DA BOMB DIGGITY CAP LINK

Notes
Youre welcome hun . Also remind me to ask you something about the drones
affs thatll be floating around at cmap on hangouts tmw.
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The use of drones as tools in war and against the war on terror is an extension
of neoliberal risk management that furthers state surveillance globally the
imperialism of neoliberal ideology constitutes the foundation for drone usage
and the affirmative obfuscates this basis
Witham 13. Ben Witham is a lecturer in International Relations at De Montfort University in
Leicester and has a PhD from Reading University in security studies, war studies, discourse
studies, political theory and international political economy [A Neoliberal Way of War? The
diffusion of market ideology in discourse of state violence, 2013, pp. 16]//vikas
War as risk management Concomitant to the focus on the post-Cold War order as an order characterised by globalisation and global threat networks,
there is, in many British policy texts, an emphasis on risk management. The concept of risk management, which has
become central to the various risk discourses in the West, is very much an expression of what Bourdieu and Wacquant call
the new planetary vulgate of neoliberalism. 48 The term risk management also predates the rise of

neoliberalism (though it certainly emerged from the world of business and finance), but its increasing ubiquity and its
application to a variety of political(rather than business) issues are a function of its place in the neoliberal
nomenclature and of the imperialism of neoliberal reason. 49 There is, moreover, a connection between the general emphasis placed on

flexibility by neoliberal ideology and the concern with managing and pre-empting risks in a market-based society. It is the potentiality of

risk that necessitates flexibility, an approach characterised by Aradau and Van Munster as precautionary risk.50 This connection
can be seen in the way the present British governments Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) describes planned changes to the organisation
and functions of the UK Armed Forces: [T]o respond to growing uncertainty about longer-term risks and threats, we will pursue an over-arching
approach which:-identifies and manages risks before they materialize in the UK, with a focus on preventing conflicts and building local capacity to deal
with problems []- ensures those capabilities have in-built flexibility to adjust to changing future requirements The SDSR also re-iterates the aims of the
National Security Strategy instituted by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, the second clear objective of, which is, the SDSR says: [T]o shape
a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or our interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and
influence to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source And this strategy, in turn, apparently leads to a National Security Council
policy which: Identifies and manages risks before they materialize in the UK This
amounts to an approach to deploying
state violence in liberal societies which is based more on a notion of pre-emptive immunity
from risks a strategy previously specific to the financial sector in the form of such things as
insurance policies than on a notion of resolving, perpetuating or otherwise enacting political conflicts. This point is sharply apparent in the
use of financial metaphor in the SDSR and many other policy papers. For example, the SDSR states that: We will retain and renew our independent
nuclear deterrent the United Kingdoms ultimate insurance policy in this age of uncertainty. To
reduce the continuous
manufacture of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to an insurance policy to couch this
activity in the terms of the market is to attempt to depoliticise it, so that, in the very next sentence, the text can speak, without
irony, of our commitment vigorously to pursue multilateral global disarmament. Multilateral global disarmament is a political goal, whereas retaining
and renewing a nuclear deterrent is a market rationality, a strategy of risk management, an insurance policy. We can also see here how it is
specifically liberal state violence which is subject to neoliberal ideology, whereas the manufacture of WMD in non-liberal rogue states like Saddam
Husseins Iraq, Iran under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmendinejad, or in nominally communist North Korea, is very much politicised in the discourse
of Western policy papers in the hands of such regimes WMD become a risk precisely because of the ideological (as opposed to post-
ideological/depoliticised/managerial) nature of their governments. The
language of risk management is pervasive in not
only the policies of political parties and government, but also the agencies tasked with
deploying state violence. In the UK, the Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), a Ministry of Defence funded policy unit
based at the Defence Academy in Shrivenham, has been charged, since 2006, with the defence authority for doctrinal, conceptual and futures work for
Army, Air Force and Navy. In DCDCs British Defence Doctrine (BDD hereafter), required reading for officers across the British Armed Forces, a chapter
dedicated to outlining The British Way of War includes the definitive claim that by its very nature, military activity is about understanding and
managing risk. 51 This
statement, with its strong epistemic modality, seeks to explicitly define the
nature of war for officers in training, and yet it does so in a rather surprising way. Let us consider, for a moment, some of the
alternative concepts that might have been deployed to reflect the nature or essence of war.
The distilled nature of war might be the defence or expansion of territory, religion or culture,
perhaps, or the co-constitution of political communities via what Carl Schmitt calls the distinction between friend and
enemy. 52 Like Lenin, we might view war in a historical materialist sense as a historically specific affair, without a discernible or timeless nature. 53
We might even simply suggest that military
activity is, in a Macchiavellian sense, really about disciplining, controlling
and winning over a populationthe subjects of the sovereign power. 54 But of all the attempts to pinpoint
what war is really about, one figure continues to tower above all others in the minds of Western (and especially European) strategists and officers
planning and fighting wars today: the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz. Indeed, the British Defence Doctrine opens with a foreword which quotes
Clausewitz extensively, explaining that the aim of this document is to provide precisely the same sort of guide to war that Clausewitz had intended On
War to be. 55 Clausewitzs most famous dictum, from Book I of On War is that war is nothing more than the continuation of politics or policy by other
means. 56 Though sometimes misinterpreted as a cynical militarism legitimising the casual use of force, this statement was actually intended to
highlight, as Louise Willmot notes, the central role of politics in war, so that war should never be waged for its own sake, but rather for the sake of
specific political objectives.57 This Clausewitzian conception of war as an intrinsically political arena seems at odds with the concept of war as risk
management described in the BDD. Management is necessarily apolitical, a term designating the
maintenance of a system, rather than its (potential) contestation. Beyond the purely textual
level, it is also possible to ascertain the causal influence of depoliticisation on more material
elements of state practice. The discourse of risk management also shapes military and policing
technologies in the War on Terror. The extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, and
for that matter earlier guided or smart weapons including cruise missiles, is not only a convenient means for reducing

military casualties on the side deploying them, and arguably civilian casualties at the receiving end, but is an
expression of the desire to pre-empt threats and manage risks in todays wars. As Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan
have noted: While drones appear to affirm the primacy of visual modalities of surveillance, their

underlying rationalities are more nuanced and problematic . As complex technological systems,
drones are both predicated upon and productive of an actuarial form of surveillance. They are
employed to amass data about risk probabilities and then manage populations or eliminate
network nodes considered to exceed acceptable risk thresholds . 58 The innovation of drones is
a step toward globalizing this depoliticised, risk management form of warfare, based on the
identification of suspicious behaviour and improper conduct. The drone, with its selective
disregard for sovereignty and ability to quite literally transcend state borders, is the weapon of
globalisation par excellence. The increasingly routine deployment of such weapons is
unsurprising given the policymakers view of the world as a globalised, marketised arena of
risk. Just as investment firms expend time and money on managing and mitigating, say, currency exchange risks, so governments attempt to manage
security risks. Furthermore, many of the state practices employed in prosecuting the domestic War on Terror can also be at least partly explained by
reference to the risk management discourse. The use of control orders in the UK, whereby the Home Office is able to detain individuals considered
terror suspects, but against whom no criminal charges could realistically in fact be brought, under indefinite conditions of house arrest and intense
surveillance, is clearly a form of risk management. Similarly, the use of detention without charge for terror suspects is predicated on this notion that the
suspension of habeas corpus is a reasonable price to pay for insurance against risk.
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Drones are problematic insofar as they are a strategy of surveillance for the
modern neoliberal state that are deployed as weapons abroad to fight wars and
assist the War on Terror. But, the affirmative begins with the wrong question
these drones and their usage are only a manifestations of neoliberal
imperialism that are rooted in strategies used by the financial sector in the form
of things like insurance policy. Military activity is actually about sovereign,
neoliberal power, but the AFFs understanding of drones and why they exist
paves over the larger underlying system of capitalism and neoliberalism
allowing the exportation of violence. Lets be clear this is NOT a link of
omission, but a criticism of your understanding of why and how drones are
utilized by the state. The routine deployment of drones nowadays is
policymakers view of the world as a globalized, marketised arena of risk that is
to be managed.