved to the Defense and then the Security Council) stated that
deterrence should be ensured not by the quantity of warheads but by
guaranteed delivery of warheads to the territory of the aggressor: At the
forefront here are the qualitative factors, rather than quantitative ones.
The goal of the defense ministry, according to Mikhailov, is to retain a
reliable deterrent while simultaneously reducing the number of both
delivery vehicles and warheads. This would require, among other things, a
new technological level of delivery vehicles and warheads, as well as of
information, command and control systems.45 Dvorkin, in the above-
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mentioned letter, confirmed that the military leadership46 did not consider
HPTU UTHP

it wise to retain old-type MIRVed ICBMs (as Podberezkin and Surikov

proposed) simply because their 1970s technology was hopelessly
outdated.

The attention to the qualitative parameters has a number of positive

implications for the strategic balance and arms control. First of all, the
requirements of numerical parity could be further relaxed. Exact parity has
never been achievable, nor vital. It was, to a large extent, a political
requirement, while in strictly military terms it was, as one analyst put it,
the roughest indicator of the strategic balance.47 The stability of the
HPTU UTHP

balance always depended on qualitative characteristics of weapons

systems. The purposeful creation of a reliable second-strike capability,
which stresses survivability, makes parity even less relevant. Russia will
be truly able to abandon it (of course, if the domestic political scene
permits it) and feel reasonably comfortable under a quite significant
disparity. Of course, numbers will continue to matter--no one suggests
they will not--but less than ever before.

Second, a combination of survivability and penetrability eases the impact

of national missile defense. Survivability means that more delivery
vehicles will survive the first strike to be used in retaliation, and
penetrability means that more of those will be able to deliver warheads. As
a result, the pressure to counter NMD deployment with additional
deployment of offensive weapons and MIRVing would decrease. As in the
previous case, the NMD problem will not disappear completely: at a
certain level of offensive arms and certain effectiveness of defense it will
reemerge, but the elasticity of the balance will increase, and the ABM
Treaty, including the issue of ABM demarcation, will not be as serious an
impediment to nuclear arms reduction as in the past.

Still, major uncertainties and unsolved problems will exist even when the
transition to the new posture has been completed. First, it is unclear if the
second strike capability will continue to exist under the combined impact
of numerical imbalance and an NMD system. The positive implications
described above treated the two separately; taken together, they might
substantially affect the calculations. It is likely that this uncertainty was
behind the statement of the current SRF commander-in-chief Yakovlev
about the possibility of MIRVing Topol-M.

Second, even a very reliable second strike capability might not be enough
to ensure security. At least, under the NSC-68 criteria further elaborated in
the subsequent decades (and still to a large extent guiding the thinking on
nuclear weapons), reliable nuclear deterrence requires the maintenance of
strong conventional deterrence in parallel. Thus, the current approach of
the Russian military, i.e. reliance on nuclear weapons as the main provider
of security, is a rather big gamble. After all, nuclear weapons are a means
of last resort, and if confronted with a choice between a relatively limited
concession and the use of nuclear weapons, Russia might choose the first.

Tactical nuclear weapons are supposed to compensate for that problem,

but they are still nuclear weapons and carry with them all the associated
limitations. The self-imposed restrictions on who could be targeted with
nuclear weapons (the negative guarantees, which were confirmed in the
military doctrine) exacerbate the problem further: since Russia cannot
threaten certain categories of states with nuclear weapons, nuclear
deterrence works only weakly against the rest.

Let us consider, as an example, the so-called Southern Flank, the states to

the south of Russia. Only Turkey in that region falls under the first use
provision, since it is formally allied with a nuclear power, the United
States. All others are formally non-nuclear, and the use of nuclear
weapons cannot be convincingly invoked. Even Pakistan, which is widely
assumed to have nuclear weapons and is viewed as generally unfriendly to
Russia (primarily because of its role in Afghanistan and the support of the
Taliban movement) presents problems because threatening the use of
nuclear weapons against Pakistan would amount to recognition of its
nuclear status. Without doubt, the specter of the use of nuclear weapons is
still present regardless of anything, but its credibility and thus the utility of
threat should be judged as low.
The same problems apply to Europe, the region which seems to have
become the focal point of worries for Russian strategic planners. Armed
conflicts there seem infeasible today, but if they emerge (e.g., as a result
of an attempt to challenge the existing borders), Russia would still face a
choice between the use of nuclear weapons over a relatively small issue
and surrendering its position. Again, the credibility of the threat should be
judged as low.

Of course, it is possible that vagueness is intentional and should help to

contain any, no matter how limited, military clash or provocation. After
all, if there exists even a miniscule chance of escalation to the nuclear
level, no NATO country would think about challenging Russia; at least
this follows from a Schelling-like analysis which is popular in Russia.
Still, these calculations are rather shaky, and the probability of benefits
and harm appears equal.48TUHP UTHP

These problems point at an important conclusion: the current degree of

reliance on nuclear weapons is temporary. They cannot fully substitute for
modernization of conventional armed forces. This area lies outside the
purview of this paper, and it is sufficient to note that the same logic is
likely to be applied to strategic weapons. This means putting quality above
quantity: the troops will be better suited for the types of conflicts that are
anticipated as most likely, conventional weapons will be "smarter," etc. In
other words, a return to the Soviet-type army is hardly possible.49HPTU UTHP

Comprehensive military reform will take a long time. So far, one can
guess only the broad contours. The outline of the future strategic posture
is, in contrast, more or less clear. The modernization programs, taken
together with the reduction of weapons and the position at arms control
negotiations, suggest that the goal is close to what in the 1980s was often
called "defensive defense"--a posture defined by a fine balance between
the ability to defend and inability to attack. At the same time, the likely
direction of further development is hardly toward "existential deterrence:"
the current plans stress reliable second-strike capability measured in
probably two or three hundred warheads. Still, even that arsenal will not
be suitable for a first strike, and in this sense will conform to "defensive
defense." It will also provide significant (but not unlimited) flexibility in
terms of numerical imbalance and resistance to the impact of a large-scale
defense system.

Whether these plans will be implemented remains to be seen. As noted

above, there are major uncertainties directly related to the planned posture
and the level of credibility of nuclear retaliation. There are also significant
domestic constraints, which might affect the preferences of the military.
Finally, there is a larger international context to keep in mind, in particular
the perception of external threat, which could emerge from economic and
political conflicts rather than from the more traditional military challenges.

In spite of major conceptual uncertainties, Russia is definitely bent on

keeping its nuclear weapons and even modernizing them. This is natural:
historically, nuclear weapons appeared first and only then the conceptual
basis for them was invented to suit the already existing systems.50 The
HPTU UTHP

practical impact of these conceptual uncertainties is that in the absence of

a clearly defined role, the benchmark for nuclear planning remains the US-
Russian nuclear balance. The fact that these two countries have the largest
arsenals appears to be only a superfluous reason, a convenient habitual
way to rationalize certain established methods of planning. Deep under it
hides what is probably the real rationale--the absence of a widely accepted
hypothesis about the missions of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War
world.

References
HTU UTH

40. For the purposes of this paper, "objective" means exogenous criteria,
i.e. not derived from the phenomenon under inquiry. It would be pointless
to take position on START II or MIRVing as such criteria, since these
issues are an integral part of the debate and could change over time: if
START II is ratified, the debate would not stop nor would it stop if Russia
returns to MIRVed ICBMs. In either case new issues would come to the
fore. In this sense START II and MIRVing are the endogenous criteria and
cannot serve as a basis for a predictive framework. An example of
endogenous criteria is Jack Snyder's treatment of interest groups' impact
on foreign policy (Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1992)). In each country case, Snyder found groups, which
influenced foreign policy, but each time the type of groups was different:
economy-based, ideology-based, social stratum-based, etc. Apparently, he
needed criteria not directly related to the cases under consideration, for
example, derived from the social structure of any society (economy-based
interest groups) or of a particular type of societies (totalitarian,
democratic, etc.). This would make a comparison across cases more
rigorous.

41. Vladimir Dvorkin, "O Polze Diskussii po Povodu Dogovora SNV-2"

(On the Benefits of Debates over the START II Treaty), Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, March 27, 1998, p. 7.

H
 Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at
DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Program on Approaches to Russian Security

Modernization Of Strategic
Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

DESBIC INTELLIGENCE FACT

FINDINGS AND

INFORMATION GATHERING FOR START

II, III, IV

Contents
Why Study Strategic Modernization?
HTU UTH

The "Minimalists:" Back to the Classic Age of Deterrence | The

HTU UTH HTU

"Maximalists:" Back to a War-Fighting Capability UTH

The Nuclear Debate

HTU UTH

HTU The Context: In Search of a Predictive Paradigm UTH

The Views of the Military Leadership

HTU UTH

Modernization of the Russian Nuclear Triad

HTU UTH
 (I) Land-Based Strategic Missiles | (II) Sea-Based Strategic
HTU UTH HTU

Weapons | (III) Air-Based Strategic Weapons

UTH HTU UTH

Conclusion
HTU UTH

Why Study Strategic Modernization?

HTU UTH

Modernization of strategic weapons belongs to what some call the

"traditional agenda" of security studies, an area of research whose
popularity has plummeted with the passing of the Cold War. The treaties
signed by the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States (INF, START 1,
START II,1 and lesser ones) as well as other steps, including the 1991
HPTU UTHP

initiatives of Bush and Gorbachev,2 were broadly viewed as putting an end

HPTU UTHP

to the nuclear arms race. Accordingly, mastery of arcane nuclear war-

fighting theories and the intricacies of arms control negotiations seems
increasingly irrelevant. More salient issues, such as economic and political
integration, ethnic conflicts, and WMD proliferation occupy the attention
of policymakers and academics.

But old problems do not go away quietly. The place and the role of
nuclear weapons has changed, as has the nature of interest in them, but in
some way they continue to be relevant. During the Cold War, the threat of
nuclear war seemed so great that any progress in arms control was
welcome; common interest in preventing war was like a locomotive,
which could pull superpower relations out of crises. Today, this is no
longer the case. Arms control plays a visible role in great power politics
(and rightly so), progress on new treaties is no longer a necessary
condition for progress on other issues. To the contrary, the lack of
progress or, even worse, a setback can easily disrupt broader cooperation.
Arms control and the politics of nuclear balance have become a disruptive
force, to an extent, as exemplified by the deadlock over START II
ratification in Russia.

There are two alternative ways the politics of nuclear balance could affect
relations between Russia and the United States: one is negative. Some
Russian modernization options could undermine the stability of the
nuclear balance and stimulate a launch-on-warning posture; this could be
perceived in the United States as a threat, in the same fashion as the Soviet
arsenal was perceived as a threat in the 1970s and the 1980s. It should be
noted that the Soviet Union never actually had a first-strike capability; the
key here is the reaction of the United States and the modernization
programs it adopted in response.

The same option could also result from the deployment of a national
missile defense (NMD) system by the United States. Russia will see it as
destabilizing and is likely to respond by modernization and/or buildup of
its offensive forces, which, in its turn, would cause negative reaction in the
United States. Given the nature of the issue, the impact on the domestic
political situation in both countries is likely to be highly disruptive.

The other alternative is positive. Russian strategic modernization could

proceed in a stabilizing manner and facilitate eventual transition toward a
pure second strike posture. The real significance of this development,
however, will not be in its impact upon the nuclear balance: nuclear war is
clearly not in the cards. Rather, stable nuclear balance will enable the sides
to "forget' 'about those weapons; the arsenals will become useless not only
for combat, but also as a political instrument. Since complete nuclear
disarmament is hardly possible in the foreseeable future, putting weapons
"aside," relegating them to irrelevance is as close to their elimination as
realistically possible. Thus, the purpose of studying strategic
modernization is not to learn more about possible scenarios of a nuclear
exchange, but rather to understand an important aspect of domestic
politics in Russia and the United States and, through it, the dynamic of the
future relationship between them.

The potentially disruptive impact of the politics of nuclear balance is

demonstrated by the continuing saga of START 11 ratification in Russia.
The shortcomings of START II have already provided fertile ground for
conservative/nationalist opposition and helped mobilize voters around
their platform. Whether these shortcomings are militarily significant or not
seems irrelevant: what counts is how the potential imbalance is used in the
political games. Although the government is likely to push START II
through the parliament,3 it might have to make concessions in other areas
TUHP UTHP

of the domestic political process.

The materials presented in this paper suggest that the current

modernization programs in Russia lean toward the second, positive
alternative. Its future nuclear arsenal is likely to be small, conducive for
strategic stability, and non-provocative. It might even be unnecessary for
Russia to engage in a significant buildup effort in response to a US NMD
system, if one is deployed.

The positive outcome depends on two conditions. One is the minimum

level of funding. Without it, the strategic triad could quickly disintegrate.
This would be a potentially dangerous development, since it might
provoke a massive buildup once the economic situation improves and/or
might increase the likelihood of an authoritarian regime that would
mobilize resources to support such a buildup. Second, the transition
toward the new posture is politically difficult: its proponents will remain
vulnerable for at least the next five-seven years, until the new posture
finally takes shape and Russia's international situation stabilizes.
In this regard the US policy toward Russia will have a lasting influence on
the ongoing transition. Since Russia lacks financial and political resources
today, the full impact of current US policy will be delayed until the next
decade: no matter what the United States does, Russia will have to
ultimately accept it, but this acceptance could be short-lived, depending on
what is at stake. This means that today's reaction of the Russian
government to US policy is not necessarily a reliable indicator of long-
term relations; the "shadow of the future" should never be absent from
policy planning in either country.

This paper begins with an analysis of the ongoing debate over the strategic
modernization in Russia, reviews the policy of the government and the
military leadership, and then proceeds to the available data on actual
modernization programs. The last part will draw conclusions regarding the
possible evolution of these views under various scenarios.

The Nuclear Debate

HTU UTH

The well-known thesis that nuclear weapons are valued in Russia because
they are the last vestige of its great-power status is generally correct but
hardly sufficient to explain the attention to the nuclear arsenal. Nor is it
sufficient to say that nuclear weapons are a key security guarantee. These
statements yield little value in terms of predicting the size and the shape of
the arsenal since they do not contain criteria by which one could judge
whether the existing arsenal is sufficient, or have to be increased, or
modernized, etc. Without such criteria, decision-making is virtually
impossible: any decision would be arbitrary and subject to intense
challenge from the opposition, both within and outside the government.

Apparently, the benefits and losses resulting from the START II Treaty
are not at the center of the debate, either. The impact of START II is
rather easy to calculate, and a decision would have been made earlier. Nor
is the matter of funding necessarily at stake: everyone knows that Russia
cannot afford to reject STARTIII, but this does not dissuade its opponents.
Some suggest that START II simply should not be ratified in order to keep
more options open for the future, when the economic situation improves;
others prefer to ratify START II because it does not contradict what they
consider the optimal future strategic posture. Rather, the debate is about
the criteria by which the Russian nuclear arsenal should be judged. An
agreement on the criteria will determine its eventual size, structure,
missions, and capabilities.

This frame of reference has several important implications. The most

important among them is that the approval or the rejection of START II
will not end the debate: the decision of the Duma will affect the
probabilities of various outcomes, but will not completely foreclose any of
those. If the treaty is ratified, the option of MIRVing ICBMs will not be
removed completely: Russia could still return to them, for example, if the
United States deploys an NMD. On the other hand, the rejection of
START II does not automatically mean that Russia will MIRV its ICBMs:
it might still stick to that key provision. At this writing, the ratification
resolution, which will be sent to the floor of the Duma, is likely to espouse
the first option: START II would be subject to a review in the case the
United States deploys an NMD to determine whether MIRVing is
advisable. At the same time, the resolution will insist on even deeper
reductions, a START III treaty.

Another characteristic of the debate could be detected in frank discussions

with many Russian experts: the lines between various positions are not
necessarily drawn according to political, ideological, or institutional
boundaries. Rather, they often run within individuals: quite a few experts
cannot decide on their own preferences. It would be a mistake to picture
the situation in simple black and white colors, as a standoff between
"liberals" and "conservatives" or between "hawks" and "doves." In this
sense, the disagreements described below are relative: in some cases, they
refer to whole groups, but in others they describe the uncertainty that
exists in the minds of experts and politicians.

All sides in the debate share a number of positions, first and foremost that
Russia needs nuclear weapons and that their role has increased since the
end of the Cold War. At a minimum, they are supposed to prevent large-
scale aggression and guarantee Russia's sovereignty and survival. A study
of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISI) underscored that
"humankind has not created a substitute to nuclear weapons in terms of
their deterrent effect in the situations of escalating large-scale armed
conflicts. This means that in the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will
remain an important element of global politics despite all the
'inconveniences' related to their maintenance and the continuing debate
over the actual role of nuclear weapons in preventing world wars during
the last fifty years.4 In other words, the special role of nuclear weapons is
HPTU UTHP

determined by their real or perceived "absolute" character.

From here, it follows that nuclear weapons can compensate for Russia's
inferiority in conventional armed forces relative to NATO and China. The
new military doctrine, which is expected to be adopted sometime in 1998,
will provide for the use of nuclear weapons "in the case of an immediate
threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia that has
emerged as a result of an external aggression.5 This will be a
HPTU UTHP

reaffirmation of the provision of the 1993 doctrine, which, in its turn,

repudiated the 1982 Soviet policy of no-first-use. The 1993 first-use plank
was also confirmed in the 1997 national security concept.6 HPTU UTHP
Having introduced the first-use plank, however, the 1993 doctrine retained
certain restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
states in line with the negative guarantees provided by the Soviet Union
(as well as all other "legitimate" nuclear states) in connection with the
Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Only nuclear-
weapons states and their allies can be threatened with nuclear weapons.
The new, 1998 doctrine will keep these limitations together with the first-
use provision: Anatoli Klimenko and Aleksandr Koltukov underlined that
the 1993 document enjoyed the support of the Foreign Ministry (meaning,
it did not contradict international obligations) and thus it was decided to
keep it. They also noted that while the doctrine was still under
development unnamed experts attempted to broaden the first-use plank.7 HPTU UTHP

A broader, less official approach to the use of nuclear weapons includes,

for example, deterrence against "a belt of unstable, and sometimes
unfriendly, states and countries, which covertly seek weapons of mass
destruction.8 This definition embraces the majority of states to the south
TUHP UTHP

of Russia; it is interesting to note, however, that the recent shifts in

Russia's relations with Iran and Iraq have probably weakened the
perceived necessity to rely on nuclear weapons. Still, some states could be
viewed as "candidates" for deterrence by nuclear weapons, e.g. Pakistan,
whose policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia is assessed in Russia as
unfriendly.

The disagreements within the Russian elite regarding nuclear weapons

rather closely mirror the debates in the United States in the end of 1960s--
early 1970s and in the 1980s between the proponents of mutual assured
destruction (MAD), war-fighting, and war-winning approaches9 with just
TUHP UTHP

one important exception: almost no one in Russia advocates a transition to

defense programs similar to SDI. A comparison of the current debate in
Russia to the 30-year old debate in the United States sheds additional light
on its substance and the views expressed by different sides. It could also
provide a better grasp on how various doctrines emerge. Some are likely
to relate to the nature of nuclear weapons, others to the conventional
balance, still others to specific weapons systems that provide new
capabilities.

To a large extent, the perceptions and the prescriptions regarding nuclear

weapons appear to be determined by two related variables. One is the
relationship with the United States and NATO, another is the prospect that
the United States might deploy an NMD system and yield the Russian
deterrent potential useless. These variables are related to the extent that the
latter could be viewed as part of a "devious plan" to dominate and
subjugate Russia. They differ to the extent that the NMD could be
conceptualized as an independent phenomenon: the United States does not
harbor hostile plans toward Russia, but, regardless of intentions, the
deployment of an NMD could undermine the hedge against future threats
that might unexpectedly emerge, for example, as a result of elections ten
or twenty years from now.

The "Minimalists:" Back to the Classic Age of Deterrence

HTU UTH

Broadly speaking, there are two loose, ill-defined groups. One could be
called the "minimalists"--those who perceive a limited role for nuclear
weapons and favor a relatively small arsenal. Another is the
"maximalists"--those who tend to assign a broad range of missions to
nuclear weapons and insist that Russia needs a large arsenal.

On the question of relations with the West, very few members of the
Russian political establishment continue to adhere to the 1992-style
positive view of these relations. But the end of the "honeymoon" conceals
two rather distinct interpretations of the events, past and future. Most
"minimalists" say that there are no fundamental differences between
Russia and the United States, but cooperation is difficult and sometimes
impossible because the United States simply does not want it. In their
view, the United States often substitutes cooperation with complete
acceptance of its position by Russia and tends to label any disagreement as
a return to the Soviet/imperial policy. Examples abound, from the early
disagreements on Bosnia to the continuing conflicts around NATO
enlargement and Iraq.

More specifically, there is growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the

United States to accommodate Russian complaints about START I
implementation.10 According to the Russian view, these problems could be
HPTU UTHP

solved, but the United States does not wish to; a narrower focus is on the
US Navy, which, some say, refuses to budge even where it is possible and
necessary. A more traditional area of concern is the ABM Treaty: the
American arguments in favor of a national missile defense are simply not
taken seriously by Russian experts. The agreements on demarcation of
tactical and strategic defenses signed in New York in the fall of 1997 were
met with wide-spread dissatisfaction as well: they are viewed as
insufficient since the United States can still interpret them to allow
development of TMD systems, which, in Russian eyes, have strategic
potential.11 Some Russian experts believe that a more restrictive
TUHP UTHP

agreement was possible, but the United States refused to accept it (of
course, many US experts will not agree, but it is significant that this
perception is widely spread in Russia).

Still, the situation is far from critical, and patience and diplomacy are seen
as the main policy tools. This line has been evident in the acceptance of
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council "in exchange" for NATO
enlargement and in the maneuvers around Iraq in the fall of 1997 and in
the early 1998. Within this paradigm, nuclear weapons are important, but
are expected to back up policy rather than play an independent role. In
addition to a fundamental role as a security guarantee, they also guard
against uncertainties in the future: a real large-scale conflict with NATO
and/or deployment of a national missile defense by the United States.

These views produce the perception of a rather limited role for nuclear
weapons. In many respects, it is close to what Bernard Brodie wrote in
1946: The first and most vital step in any American security program for
the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in
case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind.12 The "minimalist"
HPTU UTHP

view of nuclear weapons is also in line with the views postulated in the
first Soviet official recognition of possession of nuclear weapons, in 1951:
the TASS statement declared that the purpose of Soviet nuclear weapons
was deterrence of nuclear war.13 The core of this view is the ability to
TUHP UTHP

retaliate in case of an attack--a nuclear attack in the "classic" formulation

or a large-scale conventional attack under a more recent policy.

A more liberal version of the "minimalist" view was expressed by Sergei

Kortunov: "The optimal version of Russia's nuclear strategy today is a
variant of non-aggressive, non-offensive and non-provocative (one could
even say 'friendly'), but also credible deterrence, which should be aimed
not only at the USA, but 'at all azimuths'--a Russian version of the classic
French, de Gaulle's doctrine of 'dissuasion' as opposed to the American
doctrine of 'deterrence' through the threat of annihilation.14 Although this HPTU UTHP

view enjoys some popularity, it is yet hardly feasible politically or even

bureaucratically: the military and politicians would still search for
"objective" criteria to determine "how much is enough," and these criteria
will inescapably be relative to the US nuclear arsenal, which is the largest
in the world. Still, this might represent the future of Russian thinking on
nuclear weapons if external and domestic conditions are right.

The dominant view of "minimalists" today does not boil down to simple
existential deterrence, in which the very presence of nuclear weapons
deters the other side. Rather, the core principle is that of assured second
strike capability, in line with McNamara's doctrinal innovations of the
1960s.15 Following McNamara, Russian experts and military planners
TUHP UTHP

attach considerable value to the ability to "ride out" the first strike and still
retain a second-strike capability. In this, they are closer to the views
expounded by Paul Nitze who said that even in the early days of the
nuclear era he and his associates believed that the quality of deterrence
depends upon one's ability to deal with the potential failure of deterrence.
The vital factor is that one's ability to deal with the contingency of
deterrence failing be understood by the other side.16 HPTU UTHP
The requirements outlined by Nitze are considerable. First, the number
and/or the survivability of nuclear weapons must be sufficient to ride out a
first strike by the other side. Second, the number and the quality of nuclear
weapons that survive the first strike of the other side must be sufficient for
it to believe that second-strike capability exists. Third, the surviving
weapons must match reasonably liberal estimates of unacceptable damage.
This calls for a rather large arsenal of deployed nuclear weapons, which,
in turn, presents the risk of a classic security dilemma: in pursuit of
second-strike capability "my" nuclear arsenal becomes so large that the
other side begins to worry about its second-strike capability.

Nitze, like many others, solved this dilemma by simply assuming that the
United States would never attack, so the Soviet Union did not have to
worry about the survivability of its deterrent force, it was only the US
headache. But, of course, the security dilemma would still emerge, and an
arms race would (and did) follow. Another solution is launch-on-warning,
whereby weapons do not have to ride out the first strike of the other side
because they are launched before the incoming warheads reach targets.

A way to avoid the security dilemma was proposed by the Scowcroft

commission in 1983: reduction of vulnerability of weapons, specifically
through the deployment of single-warhead mobile ICBMs--the route
which the Soviet Union was already taking and the United States planned
to take. In this way one can, theoretically, retain a second-strike capability
without inadvertently creating a first-strike capability. Apparently, this is
the favorite option of the Russian"minimalists."

Yet another solution is an NMD, but Russian experts and politicians

almost uniformly reject it on the grounds that a response in offensive
weapons would be cheaper and easier; thus mutual deterrence would be
reproduced at a higher level of arsenals. There is not consensus among the
"minimalists," however, on the proper response to a US NMD.

Even one of the experts of a conservative think tank, Spiritual Heritage

Foundation,17 concluded that under the most unfavorable circumstances
HPTU UTHP

(US first strike with 70-80 percent of Russian warheads lost and 50
percent effectiveness of the US ABM system) between 350 and 500
warheads would still reach US territory. The author also claimed that a 50
percent effective system would not be available until 2010-2015.

The official position stresses negotiations as the way to regulate and limit
the impact of defense systems. Recently, indications appeared that the
option of MIRVing of Topol-M with up to three warheads is kept open as
well. Vladimir Yakovlev, the SRF commander-in-chief, has openly
declared that Topol-M could be MIRVed if necessary as a hedge against a
US NMD.18 MIRVed ICBMs are considered the best means of
HPTU UTHP
overcoming defense because they can overwhelm it with warheads and
decoys. A simultaneous launch of a handful of MIRVed ICBMs is
obviously easier to coordinate than a simultaneous launch of several
hundred single-warhead ICBMs.19 Still, this is a far cry from the more
TUHP UTHP

conservative proposals discussed below.

The prescriptions of Russian "minimalists" do not necessarily match all

postulates of the "classic" deterrence theory, in particular the NSC-68
requirement of a sizable conventional force to supplement nuclear
deterrence, nor do they appear to fully account for the complex problems
of misperception, credibility, etc.20 A detailed discussion of these belongs
HPTU UTHP

elsewhere. It is sufficient to note that the threat of an East-West military

conflict is seen as low, and this helps to decrease many concerns that
otherwise could have emerged.

To summarize, the "minimalists" see nuclear weapons as an insurance

against a possible future threat, which will not necessarily materialize;
thus the insurance can be minimal. This insurance is not immediately
usable, like any insurance, and the size should be a reasonable
compromise between the need to guard against uncertainty and the risk of
buying an excessively expensive policy.

The "Maximalists:" Back to a War-Fighting Capability

HTU UTH

A considerable part of the Russian elite suspects, however, that more than
just the unwillingness to cooperate or high-handed American behavior is
at stake. Many think that the goals of the United States are outright anti-
Russian and that the threat to the country's survival is much more
imminent and requires a more robust military response.

The "maximalists" tend to conceptualize US policy toward Russia in terms

of Zbignew Brzezinski's writings.21 His idea is essentially about dividing
HPTU UTHP

Russia into several parts, of which the Western third should be integrated
into the "Atlanticist Europe," the Eastern third fall into China's sphere of
influence, while the middle would remain a "political black hole." This
proposal, predictably, infuriated the Russian political establishment, and
some suspect that Brzezinski simply made public the real goals of the
United States.22 If one adds to this the perception of threats from other
TUHP UTHP

"azimuths" such as China, Islamic countries, etc.,23 then the prescription HPTU UTHP

would be obvious: Russia needs a large nuclear force capable of

performing various missions, both strategic and theater-wide, to deter and
if necessary defeat almost any country or group of countries. Nuclear
weapons are supposed to have immediate value as a foreign policy tool
and be useful in a wide variety of global and local conflicts (after all,
within this world-view every local conflict is only part of a larger, global
US strategy aimed at eliminating Russia).
Same as with the "minimalists," the recommendations of this group
largely mirror relevant American theories. Consider, for example, the
warning Richard Perle gave after the collapse of the Berlin Wall but
before the collapse of the Soviet Union: it would be dangerous, he wrote,
to "disarm the West after the Cold War [and] ... run the risk that we might
yet again make Europe safe for the exertion of Soviet military power."24 TUHP UTHP

One only needs to replace the Soviet Union with the United States in that
quote and adjust for the geostrategic situation to arrive at a statement by
Sergei Glaziev, a prominent nationalist politician: [We need to] rethink
our foreign policy and defense doctrine, as well as the national security
doctrine. The thesis about the absence of enemies to Russia is obviously
wrong. ...[We need to] create necessary conditions for preservation and
development of strategic nuclear forces as a necessary and the most
important element of national security. ...[W]e should abstain from
ratification, implementation, and signing of treaties, which could reduce
the effectiveness of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, and particularly those
[treaties] that provide for unilateral concessions.25 HPTU UTHP

Much as some US theorists during the Cold War expected a first

disarming Soviet nuclear strike,26 these experts believe that the United
HPTU UTHP

States could strike first, or at least achieve a position where a successful

first strike would be possible. This concern is similar to that of the
American proponents of the infamous "bomber gap" and the "missile gap"
in the late 1950s27 -- that the United States would use its theoretical ability
HPTU UTHP

to defeat Russia in a nuclear war to chip away at its interests and

geopolitical positions. Nuclear inferiority would weaken Russia's ability to
resist because it would not be able to up the ante in an (inevitable?)
brinkmanship game. To avoid this gloomy scenario, they insist that
Russia's nuclear arsenal should be rather large (probably the same as or
larger than the START II limit of 3,500 warheads, and include a
significant number of MIRVed ICBMs).

MIRVed ICBMs are supposed to perform two functions. One is making a

US NMD incapable of defending against a Russian response--this mission
generally follows the logic of deterrence with the exceptions noted below.
The second function is to return to the situation of the 1980s, which made
possible greater versatility of scenarios of employment of nuclear weapons
beyond the straightforward second-strike option. This is essentially about
the ability to fight a nuclear war rather than simply threaten to "punish"
the aggressor. Or, as Brodie wrote in 1959 in a departure from his 1946
views, if deterrence fails we shall want enough forces to fight a total war
effectively.28
HPTU UTHP

The key difference between the "minimalists" and the "maximalists"

regarding the value of MIRVed ICBMs boils down to the following. The
former propose MIRVing only in response to a US NMD (and not all of
them think it necessary), the proposed scale of MIRVing is limited. The
latter consider MIRVing essential irrespective of the NMD, and when
(rather than if) it is deployed, the number of MIRVed ICBMs should be
increased even further. The scale of MIRVing is massive with or without
NMD and "heavy"--up to ten warheads per missile rather than up to three
for the "minimalists."

Two of the leading opponents of START II a deputy head of the

International Affairs Committee of the Duma Alexei Podberezkin and his
advisor Anton Surikov asserted: "Specialists think that in the case of
ratification of START II and especially if in five-six years Washington
would decide to annul the 1972 ABM Treaty, then in ten years Russia
would lose the ability to inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage to the
United States in a response strike.29 They argue that Russia should HPTU UTHP

transfer to its territory the production of heavy SS18 ICBMs (R-36M2 in

Soviet designation) and deploy 154 of those in the existing silos; in the
case the United States deploys an NMD, Russia should additionally
deploy 180 heavy ICBMs.30 In an earlier publication Anton SurikovHPTU UTHP

suggested that deploying up to seven warheads on Topol-M was possible

and advisable.31 HPTU UTHP

A crucial element in this system of views are tactical nuclear weapons,

which are expected to compensate for NATO's superiority in conventional
armed forces--superiority that will increase after the enlargement of
NATO. Tactical weapons should enable Russia to feel more self-assured
in local/regional conflicts and either help prevent or terminate them at
favorable conditions.32 During his tenure as a minister of defense, Igor
HPTU UTHP

Rodionov declared that in the view of NATO enlargement Russia "might

objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear weapons at [its]
borders.33 One of the most vocal proponents of greater reliance on TNF,
HPTU UTHP

Gen. Vladimir Belous (Ret.) proclaimed that "in contrast to strategic

weapons, whose central mission is 'deterrence' and, in the case it did not
succeed, 'punishment,' tactical weapons, even as they perform the function
of deterrence, could fulfill the mission of 'repulsing' aggression.34 In line HPTU UTHP

with NATO's Cold War-period rationalization, the "maximalists" suggest

that without tactical nuclear weapons Russia might have to choose
between defeat and an all-out war. The ability to prevail at the tactical
level is supposed to take care of this grim choice.

Overall, the perception of an imminent threat has created a host of (still

rather poorly developed) theories analogous to American doctrines of
limited nuclear strike, flexible response, limited war, escalation
dominance, etc.35 The purpose is to enable nuclear weapons to achieve a
HPTU UTHP

broad variety of missions when less than survival of the country is at

stake. To support these missions the strategic force should be capable of a
limited exchange, or a "demonstration" strike (similar to what Alexander
Haig proposed in the 1980s), or of deadlocking the strategic situation in
order to improve the chances of success at the substrategic level. Broad
missions also require a substantial tactical nuclear potential capable of
deterring NATO's conventional forces and dealing with other
contingencies (such as conflicts to the south of Russia).

The advocates of a more limited approach to nuclear weapons, the

"minimalists," display a rather ambiguous attitude toward tactical nuclear
weapons. They seem to avoid public statements on this subject and rarely
offer ideas on how exactly these weapons could be used. A mainstream
think tank, the Institute of Geopolitical and Military Forecasts (part of
IMEMO) cautiously suggested that "Russia needs a certain tactical nuclear
weapons potential as one of [the] guarantees of national security in the
case of possible radical changes in the European or Asian strategic scenes.
TNF could also be [a] somewhat useful36 addition in the case the balance
TUHP UTHP

in conventional armed forces is disrupted; they could be used primarily as

a political tool to prevent war."37 But they also said that the existing TNF
TUHP UTHP

arsenals were excessive and could be significantly reduced. Caution is

easy to explain by the domestic political situation in Russia, as well as its
uncertain international situation: the enlargement of NATO has
significantly increased the value of tactical nuclear weapons.

In a recent publication, Alexei Arbatov pointed at a fundamental

contradiction related to tactical nuclear weapons. On one hand, there is
widespread consensus that Russia needs them to balance NATO's
conventional superiority; on the other, the United States could destroy up
to 70 percent of Russian strategic weapons using only its tactical nuclear
and conventional weapons. A first strike using a combination of strategic
and tactical weapons, he said, would be 1.5-2 times more effective than
the one with only strategic weapons. Thus, Russia would do best if only it
had tactical nuclear weapons, but this is hardly possible.38HPTU UTHP

The brief description of the views espoused by the two groups, the
"minimalists" and the "maximalists," reveals that differences between
them relate to fundamental concepts of nuclear weapons and their role in
the international system. Regardless, there are certain trends common
both. They are situation-specific and are caused by shared concerns over
possible unfavorable developments in the international environment:
doubts still linger about US policy, particularly the prospect of
deployment of an NMD. Of course, the proposed responses radically
differ, but it seems significant that at least some concerns are shared and
the groups are apparently moving closer. It is not inconceivable that the
above-mentioned ambiguity in the minds of some experts and politicians
stems from this--for example, when the "minimalist" view of nuclear
weapons contradicts the "maximalist" assessment of the international
situation. The perceived weakness of the current Administration and the
influence of Congressional Republicans who advocate an NMD increases
the propensity to seek a hedge against unpleasant surprises.39 Unless the
HPTU UTHP

United States takes these concerns and uncertainties seriously, the still
slow drift of the Russian political establishment toward negative
expectations could become widespread.

In terms of START II, it is worth repeating that the treaty itself is of

relatively marginal concern and few actually like it. For the "minimalists,"
START II is consistent with their image of the future Russian nuclear
arsenal and, in addition, it helps somewhat constrain the US arsenal.
Though critical of many provisions of START II, they are willing to go
along with it. The "maximalists" oppose START II not simply because
they are concerned about its deficiencies, but primarily because it is
inconsistent with their preference for the future Russian arsenal.
Regardless, the "minimalists" might still abandon START II if they come
to the conclusion that a future US NMD system would deprive Russia of
its retaliatory capability.

References
HTU UTH

1. INF-Intermediate Nuclear Forces, i.e. the 1987 Treaty, which

eliminated land-based missiles with the range from 500 to 5,500 Ian;
START I-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the 1991 Treaty, which
reduced the strategic weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States to
6,000 accountable warheads (due to special accounting rules, the actual
number of warheads was higher for both sides); START II-the 1993
Treaty, which reduced the strategic weapons of Russia and the United
States to 3,500 warheads (the number of accountable and real warheads is
equal under the rules of that treaty). The INF Treaty has been
implemented, START I is being implemented now, START II has not
been ratified by Russia.

2. In the late September-early October, 1991 Presidents Bush and

Gorbachev made unilateral, more or less parallel statements with regard to
both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Both sides canceled one
ICBM program each, the Soviet Union promised to unilaterally reduce its
strategic forces under START I to 5,000 warheads, and-the most
significant part-both sides promised to significantly reduce their tactical
nuclear weapons by removing to central storage facilities or eliminating
warheads for all land- and sea-based tactical delivery systems and a
significant portion of warheads for air-based non-strategic delivery
systems. These statements also included other important steps.
3. For a comprehensive analysis of the prospects of START II ratification
see "Problemy Ratifikatsii Dogovora SNV-2 Na Vesennei Sessii 1998
goda v Gosudarstvennoi Dume" (The Problems of Ratification of the
START II Treaty during the Spring 1998 Session of the State Duma) in
Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 23, No. 3
FACT FINDING START III-

Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Modernization Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

THE DESBIC Institute for International Studies

AGENCY FACT FINDING FILES

The Context: In Search of a Predictive Paradigm

The analysis of the nuclear debate presented above has inherent limitations. First,
the proposed classification, albeit sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this
paper, overlooks many potentially significant differences between various experts
and organizations that have to be lumped together to achieve a semblance of
descriptive order. As noted above, the structure of the debate is not reducible to a
simple dichotomy of "good" and "bad," "hawks" and "doves," the proponents and
the opponents of START II. Second, the simple classification does not provide an
40
adequate picture of the dynamic of the debate. One needs "objective" criteria to
understand the preceding evolution and predict its future development: a simple
extrapolation of the last five-seven years might be wrong if the process is not linear.

Two variables stand out in the previous section: the perceived utility of nuclear
weapons and the perceived level of threat. The first refers to the extent that nuclear
weapons are expected to achieve "positive" goals: if nuclear weapons can only
threaten "punishment" (i.e. a reactive mission), their utility is assumed to be low,
but if they can help solve local conflicts or dissuade the United States from
interfering in the Caspian Sea basin, utility is coded as high. The level of threat is
more self-explanatory and its coding generally follows the lines in the previous
sections (from the West as a friend and ally to the West as an implacable foe bent on
eliminating Russia). Graphically, the current debate could be represented as a
function of these two variables in the following way:

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Picture 1

Picture 1

Of course, this diagram is only an approximation intended to convey the general

idea and the author's estimate of the situation; an accurate diagram would require a
survey (or, rather, a series of surveys) of the Russian political establishment. Still, it
does provide an idea of how the views are distributed across the spectrum. The
location of the views represented by the 1993 military doctrine (and, as is now clear,
the 1998 doctrine) serves as a point of reference for the rest of the field. The area in
the lower-left comer represents the "minimalists," while the upper-right comer is the
"maxima lists." Of course, the blank spaces are not necessarily empty: there are just
too few people whose positions fall there. There are areas of overlap, where
positions of individuals and institutions are difficult to distinguish in terms of the
two proposed variables, but prescriptions could still differ as a result of affiliation,
sources of funding, personal predispositions, etc.

Arrows show the trends of change in the distribution of views over the last seven-
ten years. An analysis of publications and interviews suggests that in the late 1980s--
early 1990s the distribution was even less even than today. There were three poles

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located approximately on one line from the lower-left to the upper-right comer. One
proceeded from very low utility of nuclear weapons and very low external threat;
this position boiled down to existential deterrence, the assumption that even a few
nuclear weapons could prevent an all-out war. The other pole united what could be
termed unreformed Cold War warriors, who stressed unilateralism and reliance on
almost unrestricted nuclear arms buildup. The third, in the middle, were the
"classic" Soviet moderate proponents of arms control, who were behind the INF and
START I Treaties. They preferred reductions as a way to optimize the nuclear
arsenal, regulate arms modernization and deployment, but still remained on the side
of rather large stockpiles of weapons.

Since then, the number of proponents of absolutely minimal, existential deterrence

has significantly dwindled. Apparently, the biggest change was caused not by a
greater belief in the utility of nuclear weapons but rather by disenchantment with the
United States, which is often expressed by a popular phrase, "the end of the
honeymoon." Probably, the perceived utility of nuclear weapons has increased as
well, at least among some erstwhile liberals, primarily as a result of a perceived
need for a more credible and robust second strike capability.

The differences between the early 1990s "idealists" and today's "minimalists" boil
down to the following: (a) larger estimated minimally sufficient arsenal, (b) lower
propensity to make concessions at arms control negotiations, and (c) greater
propensity to hedge against possible unpleasant surprises. The first two points
simply represent formal attributes of nuclear balance, first and foremost the
maintenance of a credible second-strike capability: the current views demand high
probability of delivering a significant number of warheads in response to an attack,
more or less along McNamara's criteria. The third component is primarily political:
even rather liberal experts and politicians are no longer optimistic about relations
with the United States.

The evolution of the Cold War warriors depicted in the diagram is not intended to
suggest that they have necessarily moderated their views, although some might
have. Rather, over time their views have become more diverse and now occupy a
larger area. One only has to compare intense, focused criticism of START II in
1992-93 with the proposals advanced today. The limited moderation was a
consequence of a clearer understanding of the economic constraints on Russia's
ability to modernize and build up its nuclear weapons, and recognition that the
dissolution of the Soviet Union is permanent.

The evolution of the former centrists, which have now become largely extinct, is

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particularly interesting. It is well known but rarely recognized that a very large part
of the Soviet political-military establishment in the mid-1980s favored reduction of
nuclear weapons. For a variety of reasons (personal convictions, institutional
interests political expediency) their positions were far from radical. The actual
process of arms reductions split this group apart. Some continued the evolution and
joined the ranks of a more liberal "minimalist" group. The growing disenchantment
of others in the arms reduction process in the late 1980s led them to more hard-line
positions.

To a large extent, the evolution of the centrists was caused by the loss of
conventional superiority or at least parity with NATO. It was easy to consider deep
reduction of nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union possessed sufficient
conventional armed forces to support a broad variety of missions. Today, the choice
of military instruments is so limited that some centrists no longer consider nuclear
arms reduction feasible. Subsequent evolution of the debate is likely to depend on
the changing perception of threat. It is formed by many different developments, not
necessarily limited to military power. Almost anything can affect the perception of
threat: economic sanctions, further enlargement of NATO, Caspian oil pipelines, a
new crisis around Iraq, etc. Such events are also subject to interpretation: some will
treat them as evidence of growing threat, while others will tend to discount their
significance.

In the meantime, the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons is likely to change
more slowly since there are fewer reasons to reevaluate the currently held views.
After all, people will be dealing with the same amount of information and the same
tools for interpreting it. As a result, in the near future polarization is likely to stay
and perhaps even increase. The existing groups will consolidate around two
different assessments of the level of threat; each group will stretch vertically.

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Picture 2

Picture 2

From this line of reasoning it follows that for some time a rather contradictory
combination of views might become possible: either perception of immediate threat
coupled with perception of low utility of nuclear weapons or, alternatively,
perception of low threat coupled with high utility of nuclear weapons. Without
doubt, such mixed views will be internally contradictory and will not remain stable
for long, making further evolution likely.

By definition, long-term evolution is difficult to predict. Several options seem

possible. First, the Russian elite might develop some sort of consensus on their
perception of US policy. Recent trends indicate that a mainstream, "hard-headed"
position is already emerging, approximately around the views espoused by the
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. In addition, the growing marginalization of
military and political aspects of US-Russian relations could stimulate the emergence
of a centrist position as well: the increasingly influential business groups tend to
judge these relations by the degree to which they are conducive to business, not by
geopolitical schemes. If business is reasonably successful, then geopolitics and

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ideology will be more or less suppressed. In both cases the groups depicted in the
diagram will tend to concentrate around one pole.

Second, if military reform is successful, Russia will come to rely somewhat less on
nuclear weapons; accordingly their perceived utility will decrease. This will be a
necessarily lengthy process since it involves restructuring, reductions, replacement
and education of personnel, modernization of weapons, etc. All of this has to be
done under severe financial constraints. Furthermore, in all likelihood the military
reform, regardless of its success will not affect policyrnaking until there is some sort
of a "small successful war" (like the US operation in Grenada) to visibly
demonstrate that conventional forces could be relied upon for a certain category of
contingencies. The second option will help consolidate the elite. If the perception of
threat remains constant, there will be two poles gravitating toward the lower left and
the upper right corners. If consensus on US-Russian relations emerges, then one
pole will emerge. Under any scenario, successful military reform is likely to benefit
the "minimalists" more.

Yet another option is continued uncertainty: the distribution of views could remain
frozen for a long time and experience only slow consolidation. The most likely
result is still the emergence of two opposite poles in the lower left and upper right
comers.

Much in the evolution of the debate will depend on economic and political
stabilization in Russia. If optimistic forecasts come true, Russia will become more
self-confident and its global positions will improve, in particular in such sensitive
areas as relations with other new independent states of the former Soviet Union and
with Europe. After all, many problems are caused by inadequate competitiveness in
international markets, the inability to offer credits (as a rule, export of high-tech
products often depends on the ability of the exporting country to offer cheap credits
to finance purchases), and the low attraction of Russia's domestic market. An
improvement of these three parameters will reduce the sense of dependency and
help reduce the perceived external threat.

The United States could do much to shape the development of the debate on nuclear
weapons in Russia, even without sacrificing any major policy goals. For example,
the US Government could make it clear that the views of Zbignew Brzezinski do
not represent official policy. More active pursuit of integration within the NATO-
Russia Permanent Joint Council could also yield significant results. More cautious
policy in the Caspian Sea region would help as well, especially if it is "packaged" in
terms friendly to Russia and sensitive to Russian concerns (e.g., it would be

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advisable to avoid proclaiming the region an area of vital US interests, since such
declarations are invariably interpreted as hostile). These are only illustrations, of
course, since a detailed analysis of possible steps is beyond the scope of this paper.

The Views of the Military Leadership

The current debate has two unique characteristics. One is a curious detachment of
the government (meaning first of all the Administration of the President, including
the Security Council and the recently deceased Defense Council) and the military
leadership from the public debate. Little is said on the matters, which are heatedly
discussed by the elite; the process of modernization, reduction and reshaping the
arsenal proceeds on its own.

The second characteristic is that the uniformed military is actually playing the
"doves:" they support START II and oppose plans for large-scale MIRVing of
ICBMs. Only rarely does one see sudden outbursts of emotion, such as Vladimir
41
Dvorkin's recent response to an article by Podberezkin and Surikov. The military
have not turned into proponents of total and complete nuclear disarmament, but they
certainly do not seem to support extreme proposals for a nuclear arms race.

The result is rather unusual. While the political elite appears to move to the right
and increasingly embrace the idea of a large, MIRVed nuclear arsenal (funding, of
course, is not available, but the attitudes are almost ripe for that), the military's
ambitions are more modest. They are more or less comfortable with START II and
are very serious about START III, which is certain to confirm a ban on MIRVed
ICBMs and will further reduce the Russian force.

Since the government's policy on nuclear weapons is relatively independent from

the broader political context, it requires a separate, independent inquiry. This section
will attempt to reconstruct the rationales for this policy; a review of the actual
modernization programs in the next section will serve as an additional test for the
hypotheses about the "real" Russian nuclear doctrine. The detachment, however, is
clearly temporary and cannot hold forever. The big question is whether the military
would eventually embrace the increasingly popular conservative views or whether
the political elite will reconcile itself with the more moderate views of the military.
But at the moment the public debate and the official views have to be analyzed
separately, even while both are important ingredients of a study that attempts to
predict the evolution of the Russian strategic arsenal and doctrine.

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It would be easy to explain away the military's moderate position as simply an

honest recognition of economic constraints. After ten years of ever-deepening
economic crisis, Russia can ill afford the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet
Union. Indeed, one of the key arguments in favor of the START II Treaty is that
deep reductions are the only way to keep the imbalance with the United States
within tolerable limits. With or without START II it will have to reduce its nuclear
arsenal to 2,000 warheads at best (START II counting rules). If START II is
42
ratified, then the US will be at the 3,500 level, if not--at 7,000-8,000.

For that reason, Russia kept insisting that the United States agrees to negotiate and
preferably sign START III even before START II is ratified, so that the Russian
parliament could consider both treaties simultaneously or at least had a clearer
picture of the future balance. In the spring of 1997, at the Helsinki summit, the
United States made a partial concession by agreeing to establish the overall limit of
warheads for START III at the level preferred by Russia. Consultations on the new
treaty have begun, and since September 1997 have been very active, but are unlikely
to result in a treaty or even assume formal character until START II is ratified.

It remains uncertain, however, whether the United States will actually pursue
START III if START II is ratified, or if it will just mark time and put Russia into an
awkward position by codifying its inferiority. Theoretically, the talks could continue
forever, keeping the United States at the START II level of 3,500, while Russia
stays at a much lower level (below 2,000 warheads) in anticipation of a new treaty.
To some extent, this uncertainly clouds the START II ratification process.

Economic constraints are hardly the only variable to affect the position of the
military. There is a widespread certainty that the United States will significantly
reduce its strategic weapons regardless of whether START II is ratified; if this logic
is correct, then Russia could MIRV its ICBMs, but the imbalance might still remain
within tolerable limits. After all, if there is no START III, then Russia will have
1,500 to 2,000 warheads compared to 3,500 on the US side; if there is no START II,
then Russia can have 3,000 to 3,500 warheads (calculation is approximate) to
something like 3,500 to 4,500 warheads on the US side. But in the latter case Russia
would have MIRVed ICBMs, which are considered a better response to an NMD
system.

This means that support of START II is a conscious decision of the military and
their policy reflects long-term planning and certain doctrinal innovations.
Apparently, this policy is connected first and foremost with the former commander-
in-chief of the SRF Igor Sergeev, who was appointed the minister of defense in

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1997.

Since his appointment as the SRF commander-in-chief in 1992, Sergeev has become
a veritable "nuclear czar," who determines not only the policies of the SRF, but to a
large extent the relevant aspects of the policies of the Navy and the Air Force. His
close ally is the director of the 4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense (the
SRF institute) Vladimir Dvorkin.

In what was a unique experience for Russia, Sergeev became the SRF commander
as a result of genuine competition, after a special commission interviewed several
candidates for the position. Reportedly, the commission was swayed by his response
to the question about the impact of a US strategic defense system. Other candidates
proposed large-scale MIRVing of ICBMs and abandonment of START II and even
START I (in 1992, to some this still seemed feasible), but Sergeev advocated a
"qualitative" response, in particular based on enhanced ability of single-warhead
ICBMs to penetrate the defense. Sergeev also advocated a faster transition toward a
pure second-strike posture to replace the "vstrechno-otvetnyi udar" (launch under
attack) strategy.

Subsequent modernization and reduction activities followed Sergeev's initial

statement without deviation. It is significant that he has not even once proposed a
different course of action (e.g., reject START III, consider MIRVing, etc.), which
leads one to conclude that fiscal constraints are not the only motivation behind his
behavior. Only recently, as mentioned above, the new SRF commander-in-chief
suggested that MIRVing Topol-M was possible, but even then he did not declare it a
top priority option.

From the point of view of the military, nuclear weapons will remain the core
element in Russia's security. There exists an obvious relationship between the role
of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and Russia's economic potential and its
(insufficient) involvement in international security regimes, on the other. Economic
weakness means, among other things, weak conventional forces and fewer
instruments of influencing international politics. Underdeveloped security regimes
mean that Russia lacks effective means of presenting and defending its interests
through international institutions, economic and political vulnerability, and reliance
on raw power to a greater extent than would have been otherwise necessary.

For the government, nuclear weapons are apparently even more valuable, in a sense.
Their impact on Russian domestic and foreign policy has been counterintuitive.
They have played a positive role and are likely to continue playing it in the

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foreseeable future. Their presence has helped to alleviate concerns about the
security environment during the difficult transition period. Nuclear weapons
probably played a critical role in the (so far) successful transition toward democracy
and a market economy: without them, the (perceived) reduction of security could
have provoked an arms buildup, requiring concentration of resources and political
power, i.e. restoration of an authoritarian regime. But proponents of reforms could
always invoke nuclear weapons and claim that security was assured, that armed
forces could be reduced and the defense budget cut down--even below the
reasonable level. In a sense, the ongoing modernization of nuclear weapons is an
inevitable "price" for reforms. Apparently, one can hardly exist without the other.

Taken together, Russian strategic weapons modernization programs fall rather

neatly into a certain well-structured and logical framework. The force will be
smaller, but will consist of relatively invulnerable weapons systems. The posture is
likely to be oriented toward the second-strike strategy meaning that it will be able to
"ride out" the first strike of any nuclear power, including the United States, and still
be able to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.

A particularly advantageous feature of the Russian arsenal will be congruence

between the low overall level and low concentration of warheads on delivery
vehicles, which will help to increase survivability. As a result, the arsenal will be
almost perfect for low levels of nuclear weapons and will fit any probable arms
control scheme, whether bilateral with the United States or multilateral, with
participation of other nuclear-weapons states.

Funding is the only element missing today from the overall picture. After economic
growth resumes (and a period of protracted economic growth might begin as early
as this year), the current modernization effort will reacquire common sense: the
economically developing Russia will ultimately cease to be the Upper Volta with
nuclear weapons, to quote Margaret Thatcher, and then nuclear weapons will look
"natural."

Modernization also fits the strategy developed by the former first deputy minister of
defense Andrei Kokoshin (who has been promoted since to the secretary of the
Security Council). According to Kokoshin, the period of scarcity should be devoted
to research and development, with acquisition postponed until approximately 2005.
The number of types of weapons (including nuclear) should be reduced. Until 2005,
weapons producing plants should be allocated the absolute minimum of contracts,
just enough to enable them to survive; plants that are no longer needed to support
the reduced armed forces and the relatively fewer types of equipment should be

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43
closed or converted.

In hindsight, it is an ultimate irony that economic and political hardships have

probably rendered Russian strategic weapons a service, after all. Russia skipped one
or two stages in the modernization plans originally projected by the Soviet Union
and, under reasonably favorable economic conditions, by the year 2010 it will have
a rather small, fully optimized arsenal, which will consist almost exclusively of the
most modern weapons (the word modern applies to delivery vehicles only; the
CTBT will limit modernization of warheads).

Modernization programs display a decisive turn toward putting quality of delivery

vehicles above quantity and survivable second-strike potential above war-fighting
capability. The new weapons will have the following characteristics:

low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles: ICBMs are single-

warhead and new submarines are likely to carry only 48 warheads each (more
on that in the next section);
mobility or other means to ensure survivability: a significant share of ICBMs
will be mobile, the rest will be based in hardened silos; submarines on patrol
are highly invulnerable by definition;
improved accuracy, which includes air-launched cruise missiles; and
increased ability to penetrate defense systems.

All these characteristics, with the exception of improved accuracy, meet the
traditional requirements of a second strike posture. Accuracy is usually considered a
property of war fighting, since the so-called countervalue strike (the threat of
punishment through elimination of cities) does not require high accuracy.
Improved accuracy is likely to be a by-product of general improvement of all
characteristics of delivery vehicles, however, and apparently cannot be construed to
mean that Russia is preparing for more than a pure second strike: this would have
44
required greater numbers and/or heavily MIRVed ICBMs.

Close attention to qualitative characteristics suggests that the military leadership is

not content with simple "existential deterrence," which could be achieved by
relatively low quantities of any weapons systems and would have required
maintenance of the existing types instead of creation of new ones. The goal is,
rather, to maintain a robust reliable second-strike arsenal capable of delivering a
rather large number of warheads under the worst (or realistically bad)
circumstances. The realistically bad circumstances probably include a first US strike

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and the ability to "ride it out." In any event, this interpretation comfortably explains
the absolute majority of data on modernization programs.

In one of the very few public statements on the subject, the first deputy minister of
defense Nikolai Mikhailov (he replaced Kokoshin after the latter moved to the
Defense and then the Security Council) stated that deterrence should be ensured not
by the quantity of warheads but by guaranteed delivery of warheads to the territory
of the aggressor: At the forefront here are the qualitative factors, rather than
quantitative ones. The goal of the defense ministry, according to Mikhailov, is to
retain a reliable deterrent while simultaneously reducing the number of both
delivery vehicles and warheads. This would require, among other things, a new
technological level of delivery vehicles and warheads, as well as of information,
45
command and control systems. Dvorkin, in the above-mentioned letter, confirmed
46
that the military leadership did not consider it wise to retain old-type MIRVed
ICBMs (as Podberezkin and Surikov proposed) simply because their 1970s
technology was hopelessly outdated.

The attention to the qualitative parameters has a number of positive implications for
the strategic balance and arms control. First of all, the requirements of numerical
parity could be further relaxed. Exact parity has never been achievable, nor vital. It
was, to a large extent, a political requirement, while in strictly military terms it was,
47
as one analyst put it, the roughest indicator of the strategic balance. The stability
of the balance always depended on qualitative characteristics of weapons systems.
The purposeful creation of a reliable second-strike capability, which stresses
survivability, makes parity even less relevant. Russia will be truly able to abandon it
(of course, if the domestic political scene permits it) and feel reasonably
comfortable under a quite significant disparity. Of course, numbers will continue to
matter--no one suggests they will not--but less than ever before.

Second, a combination of survivability and penetrability eases the impact of

national missile defense. Survivability means that more delivery vehicles will
survive the first strike to be used in retaliation, and penetrability means that more of
those will be able to deliver warheads. As a result, the pressure to counter NMD
deployment with additional deployment of offensive weapons and MIRVing would
decrease. As in the previous case, the NMD problem will not disappear completely:
at a certain level of offensive arms and certain effectiveness of defense it will
reemerge, but the elasticity of the balance will increase, and the ABM Treaty,
including the issue of ABM demarcation, will not be as serious an impediment to
nuclear arms reduction as in the past.

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Still, major uncertainties and unsolved problems will exist even when the transition
to the new posture has been completed. First, it is unclear if the second strike
capability will continue to exist under the combined impact of numerical imbalance
and an NMD system. The positive implications described above treated the two
separately; taken together, they might substantially affect the calculations. It is
likely that this uncertainty was behind the statement of the current SRF commander-
in-chief Yakovlev about the possibility of MIRVing Topol-M.

Second, even a very reliable second strike capability might not be enough to ensure
security. At least, under the NSC-68 criteria further elaborated in the subsequent
decades (and still to a large extent guiding the thinking on nuclear weapons),
reliable nuclear deterrence requires the maintenance of strong conventional
deterrence in parallel. Thus, the current approach of the Russian military, i.e.
reliance on nuclear weapons as the main provider of security, is a rather big gamble.
After all, nuclear weapons are a means of last resort, and if confronted with a choice
between a relatively limited concession and the use of nuclear weapons, Russia
might choose the first.

Tactical nuclear weapons are supposed to compensate for that problem, but they are
still nuclear weapons and carry with them all the associated limitations. The self-
imposed restrictions on who could be targeted with nuclear weapons (the negative
guarantees, which were confirmed in the military doctrine) exacerbate the problem
further: since Russia cannot threaten certain categories of states with nuclear
weapons, nuclear deterrence works only weakly against the rest.

Let us consider, as an example, the so-called Southern Flank, the states to the south
of Russia. Only Turkey in that region falls under the first use provision, since it is
formally allied with a nuclear power, the United States. All others are formally non-
nuclear, and the use of nuclear weapons cannot be convincingly invoked. Even
Pakistan, which is widely assumed to have nuclear weapons and is viewed as
generally unfriendly to Russia (primarily because of its role in Afghanistan and the
support of the Taliban movement) presents problems because threatening the use of
nuclear weapons against Pakistan would amount to recognition of its nuclear status.
Without doubt, the specter of the use of nuclear weapons is still present regardless
of anything, but its credibility and thus the utility of threat should be judged as low.

The same problems apply to Europe, the region which seems to have become the
focal point of worries for Russian strategic planners. Armed conflicts there seem
infeasible today, but if they emerge (e.g., as a result of an attempt to challenge the

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existing borders), Russia would still face a choice between the use of nuclear
weapons over a relatively small issue and surrendering its position. Again, the
credibility of the threat should be judged as low.

Of course, it is possible that vagueness is intentional and should help to contain any,
no matter how limited, military clash or provocation. After all, if there exists even a
miniscule chance of escalation to the nuclear level, no NATO country would think
about challenging Russia; at least this follows from a Schelling-like analysis which
is popular in Russia. Still, these calculations are rather shaky, and the probability of
48
benefits and harm appears equal.

These problems point at an important conclusion: the current degree of reliance on

nuclear weapons is temporary. They cannot fully substitute for modernization of
conventional armed forces. This area lies outside the purview of this paper, and it is
sufficient to note that the same logic is likely to be applied to strategic weapons.
This means putting quality above quantity: the troops will be better suited for the
types of conflicts that are anticipated as most likely, conventional weapons will be
49
"smarter," etc. In other words, a return to the Soviet-type army is hardly possible.

Comprehensive military reform will take a long time. So far, one can guess only the
broad contours. The outline of the future strategic posture is, in contrast, more or
less clear. The modernization programs, taken together with the reduction of
weapons and the position at arms control negotiations, suggest that the goal is close
to what in the 1980s was often called "defensive defense"--a posture defined by a
fine balance between the ability to defend and inability to attack. At the same time,
the likely direction of further development is hardly toward "existential deterrence:"
the current plans stress reliable second-strike capability measured in probably two
or three hundred warheads. Still, even that arsenal will not be suitable for a first
strike, and in this sense will conform to "defensive defense." It will also provide
significant (but not unlimited) flexibility in terms of numerical imbalance and
resistance to the impact of a large-scale defense system.

Whether these plans will be implemented remains to be seen. As noted above, there
are major uncertainties directly related to the planned posture and the level of
credibility of nuclear retaliation. There are also significant domestic constraints,
which might affect the preferences of the military. Finally, there is a larger
international context to keep in mind, in particular the perception of external threat,
which could emerge from economic and political conflicts rather than from the more
traditional military challenges.

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FACT FINDING START III-

In spite of major conceptual uncertainties, Russia is definitely bent on keeping its

nuclear weapons and even modernizing them. This is natural: historically, nuclear
weapons appeared first and only then the conceptual basis for them was invented to
50
suit the already existing systems. The practical impact of these conceptual
uncertainties is that in the absence of a clearly defined role, the benchmark for
nuclear planning remains the US-Russian nuclear balance. The fact that these two
countries have the largest arsenals appears to be only a superfluous reason, a
convenient habitual way to rationalize certain established methods of planning.
Deep under it hides what is probably the real rationale--the absence of a widely
accepted hypothesis about the missions of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War
world.

References
40. For the purposes of this paper, "objective" means exogenous criteria, i.e. not
derived from the phenomenon under inquiry. It would be pointless to take position
on START II or MIRVing as such criteria, since these issues are an integral part of
the debate and could change over time: if START II is ratified, the debate would not
stop nor would it stop if Russia returns to MIRVed ICBMs. In either case new
issues would come to the fore. In this sense START II and MIRVing are the
endogenous criteria and cannot serve as a basis for a predictive framework. An
example of endogenous criteria is Jack Snyder's treatment of interest groups' impact
on foreign policy (Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press,
1992)). In each country case, Snyder found groups, which influenced foreign policy,
but each time the type of groups was different: economy-based, ideology-based,
social stratum-based, etc. Apparently, he needed criteria not directly related to the
cases under consideration, for example, derived from the social structure of any
society (economy-based interest groups) or of a particular type of societies
(totalitarian, democratic, etc.). This would make a comparison across cases more
rigorous.

41. Vladimir Dvorkin, "O Polze Diskussii po Povodu Dogovora SNV-2" (On the
Benefits of Debates over the START II Treaty), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 27,
1998, p. 7.

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Breaking News

We Need a New, Comprehensive Arms Control

Treaty

DESBIC AGENDA AGENCY

Senior Staff Advisor

Col. Stanislav Lunev

Thursday April 21, 2,005

We finally have an administration that recognizes the threat

posed by ballistic missile programs in Iraq, Iran, North Korea
and other rogue states, as well as a threat posed by an
accidental launch of missiles by nations that are traditional
members of the so-called nuclear-missile club.

However, Washington's plans to build a National Missile

Defense (NMD) system has met strong resistance from some
Democrats on Capital Hill, as well as from Moscow and Beijing
both of whom strongly oppose such American initiatives.

The achievement of Washington's plans for the NMS system are

also seriously limited by 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
and other arms control agreements which are considered by
some American policy makers and their friends in Moscow and
Beijing as a cornerstone of the world strategic stability.

There is no doubt that at the time when these arms control

treaties were signed they played an important role in the peace-
keeping process, but today their importance is questionable.

Last week in Moscow Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said

that Russia and the U.S. should reduce their vast nuclear
arsenals, but warned that new security ties would not come
quickly for both countries. During his talks with former KGB Lt.-
Colonel Putin, now Russia's president, and former KGB Lt.-
General Ivanov, now Russia's Defense Minister, Mr.Rumsfeld
said proposed nuclear reductions and expanded military,
political and economic cooperation could become pillars of a
strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington.

However, President Putin firmly rejected the Bush

administration's push to jointly withdraw from 1972 ABM treaty
but spoke hopefully of agreeing to mutual cuts in nuclear
weapons.

"You know our attitude toward the ABM treaty," Putin told
reporters in the Kremlin. "For us, it's unconditionally linked with
both the START-I and START-II treaties. I would like to
underline that."

We know that today's Russian leaders, as well as their Soviet

predecessors, have systematically violated and are still violating
their international obligations, including all these treaties.

Using the ABM treaty, signed by the U.S. with the no-longer
existing USSR, Moscow has been trying to prevent America
from building an NMD, which is vital for America's national
security.

Having its own territorial anti-missile defense in place today, the

Kremlin is also using the ABM treaty to extort money from
America on the basis a future "strategic relationship" which
would recognize Moscow's new international status, as well as
supply new credits, loans and other benefits.

As the 20 years that followed the signing of the ABM treaty

clearly demonstrated, the U.S. was, and is, the only party to this
treaty that followed its international obligations. At the same
time, Moscow continued to build up and modernize its own
missile defenses and the development of its nuclear and missile
arsenal.

In 1972, the U.S. had 5,700 nuclear weapons (which could be

delivered by the inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-
launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, while the USSR
had 2,164 of the same weapons.
In 1991, the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal exceeded 12,000,
reflecting a post-ABM treaty increase of 112 percent, and the
Soviet arsenal was nearly 11,000, having increased by more
than 400 percent. Do we need to say anything else?

Moscow also likes the START-I treaty, which was signed by

former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President
George Bush during their Moscow summit in 1991. As the
Russian press has reported, according to this treaty's basic
provisions, Russia and the U.S. must have no more than 1,600
delivery vehicles (i.e. ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles and
heavy bombers) and 6,000 nuclear strategic warheads by
December 2009 and thereafter.

Moscow likes this treaty because under START-I's provisions it

had a chance to dismantle old and extremely costly strategic
nuclear weapons and develop and deploy the new generation of
strategic ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads.

According to Russia's state-run press, the START-I treaty "is the

only document today that really works in the sphere of strategic
offensive arms reduction."

However, in 1993, President George Bush and his Russian

counterpart Boris Yeltsin signed the START-II treaty, which
could once more dramatically reduce the strategic nuclear-
missile arsenals of the both nations. In particular, it was
supposed to result in the early elimination of all of the former
Soviets' vast arsenal of SS-18s - heavy ballistic missiles
capable of pre-emptively attacking the U.S. with large numbers
of independently targetable multiple warheads. This was exactly
the treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate in January 1996.

Unfortunately, the Clinton-Gore administration agreed in

September 1997 to defer the dismantling of these and other
threatening Russian missiles until as late as 2007. And that was
the arrangement the Russian Duma (Lower House of
parliament) approved in April 2000. As a result, until now
START-II is not in effect because the U.S. Senate and Russian
Duma ratified different documents and the last version of the
treaty has yet to be approved by the U.S. Congress.

Putin's position on this question is well known and he

subsequently indicated that none of Russia's long-range
missiles would be retired until they reach the end of their useful
service life. He also has said Russia would pull out of other
arms control treaties and could equip existing single-warhead
missiles with multiple warheads if the U.S. goes ahead with its
plans for the NMD system.

At the same time Russia continues to develop and deploy a new

generation of its strategic nuclear-missile arsenal. According to
press reports, Russia conducted a test of a long-range SS-25
missile last month that may be designed to scuttle U.S. missile
defenses.

The missile's engine - a supersonic-combustion ramjet - is just

as powerful as it sounds, and can generate speeds five times
the speed of sound. The missile was fired into space from a
launch site in Central Russia, and its last stage dropped down
into the atmosphere, flying at supersonic speed to the
Kamchatka Peninsula, The missile has a range of more than
7,000 miles.

We know that currently the number of warheads in the U.S. and

Russian strategic arsenals is more than enough to destroy our
planet several times. There is no doubt that the old arms control
treaties, which were good at the time they were signed, are not
good for the present day. And it would be a really good idea for
the U.S. to find a way for forging a new and comprehensive
arms control treaty that could combine positive parts of old
agreements and limit offensive as well as defensive nuclear,
missile and other weapons.

But of course, any new and comprehensive treaty needs to work

for America and our friends and allies, as well as for
international peace and real stability.
from my L
f,: and

tiYw o ndrous w o rLs.

7kI7
a n d fo get un&rstandnP
START III AGENDA

IDF TREATY SERIES START III

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLYS
THE NUCLEAR POWERS AND ALL ENSIGNS TO THE STATES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
ON FURTHER DISPOSAL REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

(Note: Certain dates and deadlines of the Treaty have been modified by the START II and III
Protocols, as ascribed for Signatory endorsements, and previously signed in New York on
September 26, 1997, whereas a Head of State may be excused from service assignment in view of
both the United States Senate, the Russian Duma, as so forth, The Republics to an Ensign and, or
States as said, found to be willfully or negligibly in disagreement or violation of Provisions , as
expressly agreed upon by a majority consensus herein afore in observance forgo. These changes
have been incorporated in the following text.)

The United States of America, The Peoples State of Israel, The United Nations
Organization, and all insignias to a Marquis, hereinafter referred to as The Nuclear Powers
or the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START and START II
Treaties,

Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
of July 1, 1968, and their desire to contribute to its strengthening,

Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties,

Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of the explosive grade dangers imposed by Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and the vitality of
the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992,

Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to eliminate

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START III AGENDA

further strategic offensive arms such as nuclear warheads for sale and nuclear biological, and
chemical formulations and said crude devices, in addition to the reductions and limitations
provided for in NPT and the START II, and other agreements reached, to this Treaty,

Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a world
order built on safe, fair and orderly values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of pre-
emptive secondary or independent terrorist attacks as a result of buy, sell, or trading
weapons of mass destruction that would lead to an inevitability perpetual to nuclear
confrontation and the consequential aftermath of sort after critical life support systems,

Recognizing their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations

Security Council for maintaining international peace and security,

Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992.
Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations
between the Parties, and the relations of partnership that have been established between
them, in particulars the nuclear fuel enrichment aiding and abetment concerns hereafter

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce, dispose and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers,
heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, all nuclear warheads of any standard
displacement; and heavy bomber armaments considered a nuclear, biological, and chemical
attack platform or program. In and though, START III shall conjoin the obligations assumed
under START II commencing December 31, 2007. All Partys to a nuclear utility energy
complex shall be considered a Nuclear Power hereinafter. Except for the United States and
Russia, the aggregate numbers for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and
IV of this Treaty, is not to exceed, 00, 66 nuclear nor biological formulation warheads. As
the conditions set forth in this Article. If for some reason the Partys to this confirmation
willfully, or negligibly violate and perpetuate the said limitable attributes, a citation and
penalty assessment conscript may be issued for the U N and ,or The Finance Ministry The
State of Israel. To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Convention an amount of 1
billion dollars on behalf of The International Court, and the Israeli Ministry of Justices; per
act or fact pertaining to deliberate concealment, or numerical discrepancies in the cause for
nuclear warheads available for purchase; suitcase bombs, crude radioactive devices as so it
is to, the financial responsibility of that State on behalf of the convicted to repatriate U N
Ministers of an alliance here withal. Upon entry into force of START III the nuclear
warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers,
are considered retro-effective as a condition of submergence from START II. In view of the

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START III AGENDA

obligations assumed, for Russia and the United States, the two Partys agreed to reduce one
anothers strategic nuclear arsenals to somewhere in between 3800 and 4250 or fewer
thereof.. Therefore within the framework of this Article, by December 31, 2,012 that their
be ,666 or less, for explosive high yielding or low yielding nuclear devices on each side,
Russia and the U S, as such as shall be considered the star based research and collaboration
scheduled reduction Agreements for the two Contracting Partys of the Powers therewith
here at. Apart from the obligations undertaken to the Conventions, .the decision of the
supreme interest of the U S Russian entire relative nuclear explosive detonating forces such
as a warheads or multiple warheads, including in particularly the cause of high frequency
yield devices with consume all an oxygen mask can never make properties shall be
considered priority deactivation silos sequences as sequences denied, so it was. The zone of
application for the purpose of this Treaty shall include the North and South hemispheres and
the breadth of the atmosphere here at. The Partys hereto establish France, Britain, China
and all others believed to be harboring fissile enzymes to a noxious disciple such as is
reported as so, are required to allow U N and U S, Israeli, and their assigned On Site
Inspection Teams permanently accessible means to verify the willingness to give up its
substantial arsenal contingencies as ordered to do so from star based research and design
insignias to the Convention. Aside from the START II follow through obligations, all other
States or Partys to a weapons grade explosive numerical identification shall be limited to
disposals monitoring and numerous sentry observation duty. The secondary Nuclear Powers
France, Great Britain, China, are required to reduce, dispose and de-limit said nuclear
devices for sale and anger management to the point of ,066 crude or secondary warheads
with higher frequency yield forgo, devisable at a 20% percent yearly agreed upon reduction
ratio also by December 31, 2,012. and discontinue upgrades in explosive charges with
nuclear contraption engineering such as mentioning will describe and nuclear warheads of
any standard attribution, hydrogen bombs, or warheads of any unit of bombardment, and any
of the sort of mentioning, thermo, and thermal fusion, nor propertys unidentifiable yet
considered to be identifiably similar in isotopic research as fissile frequency defoliant, as
soon to cease and desist by 31 December 2,012, or face considerable fines instilled here at.
For the purpose of providing assurance of the objective stated, operational custody of
devices of the higher explosive yield shall be considered a higher priority interest in the
strategic destruction or dismantling and disposal procedures as provided for in this Provision
in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty(s).

Section 2.

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers
for The U S and Russia from START II to START III entry into force, shall not exceed:
(a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;
(b) 1200 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one

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START III AGENDA

warhead is attributed; and

(c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. Memorandum of Attribution;
3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, The U S
and Russia shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and
SLBM launchers, s, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so
that no later than [January 1, 2003] December 31, 2007, and thereafter, the aggregate
number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does
not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMS, and deployed
heavy bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall
agree as such, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500.
4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers
for The U S and Russia, their sponsor States as well, shall not exceed:
(a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMS or such
lower number as all insignias intended victims to a Party shall have agreed so, but in no
case shall such number exceed 1750; [Memorandum of Attribution]Same as for all Partys;
(b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one
warhead is attributed; and same as for all insignias to a Marquis with similar attribution;
(c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.; Memorandum of Attribution
5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin
upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period
provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and a 10% reduction to aspect ratio per year for
all The Nuclear Powers, shall be the cause for U N penalty assessments fines, and shall be
completed no later than [seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty] December
31, 2012. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions
provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout
the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.
6. [Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty,
an agreement on a program of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this
Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of
this Treaty shall be fulfilled by every Party no later than December 31, 2012.] The Parties
may conclude an agreement on a program of assistance for the purpose of facilitating
implementation of the provisions of this Article, including for the purpose of accelerating
such implementation.

Article II

1. No later than December 31, 2007, in orders to facilitate the aspect to ratio progress is
foregoing and in order to insure the peoples propertys from radioactive debris and said
accumulations, permits and termination orders shall be issue of the days we went
deliberating hostile quotations, even so, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have

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START III AGENDA

converted to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed all its deployed and
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under
Article III of this Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), without exception,
inclusive to those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities
allowed under the START Treaty, and disavowed hereby and not to have thereafter
launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that
have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not have a capability of
launching an ICBM of the pre-existing or modernized attribution therefore. Each Party shall
carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START
Treaty, except as otherwise provided for, in DESBIC AGENDAS multimode nuclear non-
proliferation upgrades and revisions, as such in paragraph 3 of this Article.
2. To insure implementation to the execution of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1
of this Article each Party to an insignia decoration is bound by Israeli Firing squad tactics
which shall also apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has
been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III and the Partys to this entry of
this Treaty.
3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training
launchers, shall be implemented by means of either:
(a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Protocol
on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START,
II and START III, IVs retroactive implementation to Treatys agendas as fulfill obligations
and; or [Memorandum of Attribution]
(b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the
procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy
ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, as so,
for all Partys to a nuclear weapons grade manufactures warning of time tables availability
as related for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as
the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be
so converted. Memorandum of Attribution]
4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister of which has a
diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in
accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article.
5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall be phased out,
orders are to be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.
6. No later than December 31, 2012, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its
deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters in accordance with the
procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such
missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such
missiles or launch canisters unless authorized by The U N General Assembly quorum call as

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START III AGENDA

in the cause for engineering modernization developers and space flight to the Moon or as
such thereto.
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination
of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with the
conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided for in the
Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the
applicable provisions of the assessment of Israel of the threats imposed by neighboring
ideals and solutions indecisive of the objectives at launching coded reminders of a Saturday
that was once free so then.
8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any
recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START,II, III, NPT Treatys thereof.
9. Beginning on December 31, 2007, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce,
acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the descriptive encodes entrys as formal Treatys; or
deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty
bearing in mind that the two cut off dates implied are Governed by United Nations
attributable fines annual imposed in lieu of the 10% aspect to ratio disarmament dictates of
martial law therefore.

Article III

1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under
this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START
Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.
2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed
ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction in
the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing
types that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty, except that:
(a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may not exceed the 1250 limit
provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty
(b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMS, other than the
Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the
Russian Federation, may at any one time not exceed the limit of 666 warheads for each Party
provided for herewith subparagraph 5(c)(i) of Article III of the START Treaty ;
each Party shall have no such right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more
than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than
105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to which the number of warheads
attributed has been reduced, because all ICBMs and are to be disassembled and all nuclear
war heads are to be destroyed not later than 2,012, December 31 in accordance with this

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START III AGENDA

paragraph shall never anymore be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an ICBM of that
type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; and
(d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of
warheads is attributed is required to be destroyed and a new reentry vehicle platform. is a
matter of 6 to 10% upgrades for the said limitations discussed in DESBIC ABENDA for
chemical low frequency yield property exceptions where the aggregate integers provided for
are U S, U N, Russia and Formers, and China 4,250 non-ICBM chemical low graded agreed
to frequency yield non-explosive devices and no biological weapons or devices of such to
orders and such as that chemical property not much more lethal than agent orange therefore
whatsoever therein.
3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in
accordance with the purpose of a Treaty, each Party undertakes not to:
(a)produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles
greater than the number of warheads attributed to within the grounds of recognizing Israels
rights to existence, as it is to supply it under terms of this Treaty; nor
(b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the
number of warheads attributed to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
[ Memorandums and Attribution]

Article IV

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy
bombers shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of
the same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers
reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear
weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count as one warhead toward
the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such counting,
nuclear weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched , nuclear warhead accounting with
numerous sentry detail assigned to guard your safety monitors average Intelligences aspect
to ratio consideration of the weapons grade crude device management teleprompter as such
are (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and
nuclear bombs.
2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber
is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant
of a type in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber
Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America, the Russian Federation
and all Jungle areas of incalculable measurements on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum on Attribution.
3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear
weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type in the

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START III AGENDA

aforementioned descriptive and a Memorandum on Attribution. Therewith;

4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one
heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type specified in the Memorandum on
Attribution. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the
number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is
capable friendly a payload bank can appear, as actually equipped.
5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the
Memorandums of Combined efforts on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber of a type or
variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such
intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification or at a later date
agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy
bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant of a
type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised
number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a
type are actually equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type
and variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification
of such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a
heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of each
change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution.
However the 90 day advance notice section denotes an intention to comply and is strongly
advised that we not seek to competitively supply industrial railcars of a passage whereat.
6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article
shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on
Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and
Inspections. However in accordance to the Final Recommendation the participating status
quo to an insignia agree to undertake the responsibilities as do the United States and Russia
to disassembly standards Protocol as specified to do so or willing to force an evacuation
efforts should be made to create a suitable environment to altercate in another manner hereof.
7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bomber equipped
for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMS. For the purposes of this
Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified
by a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-
range nuclear ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy
bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMS. The reorienting Party shall provide to the
other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no
less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation; conversion procedures shall be required
for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role.
8. Heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following

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requirements
(a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 between them at 50 apiece at
any one time for the U S and the Soviet Empire by reason of close military exercise and joint
supplications to the former Republics, as so the same for the United Nations contingencies,
so as to be stated perspective of an aspect to ratio disarmament Protocol objective herein;
(b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles; [
such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers
shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or
exercise for such missions; and
(d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy
bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of
verification and visible during inspection.
9. Each Party shall have every right to return a nuclear role heavy bombers
that has been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The
Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels
notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber no less than 90 days in advance of taking such
action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role would be considered counterpoint, and only
subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role
shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during
inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented
to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still
reoriented to a conventional role.
10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than
100 kilometers from any air base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are
based.
11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a
conventional role shall remain subject to the provisions of Treaty, including the inspection
provisions.
12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a
conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber
reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of
demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) of this
Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Partys.
13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional
role are returned to a nuclear role, it will be considered a retractable citation subject to fines
and, or sanctions therefore one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy
bomber shall not be returned to a nuclear role so be an exhibition in the open for the purpose
of demonstrating to the other Partys the differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this
Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the On Site Inspection Agencys
and other collective arrangements of the duly sworn approach to detonation powers here
when;

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14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall
be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the START II Protocol on
Exhibitions and Inspections.

Article V

1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of the NPT, and START, II, III, S-4,
and DESBIC AGENDA Treatys, including the verification provisions, shall be used for
implementation of this unconditional responsibility;
2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties
hereby establish the Multilateral Implementation Commission, (MIC). The MIC
Commission shall be an impartial unbiased conciliatory Israeli bonded branch of the United
Nations Organization for International accordance The Parties agree that, if either Party so
requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Multilateral Implementation
Commission to:
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and
effectiveness of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution., Elimination and Conversion

Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections, DESBIC AGENDA, START III, The
S-4 Treatys, INF, and its executions , all of which are integral parts thereof, shall be subject
to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, and
subsequently retro-effective and to the entry into force of the START II Treaty herein;
2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by
the Parties from the date of its signature.
3. This Treaty shall remain in force and is of unlimited duration here withal we do.
4. Their shall any Party , in exercising its national sovereignty, have any excuses to
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides it cant be a matter of options on the disc Ill never
received. All Partys were bound to it so stipulated tonight. Therefore in and if extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have produced an enzyme of sparks; it will
be deemed as the choice of judgment and legal actions we misconceived, and troublesome
and now. Any notice of withdrawal or condemnation is the sign of the devil,; and how could
we forgive all the times we forgot, therefore to the Providence of all who betray the way to
understand survival as inscribed by Israel of a Faith wherein as entered to the face of value
made known to all these presents.

Article VII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into

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force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article VIII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Revised: DONE at H B. U S A. on the 7th day of May 2,005 in the English language; text
being authentic.

O
IN WITNESS WHEREOF; DONE FOR THE STATES OF
ISRAEL; THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALL
INSIGNIAS TO AN MARQUIS; AND ALL ENSIGNS TO
AN UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION; NATO
ALLIANCES; THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION(S); THE
REPUBLIC OF JAPAN; HERETO THE PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND SPONSORED STATES; OF
FAITH WHEREFORE IN GODS WILL WE TRUST
HEREINAFTER AMEN

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

START III TREATY

MEMORANDUM *

OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLYS THE NUCLEAR POWERS
AND ALL ENSIGNS TO THE STATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PROVISIONAL APPLICATION ON FURTHER DISPOSAL REDUCTION AND
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

The United States of America, The Peoples State of Israel, The United Nations
Organization, and All Insignias to a Marquis, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity,
that it cannot be won and must never be fought,
Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of
strategic
obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear
war and strengthen International peace and
security,
Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international
security require the strengthening of strategic stability,
Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article
XI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26,
1972; the dangers of nuclear detonation combust able matters, and the Washington
Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990,

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Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I
Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this
Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

ARTICLE II
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBM s and
SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, heavy
bomber armaments, and all nuclear and biological components such as warheads of
any standard displacement, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty
and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of
this Treaty, do not exceed:
(a) 000, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s and
their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 000 for
deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers; [RF MOU, Section II] [US
MOU, Section II The United National Accounting, (U N] [Agreed State of
Protocols as Referred to as the IDF Treaty Series ]
(b) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and
deployed heavy bombers, including: [START III, Art. I,5]
(i) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(ii) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of
ICBMs;
(iii) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. [phased heavy
reductions)
2. Each Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article
in to multiple phases, so that its strategic offensive arms do not exceed:
(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 31 December 2,007,after entry
into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:
(i) 0,666, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s
and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;

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(ii) 0,666, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and
deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 0.666, warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 31 December 2,017 after
entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:
(i) 0,000, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s
and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;
(ii) 0,000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and
deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 0,000, warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(c) by the end of the third phase, and with attributable fines sanctioned and
impugned, that is, no later than 31 December 2,022 after entry into force of this
Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
reduced and disposed of properly to the points of aggregate uniform numerical
contingencies of 0,000, including crude radioactive contraptions thereupon
3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and
deployed SLBM s so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 10% per annum
accumulative reduction aspect to ratio of metric tons. [Throw-weight Limits/
Provisions Provided hereupon for Types of ICBMs and SLBM s]

4. If under any circumstances a Party to the Provisions of this entry are not in
standard conformity of the per annum 10% aspect to ratio reduction phase of
uniform disarmament Protocols; a Promissory report must be received by the U N
Supervisory Unit, The Chief of Staffs U S and Israeli Defense quarters; and a
determination will be made if any late charges or penalty fees are to be assessed
thereto

ARTICLE III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for
in subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a)(i), and 2(b)(i) of Article II of this Treaty:
(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit;
each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher; shall be counted as one unit.

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(b) Each deployed heavy bombers shall be counted as one unit.

2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and
deployed SLBM s and their associated launchers
(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBM s shall
be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively.
(b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile
has not been installed in that launcher, such an ICBM removed from its launcher
and located at that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in
that launcher.
(c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile
has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher
shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed from
its launcher shall be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBM s may
be located pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in
movement to such a facility.
3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBM s:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBM s that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the
first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an
ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(b) For ICBMs or SLBM s that are maintained, stored, and transported as
assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular
type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in
launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister,
shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type.
(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it
first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been
launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. a
launch canisters shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a
training model of a missile or has been placed on static display . Launch
canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch
canisters for ICBMs of a different type.
4. For the purposes of counting warheads:
(a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type

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shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding [RF MOU,

Section I] [US MOU, Section I]on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to
this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.
(b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new
type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or
SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of warheads that will be
attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing
design with multiple reentry vehicles, or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with
one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the
result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or
SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM of
SLBM of a new type. In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with or of
warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM of SLBM of a new type with a front
section of a fundamentally new design, the question of the applicability of the 40-
percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the
framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Until agreement
has been reached regarding the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or SLBM, the
number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be
subject, as considered the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an
ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of new types of
ICBMs or SLBM s with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not
exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty remains in force.[Agreed State to
upgrade expect abilities Pursuant of DESBIC AGENDA Article IV Section 7s
exclusive limitations set forth for lower yield frequency chemical formulation
ordnance acceptances here with thereabouts.]
(c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-
tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually
released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry
vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was
released. A procedure for dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be
a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for
dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.
(d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one
warhead.

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(e) For the United States of America, by 31 December 2,012 each heavy bomber
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 66 such heavy bombers,
shall be attributed[MOU US Section I] with six warheads. Each heavy bomber
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy bombers shall
be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear
ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The United States of America shall
specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in
excess of 66 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at
which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each
heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy
bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of
long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant
is actually equipped.[category]
(f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to that very same time reference
afore specified, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to
a total of 66 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed[MOU RF Section I] with six
warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess
of 66 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to
the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for
long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 66 such heavy bombers by
number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of
long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range
nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually
equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a
heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.[category]

Article IV

Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear
ALCMs shall be attributed[MOU US Section I] [MOU RF Section I] with one
warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be
considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-
range nuclear ALCMs, with the exception of heavy bombers equipped for non-

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nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. [category]
[START II, Art. IV.1,2]
5. Each Party shall reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM
s only of existing types, up to an aggregate number of 66 by the time references
indicative o f progressive engagement afore specified as 31 December 2,012 at any
one time. [START III Art III. 2 (a)]
(a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following:
(i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads
attributed to the type of ICBM designated by the United States of America as, and
known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the
reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM s of no more
than two other existing types except whereas upgrades and revision are or were not
accounted for; the same is for Russia, also recognized to be in charge and the
supplier of weapons grade uranium exportation inter alia The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of four multiplied by the number of
deployed SLBM s designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-
50, which is known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, [MOU RF
Section III]plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and
SLBM s of no more than two other existing types forgo the afore mentioned
upgrades and descriptive to date 31 December 2,012 .
(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III shall be
carried out subject to the following:
(i) Minuteman III to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not
be deployed at the same ICBM base.
(ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry
into force of this Treaty.
(iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III to which a reduced number
of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle
platform.
(c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM s of
types other than Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following:
(i) Such reductions include disassembly multi National standing and numerous
sentry observation are urged to reduce and dispose at a 10% per annum aspect to

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ratio as ascertained, however within a 30 day period reduction oversight may be

limited to 500 warheads at any one time for each Party ; inclusive of the same
relative abstracts pursuant of these Provisions of The Nuclear Powers, who as a
combined assertion are collectively assumed to be in possession and control of the
same amounts comb natively articulating, as the said U S Russian dealers of those
enchantments; and in furtherance for the mark of suggestion the abstracts,
timetables, descriptions of Weapon of Mass Destruction, hereinafter referred to as
WMD, are duly subject to the coinciding aspect to ratio disarmament obligations
here withal. [START II Art III.2(b)]
(ii) Afore and after a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to
ICBMs or SLBM s of two existing types, that Party shall delimitate and continue to
reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBM s of any additional
type.

(III) SLBM s of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are
attributed, shall be discontinued as of not later than 31 December 2,012 and are not
be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to International or
internal water destinations, arrivals, Ports of Call adversary air and sovereign
territorial bounds therein.
(IV) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type
is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM
to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed
herein. (d) A Party
shall not have the right to attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of warheads
greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that
Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of
this paragraph. A Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBM s of a new
type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed
to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads
pursuant to31 December 2,012 and subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.
6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows:
(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for
mobile launchers of ICBMs;

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(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been
completed and if and when the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed,
or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier;
(d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo
launchers of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when
excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the
silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever
occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a
deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, even so as for the non-
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article
IV of this Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;
(e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is
first launched;
(g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an
SLBM launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the
submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched
(h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out
of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former
heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is
first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes
are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes. [Agreed State
12]

Article V

7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an
ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching
an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Such converted launchers shall be
considered to be launchers of ICBMs or SLBM s of that different type as follows:
(a) a silo launchers of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training
model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the

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silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission;
(c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher
is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of that different type and that
submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates under its
own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was
performed.
8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different
category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of
that different category or former heavy bombers as follows:
(a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear
ALCMs converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs,
when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for
long-range nuclear ALCMs;
.
9. For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter
objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a
ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply.
(b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all
ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
(c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all
cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM
of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBM s of
that type. If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a
launcher of ICBMs or SLBM s of a different type, it shall be considered to be a
launcher of ICBMs or SLBM s of the type for which it has been converted.
(e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy
bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear
ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy
bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range
nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular

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type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-
range nuclear ALCMs. Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-
range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than
long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments,
a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from
one another.
(f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-
tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to
be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of
which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31,
2,007, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range
non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-
range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-
range nuclear ALCMs.
(g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable
from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile
launchers of ICBMs of other new type of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with their
associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of
ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and
from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their
associated missiles installed.
(h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type
of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous
type of ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles installed,
shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of
ICBM with their associated missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of
ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed within the
framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:
(a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBM s are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United
States of America as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident
I, and Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon, Trident I, Trident II, and other

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respectively;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18,
RS-22, RS-12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are
known to the United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-
24, SS-25, SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, and other
respectively.
(b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and all other insignias
to a missile complex.:
(i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United
States of America as Peacekeeper, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as MX;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to
the United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively.
(c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBM s are the types of missiles designated by the
United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
as, Minuteman I and Polaris A-3.
(d) Existing types of heavy bombers are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United
States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-
52, B-1, and B-2;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to
the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively. [Soviet TU-22M
Declaration]
(e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs
designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as, AGM-86B and AGM-129;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear
ALCMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and
RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-
15 B, respectively. [Nuclear SLCM Policy Declarations]
[Agreed State 28]

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ARTICLE VI

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be

based only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed five square
kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten
deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be
based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed
ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.
2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers
of ICBMs within each restricted areas so that these structures shall not be capable
of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-
mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area. 3. Each
restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall
not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another
deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for
road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.
4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be
based only in rail garrisons. Each Party shall have no more than seven rail
garrisons. No point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more
than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall
be measured along the tracks. A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail
garrison. 5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/
exits. Each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks
passing through it (a total of four rails).
6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more
than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison.
Each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites.
7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of
ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard
configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain no
more than one train of standard configuration. 8. Each rail garrison shall contain no
more than one maintenance facility.

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9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave
restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or
dispersals [XIII.1] [XIV.1]. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational
dispersals.
10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the
total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater,
may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No
more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated
missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the
purpose of relocation.
11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers
of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at
any one time
12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. All such trains
shall conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine
movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining
within a rail garrisons after the other portion of such a train has departed for the
maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another
facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for
dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided
thereupon.

ARTICLE VII

1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for

mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this
Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or
Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national
technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and

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XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on

Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty,
hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol.
2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,
heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to
the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or
otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in
accordance with
procedures.
3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBM s shall be subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering
them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at
the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBM s.
4.The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of
ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and bombers shall be carried out at
conversion or elimination facilities,. A launch canister [Launch Canister Letters]
remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile
launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open or at a conversion or
elimination facility,

ARTICLE VIII

1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the
Memorandum of Understanding, in which data with respect to items subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of
data. 2. In order to ensure the
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the
other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article,
and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in
accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this
Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol.
3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification
Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III
of the Inspection Protocol:[Agreed State 37]

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(a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations
provided for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the
Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data;[Agreed State
21]
(b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided
for in this Treaty;
(c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection
with the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight [MOU, Section I] Relating to
this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol;
(d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this
Treaty;
(e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of
national technical means of verification;
(f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s and notifications
concerning telemetric information; [Launch Notification Agreement]
(g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds;
[Agreed State 2]
(h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided
pursuant to this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities;
(i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and
(j) notifications concerning operational dispersals.
4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for
continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications
in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless
otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such
notifications no later than one hour after receipt.
5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that
time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified
in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds
to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.
6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to
release to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the

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Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended

thereto. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic
Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be
released to the public unless otherwise agreed. The Parties shall hold consultations
on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this
Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this
Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of
the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to
those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or
other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations
provided for in this Treaty. [Statements on Release to Public]

ARTICLE IX

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal
in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph l of this
Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification,
by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures
includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result
in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBM s, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the
association between ICBMs or SLBM s and their launchers during testing. The
obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment
practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental
shelters for strategic offensive arms.
4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a
unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

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ARTICLE X

1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric
information obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test
shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight
test, as well as the methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information.
2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric
information, including: [Statements on Encryption & Jamming]
(a) the use of encryption;
(b) the use of jamming;
(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow
directional beaming; and
(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of eject able capsules
or recoverable reentry vehicles..
3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
undertakes not to broadcast from reentry vehicles. telemetric information that
pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism
of the ICBM or SLBM.
4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric
Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry
Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is
broadcast during the flight test.
5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data
associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.[Agreed State 35]
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party
shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements
during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s each year.
Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of
ICBMs or SLBM s of each type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a
self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such encapsulation shall be carried out in

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accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol,
and such encryption shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section
III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on
the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the
quotas specified in this paragraph.[Agreed State 31]

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous
monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the
Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions
shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection
Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. [item of inspection] [size
criteria][Agreed State 36]
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to
confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such
facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Section I of the Notification Protocol. [facility inspections at] [Agreed State 10]
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to
confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such
facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
[facility inspections at] [Agreed State 10]
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the
accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of
new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the
Notification Protocol.[facility inspections at]
5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that
covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of
first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring. [facility inspections at] [Joint State
on Site Diagrams]
6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of

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deployed ICBMs and SLBM s to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no
more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them.[facility
inspections]
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that
the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are
located at the inspected ICBM bases and those that have not returned to it after
completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM
base.
8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or
elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic
offensive arms.
9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that
the elimination of facilities has been completed.
10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections
to confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided
in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not
being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.
11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the
right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM
and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of
ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile
launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the
inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to the data
specified for these items.
12. Each Party shall conduct distinguish ability exhibitions for heavy bombers,
former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right
during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:
(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such
exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical
characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to
the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of
Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear
ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually

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equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number
provided for in paragraph 20 or21 of Article V of this Treaty, as applicable;
(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear
ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type
of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear
ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been
flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber,
each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-
range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are
distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the
same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and
(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit
the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and
each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these
items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of
such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been
provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the
Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable
from long-range nuclear ALCMs.
13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during
such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all
training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial
exchange of data provided.. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for.
After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a
type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-
tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and
the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections,
of 30 percent of the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of

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such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at
each air base specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions
shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features
that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the
same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at
production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the
number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.[Agreed State]
[facilities] [Site Surveys Letters]

ARTICLE XII

1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each

Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with the Protocol, carry
out the following cooperative measures:
(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within
restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile
launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request
shall not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers
of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one
ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area,
the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for
the duration of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the
restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of
such fixed structures;
(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking
sites specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by
removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the
rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display
pursuant to each such request shall include all such launchers located at no more
than eight parking sites, provided that no more than two parking sites may be
requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning
specific parking sites shall include the designation for each parking site as provided
for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding; and[

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(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located
within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers
and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or
operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by
removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the
airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the
air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to
maintenance or operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification
provided in accordance with Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no
later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.
2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy
bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph
1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment
measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year,
but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile
launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more
than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single
request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile
launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A
display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall
continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the
requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by
force major, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with
Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests
to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been
designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the
inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures
have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative
measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in
accordance with Protocol.

ARTICLE XIII

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersal of deployed mobile
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail
garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as
provided for below:
(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol.
(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and
time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of
Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification
provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol
shall be considered to be involved in exercise dispersal.
(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and
their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or
rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in
such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.
b(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and
their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail
garrisons of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such
a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation.
Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance
with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of
the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of
Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for
mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be
part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a
facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

(g) An exercise in dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:
(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;
(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;
(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility
inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an
inspection has expired; or
(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated
for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such
an inspection.
(i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with
Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update
inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of
ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an
ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal.
(j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs
and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their
restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in
accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification
has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of
September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below:
(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol.
(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol.
(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise.

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall
be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided
for baseline data inspections.
(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to
conduct inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former
heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such
air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major
strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with
Protocol.
(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the
completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for
cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with this Treaty at one of the
air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the
quota provided for in this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile
submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and
duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile
submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals. When an operational
dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party shall be considered to be
part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted as provided for
below:[Agreed State]
(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and
time specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and
time specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:
(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any
conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d)
of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with
Protocol;
(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;
(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and
(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In
such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the
number that has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of
the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in
accordance with Protocol.
3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no
later than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal
has been provided in accordance with Protocol. The right to conduct inspections
and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this
Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of the operational
dispersal has been provided in accordance with Protocol. Inspections or
cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that
it suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal
shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty.
4. When an operational dispersal is completed:
(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles
shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations .
(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall
be located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or
relocations .
(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have
resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located
outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties
will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances
can be provided.

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the
Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more
than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII
of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such
requests shall count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of
Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the
Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The
Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework
of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to: United Nation Assemblies
Protocol]
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the
viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and
(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty
to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in
accordance with Protocol.

ARTICLE XVI

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume
any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its
provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of
this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The
Parties [United Nations Assemblies Protocol] agree that this provision does apply
to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic
offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and
a third State. [Agreed State 1] [Soviet State on Non-Circumvention & Patterns of
Coop. The NATO Alliances and Its Supreme Commanders; The Republic of
China, Koreas and Japanese Multilateralism, The Persian Empires, The Arabian

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Peninsula, France, Switzerland, Spain Portugal, Sweden The States of Israel, and
India, Pakistan and all other insignias to developing needs to isotopic mentioning
there again in still.]

ARTICLE XVII

1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of

Understanding, all of which form integral parts and are considered hereby to say
the IDF Treaty series, in which the purpose was to reserve adaptive language and
interceptive resurrection thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with
the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the
date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall
meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this
Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the
expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduce, dispose and de-
limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive
five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures
governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-
year period of extension unless as was to be retro ceded by a subsequent agreement
on the reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms.
3. There shall any Party in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Treaty. No such extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty can jeopardized the supreme interests as willful or negligible
dissention... Such notice shall have no bearing on the situation implied as dire need
to comprehend a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards
as having Natures said orientation over its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall
enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Treaty.

ARTICLE XIX

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.

Done at HB 92649 USA, one copy in English and authentic Text in all who come to
call upon it.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION THE U N

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION INTER ALIA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL

THE NATO ALLIANCE ORGANIZATION

AND ALL INDEPENDENT ENSIGNS

TO A MARQUIS

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE UNDERSIGNED BEING

DULY AUTHORIZED UNDERTAKE TO BEAR TRUE

FAITH ON THE BEHALF OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF DEVINE REVELATION FROM HERE ON IN

COUNTRY SIGNATURE DATES OF ACCESSION

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 Descriptive Encode in Star Based Internal Command
The Articles of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal
DESBIC AGENDA

FINAL PROVISIONS Signatures

The present Convention shall be mandatory of all States Members of the United Nations or of
any of the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State invited or ordered to do so,
by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to this Convention, whose
time references are of unlimited duration, at the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the
State of Israel, and subsequently, at United Nations Headquarters, New York.

Ratification

The present Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be

deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Accession

The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State belonging to any of the
categories mentioned hereupon.. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Entry into force

1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirty first of December 2,007 and so
shall the date of deposit of the U N Charter insignias for an instrument of ratification or
accession.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the instruments of
ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force within the time references as
specified as retro effective with START II as START III, with the notable obligations
assigned to all Nuclear Powers and their suspected sponsoring states, thereby the deposit by
such State of its instrument of ratification or accession is assigned to the United States of
America as Depositary underwriter and defendant; and in the case of an absence of Law or an
excuse or submergence in anti-pas; the State of Israel by reason of star based special science
selective service retention, is obligated to perform as the acting authority of this world in the
Day of the LORD, not later than 31 December 2,007 therewithal herein..

Authentic texts

The original of this present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts shall be equally authentic and deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall be made available in all manor of speech, with all due consideration of
the various languages of the U N Memberships, to that end;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by

their respective Governments, have signed the present Convention.

DONE IN HUNTINGTON BEACH CALIFORNIA 92649 USA IN GOD WE TRUST TO

OUR FAITH IS WILL WHEREIN THEREUPON THIS Fifth DAY OF May, 2,005

ANNEX

1. A list of conciliators consisting of qualified jurists shall be drawn up and maintained by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. To this end, every State which is a Member of the
United Nations or a party to the present Convention shall be invited to nominate two
conciliators, and the names of the persons so nominated shall constitute the list. The term of a
conciliator, including that of any conciliator nominated to fill a casual vacancy, shall be five
years and may be renewed. A conciliator whose term expires shall continue to fulfill that
function for which he has been chosen; the State of Israel is required to have a say in the event
of an uneventful occurrences as so stated under the following paragraph;.

2. When a request has been made to the Secretary-General under article 66, the Secretary-
General shall bring the dispute before a conciliation commission constituted as follows:

The State or States constituting one of the parties to the dispute shall appoint:

(a) one conciliator of the nationality of that State or of one of those States, who
may or may not be chosen from the list referred to in paragraph 1; and
(b) one conciliator not of the nationality of that State or of any of those States,
who shall be chosen from the list.

The State or States constituting the other party to the dispute shall appoint two conciliators in
the same way. The four conciliators chosen by the parties shall be appointed within sixty days
following the date on which the Secretary-General receives the request.

The four conciliators shall, within sixty days following the date of the last of their own
appointments, appoint a fifth conciliator chosen from the list, who shall be chairman.

In the appointment of an Israeli chairman, or of any other conciliators within the period
prescribed above for such appointment has not been made, it shall be made by the Secretary-
General within sixty days following the expiry of that period. The appointment of the
chairman may be made by the Secretary-General either from the list or from the membership
of the International Law Commission. The Law Commission shall respect the binding and
officially recognized documentation of our word, His LORD, the inscribed Testaments of their
Heritages, and the fact that the Israelis are to be held somewhat accountable if none other then
Heaven on Earth is not accounted for as much as the Justices of the Peace and peace overtures
expressed and assigned, are by star elders on this planet in uniform divisionary supplemental
areas of continuity. Any of the periods within which appointments must be made may be
extended by agreement between the parties to the dispute.
Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial appointment.

3. The Conciliation Commission shall decide its own procedure. The Commission, with the
consent of the parties to the dispute, may invite any party to the treaty to submit to it its views
orally or in writing. Decisions and recommendations of the Commission shall be made by a
majority vote of the five members.

4. The Commission may draw the attention of the parties to the dispute to any measures which
might facilitate an amicable settlement.

5. The Commission shall hear the parties, examine the claims and objections, and make
proposals to the parties with a view to reaching an amicable settlement of the dispute.

6. The Commission shall report within twelve months of its constitution. Its report shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General and transmitted to the parties to the dispute. The report
of the Commission, including any conclusions stated therein regarding the facts or questions of
law, shall not be binding upon the parties and it shall have no other character than that of
recommendations submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to facilitate an
amicable settlement of the dispute.

7. The Secretary-General shall provide the Commission with such assistance and facilities as it
may require. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne by the United Nations.
FOR THE

UNITED NATIONS;----------------------------------------------------------------

FOR THE

STATE OF ISRAEL;----------------------------------------------------------------

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DATED__________________ ______________________________

_ _

IN FAITH WHEREFORE DEPOSITARY

TRUSTEES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND

ALL INSIGNIAS TO A MARQUIS

 Employer
IC. Resume Steven V. Arroyo Resources
Page1 of 7
03-27-05 16941 Green St. # 13
Huntington Beach Ca. 92649
Home # 714 377-8903:
email; sarroyo1@socal.rr.com

This report may contain information bearing credit worthiness, credit standing,
and capacity, character, or general reputation from public record sources in
connection with the Job Search for employment purposes, including, but not limited
to, reassignment, or retention as an associate hereby.

Objectives: by a common determination to promote an

understanding among our peoples and co-operative growth in all
spheres of diplomatic endeavourment;

(a) establish our ground on the basis of a program of work, or

vocational service unto an Oath, to thee I bid, to address,
advise and call attention to, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense herein;
(b) support research and development of aero dynamical
space based resource and analysis to further the cause of
universal Law and Order for which Ill stand.
(c) Evaluate, interpret, and convey encoded communication
transcripts and Celestial Organized Agendas for the
purpose of a Mission, within the bounds of arbitrational
access for the free standing States of Naval Intelligence
inter-agency locations, on earth, or in space.
(d) Research: consolidate and acquire, to disarm numerous
ensigns to a statement of centrifically forged field
frequency contingencies, by order of a star people
consensus and a START Treaty so as to adjust for the
distance between senses and imbalances, and undertake
to arbitrate disputes without shots being fired therefore.
 Department of Naval Investigations
IC. Resume
Page 5 of 7
Steven V. Arroyo

Position applying for:

Communications care coordinator for Dugway and /or, other areas of research and aero
dynamical design in selective services.

Re: Cover Letter and Resume for S.B.I.C. Mediator and Telepath, Utility.

Contacts Name: Richard Cheney

Contacts Title: Vice President (USA)
Company of recommendations:
Admiral Bobby Inman;
Admiral Brent Scowcroft

March 31, 2,005

Dear Mr. Secretary,

My name is Steven Arroyo and I am contacting you in reference to employment with our
installations whereabouts. Now that I have put forth a draft of protocol called the
DESBIC AGENDA TREATY, I feel that I can wash my hands of critical consciousness,
I feel that I can entertain the thought of letting you utilize my extra sensory objectives for
the purpose of a Pledge; and try to hold a higher mass and a stronger flag without
walking inside a circle of danger, or stepping outside a line of conformity here withal.
My hours are flexible at the present time reference; say upward to 20 to 50 hours a week
or more as need be the courts. I specialize in inter-communion telepathic agenda
translation with star people and are considered a reasonably resonant medium.

I am interested in working in the special scientist field because I feel that, its not that far
to Groom Lake Research and Development Containers, or distant green lights of the
galaxys, but it is pretty far from just what type of disarmament questions need to be
addressed, advised, and descended upon, as a special orders in tact Sir, Your Honors
Sir. Sometimes it gets difficult to imagine how we succeed, by, for and of a thousand
generations for His Honor; but the renewable resources are said to be free as these spoken
words, and I would tend to believe they.

The star people chose me I believed, because I was a nose for news when CNN first got
started, and in furtherance of denials, I was a behemoth Secretary James A. Baker,
 The Department of Naval Criminal Investigations
IC. Resume
Page 6 of 7
Steven V. Arroyo

George Bush advocate to some extent within the bounds of intellectuality. The peace
overtures of Soviet to independent East Europe I viewed as a light to a not a mutually
assured deplorable trajectory path from iron curtains, to iron mules in the civics there
instead. So they summoned for a Handy Dandy; a Safety Personality, to possibly prove
that mission worthy of praise, in the face of battle lines that need not exist from a sub
marginal degrees of likely and unlikely courses of judgment and legal actionary
framework to every saucer module in U N operative custody(s) here and now thereto.

As the frame depicts, I am a portrait of a Faith defender. I fight for a cause if it fancys
my taste. I am not a rebel. I can be ridged and unyielding on one hand, exercise
precedence and etiquette on the cuff, slow to anger, slick as oil, dramatic and crude, not
too quick to speak though, in and that I get under tomorrow, lost in reminders that my
foreign policy beliefs are that to which is upward of, say 91% up to par U S A / U N
standards. Exception being, a bailout policy if the red Chinese make a try, on Taiwan;
and if you do that, love can be an angry word, and so. The Treaty terms are 31 December
2,017; re-unification, pending disarmament duties assumed here withal thereupon.
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SS | Russian Arms, Military Technology, Analysis of Russia's Military Forces

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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS

Browse database:
Total: 15 topics in category

SS-1* Scud R-17

Designed for short range firing. It is a single stage, liquid propellant, theater missile with an inseparable warhead. It entered service in 1962. The
missile is fired from tracked and wheeled launchers, which are also used to transport the fueled missile. The prelaunch tests, preparation procedures,
targeting, fueling and launching are performed when the missile is brought to the firing ... [+]

SS-13 Savage / RT-2

RT-2/SS-13 Savage: specifications.

SS-18 Satan / (RS-20A/B/R-36M/15A14/15A18)

This missile is intended for use against strategic targets of all types at intercontinental ranges. The SS-18 was an evolutionary follow-on to the SS-9.
The SS-18, along with the SS-17 and SS-19, deployed in the 1970s, represent the fourth generation of Soviet ICBMs. Like the other fourth generation
missiles, the SS-18 is transported and stored in a sealed capsule. SS-18s were designated ... [+]

SS-19 STILETTO / (UR-100N, UR-100NU)

The SS-19 missile is one of the oldest missiles in the current Russian strategic arsenal. The first version of the missile, designated UR-100N, began
deployment in April 1975 and was officially commissioned in December 1975. The development of the missile, which was intended to replace the
single-warhead SS-11 (UR-100), was carried out at the TsKBM Design Bureau (the Chelomey Design Bureau), ... [+]

SS-21 Scarab / OTR-21 Tochka-U

http://warfare.ru/?catid=265&cattitle=SS (1 of 2)5/8/2005 5:37:25 PM

SS | Russian Arms, Military Technology, Analysis of Russia's Military Forces

The system is designed to effectively defeat critical targets in the tactical depth of the enemy battle formation. Components: - solid-propellant missiles
with submunition warhead and with HEF warhead; - self-propelled launcher (SPL); - transloader; - transporter; - automated test vehicle; - maintenance
vehicle; - arsenal equipment set; - missile and warhead containers. The single-stage ... [+]

SS-23 Spider / OTR-23

OTR-23/SS-23 Spider: specifications and image.

SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22/RT-23U)

The SS-24 has the Russian designation RS-22 or RT-23U Molodets and the identification numbers 15 Zh 60 and 15 Zh 61 (for RS-22B or Mod 1 silo-
based and RS-22A or Mod 2 rail-based versions respectively). The USA has arbitrarily assigned generations to Soviet missiles and has designated
the SS-24 as the first of the fifth generation, presumably because it was radically different from the SS-17, ... [+]

SS-25 Sickle (RS-12M/RT-2PM/Topol)

This small, fifth-generation ICBM is the latest Russian land-based missile. It can either be carried on an off-road, unhardened transporter-erector
vehicle (TEL), or stationed in silos. There was some controversy surrounding the SS-25, which the Soviets claimed was an upgrade to the SS-13
Savage. The United States claimed the SS-25 was more than 5 percent larger than the SS-13, qualifying ... [+]

SS-26 Stone / Iskander (-E)

It has been developed as a result of joint work of a number of research institutes, design bureaus and plants under the supervision of the KBM
Engineering Design Bureau, a well-known as a developer of Tochka (SS-21), Oka (SS-23) and Tochka-U missile systems. The Kolomna Engineering
Design Bureau is the leading developer of precision-guided tactical and theater missiles for the Ground Forces. ... [+]

SS-27 Topol-M
The single-warhead Topol-M is an advanced version of the silo-based and mobile Topol intercontinental ballistic missile. The solid-propellant three-
stage Topol-M missile complex, with a standardized (silo and mobile) missile, is to become the foundation of the Russian strategic nuclear forces in
the 21st century. It is planned to accommodate Topol-M both on self-propelled launchers as well ... [+]

Results pages: 1 2

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SS-1* Scud R-17 | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTEL. AGENCY

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Video Additional

Launch w tight, t 5.8

Maximum range, km 300
Warhead inseparable
Number of RVs 1
Guidance system inertial
Number of stages 1
Length, m 11.2
Diameter, m 0.88
Propellant liquid

Designed for short range firing.

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It is a single stage, liquid propellant, theater missile with an inseparable warhead. It

entered service in 1962. The missile is fired from tracked and wheeled launchers, which
are also used to transport the fueled missile.

The prelaunch tests, preparation procedures, targeting, fueling and launching are
performed when the missile is brought to the firing site.

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SS-18 Satan / (RS-20A/B/R-36M/15A14/15A18) | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-18 Satan / (RS-20A/B/R-36M/15A14/15A18)

SS-18 Satan / (RS-20A/B/R-

36M/15A14/15A18) Discuss Email

Video Additional
Statistics:
Total number: ~188

Type: Inter-continental-range, silo-based, liquid-propellant, Multiple Independently

targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV)-capable ballistic missile
Launch weight, kg 217,000
Length of the missile in
the launching container, m 34.3
Launching container
diameter, m 3
Warhead 8 MIRV x 20 MT/10 MIRV x 500 KT
Range, km: 16000/11,000
Info by CDI:
Year Deployed: ~1975
Dimensions: 36.5 meters length, 3.0 meters diameter
Weight: 211,100 kilograms
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Propulsion: Two stage liquid fuel plus PBV, cold launch

Throw-weight: 8,800 kilograms
Range: Mod 4 - 11,000 kilometers, Mod 5 - unknown, Mod 6 - unknown
Guidance: Computer-controlled inertial for booster and PBV
Circular Error Probable: 250 meters
Warhead: Mod 4 with 10 warheads, Mod 5 with 10 warheads, or Mod 6 with one
warhead
Yield: Mod 4 - 500 kilotons each, Mod 5 - 750 kilotons each, Mod 6 - 20 megatons
Locations: Uzhur - 52, Aleysk - 30, Kartaly - 46, Dombaroskiy - 52
Number Deployed: 168 missiles
Primary Contractor: Yangel Design Bureau

This missile is intended for use against strategic targets of all types at intercontinental
ranges.

The SS-18 was an evolutionary follow-on to the SS-9. The SS-18, along with the SS-17
and SS-19, deployed in the 1970s, represent the fourth generation of Soviet ICBMs.
Like the other fourth generation missiles, the SS-18 is transported and stored in a
sealed capsule. SS-18s were designated "heavy" missiles under SALT II, and a limit of
308 such heavy ICBMs was established, with Russia soon deploying to that limit.
Though limited by treaty to 10 warheads each, the SS-18 is allegedly able to carry more
-- its massive throw-weight certainly suggests such.

During the Cold War the SS-18 was perhaps the most feared of Russian strategic
systems (hence its demonic NATO designation) because of the supposed threat it
posed to U.S. ICBM silos. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Committee on the
Present Danger (among others) touted the "window of vulnerability" -- the threat the
large, accurate SS-18 posed to U.S. ICBMs. This fear of ICBM vulnerability (which didn't
take into account the invulnerability of the sea leg, and the alert posture of the air leg)
was a significant impetus for the nuclear buildup of the 1980s iniated by U.S. President
Ronald Reagan.

The Reagan administration and the first Bush administration made this missile the focus
of their arms control efforts because of its destabilizing capability. With the SS-18 in
mind, the START II treaty banned land-based MIRV systems for ICBMs. In recent years,
through the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States has sponsored the dismantlement
of many of these missiles.

The RS-20B represents a further development of the RS-20A missile, the principle
difference being a new combat stage.

The new version also boasts improved accuracy, greater nuclear warhead yield and a
wider RV dispensing area.

No attempt was made to redesign the first and second stages. The functional diagram of
the missile systems and the transport launch canister remained the same. The bus
motor propellant is identical to that of the sustainers: asymmetrical dimethylhydrazine
and nitrogen tetroxide.

The modernized guidance/control system ensures reduced instrumental and methodical

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errors due to improvements in control units and onboard computer software. The SS-18
has the Russian designation RS-20 and it is believed to have identification numbers
15A14 (RS- 20A) for the Mod 1 and Mod 2 versions, 15A18 (RS-20B) for the Mod 3,
and 15A18M (RS-20V) for the Mod 4 version. The SS-18 was also given the Russian
designator R-36M to indicate that it was derived from the earlier R-36 (SS-9 `Scarp')
ballistic missile. As with the smaller SS-17 and SS-19, the SS-18 was an evolutionary
development of an existing missile, the SS-9; this latter missile being used as the
development vehicle for the MIRV technology to be incorporated on the SS-18.
Development of the SS-18 began in 1964 with the first, single Re-entry Vehicle (RV),
version being deployed in 1975. A modification 2 version, with eight RVs in MIRV
configuration, was deployed a year later in 1976. A third version, Mod 3, with a single
warhead and a greater range was introduced in 1980.

Under the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) terms, the SS-18, was classed as
`heavy', as was the US Titan missile. The terms of the SALT 2 Treaty allowed
modernisation of missiles in this `heavy' category, but new missiles were not permitted,
and SALT 2 allowed a maximum of 820 land-based Inter-Continental-range Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs), of which no more than 308 may be of the `heavy' SS-18 category.
Early flight tests of a modification 4 (10 RV) version SS-18 missile did not prove
successful. The first launch, in April 1986, exploded soon after clearing the silo and
another launch in September 1986 ended when an explosion occurred during the
separation of the first and second stages. The Mod 4 version entered service in 1988.

Tests in the later 1980s were made using a single RV, and this version was believed to
be Mod 5, although it could have been a Mod 3 version, from which it is deduced that
the Russians may have had a continuing interest in a missile with one, very powerful
warhead. These single warhead tests may have been part of a comparative test
programme designed to establish the best way of countering the improved hardness of
modern silos, given that single warhead missiles have a greater accuracy and hard
target capability than MIRV systems. Description The SS-18 is the largest of the `fourth-
generation' Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles and the only `heavy' missile
permitted under the SALT 2 Treaty. It is a two-stage, liquid-propelled missile. SS-18
Mods 1 and 2 are 33.6 m long and 3 m in diameter. It is believed that the first stage
uses the four-motor RD-251 propulsion system producing 460 tonne thrust, and the
second stage uses the single motor RD-0229/0230 system producing 77 tonne thrust.
The first stage is controlled by deflecting the motor nozzles, and the second stage by
four vernier motors. Both first and second stages use Unsymmetrical Dimethyl
Hydrazine (UDMH) and N204 liquid propellants. The bus motor is a solid-propellant
motor. Launch weight is 215,000 kg and the throw weight (payload) is 7,200 kg. These
missiles have inertial navigation with digital computer guidance and control. The Mod 1
missile had a single 24 MT nuclear warhead, a range of 10,500 km and an accuracy of
430 m CEP. The Mod 2 version had eight MIRVs, each with a 900 kT nuclear warhead
and a range of 9,250 km.

The Mod 3 and 4 versions are 34.3 m long and have an increased launch weight of
217,000 kg. Improvements were made to the accuracy for these versions of SS-18, with
increased warhead yields and a wider MIRV dispersed area. The second stage has
been modified and the engines are single motor RD-0256/0257. The bus motors are
liquid propellant using the same propellants as the first two stages. The Mod 3 has a
single 20 MT nuclear warhead and a range of 16,000 km. The Mod 4 version has 10
MIRVs, each with a 500 kT nuclear warhead, and a range of 11,000 km. The Mod 4
version also has improved protection against nuclear bursts, improved accuracy and
better reliability. The Russians declared both one and 10 RV versions for the STrategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) data exchange in 1991, believed to be Mod 3 and 4
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versions, together with a throw weight of 8,800 kg for the SS-18. Subsequent data
indicates that the payload bay is 8.0 m long.

Like other fourth generation ICBMs, the SS-18 is deployed in a launch canister within
the silo to provide environmental protection to the missile during transportation and silo
loading. The missiles can remain fuelled and on alert for several years. The missile has
a life of 22 years, but in 1999 it was reported that this life was to be extended.
Operational status The SS-18 was deployed operationally in 1975 in former SS-9 silos
and launch complexes converted and improved to accommodate the larger SS-18
missiles. The Mod 2 version was introduced in 1976, the Mod 3 in 1980 and the Mod 4
in 1988. The number of SS-18s deployed was estimated to be 308, the 1991 level of
deployment for this system. In 1991, there were six major SS-18 operational sites, four
in Russia and two in Kazakhstan. The Russian sites were at Dombarovsky (64 silos),
Kartaly (46), Aleysk (30) and Uzhur (64). The two Kazakhstan sites were at Derzhavinsk
(52 silos) and Zhangiz-Tobe (52). Training facilities were located at Balabanovo and
Panerki in Russia and testing was located at Leninsk with 10 test silos. Missile storage
was at Pibanshur and Khrizolitovy, with 58 missiles in store.

The START 1 agreement requires the SS-18 missiles to be reduced to 154 by 2001,
and the START 2 proposals that the remaining SS-18 missiles will be removed from
their silos and destroyed by 2007. START 2 was ratified by the Russian Federation in
May 2000, and some missiles may now be used as satellite launch vehicles rather than
being destroyed. In addition, it is believed that the Russians will modify some of the
former SS-18 silos to accept the SS-27 (Topol-M) missiles, but it is not known how
many silos will be modified. By extending the life of some of the later SS-18 missiles,
the Russians are indicating that they would like to amend the START 2 provisions to
allow some multiple warhead land-based ballistic missiles to remain in service.

In December 1994, the number of operational missiles had reduced to 255, by July
1996 to 193, and by January 1998 to 180. At January 2000, there were still 180 missiles
in service, with 122 Mod 3 and 58 Mod 4 standard. It is reported that all 104 missiles in
Kazakhstan have been deactivated and by January 1998, all the missiles had been
removed. Some of the missiles removed from Kazakhstan were the Mod 3 single
warhead version. All the silos in Kazakhstan had been destroyed by September 1996.
An SS-18 destruction plant has been built at Surovatikha near Nizhny Novgorod and
this has the capacity to destroy around 30 missiles per year, although there are plans to
increase this rate to 50 per year. A trials SS-18 launch was made in June 1995 from
Baikonur, testing an 18 year old missile, and a further trial was made in April 1997
successfully testing a 20 year old missile. By January 1999, there had been 157 SS-18
missile test launches completed, with a reported success rate of 97 per cent. The
Yuzhnoye NPO offered a civilianised variant of the SS-18 missile, for use as a launcher
for large payloads (up to 4,000 kg) into low Earth orbit in 1991. The first launch of a
converted SS-18 missile was made in April 1999, with the satellite launch vehicle
named Dnepr-1, as a joint Russian Federation and Ukraine programme. The launch
was made from one of four available silos at Baikonur, and there are plans to convert a
further 20 to 50 missiles for use as SLVs rather than destroying them as required under
the START agreements.

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SS-19 STILETTO / (UR-100N, UR-100NU) | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-19 STILETTO / (UR-100N, UR-100NU)

SS-19 STILETTO / (UR-100N, UR-

100NU) Discuss Email

Video Additional
Statistics:
Total number: ~170

Year Deployed: 1982

Dimensions: 27 meters length, 2.5 meters diameter
Weight: 105,600 kilograms
Propulsion: Two-stage liquid fuel plus PBV, hot launch
Throw-weight: 4,950 kilograms
Range: 10,000 kilometers
Guidance: Inertial, with onboard digital computer, and PBV
Circular Error Probable: 300 meters
Warhead: Mod 3 has 6 MIRVs (under START II, assumed to be downloaded to Mod 2
with 1 warhead)
Yield: Mod 3 - 550 kilotons, Mod 2 - 5 megatons
Locations: Tatischevo, Kozel'sk
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Number Deployed: 150 missiles (105 planned)

Primary Contractor: Chelomei Design Bureau

The SS-19 missile is one of the oldest missiles in the current Russian strategic arsenal.
The first version of the missile, designated UR-100N, began deployment in April 1975
and was officially commissioned in December 1975. The development of the missile,
which was intended to replace the single-warhead SS-11 (UR-100), was carried out at
the TsKBM Design Bureau (the Chelomey Design Bureau), located in Reutov near
Moscow. The missiles were produced at the Khrunichev Machine-Building Plant in
Moscow.

The SS-19 missile, which carries six independently targeted warheads, was deployed in
hardened silos built at the locations of SS-11 silos. Shortly after the missile entered
service, the TsKBM Design Bureau began development of a follow-on missile, which
was designated the UR-100NU. This missile, which also carries six warheads, began
deployment in November 1979 and soon after that replaced almost all of the original UR-
100N missiles.

Deployment of UR-100NU missiles was completed in 1984. At that time the number of
deployed SS-19 missiles reached its peak of 360. Starting in 1988, the Soviet Union
began replacing the SS-19s with the silo version of the solid-propellant SS-24 missile.
Since the SS-19s were from the very beginning deployed in hardened silos, this
replacement did not require any substantial silo modifications.

The UR-100NU missiles, which were deployed in the early 1980s, reached the end of
their initial operational lives in 1992-1995. However, the Strategic Rocket Forces
initiated a life-extension program, which allowed it to keep these missiles in the active
arsenal. As part of this program, in 1995-1996 the Strategic Rocket Forces carried out a
series of test launches of SS-19 missiles that had been deployed in silos for more than
20 years (these apparently were UR-100N missiles deployed in 1975). The results of
these test launches allowed Russia to extend the operational life of the SS-19 to 21
years. Current Russian military plans call for extending the service life of the missiles
even further, to 25 years.

If the operational life of the SS-19 missiles is extended to 25 years, Russia will have to
decommission these missiles in 2007-2010. Although some of the SS-19s could expire
earlier, Russia has a surplus of "dry" SS-19 missiles, which includes 39 SS-19 missiles
bought from Ukraine. Since these could replace aging missiles, Russia could avoid
rapid disintegration of its SS-19 force after 2007.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia was left with 170 of the 300 Soviet SS-19
silos. Some of these will be refurbished to accommodate the silo-based version of the
new SS-27 missile, currently being developed in Russia. The silo conversion program
began in 1995 at the Tatishevo missile base. By April 1997 SS-19 missiles were
removed from ten silos at that base. Two silos were used to accommodate the first SS-
27 missiles, deployed in December 1997. Since the development of the mobile version
of the SS-27 missile has not been completed yet, to proceed with the deployment of the
SS-27 Russia will have to eliminate some of the currently deployed SS-19s. If the
number of eliminated SS-19 missiles matches the projected rate of SS-27 production,
by the end of 2001 Russia will have 130 SS-19 missiles deployed.

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If Russia ratified the START II Treaty, it could keep 105 SS-19 missiles provided they
carry only a single warhead. The conversion procedure might prove expensive, since in
order to deploy a single-warhead version of the SS-19 Russia would have to develop
and test a new bus for the missile. The only alternative to such a conversion would be
the early decommissioning of SS-19 missiles, so that their silos could be used for
deployment of SS-27 missiles. According to the START II Treaty provisions, the SS-19
silos could be used for SS-27 missiles without any restrictions.

SS-24 (RT-23, RT-23UTTH).The SS-24 was developed as a universal solid-propellant

missile that could be deployed either in silos or as a part of a railroad-mobile missile
system. The flight tests of the railroad-based RT-23 system were completed in 1985, but
the missile was not accepted for service. Instead, the designers were assigned with the
job of developing an improved version of the system, which was designated the RT-
23UTTH. Deployment of both the silo- and railroad-based versions of the RT-23UTTH
missiles began in 1987-1988. In 1989 both versions were officially accepted for service.
The first railroad-mobile version, the RT-23 missile, although not commissioned, had
been operationally deployed in 1987.

The SS-24 system was developed at the Yuzhnoe Design Bureau and produced at the
Pavlograd Mechanical Plant. The missile carries ten warheads and was developed to
replace the older SS-17 and SS-19 missiles. The initial plan probably was to replace the
SS-17 missiles with the mobile version of the SS-24, because the SS-17 silos were
relatively soft compared to those of the SS-19. SS-19 silos were used for deployment of
the silo-based version of the SS-24.

By 1992 the Soviet Union had deployed 92 SS-24s, 36 of which were railroad-mobile
RT-23 and RT-23UTTH systems, and 56 were silo-based RT-23UTTH missiles. Since
46 of the SS-24 silos were located on Ukrainian territory, Russia now has only 10 SS-24
silos. However, all 36 railroad-mobile SS-24 systems were based in Russian territory. In
October 1991, the Soviet Union announced that the mobile SS-24 systems will be
stationed in garrisons. This practice was upheld by the Russian leadership and reflects
concerns about safety of the missile-carrying trains during movements.

The operational life of the SS-24 missiles was initially set at 10 years. A life-extension
program could probably extend this period to 15 years, but it is highly unlikely that
Russia will initiate such a program. Since the production and development base for
missile is located in Ukraine, production of SS-24 missiles could not be resumed.
Moreover, the railroad-based SS-24 missiles are still considered unsafe to operate on
the national railroad network. Building a dedicated set of railroads is too expensive to be
a realistic option. At the same time, the number of silo-based SS-24s in the Russian
arsenal is too small to justify any substantial life-extension effort. As a result, it seems
likely that the SS-24 will be the first system to be eliminated under the START I
reductions.

SS-25 (RT-2PM Topol).The SS-25 missile was until very recently the only land-based
missile in serial production. This single-warhead solid-propellant missile, developed by
the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT, the Nadiradze Design Bureau), was
the first road-mobile intercontinental missile that was accepted for service. The SS-25
missile is produced at the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant in Russia. Deployment of the
SS-25 began in July 1985, but it was only in December 1988 that the system began
deployment in its current configuration, which includes a mobile regiment command
center and a modern command and control system.

In 1990 Russia had 288 deployed SS-25 missiles in its arsenal. By April 1997 this

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number reached 360. Production of the SS-25 most likely stopped in 1996-1997 as
funds and production capacity were directed into production of the new SS-27 missile,
which is produced at the same plant in Votkinsk. Although it is possible that there were
some SS-25 missiles produced in recent years, which could be deployed in addition to
the currently deployed 360 missiles, we assume that the total number of operational SS-
25 missiles will stay at the current level.

It is likely that Russia will undertake a life extension program, which would extend the
operational life of the SS-25 missiles to at least 15 years. In this case Russia will start
decommissioning SS-25 missiles in 2000, and their number will decrease to 288 by the
end of 2001, and to 216 at the beginning of 2003. Without further extension of the
missile's operational life, by January 2008 Russia would have only 45 operational SS-25
missiles. All of these missiles would reach the end of their operational lives by 2010.

SS-27 (RT-2PM2 Topol-M). Development of the SS-27 missile began in the late 1980s
or early 1990s. This single-warhead solid-propellant missile was developed in two
versions-a silo-based one and as part of a road-mobile missile system. Initially the
development was a joint effort of the Yuzhnoe Design Bureau, responsible for the silo-
based version, and the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which was developing
the missile for the road-mobile system. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the
development of both versions was transferred to Moscow. The production base of the
new missile is the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant, which has been producing SS-25
missiles.

Although Russia declared the SS-27 missile to be a modification of the SS-25, the new
missile is quite different from its predecessor. It has a bigger first stage and a larger
throw weight. The silo-based version of the missile will be deployed in SS-19 and SS-24
silos. The missile will also be deployed as a part of a road-mobile system, similar to that
of the SS-25.

Deployment of the SS-27 missile began in December 1997 at the Tatishevo missile
base. The first two missiles, one of which will be used for combat training, were
deployed in converted SS-19 silos. The road-mobile version of the missile is still
undergoing tests and it is not clear when this version of the missile could enter service.

The scale of deployment of the silo-based version of the SS-27 will depend on the
availability of silos that could accommodate the missile. Since the missile is being
deployed at the expense of the SS-19, the deployment of the silo-based version of the
SS-27 would probably stop after the mobile version becomes available. In our analysis,
we assume that 40 of the currently available SS-19 silos will eventually be converted for
SS-27 deployment. Ten additional SS-27 missiles could be deployed in SS-24 silos,
bringing the total number of silo-based SS-27s to 50.

The START II Treaty allows Russia to convert 90 of its SS-18 silos for the deployment
of a single-warhead missile. However, the conversion of SS-18 silos would involve
some additional efforts, so Russia will probably prefer to avoid converting these silos
and concentrate on production of the mobile version of the SS-27.

Assuming that the production rate of SS-27 missiles could be sustained at the level of
10 missiles a year, by the end of 2001 Russia will have 40 silo-based SS-27 missiles.
By that time Russia will probably be able to begin production of the mobile version of the
missile. With the same aggregate production rate of 10 SS-27 missiles a year, the total
number of these missiles could reach 50 by January 2003, and 110 by January 2008.

Strategic submarines
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By the beginning of 1997 the Russian Navy had almost completed deactivation of its
older types of strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Of the 62 strategic
submarines which were deployed in 1990, the Russian Navy currently has only 28.
Among the dismantled types are almost all Yankee I and Delta II submarines, the
Yankee II submarine, and some of the Delta I and Delta III submarines. The remaining
Yankee I, Delta I and Delta II submarines are being decommissioned and will soon be
taken out of service. As a result, Russia now has 13 Delta III submarines, 6 submarines
of the Typhoon type and 7 Delta IVs. However, not all of these ships are in active
service. Two Delta III and two Typhoon submarines have been deactivated and most
likely will not be returned to service. However, in 1996 Russia began construction of a
strategic submarine "Yuri Dolgorukii" of a new type known as the "Borey."
The future of the Russian strategic fleet will depend to large extent on the resources that
Russia can devote to the maintenance of the existing submarine fleet and to the
development and production of new submarines and sea-based missiles.

Delta III (Project 667BDR). The Delta III submarines carry the D-9R missile system,
which includes 16 SS-N-18 (R-29R) missiles, carrying 3 warheads each.

The Delta III submarines were built and deployed in 1976-1981. Since the operational
life of a submarine usually ranges from 25 to 30 years, these ships were to stay in the
Navy until 2001-2006. The operational life of SLBMs is usually shorter, so the missiles
have to be replaced during a mid-life overhaul. Problems with financing the
maintenance of the submarines and production of R-29R missiles could result in all the
Delta III submarines being withdrawn from service by 2002. The first three Delta III
submarines have already been deactivated.

Since the Delta IIIs are the only modern missile submarines deployed with the Pacific
Fleet, this means that after their decommissioning all Russian strategic submarines will
be concentrated in the Northern Fleet. Although it would be possible to transfer some of
the newer missile submarines to the Pacific, the Navy will probably decide to minimize
its operational expenses by having only the one strategic submarine base in the
Northern Fleet.

Delta IV (Project 667BDRM). The submarines of the Delta IV type are the last in the
series of SSBNs with liquid-fuel missiles built in the Soviet Union. The D-9RM missile
system, deployed on Delta IV submarines, includes 16 SS-N-23 (R-29RM) missiles,
which carry 4 warheads each.

The Delta IV submarines, which were built during the 1985-1990 period, could
theoretically remain in service until 2010-2015. However, lack of resources might force
the Navy to decommission some of the Delta IV submarines early and direct the
resources into maintenance of the remaining submarines and dismantlement of the old
ones. In our analysis we assume that by 2008 Russia will decommission two Delta IV
submarines which entered service in 1985-1986. This will leave 5 Delta IV ships, all of
which are part of the Northern Fleet.

The R-29RM missile, deployed on the Delta IV submarines, as well as the R-29R of the
Delta III, was developed at KB Mashinostroeniya (the Makeev Design Bureau) and is
produced at the Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant. Since the operational life of the
missiles is shorter than that of the submarines, the plant will have to continue production
of the missiles. The rate of production required to refurbish five Delta IV submarines is
about 30 missiles a year, which is consistent with the current capability of the
Krasnoyarsk Plant.

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Typhoon (Project 941). The Typhoon-type SSBNs are widely known as the biggest
submarines ever built. A large submarine was required to accommodate the D-19
missile system, which includes 20 large solid-propellant SS-N-20 (R-39) missiles. Each
missile carries 10 warheads.

Construction of the first Typhoon submarine was completed at the Severodvinsk

shipyard in 1980. The sixth and the last submarine of the Typhoon type entered service
in 1989. The SS-N-20 missiles were developed by the KB Mashinostroyeniya Design
Bureau (KBM, the Makeev Design Bureau), located in Miass, Russia. Production of the
missile was shared between the Pavlograd Machine-Building Plant in Ukraine, which
produced the first stage of the missile, and the Zlatoust Machine-Building Plant, located
in Russia.

Since the operational life of the SS-N-20 missiles was 10 years, the KBM began
development of a follow-on missile, which was to be deployed on Typhoon submarines
during their scheduled refurbishments. This missile, reportedly designated the R-
39UTTH, has somewhat greater dimensions and substantially greater throwweight.
However, the external dimensions of the R-39UTTH launch canister are identical to that
of the R-39 missile.

The development of the R-39UTTH missile was to be completed by the mid-1990s.

However, work on the missile fell behind schedule. Development slowed down
substantially after the breakup of the Soviet Union, partly because the Pavlograd Plant
in Ukraine could no longer produce the first stage of a missile and so its production had
to be transferred to Russia. The development of the missile has continued and as of the
beginning of 1998 there have been several flight tests of the R-39UTTH missile, none of
which were successful.

Delays with the development of the SS-N-20 follow-on forced the Navy to undertake a
rather unusual step. In March and December of 1997 the Navy destroyed the missiles
that were carried on two Typhoon submarines, presumably those built in 1980-1983.
Since Russia had neither old R-39 nor new R-39UTTH missiles to deploy on these two
Typhoons, these submarines have been deactivated. However, they have not been
formally decommissioned and might return to the fleet after development of the R-
39UTTH is completed.

The requirements of the START I Treaty may force Russia to decommission and
eliminate the two deactivated Typhoon submarines. According to the treaty provisions,
the number of warheads on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles can not exceed
4,900. An analysis of the options available to Russia shows that this provision in effect
requires Russia to reduce the number of its SLBM warheads down to less than 1,800.
Otherwise Russia will have to eliminate ICBM silos which are required for SS-27
deployment. In order to keep the number of SLBM warheads within this 1,800 limit,
Russia will either have to eliminate two Typhoon submarines or reduce the number of
warheads on the SS-N-20 missile from ten to eight.

The option of "downloading" the SS-N-20 missile had been considered by the Soviet
Union during the START I negotiations and may still be considered by the Russian
Navy. At the same time, it is quite likely that the follow-on R-39UTTH missile was
intended to be deployed with eight warheads. Although the conversion of the currently
deployed R-39 missile to an eight-warhead version is possible, it is not clear that the
Navy would prefer this option to dismantling the two already deactivated Typhoons. In
our analysis we assume that the Navy will dismantle the two currently deactivated
Typhoon submarines which in any event will reach the end of their operational life by

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2005-2007. In addition, we assume that by the year 2007 the Navy will decommission
one more Typhoon submarine, which by that time will be 23 years old. This would leave
three Typhoons armed with 60 missiles, which can carry 600 warheads.

In considering the future of the Typhoons, we also should not rule out the possibility that
the Typhoon program will be terminated altogether in favor of new strategic submarines
of the "Yuri Dolgorukii" type. Such a decision could free the resources required for the
construction of these new submarines and the development of a smaller missile that
could be deployed on these submarines.

"Yuri Dolgorukii" (Project 955). In October 1996 the Severodvinsk shipyard started
construction of a missile submarine of a new type. This ship, known as the "Yuri
Dolgorukii," will be the first in a series of the Project 955 strategic submarines equipped
with a new solid-propellant missile. Current plans call for the construction of the first ship
to be completed in 2002. After that the Navy plans to commission one new submarine
annually. This plan is probably not realistic and it would be safer to assume that the first
submarine will not enter service before 2004. The rate of production thereafter probably
will not exceed one submarine every two years.

Work on the new solid-propellant missile which is to be deployed on the new

submarines is still in the R&D phase. The missile is being developed at the KB
Mashinostroeniya (the Makeev Design Bureau), which is currently working on the R-
39UTTH missile, which would be deployed on Typhoons. Since the two missile
development programs would be competing for limited resources, the R-39UTTH
program might eventually be terminated. As mentioned earlier, such a decision would
also lead to an early decommissioning of the Typhoon submarine fleet. In this case, we
might expect that the rate of production of the new-type submarines could be somewhat
higher than one every two years and that by the end of 2007 Russia might have three
submarines of the Project 955 type.

The exact number of SLBMs that the new submarine would carry is not known. It has
been reported that the submarine will carry 12 or 16 missiles similar to or smaller than
the R-39UTTH. For the purposes of our analysis we take the lower number and assume
that the "Yuri Dolgorukii" will have 12 missiles with four warheads each.

Strategic Bombers
The long-range aviation forces have always been regarded as the least developed and
the most neglected part of the Soviet strategic triad. This attitude continued on to Russia
and currently the Russian strategic bombers are usually thought of as comprising a
token force which does not have a strategic role of its own. Nevertheless, Russia
continues to maintain its heavy bomber fleet and has no immediate plans to abolish the
air-based component of its strategic forces.
By the beginning of 1997 Russia had eliminated almost all of the strategic-capable
bombers of the older Tu-95 Bear types. Currently, strategic aviation consists of 63 Tu-
95MS Bear H bombers and six Tu-160 Blackjack aircraft. Both aircraft carry AS-15 (Kh-
55) long-range air-launched cruise missiles.

Tu-95MS Bear H. The Tu-95MS bomber is a relatively new modification of the old Tu-95
turboprop aircraft. The Tu-95MS bomber was developed in the late 1970s as a carrier of
long-range cruise missiles. The Tu-95MS design was based on that of the Tu-142
maritime patrol aircraft, which was, in turn, a substantially modified Tu-95 bomber.
Production of the Tu-95MS aircraft began in 1981, first in Taganrog and then in
Kuibyshev. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, 25 Tu-95MS aircraft were left in
Ukrainian territory.

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There are two modifications of the bomber: the Tu-95MS6, carrying 6 AS-15 ALCMs in
the bomb bay, and the Tu-95MS16, which can carry an additional 10 missiles on pylons
under the wings. Of the 63 Tu-95MS bombers currently in service, 28 are of the Tu-
95MS6 type and the remaining 35 are Tu-95MS16.

Russia currently has no plans for continuing or resuming Tu-95MS production. The
production lines at the Kuibyshev Aviation Plant, which produced the aircraft, were
closed in 1995. Since all the Tu-95MS aircraft were built in the late 1980s they could
probably stay in service until at least 2010. However, to maintain the bomber force
Russia will have to complete the development of a new long-range cruise missile which
will replace the currently deployed AS-15.

Tu-160 Blackjack. The Tu-160 strategic bomber is a modern supersonic jet aircraft
which entered service with the Soviet strategic aviation forces in 1987. The bomber can
carry 12 AS-15 long-range cruise missiles in its bomb bays.

In 1991, during the breakup of the Soviet Union, almost all of the Soviet Tu-160
bombers were located on Ukrainian territory. As a result, Russia currently has only six
operational Tu-160 aircraft, which were built in 1991-1992 and had not been transferred
to Ukraine. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia unsuccessfully tried to arrange
for the return of some or all of the 19 Tu-160 bombers which had been left in Ukrainian
territory. In 1997 the Russian government announced that it has no interest in
purchasing these aircraft.

Production of the Tu-160 was ended in 1992 and its resumption is highly unlikely. The
currently deployed aircraft could stay in service until at least 2010. The bombers will
carry the same cruise missile that is currently being developed for the Tu-95MS
bombers.

The case for the START III

An analysis of various available options shows that despite its extremely difficult political
and economic conditions Russia has a realistic technical capability to keep the number
of deployed strategic weapons at the level of 3,500-4,000 warheads by the year 2008.
However, almost half of these warheads would be deployed on silo-based MIRVed
missiles which would have to be eliminated if Russia ratified the START II Treaty, which
bans MIRVed land-based missiles. Elimination of these MIRVed ICBMs would bring the
number of Russian strategic warheads that could be deployed in 2008 down to about
2,100.
Neither of these two options seems attractive to Russia. Although in the absence of the
START II Treaty Russia could keep its MIRVed land-based missiles, the total number of
deployed warheads would be significantly lower than the limit of 6,000 set forth in the
START I Treaty. Moreover, within the framework of the START I Treaty, the United
States could preserve its most potent counterforce weapons which would make the
Russian silo-based ICBM force extremely vulnerable.

The number of strategic weapons that Russia could support if it ratifies the START II
Treaty is also lower than the treaty limit of 3,500 warheads. This does not provide a
strong argument for the supporters of START II ratification. However, implementation of
START II could significantly reduce the U.S. counterforce potential by eliminating the
MX Peacekeeper missiles and reducing the number of sea-based missiles capable of
attacking hard targets. The reduction of the U.S. counterforce potential that could result
from the START II implementation has been the strongest argument for the ratification
of the treaty so far. At the same time, its strength is undermined by the fact that the

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treaty does not reduce the U.S. counterforce potential irreversibly, allowing for
reconstitution of a significant part of the sea- and land-based forces in the event the
United States break out from the treaty. Besides, even the reduced Trident force has
great remaining counterforce potential, which does not make the START II option more
attractive.

Although the opposition to the START II Treaty in Russia is very often centered on the
financial problems with its implementation, the difference between START I and START
II in terms of the resources Russia will have to spend to maintain its strategic forces is
hardly as large as it might seem. While it is true that if Russia ratified the START II
Treaty, it would have to eliminate most of its land-based missiles long before they
served their full lifetime, the cost of elimination is probably comparable with that of the
life-extension programs necessary to keep these systems in service until 2008-2013.
Moreover, the operational life of the missiles could not be stretched out indefinitely. This
means that if Russia wants to keep its forces at a level of 4,000 warheads, it would have
to start development of a new MIRVed missile that could replace the aging SS-18s and
SS-19s. Although such a development could not be ruled out, its cost would almost
certainly be higher than the expenses associated with the dismantlement of the
currently deployed MIRVed missiles.

The Helsinki agreement of March 1997 shows that instead of having to choose between
two almost equally unattractive options-START I or START II-Russia would much rather
consider a third one. The statement on further reductions of nuclear weapons made in
Helsinki calls for the conclusion of a START III Treaty which would reduce the number
of strategic warheads to the level of 2,000-2,500 by the beginning of 2008. This is very
close to the number of warheads that Russia would have in its arsenal after it ratifies the
START II Treaty.

Although the Helsinki statement was certainly a step toward the ratification of the
START II by the Russian Duma, the reaction to it shows that it fell short of expectations
and might prove insufficient. Part of the problem is that the United States insists that no
negotiations can begin before the Duma ratifies the START II Treaty. While this might
seem to be a legitimate requirement, from the Russian point of view it effectively
neutralizes the agreement on START III reached in Helsinki.

First, without more details on the future START III agreement, it is still unclear whether
the new treaty would address the problem of the reconstitution of the U.S. counterforce
potential. If it did not, it would weaken one of the strongest arguments for START II
ratification. Moreover, the problem of force reconstitution or of "upload potential" has
became one of the most contentious issues for START II in Russia. Strong assurances
that the new agreement will address this issue is probably one of the best ways to
speed up START II ratification.

Second, once START II is in force, the number of warheads in the Russian arsenal will
be reduced to the agreed-on START III levels regardless of the progress at the START
III negotiations. By ratifying START II now Russia would lose whatever negotiating
leverage it currently has and will be faced with a prospect of having protracted START
III negotiations without clearly defined goals. Although the Helsinki agreement calls for
completion of the START III Treaty by 2003, should the negotiation efforts fail by that
time, it would be too late for Russia to return to the START I options it currently has and
Russia would find events developing along the uncomfortable START II scenario.

[18 Jun 1999] LE BOURGET, France, June 13 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian

Khrunichev State Space Center has bought 45 SS-19 missiles to be

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transformed into the Rokot boosters, Center General Director

Anatoly Kiselyov said at a news conference in Le Bourget on
Sunday.

A model of the Rokot booster meant for putting into the

orbit satellites with a weight of up to two tonnes is displayed
at the stand of the Khrunichev Center at the 43rd international
aerospace show.

Two launches of the Rokot boosters will be made this year

from the Plesetsk space center, Kiselyov said. The Center took
up the program bearing in mind the vast market of small
satellites to remain till 2010. A joint venture has been formed
with the German Dasa concern to promote the Rokot.

"The launching pad for the Rokot will be ready in two-three

months and we will be able to make commercial launches,"
Kiselyov said. There are about ten contracts of the sort and "I
think their number will increase," he added.

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SS-21 Scarab / OTR-21 Tochka-U | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM ON PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

DESBIC
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IDF
TREATY SERIES
START III
MEMORANDUM OF
PROVISIONAL
APPLICATION

Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-21 Scarab / OTR-21 Tochka-U

SS-21 Scarab / OTR-21 Tochka-U Discuss Email

Video Additional
Statistics:
Total number: ~200

Type: Short-range ballistic missile

Year: 1976
Range (miles): 45
Weight (lbs): 4440
Lenght (ft): 21.1
Diameter (ft): 2
Launch range, km 120
Weight:
missile, kg 2,010
warhead, kg 480
SPL, t 18
SPL chassis three-axle, cross-country, amphibious
Number of missiles carried:
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SPL 1
transloader 2
transporter 2 (4 warheads)

The system is designed to effectively defeat critical targets in the tactical depth of the
enemy battle formation.

Components:
- solid-propellant missiles with submunition warhead and with HEF warhead;
- self-propelled launcher (SPL);
- transloader;
- transporter;
- automated test vehicle;
- maintenance vehicle;
- arsenal equipment set;
- missile and warhead containers.

The single-stage solid-propellant missile with an inseparable warhead is inertially

controlled throughout its flight path. The self-propelled launcher determines the
coordinates of its location, performs the prelaunch preparation and laying of a missile,
computes the flight mission data and launches the missile from a deployed fire position
with the crew staying in the cabin.

The transloader is designed to carry missiles, perform loading and unloading operations
and to mate warheads to missiles.

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SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22/RT-23U) | Russian Arms, DESBIC AGENDA IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

DESBIC
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IDF TREATY
SERIES START III
MEMORANDUM OF
PROVISIONAL
APPLICATION

Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22/RT-23U)

SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22/RT-23U) Discuss Email

Video Additional
Statistics:
Total number: ~46

Type: Inter-continental-range, rail-mobile and silo-based, solid-propellant, Multiple

Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV)-capable ballistic missile
Year: 1987
Guidance: Computer-controlled inertial through flight, including PBV
Range (miles): 6200
Weight (lbs): 230950
Lenght (ft): 78.1
Diameter (ft): 7.9
Warhead: nuclear 10 x 550 ktons
Locations: Bershet, Kostroma, Krasnoyarsk, Tatishchevo
Number Deployed: 36 missiles
Primary Contractor: Nadiradze Design Bureau

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The SS-24 has the Russian designation RS-22 or RT-23U Molodets and the
identification numbers 15 Zh 60 and 15 Zh 61 (for RS-22B or Mod 1 silo-based and RS-
22A or Mod 2 rail-based versions respectively). The USA has arbitrarily assigned
generations to Soviet missiles and has designated the SS-24 as the first of the fifth
generation, presumably because it was radically different from the SS-17, SS-18 and
SS-19 group. Development of the SS-24 began in 1971 and the first flight test was
reported to have taken place in October 1982 from the Plesetsk test range. Thereafter,
testing continued at a rapid pace, although there were believed to be several failures,
with a successful launch, the 11th, of a vehicle carrying eight Re-entry Vehicles (RVs) in
November 1983.

The first test launch of a rail-launched SS-24 was made in 1985, with the first silo launch
made in 1986. The rail mobile SS-24 Mod 2 (RS-22A) version was deployed in 1987,
with the silo-based SS-24 Mod 1 (RS-22B) version following in 1988 and displacing the
SS-17 missile. Description The SS-24 falls into the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty 2
(SALT 2) `light' category of Inter-Continental-range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), a
category including the liquid-propelled SS-19 and the US MX (LGM-118 Peacekeeper)
missiles. The SS-24 is a three-stage, cold-launched, solid-propellant missile 23.4 m long
for the Mod 1 silo launched missile and 23.3 m long for the rail launched Mod 2 version,
and with a diameter of 2.4 m for each stage. Launch weight is 104,500 kg. It has a
MIRV capability with 10 RVs. In 1991, the Russians declared the SS-24 had a throw
weight of 4,050 kg and carried 10 RVs. Subsequent information indicates that the
payload bay is 2 m long, and that each RV carries a 550 kT nuclear warhead. There are
only minor differences between the Mod 1 and 2 missiles, with the Mod 2 rail-launched
missile having a larger cold launch assembly in a boat tail fairing, additional hot gas
control for the first stage motor and a modified guidance and control system interface.

The first stage has a weight of 53,700 kg, a thrust of 210 tonnes and is controlled by a
pivoted motor nozzle. The second stage has a thrust of 107 tonnes and the third stage
21 tonnes. Both these stages are controlled by four small control fins on the nose cone
section. The three solid-propellant motor stages are contained within composite cases.
The bus vehicle uses liquid propellants, believed to be UDMH and nitrogen tetroxide.
Guidance is inertial with a digital guidance and control system, believed to be an
upgraded version of the system installed in the SS-18 'Satan' missile. The maximum
range is 10,000 km and the accuracy is believed to be 185 m CEP. It is reported that the
SS-24 missiles have a design life of 11 years. The SS-24 launch canister is 22.6 m long,
has a diameter of 2.7 m, and the missile nose cone folds back when the missile is in the
canister, folding forwards again during the launch sequence. The missile is cold
launched by a solid-propellant gas generator contained within a 2 m high assembly ring
that is jettisoned after launch at around 50 m altitude. Both rail and silo SS-24 versions
are cold launched from their canisters. The launch silo complex has the Russian
designator 15P961. The rail launch vehicle weighs over 200,000 kg with a missile in its
canister, is 23.6 m long and has a height of 5 m and a width of 3.2 m.

The mobile versions of the SS-24 may be seen as the parallel developments to the US
work during the 1970s, to give their missiles survivability through mobility; the early US
experiments included air, sea and ground launches of the Minuteman missile. All mobile
systems suffer some degradation in accuracy, largely through upset of their guidance
systems, and perhaps that led to the decision for dual-basing of the SS-24. The rail
mobile missiles are deployed in trains, with three missile launch cars, two diesel
locomotives, an electrical power generating car, a command and control car, and two
support and accommodation cars per train set. Each missile division has four train sets.
Operational status The rail mobile version of the SS-24 Mod 2 was deployed in 1987,
with the silo based SS-24 Mod 1 deployment following in 1988 at converted SS-17
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bases. In 1991, there were 56 silo-based missiles and 33 rail mobile missiles.

The silos were at Tatischevo (10 silos) in Russia and at Pervomaysk in Ukraine (46).
There were three rail garrisons in Russia at Bershet (9), Kostromo (12 launchers), and
Krasnoyarsk (12). Training facilities were at Perm and Plesetsk, with storage at
Khrizolitovily with six missiles. There are eight test silos at Plesetsk. The Russians
announced in August 1990 that SS-24 missile production would cease in 1991 and only
three more missiles were built. As the missiles were designed and built in the Ukraine,
Russia has been dependant upon Ukrainian support for post-design services and
spares.

In 1991, the Yuzhnoye NPO proposed using the SS-24 missile as a civilian satellite
launch vehicle, including a scheme known as `Space Clipper' which would involve an
SS-24 being carried to 10,000 m (33,000 ft) altitude in a converted Antonov An-124
aircraft, rolled out by parachute and then launched from a vertical position. In 1994,
proposals were made to launch satellites using a converted SS-24 missile launched
from a floating barge in the Black Sea.

Following the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 2 (START 2) agreements and ratification
by Russia in May 2000, the SS-24 `Scalpel' missiles are expected to be phased out and
destroyed by 2007. In 1994, Ukraine started to deactivate the 46 missiles at
Pervomaysk by removing warheads, and it is believed that all the Ukraine missiles were
non-operational in December 1994. Ten missiles had been destroyed in Ukraine by
September 1998, and the remainder are scheduled for destruction by December 2001.
By mid-1995, it was reported that Russia had 10 `Scalpel' missiles in silos and 36 rail-
mounted missiles in service, and this number had not changed by January 2000. A
further 12 missiles were in storage in 1995, four Mod 1 and eight Mod 2 versions. A test
launch of an SS-24 Mod 1 rail-launched missile was made from the Plesetsk test site in
December 1996, and a further test was reported in December 1998.

The SS-24 is one of the fifth generation of Russian ICBMs, along with the SS-25. Both
systems are mobile, though the SS-24 is a rail-mobile missile (Mod 1), with some based
in silos (Mod 2.) The rail-mobile version can be seen as the analogue to the AMERICAN
concern about missile survivability, as exemplified in the rail-garrison MX Peacekeeper
plans. SS-24 missile trains reportedly have three missile-launching cars, several diesel
locomotives, an electrical power generator car, a command car, and several support
cars. The trains are camouflaged as standard freight cars. Alert duty was cut back
drastically in 1994 due to lack of fuel for the trains.

Production of the SS-24 ceased in 1991 with 90 missiles deployed. In that same year,
there was the "Space Clipper" proposal to use SS-24s as civilian satellite launch
vehicles. The missiles were to be dropped out of a converted Antonov-124 aircraft at
33,000 feet with parachutes, and then launched vertically while drifting downwards.

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DESBIC AGENDA IDF

TREATY SERIES
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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-25 Sickle (RS-12M/RT-2PM/Topol)

SS-25 Sickle (RS-12M/RT-2PM/

Topol) Discuss Email

Video Additional
Statistics:
Total number: ~318

Missile: ballistic, solid-propellant,three-stage, in the launching

container
Launch weight, tons 45
Length of the missile in the launching container, m 22.3
Launching container diameter, m 2
Launcher mounted on cross-country 7-axle chassis
Mobile command posts,
support facilities : mounted on cross-country
4-axle chassis with unified
vans
Guidance: Presumed inertial with onboard digital computers
Circular Error Probable: Estimated 200 meters
Warhead: Single warhead
Yield: 750 kilotons
Locations: Irkutsk - 36, Kansk - 46, Novosibirsk - 45, Yoshkar-Ola - 36, Nizhniy Tagil -
45, Yur'ya - 45, Teykovo - 36, Vypolzpvp - 9, Barnaul - 36, Drovyanaya - 18
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Number Deployed: 360 missiles

Primary Contractor: Nadiradize Design Bureau

This small, fifth-generation ICBM is the latest Russian land-based missile. It can either
be carried on an off-road, unhardened transporter-erector vehicle (TEL), or stationed in
silos. There was some controversy surrounding the SS-25, which the Soviets claimed
was an upgrade to the SS-13 Savage. The United States claimed the SS-25 was more
than 5 percent larger than the SS-13, qualifying it as a new system, and therefore a
violation of the SALT II Treaty.

The mobile component is by START I, which stipulates that in peace-time mobile missile
garrisons are confined to groups of 10 missiles in a 25 square kilometer area. The SS-
25 is accurate, and its one warhead has a comparatively large yield. This combination
makes it the most credible hard-target kill ballistic missile of Russia's arsenal.

All currently deployed missiles, including those returned from Belarus, are mobile. An
improved variant, the Topol-M (sometimes referred to as the SS-X-29), was first flight-
tested on Dec. 20, 1994, with flight testing continuing thereafter. With components of its
guidance system manufactured in Ukraine and other parts made in Belarus, the SS-25
program could fall victim to the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The SS-25 is a cold-launched, three-stage, solid propellant, road-mobile ballistic missile.

It is 20.5 m long, with the first-stage diameter 1.8 m, the second-stage diameter 1.55 m
and the third-stage 1.34 m. The three solid propellant stages are made from
composites. Guidance is inertial, with a digital guidance and control system. Its launch
weight is 45,100 kg, with range capability of 10,500 km. It has a single RV, with a
nuclear warhead having a yield of 550 kT, and the Russians declared a throw weight of
1,000 kg in 1991. The missile has eight lattice paddle-type fins at its base, four to
provide stability of the missile and four to control the missile during the launch phase. In
addition, first stage control is augmented by jet vanes in the motor nozzle. The second
and third stages are controlled by eight roll and yaw motor nozzles fitted at the top of the
third stage, with gas injection into the second- and third-stage motor nozzles.

The Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) operate out of bases to pre-surveyed launch

sites usually in forest areas, but the TEL storage sites have sliding roof garages, from
which the missile can be launched in an emergency. The SS-25 TEL is similar to the
MAZ-547 used with the SS-20 system, but has an additional seventh axle and has the
Russian designator MAZ-7912 or 7916 for the 14 ? 14 wheeled vehicle. Each axle on
this new TEL is steered independently. The TEL has a length of 17.3 m, a width of 3.0
m and a height of 3.1 m. The missile is stored and fired from a launch canister that is 22
m long and 2 m in diameter; the nose section is removed shortly before the missile is
launched. The missile is cold-launched from the canister, using a solid propellant gas
generator. The complete TEL vehicle is raised on four hydraulic jacks for stability at
missile launch. Operational Status The SS-25 `Sickle' entered service in 1985 and in
1991 there were 288 missiles deployed at nine sites. There were two sites in Belarus, at
Lida (27 TELs) and Mozyr (27); and seven sites in Russia, at Teykovo (36 TELs),
Yoshkar-Ola (18), Yuryu (45), Nizhny-Tagil (45), Novosibirsk (27), Kansk (27) and
Irkutsk (36).

Training facilities were located at Serpukhov, Perm, Plesetsk, Balabanovo and

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Goryachiy Klyuch. Missile storage for SS-25 was at Surovatikha and Khrizolitovy with 48
missiles. Testing is carried out at Plesetsk with five TELs located there. There were 17
further SS-25 TELs non-deployed in July 1991. The production rate in 1990 was
reported to be 56 missiles per year. From 1992, there was a reduced production rate,
and it is believed that 20 were built in 1993 and nine in 1994. It is believed that around
420 missiles were built and that production ceased in 1994. Following the START 2
agreements it is expected that SS-25 missiles will be restricted to their garrison areas,
and that some might be relocated into converted SS-18 silos in Russia. Proposals were
made in 1992 to develop a commercial satellite launcher based upon the SS-25 `Sickle'
design, offering mobile launch facilities around the world to place 500 kg payloads into
low Earth orbits. A trial launch of a converted SS-25, known as Start 1, was carried out
in March 1993 and is believed to have used an additional fourth orbital injection stage
giving the launch vehicle an overall length of 27 m.

The first operational launch of the Start 1 vehicle, in March 1995, resulted in failure at
the final fourth stage, and the loss of the three satellites onboard. A second successful
launch was made from the Svobodny Cosmodrome in March 1996. A five-stage Start 2
satellite launch vehicle, with an increased length of 29 m and a launch weight of 60,000
kg, is in development. Start 2 will be able to launch payloads of up to 750 kg into low
Earth orbit, and the first launch is now planned to be made from the Woomera test
range in Australia in 2001. In January 2000, it was believed that there was a total of 360
SS-25 `Sickle' missiles operational. The last missiles from Belarus were returned to
Russia in November 1996. A further number of missiles were in storage, together with
some TEL vehicles, but the numbers are not known. Test launches of SS-25 were made
in November 1995, April 1996, November 1996, and September 1998. A silo-launched
version of SS-25 was tested in July 1996. It is reported that a total of 58 SS-25 `Sickle'
missiles had been launched by December 1998.
During the 50-year history of modern missile weapons, designers from a number of
countries created dozens of versions of missile systems, which were mainly deployed
as the most important component of weapon systems in the armed forces of nuclear-
weapon states. Mobile missile systems mounted on truck chassis assumed a particular
place among numerous military-technical concepts of ground- launched missile
systems. History of military-technical thought has formed in such a way that the FAU-2
worlds first ballistic rocket was deployed only in the mobile concept. The level of
technology at that time dictated a system version, which was complicated to operate
and required mobile units of several dozens of names for rocket launch. Today the
launch of a modern intercontinental ballistic missile involves only the equipment of the
same transporter used to transfer the missile from one place to another, thereby
escaping the enemy intelligence and counterattack means.
Attempts were repeatedly made in both the Soviet Union and abroad to create mobile
strategic missile systems. However, nobody managed to create a serial system of such
weapons for the Armed Forces until the mid-1970s, when the Pioneer missile system
was created in the USSR with an intermediate-range missile, followed by the Topol
intercontinental ballistic missile tems, were developed by cooperating enterprises led by
the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute, headed for a long time by Chief Designer
Alexander Nadiradze and currently by General Designer Boris Lagutin.

At present, among the all modern nuclear-ballistic missile systems, only the Russian
system is developed according to the mobile ground-launched ICBM concept. The
history of military-political confrontation of nuclear powers formed in such a way that
today this system proved to be fully ade- quate to the modern strategic sta- bility
concept, as confirmed by the START-1 and START-2 Treaties. It is no coincidence that
several silo-based missile systems with multiple independently targetable warheads
(MIRV type) were replaced by single-warhead mobile missiles. Such a system is highly
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survivable, simple and effective owing to the mobility and concealment of the systems
main component - a launcher with a missile.

In Russia a grouping of self-propelled launchers with single-warhead three-stage solid-

propellant ballistic missiles RS-12M Topol (SS-25 under NATO classification or Side
according to the USA designation) has been deployed. Although the first missiles were
delivered to the Rocket Forces ten years ago, today they are still being produced by
Votkinsk Engineering Plant. This means that until the first decade of the next century
these missiles and other components of the missile system will form part of the Russian
ground nuclear-missile weapon grouping.

At the launching pad in Plesetsk

Incidentally, US inspectors scrupulously keep a record of our missiles at the plants

crossing point. This is the present-day reality - the US Inspection has established a
base till the end of this century in Urals region, which was absolutely restricted for
foreigners in previous times, to carry out the procedures specified by the Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles Treaty.

In terms of military and technical aspects the Topol missile system is almost perfect.
This powerful and mobile creation of the human mind and hands impresses even in
photographs. In off-road marching or deployment in a combat position under a
camouflage net, in readiness to instantly and precisely deliver an attack against a target,
located even on another continent, this system can beneficially influence world stability
owing to its existence. One should know above all that Russia has a sufficient number
of nuclear-missile systems capable, if required, of quickly dispers- ing and hiding,
without losing the centralized controllability in any situation, and then delivering in a few
seconds an attack of such power and accuracy that no target will be able to withstand it.

An extraordinary capability to quickly travel off roads is realized in these enormous

vehicles, and their safety, reliable and simple operation are maintained at a level typical
of Russian weaponry. The optimum variant, found by designers, combining the
automation of processes, associated with execution of a combat mission, with human
participation, ensures the high combat and operational effectiveness of the missile
system. In short, to date the Topol missile system is the most optimum strategic
missile system for Russia.
This missile system demonstrates effectively the capability of materiel and personnel
involved in its operation. This is one of the main properties of the strategic deterrent
system. The Topol missile system was designed and con- structed with the Russian
operating conditions taken into consider- ation. However, its separate components
(naturally, not associated directly with combat elements) may be used and are used
successfully now for civilian purposes in any world region. Most are unique and resulted
from the hard research-and-development and design-and-invention work of many
defense industry organizations of Russia and a number of enterprises from former
Union Republics.

Now that considerable information on the Topol missile sys- tem has become
accessible to military experts of foreign countries and the public after the execution of
Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaties, and owing to a number of
advertising activities of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, there is no reason to hide
objects, which can successfully be used in a civilian field of activity.

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A missile is heading for its target

It is difficult in one article to describe the advantages and unique properties of Minsk
automobiles powered by Yaroslavl engines, which serve as the basis for launchers and
other mobile units of the missile system. They ensure the unique mobility of the Topol
missile system. The Minsk Wheeled Truck-Tractor Manufacturing Plant is the worlds
only plant to manufacture such cross-country vehicles with a load-carrying capacity of
over 50 tons. This plant is already converting in cooperation with Russian allied
suppliers its multi-axle trucks. In the literal sense of the word, the cars on truck
chassis, manufactured by the Minsk Automobile Plant jointly with the Shumerlya
Specialized Automobiles Manufacturing Plant Joint Stock Company, can satisfy the
demands of any customer. Such a body has a usable area of more than 30 m2 and a
load-carrying capacity of over ten tons, providing perfect conditions for equipment
mounting and personnel vital activities.

Unique jacks, gas and hydraulic drives and cylinders, with a power of several hundred
tons, ensuring rapid response, also deserve mention. In the missile system they are
intended for jacking and leveling of the launcher, speeded up (combat) and slowed
down (maintenance) elevation of a large-tonnage container with the missile to the
vertical position. It is very simple to apply these systems in the civilian sphere. Simple
and highly reliable electrical equipment and various current converters incorporated in
the missile system provide continuous power supply to consumers with wide-range
currents of various voltages and frequencies. The system features complete power
supply independence, which is greatly needed by many consumers separated from the
centralized power supply.

To ensure serviceability of the missile and also some other subsystems during the
guaranteed service life, the missile system incorporates a subsystem maintaining the
temperature and humidity conditions in the missile container and some bins of the
launcher. This subsystem cools effectively air in these spaces or warms it up to the
required values, and also controls the humidity level. Based on the design-and-
configuration concepts and tech- nologies used in this missile system, the Russian
specialists creat- ed a self-contained container-thermostat intended for long-term
storage of food stuffs in various climatic conditions.

One more striking example of the high level of technologies, used in the Topol missile
system, is its topogeodesic support and navigation subsystem, created by the Signal
Research Institute. It provides a quick and highly precise tie-in of the launcher in a field
position and enables its crew to carry out missile launches from any combat patrolling
route point, where the launch command was received. Geologists and surveyors, as
well as specialists of many other professions can only dream about such navigation.

The system incorporates a host of other novelties applicable in the national economy
and civil production. Now may be a good time as any to start specifying this materiel,
mass produce, sell and service all its nonmilitary, useful components. After all, we
managed to convert the heart of the missile system - the RS-12M intercontinental
ballistic missile - into the peaceful carrier rockets of the Start family.

What does the future hold for Topol? First of all - a long life in our army. More than one
genera- tion of officers have already served in subunits operating this missile system. In
compliance with the Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaties, signed
with the USA, a new updated next- generation system, with a universal silo-based and
mobile missile, is growing up as a substitute for the Topol missile system.

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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS

Browse database:
Total: 15 topics in category

SS-N-17 Snipe / RSM-45

RSM-45/SS-N-17 Snipe: specifications and drawing.

SS-N-18 Stingray / RSM-50

R-29R Ballistic Missile of D-9R Complex Designed to destroy strategic targets at intercontinental ranges. Adopted for operation with the Navy
in 1977. The missiles were installed on strategic missile-carrying submarine for the project 667BDR with a set of 16 missiles. The missile
comprised a number of new technical solutions: creation of warhead with multiple independently targeted ... [+]

SS-N-20 Sturgeon / RSM-52

R-39 Designed to destroy strategic targets at intercontinental ranges. Adopted for service with the Navy in 1983. The missile is installed on
the project 941 strategic missile-carrying submarines having a basic load of 20 missiles. The missile possesses a number of new technical
solutions: rocket engines have a high-energy solid propellant, and made from new structural materials; ... [+]

SS-N-23 Skiff / RSM-54

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R-29RM Ballistic Missile of D-9RM System Designed to destroy strategic targets at intercontinental ranges. Adopted for service with the Navy
in 1986. Installed on the project 667BDRM strategic missile-carrying submarines having a basic load of 16 missiles. The missile comprises a
number of new technical solutions: three-stage design of the missile having minimum sizes; use of ... [+]

SS-NX-30 Bulava ("Mace")

The Russian SS-NX-30, or Bulava, is an intercontinental-range, submarine launched, solid propellant ballistic missile. It is a submarine
launched version of the SS-27, which represents the pinnacle of ballistic missile technology and is currently under development.The SS-27 is
currently portrayed as being immune to any ABM defense the United States can put into being. The missile is capable ... [+]

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SS-26 Stone / Iskander (-E) | Russian Arms, DESBIC AGENDA IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-26 Stone / Iskander (-E)

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It has been developed as a result of joint work of a number of research institutes, design
bureaus and plants under the supervision of the KBM Engineering Design Bureau, a
well-known as a developer of Tochka (SS-21), Oka (SS-23) and Tochka-U missile
systems.
The Kolomna Engineering Design Bureau is the leading developer of precision-guided
tactical and theater missiles for the Ground Forces.

In creative cooperation with leading research and design organizations and plants of the
defense industry as well as the Defense Ministry Research Institute, the KBM
Engineering Design Bureau has created a number of missile systems (division-level
Tochka (SS-21) with a range of up to 70 km, army-level Oka (SS-23) with a range of up
to 400 km, corps-level Tochka-U with a range of up to 120 km) that superseded the first
generation missile systems of the Ground Forces (9K72 with 8K14-1 liquid-propellant
missile, 9K52 with the 9M21unguided solid-propellant missile,ensuring effective
engagement only if nuclear-tipped).

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The particular features of the aforementioned systems are: high accuracy of fire, a short
time of readiness for launch, independence of combat assets, a high degree of
prelaunch preparation automation and sufficiently high effectiveness of conventional
warheads.

That was evidently the reason to include the Oka missile system in the Soviet-American
treaty on the elimination of their intermediate range and shorter range missiles, although
its maximum guaranteed range was only 400 km.

The conclusion of the 1987 INF Treaty and the decision not to use theater nuclear
weapons set a number of principally new requirements for modern missile systems:

- use of non-nuclear destruction weapons only;

- precise accuracy of fire;

- control throughout the entire flight path;

- broad range of effective warheads;

- availability of battle management automation and information support systems,

including preparation of standard information for correction and terminal guidance
systems;

- possibility of integration into global satellite navigation systems (GSNSs), such as

GLONASS and NAVSTAR;

- ability to engage hardened targets;

- increase in the number of engaged targets per unit of time;

- ability to penetrate air and missile defenses;

- capability to engage moving targets.

To meet the above requirements, the KBM Engineering Design Bureau has created the
Iskander-E missile system.

The Iskander-E missile system has embodied the best scientific, technical and design
achievements in the field of theater missile systems; in terms of its design and high
combat effectiveness it is an absolutely new-generation weapon which outperforms
existing Scud-B, Tochka-U, Lance, ATACMS, Pluto and other missile systems.

The Iskander-E missile system is designed to engage:

- hostile fire weapons (SAM and missile batteries);

- fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft at parking areas;

- air and missile defense facilities;

- command posts and communications nodes;

- vital pinpoint and area targets;

- critical civilian facilities.

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Owing to the implementation of terminal control and guidance methods, control

throughout the entire flight path, a broad range of powerful warheads and integration of
the onboard control system with various correction and homing systems as well as a
high probability of combat mission accomplishment in heavy hostile jamming
environments, type targets are engaged by one or two Iskander-E missiles, which in
terms of effectiveness is equivalent to the use of a nuclear munition.

For the first time in the world a missile system with a firing range not exceeding 300 km
is capable of accomplishing all combat missions using conventional warheads and
having two missiles on a launcher, which substantially increases the fire power potential
of missile units.

Iskander-E missile system's features ensure:

- highly precise and effective engagement of various types of targets;

- possibility of concealed preparation, combat duty and delivery of effective missile

strikes;

- automatic computation and input of a missile flying mission by the launcher devices;

- high probability of combat mission accomplishment in heavy hostile jamming

environments;

- high probability of trouble-free missile operation during launch preparation and in flight;

- high tactical maneuverability due to cross-country combat vehicles mounted on all-

wheel drive, chassis, and strategic mobility owing to transportability of the missile
system by all types of transport facilities, including transport aircraft;

- automation of missile unit battle management, immediate processing of intelligence

data and their dissemination to appropriate command levels;

- long service life and ease of operation.

In terms of performance characteristics, the Iskander-E missile fully complies with the
provisions of the missile technology non-proliferation agreement. This is a deterrent
weapon for local conflicts and a strategic weapon for countries with limited living space.

A long firing range, permitting the use of the system from the depth of own troops
location, and a short time of stay on a launch site make the system virtually invulnerable
to conventional destruction weapons.

The research conducted by specialists of leading Russian military research centers has
demonstrated that in terms of the effectiveness-cost ratio the Iskander-E missile system
outperforms the best foreign counterparts by five to eight times.

The system structure, its control systems, automated battle management and
information support make it possible to promptly meet to new requirements without
substantial modification of combat assets and, as a result, to guarantee a long lifespan.

Provision is made for the modernization of the Iskander-E system to improve the
accuracy of missile strike, reduce missile expenditure to one piece per target and adapt
the system to the transportation and electronic facilities of a potential customer.

Continuous (or periodic) maintenance of system components by highly qualified

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Russian specialists is also possible.

The composition of the missile system makes it possible to ensure the full cycle of its
combat employment, including battle management, information support, maintenance,
and crew training, without additional expenditures. The composition can be specified in
a contract in compliance with customer's requirements.

In addition, at foreign customer' request, missiles can be outfitted with various

warheads.

In terms of the attained combat potential level, the Iskander-E missile system, which is
at the final stage of flight tests, is unrivaled in the world and is a 21st century weapon.

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SS-27 Topol-M DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-27 Topol-M

SS-27 Topol-M Discuss Email

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Statistics:
Total number: ~39

Year Deployed: 1997

Dimensions: 21 meters length, 1.86 meters height
Weight: 47,200 kilograms
Propulsion: 3 stage, solid propellant
Throw-weight: 1,000-1,200 kilograms
Range: 10,500 kilometers
Guidance: Presumed inertial with onboard digital computers
Circular Error Probable: Unknown
Warhead: Unknown
Yield: Unknown
Locations: Unknown
Number Deployed: 24
Primary Contractor: Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology

The single-warhead Topol-M is an advanced version of the silo-based and mobile Topol
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intercontinental ballistic missile. The solid-propellant three- stage Topol-M missile

complex, with a standardized (silo and mobile) missile, is to become the foundation of
the Russian strategic nuclear forces in the 21st century. It is planned to accommodate
Topol-M both on self-propelled launchers as well as in silos. High survivability of the
mobile complex is achieved by the capability of offroad movement, of a continuous
change in location and of a missile launch from any point along the movement route.
The Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering (MIT) State Enterprise is the only plant in
Russia building such missiles today.
The modernized 45-ton Topol-M is the first strategic missile to be built by Russia without
the participation of Ukraine and CIS countries. The flight and design testing of the Topol-
M was successfully completed in 1995, and joint flight-testing is continuing, leading to a
decision to commence series production. All the launches have been a success, but
serial production has not started due to a shortage of funds. On 08 July 1997 the fourth
launch of a Topol-M ICBM was successfully made from the Strategic Missile Forces'
Plesetsk State Test Site within the framework of joint flight-testing. Work on the new
Topol-M ICBM is lagging seriously behind the initial timetable. Defense state order
financing for the next decade provides that by 2003 there will be on the order of 250-300
Topol-M missiles in service. A total of 1.5 trillion [old] rubles were included in the 1997
budget for the development of the Topol-M missile complex. The Russian Missile
Troops are permitted to have 300 Topol RS-12M mobile missiles under the START II
Treaty, and the RVSN must acquire two Topol-M regiments annually up to 2001, which
will cost 3.7 billion new rubles. A total of R700 billion would be required to place 450
Topol-M missiles in service by 2005 to maintain parity under START II.
But the present 55 percent funding will permit production of at the very most 10-15
missiles at this facility each year year. As a result the Strategic Missile Troops will have
a total of approximately 350-400 ICBM warheads, not the 800-900 which are permited
within the framework of the START II Treaty. On 15 April 1998 Acting Prime Minister
Sergey Kiriyenko approved a schedule of monthly budget appropriations for the Topol-
M, which he noted would make up the core of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. In
December 1997, the first two Topol-M systems were put on alert for a trial period with
the Taman Division at Tatischevo in the Saratov region. As of late July 1998 two more
Topol-M launch sites were completed and were awaiting acceptance trials. The Topol-M
missile system is being commissioned in the Russian strategic nuclear forces' grouping
regardless of whether heavy missiles are stood down from combat alert duty or not. It is
intended that the Topol-M ICBM grouping will comprise an equal number of mobile and
silo-launched missiles. Some 90 of the 360 launch silos vacated by the RS-20 ICBM's,
which are being stood down from combat alert duty, need to be converted for the latter.
Apart from Saratov Oblast the Topol-M systems will be deployed in Valday, the southern
Urals, and the Altay.
The Topol-M missiles could be transformed into missiles with multiple reentry vehicles
[MIRV's], since their throw weight allows accommodating 3-4 warheads on a missile.
The warheads could be taken from some of those ground-based and naval missiles
which will be withdrawn from the order of battle in coming years.

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SS-N-18 Stingray / RSM-50 | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

DESBIC
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AGENCY IDF
TREATY SERIES
START III
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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-N-18 Stingray / RSM-50

SS-N-18 Stingray / RSM-50 Discuss Email

Video Additional

Type: Submarine launched ballistic missile

Year: 1976
Range (miles): 4000
Weight (lbs): 78010
Lenght (ft): 51.2
Diameter (ft): 5.9
Propulsion: Two stage liquid fuel plus PBV
Throw-Weight: 1,650 kilograms declared
Range: 6,500 kilometers
Guidance: Stellar inertial
Circular Error Probable: 900 meters
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SS-N-18 Stingray / RSM-50 | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Warhead: 3 MIRVs (Mod 3 had 7 MIRVs)

Yield: 200 kilotons per warhead
Locations: Delta III SSBNs
Number Deployed: 112 missiles
Primary Contractor: Makeyev Design Bureau

[crossreferences: used by ]
667bdr Kalmar class

R-29R Ballistic Missile of D-9R Complex

Designed to destroy strategic targets at intercontinental ranges. Adopted for operation

with the Navy in 1977. The missiles were installed on strategic missile-carrying
submarine for the project 667BDR with a set of 16 missiles.

The missile comprised a number of new technical solutions:

creation of warhead with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV);

possibility to equip the missile with warheads of different configurations;
use of astro-correction system and significant improvement of firing accuracy;
creation of small and high-speed reentry vehicles with low radius of dispersion at
atmospheric phase of trajectory.

The R-29R missile has a two-stage configuration, with stages having the same
diameter. It has liquid-propellant engines on the 1st and 2nd stages and a warhead
which allows using any of three replaceable warheads (monoblock, with three reentry
vehicles and with seven reentry vehicles).

At present as prescribed by Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1 (START 1) the missiles

carry a three-RV warhead.

The cases of the 1st and 2nd stages consist of wafer-type tank shells made of
aluminum-magnesium alloy, a two-layer intermediate and single-layer rear and front
bottoms.

The first-stage propulsion system is a two-unit system consisting of stationary main

engine and two gimbaled chambers of the steering system. The second stage uses a
gimbaled single-chamber motor. Pitch and yaw control is provided by turning the engine
at respective plane, whereas roll control is accomplished by redistribution of exhaust
gases from the turbine and their injection to the nozzles of roll control. The missile
stages are separated by energy of pressurized gases of the 1st stage, and rigid case
between the stages is destroyed by extended explosive charge. The filling and
encapsulation of the missile tanks are made at the factory.

The upper stage of the missile consists of an instrument, engine and a warhead
sections.

The self-contained control system with the equipment providing for the complete astro-
correction of the missile trajectory is composed in the missile nose in a sealed
instrument section with astro-dome which is dropped in flight. Use on the missile of the
complete astro-correction system which calculates and compensates all errors made by

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SS-N-18 Stingray / RSM-50 | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

the submarines navigation complex in recognition of both the direction and position of
submarine in firing substantially improved the accuracy of firing.

Structurally, the instrument section is divided into two sections by sealed bottom. The
first section houses a three-axis gyrostabilizer with astro-sighting device. The control
system equipment is mounted on a frame without individual shock absorbers for its
elements, however the frame is attached to the airframe by means of shock absorber.

Such method of installation of the control system devices allowed increasing the density
of their composition in the instrumentation section.

The engine section of the upper stage includes a four-chamber liquid-propellant engine,
propellant tanks and a case and provides for the individual targeting of each reentry
vehicle at large distance. On the outside surface of the case the engine combustion
chambers and nozzles are mounted and inside - propellant tanks which have the
shapes of toroid parts. The engines automatic control elements and the steering
actuator are arranged in the central part of the section. The engine has an open-loop
configuration with turbine-pump fuel supply system. Pitch and roll control is provided by
redistribution of thrusts of a pair of chambers placed in respective stabilization planes.

The warhead section accommodates reentry vehicles, a frame, cables and a reentry
vehicles fixing and release device. It occupies the area formed by the concave upper
bottom of the 2nd stage fuel tank. The reentry vehicles are mounted on the frame and
separated in flight by command of the control system.

The instrument section with control system is changeable. Reentry vehicles and the
instrument section can be replaced without uploading the missile from the launch tube.
Missiles may be launched from under-water position being at depth from 40 to 50 m as
well as from above-water.

The R-29R (RSM-50) is a two-stage intercontinental missile in service with the D-9R
shipborne strategic missile system. It can be outfitted with either a monoblock or
MIRVed warhead.

SS-N-18 Mods 1 and 3 were the first multiple warhead Soviet SLBMs. Given these
missiles' inaccuracy and the fact that several may have been replaced aboard the Delta
IIIs by the more advanced SS-N-23, this missile may be phased out in the near future.
There have been conflicting statements about this possibility (see description of Delta III
SSBN). In 1991, the Russians announced that all their SS-N-18s had been downloaded
to three missiles, presumably in the Mod 1 configuration. Also, the SS-N-18 has been
proposed to launch small satellites into low earth orbit, under the name "Volyna."

The D-9R and D-9 missile systems are noted for the high degree of unification of their
ground support equipment, launch systems, as well as routine and pre-launch
preparation procedures.

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SS-N-20 Sturgeon / RSM-52 | Russian Arms, IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING DESBIC AGENDA

DESBIC AGENDA
IDF TREATY SERIES
START III
MEMORANDUM OF
PROVISIONAL
APPPLICATION

Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-N-20 Sturgeon / RSM-52

SS-N-20 Sturgeon / RSM-52 Discuss Email

Video Additional

Type: Submarine launched 3 stage solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile

Year: 1982
Range (miles): 5150
Weight (lbs): 85650
Lenght (ft): 59.0
Firing conditions in any weather from submerged submarine
Diameter (ft): 7.9
Warhead: nuclear 10 x 100 ktons
Guidance: Inertial plus stellar reference update, computer-controlled PBV
Circular Error Probable: 500 meters
Warhead: 10 MIRVs (to be downloaded to 6 MIRVs under START II)
Yield: 100 kilotons per warhead
Locations: 3 Typhoon SSBNs, storage
Number Deployed: 60 missiles
Primary Contractor: Makeyev Design Bureau

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SS-N-20 Sturgeon / RSM-52 | Russian Arms, IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING DESBIC AGENDA

[crossreferences: used by ]
955/935 Borei class
941 Typhoon class

R-39

Designed to destroy strategic targets at intercontinental ranges. Adopted for service with
the Navy in 1983.

The missile is installed on the project 941 strategic missile-carrying submarines having
a basic load of 20 missiles.

The missile possesses a number of new technical solutions:

rocket engines have a high-energy solid propellant, and made from new structural
materials;
control system uses the principle of generalized astro-correction;
high-speed small-size reentry vehicles have increased specific power;
chock-mounted launch system provides the storage, transportation and launch of
missile;
ground support equipment mounted on railway cars allows reloading of missiles without
lifting cranes and missile loading complex provide the safe operation of missiles.

The missile includes a three-stage solid-propellant launch vehicle, a shock-mounted

missile launch system (SMMLS) and MIRVed warhead. The warhead comprises ten
reentry vehicles, control system equipment and a liquid-propellant rocket engine
allowing individual targeting of reentry vehicles.

In the launch tube the missile is kept suspended with the special shock-mounted missile
launch system based on the launch pad (bearing ring) placed in the upper part of the
launch tube. The SMMLS damps the missile, seals the launch tube and provides for
safety of the missile in submarine, allowing dipping of the submarine to a great depth
with opened launch tube hatch cover. All load-bearing elements of the missile needed
for its operation both on the ground and on the ship board, except for the middle support
belt, are located on the SMMLS and on the tail section structure, which are dropped at
the initial phase of the flight just after the missile escapes the water.

The missile is launched from the dry launch tube by means of the pyrotechnic
pressure accumulator arranged on the launch tube bottom in the 1st stage engine
nozzle. At the moment of launch the special solid-propellant charges located in the
SMMLS provide for gas-jet protection by means of a cavern which considerably reduces
hydrodynamic loads acting on the missile. The command to start the 1st stage engine is
initiated at the moment the missile leaves the launch tube. If the 1st stage engine fails to
start up, the missile, after its appearance on the water surface, is moved away from the
submarine for the safety purposes. The launch system is separated in flight by means of
special engines and is also moved away.

Instrument section covered by the dome is located in the missiles nose. It is joined with
the dispensing stage through a flange. Both they form a MIRVed warhead. The
instrument section consists of two sealed sections divided by intermediate bottom: a
section of free gyro with astro-sighting device covered with a dome which is dropped in
flight and a section of control system instrumentation arranged on a shock-mounted

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SS-N-20 Sturgeon / RSM-52 | Russian Arms, IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING DESBIC AGENDA

frame.

The dispensing stage is joined with the instrument section. It keeps reentry vehicles.
Liquid-propellant separation engine and the 3rd stage engine are mounted on the
dispensing stage body.

(RSM-52) is a three-stage solid-propellant intercontinental missile in service with the D-

19 shipborne strategic missile system. It is outfitted with a MIRVed warhead. A
fundamentally new launch system has been developed for the missile, where some of
the launch elements are assembled on it.

Expulsion of the missile from the unflooded launch tube is accomplished by a

pyrotechnic pressure accumulator installed at the launch tube bottom inside the first-
stage motor nozzle. As the missile breaks the sea surface, its launch and shock
absorption elements are jettisoned and moved away from the submarine by special
motors.

While it had considerable testing difficulties, the SS-N-20 (Russian name, RSM-52) is
one of the newest and most accurate Russian SLBMs (sixth generation), and has been
compared to the American Trident I C-4. A three-stage, solid-fuel missile first deployed
in 1981, the SS-N-20 can carry a large load of 10 MIRVs. These missiles are carried on
the three Typhoon subs.

Efforts to extend the missile's service life have floundered. One upgrade program
collapsed with the Soviet Union. Another follow-on program was canceled in 1997 after
several test failures.

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SS-N-23 Skiff / RSM-54 | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

DESBIC
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IDF TREATY
SERIES START III
MEMORANDUM OF
PROVISIONAL
APPLICATION
$

Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-N-23 Skiff / RSM-54

SS-N-23 Skiff / RSM-54 Discuss Email

Video Additional

Type: Submarine launched ballistic missile

Year: 1986
Range (miles): 5150
Weight (lbs): 89060
Lenght (ft): 55.1
Diameter (ft): 6.2
Warhead: nuclear 4 x 100 ktons
Guidance: Inertial plus stellar reference update, computer-controlled PBV
Circular Error Probable: 900 meters
Warhead: 4 MIRVs (can carry 10 MIRVs)
Yield: 100 kilotons per warhead
Locations: 7 Delta IV SSBNs
Number Deployed: 112 missiles
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SS-N-23 Skiff / RSM-54 | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Primary Contractor: Makeyev Design Bureau

[crossreferences: used by ]
667bdrm Delta IV class

R-29RM Ballistic Missile of D-9RM System

Designed to destroy strategic targets at intercontinental ranges. Adopted for service with
the Navy in 1986. Installed on the project 667BDRM strategic missile-carrying
submarines having a basic load of 16 missiles.

The missile comprises a number of new technical solutions:

three-stage design of the missile having minimum sizes;

use of high-accuracy astro-inertial control system, and use of radio correction via radio
navigational satellites Uragan substantially increased the firing accuracy;
use of various types of flight trajectories at short and intermediate firing ranges;
flexible (refer to energy consuming) zone of dispensing of reentry vehicles;
expansion of combat capabilities of missiles due to the possibility of their use in the high
latitudes of Arctic.

Main liquid-propellant engines of two stages are submerged in the fuel tanks of the
missile. A salient feature of the missile is the integration of the 3rd stage and the
warhead into a single unit with common tanks. The front section of the missile houses
an instrument section with a missile control system, which includes: equipment for the
astro-correction of flight trajectory according to the results of measurement of navigation
star coordinates, radio-correction system exchanging information with navigational
satellites, and reentry vehicles.

The all-welded missile body is made of an aluminum-magnesium alloy.

The 1st stage engine consists of two units: a main (single-chamber) and a steering (four-
chamber) engines. Control in pitch, yaw and roll is provided by turning the combustion
chambers of the steering unit.

The 2nd stage body consists of oxidizer tank coupled with the 1st stage body and fuel
tank with its front bottom made in the shape of conoid used for accommodation of
reentry vehicles and the 3rd stage engine.

The 2nd stage engine is a single-chamber engine. Its main components are
accommodated in the 1st stage oxidizer tank, control in pitch and yaw is provided by
turning the gimbaled combustion chamber, and in roll - by the roll unit.

The 3rd stage engine is a single-chamber engine. Control of the 3rd stage in all
channels is provided by the 2-modes dispensing engine of the reentry vehicles which
operates concurrently with the 3rd stage engine.

The separation of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd stages is accomplished by the system of
extended explosive charges.

To mate the missile with the launcher the tail section of the missile is provided with the
load-bearing belt (adapter).
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SS-N-23 Skiff / RSM-54 | Russian Arms, DESBIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

During the missile launch the adapter remains on the launch pad. The D-9RM system
provided simultaneous (or separate) launch of missiles from one strategic missile-
carrying submarine, with the missiles being armed either with four-RV or ten-RV
warhead.

Pursuant to START-1 agreement the R-9RM missiles are equipped only with four-RV
warhead.

Missiles are launched from submarine in under-water or above-water position.

RSM-54 is the world's best ballistic missile by energy-to-weight ratio (EWR). RSM-54's
EWR is 46 and, for example, Trident-1 EWR is 33 and Trident-2 EWR is just 37.5.
RSM-54 is 3 stage intercontinental ballistic missile thrusting 1st stage at 100tons.

A three-stage, liquid-propelled missile, the SS-N-23 is the other of Russia's newest

SLBMs, referred to as the RSM-54. Like the SS-N-20, the SS-N-23 had considerable
testing and reliability difficulties, but it is assumed these have been largely solved and
that it is a mature system.

The SS-N-23s are carried on the Delta IV SSBNs, though some have been reportedly
backfitted on the Delta III subs as well. The SS-N-23 has also been described as the SS-
N-18's follow-on. Even though it has the capability to carry 10 MIRVs, it is counted as
four MIRVs under the START I treaty, and this is the number of warheads per missile
postulated for future deployment. Today, seven Delta IV submarines carry 112 SS-N-23
missiles each, for a total of 448 warheads.

Of the three Russian SLBMs, only the SS-N-23, the newest missile type, is likely to
remain in service into the next decade. Production recently resumed in Krasnoyarsk and
follow-on missile programs are underway.

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SS-NX-30 Bulava ("Mace") | Russian Arms, DESBIC AGENDA IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APLICATION

DESBIC
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IDF TREATY
SERIES START III
MEMORANDUM OF
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Arms catalog >> Missiles >> SS >> SS-NX-30 Bulava ("Mace")

SS-NX-30 Bulava ("Mace") Discuss Email

Video Additional

Country: Russian Federation

Alternate Name: Bulava
Class: SLBM
Basing: Submarine launched
Propulsion: 3-stage solid
Range: 10,000 km
Status: Development
The SS-27 has a launch weight of 47,200 kg with a length of 21.9 m and a maximum
width of 1.9 m.

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SS-NX-30 Bulava ("Mace") | Russian Arms, DESBIC AGENDA IDF TREATY SERIES START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APLICATION

The Russian SS-NX-30, or Bulava, is an intercontinental-range, submarine launched,

solid propellant ballistic missile. It is a submarine launched version of the SS-27, which
represents the pinnacle of ballistic missile technology and is currently under
development.

The SS-27 is currently portrayed as being immune to any ABM defense the United
States can put into being. The missile is capable of making evasive maneuvers as it
approaches the target, enabling it to evade any terminal phase interceptors. It almost
certainly also carries countermeasures and decoys to increase the chances of its
success. The warhead is shielded against radiation, electromagnetic interference and
physical disturbance; previous missiles could be disabled by detonating a nuclear
warhead within ten kilometers (6 miles). This vulnerability is the basis behind the use of
nuclear ground-based interceptors, to detonate or damage the missile before it reaches
its target. However, the SS-27 is designed to be able to withstand nuclear blasts closer
than 500 m, a difficult interception when combined with the terminal phase speed and
maneuverability. While the boost phase is the most vulnerable time for the SS-27, it
remains protected.

The SS-NX-30 is identical to the SS-27 except for a slight decrease in range resulting
from the conversion for submarine launch. It has a range of 10,000 km (6214 miles) and
is reported to be equipped with a 550 kT yield nuclear warheads. It is reported that up to
six MIRVs can be placed at the cost of removing warhead shielding and decoys,
reducing its ability to penetrate ABM defenses. It uses a Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV)
system to deploy its warhead(s) using a digital inertial navigation system with a
GLOSNASS (equivalent to Global Position Satellite) receiver. This achieves a reported
accuracy of 350 m CEP, but this accuracy is lower than is reasonable to believe, given
modern guidance systems and previous US and Russian missiles.

The SS-NX-30 is currently under development and is expected to enter test launches
upon a converted type 941 Akula (Typhoon) class nuclear submarine. The Bulava will
be fitted aboard the Borey class nuclear submarines, the first of which is expected to
be commissioned in 2006.
[missilethreat.com]

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