A.M. No.

133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left
by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter
of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first
marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage
with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no
properties were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties
should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother,
Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two
marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders
judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an
illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging
to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as
belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging
exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of
her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the
remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304
and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth
(1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12)
of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to
be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall
not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code),
each of the latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd
Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project
of partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed
convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing
the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first
named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge
Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is
quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the following project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition:

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R.
Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa
Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to
Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the
remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which is made in accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both
counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference and
agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court that
they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to
be in accordance with law, hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers, documents or instrument
sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective parties, as
outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition, and
to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of
partition (see Exh. U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot,
which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the
plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by
the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had
an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No.
2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion
and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa
Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the
President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on
January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit:
[1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No.
1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I
and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that
respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa
Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of
Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by
respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In
Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report
and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent
Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of
action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth
causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders
issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It
appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed
because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of
lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time
the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was
already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P.
Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P.
Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969
by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No.
4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity
of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED
GERARDO VILLASIN

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng
and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February
22, 1971.

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Judge
Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one
of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of
another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons
disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs.
Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which
he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the
lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23,
1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963
decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz
R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was
adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and
the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.
Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot
to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses
Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.
3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte
docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the
estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality
of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and
November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the
questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid
decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation
of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes
and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration
for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the
subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to
the Order of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E,
and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him
and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of
respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere,
and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any
intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed by
the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the
project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith
as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by
his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was
any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being
the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew
the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:

1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes
holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly
entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola onOctober 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector
Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute
owner of said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per
decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back
of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved
by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to
Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of
the project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case
3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of
one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's
mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see
Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of
the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the
cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from
which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least
valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and
distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and
market value of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of
the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and
his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or
acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which
he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and
responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of
respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even
if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not
from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he
and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations
in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in
general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer,
said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct,
administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they
discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be
applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the
functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental
organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897
[1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the
law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an
administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business:
hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made
by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of
August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, ... those
laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer
of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the
express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such
political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be
continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in
time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356
Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their
relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their
territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated
political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered
by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the
change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the
business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of
said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held
in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly
or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to
be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official
who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G.
11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of
respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is
undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party
plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the
complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed
only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer
connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the
Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that
effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of
law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated
automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.

Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the
court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took
place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was
no longer subject of litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or
employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the
purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition
by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation.
Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written
permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to
the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of
Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the
Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the
corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as
other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law and
rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote
him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation
of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised
Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec.
20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X,
1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges
because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section
67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction
"(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the
competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all
matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations
governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in
interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified
service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco
vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as
a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the
impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his
accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of
them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to
arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial
duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid
corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any
case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the
drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual
withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the
corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate
withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation

III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in
disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the
recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and
WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:

The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan
who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan
does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time he believed that the latter was
a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador
Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at
Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that
statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa
Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render
respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his
official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue
privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or
that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with
practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in
determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a
ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor
of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by
purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency
as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his
conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE
DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.

PER CURIAM:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as
erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...

The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.

Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that this Court
assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of
the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure.

The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly
gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President
Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30,
1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of
May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government
but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22,
1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for
Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C.
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. or the
above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar,

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.

The petitioner asks the Court to declare who are "the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 elections" as stated in
Article XVIII, Section 5 of the Draft Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986.

We agree that the petition deserves outright dismissal as this Court has no original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.

As to lack of cause of action, the petitioner's prayer for a declaration as to who were elected President and Vice President in the February 7, 1986
elections should be addressed not to this Court but to other departments of government constitutionally burdened with the task of making that
declaration.

The 1935 Constitution, the 1913 Constitution as amended, and the 1986 Draft Constitution uniformly provide 'that boards of canvassers in each
province and city shall certified who were elected President and Vice President in their respective areas. The certified returns are transmitted to the
legislature which proclaims, through the designated Presiding Head, who were duty elected.

Copies of the certified returns from the provincial and city boards of canvassers have not been furnished this Court nor is there any need to do so. In the
absence of a legislature, we cannot assume the function of stating, and neither do we have any factual or legal capacity to officially declare, who were
elected President and Vice President in the February 7, 1986 elections.

As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President referred to in the 1986 Draft Constitution, we agree that there is no doubt the 1986
Constitutional Commission referred to President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice President Salvador H. Laurel.

Finally, we agree with the Resolution of the Court in G.R. Nos. 73748, 73972, and 73990.

For the foregoing reasons, we vote to DISMISS the instant petition.

[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.]

LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court,
seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.

It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office for
said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.
On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." 2 Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the
First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be ceased to be a
member of the Judiciary. 3

The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the
reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice, now
Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations Sedfrey Ordoez as Vice
Chairman. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to govern the
aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary. 4

The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number
eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioners seniority
ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26). 5

Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the
provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33, which reads:
"SECTION 2. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment and the Associate Justice shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more shall bear the same date, according to
the order in which their appointments were issued by the President. Any Member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other
position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all
intents and purpose be considered as continuous and uninterrupted." 6

Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her own Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction
of the inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President as well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind of
constitutional confrontation (between the President and the Supreme Court). 7

Petitioner points to the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano, former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals who, according to petitioner, was transferred
from his position as Justice of the Court of Appeals to the Ministry of Justice as Commissioner of Land Registration and in 1986 was reappointed to the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner states that his (Victorianos) stint in the Commission of Land Registration did not adversely affect his seniority ranking in the
Court of Appeals, for, in his case, Executive Order No. 33 was correctly applied. 8

In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Justice Punos request. 9 It will be noted that before the issuance of
said resolution, there was no written opposition to, or comment on petitioners aforesaid request. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno for correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is granted. The
presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is hereby directed to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from number
twelve (12) to number five (5). Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator and the Judicial and Bar Council for their guidance and
information." 10

A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr.
and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new
Court with fifty one (51) members and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was returning to his
former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. 11

The Court en banc in a resolution dated 17 January 1992 required the petitioner to file his comment on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dated 29 November 1990.

In his Comment, petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals
is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3
(otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution) that "no right provided under the unratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom
Constitution." 12

Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129,
statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandate, according to petitioner, the preservation and enforcement of all rights
and liabilities which had accrued under the original statute. 13 Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the power of appointment is executive in
character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the Government, such power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate
law, in this case, by the limits set by Executive Order NO. 33 14 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law. 15

Justices Javellana and Campos were required by the Court to file their reply to Justice Punos comment on their motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the Court en banc dated 24 January 1991.

In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, Associate Justices Javellana and Campos submit that the appeal or request for correction filed by the petitioner
was addressed to the wrong party. They aver that as petitioner himself had alleged the mistake to be an "inadvertent error" of the Office of the
President, ergo, he should have filed his request for correction also with said Office of the President and not directly with the Supreme Court. 16
Furthermore, they point out that petitioner had indeed filed with the Office of the President a request or petition for correction of his ranking, (seniority)
but the same was not approved such that his recourse should have been an appropriate action before the proper court and impleading all parties
concerned. The aforesaid non-approval by the Office of the President they argue, should be respected by the Supreme Court "not only on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers but also their presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce" 17 for it
(the non-approval) is a confirmation that petitioners seniority ranking at the time of his appointment by President Aquino was, in fact, deliberate and not
an "inadvertent error" as petitioner would have the Court believe. 18

The resolution of this controversy is not a pleasant task for the Court since it involves not only members of the next highest court of the land but persons
who are close to members of this Court. But the controversy has to be resolved. The core issue in this case is whether the present Court of Appeals is a
new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate
Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 or whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said Executive Order No. 33.

It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate
Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary
government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986.
A resolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject
to it" 19 or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence." 20 In Kelsens book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified
and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself." 21

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the Filipino
people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or
effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making
such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." 22 It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies
with the people of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without
regard to the existing constitution." 23

The three (3) clauses that precede the text of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, 24 read:

"WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon C. Aquino was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines;

"WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended;

"WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the sovereign mandate of the people, do
hereby promulgate the following Provisional Constitution."25

These summarize the Aquino governments position that its mandate is taken from "a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people." 26

Discussions and opinions of legal experts also proclaim that the Aquino government was "revolutionary in the sense that it came into existence in
defiance of the existing legal processes" 27 and that it was a revolutionary government "instituted by the direct action of the people and in opposition to
the authoritarian values and practices of the overthrown government." 28

A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was overthrown by the Aquino government. "A legal order is the
authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state operates under a
written constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter
to locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution, comprise the legal order of that constitutional state." 29 It
is assumed that the legal order remains as a "culture system" of the polity as long as the latter endures 30 and that a point may be reached, however,
where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials. 31

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986 presidential election. 32 Thus it
can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the
appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revampt of the Judiciary and the
Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.

The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal
system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with
appointments thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in the
last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.

But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive Order No. 33 did not abolish the precedence or seniority ranking resulting from previous appointment to
the Court of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to the 1986 revolution, it is believed that President Aquino as head of then
revolutionary government, could disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her appointments to the reorganized
Court of Appeals in 1986.

It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 33, President Aquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary
government, encompassing both executive and legislative powers, such that she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg.
129 or her own Executive Order No. 33. It should also be remembered that the same situation was still in force when she issued the 1986 appointments
to the Court of Appeals. In other words, President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified or disregarded the rule
embodied in B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33, on precedence or seniority in the case of the petitioner, for reasons known only to
her. Since the appointment extended by the President to the petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in
the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored on the Presidents exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at this time
to question or correct that exercise.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of
the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity
as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA,
TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from their respective positions as
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.

As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment.

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel
S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC
Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio
M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the
same Barangay and Municipality.

That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of which read:

xxx xxx xxx

That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;

That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign the
unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;

That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February 8,1987;

That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited
from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of
the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from February 25,1986.

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that
petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for
being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.

Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in
office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1

Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective
Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during
the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of
replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be
deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to
have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a
policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities. 2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays
form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same
1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987
Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and
(2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions
subject of this Petition. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:

The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for
its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the
President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.

The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987
Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the
1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.

The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not
at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations,
but was withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very day of the
plebiscite."

The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear,
unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission in unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the
aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So
that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done
during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually
done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."

The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless
there are other commissioners who would like to present amendments.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.

On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS
BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."

MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to propose an additional sentence, the committee would
suggest that we take up first his amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready to comment on that proposed
amendment.

The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lieu thereof insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE
PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word "constitutions," add the words" AND
THEIR AMENDMENTS,"

The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we cannot accept the second proposed amendment after the
word "constitutions" because the committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions, necessarily it includes "AND THEIR
AMENDMENTS."

MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam President, may I request that I be allowed to read the second
amendment so the Commission would be able to appreciate the change in the first.

MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.

MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE
COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the committee feels that the second proposed amendment in the form
of a new sentence would not be exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a time frame on the
President to make the proclamation. As we would recall, Madam President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a provision which
says that the President shall make certain that all laws shall be faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence, and it says that there
will be a proclamation by the President that the Constitution has been ratified, the President will naturally comply with the law in accordance
with the provisions in the Article on the Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on the President a time frame within
which she will make that declaration. It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that after the results shall have been
canvassed by the COMELEC.

Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be an immediate proclamation of the results by the
President.

MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.

FR. BERNAS. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution
dependent upon the proclamation of the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification, not on
the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I think, is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ratified.
In that particular case, the reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the President was that the draft presented
to the people said that the amendment will be effective upon the proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put in there
precisely to give the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ratification or not. Therefore, we should not make this
dependent on the action of the President since this will be a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the supervision of the
COMELEC and it should be the COMELEC who should make the announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the Constitution was ratified
and there should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?

FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.

FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes were supposed to have been cast.

MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people
exercise their right to vote, then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested amendment which says:
"THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date when the Constitution
is supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the case may be?

FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to say that the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on
January 19, 1987, then the date for the effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.

MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the results by the Commission on Elections which will be
doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam President

FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act of saying "yes" is done when one casts his ballot.

MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?

FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if he is
insisting on his amendment.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the
date of the ratification is reckoned from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of reckoning because it is a plebiscite all
over the country. We do not split the moment of casting by each of the voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be all right if it would
be upon the announcement of the results of the canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over the country.
But it is necessary that there be a body which will make the formal announcement of the results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President or
the COMELEC itself upon the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the President.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas
because it is really the date of the casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution The announcement merely
confirms the ratificationeven if the results are released two or three days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in civil
law, because an announcement is a mere confirmation The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification. If there should be any need for presidential proclamation, that proclamation will merely confirm the act of ratification.

Thank you, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?

MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass
thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President
is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they
cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.

MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.

MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for the effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the
announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in favor of the Davide amendment.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.

MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for the Commission on Elections to declare the results of
the canvass?

FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes the official announcement of the results.

MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision on Elections has declared the results of the canvass, will
there be a necessity for the President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the Commission on Elections?

FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclamation whether the Constitution has been ratified or not.

FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be immaterial because under the law, the administration of all
election laws is under an independent Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which announces the results.

MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.

FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the Commission on Elections says, it would have no effect. I would
only add that when we say that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is that the Constitution takes effect
on every single minute and every single second of that day, because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.So that even if the votes are cast
in the morning, the Constitution is really effective from the previous midnight.

So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children of Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what time of day or night.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC
retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?

FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it is precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas
which speaks of the date (of ratification that would have a definite date, because there would be no definite date if we depend upon the
canvassing by the COMELEC.

Thank you,

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.

Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC or the President, would announce that a majority of
the votes cast on a given date was in favor of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution takes effect, apart from the fact that
the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution provides that a constitution becomes effective upon ratification by a majority of
the votes cast, although I would not say from the very beginning of the date of election because as of that time it is impossible to determine
whether there is a majority. At the end of the day of election or plebiscite, the determination is made as of that time-the majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be considered ratified and, therefore,
effective.

THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.

MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of Commissioner Davide and I support the view of Commissioner
Bernas and the others because the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote, have cast their votes in favor of
the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a contract, say, between an agent and a third person and that contract is confirmed or ratified by
the principal, the validity does not begin on the date of ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed.

Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the
Constitution.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized

MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on his amendment

MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I
am withdrawing my amendment on the assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the President or the COMELEC will make the
formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as stated by the committee.

MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the original committee report as Section 12.

This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.

We ask for a vote, Madam President.

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hands.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
2
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved.

The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite
held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by
the 1987 Constitution on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the
contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their
positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation
on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a
one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the
ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they
would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article
XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the convening of the first Congress,
etc.

A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial
fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the
provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar Council
created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The
official records of the Court show that the appointments of the seven Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1,
1987 and they were all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3(Similarly, the records of the Department of Justice likewise show that the
appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in completion of the reorganization of the prosecution
service were made on January 31, 1987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of record that since
February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended by the President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar
Council, indicating that the Chief Executive has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly
declared by the Court.

CRUZ, J., concurring.

In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect than the tones of thunder. She has written
another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and
Bayas cases, where I submitted that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired security of tenure under the new
Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on February 25, 1987, after the deadline set by the Freedom
Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with
her ponencia completely.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.

With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.

While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution with respect to the tenure of
government functionaries, as follows:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-off period began on February 2,
1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind the 1987 constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date
the same was proclaimed ratified pursuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987, plebiscite day.

I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:

Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose
and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained, and not at the time the
people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said that Constitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will
of the people as of that time, had not, and could not have been, vet determined.

Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.

I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts that would have been valid under the
Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the appointments of some seven
Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under Sections 8
(1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no confirmation.

xxx xxx xxx

such appointments could be open to serious questions.

Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the amendments thereto from the date it is
proclaimed ratified.

In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17, 1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102,
"Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was issued, although
Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice, Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so notwithstanding Section 16, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:

SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose
and, except as herein provided, shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all amendments thereto.

On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the ratification of the 1976 amendments
submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation states, inter alia, that.

By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino
people in the referendum- plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of this date.

It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.

These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in the referendum-plebiscite.

On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:

[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held, together with the election for local
officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.

It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment shall take effect on the date the incumbent
President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.

On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of April 7, 1981 of the Amendments to the
Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect." The Proclamation,
in declaring the said amendments duly approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of the date of this
Proclamation," It shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session,
Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which parented these amendments, the same:

. . .shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2,
Article XVI of the Constitution.

On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification or Rejection, the Amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three,
Two, and One, and to Appropriate Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:

SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass and proclaim the result of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to
it, duly authenticated and certified by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.

We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January 27, 1984, of the Amendments to the
Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states that the amendments:

....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation.

It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9, Batas Blg. 643), which states, that:

The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in the plebiscite held for the purpose, but not later than three months from the approval of the amendments.

albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:

These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it
is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, as amended.

That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite is a view that is
not peculiar to the Marcos era.

The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the
Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18, 1946, was adopted on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes
no mention of a retroactive application.

Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11, 1987, at Malacanang Palace:

... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended
thereto, has been duly ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other time.

I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter was ratified on February 2, 1987, does
not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in passing-we did not resolve the case on account of a categorical holding
that the 1987 Constitution came to life on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.

I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged dismissals done on February 8, 1987 were valid,
the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in force.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358,
359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300,
1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204,
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-
303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882,
939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588,
1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751,
1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-
1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549,
551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and
directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite
legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the
general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this
character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to
the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the
rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the
rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which
surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this
character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the
land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled
that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the
date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in
the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of
the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or
abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis
non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time
when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by
the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records
no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of
such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed
on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and
the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees,
orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the
validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the
Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar.
In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right
had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may
have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in
the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
[penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized
by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national
economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder
will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained.[3]

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a
letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent
letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid
Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhadx x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of
the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the
sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then
set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with
the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release
the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a
part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. [7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national
economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. [8]

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there
must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done. [9]

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under thepatrimony of the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct
from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is
being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares
of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the
bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of
submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of
shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a
capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to
what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded.The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and
carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. [12] A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. [13]

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function
of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. [14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
-

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion
to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[15]

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on
the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is
given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do
we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective laws will
always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other
financial structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact
that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. [17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not
self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as
in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.[19]

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are
basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply
not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation [20] speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity
of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of education.[25] Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights [27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and
the promotion of total human liberation and development. [33] A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles
upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains -

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests,
mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel
was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the
hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the
hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation
and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity.In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within
the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands.[38]

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL
OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is
80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.

MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or
entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.

MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions,
privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.[42]

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by
Commissioner Nolledo[43] -

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x
x x x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x

The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common
good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to
the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified
Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It
was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to
be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has
an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. [44]

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires
implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too
distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the
provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial
remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that
there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole
prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the
executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.[45]

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a
separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts
of persons distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public
function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and,
(3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. [46]

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority
from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide
that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policyprovision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the
highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law
that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the
foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be
so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a
perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities
is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from
the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by
the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent
GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling
the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated
as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters
for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute
the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for
future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun,
under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing
that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court
encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice
Narvasa -

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the
wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles
to economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the sale of
the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up
as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or
are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter
how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of
the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the
expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer
to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino
people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The
nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of
foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted
many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would
prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the
Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting
that has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of
hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask:
What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands
for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other
hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-
meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court,
heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999]

JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR.,
ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondents.

LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998 [1] of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for
representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998[2] of
the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINOs motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are not disputed.

On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province
of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year
and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. [3]

On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr.,
filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and
assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate their
allegations, private respondents presented the following evidence:

1. Annex A the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman of the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani filed
with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of birth
as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the constituency where he seeks election for one (1) year and two (2) months;
and, in item 10, that he is registered voter of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;

2. Annex B Voters Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating respondents registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old
Balara, Quezon City;

3. Annex C Respondents Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January 15, 1997;

4. Annex D Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial & Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated
February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr. Conrado G. Butil, which reads:

In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox copy of the triplicate copy of COMMUNITY TAX
CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino.

Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to Carlito Engcong on September 5, 1997, while
Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan Domino but was cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of
Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997.

5. Annex E The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino dated September 5, 1997;

6. Annex F Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2, 1998 addressed to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy
Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which states:

For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of Community Tax Certificate containing Nos. 11132201C-
11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid under Official Receipt No. 7854744.

Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.

7. Annex G Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3rd District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections filed
with the Office of the Regional Election Director, National Capital Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his birth date
as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election as 3 years and 5 months; and, in item 9, that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City;

8. Annex H a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent
dated August 30, 1997 addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating among
others, that [T]he undersigneds previous residence is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he is
a registered voter and that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned has transferred and conducts his business and reside at
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this application;

9. Annex I Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR CANCELLATION OF VOTERS [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of
respondent subscribed and sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani.[4]

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani
since January 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit:

1. Annex 1 - Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses
Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Johnny P. Landero;

2. Annex 2 - Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of sale executed by and between the heirs of deceased
spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on November 4, 1997,
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;

3. Annex 3 - True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35,
Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725 captioned as In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of Precinct No. 4400-A
Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino, Petitioners, -versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City,
District III, and the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City, Respondents. The dispositive portion of which
reads:

1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara, in District III Quezon City as completely
erroneous as petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel, Sarangani where they have been residing since December
1996;

2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done in good faith due to an honest mistake caused by circumstances
beyond their control and without any fault of petitioners;

3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No.
14A1 of Barangay Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and

4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the election/voters registration records of the petitioners in Quezon City to
the Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other Comelec Offices of Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously
qualified to exercise their respective rights of suffrage.

4. Annex 4 - Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC
Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August 30, 1997.

5. Annex 5 - Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of applications for registration approved by the Election
Registration Board on October 20, 1997, showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and 112 both under
Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as transferees without VRR numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997
and September 30, 1997, respectively.

6. Annex 6 - same as Annex 5

7. Annex 6-a - Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voters Previous Registration (Annex I, Petition);

8. Annex 7 - Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504 dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of
Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;

9. Annex 7-a - Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer IV, District III, Quezon City, which reads:

This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered voters of District III, Quezon City. Their registration
records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the possession of the Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.

This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.

10. Annex 8 - Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the circumstances and incidents detailing their alleged
acquaintance with respondent.

11. Annexes 8-a, 8-b, 8-c and 8-d - Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena
V. Piodos subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying their alleged personal knowledge
of respondents residency in Alabel, Sarangani;

12. Annex 8-e - A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of
fifty-five(55) residents of Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and certifying under oath that they personally know the respondent as a permanent
resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to present;

13. Annexes 9, 9-a and 9-b- Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year 1997, BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent;
and,

14. Annex 10 - The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and circumstances leading to his relocation to the Municipality of
Alabel, Sarangani, appending Annexes A, B, C, D, D-1, E, F, G with sub-markings G-1 and G-2 and H his CTC No. 111`32214C dated
September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes 1, 2, 4, 5, 6-a, 3, 7, 9 with sub-markings 9-a and 9-b except Annex H.[5]

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following findings:
What militates against respondents claim that he has met the residency requirement for the position sought is his own Voters Registration
Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997[Annex B, Petition] and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City. This evidence, standing alone, negates all his protestations that he established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same position in the 3rd
Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office sought.

Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the
elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House
of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

All told, petitioners evidence conspire to attest to respondents lack of residence in the constituency where he seeks election and while it may be
conceded that he is a registered voter as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the position of
Congressman for the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani. [6]

On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for
DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet
become final and executory.[7]

The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, [8] shows that DOMINO
garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.

On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en
banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998.Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in
the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet
the one-year residence requirement.

On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINOs Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status
quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant petition.[9]

On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes,
was allowed by the Court to Intervene.[10]

INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in Intervention[11] is asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of
petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.

Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:

a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon
City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.

b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11,
1998 elections; and

c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.[12]

The first issue.

The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a
resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.

The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false
representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.

The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or
excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of
DOMINOs qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court
and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction
are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to
decide the issue raised including the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or
exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said
authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to
which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the
nature of res judicata.[13] In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed
upon in the proceeding.[14] Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election. [15]

Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar[16] we ruled that:

xxx It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has become final, the same does not constitute res
adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an important and intricate matter of citizenship may
be passed upon and determined with finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in the
registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellants petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she
is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would still have been left open to question.

Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident
of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voters registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara,
Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion
proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is
limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the
precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voters disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or
transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section
12 of R.A. No. 8189.[17] The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election
Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voters registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the
order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file. [18]

Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action are indispensable
requirements for the application of said doctrine.Neither herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion
proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINO himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the Voters
List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private
respondents against DOMINO for alleged false representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by
reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and
identity of causes of action.[19] In the present case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval v. Guray, et al.,[20] the
Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue ruled that:

The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the
exclusion of Norberto Gurays name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in
quo warranto, which is now before us.

The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of a summary character and the
judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in
which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.

The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly
registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said
municipality. The present proceeding of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the
office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of
parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said
persons litigate. ( Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)

In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter
from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter
is his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter.

In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six months legal residence in the municipality
of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the
one years legal residence required for eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist therefore, identity of
causes of action.

In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no
identity of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there isno res judicata.
The Second Issue.

Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his
certificate of candidacy?

We hold in the negative.

It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the
same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.[21] Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return.[22] Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances,
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains
until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. [23]

Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur [24] and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at
24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the
3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City
and has established a new domicile of choice at the Province of Sarangani.

A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. [25] To successfully
effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.[26] In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.[27]

It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the
lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place that
they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality.

While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To
establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While residence
simply requires bodily presence in a given place, domicile requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable
intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home. [28]

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must
concur in order to establish a new domicile.No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile
without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.[29]

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of DOMINOs intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it
does not result in loss or change of domicile. [30] Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of
Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement.

Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of
the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this
case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of
residence, and is said to have decided preponderance is a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his
residence.[31] The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his
domicile.[32]

His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which he had no control cannot be sustained. The
general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21,
and 22.[33]

While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on
November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997,[34] and that he applied for
transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, [35] DOMINO still falls short of the
one year residency requirement under the Constitution.

In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the
length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.[36] Dominos failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.[37]
The Third Issue.

DOMINOs contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.

As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification
is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes[38] and provided
further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. [39]

It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the
Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. [40]

The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.[41] A
candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.

In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by
reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the suspension of DOMINOs
proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May
1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position.

Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he
cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction
over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.[42]
Issue raised by INTERVENOR.

After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the province of Sarangani, may INTERVENOR, as
the candidate who received the next highest number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate?

It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified.[43]

In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the
majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be
declared elected in his place.[44]

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. [45] To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because
in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.[46]

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.[47]

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred[48] from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor
of the person who haS obtained a plurality of votes [49] and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. [50] To allow the defeated and repudiated
candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their
part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice. [51]

INTERVENORs plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be sustained. INTERVENORs reliance on the
opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case[52] to wit: if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to
have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected, is misplaced.

Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible candidate. Although the resolution
declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less
than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the
votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are
presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said
votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. [53]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29
May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004.
The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as
they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.

On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as
SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for
national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC
declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for
petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal
access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987

Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated
by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process
and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the
most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner
likewise attacks the validity of the form for theCertificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not
provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and
his program of government.

First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that
there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to
the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. 3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.4

An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the
present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." 6 Commissioner
(now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal
access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you
broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to
accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we
should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary
and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden." 7 (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible
into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a
desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of
claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities,"
and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions 9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC
Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to
or cancel aCertificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to be accorded due weight.

Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide
intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number
of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the
same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly
election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme
Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name
of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the
democratic [process].11

The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the
study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the COMELECs Comment:

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because the election process
becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in
the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For
the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00).

xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect
of winning, no matter how slim.12

The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election
laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every polling place,13 watchers in the board of
canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are
dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election
with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a
one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in,
as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."

The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible
elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is
mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods
that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest elections. 17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for
public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. 18 The determination of bona fidecandidates is governed by the
statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.

Now, the needed factual premises.

However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and
reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence
which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the
matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.

Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for
the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the
COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not
before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.

A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It deserves not a cursory treatment
but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.

As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74
of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required
information tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the
Constitution and other election laws.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196271[October 18, 2011]

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,

in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI versus

SENATE of THE PHILIPPINES

BRION, J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections
from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular
national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional
Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and
Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
theCordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into
effect the granted autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both
of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by
Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting
provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of
the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next
legislative act passed. This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140 [1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled
under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same
date.

RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005, and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153
was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections
scheduled onAugust 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191)
Members voting in its favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13)
Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June
30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the
constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the
constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition[4] also assailing the
validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the
filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:

a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa,
Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;

b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197282;

c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction [7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and

d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino
Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus[9]against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion
for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the
motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No.
2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective
memoranda within twenty (20) days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the
incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term
on September 30, 2011.

The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply
with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as
well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

The Issues

From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987
Constitution?

IV.Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position,
cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members
of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining
twelve for three years.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, [10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. [11]

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the
twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once
every three years.[12] This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. [13]

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent
indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all
the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v.
Commission on Elections,[14] we explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon
of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the
phrase holding simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II,
p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be
synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given
their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this
Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language should be understood in the sense
that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a
community or minor political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of
ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article
X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the
article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious.We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the
various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of
the Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three
readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
"except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.

xxx

That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be
dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in
consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the
Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or
emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the
existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to
judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress,
certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification
and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of
Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review. [21]

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and
this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent
exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay
of the judicial hand.[22]

In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of
every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to
them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to
give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process. [23]

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient
opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.

III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054

The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines
upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only
provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the
Congress to fix the date of thesubsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153.
Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of
the subsequent regular elections.

This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds
support in ARMMs recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix
the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, [24] leaving the date to be fixed in another
legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No. 8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted
by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were
not amendments to this latter law.Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second
Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No.
9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional
elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a
plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring
compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under
Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more
than what the Constitution demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as
long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct
business and hold session.Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher
than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal
the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future
legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual
infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments
or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction,
either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by
its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or
abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular
mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon
existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of
bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility.

III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as
embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite
requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the
Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining
which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the
Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective, [35] questions on the extent of the matters requiring
ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a
plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the
majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With these wordings as standard, we interpret the
requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous
regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification
through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the
regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative
powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36]

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the
Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of
elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.

IV. The synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this
synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the
current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional
elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception
of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is
already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition. [37]

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been
held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May
2013).

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to
allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until
those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; [38] (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to
expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3
of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct
option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A. Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of
Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy
as recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. [39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. [42]

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some
provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional
provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their
own express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events
which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law. [43]

The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on
legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress
to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the
government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the
constituent political units; national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article
X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X,all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching
on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or
self-government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under
these provisions are the permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-
quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion
of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established
constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage;
synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional
effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe
the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the national, congressional and all other
local elections (save forbarangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance
in the intervening period between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21)
months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established
supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in
the Philippine legal landscape. The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the old
constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of
elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far
enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present
problem is with us today.

The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur[48] and
Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until a new
set of provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified. [50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local
government from a sub-province to a province.[51]

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in
order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted
norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available
to Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures
that Congress had to provide.The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is under these
terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot
legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term
as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and
qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the
official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by
the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself
made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is
changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of
government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow. [53] If at all, Congress may only pass
legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court,
on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for. [54]

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation
with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local
officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new
term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress
cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that
cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. [55] Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President. [56] Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that
Congress could not have undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of
approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v.
COMELEC,[57] Adap v. Comelec,[58]and Montesclaros v. Comelec,[59] where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their
positions in a hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution;the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. [61]

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA
No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,[62] except
where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections
pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the
Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be
held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states:

xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday
of May. [Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.[63]

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13,
2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a
policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of
the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To
be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is
not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to
set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.[65] Statutorily,
COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did
grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and
can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and
after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to
a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after
the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results
in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall,
on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take
place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force
majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in
any political subdivision. Under the principle ofejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These analogous causes are further defined by
the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible.

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of
(a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in
Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional
mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the same character
as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of
elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no
legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.

D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to
rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have
assumed office.

In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of
office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress
itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,[68] and
extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same
power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. [70] More particularly, not even Congress and
certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally
mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of
less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term
(where the term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another, while the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office). [72] As with
the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would
commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.

E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern
the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can make. This
choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should
be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. [73] The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. [74]

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No.
10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA
No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did
not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must
in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms.[75] Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation
that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on the above considerations, given the plain
unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the
term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to
make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to
choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the
grant that would frontally breach the elective and representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more
importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor
affected at all.To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance
with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the
communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim
measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units [76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of
provinces.[77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the
regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent
police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given
circumstances.

Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this
requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this
regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the
assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution
(specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a
dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective
officials with OICs.

This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to
address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is
limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect to elections.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It
was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this
legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other
localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to
the COMELEC, as above discussed.

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court
cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the
ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the
time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the
lessons of our Mindanaohistory past and current teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the
countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past. [78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of
an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even
temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute necessity.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of
vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best
interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in
the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between
the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation
and governance in their own local government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the
management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of
basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21
months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management
of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the
President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to
take.

B. Autonomy in the ARMM

It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the
Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized
Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of
one over the other is clear.[82] We refer to the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and
apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and
effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile
and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with
the least disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as
the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the
attendant circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local elections in order to
maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This
argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never
equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is
still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional
autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather an efficient working relationship between
the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a separation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of the nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express
reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the
enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided
to reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous
government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national government[.][85] Of note is the Courts pronouncement
in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments,
including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development
at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-
setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of
elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be
used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.

Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted
RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. [87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its
wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the
Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The
petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to
venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic government
the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse
of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[90]

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the
petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed
valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the
onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its
validity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13,
2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration 1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed 2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner).

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29,
2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether
the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if
the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as
a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and
114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the
arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision
which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution 8 reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders,
the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Courts July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads:
"This disposition is immediately executory." 9

Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda. 10

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has
always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins,
both the Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of
aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.13

Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices
ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that
the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities,15 the
members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President.

Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the
JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1wphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.18 It has
been the situation since then.

Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that
allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the
Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two
representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the
rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself
unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.

As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.

Ruling of the Court

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and
defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework
upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the
basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen
for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained
inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July
17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism.
One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be
confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately." 21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form
of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very
clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise
of its primary function to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
assigned a contributory non-legislative function.

The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions
which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. W hether in the
exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation, 24 the declaration of an existence of a
state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must
be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally
granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC,
the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the
Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so
providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence
to it as a major branch of government.

On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered
position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:

I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1)
of the 1987 Constitution x x x.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-
repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in order
to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC
Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:

8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in
Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of
two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the
appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock
by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:

As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors.
From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the
bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific
that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth
reiterating.31 Thus:

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in
the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives
from the three main branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The
unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx
Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial
nominees.

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of
government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the
exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in
furtherance of Congress role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives
act as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly
bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the
JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively
disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice
cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the
rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly
a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of
Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular
members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular
members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of
Congress.

Respondents contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the
first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no
matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act is
considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.

It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts
done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. 33

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in
the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot
correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the
Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence.
To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as
intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission
may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it
thinks the legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation." 37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains
steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial
exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to
the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft
and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may
sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This
disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit
the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent,
against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the
said district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la
adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the
election of said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of
the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests
against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal
or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein
petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been
reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding
the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can
regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie
Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of
the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the
following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the
jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting
its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the
rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme
Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election
protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his
special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period
within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day
for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly
conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by
paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction
of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that such
confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over
protest filed subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision
are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of
sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII)
of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to the case
at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary
writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by
resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts,
and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election
of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been
presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty
to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of
counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to
be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is
so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check
that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may
be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any
living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article
VIII of our constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality
to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the
language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing
must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their
constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the
said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation
made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting
off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and
had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the
exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day
for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on
the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the
light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it
does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under
the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted
the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to
interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts
are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have
no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa.
Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and
Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of
ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the
conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be
in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of
the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral
Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National
Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article
VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and
the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall
be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the
United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently
in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this
grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by the
sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee
submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but
also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of
three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three
members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is
also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to
the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members,
that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each
from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934
subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election of any of their members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest
number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in
favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited
jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative
Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its
Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in
the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of
the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of
December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft,
reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its
Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to
indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and
there is nothing to be determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose election is not
contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming the election of
its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has
been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a
member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a
municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the
municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part
of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one
person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been
elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the
returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to
the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However
I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as
separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included in the phrase "the elections,
returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion
does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a
member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the Electoral
Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura,
Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas
speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

xxx xxx xxx

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la
primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la
Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad,
creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the
election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas."
Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su
Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los
de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo
no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

xxx xxx xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party
and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by
the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the
original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the
elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative
body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously
notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership.
One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections,
whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings,
with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties
and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions,
which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself.
When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was
usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be
present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually assumed a political character; so
that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party
questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated
attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the
trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted,
from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious
matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons,
undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to
regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for
leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the
principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to
attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary
impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge
in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial
management of the very business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and
received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr.
Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever
devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many
of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the
day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief
justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important
rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of
its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with
rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary
Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22];
Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee
of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were
originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the
election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37,
par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the
authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests,
the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and
the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in
the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two
opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877
(United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected
by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by
the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although
there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field,
who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25et seq.), the experiment has at least
abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. To
be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it
wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can
be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and
"ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and
specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36
S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings
of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of
power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority
from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A
sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but
in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a
situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National
Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of
respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its
acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of
the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of
the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting
protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the
possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second
place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought
through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We
believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination
of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies
of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own
particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for
which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given
instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in
appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable character that should not be
overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15,
1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new
National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to
the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a
mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of
this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the
Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming
non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the
result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases had
already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and
method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at
the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While
there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the
power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the
Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended
by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by
the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties
as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in
the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6,
1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither
necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect
presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp.
331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the
decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker
of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon
the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into
execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or
decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing,
Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests
against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house
the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after
the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of
such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of
further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature,
Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record
First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892,
893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly
abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing
of contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the
medium of confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the
executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers
granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to
see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer
for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the
sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate
rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which
object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering
each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of
notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against
the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope
and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission
is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

G.R. No. 177780 [January 25, 2012]

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO versus-

ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III

BERSAMIN, J.:

This appeal assails the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 that dismissed the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to
nullify and set aside the resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice on July 20, 20042 and November 18, 20053 directing the City Prosecutor
of Malabon City to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 27020 entitled People v. Antonino O. Tobias III.

We affirm the CA in keeping with the principle of non-interference with the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of
the public prosecutor in the latters determination of the existence of probable cause, absent any showing that the Secretary of Justice thereby
commits grave abuse of his discretion.

Antecedents

In 1997, Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (METROBANK) in Valero Street, Makati City,
was introduced to respondent Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose Eduardo Gonzales, a valued client of METROBANK. Subsequently,
Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias
applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings.
METROBANK next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other related
documents.4 The property consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila with a total area of 6,080 square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-16751.5 Based on the financial statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a
credit line for P40,000,000.00. On August 15, 1997, Joselito Bermeo Moreno, Lead Internal Affairs Investigator of METROBANK, proceeded to
the Registry of Deeds of Malabon to cause the annotation of the deed of real estate mortgage on TCT No. M-16751. The annotation was Entry
No. 26897.6

Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of P20,000,000, but took out the balance within six months. 7 He paid the interest on the loan for
about a year before defaulting. His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the
mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder. 8 On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued
in favor of METROBANK.9

When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-
16751 was found in the registry vault. Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido, Deputy Register of Deeds of Malabon, went on to verify TCT No. M-16751 and
learned that Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein had been issued for TCT No. M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT No.
16751 (now TCT No. 390146) appeared to have been issued in the name of Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a parcel of land located in Navotas. 10
Given such findings, METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate.11 In its report dated
May 29, 2000,12PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF
recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of
Article 315, in relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.13

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents through the
following information,14 viz:

xxx

That on or about the 15th day of August, 1997 in the Municipality of Malabon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretense, fraudulent acts and misrepresentation executed prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud, represented to METROBANK, as represented by MS. ROSELLA S. SANTIAGO, that he is the registered owner of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-16751 which he represented to be true and genuine when he knew the Certificate of Title No. M-16751 is
fake and spurious and executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Metrobank and offered the same as collateral for a loan and Rosella S.
Santiago relying on said misrepresentation gave to accused, the amount of P20,000,000.00 and once in possession of the amount, with intent
to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously failed to deliver the land covered by spurious title and misappropriate, misapply and converted
the said amount of P20,000,000.00 to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands accused failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to return the amount to complainant METROBANK, and/or delivered the land covered in the spurious title in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Tobias filed a motion for re-investigation,16 which was granted.

In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-investigation,17 Tobias averred that he had bought the property from one Leonardo Fajardo
through real estate brokers Augusto Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil; that Natalio Bartolome, his financial consultant from Carwin International,
had convinced him to purchase the property due to its being an ideal site for his meat processing plant and cold storage business; that the
actual inspection of the property as well as the verification made in the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City had ascertained the veracity of TCT
No. 106083 under the name of Leonardo Fajardo; that he had applied for the loan from METROBANK to pay the purchase price by offering the
property as collateral; that in order for the final application to be processed and the loan proceeds to be released, METROBANK had advised
him to have the title first transferred to his name; that he had executed a deed of absolute sale with Fajardo covering the property, and that said
instrument had been properly registered in the Registry of Deeds; that the transfer of the title, being under the account of the seller, had been
processed by seller Fajardo and his brokers Munsuyac and Pilapil; that his title and the property had been inspected and verified by
METROBANKs personnel; and that he did not have any intention to defraud METROBANK.

Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being
charged with estafa through falsification of public document.18

Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information
filed against Tobias,19 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Malabon City is directed to cause the
withdrawal of the Information in Crim. Case No. 27020 against respondent Antonino O. Tobias III, and report the action taken thereon within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez opined that Tobias had sufficiently established his good faith in purchasing the property; that he had even
used part of the proceeds of the loan to pay the seller; that it was METROBANK that had caused the annotation of the mortgage on the TCT,
thereby creating an impression that the title had been existing in the Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the presumption that the
possessor of a falsified document was the author of the falsification did not apply because it was always subject to the qualification or reference
as to the approximate time of the commission of the falsification.

METROBANK moved to reconsider,20 arguing that Tobias had employed deceit or false pretense in offering the property as collateral by using a
fake title; and that the presumption that the possessor of the document was the author of the falsification applied because no other person
could have falsified the TCT and would have benefitted therefrom except Tobias himself.

On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANKs motion for reconsideration. 21
Ruling of the CA

METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari.

On December 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision,22 dismissing METROBANKs petition for certiorari by holding that the presumption of
authorship might be disputed through a satisfactory explanation, viz:

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document
and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651
[2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs.
Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all,
is merely a disputable one.

It is in this score that We affirm the resolution of the Department of Justice finding no probable cause against private respondent Tobias for
estafa thru falsification of public document. The record speaks well of Tobias good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability. Consider:

(a) Tobias has in his favor a similar presumption that good faith is always presumed. Therefore, he who claims bad faith must prove it (Prinsipio
vs. The Honorable Oscar Barrientos, G.R. 167025, December 19, 2005). No such evidence of bad faith of Tobias appears on record;

(b) Tobias actuation in securing the loan belies any criminal intent on his part to deceive petitioner Bank. He was not in a hurry to obtain the
loan. He had to undergo the usual process of the investigative arm or machine of the Bank not only on the location and the physical
appearance of the property but likewise the veracity of its title. Out of the approved P40,000,000.00 loan he only availed of P20,000,000.00, for
his frozen meat business which upon investigation of the Bank failed to give negative results;

(c) Tobias paid the necessary interests for one (1) year on the loan and two (2) installments on the restructured loan; and

(d) More importantly, the loan was not released to him until after the mortgage was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City
and even paid the amount of P90,000.00 for the registration fees therefor.

These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that Tobias has the least intention to deceive the Bank in obtaining the loan. It may not be
surprising to find that Tobias could even be a victim himself by another person in purchasing the properties he offered as security for the loan.23

The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and,
ultimately, of the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such determination;24 that the private complainant in a
criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that should the State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant
might initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of the Civil Code, to wit:

In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to file the criminal complaint, the complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect of
the case and not the criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. In Vda. De Jacob vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144, 149 [1984], the Supreme
Court has this for an answer:

The remedy of complainant in a case where the Minister of Justice would not allow the filing of a criminal complaint against an accused
because it is his opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain an information for the complaint with which the respondents are charged
of, is to file a civil action as indicated in Article 35 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or
the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendants motion, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complainant should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended
until the termination of the criminal proceedings.25

METROBANK sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for that purpose, emphasizing that the presumption that METROBANK
firmly relied upon was overcome by Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith and lack of criminal intent. The CA relevantly held:
Petitioner should be minded that the subject presumption that the possessor and user of a forged or falsified document is presumed to be the
falsifier or forger is a mere disputable presumption and not a conclusive one. Under the law on evidence, presumptions are divided into two (2)
classes: conclusive and rebuttable. Conclusive or absolute presumptions are rules determining the quantity of evidence requisite for the support
of any particular averment which is not permitted to be overcome by any proof that the fact is otherwise, if the basis facts are established (1
Greenleaf, Ev 44; 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 164; 1 Jones on Evidence 6 ed, page 132). Upon the other hand, a disputable presumption has
been defined as species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on when there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it
stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence (31A C.J.S., p. 197; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, Feb. 9, 1994; Herrera,
Remedial Law, Vol. VI, 1999 Edition, pp. 40-41). In fact, Section 3 of Rule 131 provides that the disputable presumptions therein enumerated
are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Thus, as declared in Our decision in this case,
private respondent had shown evidence of good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability that can overthrow the controversial disputable
presumption.26

Issue

In this appeal, METROBANK raises the lone issue of

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE PROBABLY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THUS, COMMITTED PATENT ERROR
IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED 29 DECEMBER 2006, DISMISSING METROBANKS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 20 JULY 2004 AND 18 NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUDTICE AND IN
DENYING METROBANKS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship was sufficient to establish probable cause to hold Tobias for trial; that the
presumption applies when a person is found in possession of the forged instrument, makes use of it, and benefits from it; that contrary to the
ruling of the CA, there is no requirement that the legal presumption shall only apply in the absence of a valid explanation from the person found
to have possessed, used and benefited from the forged document; that the CA erred in declaring that Tobias was in good faith, because good
faith was merely evidentiary and best raised in the trial on the merits; and that Tobias was heavily involved in a modus operandi of using fake
titles because he was also being tried for a similar crime in the RTC, Branch 133, in Makati City.

METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused, which should not be done
during the preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.

On the other hand, Tobias posits that the core function of the Department of Justice is to prosecute the guilty in criminal cases, not to
persecute; that although the prosecutors are given latitude to determine the existence of probable cause, the review power of the Secretary of
Justice prevents overzealous prosecutors from persecuting the innocent; that in reversing the resolution of Malabon City Assistant Prosecutor
Ojer Pacis, the Secretary of Justice only acted within his authority; that, indeed, the Secretary of Justice was correct in finding that there was
lack of evidence to prove that the purported fake title was the very cause that had induced the petitioner to grant the loan; and that the
Secretary likewise appropriately found that Tobias dealt with the petitioner in good faith because of lack of proof that he had employed fraud
and deceit in securing the loan.

Lastly, Tobias argues that the presumption of forgery could not be applied in his case because it was METROBANK, through a representative,
who had annotated the real estate mortgage with the Registry of Deeds; and that he had no access to and contact with the Registry of Deeds,
and whatever went wrong after the annotation was beyond his control.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government,27 or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, 28 represented in
this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause
for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.29 That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 30 For instance, inBalanganan v. Court of
Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,31 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required
hard facts and solid evidence in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the
court after the conduct of a trial.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial.32 At
a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.33Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.34 There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to
consider the attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the
examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear dictates
of reason.35
Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public document the elements of which are: (a) the accused uses a fictitious name, or
falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other
similar deceits; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was
induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.36 It is required that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only
motive that induced the complainant to part with the thing.37

METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the
spurious title to secure the loan; and posits that there is no requirement that the presumption shall apply only when there is absence of a valid
explanation from the person found to have possessed, used and benefited from the forged document.

We cannot sustain METROBANKs urging.

Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State. 38 The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence
to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary.39 As such, a presumption of law is material during
the actual trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to
rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case.40 This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only
determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court.41

Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for
which it stands.42 It is not correct to say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption
during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause
during a preliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from
discharging the duty to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the
Secretary of Justice have ample discretion to determine the existence of probable cause,43 a discretion that must be used to file only a criminal
charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant.

The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation.44 Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in the face of the controverting
explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse
of discretion, least of all grave. We concur with the erudite exposition of the CA on the matter, to wit:

It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the moment a person has in his possession a falsified document and has
made use of it, probable cause orprima facie is already established and that no amount of satisfactory explanation will prevent the filing of the
case in court by the investigating officer, for any such good explanation or defense can only be threshed out in the trial on the merit. We are not
to be persuaded. To give meaning to such argumentation will surely defeat the very purpose for which preliminary investigation is required in
this jurisdiction.

A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary
investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed, and (b) whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]). It is a means of discovering the person or persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410 [2005]). Prescindingly,
under Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondent must be informed of the accusation against him and shall have
the right to examine the evidence against him and submit his counter-affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far, respondent in a criminal
preliminary investigation is legally entitled to explain his side of the accusation.

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document
and makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651
[2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs.
Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all,
is merely a disputable one.45

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to
ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty.46 Its duty included
the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of
investigating who was its real owner.47 Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the
circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to
exercise greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest. 48 Their failure to do
so constitutes negligence on its part.49

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
December 29, 2006. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court.

PER CURIAM:

The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T.
Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These

Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice
and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government properties they used during their tenure.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion 1 issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on
Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased
from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court, to wit:

1wphi1

Valuation under
Valuation under COA
Difference
Name of Justice Items Purchased CFAG Memorandum
(in pesos)
(in pesos) No. 98-569A
(in pesos)

Artemio Panganiban Toyota Camry, 341,241.10 365,000.00 23,758.90

(Chief Justice) 2003 model

Toyota Grandia, 136,500.00 151,000.00 14,500.00

2002 model

Toyota Camry, 115,800.00 156,000.00 40,200.00

2001 model

Ruben T. Reyes Toyota Camry, 579,532.50 580,600.00 1,067.50

(Associate Justice) 2005 model

Toyota Grandia, 117,300.00 181,200.00 63,900.00

2003 model

Angelina S. Gutierrez Toyota Grandia, 115,800.00 150,600.00 34,800.00

(Associate Justice) 2002 model

Adolfo S. Azcuna Toyota Camry, 536,105.00 543,300.00 9,195.00

(Associate Justice) 2005 model

Toyota Grandia, 117,300.00 145,000.00 27,700.00

2002 model

Sony TV Set 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10

Ma. Alicia 5,800.002

The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the
appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by
applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA
Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.

Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the
Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA
questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government
property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate
Justices,5 the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly,
the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full autonomy, among
others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of the Judiciarys resources, based on its own determination
of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the
course of the discharge of its functions.7 To allow the COA to substitute the Courts policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to
an encroachment into this judicial prerogative.
OUR RULING

We find Atty. Candelarias recommendation to be well-taken.

The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-
audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours

This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Courts fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on
judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.

Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to
be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.9

The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch
from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.10 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence would
result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.11

Under the Judiciarys unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to
resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints
and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself. 12 Thus, judicial independence can be "broken
down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence." 13 Decisional independence "refers to a judges ability
to render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." 14 On the other hand,
institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government."15 Simply
put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body." 16

In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19,
20 and 21, 2007,17 the Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts of judicial independence in the following manner:

One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases
with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at
least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is
institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.

A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence
threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. italics and emphases ours Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our
system of government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of
the government is attended with grave abuse of discretion,18 no less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that
judicial independence is protected and maintained.

The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the
Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary. 19 The Constitution also mandates
that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy, 20 and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.
Jurisprudence21 has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and
court personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.22

The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in
office,23 and ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office."24 With these
guarantees, justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy
motives.25

All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by clearly stating the Courts powers, but
also by providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of government to interfere with the Courts affairs.

Fiscal Autonomy

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent
a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the
Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts,26 the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of
their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the
first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy amounts to an
improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to
command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national
purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to
maintain judicial independence27 and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article
VIII. This provision states:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,28 we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources
with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10
typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of
their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far
limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless
provision.29 (emphases ours)

In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquinos veto of particular provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal
Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of
the Judiciarys constitutionally guaranteed independence and fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled:

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its
funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization
of the funds appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition
of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be
given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. 30

The Courts declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive than the mere automatic
and regular release of its approved annual appropriations; 31 real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and
dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference.

Application to the Present Case

The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the
exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in
A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to retiring
Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts:

WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133,
150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require";

WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of purchasing for sentimental reasons at
retirement government properties they used during their tenure has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials;
and

WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a retiring Justice attaches to properties
he or she officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of
government resources.

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of
specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has
become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. 32 The En Banc Resolution also deems the
grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of
administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciarys internal affairs, and this
includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own
grants.33

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and
decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel
within the parameters of the Courts granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts exercise of its
discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on
how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the
Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the
Judiciarys own affairs.

As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly,
Section 501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:

Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The full and sole authority and responsibility for the divestment and
disposal of property and other assets owned by the national government agencies or instrumentalities, local government units and government-
owned and/or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of the
national government, the local government units and the governing bodies or managing heads of government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries conformably to their respective corporate charters or articles of incorporation, who shall constitute the appropriate
committee or body to undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours

This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to
divest and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he determines the manner and the conditions of disposition,
which in this case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the
Court En Banc. However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion
is unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretations and insertions.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative
Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to
be legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-08-2531 April 11, 2013

(Formerly A.M. No. 08-7-220-MTCC)

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Complainant,

vs.
MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City. Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative case arose from a letter1dated June 23, 2006 by Director David E. Cabanag, Jr. of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Regional Office No. VII calling the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to the continued employment of Merle Ramoneda-
Pita (Ramoneda-Pita) as Clerk III of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Danao City. It informed the OCA that in CSC Resolution No.
0102632 dated January 26, 2001, Ramoneda-Pita was found guilty of dishonesty and dismissed from the service. As accessory penalties, she
was perpetually barred from joining government service and her civil service eligibility was revoked. However, Ramoneda-Pita did not declare
her ineligibility when she stated in her Personnel Data Sheet (PDS) 3 dated June 14, 2005 that she had never been involved in any
administrative case and that she was civil service eligible.

The antecedent facts follow.

On March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter4 informed the CSC of an alleged irregularity in the civil service eligibility of Ramoneda-Pita. The letter
stated that the irregularity concerned Ramoneda-Pitas taking of the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in Cebu City on July
26, 1987.

The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987 examinations and compared the pictures and signatures of Ramoneda-Pita as they
appeared in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) for the exam and her PDS dated October 17, 1990. As the pictures and signatures did not match, the
CSC required Ramoneda-Pita to explain why it seemed that another person took the civil service examination on her behalf.

Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil service examinations in her stead. She averred that she took the civil service
examinations on July 30, 1986 and not July 26, 1987. She explained that there were dissimilarities in the pictures in the PSP and the PDS
because these were not taken on the same year and might have deteriorated in quality over the years. On the other hand, she accounted for
the difference in her signatures to her low educational attainment leading to her non-development and non-maintenance of a usual signature.5

In its Investigation Report6 dated May 3, 1999, the CSC made the following observations and recommendation:

The person who actually took the Career Service Subprofessional Examination on July 26, 1987 in Cebu City, was the "Merle C. Ramoneda"
whose picture and signature were affixed in the Admission Slip/Notice of Admission and in the Picture Seat Plan, is NOT the "Merle C.
Ramoneda" whose picture and signature appear in the Personal Data Sheet dated October 17, 1990 of the real Merle C. Ramoneda.

In view of the foregoing, considering that the evidence presented is substantial, it is recommended that respondent Merle C. Ramoneda be
adjudged guilty of the charges and meted the penalty of dismissal with all its accessories. 7

Thus, the CSC issued Resolution No. 010263 dated January 26, 2001 finding Ramoneda-Pita guilty of dishonesty, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Merle C. Ramoneda guilty of the offense of Dishonesty. Accordingly, the penalty of dismissal from
the service with all its accessory penalties is imposed.

Since the respondent is not in the government service, the penalty of dismissal is deemed implemented. She is also perpetually barred from
entering the government service and from taking any civil service examination in the future. Her Civil Service Sub-Professional Eligibility is
likewise revoked.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas for whatever legal action it may take under the premises. 8

Ramoneda-Pita moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied it in Resolution No. 0108809 dated May 3, 2001.

Ramoneda-Pita appealed CSC Resolution Nos. 010263 and 010880 to the Court of Appeals and, subsequently, to this Court. In both instances,
her appeal was denied.10

On January 14, 2005, Ramoneda-Pita wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appealing for clemency stating that she accepted her
fate and turned a new leaf with a solemn commitment to do good for the rest of her life. The Office of the President referred the matter to
Director David Cabanag, Jr. of the CSC Regional Office No. VII for validation, verification and investigation. 11
While the appeal for clemency was pending and in the course of the CSCs investigation, the CSC discovered that, again, Ramoneda-Pita had
been declaring in her PDS, particularly the PDS dated June 14, 2005 submitted to the Supreme Court, that she had not been found guilty in any
administrative case and that she was civil service eligible. 12

Thus, on May 11, 2006, the CSC, in its Investigation Report 13 pursuant to the Office of the Presidents referral, found that Ramoneda-Pita had
not sufficiently established moral reformation which is crucial in the grant of executive clemency. It recommended that the plea for executive
clemency be denied.

On June 23, 2006, Director Cabanag, Jr. wrote a letter to the OCA informing it of the continued employment of Ramoneda-Pita as Clerk III of
the MTCC, Danao City despite the finality of CSC Resolution No. 010263.

On August 18, 2006, the OCA required Ramoneda-Pita to submit her comment within fifteen (15) days.

In her Comment dated September 7, 2006, Ramoneda-Pita asserted that she never concealed that she had been previously found guilty of
dishonesty. She claimed that her immediate supervisor, Judge Manuel D. Patalinghug, was furnished a copy of CSC Resolution No. 010263.
She admitted having filed request for executive clemency with the Office of the President. In connection to this, she said that the CSC directed
her to submit some documents needed for its processing. She explained that she made the entries in her June 14, 2005 PDS because she
wanted to be consistent in her statements in her previous PDS and, considering her low education, she just copied the data entries contained in
her earlier PDS. She said that it was never her intention to falsify the PDS and she did not understand the legal implications. She prayed for the
Courts understanding and cited her good record during her years of service.

In its Report14 dated July 4, 2008, the OCA recommended, among others, that the case be docketed as a regular administrative matter and that
this Court conduct its own investigation on the matter.

This Court noted and adopted the recommendation of the OCA in a Resolution 15 dated August 6, 2008 where it directed the OCA to conduct its
own investigation on the matter and submit a report and recommendation thereon.

Thus, this administrative case.

In its Memorandum16 dated February 19, 2009, the OCA recommended Ramoneda-Pitas dismissal from the service. It found that Ramoneda-
Pita fully participated in the proceedings before the CSC never once questioning its jurisdiction. It stated:

In the instant case, respondent Ramoneda-Pita, who never even questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC, fully participated in the proceedings
before the CSC. Although she was not yet a Supreme Court employee when the CSC instituted the case against her, she had already become
a member of the judiciary when Resolution No. 01-0263 dated January 26, 2001 finding her guilty and meting her the penalty of dismissal was
issued - having been appointed by the Court to her present position on July 24, 2000. Her motion for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution
was denied. The respondent then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the same Resolution. A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed with the Supreme Court which in its Resolution dated August 24, 2004 found no reversible error in
the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case. Taking
into consideration the pronouncement in the Ampong case, we believe that with all the more reason the doctrine of estoppel should thus be
considered applicable in the instant case as the respondent went all the way to the Supreme Court to question the CSC Resolution. In addition,
the Court itself has even ruled on the case, effectively upholding CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 when it explicitly stated that in any event, the
petition would still be denied for failure thereof to sufficiently show that the public respondent committed any reversible error in the challenged
decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.

xxxx

There lies the question as to how should respondent then be proceeded against with respect to her employment in the Judiciary. We deem that
we cannot just implement CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 and dismiss the respondent outright. The Court still maintains its administrative
jurisdiction over the respondent and should therefore have the final determination of her administrative liability.

Considering, however, that the CSC had already conducted both fact-finding and formal investigations, we find no reason why the Court should
replicate what the CSC had done more ably.17

In support of its conclusion, the OCA cited Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 1118among others. Said the OCA:

The standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Supreme Court through the OCA as shown
in several cases. The Court, however, has made exceptions in certain cases. In the very recent case of Ampong, the Court, although it declared
that it had administrative jurisdiction over the petitioner, nevertheless upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. In the
said case, petitioner Ampong, a court interpreter at the time the CSC instituted administrative proceedings against her, questioned the
jurisdiction of the CSC after it found her guilty of dishonesty in surreptitiously taking the CSC-supervised Professional Board Examination for
Teachers (PBET) in 1991 in place of another person and dismissed her from the service. The Court denied the petition on the ground that the
previous actions of petitioner estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC which had accorded her due process. 19 (Citations
omitted.)

The OCA then proceeded to discuss the merits of Ramoneda-Pitas contention. It noted Ramoneda-Pitas claim that her physical appearance
changed over the intervening years since she took the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations. She also posed the possibility that the
picture quality had deteriorated over time. In addition, she also claims that the examiner must have interchanged her picture with someone else
as he was the one who pasted the pictures to the seat plan.

However, the OCA seriously doubted the validity of Ramoneda-Pitas claim saying:

We do not think that a mere three-year gap would bring about drastic changes in a persons appearance. Besides, the respondent failed to
substantiate her claims. She could have easily submitted additional evidence, such as pictures to show the gradual change in her appearance
through the three-year period.20

On the confusion with respect to the pictures, the OCA said that it was not "likely due to the strict procedure followed during civil service
examinations x x x."21 Moreover, the OCA stated:

The presentation of various explanations and conjectures show the inconsistent stands taken by the respondent. She insists that the picture in
the seat plan was her and that her physical appearance has changed over the years, yet in the same breath argues that the examiner must
have interchanged her picture with the pictures of other examinees.
The same inconsistency is manifest in all her records. Upon the Courts resolution of her petition for review on certiorari, the respondent states
in her letter dated January 14, 2005 addressed to President Arroyo that she fought hard to prove her innocence but had accepted her fate and
mistake, with the solemn commitment that she would never commit the same or similar mistake for the rest of her life. x x x.

xxxx

The respondent has a string of dishonest acts which started when she had somebody impersonate her in taking the Civil Service
Subprofessional examination. Upon the discovery of her deception, she embarked on a series of prevarications to cover it up, the most notable
of which is the Personal Data Sheet dated April 5, 2000 she submitted to the Court as one of the supporting documents for her appointment to
the judiciary. In the Personal Data Sheet, item no. 25 asks "Do you have any pending administrative case?" while item no. 27 queries "Have
you ever been convicted of any administrative offense?" The respondent answered "no" to both questions. It must be remembered that at the
time she filled out the Personal Data Sheet, she already had a pending administrative case, the CSC having already filed its formal charge on
September 7, 1998. Her fraudulent answers had been instrumental in the unquestioned approval of her appointment because had she
answered truthfully the Court would have been alerted to her pending administrative case with the CSC and would have surely withheld, if not
denied, her appointment.

Taking judicial notice of the fact-finding and formal investigations conducted by the CSC relative to the impersonation case of the respondent
and given the observations on her subsequent actuations which were predisposed to deceive, we find that the respondent, is indeed, guilty of
dishonesty and falsification of document.22

The OCA thus recommended:

In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit for the consideration of the Honorable Court the recommendation that respondent Merle
Ramoneda-Pita, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City, be found GUILTY of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document and
be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except the value of her accrued leaves, if any, and with prejudice
to re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies including government-owned or controlled
corporations.23

We note and adopt the recommendation of the OCA.

As a preliminary matter, we address the matter of propriety of the proceedings against Ramoneda-Pita in the CSC.

We have always maintained that it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels administrative compliance with
all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.24 However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, Ramoneda-Pita was afforded the full protection of the law, that is, afforded due process.
She was able to file several affidavits and pleadings before the CSC with counsel. It may also be noted that the case had been elevated to the
Court of Appeals and this Court, where the Resolution of the CSC was upheld in both instances.

The OCAs reliance in Ampong v. Civil Service Commission is well taken. As we have stated in Civil Service Commission v. Andal25:

In Ampong, petitioner in that case admitted her guilt. She voluntarily went to the CSC regional office, admitted to the charges leveled against
her and waived her right to the assistance of counsel. She was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her
defense before the CSC. She filed her answer to the charges against her and even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse ruling of the
CSC. In short, Ampong did not question the authority of the CSC and, in fact, actively participated in the proceedings before it.

In the present case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty after having been directed to do so, he
denied having taken the civil service examination and did not even appear at the formal investigation conducted by the CSC-NCR. He appealed
to the CSC after the adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. He argued that
as an employee in the Judiciary, "the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him vests with the Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court." It
cannot therefore be said that he was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC.

This notwithstanding, we reiterate that we will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest standard of integrity from
all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with
a heavy burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. (Citations omitted; emphases ours.)

In any event, the OCA had asked Ramoneda-Pita to comment on the matter. She was therefore given due notice and fair hearing. It is
noteworthy that she only rehashed the arguments that she raised before the CSC proceedings.

We now proceed to the substantive aspect of the case.

This Court has defined dishonesty in Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr. 26 as:

Intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his
examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a
question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the
time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could
have had at that moment. (Citations omitted.)

We have previously dealt with cases with a marked resemblance to the present case.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,27 we found sufficient basis to dismiss a court stenographer for misrepresenting herself to have passed
the Career Service Professional Examination Computer Assisted Test (CAT) when she had somebody else take the exam for her. The CSC
undertook to compare the respondents PDS with the CAT application and the Picture Seat Plan of the examinations and found them to be
different.

In Civil Service Commission v. Dasco,28 we found Ms. Caridad S. Dasco guilty of dishonesty and consequently dismissed her from the service
for having someone else take the requisite Civil Service Examinations in her stead. It was found that her picture in the CSCs PSP had a
marked difference from her PDS.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Bermejo,29 we dismissed Ms. Lourdes Bermejo for having another person impersonate her at the Civil
Service Examinations.

A careful review of the documents submitted before the CSC and a perusal of its investigation reports in the present case, convince us that
Ramoneda-Pita was not the one who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations conducted on July 26, 1987. Specimen signatures
in the various PDS she had submitted over the years to the Court do not resemble the signature which appeared in the seat plan of the CSC.
Moreover, no substantive evidence was presented by Ramoneda-Pita to bolster her defense that she was not able to develop a settled
signature. Nor did she substantiate her claim that the difference between the pictures in the PSP and the PDS is due to the aging process.

This Court cannot stress enough that its employees should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of this esteemed
institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. As we have stated in the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel30:

WHEREAS, court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any position lower than that of a judge or justice, are involved in
the dispensation of justice, and parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel as part of the Judiciary.

WHEREAS, in performing their duties and responsibilities, court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it. (Emphases supplied.)

In this case, Ramoneda-Pitas length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The CSCs discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of her
civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her PDS when she had been already found guilty of an
administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell this Court that Ramoneda-Pita has
not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. As the Court has previously stated it will not hesitate to rid the
ranks of undesirables.31

WHEREFORE, Merle C. Ramoneda-Pita is hereby found GUILTY of dishonesty. She is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all her
retirement benefits, except the value of her accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies including government-owned and controlled corporations. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
her records with this Court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-
GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million
adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the
church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of
all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled
"An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor,
and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by
women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts
of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers,
health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil
Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3)
children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old. 8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who
is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at
a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. 9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of
one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household
help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because
of their accounts with the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels,
petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann,
who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped
her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves,
petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows
up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she
attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to
the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or
showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner
got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good.
He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital
affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her. 13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of
financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations 326 Realty
Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one
corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by
private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances
and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of
access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting
of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to
recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is
to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to
remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall
not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or
contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the
children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender
any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to
31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of
the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the Respondent
and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE
in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included
the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in
Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila,
whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month
plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of
the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros
Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at P100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed for by private
respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-
counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect
Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod
City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within
eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have
left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household
furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic)
children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with
the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon
private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph
Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the
boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of
R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for
kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to
get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private
respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly
or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore,
that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or
other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September
6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the
respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of
Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an
interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are
conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and
listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER
and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation
without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the
fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of
five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order 32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had
already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is
hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until
further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for
renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP.
No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the
due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of
an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended
TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue
in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the
validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on
said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before
us alleging that

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS
NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY
OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST,
AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT
THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT
ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the
dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it
may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has
limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise
known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial
Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A.
9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC
defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence
against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to
pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law."46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his
Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the
review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could
be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded
from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. 50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a
third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection
order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of
a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his
Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that
as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of
the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30)
days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could
be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this
case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the
case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, 56 should
not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In
Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be
granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution,
in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful
is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.
(Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however,
that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with
far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason
now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by
either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa
Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 an
amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63
providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual
victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote
pertinent portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these
concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including
children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the
victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good
Senator respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not
want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members
of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law
wives, and those related with the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of
the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly,
Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to
protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their
live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be
abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their
women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no
matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino
man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members have been included in
this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most
likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men
also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough
protection extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or
less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their
abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize
the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of
both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this
particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned
by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment
of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment
rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I
tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not
limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it
breaks my heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the
abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved. 66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this
case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it
is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
(Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be
discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality." 70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence
against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
"gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant
roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads
to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination
of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the
full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
subordinate positions, compared with men." 72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to
eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force
on members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all
societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were
under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism,
Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as
saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to
beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of
Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or
to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a
simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars
and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation
movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue
into an important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a
1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical
Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them,
and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or
hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence
is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their
lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these
incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly
forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women
who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's
abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States
are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City,
Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our
1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it
all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children show that

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first
semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially
difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first
semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-year period from
2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23

Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201

Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness

Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

 Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29

Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155

Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents
thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women
who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had
ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around
(18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of
their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in
self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A.
9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles
the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals
and not to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the
city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community." 77The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree,
but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and less
seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices
against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal
system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the
police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the
prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved
by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory
and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner"
and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused
her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices
and lack of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an
"anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself
to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of
domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the
prosecution and the judges."85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and
children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for
human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional
Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as
long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing
the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep
together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not
limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim
belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property
owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and
dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence,
the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple
marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above
are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness
that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its
application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they
make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may
likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-
neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while
the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does
not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the
allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened." 95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members,
and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to
curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there
is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur. 100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment
which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond
or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103 among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent
directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was
granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in
futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could
prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
complain that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of
ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. 108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence,
remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence
to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." 109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this
provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process
by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a
subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition,
mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally
with the person against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme
Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order
issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1wphi1 A
Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be
acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be
effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." 113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under
the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in
order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the
issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same
holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to
extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were
presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most
difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its fulfillment." 118Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29,
2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in
accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified
as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay
City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated
June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under
FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D.
1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the
record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing
the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation
of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable
only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of
possession.

Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if
the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable
and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the
application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering
that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted"
into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and
occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and
his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently,
the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their
favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and
Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land
subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing
applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public
dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character
but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State. 15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The
identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by
the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or
when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land
from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises
its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for
public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, 28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof
that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that
the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that
the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have
been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal
effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial
social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative
of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of
possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the
Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of
the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title
is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or
title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during
the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of
law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property subject
of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration
of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the
application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The
imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by
the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed, we
should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted
legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to
qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations. 34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of
Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning
disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.35As such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that
are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under
Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant
has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an
imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation
that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that
the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164763 February 12, 2008

ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review1 of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan2 for malversation of public funds3 under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code.

This is not a big case but its implications are wide-ranging and the issues We resolve include the rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of
a criminal case, the balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment.

The Facts

On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin, Provincial Auditors Office, Bohol, 4conducted a cash examination
on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol.

Petitioner was absent on the first scheduled audit at his office on December 28, 1988. A radio message was sent to Loon, the town where he
resided, to apprise him of the on-going audit. The following day, the audit team counted the cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his
presence. In the course of the audit, the amount ofP21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner.

The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, 5 which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said
audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.6

The report also contained the Cash Production Notice 7 dated January 4, 1989, where petitioner was informed and required to produce the
amount of P72,784.57, and the cash count sheet signed and acknowledged by petitioner indicating the correctness of the amount
of P21,331.79 found in his safe and counted in his presence. A separate demand letter 8 dated January 4, 1989 requiring the production of the
missing funds was sent and received by petitioner on January 5, 1989.

When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay
for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine. 9

As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum 10 dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol
recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.

On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol the amounts ofP10,000.00 and P15,000.00,
respectively. On February 14, 1989, petitioner again remitted to the Provincial Treasurer an additional amount of P35,000.00, followed by
remittances made on February 16, 1989 in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P2,784.00.

An administrative case was filed against petitioner on February 13, 1989. He filed an Answer11 dated February 22, 1989 reiterating his earlier
verbal admission before the audit team.

On April 17, 1989, petitioner again remitted the amount of P8,000.00 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol. Petitioner had then fully restituted his
shortage in the amount of P72,784.57. The full restitution of the missing money was confirmed and shown by the following receipts: 12

Official Receipt No. Date Issued and Amount

Received

8266659 January 16, 1989 P10,000.00

8266660 January 16, 1989 P15,000.00

8266662 February 14, 1989 P35,000.00

8266667 February 16, 1989 P 2,000.00

8266668 February 16, 1989 P 2,784.00

8266675 April 17, 1989 P 8,000.00

TOTAL - P72,784.57

Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code in an Information that read:

That on or about the period covering from December 28, 1988 to January 5, 1989, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of
Tubigon, Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Zenon R. Perez, a public
officer being then Acting Municipal Treasury of the said Municipality, by reason of the duties of his official position was accountable for the
public funds collected and received by him, with grave abuse of confidence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and take away from the said funds the total amount of SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
EIGHTY-FOUR PESOS and 57/100 (P72,784.57), which said fund was appropriated and converted by the said accused to his own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.13 (Underscoring supplied)

On March 1, 1990, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of "not guilty."14

Pre-trial was initially set on June 4-5, 1990 but petitioners counsel moved for postponement. The Sandiganbayan, however, proceeded to hear
the case on June 5, 1990, as previously scheduled, due to the presence of prosecution witness Arlene R. Mandin, who came all the way from
Bohol.
On said date, the Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial and allowed the prosecution to present its witness. Arlene R. Mandin testified as
narrated above.

The defense presented evidence through petitioner Zenon R. Perez himself. He denied the contents of his first Answer15 to the administrative
case filed against him by the audit team. He claimed it was prepared without the assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation
and submission, he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with diabetes mellitus. 16

He then revoked his Answer dated February 22, 1989 and filed his second Answer dated March 2, 1989. 17 In the latter, he vehemently denied
that he incurred a cash shortage P72,784.57.

According to petitioner, the alleged shortage was in the possession and custody of his accountable personnel at the time of the audit
examination. Several amounts totalling P64,784.00 were remitted to him on separate dates by his accountable officer, starting January 16,
1989 to February 16, 1989. The same were turned over by him to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer, leaving an unremitted sum
of P8,000.00 as of February 16, 1989.18 He remitted the P8,000.00 on April 17, 1989 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol, fully restoring the
cash shortage.

Petitioner further testified that on July 30, 1989, he submitted his Position Paper19 before the Office of the Ombudsman, Cebu City and
maintained that the alleged cash shortage was only due to oversight. Petitioner argued that the government did not suffer any damage or
prejudice since the alleged cash shortage was actually deposited with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer as evidenced by official receipts.20

Petitioner completed his testimony on September 20, 1990. He rested his case on October 20, 1990. 21

Sandiganbayan Disposition

On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of conviction with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ZENON R. PEREZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds as defined in and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being one mitigating
circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS ofreclusion temporal as the
maximum and to suffer perpetual special disqualification. The accused Zenon R. Perez is likewise ordered to pay a FINE equal to the total
amount of the funds malversed, which is Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Four Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P72, 784.57).

SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original)

On January 13, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration23 which the prosecution opposed on January 28, 2004.24 Petitioner
replied25 to the opposition. On August 6, 2004, petitioners motion was denied with finality.

On September 23, 2004, petitioner resorted to the instant appeal 26 raising the following issues, to wit:

I. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN BY UNDULY AND UNREASONABLY DELAYING THE DECISION OF THE CASE FOR OVER THIRTEEN
(13) YEARS VIOLATED THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE AND DUE PROCESS.

II. THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER AND THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES
SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION.27 (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

Before addressing petitioners twin assignment of errors, We first tackle the propriety of petitioners conviction for malversation of public funds.

I. Petitioner was correctly convicted of malversation.

Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished as malversation are:
(1) appropriating public funds or property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3)consenting, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitting any other person to take such public funds or property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property.28

There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are:

(a) That the offender be a public officer;

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and

(d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.29

Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public
officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was accountable for the public funds
under his custody or control.

The question then is whether or not petitioner has appropriated, took or misappropriated, or consented or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take such funds.

We rule in the affirmative.

In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for them
and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer
may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts
which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.30

Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law
establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an
officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion.31
Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the
funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the
missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision.

However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the
contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end
and the prima facie case is destroyed.32

In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his
custody or control. What is extant in the records is that the prosecution, through witness Arlene R. Mandin, was able to prove that petitioner
malversed the funds under his custody and control. As testified by Mandin:

Atty. Caballero:

Q: Was Mr. Zenon Perez actually and physically present during the time of your cash examination?

Witness:

A. Yes, Sir.

Q: From December 28, to January 5, 1989?

A: He was present on December 28, 1988 and January 4 and 5, 1989, Sir.

Q: Did he not make any verbal explanation as the reason why he was short of about P72,000.00, after you conducted the cash
count on January 5, 1989?

A: Yes, Sir, he did.

Q: What did he tell you?

A: He told us that he used some of the money to pay for the loan of his brother and the other portion was spent for food of his
family; and the rest for his medicine.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner gave himself away with his first Answer filed at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol in the administrative case filed against
him.

In that Answer, petitioner narrated how he disposed of the missing funds under his custody and control, to wit: (1) about P30,000.00 was used
to pay the commercial loan of his late brother; (2) he spent P10,000.00 for the treatment of his toxic goiter; and (3) about P32,000.00 was spent
for food and clothing of his family, and the education of his children. He there stated:

1. That the circumstances surrounding the cash shortage in the total amount of P72,784.57 during the examination of the respondents cash
accounts by the Commission on Audit on December 28-29, 1988 and January 4-5, 1989 are as follows, to wit:

(a) That respondent paid the amount of about P30,000.00 to the Philippine National Bank, Tagbilaran Branch as interests of the
commercial loan of his late brother Carino R. Perezusing respondents house and lot as collateral thereof. If the interests would not be paid,
the loan would be foreclosed to respondents great prejudice and disadvantage considering that he and his family are residing in said house
used as collateral;

(b) That respondent spent the amount of P10,000.00 in connection with the treatment of his toxic goiter;

(c) That the rest of the amount amounting to about P32,000.00 was spent by him for his familys foods, clothings (sic), and education
of his children because his monthly salary is not enough for the needs of his family. 34

By the explicit admission of petitioner, coupled with the testimony of Arlene R. Mandin, the fourth element of the crime of malversation was duly
established. His conviction thus stands in terra firma.

True it is that petitioner filed another Answer on March 2, 1989 with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol, substantially changing the
contents of his earlier answer of February 22, 1989. His second Answer averred:

3. That the truth of the matter is that the alleged total cash shortage of P72,784.57 were still in the possession and custody of his accountable
personnel at the time of the examination held by the auditor of the Commission on Audit;

4. That out of the alleged cash shortage of P72,784.57, almost all of said amount were already remitted to him by his accountable personnel
after January 5, 1989, and only the remaining amount of P8,000.00 remains to be remitted to him by his accountable personnel. 35

The sudden turnaround of petitioner fails to convince Us. To Our mind, petitioner only changed his story to exonerate himself, after realizing
that his first Answer put him in a hole, so to speak.

It is contended that petitioners first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not have been given probative weight because it was executed without
the assistance of counsel.36

There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the
contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings.

Walang batas, hurisprudensiya, o tuntunin na nagsasabi na ang isang kawani ay dapat may tulong ng abogado sa isang kasong
administratibo. Sa katunayan, ang hurisprudensiya ay iisa ang sinasabi na ang pagtulong ng isang abogado ay hindi kailangang-
kailangan sa kasong administratibo.

The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or
accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry.37

Ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado, na hindi maaaring talikdan malibang ang waiver ay nakasulat at sa harap ng abogado, ay
karapatang ibinibigay sa suspek o nasasakdal sa isang custodial investigation. Ito ay hindi lubos na karapatan at maaring hingin o
tanggihan sa isang prosesong kriminal, at lalo na sa isang administratibong pagsisiyasat.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing
laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. 38

Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of
government service.39

Kung gayon, ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado ay hindi sapilitan sa isang administratibong imbestigasyon sapagkat ito ay
ginagawa lamang upang malaman kung may sapat na batayan na patawan ng disiplina ang nagkasalang opisyal o empleyado, para
mapanatili ang dignidad ng paglilingkod sa pamahalaan.

There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without
such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. 40

More than that, petitioners first Answer may be taken against him, as he executed it in the course of the administrative proceedings below. This
is pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given against him." In People v. Lising,41 the Court held:

Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given against him. This is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself, unless such declarations were true. A mans act, conduct and declarations wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are
admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are not.

There is also no merit in the contention that petitioners sickness affected the preparation of his first Answer. He presented no convincing
evidence that his disease at the time he formulated that answer diminished his capacity to formulate a true, clear and coherent response to any
query. In fact, its contents merely reiterated his verbal explanation to the auditing team on January 5, 1989 on how he disposed of the missing
funds.

II. There is no violation of the rights to a speedy disposition of the case and to due process of law.

We now discuss the right to a speedy trial and disposition, the balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment.

Petitioner asserts that his right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of his case was violated because the decision of the
Sandiganbayan was handed down after the lapse of more than twelve years. The years that he had to wait for the outcome of his case were
allegedly spent in limbo, pain and agony.42

We are not persuaded.

Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been interpreted to mean "a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."43 Petitioner cannot complain that his right to due process has been violated. He was given all the
chances in the world to present his case, and the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after considering all the pieces of evidence
presented before it.

Petitioners claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case must also fail.

The 1987 Constitution44 guarantees the right of an accused to speedy trial. Both the 1973 Constitution in Section 16 of Article IV and the 1987
Constitution in Section 16 of Article III, Bill of Rights, are also explicit in granting to the accused the right to speedy disposition of his case.45

In Barker v. Wingo,46 the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with two "rigid approaches" on speedy trial as "ways of
eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts experience protecting the right."47

The first approach is the "fixed-time period" which holds the view that "the Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial
within a specified time period."48 The second approach is the "demand-waiver rule" which provides that "a defendant waives any
consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior demand is a
necessary condition to the consideration of the speedy trial right." 49

The fixed-time period was rejected because there is "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial can be quantified into a specific
number of days or months."50 The demand-waiver rule was likewise rejected because aside from the fact that it is "inconsistent with this Courts
pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights,"51 "it is insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental." 52

The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which "the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are
weighed."53 Mr. Justice Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:

A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.We can do little more than identify some
of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might
express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendants assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant.

The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no
necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the
length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but
one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.

Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be
assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the
government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a
valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. We have already discussed the third factor, the
defendants responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have
mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most
particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation,
the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendants assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in
determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a
defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.

A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants
which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.
If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can
rarely be shown.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Philippine jurisprudence has, on several occasions, adopted the balancing test.

In 1991, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan,55 this Court ruled:

It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a
case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay,
reason for the delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered. (Underscoring supplied)

Subsequently, in Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan,56 this Court again enumerated the factors that should be considered and balanced, namely: (1)
length of delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) prejudice caused by the delay.57

Once more, in Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,58 this Court reiterated that the right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial,
is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. 59 In the determination of whether said right
has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 60 The conduct of both the prosecution
and defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.61

Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be based on a mere mathematical reckoning of
time.62

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.

More important than the absence of serious prejudice, petitioner himself did not want a speedy disposition of his case. 63 Petitioner was duly
represented by counsel de parte in all stages of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted
for decision up to the time he was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation which
could be construed even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to be dispatched without delay.

Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those twelve years, petitioner had shown
signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show
that he was not waiving that right.64

Currit tempus contra decides et sui juris contempores: Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights. Ang panahon ay hindi
panig sa mga tamad at pabaya sa kanilang karapatan. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant and
not those who slumber in their rights. Ang batas ay tumutulong sa mga mapagbantay at hindi sa mga humihimbing sa kanilang
karapatan.

Pending his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner may have truly lived in suspicion and anxiety for over twelve years. However, any
prejudice that may have been caused to him in all those years was only minimal. The supposed gravity of agony experienced by petitioner is
more imagined than real.

This case is analogous to Guerrero v. Court of Appeals.65 There, the Court ruled that there was no violation of petitioners right to speedy trial
and disposition of his case inasmuch as he failed seasonably to assert his rights:

In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent
trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right a situation amounting to
laches had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy
precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when
accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was re-raffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him
in 1987 when the new Constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the
stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such
right.

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always
zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a
partys individual rights should not work against and preclude the peoples equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three
people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case
prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as
the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and
equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.

III. The law relied upon in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual. It does not violate Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights.

What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly defined. 66 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution,67 the
source of Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights 68 of our own Constitution, has yet to be put to the test to finally determine what constitutes
cruel and inhuman punishment.69

Cases that have been decided described, rather than defined, what is meant by cruel and unusual punishment. This is explained by the
pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court that "[t]he clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be
therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice."70

In Wilkerson v. Utah,71 Mr. Justice Clifford of the United States Supreme Court opined that "[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with
exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to
affirm that punishments of torture, x x x and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the
constitution."72

In In Re: Kemmler,73 Mr. Chief Justice Fuller of that same Court stated that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies x x x something more
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."74

Again, in Weems v. U.S.,75 Mr. Justice McKenna held for the Court that cadena temporal and its accessory penalties "has no fellow in American
legislation. Let us remember that it has come to us from a government of a different form and genus from ours. It is cruel in its excess of
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in character. Its punishments come under the condemnation
of the Bill of Rights, both on account of their degree and kind. And they would have those bad attributes even if they were found in a Federal
enactment, and not taken from an alien source."

In Echegaray v. Executive Secretary,76 this Court in a per curiam Decision held that Republic Act No. 8177,77even if it does not provide in
particular the details involved in the execution by lethal injection, is not cruel, degrading or inhuman, and is thus constitutional. Any infliction of
pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. 78

The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.79

In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself, petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of public funds "that ha[ve]
been replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is cruel and therefore unconstitutional, "as government has not suffered any
damage."80

The argument is specious on two grounds.

First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence
shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.81

Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is
because damage is not an element of malversation.

Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.

It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the
Constitution.82 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than
may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 83 It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers.
So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and
constitutional.84

He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome
its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.

IV. On the penalty

The Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In imposing the penalty, it found that petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of payment which is akin to voluntary surrender.

Article 217 penalizes malversation in the following tenor:

Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.

xxxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000 but is less than 22,000
pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. (Underscoring supplied)

The amount malversed totalled P72,784.57. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period toreclusion perpetua, which
has a range of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

However, the commission of the crime was attended by the mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender. As correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner restituted the full amount even before the prosecution could present its evidence. That is borne by the records.

It bears stressing that the full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate an accused, as payment is not one of the
elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of the sum misappropriated, even before the commencement of the criminal
prosecution, does not exempt the guilty person from liability for the crime. 85 At most, then, payment of the amount malversed will only serve as
a mitigating circumstance86 akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13 87 in relation to paragraph 1088 of the same
Article of the Revised Penal Code.

But the Court also holds that aside from voluntary surrender, petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so
grave a wrong,89 again in relation to paragraph 10 of Article 13.90

The records bear out that petitioner misappropriated the missing funds under his custody and control because he was impelled by the genuine
love for his brother and his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the funds to pay off a debt owed by his brother. Another portion of
the misappropriated funds went to his medications for his debilitating diabetes.

Further, as shown earlier, petitioner restituted all but Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) of the funds in less than one month and a half and said
small balance in three (3) months from receipt of demand of COA on January 5, 1999. Evidently, there was no intention to commit so grave a
wrong.

Of course, the end does not justify the means. To condone what petitioner has done because of the nobility of his purpose or financial
emergencies will become a potent excuse for malefactors and open the floodgates for more corruption in the government, even from "small fry"
like him.

The bottom line is a guilty person deserves the penalty given the attendant circumstances and commensurate with the gravity of the offense
committed. Thus, a reduction in the imposable penalty by one degree is in order. Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code is explicit:

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contains three
periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three difference penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty, the following rules, according to whether there
are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

xxxx

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
(Underscoring supplied)

Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, the prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, to be imposed in any of its periods. The new penalty has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 91 the maximum term could be ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayormaximum, while the minimum term is again one degree lower92 and could be four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional maximum.

In the 1910 case of U.S. v. Reyes,93 the trial judge entered a judgment of conviction against the accused and meted to him the penalty of "three
years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one day for
every P2.50 that he failed to pay, which subsidiary imprisonment, however, should not exceed one third of the principal penalty" and to be
"perpetually disqualified for public office and to pay the costs." This was well within the imposable penalty then under Section 1 of Act No.
1740,94 which is "imprisonment for not less than two months nor more than ten years and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not more
than the amount of such funds and the value of such property."

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accuseds conviction was affirmed but his sentence was modified and reduced to six months. The
court, per Mr. Justice Torres, reasoned thus:

For the foregoing reasons the several unfounded errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been fully refuted, since in conclusion it
is fully shown that the accused unlawfully disposed of a portion of the municipal funds, putting the same to his own use, and to that of other
persons in violation of Act. No. 1740, and consequently he has incurred the penalty therein established as principal of the crime of
misappropriation; and even though in imposing it, it is not necessary to adhere to the rules of the Penal Code, the court in using its discretional
powers as authorized by law, believes that the circumstances present in the commission of crimes should be taken into consideration, and in
the present case the amount misappropriated was refunded at the time the funds were counted.95 (Underscoring supplied)

We opt to exercise an analogous discretion.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 24, 2003 is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification. He is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine
ofP72,784.57, the amount equal to the funds malversed.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA,- versus -

THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER,

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to
Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 89-299, which lifted its
system of pre-audit of government financial transactions.

Statement of the Facts and the Case

On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain
exceptions. The circular affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in accordance
with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency,
economy and effectiveness in the operations of government. Further, the circular emphasized that the responsibility to ensure faithful
adherence to the policy rested directly with the chief or head of the government agency concerned. The circular was also designed to further
facilitate or expedite government transactions without impairing their integrity.

After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave irregularities and anomalies in the governments financial
transactions were uncovered. Hence, on 31 March 1986, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the pre-audit of selected
government transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to be an effective, although temporary, remedy against the said anomalies.

With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299,
which again lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled
corporations (GOCCs). The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management as
embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and
improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while continuing
to preserve and protect the integrity of these transactions. Concomitant to the lifting of the pre-audit of government transactions of NGAs and
GOCCs, Circular No. 89-299 mandated the installation, implementation and monitoring of an adequate internal control system, which would be
the direct responsibility of the government agency head.

Circular No. 89-299 further provided that the pre-audit activities retained by the COA as therein outlined shall no longer be a pre-requisite to the
implementation or prosecution of projects and the payment of claims. The COA aimed to henceforth focus its efforts on the post-audit of
financial accounts and transactions, as well as on the assessment and evaluation of the adequacy and effectivity of the agencys fiscal control
process. However, the circular did not include the financial transactions of local government units (LGUs) in its coverage.

The COA later issued Circular No. 94-006 on 17 February 1994 and Circular No. 95-006 on 18 May 1995. Both circulars clarified and expanded
the total lifting of pre-audit activities on all financial transactions of NGAs, GOCCs, and LGUs. The remaining audit activities performed by COA
auditors would no longer be pre-requisites to the implementation or prosecution of projects, perfection of contracts, payment of claims, and/or
approval of applications filed with the agencies.[1]

It also issued COA Circular No. 89-299, as amended by Circular No. 89-299A, which in Section 3.2 provides:

3.2 Whenever circumstances warrant, however, such as where the internal control system of a government agency is inadequate, This
Commission may reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such other control measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to protect the funds and property of the agency.

On 18 May 2009, COA issued Circular No. 2009-002, which reinstituted the selective pre-audit of government transactions in view of the rising
incidents of irregular, illegal, wasteful and anomalous disbursements of huge amounts of public funds and disposals of public property. Two
years later, or on 22 July 2011, COA issued Circular No. 2011-002, which lifted the pre-audit of government transactions implemented by
Circular No. 2009-002. In its assessment, subsequent developments had shown heightened vigilance of government agencies in safeguarding
their resources.

In the interregnum, on 3 May 2006, petitioner dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner,
informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299.[2] The 18 July 2006 reply of the COA further emphasized the required observance of
Administrative Order No. 278 dated 8 June 1992, which directed the strengthening of internal control systems of government offices through the
installation of an internal audit service (IAS).

On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot
be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.[3] He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been
committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory project of the Commission on
Higher Education, and many others.

On 22 February 2008, public respondents filed their Comment [4] on the Petition. They argue therein that the Petition must be dismissed, as it is
not proper for a petition for certiorari, considering that (1) there is no allegation showing that the COA exercised judicial or quasi-judicial
functions when it promulgated Circular No. 89-299; and (2) there is no convincing explanation showing how the promulgation of the circular was
done with grave abuse of discretion. Further, the Petition is allegedly defective in form, in that there is no discussion of material dates as to
when petitioner received a copy of the circular; there is no factual background of the case; and petitioner failed to attach a certified true copy of
the circular. In any case, public respondents aver that the circular is valid, as the COA has the power under the 1987 Constitution to promulgate
it.

On 9 May 2008, petitioner filed his Reply[5] to the Comment.

On 17 June 2008, this Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda. On 12 September 2008, public respondents
submitted their Memorandum.[6] On 15 September 2008, Amethya dela Llana-Koval, daughter of petitioner, manifested to the Court his demise
on 8 July 2008 and moved that she be allowed to continue with the Petition and substitute for him. Her motion for substitution was granted by
this Court in a Resolution dated 7 October 2008. On 5 January 2009, petitioner, substituted by his daughter, [7] filed his Memorandum.[8]
The main issue for our resolution in this Petition is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Procedural Issues

Technical Defects of the Petition

Public respondents correctly allege that petitioner failed to attach a certified true copy of the assailed Order, and that the Petition lacked a
statement of material dates. In view, however, of the serious matters dealt with in this Petition, this Court opts to tackle the merits thereof with
least regard to technicalities. A perusal of the Petition shows that the factual background of the case, although brief, has been sufficiently
alleged by petitioner.

Standing

This Petition has been filed as a taxpayers suit.

A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. [9] Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the
dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left
unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to
file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.

Propriety of Certiorari

Public respondents aver that a petition for certiorari is not proper in this case, as there is no indication that the writ is directed against a tribunal,
a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, as required in certiorari proceedings.[10] Conversely, petitioner for his part
claims that certiorari is proper under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part:

Section 7. x x x. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Petitioner is correct in that decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari. However, these refer to
decisions and orders which were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity. Circular No. 89-299 was promulgated by the COA under its
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence, Circular No. 89-299 is not reviewable by certiorari.

Neither is a petition for prohibition appropriate in this case. A petition for prohibition is filed against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified in the petition.[11] However, prohibition only lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-
legislative functions.[12]

Nonetheless, this Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of
the public importance of the issues raised therein.[13] In this case, petitioner avers that the conduct of pre-audit by the COA could have
prevented the occurrence of the numerous alleged irregularities in government transactions that involved substantial amounts of public money.
This is a serious allegation of a grave deficiency in observing a constitutional duty if proven correct.

This Court can use its authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure, including the aforementioned technical defects of
the Petition, and resolve the merits of a case with such serious allegations of constitutional breach. Rules of procedure were promulgated to
provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. [14]

Substantive Issues

The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government
revenues and expenditures and the use of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination; to establish the techniques and methods for the review; and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. [15] Its
exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form
of government.[16]

Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct pre-audit. A pre-audit is an examination of financial
transactions before their consumption or payment. [17] It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are present: (1) the proposed
expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority; (2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose; (3) the
proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended balance of appropriations to which it will be charged is sufficient
to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and the claim is duly supported by
authentic underlying evidence.[18] It could, among others, identify government agency transactions that are suspicious on their face prior to their
implementation and prior to the disbursement of funds.

Petitioner anchors his argument on Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:

Section 2.

1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post- audit basis:

a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;

b. autonomous state colleges and universities;

c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and

d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control
system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit,
as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as
may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties. (Emphasis supplied)

He claims that under the first paragraph quoted above, government transactions must undergo a pre-audit, which is a COA duty that cannot be
lifted by a mere circular.

We find for public respondents.

Petitioners allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional provision. There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA
to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is
found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or
equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures,
including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.

Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line
with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. [19] Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly
enlarged by this Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

EUSTAQUIO CANDARI, JR., RENE ESPULGAR, EDITHA DACIA, GONZALO PALMA, JR., ANDRES DE LEON, ARNOLD BAJAR, PETER
BAYBAYAN, EUGENIO TABURNO, MATEO ALOJADO, ANSELMO LIGTAS, FLORITA BULANGIS, ADELAIDA PENIG, ATTY. LEVI
SALIGUMBA, EDITHA JIMENA, CYNTHIA BELARMA and ANTONIA BANTING,- versus -

ROLAND DONASCO, LIDIO VILLA, RENE GAID, PEPITO GUMBAN, OSCAR ANDRADA, ROMEO CASTONES, ROSEMARY CORDOVA,
GLORIA MATULLANO, PONCIANO ABALOS, RESTITUTO BATIANCILLA,

SERENO, J.:

Respondents were members of the board of directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Incorporated (DARBCI). They were
elected into office on 12 July 1998 and their terms should have ended on 12 July 2000. However, they continued to occupy their positions in a
holdover capacity until the controversy in this case arose.

On 23 November 2005, respondents instituted Civil Case No. 471-05 at Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Polomolok, South
Cotabato to enjoin petitioners from holding a special general assembly (GA) and an election of officers. Respondents alleged that the process
by which the GA had been called was not in accordance with Sec. 35 of Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines.

On 24 November 2005, the RTC issued a 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to restrain petitioners from holding the GA.[1]

Despite the TRO, but without the participation of petitioners, 5,910 members or 78.68% of the total membership of the cooperative went
through with the GA on 26 November 2005 and elected petitioners in absentia as new members of the board.

On 1 December 2005, the TRO was extended to its full term of twenty (20) days from issuance. [2]

The trial court considered the evidence adduced during the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. In addition, it
considered the supervening events that occurred since the issuance of the TRO. These events were the holding of the GA on 26 November
2005 and the election of new officers. Thus, on 8 December 2005, the RTC, finding the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction to be moot,
issued a Resolution[3] denying respondents prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and quashing the TRO previously issued.

Thereafter, respondents filed an Amended Complaint [4] seeking to enjoin petitioners from assuming office and exercising the powers conferred
on directors of DARBCI.

On 29 November 2006, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[5] dismissing the Amended Complaint, ruling as follows:

Gauging from these allegations that plaintiffs were incumbent BOD members of DARBCI and did not consent or sanctioned (sic) the 26
November 2005 BOD election, which was conducted despite the existing TRO, do not confer a right unto them that ought to be respected by
defendants (sic); neither the Tripartite Agreement among Board I, II, and III help their cause. The supervening factors, i.e. the General
Assembly Meeting and the Election of Officers by the overriding majority members of DARBCI then occurring (sic) rendered these
averments insignificant. Resultantly, no delict or wrong can be imputed to the latter owing to said factors which were duly
established during the hearings and found by the Honorable Court.

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, the Amended Complaint and the evidence thus far adduced disclose that plaintiffs have neither legal right nor the requisite personality
to file an action for nullification of the assailed DARBCI General Assembly and Election. Hence, their aforesaid Complaint is doomed for
dismissal for failing to state a cause of action. The Court must hold, as it holds now, that the present action cannot pass muster on sheer
dictates of law and equity. (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari [6] with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01851. They contended that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered the evidence adduced in the hearing for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. They further alleged that the Amended Complaint clearly stated a cause of action based on their rights as the then
incumbent officers of DARBCI.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision,[7] which remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. In allowing the Petition, the appellate
court stated that the lingering organization and leadership crisis in the DARBCI undermines the cooperatives viability to pursue its objectives. It
considered the case to be one that might become an impediment to the States land reform program in Polomolok. Thus, it took cognizance of
the case in the interest of public welfare and the advancement of public policy.

The CA found that respondents Amended Complaint contained sufficient allegations that constituted a cause of action against herein
petitioners. Thus, it held that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when the latter dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but this motion was subsequently denied.[8]

Petitioners now come before this Court, alleging that the CA erred in allowing respondents Petition for Certiorari despite being the wrong
remedy. They also insist that the CA erred in ruling that a cause of action existed despite the fact that the issue had become moot. They allege
that the trial court was not limited to the allegations of the Complaint, but it may also consider the evidence presented during the hearing for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Finally, they contend that the CA misappreciated the facts of the case in stating that the issue was
with regard to the implementation of the agrarian reform program, when it was merely the legality of the elections of the new board of directors.

Respondents, in their Comment,[9] assert that their Amended Complaint stated a cause of action, and that the trial court should have conducted
a trial on the merits instead of dismissing the Amended Complaint, especially when petitioners failed to present proof that a GA and an election
of officers were held on 26 November 2005. Finally, respondents contend that the RTCs act of dismissing the case was in grave abuse of
discretion, reviewable via their Petition for Certiorari.

On 8 July 2009, petitioners filed a Reply to respondents Comment.[10] They informed this Court that two more GA meetings had been held.

During the 20 December 2008 meeting, the GA ratified the Amended Articles of Cooperation and the Amended By-Laws of the cooperative. A
Certificate of Registration to that effect was issued by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) on 9 February 2009. [11]

Article X, Sec. 1 of the Amended By-Laws provides:

The incumbent members of the Board of Directors and various committees who were elected into office during the November 25, 2005 special
elections shall continue to serve the cooperative until their successors have been elected and qualified into office. They shall be deemed to
have served for one term only;

The Court notes that the 25 November 2005 GA meeting referred to by the by-laws was actually held on 26 November 2005. However,
considering the clear language and intent of the provision, the Court deems the date contained in the Amended By-laws to be a mere
typographical error.

On 29 March 2009, the second meeting was held whereby a new set of officers was elected by the GA.

In Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[12] we said:

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as
the case before us.

Sec. 34 of the Cooperative Code states that the highest policy-making body of the cooperative is the GA, to wit:

The general assembly shall be the highest policy-making body of the cooperative and shall exercise such powers as are stated in this Code, in
the articles of cooperation and in the by-laws of the cooperative. The general assembly shall have the following exclusive powers which cannot
be delegated:

(1) To determine and approve amendments to the articles of cooperation and by-laws;

(2) To elect or appoint the members of the board of directors, and to remove them for cause;

(3) To approve developmental plans of the cooperative; and

(4) Such other matters requiring a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the general assembly, as provided in this Code.

In the present case, the GA has clearly expressed its intentions through the subsequent amendment of DARBCIs Articles of Cooperation and
By-Laws and through the election of new officers.

In Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) v. Dominguez,[13] we
denied the Petition on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic considering that the GA of KBMPM already elected a new set
of officers, even if it was found that the right to due process of petitioners therein were clearly violated, to wit:

In the instant case, there was no notice of a hearing on the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM; there was, as well, not
even a semblance of a hearing. The Order was based solely on an alleged petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM. There was
then a clear denial of due process. It is most unfortunate that it was done after democracy was restored through the peaceful people revolt at
EDSA and the overwhelming ratification of a new Constitution thereafter, which preserves for the generations to come the gains of that historic
struggle which earned for this Republic universal admiration.

If there were genuine grievances against petitioners, the affected members should have timely raise (sic) these issues in the annual general
assembly or in a special general assembly. Or, if such a remedy would be futile for some reason or another, judicial recourse was available.

Be that as it may, petitioners cannot, however, be restored to their positions. Their terms expired in 1989, thereby rendering their
prayer for reinstatement moot and academic. Pursuant to Section 13 of the by-laws, during the election at the first annual general
assembly after registration, one-half plus one (4) of the directors obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for two years, and
the remaining directors (3) for one year; thereafter, all shall be elected for a term of two years. Hence, in 1988, when the board was
disbanded, there was a number of directors whose terms would have expired the next year (1989) and a number whose terms would
have expired two years after (1990). Reversion to the status quo preceding October 1988 would not be feasible in view of this turn of
events. Besides, elections were held in 1990 and 1991. The affairs of the cooperative are presently being managed by a new board of
directors duly elected in accordance with the cooperative's by-laws.

In the present case, the replacement of respondents with other members of the board was willed by the GA. It is also important to note that
respondents were only occupying their positions in a holdover capacity when they filed the case with the RTC, as their terms had ended on 12
July 2000. Undoubtedly, it would be a futile attempt and a waste of resources to remand the case to the trial court. There would be nothing left
for the trial court to execute, should respondents be successful in their Petition.

It is clear from the Omnibus Order of the RTC that it dismissed the Amended Complaint because the supervening events had rendered the
case moot through the voluntary act of the GA as the highest policy-making body of the cooperative to declare the contested positions vacant
and to elect a new set of officers. As a consequence, respondents no longer had the personality or the cause of action to maintain the case
against petitioners herein. Thus, the RTC committed no error when it dismissed the case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 01851
dated 6 August 2008 and the Resolution dated 14 October 2008 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 21 November 2006
issued by Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Polomolok, South Cotabato is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

JELBERT B. GALICTO,- versus -

H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management,

BRION, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order,[1] seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8,
2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for
being in breach of existing laws.

The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth).[2] He is currently holding the
position of Court Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA. [3]

Respondent Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of the Republic of the Philippines (Pres. Aquino); he issued EO 7 and has the duty
of implementing it. Respondent Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. is the incumbent Executive Secretary and, as the alter ego of Pres. Aquino, is tasked with
the implementation of EO 7. Respondent Florencio B. Abad is the incumbent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
charged with the implementation of EO 7.[4]

The Antecedent Facts

On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other
benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. [5] Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines (Senate),
through the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported
excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).[6]

Based on its findings that officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted
allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices, [7] the Senate issued
Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances,
bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]. [8]

Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation
and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework
to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all
remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information
regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation,
except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the
President,[9] and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until
December 31, 2010.[10]

EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010.[11] It took effect on September 25, 2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or
Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates
of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their employees.

The Petition

The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, based on the following arguments:
I.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF LEGAL BASIS DUE TO THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

A. P.D. 985 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS BASIS FOR EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED THE POWER TO FIX COMPENSATION LONG AFTER SUCH POWER HAS BEEN
REVOKED BY P.D. 1597 AND R.A. 6758.

B. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS DO NOT NEED TO HAVE ITS COMPENSATION PLANS, RATES
AND POLICIES REVIEWED BY THE DBM AND APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT BECAUSE P.D. 1597 REQUIRES ONLY THE GOCCs TO
REPORT TO THE OFFICE TO THE PRESIDENT THEIR COMPENSATION PLANS AND RATES BUT THE SAME DOES NOT GIVE THE
PRESIDENT THE POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE FISCAL POWER OF THE GOCCs.

C. J.R. NO. 4, [SERIES] 2009 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE IT HAD NOT RIPENED INTO X X X LAW, THE SAME NOT
HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED.

D. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT J.R. NO. 1, S. 2004 (sic) AND J.R. 4, S. 2009 ARE VALID, STILL THEY ARE NOT APPLICABLE AS
LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT LAWS WHICH MAY VALIDLY DELEGATE POWER TO THE PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND THE
POWER OF THE BOARD TO FIX COMPENSATION.

II.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS INVALID FOR DIVESTING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF [THE] GOCCS OF THEIR POWER TO FIX THE
COMPENSATION, A POWER WHICH IS A LEGISLATIVE GRANT AND WHICH COULD NOT BE REVOKED OR MODIFIED BY AN
EXECUTIVE FIAT.

III.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS BY SUBSTANCE A LAW, WHICH IS A DEROGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVE AND IS
THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

IV.

THE ACTS OF SUSPENDING AND IMPOSING MORATORIUM ARE ULTRA VIRES ACTS BECAUSE J.R. NO. 4 DOES NOT EXPRESSLY
AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE SUCH POWERS.

V.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS AN INVALID ISSUANCE BECAUSE IT HAS NO SUFFICIENT STANDARDS AND IS THEREFORE
ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND A VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.

VI.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION AND DISCRETION AS TO WHAT THE LAW SHALL BE AND IS
THEREFORE INVALID FOR ITS USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

VII.

CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE CASE, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS ONLY
DIRECTORY AND NOT MANDATORY.[12]
The Case for the Respondents

On December 13, 2010, the respondents filed their Comment. They pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds for the petitions
dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi; (2) the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or secretarys certificate authorizing him to
question EO 7 in behalf of PhilHealth; (3) the petitioners signature does not indicate his PTR Number, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Number; (4) the jurat of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping failed to indicate a valid identification card as provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; (5) the President should be dropped as a party
respondent as he is immune from suit; and (6) certiorari is not applicable to this case.[13]

The respondents also raised substantive defenses to support the validity of EO 7. They claim that the President exercises control over the
governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages. In addition, EO 7 was issued in accordance with law
for the purpose of controlling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI employees. They also
advocate the validity of Joint Resolution (J.R.) No. 4, which they point to as the authority for issuing EO 7.[14]

Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, [15] otherwise known as the GOCC Governance Act of
2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

The Courts Ruling

We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for having been mooted by subsequent
events.

A. Certiorari is not the proper remedy.

Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the
issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a
petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the
validity of EO 7:

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action
in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. (Emphases ours.)

Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila [16] is a case in point.[17] In Liga, we dismissed the petition for certiorari to set aside an
EO issued by a City Mayor and insisted that a petition for declaratory relief should have been filed with the RTC. We painstakingly ruled:

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for certiorari.

First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial
prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out
by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the
questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).

As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved.[18]

Likewise, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti Terrorism Council, [19] we similarly dismissed the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, since the respondents
therein (members of the Anti-Terrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion and rulemaking authority we are granted under the
Constitution,[20] and set aside procedural considerations to permit parties to bring a suit before us at the first instance through certiorari and/or
prohibition,[21] this liberal policy remains to be an exception to the general rule, and thus, has its limits. In Concepcion v. Commission on
Elections (COMELEC),[22] we emphasized the importance of availing of the proper remedies and cautioned against the wrongful use
of certiorari in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of the COMELEC, especially by the wrong party. In ruling that liberality and the
transcendental doctrine cannot trump blatant disregard of procedural rules, and considering that the petitioner had other available
remedies (such as a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate RTC under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in this
case, we categorically ruled:

The petitioners unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading Rule
65, given the way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in his
individual capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the
Rules of Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioners approaches constitute an abuse of process through a
manipulative reading and application of the Rules of Court, we nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant
violation of the Rules. The transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications for
blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available under these same rules to achieve
the petitioners objectives. For our part, we cannot and should not in the name of liberality and the transcendental importance
doctrine entertain these types of petitions. As we held in the very recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different
perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused. [23] [emphasis supplied]

B. Petitioner lacks locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [24] This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional
mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. [25]

Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3)
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [26]

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."[27]

To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he stands to
be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers
and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation.[28] The
petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the
Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.

The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are
merely contingent events or expectancies.[29] The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. Section 9 of EO 7 reads:
Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and Other Benefits. Moratorium on increases in the rates of
salaries, and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to
Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until specifically
authorized by the President. [emphasis ours]

In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome
of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his
salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary
increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.

It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has
to be direct and substantial to make it worth the courts time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another
department of government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may
end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication.[30] The rationale for
this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case;
more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciarys overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of
government, such as the President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence of
representative democracies.[31]

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good
standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed
interest has been branded by the Court inIntegrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora,[32] as too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and [by] the whole citizenry.[33] Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. The Court made a similar ruling in Prof.
David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo[34] and held that the petitioners therein, who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having
failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5. [35]

We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation
packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot infuse or give the petitioner locus
standi under the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society,[36] we held that even if
the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the
transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.[37] In other
words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities explained above in this Resolution,
cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit the Courts liberality. As we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles,[38] while the Court has
taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of personal injury to the
broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. [39]

Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to
have filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to
provide a Board Resolution or a Secretarys Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative.

C. The petition has a defective

The respondents claim that the petition should be dismissed for failing to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires the party or the counsel representing him to sign the pleading and indicate an address that should not be a post office box. The petition
also allegedly violated the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001, requiring counsels to indicate in their pleadings their
Roll of Attorneys Number, their PTR Number and their IBP Official Receipt or Lifetime Member Number; otherwise, the pleadings would be
considered unsigned and dismissible. Bar Matter No. 1922 likewise states that a counsel should note down his MCLE Certificate of Compliance
or Certificate of Exemption in the pleading, but the petitioner had failed to do so. [40]

We do not see any violation of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as the petition bears the petitioners signature and office
address. The present suit was brought before this Court by the petitioner himself as a party litigant and not through counsel. Therefore, the
requirements under the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001 and Bar Matter No. 1922 do not apply. In Bar Matter No.
1132, April 1, 2003, we clarified that a party who is not a lawyer is not precluded from signing his own pleadings as this is allowed by the Rules
of Court; the purpose of requiring a counsel to indicate his IBP Number and PTR Number is merely to protect the public from bogus lawyers. A
similar construction should be given to Bar Matter No. 1922, which requires lawyers to indicate their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption; otherwise, the provision that allows parties to sign their own pleadings will be negated.

However, the point raised by the respondents regarding the petitioners defective jurat is correct. Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, dated February
19, 2008, calls for a current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual as
competent evidence of identity.Nevertheless, we hasten to clarify that the defective jurat in the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
is not a fatal defect, as we held in In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. Sehwani, Incorporated.[41] The verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional,
requirement that the Court may waive.
D. The petition has been mootedby supervening events.

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already been rendered moot by these supervening
events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of
GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their
board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.

With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and
GFIs. The pertinent provisions read:

Section 5. Creation of the Governance Commission for Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations. There is hereby created an advisory,
monitoring, and oversight body with authority to formulate, implement and coordinate policies to be known as the Governance Commission for
Government-Owned or-Controlled Corporations, hereinafter referred to as the GCG, which shall be attached to the Office of the President. The
GCG shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

h) Conduct compensation studies, develop and recommend to the President a competitive compensation and remuneration system which shall
attract and retain talent, at the same time allowing the GOCC to be financially sound and sustainable;

xxxx

Section 8. Coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System. The GCG, after conducting a compensation study, shall develop
a Compensation and Position Classification System which shall apply to all officers and employees of the GOCCs whether under the Salary
Standardization Law or exempt therefrom and shall consist of classes of positions grouped into such categories as the GCG may determine,
subject to approval of the President.

Section 9. Position Titles and Salary Grades. All positions in the Positions Classification System, as determined by the GCG and as approved
by the President, shall be allocated to their proper position titles and salary grades in accordance with an Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System, which shall be prepared by the GCG and approved
by the President.

xxxx

[N]o GOCC shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System developed by the GCG under this Act.

As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix
their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all
GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EO containing these same
provisions without any legal constraints.

A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value.[42] [A]n action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its]
determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events. [43]

This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the President to establish the compensation
systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any
further discussion of the constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A.
No. 10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition
touching on an issue that has become moot because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a flesh and blood case for the Court to resolve.[44]

All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as its patent formal and procedural infirmities, we no longer see
any reason for the Court to resolve the other issues raised in the certiorari petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLYAND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairmanand counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members,
ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELYFULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA
BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDODE GUZMAN, ROGELIO
KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO
REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of
Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.,- versus

THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Membersof the
Congress,

MENDOZA, J.:

For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of
2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling
all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country,[1] also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing
budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as pork barrel funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National
Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision.

On September 14, 2004, the Court required respondents, including the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to comment on the petition. On April 7, 2005, petitioner filed a Reply thereto.[2] On April 26, 2005, both parties were required
to submit their respective memoranda.

The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:

PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND

For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder 8,327,000,000.00

Xxxxx

Special Provision

1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required
counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or
Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if
deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used
for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.

Petitioners Position

According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators
and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs
and projects to be funded out of PDAF. In previous GAAs, said allocation and identification of projects were the main features of the pork barrel
system technically known as Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Nothing of the sort is now seen in the present law (R.A. No. 9206 of CY
2004).[3] In its memorandum, LAMP insists that [t]he silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a
deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with the pork barrel system. [4] In other words, [t]he
omission of the PDAF provision to specify sums as allocations to individual Members of Congress is a casus omissus signifying an omission
intentionally made by Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply. [5] Hence, LAMP is of the conclusion that the pork barrel has become
legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004.[6]

LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the DBM illegally made and directly released
budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members of Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select
and identify which projects are to be actually funded by PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their
chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the
appropriation for which was made by them. In their individual capacities, the Members of Congress cannot virtually tell or dictate upon the
Executive Department how to spend taxpayers money. [7] Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It
is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction, [8] and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than
malfeasance. The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, which is
the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution. Verily, the power of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, does not
include the power of the Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually implemented and funded
- a function which essentially and exclusively pertains to the Executive Department. [9] By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct
allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of the
PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.
Respondents Position

For their part, the respondents[10] contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its
roots to CDF,[11] they argue that the former should not be equated with pork barrel, which has gained a derogatory meaning referring to
government projects affording political opportunism.[12] In the petition, no proof of this was offered. It cannot be gainsaid then that the petition
cannot stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. Without probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner
deserve scant consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork
barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioners plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no
concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork barrel, is a source of dirty money for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to
misuse their allocations. These facts have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition accepted by the public without qualification,
to be subjected to judicial notice. This applies, a fortiori, to the claim that Members of Congress are beneficiaries of commissions (kickbacks)
taken out of the PDAF allocations and releases and preferred by favored contractors representing from 20% to 50% of the approved budget for
a particular project. [13]Suffice it to say, the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations
circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. Failing to present even an iota of proof that the DBM Secretary has been
releasing lump sums from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual Members of Congress, the petition falls short of its cause.

Likewise admitting that CDF and PDAF are appropriations for substantially similar, if not the same, beneficial purposes, [14] the respondents
invokePhilconsa v. Enriquez,[15] where CDF was described as an imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority
programs/projects specified in the law. In Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and identify
priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature. In said case, it was also recognized that individual members of
Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project.

The Issues

The respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition for its failure to establish factual and legal basis to support its claims, thereby lacking an
essential requisite of judicial reviewan actual case or controversy.

The Courts Ruling

To the Court, the case boils down to these issues: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this
case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[16]

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether
a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern is the
evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed
by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. [17]

In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP,
the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects
is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably,
as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a
misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present controversy.

Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.
The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial
resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without
prejudice to other recourse against erringpublic officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have
been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be
discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there
indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

Anent locus standi, the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[18] The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [19] In public suits, the plaintiff, representing
the general public, asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person, and could be suing as a stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer.[20] Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. [21] Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. [22]
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the
claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be
allowed to sue. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works[23] is authority in support of the petitioner:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is
that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [11 Am. Jur.
761, Emphasis supplied.]

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the
unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

Now, on the substantive issue.

The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme
within its own sphere being independent from one another and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is
constitutional or unconstitutional.[24] The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. [25]

With these long-established precepts in mind, the Court now goes to the crucial question: In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF
funds to the Members of Congress based on their own list of proposed projects, did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA
of 2004 violate the Constitution or the laws?

The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts
of Congress. In Farias v. The Executive Secretary,[26] the Court held that:

Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates
no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In
case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based
on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved
it.[27] This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution,
and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape,
that the challenged act must be struck down.[28]

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the PDAFs enforcement based on
the absence of express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the latters encroachment on executive
power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. Regrettably, these allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was
presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their
sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the
petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in
the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request
for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like this, the Courts hands are tied in deference to
the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court commits unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the power of
clairvoyance to divine from scanty allegations in pleadings where justice and truth lie. [29] Again, newspaper or electronic reports showing the
appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the
simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. [30]

Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers was committed, much less tolerated by both the
Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued
during the enactment and all throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004. The process was explained in this wise, in Guingona v.
Carague:[31]

1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the
determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the
translation of desired priorities and activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and Management. Each agency is required to submit agency
budget estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the Development Budget Coordinating Council
(DBCC).

With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated
sources of domestic and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for
the interest and principal payments for the year for all direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.

2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and
Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.

xxx

3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The
establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of
government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities
comprise this phase of the budget cycle.

4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets, obligations
incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved.

Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the requirement that appropriation bills originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments. [32] While the budgetary
process commences from the proposal submitted by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an
appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the
appropriation act may then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget
execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch which deals with theoperational aspects of the cycle including the allocation and
release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases, the implementation of payment schedules and
up to the actual spending of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel. The DBM lays down the guidelines for the
disbursement of the fund. The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be
funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the
DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the
Executive.[33] This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per
se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds
out of PDAF.Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient
bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress
to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse
the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of
the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used
as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress. Again, all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality;
one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does
not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger
must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.[34]

There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of the petitioner in filing this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail based
on the foregoing reasons.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA,- versus -

THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, Dennis A. B. Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo
A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and accordingly prays that a judgment issue declaring the unconstitutionality of the
appointment.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N. Carague (Carague) as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. [1] Caragues term of office started
on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008.

Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as the third member of the COA for a term
of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as
Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as
Chairman of the COA.Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner
or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his
appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of
office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) was appointed as COA Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as
Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified
his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President
Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.

A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, [2] or when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to
the onset of supervening events,[3] so that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. [4] In such
instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the
basic petition.[5] As a general rule, it is not within Our charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo,[6] We acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus:

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as
falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed
in David, namely: there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public
interest; the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.[7] The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such exceptional nature as to necessarily call for
the promulgation of principles that will henceforth guide the bench, the bar and the public should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar
future situations would be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case are resolved straightaway and settled definitely.
There are times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be addressed. To borrow from Javier v.
Pacificador,[8] Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and
as a restraint in the future.

Both procedural and substantive issues are raised in this proceeding. The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the
following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz: (1) there must be an actual case or
justiciable controversy before the court; (2) the question before it must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a
proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.[9]

To Villar, all the requisites have not been met, it being alleged in particular that petitioner, suing as a taxpayer and citizen, lacks the necessary
standing to challenge his appointment.[10] On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), while recognizing the validity of Villars
appointment for the period ending February 11, 2011, has expressed the view that petitioner should have had filed a petition for declaratory
relief or quo warranto under Rule 63 or Rule 66, respectively, of the Rules of Court instead of certiorari under Rule 65.

Villars posture on the absence of some of the mandatory requisites for the exercise by the Court of its power of judicial review must fail. As a
general rule, a petitioner must have the necessary personality or standing (locus standi) before a court will recognize the issues
presented. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, We defined locus standi as:

x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [11]
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of a government action, or
have a material interest in the issue affected by the challenged official act.[12] However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus
standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act,
standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. [13] The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural
technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. [14] In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm
before the so-called non-traditional suitors may be extended standing to sue, thusly:

1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has far-reaching implications, and there is a need to promulgate rules
that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the
instant petition.

Anent the aforestated posture of the OSG, there is no serious disagreement as to the propriety of the availment of certiorari as a medium to
inquire on whether the assailed appointment of respondent Villar as COA Chairman infringed the constitution or was infected with grave abuse
of discretion. For under the expanded concept of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution, the corrective hand of certiorari may be invoked
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[15] Grave abuse of discretion denotes:

such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. [16]

We find the remedy of certiorari applicable to the instant case in view of the allegation that then President Macapagal-Arroyo exercised her
appointing power in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.

This brings Us to the pivotal substantive issue of whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after
having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the
circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, which reads:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven yearswithout reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. (Emphasis added.)[17]

And if valid, for how long can he serve?

At once clear from a perusal of the aforequoted provision are the defined restricting features in the matter of the composition of COA and the
appointment of its members (commissioners and chairman) designed to safeguard the independence and impartiality of the commission as a
body and that of its individual members.[18] These are, first, the rotational plan or the staggering term in the commission membership, such that
the appointment of commission members subsequent to the original set appointed after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution shall occur every
two years; second, the maximum but a fixed term-limit of seven (7) years for all commission members whose appointments came about by
reason of the expiration of term save the aforementioned first set of appointees and those made to fill up vacancies resulting from certain
causes; third, the prohibition against reappointment of commission members who served the full term of seven years or of members first
appointed under the Constitution who served their respective terms of office; fourth, the limitation of the term of a member to the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor; and fifth, the proscription against temporary appointment or designation.

To elucidate on the mechanics of and the adverted limitations on the matter of COA-member appointments with fixed but staggered terms of
office, the Court lays down the following postulates deducible from pertinent constitutional provisions, as construed by the Court:

1. The terms of office and appointments of the first set of commissioners, or the seven, five and three-year termers referred to in Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D) of the Constitution, had already expired. Hence, their respective terms of office find relevancy for the most part only in understanding the
operation of the rotational plan. In Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,[19] the Court described how the smooth functioning of the rotational system
contemplated in said and like provisions covering the two other independent commissions is achieved thru the staggering of terms:

x x x [T]he terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a
common date [February 02, 1987, when the 1987 Constitution was ratified] irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular
recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.

x x x In case of a belated appointment, the interval between the start of the terms and the actual appointment shall be counted against
the appointee.[20](Italization in the original; emphasis added.)

Early on, in Republic v. Imperial,[21] the Court wrote of two conditions, both indispensable to [the] workability of the rotational plan. These
conditions may be described as follows: (a) that the terms of the first batch of commissioners should start on a common date; and (b) that any
vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term. Otherwise, Imperial continued, the regularity of the intervals between appointments would be destroyed. There appears to be near
unanimity as to the purpose/s of the rotational system, as originally conceived, i.e., to place in the commission a new appointee at a fixed
interval (every two years presently), thus preventing a four-year administration appointing more than one permanent and regular
commissioner,[22] or to borrow from Commissioner Monsod of the 1986 CONCOM, to prevent one person (the President of the Philippines) from
dominating the commissions.[23] It has been declared too that the rotational plan ensures continuity in, and, as indicated earlier, secure the
independence of, the commissions as a body.[24]

2. An appointment to any vacancy in COA, which arose from an expiration of a term, after the first chairman and commissioners appointed
under the 1987 Constitution have bowed out, shall, by express constitutional fiat, be for a term of seven (7) years, save when the appointment
is to fill up a vacancy for the corresponding unserved term of an outgoing member. In that case, the appointment shall only be for
the unexpired portion of the departing commissioners term of office. There can only be an unexpired portion when, as a direct result of his
demise, disability, resignation or impeachment, as the case may be, a sitting member is unable to complete his term of office.[25] To repeat,
should the vacancy arise out of the expiration of the term of the incumbent, then there is technically no unexpired portion to speak of. The
vacancy is for a new and complete seven-year term and, ergo, the appointment thereto shall in all instances be for a maximum seven (7) years.

3. Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the reappointment of a member of COA after his appointment for seven (7) years.
Writing for the Court in Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,[26] a case involving the promotion of then COMELEC Commissioner De Vera to the
position of chairman, then Chief Justice Manuel Moran called attention to the fact that the prohibition against reappointment comes as a
continuation of the requirement that the commissionersreferring to members of the COMELEC under the 1935 Constitutionshall hold office for a
term of nine (9) years. This sentence formulation imports, notes Chief Justice Moran, that reappointment is not an absolute prohibition.

4. The adverted system of regular rotation or the staggering of appointments and terms in the membership for all three constitutional
commissions, namely the COA, Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) found in the 1987 Constitution
was patterned after the amended 1935 Constitution for the appointment of the members of COMELEC[27] with this difference: the 1935 version
entailed a regular interval of vacancy every three (3) years, instead of the present two (2) years and there was no express provision on
appointment to any vacancy being limited to the unexpired portion of the his predecessors term. The model 1935 provision reads:

Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other members to be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed. Of
the Members of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office for nine years, another for six years and the third for three years. x x x

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the
commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or
upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio. Attention is drawn in this regard to the
Courts disposition in Matibag v. Benipayo.[28]

Villars promotional appointment, so it is argued, is void from the start, constituting as it did a reappointment enjoined by the Constitution, since it
actually needed another appointment to a different office and requiring another confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Central to the adjudication of the instant petition is the correct meaning to be given to Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) of the Constitution on the ban
against reappointment in relation to the appointment issued to respondent Villar to the position of COA Chairman.

Without question, the parties have presented two (2) contrasting and conflicting positions. Petitioner contends that Villars appointment is
proscribed by the constitutional ban on reappointment under the aforecited constitutional provision. On the other hand, respondent Villar initially
asserted that his appointment as COA Chairman is valid up to February 2, 2015 pursuant to the same provision.

The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context, embracing any and all
species of appointment.
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.[29] This is known as the plain meaning rule enunciated by the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.[30]

The primary source whence to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. [31] If possible, the words in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning, save where technical terms are employed. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration illustrates the verbal legis rule in this wise:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to
be assumed that thewords in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.What it says according
to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. [32] (Emphasis
supplied.)

Let us dissect and examine closely the provision in question:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. x x x (Emphasis added.)

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has
served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was
appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or
Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him to appoint an
additional or two more commissioners.

The same purpose obtains in the second sentence of Sec. 1(2). The Constitutional Convention barred reappointment to be extended to
commissioner-members first appointed under the 1987 Constitution to prevent the President from controlling the commission. Thus, the first
Chairman appointed under the 1987 Constitution who served the full term of seven years can no longer be extended a reappointment. Neither
can the Commissioners first appointed for the terms of five years and three years be eligible for reappointment. This is the plain meaning
attached to the second sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D).

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the
commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position
of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the
service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven
years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman,
provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.

It may be argued that there is doubt or ambiguity on whether Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D), as couched, allows a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman. Even if We concede the existence of an ambiguity, the outcome will remain the same. J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc.[33] teaches that in case of doubt as to the import and react of a constitutional provision, resort should be made to extraneous aids of
construction, such as debates and proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, to shed light on and ascertain the intent of the framers or the
purpose of the provision being construed.

The understanding of the Convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it. The Court applied this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.[34] (Emphasis added.)
And again in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.[35] (Emphasis added.)

Much weight and due respect must be accorded to the intent of the framers of the Constitution in interpreting its provisions.

Far from prohibiting reappointment of any kind, including a situation where a commissioner is upgraded to the position of chairman, the 1987
Constitution in fact unequivocally allows promotional appointment, but subject to defined parameters. The ensuing exchanges during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on a draft proposal of what would eventually be Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
present Constitution amply support the thesis that a promotional appointment is allowed provided no one may be in the COA for an aggregate
threshold period of 7 years:

MS. AQUINO: In the same paragraph, I would propose an amendment x x x. Between x x x the sentence which begins with In no case, insert
THE APPOINTEE SHALL IN NO CASE SERVE AN AGGREGATE PERIOD OF MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS. I was thinking that this may
approximate the situation wherein a commissioner is first appointed as chairman. I am willing to withdraw that amendment if there is a
representation on the part of the Committee that there is an implicitintention to prohibit a term that in the aggregate will exceed more than
seven years. If that is the intention, I am willing to withdraw my amendment.

MR. MONSOD: If the [Gentlewoman] will read the whole Article, she will notice that there is no reappointment of any kind and, therefore, as a
whole there is no way somebody can serve for more than seven years. The purpose of the last sentence is to make sure that this does not
happen by including in the appointment both temporary and acting capacities.

MS. AQUINO. Yes. Reappointment is fine; that is accounted for. But I was thinking of a situation wherein a commissioner is upgraded to
a position of chairman. But if this provision is intended to cover that kind of situation, then I am willing to withdraw my amendment.

MR. MONSOD. It is covered.

MR. FOZ. There is a provision on line 29 precisely to cover that situation. It states: Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the predecessor. In other words, if there is upgrading of position from commissioner to chairman, the appointee can serve
only the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.

MS. AQUINO: But we have to be very specific x x x because it might shorten the term because he serves only the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor.

MR. FOZ: He takes it at his own risk. He knows that he will only have to serve the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. (Emphasis added.)[36]

The phrase upgrading of position found in the underscored portion unmistakably shows that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution, for all
its caveat against reappointment, does not per se preclude, in any and all cases, the promotional appointment or upgrade of a commissioner to
chairman, subject to this proviso: the appointees tenure in office does not exceed 7 years in all. Indeed, such appointment does not contextually
come within the restricting phrase without reappointment twice written in that section. Delegate Foz even cautioned, as a matter of fact, that a
sitting commissioner accepting a promotional appointment to fill up an unexpired portion pertaining to the higher office does so at the risk of
shortening his original term. To illustrate the Fozs concern: assume that Carague left COA for reasons other than the expiration of his threshold
7-year term and Villar accepted an appointment to fill up the vacancy. In this situation, the latter can only stay at the COA and served the
unexpired portion of Caragues unexpired term as departing COA Chairman, even if, in the process, his (Villars) own 7-year term as COA
commissioner has not yet come to an end. In this illustration, the inviolable regularity of the intervals between appointments in the COA is
preserved.

Moreover, jurisprudence tells us that the word reappointment means a second appointment to one and the same office. [37] As Justice Arsenio
Dizon (Justice Dizon) aptly observed in his dissent in Visarra v. Miraflor,[38] the constitutional prohibition against the reappointment of a
commissioner refers to his second appointment to the same office after holding it for nine years. [39] As Justice Dizon observed, [T]he occupant
of an office obviously needs no such second appointment unless, for some valid cause, such as the expiration of his term or resignation, he had
ceased to be the legal occupant thereof. [40] The inevitable implication of Justice Dizons cogent observation is that a promotion from
commissioner to chairman, albeit entailing a second appointment, involves a different office and, hence, not, in the strict legal viewpoint, a
reappointment. Stated a bit differently, reappointment refers to a movement to one and the same office. Necessarily, a movement to a different
position within the commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute an appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise, but
not reappointment.
A similar opinion was expressed in the same Visarra case by the concurring Justice Angelo Bautista, although he expressly alluded to a
promotional appointment as not being a prohibited appointment under Art. X of the 1935 Constitution.

Petitioners invocation of Matibag as additional argument to contest the constitutionality of Villars elevation to the COA chairmanship is
inapposite. InMatibag, then President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion
Borra and Florentino Tuason as Commissioners, each for a term of office of seven (7) years. All three immediately took their oath of, and
assumed, office. These appointments were twice renewed because the Commission on Appointments failed to act on the first two ad
interim appointments. Via a petition for prohibition, some disgruntled COMELEC officials assail as infirm the appointments of Benipayo, et al.

Matibag lists (4) four situations where the prohibition on reappointment would arise, or to be specific, where the proviso [t]he Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment shall apply. Justice Antonio T. Carpio declares in his
dissent that Villars appointment falls under a combination of two of the four situations.

Conceding for the nonce the correctness of the premises depicted in the situations referred to in Matibag, that case is of doubtful applicability to
the instant petition. Not only is it cast against a different milieu, but the lis mota of the case, as expressly declared in the main opinion, is the
very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.[41] And what is/are this/these issue/s? Only two defined issues in Matibag are relevant, viz: (1) the
nature of an ad interim appointment and subsumed thereto the effect of a by-passed ad interim appointment; and (2) the constitutionality of
renewals of ad interim appointments. The opinion defined these issues in the following wise: Petitioner [Matibag] filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, et al. violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. As
may distinctly be noted, an upgrade or promotion was not in issue in Matibag.

We shall briefly address the four adverted situations outlined in Matibag, in which, as there urged, the uniform proviso on no reappointmentafter
a member of any of the three constitutional commissions is appointed for a term of seven (7) yearsshall apply. Matibag made the following
formulation:

The first situation is where an ad interim appointee after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments serves his full 7-year term. Such
person cannot be reappointed whether as a member or as chairman because he will then be actually serving more than seven (7) years.

The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office
ends. Such person cannot be reappointed whether as a member or as chair to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will
result in the appointee serving more than seven years.

The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired portion of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee
completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed whether as a member or as chair to a vacancy arising from retirement
because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven (7) years.

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven (7) years, and a vacancy arises from
death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an
unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Sec. 1(20),
Art. IX-C of the Constitution [referring to the first set of appointees (the 5 and 3 year termers) whose term of office are less than 7
years but are barred from being reappointed under any situation].[42] (Words in brackets and emphasis supplied.)

The situations just described constitute an obiter dictum, hence without the force of adjudication, for the corresponding formulation of the four
situations was not in any way necessary to resolve any of the determinative issues specifically defined in Matibag. An opinion entirely
unnecessary for the decision of the case or one expressed upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the case is an obiter.[43]

There can be no serious objection to the scenarios depicted in the first, second and third situations, both hewing with the proposition that no
one can stay in any of the three independent commissions for an aggregate period of more than seven (7) years. The fourth situation, however,
does not commend itself for concurrence inasmuch as it is basically predicated on the postulate that reappointment, as earlier herein defined, of
any kind is prohibited under any and all circumstances. To reiterate, the word reappointment means a second appointment to one and the
same office; and Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution and similar provisions do not peremptorily prohibit the promotional appointment
of a commissioner to chairman, provided the new appointees tenure in both capacities does not exceed seven (7) years in all. The statements
in Matibag enunciating the ban on reappointment in the aforecited fourth situation, perforce, must be abandoned, for, indeed, a promotional
appointment from the position of Commissioner to that of Chairman is constitutionally permissible and not barred by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX (D) of the
Constitution.

One of the aims behind the prohibition on reappointment, petitioner urges, is to ensure and preserve the independence of COA and its
members,[44] citing what the dissenting Justice J.B.L Reyes wrote in Visarra, that once appointed and confirmed, the commissioners should be
free to act as their conscience demands, without fear of retaliation or hope or reward. Pursued to its logical conclusion, petitioners thesis is that
a COA member may no longer act with independence if he or she can be rewarded with a promotion or appointment, for then he or she will do
the bidding of the appointing authority in the hope of being promoted or reappointed.
The unstated reason behind Justice J.B.L. Reyes counsel is that independence is really a matter of choice. Without taking anything away from
the gem imparted by the eminent jurist, what Chief Justice Moran said on the subject of independence is just as logically sound and perhaps
even more compelling, as follows:

A Commissioner, hopeful of reappointment may strive to do good. Whereas, without that hope or other hope of material reward, his enthusiasm
may decline as the end of his term approaches and he may even lean to abuses if there is no higher restrain in his moral character. Moral
character is no doubt the most effective safeguard of independence. With moral integrity, a commissioner will be independent with or without
the possibility of reappointment.[45]

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7-
year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements
made by this Court, starting in De Vera, then Imperial, Visarra, and finally Matibag. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import
of the word reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or
commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the
aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of
succession. Imperial, passing upon the rotational system as it applied to the then organizational set-up of the COMELEC, stated:

The provision that of the first three commissioners appointed one shall hold office for 9 years, another for 6 years and the third for 3 years,
when taken together with the prescribed term of office for 9 years without reappointment, evinces a deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or
cycle in the membership of the commission, by having subsequent members appointable only once every three years. [46]

To be sure, Villars appointment as COA Chairman partakes of a promotional appointment which, under appropriate setting, would be outside
the purview of the constitutional reappointment ban in Sec 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution. Nonetheless, such appointment, even for the term
appearing in the underlying appointment paper, ought still to be struck down as unconstitutional for the reason as shall be explained.

Consider:

In a mandatory tone, the aforecited constitutional provision decrees that the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term if
the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor. We reproduce in its pertinent part the provision referred to:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment. x x
x Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. x x x

Accordingly, the promotional appointment as COA Chairman of Villar for a stated fixed term of less than seven (7) years is void for violating a
clear, but mandatory constitutional prescription. There can be no denying that the vacancy in the position of COA chairman when Carague
stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term. Hence, the appointment to the vacancy thus created ought to
have been one for seven (7) years in line with the verbal legis approach[47] of interpreting the Constitution. It is to be understood, however,
following Gaminde, that in case of a belated appointment, the interval between the start of the term and the actual appointment shall be
counted against the 7-year term of the appointee. Posing, however, as an insurmountable barrier to a full 7-year appointment for Villar is the
rule against one serving the commission for an aggregate term of more than seven (7) years.

Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without authority to
specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the
President is without discretion to extend a promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years. There is no in between. He or she
cannot split terms. It is not within the power of the appointing authority to override the positive provision of the Constitution which dictates that
the term of office of members of constitutional bodies shall be seven (7) years.[48] A contrary reasoning would make the term of office to depend
upon the pleasure or caprice of the [appointing authority] and not upon the will [of the framers of the Constitution] of the legislature as
expressed in plain and undoubted language in the law. [49]

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a
full 7-year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4
years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding
appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set
of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less
than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the
predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than
seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

On the other hand, a commissioner who resigned before serving his 7- year term can be extended an appointment to the position of chairman
for the unexpired period of the term of the latter, provided the aggregate of the period he served as commissioner and the period he will serve
as chairman will not exceed seven (7) years. This situation will only obtain when the chairman leaves the office by reason of death, disability,
resignation or impeachment. Let us consider, in the concrete, the situation of then Chairman Carague and his successor, Villar. Carague was
appointed COA Chairman effective February 2, 2001 for a term of seven (7) years, or up to February 2, 2008. Villar was appointed as
Commissioner on February 2, 2004 with a 7-year term to end on February 2, 2011. If Carague for some reason vacated the chairmanship in
2007, then Villar can resign as commissioner in the same year and later be appointed as chairman to serve only up to February 2, 2008, the
end of the unexpired portion of Caragues term. In this hypothetical scenario, Villars appointment to the position of chairman is valid and
constitutional as the aggregate periods of his two (2) appointments will only be five (5) years which neither distorts the rotational scheme nor
violates the rule that the sum total of said appointments shall not exceed seven (7) years. Villar would, however, forfeit two (2) years of his
original seven (7)-year term as Commissioner, since, by accepting an upgraded appointment to Caragues position, he agreed to serve the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. As illustrated earlier, following Mr. Fozs line, if there is an upgrading of position from
commissioner to chairman, the appointee takes the risk of cutting short his original term, knowing pretty well before hand that he will serve only
the unexpired portion of the term of his predecessor, the outgoing COA chairman.

In the extreme hypothetical situation that Villar vacates the position of chairman for causes other than the expiration of the original term of
Carague, the President can only appoint the successor of Villar for the unexpired portion of the Carague term in line with Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of
the Constitution. Upon the expiration of the original 7-year term of Carague, the President can appoint a new chairman for a term of seven (7)
full years.

In his separate dissent, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, takes strong exception to the view that the promotional appointment of a
sitting commissioner is plausible only when he is appointed to the position of chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of said official who
leaves the office by reason of any the following reasons: death, disability, resignation or impeachment, not when the vacancy arises out as a
result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the past chairman. There is nothing in the Constitution, so Justice Mendoza counters, that restricts
the promotion of an incumbent commissioner to the chairmanship only in instances where the tenure of his predecessor was cut short by any
of the four events referred to. As earlier explained, the majority view springs from the interplay of the following premises: The explicit command
of the Constitution is that the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President x x x for a term of seven years [and]
appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. To repeat, the President has two and only
two options on term appointments. Either he extends an appointment for a full 7-year term when the vacancy results from the expiration of term,
or for a shorter period corresponding to the unexpired term of the predecessor when the vacancy occurs by reason of death, physical disability,
resignation or impeachment. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the Chief Executive is barred from extending a promotional
appointment for less than seven years. Else, the President can trifle with terms of office fixed by the Constitution.

Justice Mendoza likewise invites attention to an instance in history when a commissioner had been promoted chairman after the expiration of
the term of his predecessor, referring specifically to the appointment of then COMELEC Commissioner Gaudencio Garcia to succeed Jose P.
Carag after the expiration of the latters term in 1959 as COMELEC chairman. Such appointment to the position of chairman is not
constitutionally permissible under the 1987 Constitution because of the policy and intent of its framers that a COA member who has served his
full term of seven (7) years or even for a shorter period can no longer be extended another appointment to the position of chairman for a full
term of seven (7) years. As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission that crafted the 1987 Constitution, a member of COA
who also served as a commissioner for less than seven (7) years in said position cannot be appointed to the position of chairman for a full term
of seven (7) years since the aggregate will exceed seven (7) years. Thus, the adverted Garcia appointment in 1959 made under the 1935
Constitution cannot be used as a precedent to an appointment of such nature under the 1987 Constitution. The dissent further notes that the
upgrading remained uncontested. In this regard, suffice it to state that the promotion in question was either legal or it was not. If it were not, no
amount of repetitive practices would clear it of invalidating taint.

Lastly, Villars appointment as chairman ending February 2, 2011 which Justice Mendoza considers as valid is likewise unconstitutional, as it will
destroy the rationale and policy behind the rotational system or the staggering of appointments and terms in COA as prescribed in the
Constitution. It disturbs in a way the staggered rotational system of appointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution.
Consider: If Villars term as COA chairman up to February 2, 2011 is viewed as valid and constitutional as espoused by my esteemed colleague,
then two vacancies have simultaneously occurred and two (2) COA members going out of office at once, opening positions for two (2)
appointables on that date as Commissioner San Buenaventuras term also expired on that day. This is precisely one of the mischiefs the
staggering of terms and the regular intervals appointments seek to address. Note that San Buenaventura was specifically appointed to succeed
Villar as commissioner, meaning she merely occupied the position vacated by her predecessor whose term as such commissioner expired on
February 2, 2011. The result is what the framers of the Constitution doubtless sought to avoid, a sitting President with a 6-year term of office,
like President Benigno C. Aquino III, appointing all or at least two (2) members of the three-man Commission during his term. He appointed Ma.
Gracia Pulido-Tan as Chairman for the term ending February 2, 2015 upon the relinquishment of the post by respondent Villar, and Heidi
Mendoza was appointed Commissioner for a 7-year term ending February 2, 2018 to replace San Buenaventura. If Justice Mendozas version is
adopted, then situations like the one which obtains in the Commission will definitely be replicated in gross breach of the Constitution and in
clear contravention of the intent of its framers. Presidents in the future can easily control the Commission depriving it of its independence and
impartiality.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of
the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.

The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the
distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt
the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the
entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not
exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal
by impeachment. The Court clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or
office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under
the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the
Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed 2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner).

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29,
2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether
the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if
the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as
a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111, 3 112,4 113,5 and
114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012. 7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the
arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision
which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders,
the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Courts July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads:
"This disposition is immediately executory." 9

Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda. 10

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has
always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins,
both the Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of
aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body. 13

Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices
ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that
the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities,15 the
members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it the J udicial and Bar
Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the
JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1wphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.18 It has
been the situation since then.

Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that
allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the
Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two
representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the
rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself
unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.

As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.

Ruling of the Court

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and
defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework
upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the
basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen
for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained
inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July
17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism.
One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be
confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately." 21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form
of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very
clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise
of its primary function to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
assigned a contributory non-legislative function.

The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions
which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the
exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation, 24 the declaration of an existence of a
state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must
be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally
granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC,
the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the
Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so
providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence
to it as a major branch of government.

On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered
position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:

I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1)
of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-
repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in order
to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC
Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:

8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in
Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of
two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the
appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock
by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:

As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors.
From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the
bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific
that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth
reiterating.31 Thus:

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in
the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives
from the three main branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The
unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx
Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial
nominees.

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of
government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the
exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in
furtherance of Congress role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives
act as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly
bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the
JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively
disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice
cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the
rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly
a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of
Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular
members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular
members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of
Congress.

Respondents contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the
first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no
matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act is
considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.

It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts
done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in
the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot
correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the
Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence.
To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as
intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission
may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it
thinks the legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation." 37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains
steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial
exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to
the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft
and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may
sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This
disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192986 January 15, 2013

ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. and EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, Petitioners,

vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD, represented by its Chairman, GOVERNOR ARMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR., and its
incumbent members: JUANITA D. AMATONG, ALFREDO C. ANTONIO, PETER FA VILA, NELLY F. VILLAFUERTE, IGNACIO R. BUNYE
and CESAR V. PURISIMA, Respondents.

REYES, J.:

Petitioners, claiming that they are raising issues of transcendental importance to the public, filed directly with this Court this Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB),
replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, has no authority to continue enforcing Central
Bank Circular No. 905,1 issued by the CB-MB in 1982, which "suspended" Act No. 2655, or the Usury Law of 1916.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner "Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns and
activities relating to money lending issues. It was incorporated on July 9, 2010,2 and a month later, it filed this petition, joined by its founder and
president, Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.

R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines on June 15, 1948, empowered the CB-MB to, among others, set the
maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations, within limits prescribed by the Usury Law.
Section 109 of R.A. No. 265 reads:

Sec. 109. Interest Rates, Commissions and Charges. The Monetary Board may fix the maximum rates of interest which banks may pay on
deposits and on other obligations.

The Monetary Board may, within the limits prescribed in the Usury Law fix the maximum rates of interest which banks may charge for different
types of loans and for any other credit operations, or may fix the maximum differences which may exist between the interest or rediscount rates
of the Central Bank and the rates which the banks may charge their customers if the respective credit documents are not to lose their eligibility
for rediscount or advances in the Central Bank.

Any modifications in the maximum interest rates permitted for the borrowing or lending operations of the banks shall apply only to future
operations and not to those made prior to the date on which the modification becomes effective.

In order to avoid possible evasion of maximum interest rates set by the Monetary Board, the Board may also fix the maximum rates that banks
may pay to or collect from their customers in the form of commissions, discounts, charges, fees or payments of any sort. (Underlining ours)

On March 17, 1980, the Usury Law was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different
maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that
the changes are effected gradually and announced in advance. Thus, Section 1-a of Act No. 2655 now reads:

Sec. 1-a. The Monetary Board is hereby authorized to prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, and to change such rate or rates whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social
conditions: Provided, That changes in such rate or rates may be effected gradually on scheduled dates announced in advance.
In the exercise of the authority herein granted the Monetary Board may prescribe higher maximum rates for loans of low priority, such as
consumer loans or renewals thereof as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and other similar credit institutions although
the rates prescribed for these institutions need not necessarily be uniform. The Monetary Board is also authorized to prescribe different
maximum rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.
(Underlining and emphasis ours)

In its Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3, 1982, 3 the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982, effective on January 1, 1983.
Section 1 of the Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits, to wit:

Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or collected by any person, whether natural or juridical,
shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended. (Underscoring and emphasis ours)

The Circular then went on to amend Books I to IV of the CBs "Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries" (Manual of
Regulations) by removing the applicable ceilings on specific interest rates. Thus, Sections 5, 9 and 10 of CB Circular No. 905 amended Book I,
Subsections 1303, 1349, 1388.1 of the Manual of Regulations, by removing the ceilings for interest and other charges, commissions,
premiums, and fees applicable to commercial banks; Sections 12 and 17 removed the interest ceilings for thrift banks (Book II, Subsections
2303, 2349); Sections 19 and 21 removed the ceilings applicable to rural banks (Book III, Subsection 3152.3-c); and, Sections 26, 28, 30 and
32 removed the ceilings for non-bank financial intermediaries (Book IV, Subsections 4303Q.1 to 4303Q.9, 4303N.1, 4303P). 4

On June 14, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7653 establishing the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to replace the
CB. The repealing clause thereof, Section 135, reads:

Sec. 135. Repealing Clause. Except as may be provided for in Sections 46 and 132 of this Act, Republic Act No. 265, as amended, the
provisions of any other law, special charters, rule or regulation issued pursuant to said Republic Act No. 265, as amended, or parts thereof,
which may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Presidential Decree No. 1792 is likewise repealed.

Petition for Certiorari

To justify their skipping the hierarchy of courts and going directly to this Court to secure a writ of certiorari, petitioners contend that the
transcendental importance of their Petition can readily be seen in the issues raised therein, to wit:

a) Whether under R.A. No. 265 and/or P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB had the statutory or constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of
interest for all kinds of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit beyond the limits prescribed in the Usury Law;

b) If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No. 905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended
Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest rates;

c) Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB Circular No. 905.5

Petitioners attached to their petition copies of several Senate Bills and Resolutions of the 10th Congress, which held its sessions from 1995 to
1998, calling for investigations by the Senate Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions into alleged unconscionable commercial rates of
interest imposed by these entities. Senate Bill (SB) Nos. 376 and 1860,7 filed by Senator Vicente C. Sotto III and the late Senator Blas F. Ople,
respectively, sought to amend Act No. 2655 by fixing the rates of interest on loans and forbearance of credit; Philippine Senate Resolution (SR)
No. 1053,8 10739 and 1102,10 filed by Senators Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., Gregorio B. Honasan and Franklin M. Drilon, respectively, urged the
aforesaid Senate Committee to investigate ways to curb the high commercial interest rates then obtaining in the country; Senator Ernesto
Maceda filed SB No. 1151 to prohibit the collection of more than two months of advance interest on any loan of money; and Senator Raul Roco
filed SR No. 114411 seeking an investigation into an alleged cartel of commercial banks, called "Club 1821", reportedly behind the regime of
high interest rates. The petitioners also attached news clippings 12 showing that in February 1998 the banks prime lending rates, or interests on
loans to their best borrowers, ranged from 26% to 31%.

Petitioners contend that under Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB was authorized only to prescribe or set
the maximum rates of interest for a loan or renewal thereof or for the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, and to change such rates
whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social conditions, the changes to be effected gradually and on scheduled dates; that nothing in
P.D. No. 1684 authorized the CB-MB to lift or suspend the limits of interest on all credit transactions, when it issued CB Circular No. 905. They
further insist that under Section 109 of R.A. No. 265, the authority of the CB-MB was clearly only to fix the banks maximum rates of interest,
but always within the limits prescribed by the Usury Law.

Thus, according to petitioners, CB Circular No. 905, which was promulgated without the benefit of any prior public hearing, is void because it
violated Article 5 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be
void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity."

They further claim that just weeks after the issuance of CB Circular No. 905, the benchmark 91-day Treasury bills (T-bills),13 then known as
"Jobo" bills14 shot up to 40% per annum, as a result. The banks immediately followed suit and re-priced their loans to rates which were even
higher than those of the "Jobo" bills. Petitioners thus assert that CB Circular No. 905 is also unconstitutional in light of Section 1 of the Bill of
Rights, which commands that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws."

Finally, petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not re-enact a provision similar to Section 109 of R.A. No. 265, and therefore, in view of the
repealing clause in Section 135 of R.A. No. 7653, the BSP-MB has been stripped of the power either to prescribe the maximum rates of interest
which banks may charge for different kinds of loans and credit transactions, or to suspend Act No. 2655 and continue enforcing CB Circular No.
905.

Ruling

The petition must fail.

A. The Petition is procedurally infirm.

The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari, as well as to grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court.15 A petition for certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same must strictly observe the procedural
rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere technicality.16
As provided in Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.17 Judicial
functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with
respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or
bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action using discretion of a judicial nature. 18

The CB-MB (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions with respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking
and credit institutions, and branches and agencies thereof. 19 It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of
CB Circular No. 905 was done in the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case. 20

B. Petitioners have no locus standi to file the Petition

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest," who is "the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a partys standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.21

Even in public interest cases such as this petition, the Court has generally adopted the "direct injury" test that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result."22 Thus, while petitioners assert a public right to assail CB Circular No. 905 as an illegal executive action, it is nonetheless required of
them to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief. It is significant that in this petition, the
petitioners do not allege that they sustained any personal injury from the issuance of CB Circular No. 905.

Petitioners also do not claim that public funds were being misused in the enforcement of CB Circular No. 905. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato,23 involving the on-line lottery contract of the PCSO, there was no allegation that public funds were being misspent, which according to
the Court would have made the action a public one, "and justify relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party-in-interest." The Court held, moreover, that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization did not give it the requisite
personality to question the validity of the contract. Thus:

Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners
as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under the Rule 3, Sec. 2. 24

C. The Petition raises no issues of transcendental importance.

In the 1993 case of Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 25 it was held that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (b) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (c) that the
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself.

In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,26 the Court summarized the requirements before taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators can be accorded a standing to sue, viz:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

While the Court may have shown in recent decisions a certain toughening in its attitude concerning the question of legal standing, it has
nonetheless always made an exception where the transcendental importance of the issues has been established, notwithstanding the
petitioners failure to show a direct injury.27 In CREBA v. ERC,28 the Court set out the following instructive guides as determinants on whether a
matter is of transcendental importance, namely: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. Further, the Court stated in Anak Mindanao Party-
List Group v. The Executive Secretary29 that the rule on standing will not be waived where these determinants are not established.

In the instant case, there is no allegation of misuse of public funds in the implementation of CB Circular No. 905. Neither were borrowers who
were actually affected by the suspension of the Usury Law joined in this petition. Absent any showing of transcendental importance, the petition
must fail.

More importantly, the Court notes that the instant petition adverted to the regime of high interest rates which obtained at least 15 years ago,
when the banks prime lending rates ranged from 26% to 31%,30 or even 29 years ago, when the 91-day Jobo bills reached 40% per annum. In
contrast, according to the BSP, in the first two (2) months of 2012 the bank lending rates averaged 5.91%, which implies that the banks prime
lending rates were lower; moreover, deposit interests on savings and long-term deposits have also gone very low, averaging 1.75% and 1.62%,
respectively.31

Judging from the most recent auctions of T-bills, the savings rates must be approaching 0%.1wphi1 In the auctions held on November 12,
2012, the rates of 3-month, 6-month and 1-year T-bills have dropped to 0.150%, 0.450% and 0.680%, respectively. 32 According to Manila
Bulletin, this very low interest regime has been attributed to "high liquidity and strong investor demand amid positive economic indicators of the
country."33

While the Court acknowledges that cases of transcendental importance demand that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
we must, technicalities of procedure,34 the delay of at least 15 years in the filing of the instant petition has actually rendered moot and academic
the issues it now raises.

For its part, BSP-MB maintains that the petitioners allegations of constitutional and statutory violations of CB Circular No. 905 are really mere
challenges made by petitioners concerning the wisdom of the Circular. It explains that it was in view of the global economic downturn in the
early 1980s that the executive department through the CB-MB had to formulate policies to achieve economic recovery, and among these
policies was the establishment of a market-oriented interest rate structure which would require the removal of the government-imposed interest
rate ceilings.35
D. The CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it issued CB Circular No. 905.

The power of the CB to effectively suspend the Usury Law pursuant to P.D. No. 1684 has long been recognized and upheld in many cases. As
the Court explained in the landmark case of Medel v. CA,36 citing several cases, CB Circular No. 905 "did not repeal nor in anyway amend the
Usury Law but simply suspended the latters effectivity;"37 that "a CB Circular cannot repeal a law, [for] only a law can repeal another
law;"38 that "by virtue of CB Circular No. 905, the Usury Law has been rendered ineffective;" 39 and "Usury has been legally non-existent in our
jurisdiction. Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon." 40

In First Metro Investment Corp. v. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc.41 cited in DBP v. Perez,42 we also belied the contention that the CB was
engaged in self-legislation. Thus:

Central Bank Circular No. 905 did not repeal nor in any way amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latters effectivity. The illegality of
usury is wholly the creature of legislation. A Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law. x x x. 43

In PNB v. Court of Appeals,44 an escalation clause in a loan agreement authorized the PNB to unilaterally increase the rate of interest to 25%
per annum, plus a penalty of 6% per annum on past dues, then to 30% on October 15, 1984, and to 42% on October 25, 1984. The Supreme
Court invalidated the rate increases made by the PNB and upheld the 12% interest imposed by the CA, in this wise:

P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow contracting parties to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent adjustment in the
interest rate that shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. In fine, they can agree to adjust, upward or downward, the
interest previously stipulated. x x x.45

Thus, according to the Court, by lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties freedom of contract to agree freely on
the rate of interest. It cited Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, under which the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

E. The BSP-MB has authority to enforce CB Circular No. 905.

Section 1 of CB Circular No. 905 provides that "The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or collected by
any person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended." It does
not purport to suspend the Usury Law only as it applies to banks, but to all lenders.

Petitioners contend that, granting that the CB had power to "suspend" the Usury Law, the new BSP-MB did not retain this power of its
predecessor, in view of Section 135 of R.A. No. 7653, which expressly repealed R.A. No. 265. The petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did
not reenact a provision similar to Section 109 of R.A. No. 265.

A closer perusal shows that Section 109 of R.A. No. 265 covered only loans extended by banks, whereas under Section 1-a of the Usury Law,
as amended, the BSP-MB may prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any
money, goods or credits, including those for loans of low priority such as consumer loans, as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance
companies and similar credit institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum rate or rates for different types of
borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.

Act No. 2655, an earlier law, is much broader in scope, whereas R.A. No. 265, now R.A. No. 7653, merely supplemented it as it concerns loans
by banks and other financial institutions. Had R.A. No. 7653 been intended to repeal Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, it would have so stated in
unequivocal terms.

Moreover, the rule is settled that repeals by implication are not favored, because laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full
knowledge of all laws existing pertaining to the subject.46 An implied repeal is predicated upon the condition that a substantial conflict or
repugnancy is found between the new and prior laws. Thus, in the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. 47 We find no such
conflict between the provisions of Act 2655 and R.A. No. 7653.

F. The lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipulations charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest.

It is settled that nothing in CB Circular No. 905 grants lenders a carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave
their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. 48 As held in Castro v. Tan:49

The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is
tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man. It has no support in law,
in principles of justice, or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify such imposition as righteous and as
one that may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals. 50

Stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests have been invariably struck down for being contrary to morals, if not against the
law.51 Indeed, under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, these contracts are deemed inexistent and void ab initio, and therefore cannot be ratified,
nor may the right to set up their illegality as a defense be waived.

Nonetheless, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lenders right to recover the principal of a loan, nor affect the
other terms thereof.52 Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by
the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due. The debt due is considered as without the stipulated excessive interest, and a legal
interest of 12% per annum will be added in place of the excessive interest formerly imposed, 53following the guidelines laid down in the landmark
case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,54 regarding the manner of computing legal interest:

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the
accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of
the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls
under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to
be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 55 (Citations omitted)

The foregoing rules were further clarified in Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 56 as follows:

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of interest, if proper, and the applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per
annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, as well as to judgments involving
such loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies "when the transaction
involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in general,"
with the application of both rates reckoned "from the time the complaint was filed until the [adjudged] amount is fully paid." In either instance,
the reckoning period for the commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be subject to the condition "that the courts are vested with
discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest." 57 (Citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES
SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity
as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the systems conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel
stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels
coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct
federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislators district and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, 9 although, as
will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the
utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release,
Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects 13"shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its members
to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications." 14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same
section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes
of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the
area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects
selected by Members of Congress, they being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local
officials or civil leaders."16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals
appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and the amount
each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the
administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives
added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960s, however, pork barrel
legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate. 18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man
controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local
Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began,
with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of
Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which
would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblymans locality. It has been further reported that
"Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also
"soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and
livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the
form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of P480
Million and P240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been
documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide
Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing
agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the
amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported 26 that by
1992, Representatives were receivingP12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft
projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of
projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the
Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each, and the Vice-
President, P20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF
Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds. 33

Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were
directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a)
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published
by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in
the list herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were
reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministrations political
agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily
identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions. 38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education
(DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Nio Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the
legislative district concerned.40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent. 41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund," 44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund," 45 all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation
with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was
explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole
condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits. 47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained
the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the release of the funds
directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same
single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003
budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways 51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on
the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the
national government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept, 55 which is
essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu
concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well
as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions
under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress61anent certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least P250 Million of the P500
Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in the
construction of public school buildings x x x." 62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd
Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board 64(GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007
(GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations 65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to
include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted
out to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million
for "hard projects" and P30 Million for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a P100
Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it
may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior
and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further
conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure
projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the
priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be
the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list. 74

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the
Vice-President, which was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to
be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the projects. 77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF
funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. 79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and
the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the terms usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such
as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to
help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or
the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he
amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985, 86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from
the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, 89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly
used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted.
Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government
money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." 91 He said that "the kickbacks were SOP (standard operating
procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from
dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings." 92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were
public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig." 93 "The publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage." 94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed. 95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government has
been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects." 96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds,
the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and
the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. 98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99 covering the use of legislators'
PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety
of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) 100 by the DBM, the application of these funds
and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and
32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly,
the Co As findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103

Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.

Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.

Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.

Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latters endorsement and without considering their mandated
functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.

Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.

The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.

Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to P6.156 Billion were either
found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.

Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant
with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." 104 According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on
the Malampaya Funds.105

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court
similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are
as follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even
date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as
the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating
funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant
thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego
(Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided
for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, 107 be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for
them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and
(b) "the use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from
the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary
funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR." 109 The Belgica Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno
Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund
priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH,
the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic
Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on
the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or
any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of
2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section
8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government
under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court,
seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Courts September
10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a
separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013
(Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.

On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled
on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza
(Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able
to competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Courts resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision
dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of
res judicata and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as
prompted by the present cases.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, 117 namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important 119 and, therefore, shall be
discussed forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that
the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." 123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." 124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing
for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result
of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms
undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme
would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and
not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration
that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either
by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the
following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law, 127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the
laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and
that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to
investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend,
now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of
the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-
blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty .

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. Youve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has
done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it
unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they essentially allege grave violations of the
Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended
undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have
been lodged at a time when the systems flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the governments own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the
Court finds petitioners claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA, 131 a recent case wherein the
Court upheld the CoAs disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives
life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such
as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x.
(Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings
under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality.
As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office
in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen)
pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. 132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in
accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by
constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. 133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a
"PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends
a semblance of truth to petitioners claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." 135 In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading
review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the
myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine
which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 139applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or
"the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light,
respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in
response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage." 140

The Court must deny respondents submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A
political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded
the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect
on the political question doctrine was explained as follows: 143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Courts avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help
ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society.
For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute
to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing
"Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are
bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as
matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 148 The CoA Chairpersons
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its
prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional
scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus,
hardly a judgment on the merits in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct
releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to
demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress."
As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the
Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 152 of the Civil Code, evokes
the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the
Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify
projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court
reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to
Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and
it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are
merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,
specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases
call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the
entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the
issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsas fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to
identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it
follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within
the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority,
as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion in the same
case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such
specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid,
would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the
CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority
of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies
which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that
the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsas allowance of post-enactment
legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed
in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional
Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to
accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political
largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the
appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or
expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects
funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official
by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds:
first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF; 158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel,
specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. 159

Considering petitioners submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the
collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the funds utilization through various post-
enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork
Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated
words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." 163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, 165belongs the power to
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great
powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." 167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to
avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch
of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain
of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch
may interfere impermissibly with the others performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; 171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." 172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle
when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another departments functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague 173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of
budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent
in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives
which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing
the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its
own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as
not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." 177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only
pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress role must be confined to mere oversight.
Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1wphi1 In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF Article "wrecks the assignment of
responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have
ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed." 179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an
illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition
that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation. 181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate
authority to control the execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators proposals.182 They maintain that
the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such
proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article
follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to
participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3
as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as
evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general
program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is
passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the
legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be
identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the
case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional
committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2,
Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be
; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry 190 x x x to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is
with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona,
Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its
ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of
legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a
funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislators identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the identification by the individual
legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor,
because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the
legislator.

xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that
he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify,
he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have,
after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of
constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of
the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought
that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we
should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or informal
practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has
conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the
process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments
which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for
the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the
case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the
nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund
from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. 203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or
tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the
"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada,
the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after
the required publication."205

Elaborating on the Presidents item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that: 206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His
disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are
precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the
executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The
courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an
act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the Presidents item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal
restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branchs role in the budgetary process. 208 In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the Presidents item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated
to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad
laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An
item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of
the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of
appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law
which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto,
must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence meaning an
allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the
item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same.
Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto.
Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that
each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item.
Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes
shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the Presidents item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds
would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein
discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2
5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said
that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may
veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of
its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may
not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to
determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in
violation of the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislators identification of
the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." 212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item
veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a
modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a
GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-
grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is
passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between
(a) accepting the entireP24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it
would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion
would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which
may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds." 216 Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency." 217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar
operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies
cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means
do not justify even commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it
renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each
legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-
interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective
officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, to well, accelerate the
decisions of senators."220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the peoples trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability, 221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; 223 or (b) investigation and monitoring
of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF
Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before another office of government
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators control of his PDAF per
se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked to
this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-
to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department,
through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics
and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus
impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as
unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to
perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined
by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
guideline for legislative or executive action.226Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated
how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The States policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local
autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, nongovernmental and peoples organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program
is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to
develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine
Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the
needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments
will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public
affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs
which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The
Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project." 231Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence
by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development
goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with
mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that
the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for
communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford. 233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
"making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrels original
intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction." 234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the
following wise:236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but
has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork
Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since
the "primary and specific purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the
Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law
allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a)
sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply
to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law," an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may
be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes,
such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the
language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to
allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion
of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly
manifested. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the
law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money
and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as
application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing
unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals,
production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resourc es, shall form
part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a
Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable
amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less thanP150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount)
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional
provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013
PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made
by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-
discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.

On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the
funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus,
construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government." 244

The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the
appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the
purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law
into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for
delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word
or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the
policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya
Funds would be used as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD
1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under
the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.

Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately
curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
"priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without
any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a
system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce
as well as economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by
any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.

Petitioners Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements
made in this Decision petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the
public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use
of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b)
"the use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty
to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right
may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State
are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner
is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information does not include the right to
compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has
a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required."
Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform
the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R.
No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
(Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed
to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF
Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the
bases of the latters duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be
allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court
recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure
are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners
prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate
petition.

It bears clarification that the Courts denial herein should only cover petitioners plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not
in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable
regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodians reasonable regulations,viz.: 259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the
latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that
undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum,
discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executives Social Funds."260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the political
branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In response to the Courts
September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No.
2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the
DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and
disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are:
first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the
Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the
PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]." 261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered
by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.

For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO
has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of
the TRO because they cannot be considered as remaining PDAF." They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the
DBM.262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered
moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting
the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for
2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBMs interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the
execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at
the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBMs interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be
"released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority."263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically
speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In
fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual
release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from
the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA,
Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after.
x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees
depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the
disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time
of this Decisions promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the
declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released meaning, those
merely covered by a SARO under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to
Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as
unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced
and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 266 the doctrine
merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to
a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored." 268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike
down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it
has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system
has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has
authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it
has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended
by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of
"priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein
pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence
or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its
co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and
vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what
has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its
course. After all, this is the Courts bounden duty and no others.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators whether
individually or collectively organized into committees to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the
budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release
and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum
allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar
import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and
(2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the
disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1)
the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or
not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall
remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners prayer seeking that the
Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit
complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners access to
official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely
subjected to the custodians reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress
as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and
accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or
unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

When a party challeges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of proof rests upon him.

Before us is a Petition for Prohibition2 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-
Sucat, Inc., domestic corporations engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial services, against public respondents Secretaries of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the Department of Finance (DOF).

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432, 3 as amended by RA 9257,4 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as
a tax deduction.

Factual Antecedents

On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the following privileges:

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments
may claim the cost as tax credit;

b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals
and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;

c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable income does not exceed the property level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year;

d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;

e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s] anywhere in the country, subject to guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System;

f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same benefits and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the case may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.

On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 provide:

Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of these regulations: i. Tax Credit refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to a
qualified senior citizen by all establishments relative to their utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants, drugstores, recreation centers, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture,
leisure and amusement, which discount shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and
from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes. x x x x Sec. 4. RECORDING/BOOKKEEPING REQUIREMENTS
FOR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. Private establishments, i.e., transport services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants,
recreation centers, drugstores, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture[,] leisure and
amusement, giving 20% discounts to qualified senior citizens are required to keep separate and accurate record[s] of sales made to senior
citizens, which shall include the name, identification number, gross sales/receipts, discounts, dates of transactions and invoice number for
every transaction. The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted from the gross income for income tax purposes and from gross sales of the
business enterprise concerned for purposes of the VAT and other percentage taxes.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 5 the Court declared Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous
because these contravene RA 7432,6 thus:

RA 7432 specifically allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts they grant. In turn, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations, issued pursuant thereto, provide the procedures for its availment. To deny such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law
and the regulations carrying out that mandate, is indefensible. First, the definition given by petitioner is erroneous. It refers to tax credit as the
amount representing the 20 percent discount that "shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax
purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes." In ordinary business language, the tax credit
represents the amount of such discount. However, the manner by which the discount shall be credited against taxes has not been clarified by
the revenue regulations. By ordinary acceptation, a discount is an "abatement or reduction made from the gross amount or value of anything."
To be more precise, it is in business parlance "a deduction or lowering of an amount of money;" or "a reduction from the full amount or value of
something, especially a price." In business there are many kinds of discount, the most common of which is that affecting the income statement
or financial report upon which the income tax is based.

xxxx

Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-94 define tax credit as the 20 percent discount deductible from gross income for income
tax purposes, or from gross sales for VAT or other percentage tax purposes. In effect, the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales
discount. This contrived definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted from gross sales in order to compute the gross
income in the income statement and cannot be deducted again, even for purposes of computing the income tax. When the law says that the
cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount when claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax
liability, plain and simple. The option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but to limit the benefit to a
sales discount which is not even identical to the discount privilege that is granted by law does not define it at all and serves no useful
purpose. The definition must, therefore, be stricken down.

Laws Not Amended by Regulations

Second, the law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that "operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is
a mere nullity;" it cannot prevail. It is a cardinal rule that courts "will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a
statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it x x x." In the scheme of judicial tax administration, the need for certainty and
predictability in the implementation of tax laws is crucial. Our tax authorities fill in the details that "Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide." The regulations these authorities issue are relied upon by taxpayers, who are certain that these will be followed by the
courts. Courts, however, will not uphold these authorities interpretations when clearly absurd, erroneous or improper. In the present case, the
tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. Their
interpretation has muddled x x x the intent of Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount. The administrative agency
issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it cannot engraft additional requirements not
contemplated by the legislature.

In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A "regulation adopted pursuant to law is law." Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof not
adopted pursuant to law is no law and has neither the force nor the effect of law. 7

On February 26, 2004, RA 92578 amended certain provisions of RA 7432, to wit:

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

xxxx

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included
in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006, the pertinent provision of which provides:

SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS AS DEDUCTION FROM GROSS INCOME. Establishments
enumerated in subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales discounts to senior citizens on the sale of goods and/or services specified
thereunder are entitled to deduct the said discount from gross income subject to the following conditions:

(1) Only that portion of the gross sales EXCLUSIVELY USED, CONSUMED OR ENJOYED BY THE SENIOR CITIZEN shall be eligible for the
deductible sales discount.

(2) The gross selling price and the sales discount MUST BE SEPARATELY INDICATED IN THE OFFICIAL RECEIPT OR SALES INVOICE
issued by the establishment for the sale of goods or services to the senior citizen.

(3) Only the actual amount of the discount granted or a sales discount not exceeding 20% of the gross selling price can be deducted from the
gross income, net of value added tax, if applicable, for income tax purposes, and from gross sales or gross receipts of the business enterprise
concerned, for VAT or other percentage tax purposes.

(4) The discount can only be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted.

(5) The business establishment giving sales discounts to qualified senior citizens is required to keep separate and accurate record[s] of sales,
which shall include the name of the senior citizen, TIN, OSCA ID, gross sales/receipts, sales discount granted, [date] of [transaction] and
invoice number for every sale transaction to senior citizen.

(6) Only the following business establishments which granted sales discount to senior citizens on their sale of goods and/or services may claim
the said discount granted as deduction from gross income, namely:

xxxx

(i) Funeral parlors and similar establishments The beneficiary or any person who shall shoulder the funeral and burial expenses of the
deceased senior citizen shall claim the discount, such as casket, embalmment, cremation cost and other related services for the senior citizen
upon payment and presentation of [his] death certificate.

The DSWD likewise issued its own Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 9257, to wit:

RULE VI DISCOUNTS AS TAX DEDUCTION OF ESTABLISHMENTS

Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. The establishment may claim the discounts granted under Rule V, Section 4 Discounts for
Establishments, Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities and Sections 10 and 11 Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered.

Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their
gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of Finance (DOF).

Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the present recourse, praying that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by RA
9257, and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow
business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from
enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

A.

WHETHER THE PETITION PRESENTS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.

B.

WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY
PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.9

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the
tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF. 10

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."11

In support of their position, petitioners cite Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 12 where it was ruled that the 20% discount privilege constitutes
taking of private property for public use which requires the payment of just compensation, 13 and Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. Department of
Social Welfare and Development,14 where it was acknowledged that the tax deduction scheme does not meet the definition of just
compensation.15

Petitioners likewise seek a reversal of the ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 16 that the tax deduction scheme adopted by the government
is justified by police power.17

They assert that "[a]lthough both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, there are still
traditional distinctions between the two"18 and that "eminent domain cannot be made less supreme than police power." 19

Petitioners further claim that the legislature, in amending RA 7432, relied on an erroneous contemporaneous construction that prior payment of
taxes is required for tax credit.20

Petitioners also contend that the tax deduction scheme violates Article XV, Section 421 and Article XIII, Section 1122of the Constitution because
it shifts the States constitutional mandate or duty of improving the welfare of the elderly to the private sector. 23

Under the tax deduction scheme, the private sector shoulders 65% of the discount because only 35% 24 of it is actually returned by the
government.25

Consequently, the implementation of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under Section 4 of RA 9257 affects the businesses of petitioners.26

Thus, there exists an actual case or controversy of transcendental importance which deserves judicious disposition on the merits by the highest
court of the land.27

Respondents Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, question the filing of the instant Petition directly with the Supreme Court as this disregards the hierarchy of
courts.28

They likewise assert that there is no justiciable controversy as petitioners failed to prove that the tax deduction treatment is not a "fair and full
equivalent of the loss sustained" by them.29

As to the constitutionality of RA 9257 and its implementing rules and regulations, respondents contend that petitioners failed to overturn its
presumption of constitutionality.30

More important, respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the States police power.31

Our Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

There exists an actual case or controversy.

We shall first resolve the procedural issue. When the constitutionality of a law is put in issue, judicial review may be availed of only if the
following requisites concur: "(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the
part of the party raising the [question of constitutionality]; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the [question
of constitutionality] is the lis mota of the case."32
In this case, petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme provided in RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF. Respondents, however, oppose the Petition on the ground that there is no actual case or
controversy. We do not agree with respondents. An actual case or controversy exists when there is "a conflict of legal rights" or "an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution."33

The Petition must therefore show that "the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it."34

In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners has a direct adverse effect on them. Thus, it cannot be denied that there exists
an actual case or controversy.

The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, as an exercise of police power of the State,
has already been settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.

Petitioners posit that the resolution of this case lies in the determination of whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an
exercise of police power or eminent domain. If it is police power, no just compensation is warranted. But if it is eminent domain, the tax
deduction scheme is unconstitutional because it is not a peso for peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given to senior citizens. Thus, it
constitutes taking of private property without payment of just compensation. At the outset, we note that this question has been settled in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation.35

In that case, we ruled:

Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore
owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to
10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
Examining petitioners arguments, it is apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a
reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion,
the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the
discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income.
Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the amount of
tax which is due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional
reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments
concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for
R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use
or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers
gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent
to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the
senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the
State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior
citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an
integral part of our society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act
provides: SEC. 2. Republic Act No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take
care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies provides: "The State shall provide social justice in all phases of national development." Further, Article XIII,
Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children." Consonant with these constitutional principles the following are the declared
policies of this Act:

(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their
partnership.

To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and
laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law
provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The
law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not
capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it
has been described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is
"[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police
power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory
effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because
petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly
whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist
that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will
be shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction. To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos
Super Drug cited the anti-hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the
distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount to senior citizens or an amount
equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the
government will allow a tax deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short,
only 32% of the 20% discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores. Petitioners computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law
states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting
allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the
case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners' sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have
accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that
they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their
customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount.

Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat nature of
the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition
cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for
being oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition. The Court is not
oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects
property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations
of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property,
various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as x x x
reminder[s] that the right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good. Undeniably, the
success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned.
This being the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective
of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued
implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.36 (Bold in
the original; underline supplied)

We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

No compelling reason has been proffered to overturn, modify or abandon the ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation.

Petitioners argue that we have previously ruled in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 37 that the 20% discount is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain, thus, requiring the payment of just compensation. They urge us to re-examine our ruling in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation38 which allegedly reversed the ruling in Central Luzon Drug Corporation.39

They also point out that Carlos Superdrug Corporation 40 recognized that the tax deduction scheme under the assailed law does not provide for
sufficient just compensation. We agree with petitioners observation that there are statements in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 41 describing
the 20% discount as an exercise of the power of eminent domain, viz.:

[T]he privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.
Accordingly, the tax credit benefit granted to these establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the
State for public use. The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with
public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. The discount privilege to which our senior citizens are entitled is actually
a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of
the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it not for RA 7432. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. As a result of the 20 percent discount imposed by RA 7432,
respondent becomes entitled to a just compensation. This term refers not only to the issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating the correct
amount of the discounts given, but also to the promptness in its release. Equivalent to the payment of property taken by the State, such
issuance when not done within a reasonable time from the grant of the discounts cannot be considered as just compensation. In effect,
respondent is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of its revenues while awaiting actual receipt, through the
certificate, of the equivalent amount it needs to cope with the reduction in its revenues. Besides, the taxation power can also be used as an
implement for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Tax measures are but "enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions"
and "clearly imposed for a public purpose." In recent years, the power to tax has indeed become a most effective tool to realize social justice,
public welfare, and the equitable distribution of wealth. While it is a declared commitment under Section 1 of RA 7432, social justice "cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice
consecrated in our [C]onstitution [is] not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto." For
this reason, a just compensation for income that is taken away from respondent becomes necessary. It is in the tax credit that our legislators
find support to realize social justice, and no administrative body can alter that fact. To put it differently, a private establishment that merely
breaks even without the discounts yet will surely start to incur losses because of such discounts. The same effect is expected if its mark-
up is less than 20 percent, and if all its sales come from retail purchases by senior citizens. Aside from the observation we have already raised
earlier, it will also be grossly unfair to an establishment if the discounts will be treated merely as deductions from either its gross income or its
gross sales. Operating at a loss through no fault of its own, it will realize that the tax credit limitation under RR 2-94 is inutile, if not improper.
Worse, profit-generating businesses will be put in a better position if they avail themselves of tax credits denied those that are losing, because
no taxes are due from the latter.42 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

The above was partly incorporated in our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 43 when we stated preliminarily that

Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore
owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to
10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
Examining petitioners arguments, it is apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a
reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion,
the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the
discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income.
Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the amount of
tax which is due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional
reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments
concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for
R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use
or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers
gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent
to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the
senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the
State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. 44

This, notwithstanding, we went on to rule in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 45 that the 20% discount and tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise
of the police power of the State. The present case, thus, affords an opportunity for us to clarify the above-quoted statements in Central Luzon
Drug Corporation46 and Carlos Superdrug Corporation.47

First, we note that the above-quoted disquisition on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 48 is obiter dicta and, thus, not binding
precedent. As stated earlier, in Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 49 we ruled that the BIR acted ultra vires when it effectively treated the 20%
discount as a tax deduction, under Sections 2.i and 4 of RR No. 2-94, despite the clear wording of the previous law that the same should be
treated as a tax credit. We were, therefore, not confronted in that case with the issue as to whether the 20% discount is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain. Second, although we adverted to Central Luzon Drug Corporation 50 in our ruling in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation,51 this referred only to preliminary matters. A fair reading of Carlos Superdrug Corporation 52 would show that we categorically ruled
therein that the 20% discount is a valid exercise of police power. Thus, even if the current law, through its tax deduction scheme (which
abandoned the tax credit scheme under the previous law), does not provide for a peso for peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given by
private establishments, no constitutional infirmity obtains because, being a valid exercise of police power, payment of just compensation is not
warranted. We have carefully reviewed the basis of our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 53 and we find no cogent reason to overturn,
modify or abandon it. We also note that petitioners arguments are a mere reiteration of those raised and resolved in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation.54 Thus, we sustain Carlos Superdrug Corporation.55

Nonetheless, we deem it proper, in what follows, to amplify our explanation in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 56 as to why the 20% discount is a
valid exercise of police power and why it may not, under the specific circumstances of this case, be considered as an exercise of the power of
eminent domain contrary to the obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation.57

Police power versus eminent domain.

Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare.58

The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive. 59

In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method of accomplishing the
goal.60

Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
the government."61

The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as] the
interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary." 62

Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property for public use. 63

The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the payment of just compensation.64

Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by
regulation,65 or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted 66 to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no
compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required. Examples of these regulations are property condemned for being
noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to
be destroyed in the interest of public morals)67 as well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to the health,
morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a citys territory into residential and industrial areas). 68

It has, thus, been observed that, in the exercise of police power (as distinguished from eminent domain), although the regulation affects the
right of ownership, none of the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.69

On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose
which necessitates the payment of just compensation therefor. Normally, the title to and possession of the property are transferred to the
expropriating authority. Examples include the acquisition of lands for the construction of public highways as well as agricultural lands acquired
by the government under the agrarian reform law for redistribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries. However, it is a settled rule that the
acquisition of title or total destruction of the property is not essential for "taking" under the power of eminent domain to be present. 70

Examples of these include establishment of easements such as where the land owner is perpetually deprived of his proprietary rights because
of the hazards posed by electric transmission lines constructed above his property 71or the compelled interconnection of the telephone system
between the government and a private company. 72

In these cases, although the private property owner is not divested of ownership or possession, payment of just compensation is warranted
because of the burden placed on the property for the use or benefit of the public.

The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The very
nature of police power as elastic and responsive to various social conditions 73 as well as the evolving meaning and scope of public use 74 and
just compensation75 in eminent domain evinces that these are not static concepts. Because of the exigencies of rapidly changing times,
Congress may be compelled to adopt or experiment with different measures to promote the general welfare which may not fall squarely within
the traditionally recognized categories of police power and eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and
effects of the challenged governmental act and decide, on the basis thereof, whether the act is the exercise of police power or eminent domain.
Thus, we now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine if it constitutes an exercise of police power or eminent domain.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to
illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the
discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the development and
progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law. As to its nature and effects, the
20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class of
individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential concern. 76

In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other words, the
subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment. However, it does not purport to appropriate or
burden specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefi t of the public, or
senior citizens for that matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross
sales that such private establishments may derive from, senior citizens. The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.77

These laws generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant
or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on investment of these corporations considering that
they have a monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the general public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the
discount does not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply
to all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this
case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of
establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure. The obiter in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation,78 however, describes the 20% discount as an exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax credit, under the previous law,
equivalent to the amount of discount given as the just compensation therefor. The reason is that (1) the discount would have formed part of the
gross sales of the establishment were it not for the law prescribing the 20% discount, and (2) the permanent reduction in total revenues is a
forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. The flaw in this reasoning is in its premise. It
presupposes that the subject regulation, which impacts the pricing and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment, automatically
amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. If this were so, then all price and rate of return on investment control laws
would have to be invalidated because they impact, at some level, the regulated establishments profits or income/gross sales, yet there is no
provision for payment of just compensation. It would also mean that overnment cannot set price or rate of return on investment limits, which
reduce the profits or income/gross sales of private establishments, if no just compensation is paid even if the measure is not confiscatory. The
obiter is, thus, at odds with the settled octrine that the State can employ police power measures to regulate the pricing of goods and services,
and, hence, the profitability of business establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives for the common good, provided that the
regulation does not go too far as to amount to "taking." 79

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,80 we recognized that x x x a taking also could be found if government regulation of the use of property went
"too far." When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes
recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well,
the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The
Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and
thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.81

The impact or effect of a regulation, such as the one under consideration, must, thus, be determined on a case-to-case basis. Whether that line
between permissible regulation under police power and "taking" under eminent domain has been crossed must, under the specific
circumstances of this case, be subject to proof and the one assailing the constitutionality of the regulation carries the heavy burden of proving
that the measure is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. The time-honored rule is that the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a
law rests upon the one assailing it and "the burden becomes heavier when police power is at issue." 82

The 20% senior citizen discount has not been shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.

In Alalayan v. National Power Corporation,83 petitioners, who were franchise holders of electric plants, challenged the validity of a law limiting
their allowable net profits to no more than 12% per annum of their investments plus two-month operating expenses. In rejecting their plea, we
ruled that, in an earlier case, it was found that 12% is a reasonable rate of return and that petitioners failed to prove that the aforesaid rate is
confiscatory in view of the presumption of constitutionality. 84

We adopted a similar line of reasoning in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 85 when we ruled that petitioners therein failed to prove that the 20%
discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a financial report, to establish the impact of the 20%
discount on the overall profitability of petitioners was presented in order to show that they would be operating at a loss due to the subject
regulation or that the continued implementation of the law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of petitioners. In the
case at bar, petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical computation of the alleged loss that they will suffer similar to what the petitioners in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation86 did. Petitioners went directly to this Court without first establishing the factual bases of their claims. Hence, the
present recourse must, likewise, fail. Because all laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality, courts will uphold a laws validity if any set of
facts may be conceived to sustain it.87

On its face, we find that there are at least two conceivable bases to sustain the subject regulations validity absent clear and convincing proof
that it is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Congress may have legitimately concluded that business establishments have the capacity
to absorb a decrease in profits or income/gross sales due to the 20% discount without substantially affecting the reasonable rate of return on
their investments considering (1) not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens and (2) the level of its profit margins on
goods and services offered to the general public. Concurrently, Congress may have, likewise, legitimately concluded that the establishments,
which will be required to extend the 20% discount, have the capacity to revise their pricing strategy so that whatever reduction in profits or
income/gross sales that they may sustain because of sales to senior citizens, can be recouped through higher mark-ups or from other products
not subject of discounts. As a result, the discounts resulting from sales to senior citizens will not be confiscatory or unduly oppressive. In sum,
we sustain our ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 88 that the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme are valid exercises of
police power of the State absent a clear showing that it is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.

Conclusion

In closing, we note that petitioners hypothesize, consistent with our previous ratiocinations, that the discount will force establishments to raise
their prices in order to compensate for its impact on overall profits or income/gross sales. The general public, or those not belonging to the
senior citizen class, are, thus, made to effectively shoulder the subsidy for senior citizens. This, in petitioners view, is unfair.

As already mentioned, Congress may be reasonably assumed to have foreseen this eventuality. But, more importantly, this goes into the
wisdom, efficacy and expediency of the subject law which is not proper for judicial review. In a way, this law pursues its social equity objective
in a non-traditional manner unlike past and existing direct subsidy programs of the government for the poor and marginalized sectors of our
society. Verily, Congress must be given sufficient leeway in formulating welfare legislations given the enormous challenges that the government
faces relative to, among others, resource adequacy and administrative capability in implementing social reform measures which aim to protect
and uphold the interests of those most vulnerable in our society. In the process, the individual, who enjoys the rights, benefits and privileges of
living in a democratic polity, must bear his share in supporting measures intended for the common good. This is only fair. In fine, without the
requisite showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, the validity of the assailed law must be sustained.
Refutation of the Dissent

The main points of Justice Carpios Dissent may be summarized as follows: (1) the discussion on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation89 is not obiter dicta ; (2) allowable taking, in police power, is limited to property that is destroyed or placed outside the commerce of
man for public welfare; (3) the amount of mandatory discount is private property within the ambit of Article III, Section 9 90 of the Constitution;
and (4) the permanent reduction in a private establishments total revenue, arising from the mandatory discount, is a taking of private property
for public use or benefit, hence, an exercise of the power of eminent domain requiring the payment of just compensation. I We maintain that the
discussion on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation91 is obiter dicta. As previously discussed, in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation,92 the BIR, pursuant to Sections 2.i and 4 of RR No. 2-94, treated the senior citizen discount in the previous law, RA 7432, as a tax
deduction instead of a tax credit despite the clear provision in that law which stated

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

a) The grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishment, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments
may claim the cost as tax credit; (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Court ruled that the subject revenue regulation violated the law, viz:

The 20 percent discount required by the law to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not merely a tax deduction from the gross income or
gross sale of the establishment concerned. A tax credit is used by a private establishment only after the tax has been computed; a tax
deduction, before the tax is computed. RA 7432 unconditionally grants a tax credit to all covered entities. Thus, the provisions of the revenue
regulation that withdraw or modify such grant are void. Basic is the rule that administrative regulations cannot amend or revoke the law. 93

As can be readily seen, the discussion on eminent domain was not necessary in order to arrive at this conclusion. All that was needed was to
point out that the revenue regulation contravened the law which it sought to implement. And, precisely, this was done in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation94 by comparing the wording of the previous law vis--vis the revenue regulation; employing the rules of statutory construction; and
applying the settled principle that a regulation cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. A close reading of Central Luzon Drug
Corporation95 would show that the Court went on to state that the tax credit "can be deemed" as just compensation only to explain why the
previous law provides for a tax credit instead of a tax deduction. The Court surmised that the tax credit was a form of just compensation given
to the establishments covered by the 20% discount. However, the reason why the previous law provided for a tax credit and not a tax deduction
was not necessary to resolve the issue as to whether the revenue regulation contravenes the law. Hence, the discussion on eminent domain
is obiter dicta.

A court, in resolving cases before it, may look into the possible purposes or reasons that impelled the enactment of a particular statute or legal
provision. However, statements made relative thereto are not always necessary in resolving the actual controversies presented before it. This
was the case in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 96resulting in that unfortunate statement that the tax credit "can be deemed" as just
compensation. This, in turn, led to the erroneous conclusion, by deductive reasoning, that the 20% discount is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain. The Dissent essentially adopts this theory and reasoning which, as will be shown below, is contrary to settled principles in
police power and eminent domain analysis. II The Dissent discusses at length the doctrine on "taking" in police power which occurs when
private property is destroyed or placed outside the commerce of man. Indeed, there is a whole class of police power measures which justify the
destruction of private property in order to preserve public health, morals, safety or welfare. As earlier mentioned, these would include a building
on the verge of collapse or confiscated obscene materials as well as those mentioned by the Dissent with regard to property used in violating a
criminal statute or one which constitutes a nuisance. In such cases, no compensation is required. However, it is equally true that there is
another class of police power measures which do not involve the destruction of private property but merely regulate its use. The minimum wage
law, zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours to eight, and the
like would fall under this category. The examples cited by the Dissent, likewise, fall under this category: Article 157 of the Labor Code, Sections
19 and 18 of the Social Security Law, and Section 7 of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. These laws merely regulate or, to use the term of the Dissent,
burden the conduct of the affairs of business establishments. In such cases, payment of just compensation is not required because they fall
within the sphere of permissible police power measures. The senior citizen discount law falls under this latter category. III The Dissent proceeds
from the theory that the permanent reduction of profits or income/gross sales, due to the 20% discount, is a "taking" of private property for
public purpose without payment of just compensation. At the outset, it must be emphasized that petitioners never presented any evidence to
establish that they were forced to suffer enormous losses or operate at a loss due to the effects of the assailed law. They came directly to this
Court and provided a hypothetical computation of the loss they would allegedly suffer due to the operation of the assailed law. The central
premise of the Dissents argument that the 20% discount results in a permanent reduction in profits or income/gross sales, or forces a business
establishment to operate at a loss is, thus, wholly unsupported by competent evidence. To be sure, the Court can invalidate a law which, on its
face, is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.97

But this is not the case here.

In the case at bar, evidence is indispensable before a determination of a constitutional violation can be made because of the following reasons.
First, the assailed law, by imposing the senior citizen discount, does not take any of the properties used by a business establishment like, say,
the land on which a manufacturing plant is constructed or the equipment being used to produce goods or services. Second, rather than taking
specific properties of a business establishment, the senior citizen discount law merely regulates the prices of the goods or services being sold
to senior citizens by mandating a 20% discount. Thus, if a product is sold at P10.00 to the general public, then it shall be sold at P8.00 (
i.e., P10.00 less 20%) to senior citizens. Note that the law does not impose at what specific price the product shall be sold, only that a 20%
discount shall be given to senior citizens based on the price set by the business establishment. A business establishment is, thus, free to adjust
the prices of the goods or services it provides to the general public. Accordingly, it can increase the price of the above product to P20.00 but is
required to sell it at P16.00 (i.e. , P20.00 less 20%) to senior citizens. Third, because the law impacts the prices of the goods or services of a
particular establishment relative to its sales to senior citizens, its profits or income/gross sales are affected. The extent of the impact would,
however, depend on the profit margin of the business establishment on a particular good or service. If a product costs P5.00 to produce and is
sold at P10.00, then the profit98 is P5.0099 or a profit margin100 of 50%.101

Under the assailed law, the aforesaid product would have to be sold at P8.00 to senior citizens yet the business would still earn P3.00102 or a
30%103 profit margin. On the other hand, if the product costs P9.00 to produce and is required to be sold at P8.00 to senior citizens, then the
business would experience a loss of P1.00.104

But note that since not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens, the business establishment may continue to earn P1.00
from non-senior citizens which, in turn, can offset any loss arising from sales to senior citizens.

Fourth, when the law imposes the 20% discount in favor of senior citizens, it does not prevent the business establishment from revising its
pricing strategy.
By revising its pricing strategy, a business establishment can recoup any reduction of profits or income/gross sales which would otherwise arise
from the giving of the 20% discount. To illustrate, suppose A has two customers: X, a senior citizen, and Y, a non-senior citizen. Prior to the
law, A sells his products at P10.00 a piece to X and Y resulting in income/gross sales of P20.00 (P10.00 + P10.00). With the passage of the
law, A must now sell his product to X at P8.00 (i.e., P10.00 less 20%) so that his income/gross sales would be P18.00 (P8.00 + P10.00) or
lower by P2.00. To prevent this from happening, A decides to increase the price of his products to P11.11 per piece. Thus, he sells his product
to X at P8.89 (i.e. , P11.11 less 20%) and to Y at P11.11. As a result, his income/gross sales would still be P20.00105 (P8.89 + P11.11). The
capacity, then, of business establishments to revise their pricing strategy makes it possible for them not to suffer any reduction in profits or
income/gross sales, or, in the alternative, mitigate the reduction of their profits or income/gross sales even after the passage of the law. In other
words, business establishments have the capacity to adjust their prices so that they may remain profitable even under the operation of the
assailed law.

The Dissent, however, states that The explanation by the majority that private establishments can always increase their prices to recover the
mandatory discount will only encourage private establishments to adjust their prices upwards to the prejudice of customers who do not enjoy
the 20% discount. It was likewise suggested that if a company increases its prices, despite the application of the 20% discount, the
establishment becomes more profitable than it was before the implementation of R.A. 7432. Such an economic justification is self-defeating, for
more consumers will suffer from the price increase than will benefit from the 20% discount. Even then, such ability to increase prices cannot
legally validate a violation of the eminent domain clause. 106

But, if it is possible that the business establishment, by adjusting its prices, will suffer no reduction in its profits or income/gross sales (or suffer
some reduction but continue to operate profitably) despite giving the discount, what would be the basis to strike down the law? If it is possible
that the business establishment, by adjusting its prices, will not be unduly burdened, how can there be a finding that the assailed law is an
unconstitutional exercise of police power or eminent domain? That there may be a burden placed on business establishments or the consuming
public as a result of the operation of the assailed law is not, by itself, a ground to declare it unconstitutional for this goes into the wisdom and
expediency of the law.

The cost of most, if not all, regulatory measures of the government on business establishments is ultimately passed on to the consumers but
that, by itself, does not justify the wholesale nullification of these measures. It is a basic postulate of our democratic system of government that
the Constitution is a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.107

All persons may be burdened by regulatory measures intended for the common good or to serve some important governmental interest, such
as protecting or improving the welfare of a special class of people for which the Constitution affords preferential concern. Indubitably, the one
assailing the law has the heavy burden of proving that the regulation is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory, or has gone "too far" as to
amount to a "taking." Yet, here, the Dissent would have this Court nullify the law without any proof of such nature.

Further, this Court is not the proper forum to debate the economic theories or realities that impelled Congress to shift from the tax credit to the
tax deduction scheme. It is not within our power or competence to judge which scheme is more or less burdensome to business establishments
or the consuming public and, thereafter, to choose which scheme the State should use or pursue. The shift from the tax credit to tax deduction
scheme is a policy determination by Congress and the Court will respect it for as long as there is no showing, as here, that the subject
regulation has transgressed constitutional limitations. Unavoidably, the lack of evidence constrains the Dissent to rely on speculative and
hypothetical argumentation when it states that the 20% discount is a significant amount and not a minimal loss (which erroneously assumes
that the discount automatically results in a loss when it is possible that the profit margin is greater than 20% and/or the pricing strategy can be
revised to prevent or mitigate any reduction in profits or income/gross sales as illustrated above), 108 and not all private establishments make a
20% profit margin (which conversely implies that there are those who make more and, thus, would not be greatly affected by this regulation).109

In fine, because of the possible scenarios discussed above, we cannot assume that the 20% discount results in a permanent reduction in profits
or income/gross sales, much less that business establishments are forced to operate at a loss under the assailed law. And, even if we
gratuitously assume that the 20% discount results in some degree of reduction in profits or income/gross sales, we cannot assume that such
reduction is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. To repeat, there is no actual proof to back up this claim, and it could be that the loss suffered
by a business establishment was occasioned through its fault or negligence in not adapting to the effects of the assailed law. The law uniformly
applies to all business establishments covered thereunder. There is, therefore, no unjust discrimination as the aforesaid business
establishments are faced with the same constraints. The necessity of proof is all the more pertinent in this case because, as similarly observed
by Justice Velasco in his Concurring Opinion, the law has been in operation for over nine years now. However, the grim picture painted by
petitioners on the unconscionable losses to be indiscriminately suffered by business establishments, which should have led to the closure of
numerous business establishments, has not come to pass. Verily, we cannot invalidate the assailed law based on assumptions and
conjectures. Without adequate proof, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail. IV At this juncture, we note that the Dissent modified its
original arguments by including a new paragraph, to wit:

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution speaks of private property without any distinction. It does not state that there should be profit
before the taking of property is subject to just compensation. The private property referred to for purposes of taking could be inherited, donated,
purchased, mortgaged, or as in this case, part of the gross sales of private establishments. They are all private property and any taking should
be attended by corresponding payment of just compensation. The 20% discount granted to senior citizens belong to private establishments,
whether these establishments make a profit or suffer a loss. In fact, the 20% discount applies to non-profit establishments like country, social,
or golf clubs which are open to the public and not only for exclusive membership. The issue of profit or loss to the establishments is
immaterial.110

Two things may be said of this argument. First, it contradicts the rest of the arguments of the Dissent. After it states that the issue of profit or
loss is immaterial, the Dissent proceeds to argue that the 20% discount is not a minimal loss111 and that the 20% discount forces business
establishments to operate at a loss.112

Even the obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 113 which the Dissent essentially adopts and relies on, is premised on the permanent
reduction of total revenues and the loss that business establishments will be forced to suffer in arguing that the 20% discount constitutes a
"taking" under the power of eminent domain. Thus, when the Dissent now argues that the issue of profit or loss is immaterial, it contradicts itself
because it later argues, in order to justify that there is a "taking" under the power of eminent domain in this case, that the 20% discount forces
business establishments to suffer a significant loss or to operate at a loss. Second, this argument suffers from the same flaw as the Dissent's
original arguments. It is an erroneous characterization of the 20% discount. According to the Dissent, the 20% discount is part of the gross
sales and, hence, private property belonging to business establishments. However, as previously discussed, the 20% discount is not private
property actually owned and/or used by the business establishment. It should be distinguished from properties like lands or buildings actually
used in the operation of a business establishment which, if appropriated for public use, would amount to a "taking" under the power of eminent
domain. Instead, the 20% discount is a regulatory measure which impacts the pricing and, hence, the profitability of business establishments.
At the time the discount is imposed, no particular property of the business establishment can be said to be "taken." That is, the State does not
acquire or take anything from the business establishment in the way that it takes a piece of private land to build a public road. While the 20%
discount may form part of the potential profits or income/gross sales 114 of the business establishment, as similarly characterized by Justice
Bersamin in his Concurring Opinion, potential profits or income/gross sales are not private property, specifically cash or money, already
belonging to the business establishment. They are a mere expectancy because they are potential fruits of the successful conduct of the
business. Prior to the sale of goods or services, a business establishment may be subject to State regulations, such as the 20% senior citizen
discount, which may impact the level or amount of profits or income/gross sales that can be generated by such establishment. For this reason,
the validity of the discount is to be determined based on its overall effects on the operations of the business establishment.

Again, as previously discussed, the 20% discount does not automatically result in a 20% reduction in profits, or, to align it with the term used by
the Dissent, the 20% discount does not mean that a 20% reduction in gross sales necessarily results. Because (1) the profit margin of a product
is not necessarily less than 20%, (2) not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens, and (3) the establishment may revise its
pricing strategy, such reduction in profits or income/gross sales may be prevented or, in the alternative, mitigated so that the business
establishment continues to operate profitably. Thus, even if we gratuitously assume that some degree of reduction in profits or income/gross
sales occurs because of the 20% discount, it does not follow that the regulation is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory because the
business establishment may make the necessary adjustments to continue to operate profitably. No evidence was presented by petitioners to
show otherwise. In fact, no evidence was presented by petitioners at all. Justice Leonen, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,
characterizes "profits" (or income/gross sales) as an inchoate right. Another way to view it, as stated by Justice Velasco in his Concurring
Opinion, is that the business establishment merely has a right to profits. The Constitution adverts to it as the right of an enterprise to a
reasonable return on investment.115

Undeniably, this right, like any other right, may be regulated under the police power of the State to achieve important governmental objectives
like protecting the interests and improving the welfare of senior citizens. It should be noted though that potential profits or income/gross sales
are relevant in police power and eminent domain analyses because they may, in appropriate cases, serve as an indicia when a regulation has
gone "too far" as to amount to a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. When the deprivation or reduction of profits or income/gross sales
is shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory, then the challenged governmental regulation may be nullified for being a "taking"
under the power of eminent domain. In such a case, it is not profits or income/gross sales which are actually taken and appropriated for public
use. Rather, when the regulation causes an establishment to incur losses in an unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory manner, what is
actually taken is capital and the right of the business establishment to a reasonable return on investment. If the business losses are not halted
because of the continued operation of the regulation, this eventually leads to the destruction of the business and the total loss of the capital
invested therein. But, again, petitioners in this case failed to prove that the subject regulation is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.

V.

The Dissent further argues that we erroneously used price and rate of return on investment control laws to justify the senior citizen discount
law. According to the Dissent, only profits from industries imbued with public interest may be regulated because this is a condition of their
franchises. Profits of establishments without franchises cannot be regulated permanently because there is no law regulating their profits. The
Dissent concludes that the permanent reduction of total revenues or gross sales of business establishments without franchises is a taking of
private property under the power of eminent domain. In making this argument, it is unfortunate that the Dissent quotes only a portion of the
ponencia The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on
investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. These laws generally regulate public utilities or
industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper
corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on investment of these corporations considering that they have a monopoly over the goods or
services that they provide to the general public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given
establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. x x x116

The above paragraph, in full, states

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control
laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. These laws generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued
with public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the
rate of return on investment of these corporations considering that they have a monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the
general public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of
prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior
citizens.

Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of
price regulatory measures which affects the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

The point of this paragraph is to simply show that the State has, in the past, regulated prices and profits of business establishments. In other
words, this type of regulatory measures is traditionally recognized as police power measures so that the senior citizen discount may be
considered as a police power measure as well. What is more, the substantial distinctions between price and rate of return on investment control
laws vis--vis the senior citizen discount law provide greater reason to uphold the validity of the senior citizen discount law. As previously
discussed, the ability to adjust prices allows the establishment subject to the senior citizen discount to prevent or mitigate any reduction of
profits or income/gross sales arising from the giving of the discount. In contrast, establishments subject to price and rate of return on investment
control laws cannot adjust prices accordingly. Certainly, there is no intention to say that price and rate of return on investment control laws are
the justification for the senior citizen discount law. Not at all. The justification for the senior citizen discount law is the plenary powers of
Congress. The legislative power to regulate business establishments is broad and covers a wide array of areas and subjects. It is well within
Congress legislative powers to regulate the profits or income/gross sales of industries and enterprises, even those without franchises. For what
are franchises but mere legislative enactments? There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Congress from regulating the profits or
income/gross sales of industries and enterprises without franchises. On the contrary, the social justice provisions of the Constitution enjoin the
State to regulate the "acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition" of property and its increments. 117

This may cover the regulation of profits or income/gross sales of all businesses, without qualification, to attain the objective of diffusing wealth
in order to protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity.118

Thus, under the social justice policy of the Constitution, business establishments may be compelled to contribute to uplifting the plight of
vulnerable or marginalized groups in our society provided that the regulation is not arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory, or is not in breach of
some specific constitutional limitation. When the Dissent, therefore, states that the "profits of private establishments which are non-franchisees
cannot be regulated permanently, and there is no such law regulating their profits permanently," 119 it is assuming what it ought to prove. First,
there are laws which, in effect, permanently regulate profits or income/gross sales of establishments without franchises, and RA 9257 is one
such law. And, second, Congress can regulate such profits or income/gross sales because, as previously noted, there is nothing in the
Constitution to prevent it from doing so. Here, again, it must be emphasized that petitioners failed to present any proof to show that the effects
of the assailed law on their operations has been unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. The permanent regulation of profits or income/gross
sales of business establishments, even those without franchises, is not as uncommon as the Dissent depicts it to be. For instance, the
minimum wage law allows the State to set the minimum wage of employees in a given region or geographical area. Because of the added labor
costs arising from the minimum wage, a permanent reduction of profits or income/gross sales would result, assuming that the employer does
not increase the prices of his goods or services. To illustrate, suppose it costs a company P5.00 to produce a product and it sells the same
at P10.00 with a 50% profit margin. Later, the State increases the minimum wage. As a result, the company incurs greater labor costs so that it
now costs P7.00 to produce the same product. The profit per product of the company would be reduced to P3.00 with a profit margin of 30%.
The net effect would be the same as in the earlier example of granting a 20% senior citizen discount. As can be seen, the minimum wage law
could, likewise, lead to a permanent reduction of profits. Does this mean that the minimum wage law should, likewise, be declared
unconstitutional on the mere plea that it results in a permanent reduction of profits? Taking it a step further, suppose the company decides to
increase the price of its product in order to offset the effects of the increase in labor cost; does this mean that the minimum wage law, following
the reasoning of the Dissent, is unconstitutional because the consuming public is effectively made to subsidize the wage of a group of laborers,
i.e., minimum wage earners? The same reasoning can be adopted relative to the examples cited by the Dissent which, according to it, are valid
police power regulations. Article 157 of the Labor Code, Sections 19 and 18 of the Social Security Law, and Section 7 of the Pag-IBIG Fund
Law would effectively increase the labor cost of a business establishment. This would, in turn, be integrated as part of the cost of its goods or
services. Again, if the establishment does not increase its prices, the net effect would be a permanent reduction in its profits or income/gross
sales. Following the reasoning of the Dissent that "any form of permanent taking of private property (including profits or income/gross
sales)120 is an exercise of eminent domain that requires the State to pay just compensation," 121 then these statutory provisions would, likewise,
have to be declared unconstitutional. It does not matter that these benefits are deemed part of the employees legislated wages because the
net effect is the same, that is, it leads to higher labor costs and a permanent reduction in the profits or income/gross sales of the business
establishments.122

The point then is this most, if not all, regulatory measures imposed by the State on business establishments impact, at some level, the latters
prices and/or profits or income/gross sales.123

If the Court were to sustain the Dissents theory, then a wholesale nullification of such measures would inevitably result. The police power of the
State and the social justice provisions of the Constitution would, thus, be rendered nugatory. There is nothing sacrosanct about profits or
income/gross sales. This, we made clear in Carlos Superdrug Corporation: 124

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer
loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in
its favor.

xxxx

The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of the business. While the
Constitution protects property rights petitioners must the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the
operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the percept for the protection of property,
various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continously serve as a
reminder for the promotion of public good.

Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments
concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose
or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the
continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain form quashing a legislative
act.125

In conclusion, we maintain that the correct rule in determining whether the subject regulatory measure has amounted to a "taking" under the
power of eminent domain is the one laid down in Alalayan v. National Power Corporation126 and followed in Carlos Superdurg
Corporation127 consistent with long standing principles in police power and eminent domain analysis. Thus, the deprivation or reduction of
profits or income. Gross sales must be clearly shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Under the specific circumstances of this
case, such determination can only be made upon the presentation of competent proof which petitioners failed to do. A law, which has been in
operation for many years and promotes the welfare of a group accorded special concern by the Constitution, cannot and should not be
summarily invalidated on a mere allegation that it reduces the profits or income/gross sales of business establishments.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193462, February 04, 2014

DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner, v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

This is a petition for mandamus1 to compel:

1.) the Commission on Audit (COA) to audit and examine the funds of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), and

2.) the MECO to submit to such audit and examination.

The antecedents:

Prelude

The aftermath of the Chinese civil war2 left the country of China with two (2) governments in a stalemate espousing competing assertions of
sovereignty.3 On one hand is the communist Peoples Republic of China (PROC) which controls the mainland territories, and on the other hand
is the nationalist Republic of China (ROC) which controls the island of Taiwan. For a better part of the past century, both the PROC and ROC
adhered to a policy of One China i.e., the view that there is only one legitimate government in China, but differed in their respective
interpretation as to which that government is.4

With the existence of two governments having conflicting claims of sovereignty over one country, came the question as to which of the two is
deserving of recognition as that countrys legitimate government. Even after its relocation to Taiwan, the ROC used to enjoy diplomatic
recognition from a majority of the worlds states, partly due to being a founding member of the United Nations (UN). 5The number of states
partial to the PROCs version of the One China policy, however, gradually increased in the 1960s and 70s, most notably after the UN General
Assembly adopted the monumental Resolution 2758 in 1971.6 Since then, almost all of the states that had erstwhile recognized the ROC as the
legitimate government of China, terminated their official relations with the said government, in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with the
PROC.7 The Philippines is one of such states.

The Philippines formally ended its official diplomatic relations with the government in Taiwan on 9 June 1975, when the country and the PROC
expressed mutual recognition thru the Joint Communiqu of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
Peoples Republic of China (Joint Communiqu).8

Under the Joint Communiqu, the Philippines categorically stated its adherence to the One Chinapolicy of the PROC. The pertinent portion of
the Joint Communiqu reads:9

The Philippine Government recognizes the Government of the Peoples Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, fully
understands and respects the position of the Chinese Government that there is but one China and that Taiwan is an integral part of
Chinese territory, and decides to remove all its official representations from Taiwan within one month from the date of signature of
this communiqu. (Emphasis supplied)

The Philippines commitment to the One China policy of the PROC, however, did not preclude the country from keeping unofficial relations with
Taiwan on a peopletopeople basis.10 Maintaining ties with Taiwan that is permissible by the terms of the Joint Communiqu, however,
necessarily required the Philippines, and Taiwan, to course any such relations thru offices outside of the official or governmental organs.

Hence, despite ending their diplomatic ties, the people of Taiwan and of the Philippines maintained an unofficial relationship facilitated by the
offices of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, for the former, and the MECO, for the latter. 11

The MECO12 was organized on 16 December 1997 as a nonstock, nonprofit corporation under Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 or the Corporation
Code.13 The purposes underlying the incorporation of MECO, as stated in its articles of incorporation, 14 are as follows:

1. To establish and develop the commercial and industrial interests of Filipino nationals here and abroad, and assist on all
measures designed to promote and maintain the trade relations of the country with the citizens of other foreign countries;

2. To receive and accept grants and subsidies that are reasonably necessary in carrying out the corporate purposes provided they are
not subject to conditions defeatist for or incompatible with said purpose;

3. To acquire by purchase, lease or by any gratuitous title real and personal properties as may be necessary for the use and need of the
corporation, and to dispose of the same in like manner when they are no longer needed or useful; and

4. To do and perform any and all acts which are deemed reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

From the moment it was incorporated, the MECO became the corporate entity entrusted by the Philippine government with the responsibility
of fostering friendly and unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan, particularly in the areas of trade, economic cooperation, investment,
cultural, scientific and educational exchanges.15 To enable it to carry out such responsibility, the MECO was authorized by the government to
perform certain consular and other functions that relates to the promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan.16

At present, it is the MECO that oversees the rights and interests of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in Taiwan; promotes the Philippines as a
tourist and investment destination for the Taiwanese; and facilitates the travel of Filipinos and Taiwanese from Taiwan to the Philippines,
and vice versa.17

Facts Leading to the Mandamus Petition

On 23 August 2010, petitioner sent a letter18 to the COA requesting for a copy of the latest financial and audit report of the MECO invoking, for
that purpose, his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. The petitioner made the request on the belief that the MECO,
being under the operational supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is a government owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.19

Petitioners letter was received by COA Assistant Commissioner Jaime P. Naranjo, the following day.

On 25 August 2010, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum20 referring the petitioners request to COA Assistant
Commissioner Emma M. Espina for further disposition. In thismemorandum, however, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo revealed that the
MECO was not among the agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector.21

On 7 September 2010, petitioner learned about the 25 August 2010 memorandum and its contents.

Mandamus Petition

Taking the 25 August 2010 memorandum as an admission that the COA had never audited and examined the accounts of the MECO, the
petitioner filed the instant petition for mandamus on 8 September 2010. Petitioner filed the suit in his capacities as taxpayer, concerned citizen,
a member of the Philippine Bar and law book author.22 He impleaded both the COA and the MECO.

Petitioner posits that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA is neglecting its duty under Section 2(1), Article IXD of the
Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide GOCC or government instrumentality. It is the adamant claim of the petitioner that
the MECO is a GOCCwithout an original charter or, at least, a government instrumentality, the funds of which partake the nature of public
funds.23

According to petitioner, the MECO possesses all the essential characteristics of a GOCC and an instrumentality under the Executive Order No.
(EO) 292, s. 1987 or the Administrative Code: it is a nonstock corporation vested with governmental functions relating to public needs; it is
controlled by the government thru a board of directors appointed by the President of the Philippines; and while not integrated within the
executive departmental framework, it is nonetheless under the operational and policy supervision of the DTI.24 As petitioner substantiates:
 1. The MECO is vested with government functions. It performs functions that are equivalent to those of an embassy or a consulate of the
Philippine government.25 A reading of the authorized functions of the MECO as found in EO No. 15, s. 2001, reveals that they are
substantially the same functions performed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), through its diplomatic and consular missions,
per the Administrative Code.26]

2. The MECO is controlled by the government. It is the President of the Philippines that actually appoints the directors of the MECO,
albeit indirectly, by way of desire letters addressed to the MECOs board of directors.27 An illustration of this exercise is the
assumption by Mr. Antonio Basilio as chairman of the board of directors of the MECO in 2001, which was accomplished when former
President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, through a memorandum28dated 20 February 2001, expressed her desire to the board of
directors of the MECO for the election of Mr. Basilio as chairman. 29]

3. The MECO is under the operational and policy supervision of the DTI. The MECO was placed under the operational supervision of the
DTI by EO No. 328, s. of 2004, and again under the policy supervision of the same department by EO No. 426, s. 2005. 30

To further bolster his position that the accounts of the MECO ought to be audited by the COA, the petitioner calls attention to the practice,
allegedly prevailing in the United States of America, wherein the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)the counterpart entity of the MECO in the
United Statesis supposedly audited by that countrys Comptroller General. 31 Petitioner claims that this practice had been confirmed in a
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in the case of Wood, Jr., ex rel. United States of America v.
The American Institute in Taiwan, et al.32

The Position of the MECO

The MECO prays for the dismissal of the mandamus petition on procedural and substantial grounds.

On procedure, the MECO argues that the mandamus petition was prematurely filed.33

The MECO posits that a cause of action for mandamus to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law only ripens once there
has been a refusal by the tribunal, board or officer concerned to perform such a duty. 34 The MECO claims that there was, in this case, no such
refusal either on its part or on the COAs because the petitioner never made any demand for it to submit to an audit by the COA or for the COA
to perform such an audit, prior to filing the instant mandamuspetition.35 The MECO further points out that the only demand that the petitioner
made was his request to the COA for a copy of the MECOs latest financial and audit reportwhich request was not even finally disposed of by
the time the instant petition was filed.36

On the petitions merits, the MECO denies the petitioners claim that it is a GOCC or a government instrumentality. 37 While performing public
functions, the MECO maintains that it is not owned or controlled by the government, and its funds are private funds.38 The MECO explains:

1. It is not owned or controlled by the government. Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, the President of the Philippines does not
appoint its board of directors.39 The desire letter that the President transmits is merely recommendatory and not binding on the
corporation.40As a corporation organized under the Corporation Code, matters relating to the election of its directors and officers, as
well as its membership, are governed by the appropriate provisions of the said code, its articles of incorporation and its by
laws.41 Thus, it is the directors who elect the corporations officers; the members who elect the directors; and the directors who admit
the members by way of a unanimous resolution. All of its officers, directors, and members are private individuals and are not
government officials.42]

2. The government merely has policy supervision over it. Policy supervision is a lesser form of supervision wherein the governments
oversight is limited only to ensuring that the corporations activities are in tune with the countrys commitments under the One
China policy of the PROC.43 The daytoday operations of the corporation, however, remain to be controlled by its duly elected board
of directors.44

The MECO emphasizes that categorizing it as a GOCC or a government instrumentality can potentially violate the countrys commitment to
the One China policy of the PROC.45 Thus, the MECO cautions against applying to the present mandamus petition the pronouncement in
the Wood decision regarding the alleged auditability of the AIT in the United States. 46

The Position of the COA

The COA, on the other hand, advances that the mandamus petition ought to be dismissed on procedural grounds and on the ground of
mootness.

The COA argues that the mandamus petition suffers from the following procedural defects:

1. The petitioner lacks locus standi to bring the suit. The COA claims that the petitioner has not shown, at least in a concrete manner,
that he had been aggrieved or prejudiced by its failure to audit the accounts of the MECO.47]

2. The petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The COA faults the filing of the instant mandamus petition
directly with this Court, when such petition could have very well been presented, at the first instance, before the Court of Appeals or
any Regional Trial Court.48 The COA claims that the petitioner was not able to provide compelling reasons to justify a direct resort to
the Supreme Court.49

At any rate, the COA argues that the instant petition already became moot when COA Chairperson Maria Gracia M. PulidoTan (PulidoTan)
issued Office Order No. 201169850 on 6 October 2011.51The COA notes that under Office Order No. 2011698, Chairperson PulidoTan
already directed a team of auditors to proceed to Taiwan, specifically for the purpose of auditing the accounts of, among other government
agencies based therein, the MECO.52

In conceding that it has audit jurisdiction over the accounts of the MECO, however, the COA clarifies that it does not consider the former as a
GOCC or a government instrumentality. On the contrary, the COA maintains that the MECO is a nongovernmental entity.53

The COA argues that, despite being a nongovernmental entity, the MECO may still be audited with respect to the verification fees for
overseas employment documents that it collects from Taiwanese employers on behalf of the DOLE. 54 The COA claims that, under Joint Circular
No. 399,55 the MECO is mandated to remit to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a portion of such verification fees.56 The
COA, therefore, classifies the MECO as a nongovernmental entity required to pay xxx government share subject to a partial audit of its
accounts under Section 26 of the Presidential Decree No. 1445 or the State Audit Code of the Philippines (Audit Code). 57

OUR RULING
We grant the petition in part. We declare that the MECO is a nongovernmental entity. However, under existing laws, the accounts of the
MECO pertaining to the verification fees it collects on behalf of the DOLE as well as the fees it was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of
EO No. 15, s. 2001, are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Such fees pertain to the government and should be audited by the COA.

We begin with the preliminary issues.

Mootness of Petition

The first preliminary issue relates to the alleged mootness of the instant mandamus petition, occasioned by the COAs issuance of Office Order
No. 2011698. The COA claims that by issuingOffice Order No. 2011698, it had already conceded its jurisdiction over the accounts of the
MECO and so fulfilled the objective of the instant petition. 58 The COA thus urges that the instant petition be dismissed for being moot and
academic.59

We decline to dismiss the mandamus petition on the ground of mootness.

A case is deemed moot and academic when, by reason of the occurrence of a supervening event, it ceases to present any justiciable
controversy.60 Since they lack an actual controversy otherwise cognizable by courts, moot cases are, as a rule, dismissible.61

The rule that requires dismissal of moot cases, however, is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions. In David v. MacapagalArroyo,62 this Court
comprehensively captured these exceptions scattered throughout our jurisprudence:

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;63second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; 64third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public;65 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.66

In this case, We find that the issuance by the COA of Office Order No. 2011698 indeed qualifies as a supervening event that effectively
renders moot and academic the main prayer of the instantmandamus petition. A writ of mandamus to compel the COA to audit the accounts of
the MECO would certainly be a mere superfluity, when the former had already obliged itself to do the same.

Be that as it may, this Court refrains from dismissing outright the petition. We believe that themandamus petition was able to craft substantial
issues presupposing the commission of a grave violation of the Constitution and involving paramount public interest, which need to be
resolved nonetheless:

First. The petition makes a serious allegation that the COA had been remiss in its constitutional or legal duty to audit and examine the accounts
of an otherwise auditable entity in the MECO.

Second. There is paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue concerning the failure of the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO.
The propriety or impropriety of such a refusal is determinative of whether the COA was able to faithfully fulfill its constitutional role as the
guardian of the public treasury, in which any citizen has an interest.

Third. There is also paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue regarding the legal status of the MECO; a novelty insofar as our
jurisprudence is concerned. We find that the status of the MECOwhether it may be considered as a government agency or nothas a direct
bearing on the countrys commitment to the One China policy of the PROC.67

An allegation as serious as a violation of a constitutional or legal duty, coupled with the pressing public interest in the resolution of all related
issues, prompts this Court to pursue a definitive ruling thereon, if not for the proper guidance of the government or agency concerned, then for
the formulation of controlling principles for the education of the bench, bar and the public in general.68 For this purpose, the Court
invokes its symbolic function.69

If the foregoing reasons are not enough to convince, We still add another:

Assuming that the allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true, Office Order No. 2011698does not offer the strongest certainty that
they would not be replicated in the future. In the first place, Office Order No. 2011698 did not state any legal justification as to why, after
decades of not auditing the accounts of the MECO, the COA suddenly decided to do so. Neither does it state any determination regarding the
true status of the MECO. The justifications provided by the COA, in fact, only appears in the memorandum 70 it submitted to this Court for
purposes of this case.

Thus, the inclusion of the MECO in Office Order No. 2011698 appears to be entirely dependent upon the judgment of the incumbent
chairperson of the COA; susceptible of being undone, with or without reason, by her or even her successor. Hence, the case now before this
Court is dangerously capable of being repeated yet evading review.

Verily, this Court should not dismiss the mandamus petition on the ground of mootness.

Standing of Petitioner

The second preliminary issue is concerned with the standing of the petitioner to file the instantmandamus petition. The COA claims that
petitioner has none, for the latter was not able to concretely establish that he had been aggrieved or prejudiced by its failure to audit the
accounts of the MECO.71

Related to the issue of lack of standing is the MECOs contention that petitioner has no cause of action to file the instant mandamus petition.
The MECO faults petitioner for not making any demand for it to submit to an audit by the COA or for the COA to perform such an audit, prior to
filing the instant petition.72

We sustain petitioners standing, as a concerned citizen, to file the instant petition.

The rules regarding legal standing in bringing public suits, or locus standi, are already welldefined in our case law. Again, We cite David,
which summarizes jurisprudence on this point:73

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

We rule that the instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance, involved as they are with the performance of a constitutional
duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA. Hence, We hold that the petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has the requisite legal standing to file the
instant mandamuspetition.

To be sure, petitioner does not need to make any prior demand on the MECO or the COA in order to maintain the instant petition. The duty of
the COA sought to be compelled by mandamus, emanates from the Constitution and law, which explicitly require, or demand, that it perform
the said duty. To the mind of this Court, petitioner already established his cause of action against the COA when he alleged that the COA had
neglected its duty in violation of the Constitution and the law.

Principle of Hierarchy of Courts

The last preliminary issue is concerned with the petitions nonobservance of the principle of hierarchy of courts. The COA assails the filing of
the instant mandamus petition directly with this Court, when such petition could have very well been presented, at the first instance, before the
Court of Appeals or any Regional Trial Court.74 The COA claims that the petitioner was not able to provide compelling reasons to justify a direct
resort to the Supreme Court.75

In view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the mandamus petition, as earlier mentioned, this Court waives this last
procedural issue in favor of a resolution on the merits. 76

II

To the merits of this petition, then.

The single most crucial question asked by this case is whether the COA is, under prevailing law, mandated to audit the accounts of the MECO.
Conversely, are the accounts of the MECO subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA?

Law, of course, identifies which accounts of what entities are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

Under Section 2(1) of Article IXD of the Constitution,77 the COA was vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle
the accounts of the following entities:

1. The government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities;

2. GOCCs with original charters;

3. GOCCs without original charters;

4. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution; and

5. Nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by
law or the granting institution to submit to the COA for audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.78

The term accounts mentioned in the subject constitutional provision pertains to the revenue, receipts, expenditures and uses of funds
and property of the foregoing entities.79

Complementing the constitutional power of the COA to audit accounts of nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity xxx from or
through the government is Section 29(1)80 of the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial authority over the following nongovernmental
entities:

1. Nongovernmental entities subsidized by the government;

2. Nongovernmental entities required to pay levy or government share;

3. Nongovernmental entities that have received counterpart funds from the government; and

4. Nongovernmental entities partly funded by donations through the government.

Section 29(1) of the Audit Code, however, limits the audit of the foregoing nongovernmental entities only to funds xxx coming from or through
the government.81 This section of the Audit Code is, in turn, substantially reproduced in Section 14(1), Book V of the Administrative Code.82

In addition to the foregoing, the Administrative Code also empowers the COA to examine and audit the books, records and accounts of public
utilities in connection with the fixing of rates of every nature, or in relation to the proceedings of the proper regulatory agencies, for purposes of
determining franchise tax.83

Both petitioner and the COA claim that the accounts of the MECO are within the audit jurisdiction of the COA, but vary on the extent of the audit
and on what type of auditable entity the MECO is. The petitioner posits that all accounts of the MECO are auditable as the latter is a bona
fide GOCC or government instrumentality.84 On the other hand, the COA argues that only the accounts of the MECO that pertain to the
verification fees it collects on behalf of the DOLE are auditable because the former is merely a nongovernmental entity required to pay xxx
government share per the Audit Code.85

We examine both contentions.

The MECO Is Not a GOCC or

Government Instrumentality

We start with the petitioners contention.

Petitioner claims that the accounts of the MECO ought to be audited by the COA because the former is a GOCC or government instrumentality.
Petitioner points out that the MECO is a nonstock corporation vested with governmental functions relating to public needs; it is controlled by
the government thru a board of directors appointed by the President of the Philippines; and it operates outside of the departmental
framework, subject only to the operational and policy supervision of the DTI.86 The MECO thus possesses, petitioner argues, the essential
characteristics of a bona fideGOCC and government instrumentality.87

We take exception to petitioners characterization of the MECO as a GOCC or government instrumentality. The MECO is not a GOCC or
government instrumentality.

Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by reason of some special function or jurisdiction they perform or
exercise, are allotted operational autonomy and are not integrated within the department framework.88 Subsumed under the rubric
government instrumentality are the following entities: 89

1. regulatory agencies,

2. chartered institutions,

3. government corporate entities or government instrumentalities with corporate powers(GCE/GICP),90 and

4. GOCCs

The Administrative Code defines a GOCC:91

(13) Governmentowned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fiftyone (51) per cent of its capital stock: x x x.

The above definition is, in turn, replicated in the more recent Republic Act No. 10149 or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, to wit:92

(o) GovernmentOwned or Controlled Corporation (GOCC) refers to any agency organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at
least a majority of its outstanding capital stock: x x x.

GOCCs, therefore, are stock or nonstock corporations vested with functions relating to public needs that are owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities.93 By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock or non
stock corporation;94second, the public character of its function; and third, government ownership over the same.

Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.

In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and second attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO lacks.

The MECO Is Organized as a NonStock Corporation

The organization of the MECO as a nonstock corporation cannot at all be denied. Records disclose that the MECO was incorporated as a
nonstock corporation under the Corporation Code on 16 December 1977.95 The incorporators of the MECO were Simeon R. Roxas, Florencio
C. Guzon, Manuel K. Dayrit, Pio K. Luz and Eduardo B. Ledesma, who also served as the corporations original members and directors.96

The purposes for which the MECO was organized also establishes its nonprofit character, to wit:97

1. To establish and develop the commercial and industrial interests of Filipino nationals here and abroad and assist on all
measures designed to promote and maintain the trade relations of the country with the citizens of other foreign countries;

2. To receive and accept grants and subsidies that are reasonably necessary in carrying out the corporate purposes provided they are
not subject to conditions defeatist for or incompatible with said purpose;

3. To acquire by purchase, lease or by any gratuitous title real and personal properties as may be necessary for the use and need of the
corporation, and in like manner when they are

4. To do and perform any and all acts which are deemed reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

The purposes for which the MECO was organized are somewhat analogous to those of a trade, business or industry chamber,98 but only on a
much larger scale i.e., instead of furthering the interests of a particular line of business or industry within a local sphere, the MECO seeks to
promote the general interests of the Filipino people in a foreign land.

Finally, it is not disputed that none of the income derived by the MECO is distributable as dividends to any of its members, directors or officers.

Verily, the MECO is organized as a nonstock corporation.

The MECO Performs Functions with a Public Aspect.

The public character of the functions vested in the MECO cannot be doubted either. Indeed, to a certain degree, the functions of the MECO can
even be said to partake of the nature of governmentalfunctions. As earlier intimated, it is the MECO that, on behalf of the people of the
Philippines, currently facilitates unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan.

Consistent with its corporate purposes, the MECO was authorized by the Philippine government to perform certain consular and other
functions relating to the promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan. 99 The full extent of such authorized functions are
presently detailed in Sections 1 and 2 of EO No. 15, s. 2001:

SECTION 1. Consistent with its corporate purposes and subject to the conditions stated in Section 3 hereof, MECO is hereby authorized to
assist in the performance of the following functions:

1. Formulation and implementation of a program to attract and promote investments from Taiwan to Philippine industries and businesses,
especially in manufacturing, tourism, construction and other preferred areas of investments;

2. Promotion of the export of Philippine products and Filipino manpower services, including Philippine management services, to Taiwan;
3. Negotiation and/or assistance in the negotiation and conclusion of agreements or other arrangements concerning trade, investment,
economic cooperation, technology transfer, banking and finance, scientific, cultural, educational and other modes of cooperative endeavors
between the Philippines and Taiwan, on a peopletopeople basis, in accordance with established rules and regulations;

4. Reporting on, and identification of, employment and business opportunities in Taiwan for the promotion of Philippine exports, manpower and
management services, and tourism;

5. Dissemination in Taiwan of information on the Philippines, especially in the fields of trade, tourism, labor, economic cooperation, and cultural,
educational and scientific endeavors;

6. Conduct of periodic assessment of market conditions in Taiwan, including submission of trade statistics and commercial reports for use of
Philippine industries and businesses; and

7. Facilitation, fostering and cultivation of cultural, sports, social, and educational exchanges between the peoples of the Philippines and
Taiwan.

SECTION 2. In addition to the abovementioned authority and subject to the conditions stated in Section 3 hereof, MECO, through its branch
offices in Taiwan, is hereby authorized to perform the following functions:

1. Issuance of temporary visitors visas and transit and crew list visas, and such other visa services as may be authorized by the Department of
Foreign Affairs;

2. Issuance, renewal, extension or amendment of passports of Filipino citizens in accordance with existing regulations, and provision of such
other passport services as may be required under the circumstances;

3. Certification or affirmation of the authenticity of documents submitted for authentication;

4. Providing translation services;

5. Assistance and protection to Filipino nationals and other legal/juridical persons working or residing in Taiwan, including making
representations to the extent allowed by local and international law on their behalf before civil and juridical authorities of Taiwan; and

6. Collection of reasonable fees on the first four (4) functions enumerated above to defray the cost of its operations.

A perusal of the above functions of the MECO reveals its uncanny similarity to some of the functions typically performed by the DFA itself,
through the latters diplomatic and consular missions.100 The functions of the MECO, in other words, are of the kind that would otherwise be
performed by the Philippines own diplomatic and consular organs, if not only for the governments acquiescence that they instead be exercised
by the MECO.

Evidently, the functions vested in the MECO are impressed with a public aspect.

The MECO Is Not Owned or Controlled by the Government

Organization as a nonstock corporation and the mere performance of functions with a public aspect, however, are not by themselves sufficient
to consider the MECO as a GOCC. In order to qualify as a GOCC, a corporation must also, if not more importantly, be owned by the
government.

The government owns a stock or nonstock corporation if it has controlling interest in the corporation. In a stock corporation, the controlling
interest of the government is assured by its ownership of at least fiftyone percent (51%) of the corporate capital stock.101 In a nonstock
corporation, like the MECO, jurisprudence teaches that the controlling interest of the government is affirmed when at least majority of the
members are government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation102 or there is otherwise substantial participation of
the government in the selection of the corporations governing board.103

In this case, the petitioner argues that the government has controlling interest in the MECO because it is the President of the Philippines
that indirectly appoints the directors of the corporation.104 The petitioner claims that the President appoints directors of the MECO thru desire
letters addressed to the corporations board.105 As evidence, the petitioner cites the assumption of one Mr. Antonio Basilio as chairman of the
board of directors of the MECO in 2001, which was allegedly accomplished when former President MacapagalArroyo, through a memorandum
dated 20 February 2001, expressed her desire to the board of directors of the MECO for the election of Mr. Basilio as chairman. 106

The MECO, however, counters that the desire letters that the President transmits are merely recommendatory and not binding on it.107 The
MECO maintains that, as a corporation organized under the Corporation Code, matters relating to the election of its directors and officers, as
well as its membership, are ultimately governed by the appropriate provisions of the said code, its articles of incorporation and its bylaws.108

As between the contrasting arguments, We find the contention of the MECO to be the one more consistent with the law.

The fact of the incorporation of the MECO under the Corporation Code is key. The MECO was correct in postulating that, as a corporation
organized under the Corporation Code, it is governed by the appropriate provisions of the said code, its articles of incorporation and its by
laws. In this case, it is the bylaws109 of the MECO that stipulates that its directors are elected by its members; its officers are elected by its
directors; and its members, other than the original incorporators, are admitted by way of a unanimous board resolution, to wit:

SECTION II. MEMBERSHIP

Article 2. Members shall be classified as (a) Regular and (b) Honorary.

(a) Regular members shall consist of the original incorporators and such other members who, upon application for membership, are
unanimously admitted by the Board of Directors.

(b) Honorary member A person of distinction in business who as sympathizer of the objectives of the corporation, is invited by the Board to be
an honorary member.

SECTION III. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Article 3. At the first meeting of the regular members, they shall organize and constitute themselves as a Board composed of five (5) members,
including its Chairman, each of whom as to serve until such time as his own successor shall have been elected by the regular members in an
election called for the purpose. The number of members of the Board shall be increased to seven (7) when circumstances so warrant and by
means of a majority vote of the Board members and appropriate application to and approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Unless otherwise provided herein or by law, a majority vote of all Board members present shall be necessary to carry out all Board resolutions.

During the same meeting, the Board shall also elect its own officers, including the designation of the principal officer who shall be the
Chairman. In line with this, the Chairman shall also carry the title Chief Executive Officer. The officer who shall head the branch or office for the
agency that may be established abroad shall have the title of Director and Resident Representative. He will also be the ViceChairman. All
other members of the Board shall have the title of Director.

xxxx

SECTION IV. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Article 5. There shall be established an Executive Committee composed of at least three (3) members of the Board. The members of the
Executive Committee shall be elected by the members of the Board among themselves.

xxxx

SECTION VI. OFFICERS: DUTIES, COMPENSATION

Article 8. The officers of the corporation shall consist of a Chairman of the Board, ViceChairman, Chief Finance Officer, and a Secretary.
Except for the Secretary, who is appointed by the Chairman of the Board, other officers and employees of the corporation shall be appointed by
the Board.

The Deputy Representative and other officials and employees of a branch office or agency abroad are appointed solely by the Vice Chairman
and Resident Representative concerned. All such appointments however are subject to ratification by the Board.

It is significant to note that none of the original incorporators of the MECO were shown to be government officials at the time of the
corporations organization. Indeed, none of the members, officers or board of directors of the MECO, from its incorporation up to the present
day, were established as government appointees or public officers designated by reason of their office. There is, in fact, no law or executive
order that authorizes such an appointment or designation. Hence, from a strictly legal perspective, it appears that the presidential desire
letters pointed out by petitionerif such letters even exist outside of the case of Mr. Basilioare, no matter how strong its persuasive effect
may be, merely recommendatory.

The MECO Is Not a Government Instrumentality; It Is a Sui Generis Entity.

The categorical exclusion of the MECO from a GOCC makes it easier to exclude the same from any other class of government instrumentality.
The other government instrumentalities i.e., the regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and GCE/GICP are all, by explicit or implicit
definition, creatures of the law.110 The MECO cannot be any other instrumentality because it was, as mentioned earlier, merely incorporated
under the Corporation Code.

Hence, unless its legality is questioned, and in this case it was not, the fact that the MECO is operating under the policy supervision of the DTI
is no longer a relevant issue to be reckoned with for purposes of this case.

For whatever it is worth, however, and without justifying anything, it is easy enough for this Court to understand the rationale, or necessity even,
of the executive branch placing the MECO under thepolicy supervision of one of its agencies.

It is evident, from the peculiar circumstances surrounding its incorporation, that the MECO was not intended to operate as any other ordinary
corporation. And it is not. Despite its private origins, and perhaps deliberately so, the MECO was entrusted111 by the government with the
delicate and precarious112 responsibility of pursuing unofficial113 relations with the people of a foreign land whose government the Philippines
is bound not to recognize. The intricacy involved in such undertaking is the possibility that, at any given time in fulfilling the purposes for which it
was incorporated, the MECO may find itself engaged in dealings or activities that can directly contradict the Philippines commitment to the One
China policy of the PROC. Such a scenario can only truly be avoided if the executive department exercises some form of oversight, no matter
how limited, over the operations of this otherwise private entity.

Indeed, from hindsight, it is clear that the MECO is uniquely situated as compared with other private corporations. From its overreaching
corporate objectives, its special duty and authority to exercise certain consular functions, up to the oversight by the executive department over
its operationsall the while maintaining its legal status as a nongovernmental entitythe MECO is, for all intents and purposes, sui
generis.

Certain Accounts of the MECO May

Be Audited By the COA.

We now come to the COAs contention.

The COA argues that, despite being a nongovernmental entity, the MECO may still be audited with respect to the verification fees for
overseas employment documents that the latter collects from Taiwanese employers on behalf of the DOLE. 114 The COA claims that, under
Joint Circular No. 399, the MECO is mandated to remit to the national government a portion of such verification fees.115The COA, therefore,
classifies the MECO as a nongovernmental entity required to pay xxx government share per the Audit Code.116

We agree that the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of verification fees is subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. However,
We digress from the view that such accounts are the only ones that ought to be audited by the COA. Upon careful evaluation of the information
made available by the records visvis the spirit and the letter of the laws and executive issuances applicable, We find that the accounts of
the MECO pertaining to the fees it was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001, are likewise subject to the audit
jurisdiction of the COA.

Verification Fees Collected by the MECO

In its comment,117 the MECO admitted that roughly 9% of its income is derived from its share in the verification fees for overseas employment
documents it collects on behalf of the DOLE.

The verification fees mentioned here refers to the service fee for the verification of overseas employment contracts, recruitment agreement or
special powers of attorney that the DOLE was authorized to collect under Section 7 of EO No. 1022, 118 which was issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on 1 May 1985. These fees are supposed to be collected by the DOLE from the foreign employers of OFWs and are
intended to be used for the promotion of overseas employment and for welfare services to Filipino workers within the area of jurisdiction
of [concerned] foreign missions under the administration of the [DOLE].119
Joint Circular 399 was issued by the DOLE, DFA, the Department of Budget Management, the Department of Finance and the COA in an
effort to implement Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1022.120 Thus, under Joint Circular 399, the following officials have been tasked to be the
Verification Fee Collecting Officer on behalf of the DOLE:121

1. The labor attach or duly authorized overseas labor officer at a given foreign post, as duly designated by the DOLE Secretary;

2. n foreign posts where there is no labor attach or duly authorized overseas labor officer, the finance officer or collecting officer of the
DFA duly deputized by the DOLE Secretary as approved by the DFA Secretary;

3. In the absence of such finance officer or collecting officer, the alternate duly designated by the head of the foreign post.

Since the Philippines does not maintain an official post in Taiwan, however, the DOLE entered into a series of Memorandum of Agreements
with the MECO, which made the latter the formers collecting agent with respect to the verification fees that may be due from Taiwanese
employers of OFWs.122Under the 27 February 2004 Memorandum of Agreement between DOLE and the MECO, the verification fees to be
collected by the latter are to be allocated as follows: (a) US$ 10 to be retained by the MECO as administrative fee, (b) US $10 to be remitted to
the DOLE, and (c) US$ 10 to be constituted as a common fund of the MECO and DOLE. 123

Evidently, the entire verification fees being collected by the MECO are receivables of the DOLE.124Such receipts pertain to the DOLE by
virtue of Section 7 of EO No. 1022.

Consular Fees Collected by the MECO

Aside from the DOLE verification fees, however, the MECO also collects consular fees, or fees it collects from the exercise of its delegated
consular functions.

The authority behind consular fees is Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. The said section authorizes the MECO to collect reasonable fees
for its performance of the following consular functions:

1. Issuance of temporary visitors visas and transit and crew list visas, and such other visa services as may be authorized by the DFA;

2. Issuance, renewal, extension or amendment of passports of Filipino citizens in accordance with existing regulations, and provision of
such other passport services as may be required under the circumstances;

3. Certification or affirmation of the authenticity of documents submitted for authentication; and

4. Providing translation services.

Evidently, and just like the peculiarity that attends the DOLE verification fees, there is no consular office for the collection of the consular
fees. Thus, the authority for the MECO to collect the reasonable fees, vested unto it by the executive order.

The consular fees, although held and expended by the MECO by virtue of EO No. 15, s. 2001, are, without question, derived from the
exercise by the MECO of consular functionsfunctions it performs by and only through special authority from the government. There was
never any doubt that the visas, passports and other documents that the MECO issues pursuant to its authorized functions still emanate from
the Philippine government itself.

Such fees, therefore, are received by the MECO to be used strictly for the purpose set out under EO No. 15, s. 2001. They must be reasonable
as the authorization requires. It is the government that has ultimate control over the disposition of the consular fees, which control the
government did exercise when it provided in Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001 that such funds may be kept by the MECO to defray the cost
of its operations.

The Accounts of the MECO Pertaining to the Verification Fees and Consular Fees May Be Audited by the COA.

Section 14(1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit accounts of nongovernmental entities required to pay xxx or
have government share but only with respect to funds xxx coming from or through the government. This provision of law perfectly fits the
MECO:

First. The MECO receives the verification fees by reason of being the collection agent of the DOLEa government agency. Out of its
collections, the MECO is required, by agreement, to remit a portion thereof to the DOLE. Hence, the MECO is accountable to the government
for its collections of such verification fees and, for that purpose, may be audited by the COA.

Second. Like the verification fees, the consular fees are also received by the MECO through the government, having been derived from the
exercise of consular functions entrusted to the MECO by the government. Hence, the MECO remains accountable to the government for its
collections of consular fees and, for that purpose, may be audited by the COA.

Tersely put, the 27 February 2008 Memorandum of Agreement between the DOLE and the MECO and Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001, vis
vis, respectively, the verification fees and the consular fees, grant and at the same time limit the authority of the MECO to collect such
fees. That grant and limit require the audit by the COA of the collections thereby generated.

Conclusion

The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted by the government with the
facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the countrys faithful commitment to the One China policy of the
PROC. However, despite its nongovernmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the verification fees it collects
on behalf of the DOLE and the consular fees it collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of
the MECO pertaining to its collection of such verification fees and consular fees should be audited by the COA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Manila Economic and Cultural Office is hereby declared a
nongovernmental entity. However, the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office pertaining to: the verification fees contemplated by
Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1022 issued 1 May 1985, that the former collects on behalf of the Department of Labor and
Employment, and the fees it was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of Executive Order No. 15 issued 16 May 2001, are subject to the
audit jurisdiction of the COA.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

ABAD, J.:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.

The Facts and the Case

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a
system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure
curiosity;

2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences like associates,
classmates, or friends and read postings from them;

3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;

4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies,
public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and

5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the
internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well
with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and
crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
defamatory statements against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing
theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked
can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For
this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.

Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or
highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending
electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has
the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day
temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the
cybercrime law until further orders.

The Issues Presented

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose
penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These provisions
are:

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;

l. Section 8 on Penalties;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

The Rulings of the Court

Section 4(a)(1)

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the
people and should thus be struck down.

The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, 1 useful in determining the constitutionality of
laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or
race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 3

In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental
freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of another without right.
It is a universally condemned conduct.4

Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools and techniques used by
criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target systems security and
report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the
equivalent of independent auditors who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records. 5

Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be
used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the "get out of jail free card." 6Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior
permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).

Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(3) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

xxxx

(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of
protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. 7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to
others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms.
There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private documents.

All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect 9 or the fear of possible prosecution that
hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating
criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful
conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish
and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of ones constitutional rights.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be
valid.11 Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(6) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

xxxx

(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others
from registering the same, if such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain
name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a
user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary
device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-
squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because
it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the
difference.

But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil
purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith
to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The
challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

b) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the
freedom of the press.

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, 14 it ruled that the
right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law
and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the
right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches 16 and seizures, which is the basis of
the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. 17 In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy
and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. 18

The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his place
and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. 19 The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying
information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity
theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.

Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific conducts proscribed do not
intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion
of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the
unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity
theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover,
acquiring and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.

The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed
from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is
present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or
sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. 21 They express fear that private communications
of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be
regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege
or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." 22 This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces
socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting
individuals.

But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act give a proper perspective on
the issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x between and among two private persons x x x although
that may be a form of obscenity to some."23 The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a
business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. 24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. 25

The subject of Section 4(c)(1)lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activityis not novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes "obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to
engage in prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person
by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration. 27

The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose than satisfy the
market for violence, lust, or pornography.29 The Court weighed the property rights of individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if
containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection,
perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.

In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity.30The Court will not declare
Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining,
controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as
Congress has intended.

Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act
of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for
in Republic Act No. 9775.

It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in
cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography
using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the
intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty. 32 The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of
child pornography"33 clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to punish. 34 Petitioners
are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for producing child
pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies
to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.

The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For now the Court must hold
that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.

Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(3) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system
which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users,
subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial
electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce
the recipients to read the message.

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early
internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam." The
term referred to a Monty Pythons Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam" when reading
options from a menu.35

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that
wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with
the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams
enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers." Secondly, people,
before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as
nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail
ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. 36 The State cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on
cyberlibel.

The RPC provisions on libel read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus
Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a
computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code 37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the
requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis
for conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal
code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence
requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People39 even where the offended parties happened to
be public figures.

The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable
falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. 43

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required to establish guilt. The
defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a
public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land
Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that
these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure.
Societys interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.44

Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of actual malice or malice in
fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who were public figures. Actually, the Court found the
presence of malice in fact in that case. Thus:

It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner
cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article
being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign.
(Emphasis ours)

Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against public figures in the above case, cinema and
television personalities, when it modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine ofP6,000.00.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its
existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. 45 For his defense, the accused must show that he has a
justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. 46

Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the countrys obligations under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines, 47 the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that penal defamation laws should include the defense of truth.

But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it
happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making the statement by
good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:

Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be
acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been
made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.

Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that defamation laws
be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression. 48Indeed, the ICCPR states that although everyone should enjoy
freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain
restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law. 49

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings
with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is
distinct from that of print.

The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of
quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the
networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users. Whether these
reactions to defamatory statement posted on the internet constitute aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law punishes,
is another matter that the Court will deal with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.

Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall
be held liable.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or
attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
protected expression.

The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the
freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that
plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.51 The legislature is not
required to define every single word contained in the laws they craft.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets another in destroying a
forest,52 smuggling merchandise into the country,53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of laborers,54 his action is essentially physical and so
is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character. These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense
and human experience.

But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea of "aiding or abetting"
wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.

According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet within a year, translating to about
31 million users.55 Based on a recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most engaged countries for social networking.56 Social
networking sites build social relations among people who, for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections.57

Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared interests use Facebook to get
in touch.58 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange
messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile. 59 A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook,
which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the users privacy settings.

If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook can react to the posting,
clicking any of several buttons of preferences on the programs screen such as "Like," "Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies that the reader
likes the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his feelings or views about the same, such as "This is great!" W hen a Facebook
user "Shares" a posting, the original "posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently making it visible to his down-line
Facebook Friends.

Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send and read short text-based
messages of up to 140 characters. These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the practice of posting small pieces of digital content
which could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or other mediaon the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has
"Followers," those who subscribe to this particular users posts, enabling them to read the same, and "Following," those whom this particular
user is subscribed to, enabling him to read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available only to his Followers, or to
the general public. If a post is available to the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting is just reposting or
republishing another persons tweet without the need of copying and pasting it.

In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the
internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet caf that may have provided the computer used for posting the blog;
e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site. 60 Now, suppose Maria (a
blogger) maintains a blog on WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the internet to access her blog so she subscribes to Sun
Broadband (Internet Service Provider).

One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public official has an illicit affair with a movie star. Linda, one
of Marias friends who sees this post, comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral." Marias original post is then multiplied by
her friends and the latters friends, and down the line to friends of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda,
comes across this blog, finds it interesting and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her Twitter account. Nenas "Followers"
then "Retweet" the link to that blog site.

Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random persons "Retweet" of Nenas original tweet and posts this on her Facebook account.
Immediately, Pamelas Facebook Friends start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting. A lot of them even press the Share
button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds, thousands, and greater postings.

The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with others, to be
regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand is a
thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did not
author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses
agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a
crime.

But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or Followers, availing
themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex world of
cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?

Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk
sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And,
considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed
in court, who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?

The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round hole when applied to cyberspace libel. Unless
the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect
on the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.

The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 61 a case involving the constitutionality of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing transmission, by means of a telecommunications device, of

"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an interactive computer service to
send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age or to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age
communications that, in context, depict or describe, in terms "patently offensive" as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs.

Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First Amendments guarantee of freedom of speech for being overbroad. The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed and ruled:

The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. 223, is a matter of special concern for two reasons. First, the
CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special U.S. Const. amend. I concerns because of its
obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction,
the CDA threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may
well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, this
increased deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses greater U.S. Const. amend. I
concerns than those implicated by certain civil regulations.

xxxx

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. 223, presents a great threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the
statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be
entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDAs burden on
protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. (Emphasis ours)

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast
across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and
friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace
communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
invading the area of protected freedoms.62

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust
discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 63 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. 64 Hence,
Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.
The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to
penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount facial challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."

In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground absence of due
process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.66

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims
no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person
who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in
order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence. 67

As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of
punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great
masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that
they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens are not given "fair notice"
or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or not one
netizens comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not?

Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory story against Armand like
"He beats his wife and children," then that should be considered an original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code and the
cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations that society values. Allowed to
cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between social or
economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.

In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures, stores, and indexes child pornography and facilitates the
completion of transactions involving the dissemination of child pornography," does this make Google and its users aiders and abettors in the
commission of child pornography crimes?68 Byars highlights a feature in the American law on child pornography that the Cybercrimes law
lacksthe exemption of a provider or notably a plain user of interactive computer service from civil liability for child pornography as follows:

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene...whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. 69

When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively republishes it whether wittingly or unwittingly. Does this make
him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When a user downloads the Facebook mobile application, the user may give
consent to Facebook to access his contact details. In this way, certain information is forwarded to third parties and unsolicited commercial
communication could be disseminated on the basis of this information.70 As the source of this information, is the user aiding the distribution of
this communication? The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve users of annoying fear of possible criminal prosecution.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its
obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace
front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated.71 In the
absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand
scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal
Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on
Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related
Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of
the freedom of expression.

The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker may for instance have done
all that is necessary to illegally access another partys computer system but the security employed by the systems lawful owner could frustrate
his effort. Another hacker may have gained access to usernames and passwords of others but fail to use these because the system supervisor
is alerted.72 If Section 5 that punishes any person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is not upheld, the owner of the username
and password could not file a complaint against him for attempted hacking. But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from liability
simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.

Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the innocent. 73 While this may be true with respect to
cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section
4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1)
as well as the actors aiding and abetting the commission of such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit tracking
of their works. Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use
of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there
exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes
committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims
or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 7 provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized
simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the other.74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave
the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice
versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense.
Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section
4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. 75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. 76

The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs scope so as to include identical
activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPAs definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount
commensurate to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more
than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred
thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as
enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a
fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than
that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five
hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.

Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of
Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices; when the crime punishable under 4(a) is
committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of
severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to
determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element
of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. 77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have
no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. 78

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 12 provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by
technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content,
nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated
information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any
such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil
liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and
where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of
every individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another.

The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require the disclosure of matters normally
considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, 79 that there is a
compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn.80 In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights,
courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.81

Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in
cyberspace for public good.82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance
its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.

Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law enforcement authorities with
the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as
Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt legislative measures to
empower state authorities to collect or record "traffic data, in real time, associated with specified communications." 83 And this is precisely what
Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to collect or record such data.

But is not evidence of yesterdays traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it has been committed, adequate for fighting cybercrimes and,
therefore, real-time data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system
without right,84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration; 86 and producing child
pornography87 could easily evade detection and prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or laptops from day to
day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafs, from kindred places that provide free
internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with
unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals can
quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding
their places of operations. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search
and seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.

Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal
boundaries and invading the peoples right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that
certain constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that there exists
an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms. 89

But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy
and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while informational
privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those who
oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an
objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 92

Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular person or group, petitioners
challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population
who use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured from the
general publics point of view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.

As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his communication through a service provider, must of necessity disclose
to the latter, a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user. For example, an ICT user who writes a text
message intended for another ICT user must furnish his service provider with his cellphone number and the cellphone number of his recipient,
accompanying the message sent. It is this information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in an
envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through the postal service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no
one will read the information appearing outside the envelope.
Computer datamessages of all kindstravel across the internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to parcels of letters or things
that are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into packets and around each of these
packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data: information that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of
data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the
packet fits together with other packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose
the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The
packets travel from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back together.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and
the recipient.

For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service providers communications system will put his voice
message into packets and send them to the other persons cellphone where they are refitted together and heard. The latters spoken reply is
sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by the service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number to the service provider
when he puts his call through. He also reveals the cellphone number to the person he calls. The other ways of communicating electronically
follow the same basic pattern.

In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone users in the 70s must realize
that they necessarily convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a call. That Court ruled that even if there is an
expectation that phone numbers one dials should remain private, such expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.

In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over cyberspace except
through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The
conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation to privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is
not prepared to recognize as reasonable.

The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled
together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create profiles of the persons under surveillance. With
enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a persons close associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual
preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right
to privacy. But has the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to protect individual rights?

Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-
time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is
left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the meaning of every
word it uses in drafting the law.

Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel situation,
fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or
motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the
collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is
akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.

Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement agencies use the traffic data to
identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent
cybercrimes from happening?

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection
should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies
holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily
expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no
limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently
threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in real time" because it is not possible to get a court
warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless search is associated with a police officers
determination of probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the search
is immediately carried out, the thing to be searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section 12.

The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal protection to internet users and that the procedure envisioned
by the law could be better served by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare assurance that law enforcement authorities will not abuse
the provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The grant of the power to track cyberspace communications in real time and determine
their sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. 95

Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine.
These doctrines however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its own neither
regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.

This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to monitor individuals and place them under
surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of a technological age x x x operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies
be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 13 provides:
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services provided
by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly
preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data preserved,
transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal
document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.

Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data preservation
order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order
prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.

No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered private
communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for
the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information
relating to communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six
months from receipt of the order for their preservation.

Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The service provider has never
assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.

At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are
not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal
transmission or use of the same.

Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any
person or service provider to disclose or submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the
disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners objection is that the issuance of subpoenas is
a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the
power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers. 98

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law
enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search
or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement
authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and
the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the
undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data storage medium and to
make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court.

Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure procedures. On its face, however,
Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of
computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of
the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements
them.

Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law
enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and
examination.

Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted upon the lapse of the
prescribed period. The Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the service providers storage systems and prevent overload. It
would also ensure that investigations are quickly concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates the users right against
deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the
service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have
saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is
deleted.

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of
this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must
satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.

Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video
recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced
or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service providers systems.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in ones papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.

The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression
over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of
expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him
to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.100

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity
of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency
doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be
blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made
to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 20 provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities
shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of
One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative
finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829, 102 Section 20 necessarily incorporates
elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not
have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.

P.D. 1829 states:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

x x x.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of
guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid
insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.

Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law

Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an
inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the
Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a
computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.

Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.103

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary
to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and
technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and users assets. 104 This definition serves as the parameters
within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by
facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast
and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient
standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications;

b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and

c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.

2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;

b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;

c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;

d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another;

e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;

f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;

g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of
information and communications technologies;

h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;

i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as
specified content data for six months;

j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;

m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;

n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);

o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICCs Powers and Functions; and

p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.

Further, the Court DECLARES:

1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and

2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation
to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System

Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section
4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4)
on online Libel.1wphi1

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the
offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act
9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state
of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government
continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development
of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that
aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial
solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that
merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the
Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine
society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every
democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy 4 - the
clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every
level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the
Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision
may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S.
Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution, and several others, 13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and
Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as citizens
(CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah);
and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
 The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are
abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.35

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as
it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the
duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to
their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear
and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to
free speech.42

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners services.44

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive
health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45

The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or
fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law. 46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to
manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned
and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real
dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their
family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to
determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50

The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress
to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51

The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution. 52

The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM).
It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the
powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH
Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents, 55 Congressman
Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH), 58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De
Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners
lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues
raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on
August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of
the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several
questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices.
As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed
"unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional
substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion
or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper
prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem should be
considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation
to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a
National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will
be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size;
mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated December 8,
1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-
all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing,
limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that policy, the country gave priority
to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the
International Conference on Population and Development. 70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna
Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of
just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The
executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory
for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to
provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and
population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life,
which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH
Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic
Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What
the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the
cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family
planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of
family planning methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal
issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of
Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and
"characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the
RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the
political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and
applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the
Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the
three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper
restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the
Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are
apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of
separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the
kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back
to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to
review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v.
COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision
is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its
operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass
upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing
precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a
law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged
"on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After
all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. 109 The underlying reason for this modification
is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily,
the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion
and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged
by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts
a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to
the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question
the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus
standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be
resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom
of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be
violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of
the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy,
it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning
methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central
idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal
services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and
Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope
of the act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion. 130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after
fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which
already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results
in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use
contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply
is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the
FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it
can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion.
They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health
care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As
the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other
experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a
particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of
the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the
law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon
a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of
R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18,
1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal
ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives
and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public
health, particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-
being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been
grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles
are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection
to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members
of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn
to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned
from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the
recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible,
the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of
the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and
reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that
results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting
in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in
the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all
stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus
was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x. 150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive?
Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by
itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric
rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the
sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46
chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night
follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt
when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum"
may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception." 152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of
conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to
Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very,
dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not
give any doubt to Congress, too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during
the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has
already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed,
these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and
should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient.
Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination
of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established
evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the
unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and
pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this
afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not
"maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it
disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually
stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really
occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it
was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines
conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human
life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual,
with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female gametes or
germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the
mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a
critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of
23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic
genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood
Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred
because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that
destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a
"potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being comm ences at a
scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any
specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.165 According to
him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected." 167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to
the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the
fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the
Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal
proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the
Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make
any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment
of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the
fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or
expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive
health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children;
the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence;
to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however,
That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of
instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an
abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first,
prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or
the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an
abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also
does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one,
there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the
moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To
repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any
drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the
proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as
abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether
natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in
the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word
"primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of
the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient"
if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of
their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together
with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is
that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of
causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that
its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the
word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of
essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing
breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point
out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections
4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive
pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and
promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged,
sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower
development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their
integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why
the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. 184 In
fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited
when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all
to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution
and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there
exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by
respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and
Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines
and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which
provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the
female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose
of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred
pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or
device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription
drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the
RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of
family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement
this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and
projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act
and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect,
and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out
by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it
may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the
Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on
this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded
herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and
non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the
expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the
third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There
must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the
proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who,
because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these
are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and
cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is
contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule
of God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives
violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious
objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer
the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the
petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it
allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no
escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They
claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b)
public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14
of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care
service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act
against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the
religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive
health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to
another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a
serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are
passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no
emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of
rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious
freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate
access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it
natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public
interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's
duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices,
which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is
an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the
constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking
the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned
natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry. 201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being
a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to
refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her
will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the
right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact. 203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is
argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept
information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the
Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception
throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious
beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social
and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of
different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be,
and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government
that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people,
shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence
of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. 205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to
society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of
church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-
versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal
affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another.
On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It
mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus
forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148,
1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion
clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83
S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the
state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without
imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom
of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with
penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for
religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or
the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. 210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the
freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the
exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of
others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." 213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has
been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained
that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose
of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory
of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the compelling state
interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. 219 In Escritor, it
was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American
Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates
the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine
that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the
law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule.
Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went
back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the
"clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in
cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger"
and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction.
Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where
conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and
short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether
immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom
as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in
the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid
of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable
state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious
liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion,
especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty,
reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state,
without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the
support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and
rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this
realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the
no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law
respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights,
the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and
the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands
of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation.
Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and
modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-
based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the
NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to
promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their
religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration
to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and
their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions
and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations,
the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and
programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is
likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children
according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic
concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the
whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they
not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH
Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because
it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's
and unto God the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-
Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly
mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in
line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's
claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating
a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is
no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of
his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the
predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience.222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought
and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that
should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights
guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks
to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any
degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to
provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the
timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether
public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of
1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House
stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more
complexity and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it
would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care
service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to
refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same
applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and
services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an
active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare
service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and
these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the
law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they
belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its
free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think
what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek
other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association. 229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the
equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law
must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in
upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I
presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such
as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office
are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals
cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1]
demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the
burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a
more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his
religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes
disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious
objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving
professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between
medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few
in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes.
And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief. 233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions.
After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or
not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become
pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a
patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents
have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to
religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering
that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-
related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other
legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The
pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-
sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major
causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to
women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of
responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to
educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and
disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health
services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are
encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and
accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with
due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character and the right of children
to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day,
hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." 235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and
figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent
from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of
maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by
a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot
be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given
preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of
a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are
objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If,
however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-
effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation
between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in
favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If
the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the
religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would
have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding
and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled
to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide
on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital
privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total
development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is
devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid
social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future
progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a
miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or
authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures
shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require
mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3,
Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family.
The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a
procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result
in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure
from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. 241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision
they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their
own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides
that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and
spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to
only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into
the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection." 244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to
an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by
couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be
allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are
excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot
replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an
inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior
to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would
result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of
maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as
one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the
latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the
consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about
family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on
the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her
unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn
child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones'
health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived
of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist
her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk
simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve
the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental
consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-
surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of
Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the
petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is
not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country,
the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content,
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the
petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the
1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become
productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing
that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution
makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not
only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-
protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen
pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender
and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides
for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds
that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the
moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with
parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates
Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education program
provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to
them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a
"private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care
institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to
define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in determining whether the
words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts
of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of
the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to
the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional,
who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay
health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health
care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not
be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem
family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing
of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict
and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby
quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty;
failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public
health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is
acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the
programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public
deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor
because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases
are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of
terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH
Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any
form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess
the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the
class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out
or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged,
sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the
RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend
to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would
raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor
in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14,
suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to
substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational
institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They
posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform
acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the
OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a
privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to
prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar
means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be
included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should
be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health
products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity,
purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and
other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy,
purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of
health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA
Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days
only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of
the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods."
From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units
(LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services
funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government
Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled
health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which
the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of
the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the
RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not
infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by
petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the
regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as
they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for
the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power
to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis
for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as
natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by
an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers
and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only
seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more
readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the
society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so
that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising
poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the
very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on
such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse
effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and
fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with
incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample
supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer
younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the
replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the
RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body.
That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the
judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal
to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that
would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of
interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore
limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the
Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women
(R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the
adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his
or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they
affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they
are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar
as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz
(petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando
City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant
was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale,
petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private
complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet;
one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both
agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period
expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht
men's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight
Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of
the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale
thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight
Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented
the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to
Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private
complainant.

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the
same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry,
which he did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1),
subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private
complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00,
or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition stating the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL
INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER
ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF
UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE
SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS
PROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE
WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial
court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this
Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as
Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show
that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private
complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer
of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed against him. He contends that the
Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred
was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was
substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first
time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner 6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material
ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do
not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the
subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the
fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of
the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus,
aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the
prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date
within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy,
hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly
apprised of the charges proferred against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.8

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court
disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he
gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:

PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what
happens (sic) when the deadline came?

a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?

a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?

a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these
amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

a No, sir.9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word
"demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. 12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The
appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the
word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to
present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was
tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that
failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be
established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private
complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation
to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those
pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from
the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in
assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely
on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number
of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered.17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on
persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and
property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since
the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean
Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel
de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed
that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe
that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a
clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. 18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it
proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the
subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of
the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act
committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report
to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except
those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the
Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the
Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C.
Grio-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts
have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ;
but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the
prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is
equal to P100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It
must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the
penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should
have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature
has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to
retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the
years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime
of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it toP50,000,000.00. In the same way, the
legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed
imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does
not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does
not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the
offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the
penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum
penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or
parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months)
is not too far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all
excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime
of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would
be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not changed:

1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6
years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional
maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). 24

3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium
(6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).

4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months
and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).

6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:

1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25

2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional
medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26

3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article
315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions asP10,000.00 may have been
substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving
higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive
the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3,
considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should
be filled by Congress.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an
additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:

....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

x x x x29

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v.
Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be
done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the
harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are
subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the
penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering
a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine.
Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of
his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for
the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely
abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household,
thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that
trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting
the proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the
money malversed by the public official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office,
is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does
not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not
exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is
less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following
the proposal, if the amount malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of
embezzlement ofP20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3, 31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any
monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years) 32under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the
case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the
government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing
unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.

In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the
ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in
entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of
robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years)
and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation,
which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision
mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry
that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value
of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value
of the damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and
not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 will now
become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine
under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized
with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of
Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the proposal, such as those that impose
imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National
Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries
or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a
penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited
Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219
(Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as
Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the
law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 36 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the
penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the
said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because
the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not
in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws
affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that
should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by
merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of
the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can
decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the
Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, 37 each
one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and
cultural settings were far different from todays conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation
and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 38 The Court should
apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly
put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead
to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter;
such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity.
Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the
victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to
the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in
increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested
ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The
law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil
indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 39 of
the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it
does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties
are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to
lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than
that which is plainly written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should be declared
unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no
longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused
convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the
application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of
Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel
than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, 41 the Court
did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42Article III
of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition
and not via the intervention of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty
emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties
were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, 43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never
touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel
or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and
the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. 44

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that
the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community."45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of money
based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and
deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its
socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us
believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct
public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the
legislature.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Thank you.46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense
justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose
an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore,
the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from
the Courts adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case
of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to
prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to
legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil
indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly
based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of
money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the
minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each
additionalP10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.

In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People 48 is highly instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the
division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into
three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 50 of the RPC.51 In the
present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which exceedsP22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added
to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed
exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7
years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is
15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress
and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the
Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT;
REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG
KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH
ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that
"[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges
posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money
pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority
under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive
Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or
offices outside of the Executive.

Antecedents

What has precipitated the controversy?

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some
Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.

Responding to Sen. Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators
Part of Spending Acceleration Program,1 explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by
the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their
letters of request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been
instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down.
He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services;2 (2)
unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that
had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.

The DBM soon came out to claim in its website 3 that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
Services4 appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects
per zero based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been
earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.

The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAPs use of savings,6 namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use
Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the
(a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.

As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained
in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.

The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first
time, and made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger
over Congressional pork barrel "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representatives district"7 excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows:
G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas), 8 on October 16,
2013; G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on
October 17, 2013; G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on November6, 2013; and G.R. No.
209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.
In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Courts attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure
Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP,
directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both
for continuing and current allotments.

In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised and joined.

Issues

Under the Advisory issued on November 14, 2013, the presentations of the parties during the oral arguments were limited to the following, to
wit:

Procedural Issue:

A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
Subsumed in this issue are whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.

Substantive Issues:

B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution insofar as:

(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the term is used
in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;

(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and

(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.

D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators.

E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP, NBC No.
541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.

In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG raised the matter of unprogrammed funds in order to support its argument regarding the Presidents
power to spend. During the oral arguments, the propriety of releasing unprogrammed funds to support projects under the DAP was
considerably discussed. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) dwelled on unprogrammed funds in their
respective memoranda. Hence, an additional issue for the oral arguments is stated as follows:

F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in accord with the GAAs.

During the oral arguments held on November 19, 2013, the Court directed Sec. Abad to submit a list of savings brought under the DAP that had
been sourced from (a) completed programs; (b) discontinued or abandoned programs; (c) unpaid appropriations for compensation; (d) a
certified copy of the Presidents directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in NBC No. 541; and (e) all circulars or orders issued in relation to the
DAP.9

In compliance, the OSG submitted several documents, as follows:

(1) A certified copy of the Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances
and their Realignment);10

(2) Circulars and orders, which the respondents identified as related to the DAP, namely:

a. NBC No. 528 dated January 3, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2011);

b. NBC No. 535 dated December 29, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2012);

c. NBC No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June
30, 2012);

d. NBC No. 545 dated January 2, 2013 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2013);

e. DBM Circular Letter No. 2004-2 dated January 26, 2004 (Budgetary Treatment of Commitments/Obligations of the National Government);

f. COA-DBM Joint Circular No. 2013-1 dated March 15, 2013 (Revised Guidelines on the Submission of Quarterly Accountability Reports on
Appropriations, Allotments, Obligations and Disbursements);

g. NBC No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 (Adoption of a Simplified Fund Release System in the Government).

(3) A breakdown of the sources of savings, including savings from discontinued projects and unpaid appropriations for compensation from 2011
to 2013

On January 28, 2014, the OSG, to comply with the Resolution issued on January 21, 2014 directing the respondents to submit the documents
not yet submitted in compliance with the directives of the Court or its Members, submitted several evidence packets to aid the Court in
understanding the factual bases of the DAP, to wit:

(1) First Evidence Packet11 containing seven memoranda issued by the DBM through Sec. Abad, inclusive of annexes, listing in detail the 116
DAP identified projects approved and duly signed by the President, as follows:

a. Memorandum for the President dated October 12, 2011 (FY 2011 Proposed Disbursement Acceleration Program (Projects and Sources of
Funds);
b. Memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and its
Realignment);

c. Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment);

d. Memorandum for the President dated September 4, 2012 (Release of funds for other priority projects and expenditures of the Government);

e. Memorandum for the President dated December 19, 2012 (Proposed Priority Projects and Expenditures of the Government);

f. Memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment to
Fund the Quarterly Disbursement Acceleration Program); and

g. Memorandum for the President dated September 25, 2013 (Funding for the Task Force Pablo Rehabilitation Plan).

(2) Second Evidence Packet12 consisting of 15 applications of the DAP, with their corresponding Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs)
and appropriation covers;

(3) Third Evidence Packet13 containing a list and descriptions of 12 projects under the DAP;

(4) Fourth Evidence Packet14 identifying the DAP-related portions of the Annual Financial Report (AFR) of the Commission on Audit for 2011
and 2012;

(5) Fifth Evidence Packet15 containing a letter of Department of Transportation and Communications(DOTC) Sec. Joseph Abaya addressed to
Sec. Abad recommending the withdrawal of funds from his agency, inclusive of annexes; and

(6) Sixth Evidence Packet16 a print-out of the Solicitor Generals visual presentation for the January 28, 2014 oral arguments.

On February 5, 2014,17 the OSG forwarded the Seventh Evidence Packet,18 which listed the sources of funds brought under the DAP, the uses
of such funds per project or activity pursuant to DAP, and the legal bases thereof.

On February 14, 2014, the OSG submitted another set of documents in further compliance with the Resolution dated January 28, 2014, viz:

(1) Certified copies of the certifications issued by the Bureau of Treasury to the effect that the revenue collections exceeded the original
revenue targets for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, including collections arising from sources not considered in the original revenue targets,
which certifications were required for the release of the unprogrammed funds as provided in Special Provision No. 1 of Article XLV, Article XVI,
and Article XLV of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs; and (2) A report on releases of savings of the Executive Department for the use of the
Constitutional Commissions and other branches of the Government, as well as the fund releases to the Senate and the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).

RULING

I.

Procedural Issue:

a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies

All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature of the petitions is individually set forth hereunder, to wit:

G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco) Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

G.R. No. 209136 (Luna) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209260 (IBP) Prohibition

G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) Certiorari

G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE) Certiorari and Prohibition

G.R. No. 209569 (VACC) Certiorari and Prohibition

The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of adverse claims between the
parties;19 that the petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a
result of the adoption of the DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners the
legal standing to sue considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of
the taxing or spending power of Congress;20 and that even if the petitioners had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law available to them, like assailing the regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the Commission
on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts.21

The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality
and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive issuances implementing the DAP. 22
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the
constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or
any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the
President in violation of the principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and
NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render. 23

The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in the
COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts
by petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court.24

The respondents arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court,
Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one
of the repositories of judicial power.25 However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its
exercise of the legislative power.

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.

The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a former Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the
proposed provisions on the Judiciary, where he said:

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable
and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband
complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and
that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some
rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court
has, also, another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgmenton matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. (Bold emphasis supplied) 26

Upon interpellation by Commissioner Nolledo, Commissioner Concepcion clarified the scope of judicial power in the following manner:

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x

The second paragraph of Section 1 states: "Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies" The term
"actual controversies" according to the Commissioner should refer to questions which are political in nature and, therefore, the courts should
not refuse to decide those political questions. But do I understand it right that this is restrictive or only an example? I know there are cases
which are not actual yet the court can assume jurisdiction. An example is the petition for declaratory relief.

May I ask the Commissioners opinion about that?

MR. CONCEPCION. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments.

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other
lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a
difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had
authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the
court has the duty to decide.27

Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the great responsibility of the Judiciary in
maintaining the allocation of powers among the three great branches of Government. Speaking for the Court in Angara v. Electoral
Commission,28 Justice Jose P. Laurel intoned:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several department and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

xxxx

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x x
x29

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari
exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company:30

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the Kings Bench,
commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and
speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior courts judgment
was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the
petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in
matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not
proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction,
however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of
Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz:

xxxx

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 31

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it
is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower
court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court
itself.32 The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor: 33

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or
persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the
acts of legislative and executive officials.34
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the
challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication
with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.35

Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional
duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the
Chief Executives spending power.

b) Requisites for the exercise of the

power of judicial review were
complied with

The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must bean actual case or justiciable
controversy before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a
proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.36

The first requisite demands that there be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power by the Court. 37 An actual case or controversy,
in the words of Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa:38

x x x is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."

An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the
constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein
meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are
averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation
of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or
utilized by reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by
the Court.

It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28, 2014 oral arguments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued
because it had fully served its purpose, saying: "In conclusion, Your Honors, may I inform the Court that because the DAP has already fully
served its purpose, the Administrations economic managers have recommended its termination to the President. x x x." 39

The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the
challenges to the DAPs constitutionality, viz:

DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present cases brought to challenge its constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge
should no longer be at the level of the program, which is now extinct, but at the level of its prior applications or the specific disbursements under
the now defunct policy. We challenge the petitioners to pick and choose which among the 116 DAP projects they wish to nullify, the full details
we will have provided by February 5. We urge this Court to be cautious in limiting the constitutional authority of the President and the
Legislature to respond to the dynamic needs of the country and the evolving demands of governance, lest we end up straight jacketing our
elected representatives in ways not consistent with our constitutional structure and democratic principles.40

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.41

The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated
cases. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by
supervening events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional
character and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. 42

Assuming that the petitioners several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely
come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review.

Did the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?

Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 43 The
concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 44 where the Court said:

In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-
present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the
efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:

The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that
the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public
action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works.

Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental
importance." Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in
Araneta v. Dinglasan.

In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far
reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has
been adopted in several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring their suits involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.

However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action
rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action
complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the
Court in the vindication of a public right.

Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the
issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court aptly explains why:

Case law in most jurisdiction snow allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in
Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held
by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is
at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." 45

The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. 46 that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in
constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."

Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the
issuance and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in
preventing the further dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their
right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political branches of the Government.47

On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.48 Luna,
the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed
duty to work for the rule of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action, not to mention its civic duty as the official association
of all lawyers in this country."49

Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer
locus standi on each of them.

In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether
appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included.
As such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised." 50

II.
Substantive Issues

1.
Overview of the Budget System

An understanding of the Budget System of the Philippines will aid the Court in properly appreciating and justly resolving the substantive issues.

a) Origin of the Budget System

The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that had derived from the Latin word bulga (which means bag or purse).51

In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined "budget" as the financial program of the National Government
for a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to
be effective based on the results of operations during the preceding fiscal years. The term was given a different meaning under Republic Act
No. 992 (Revised Budget Act) by describing the budget as the delineation of the services and products, or benefits that would accrue to the
public together with the estimated unit cost of each type of service, product or benefit. 52 For a forthright definition, budget should simply be
identified as the financial plan of the Government, 53 or "the master plan of government."54

The concept of budgeting has not been the product of recent economies. In reality, financing public goals and activities was an idea that existed
from the creation of the State.55 To protect the people, the territory and sovereignty of the State, its government must perform vital functions
that required public expenditures. At the beginning, enormous public expenditures were spent for war activities, preservation of peace and
order, security, administration of justice, religion, and supply of limited goods and services. 56 In order to finance those expenditures, the State
raised revenues through taxes and impositions.57 Thus, budgeting became necessary to allocate public revenues for specific government
functions.58 The States budgeting mechanism eventually developed through the years with the growing functions of its government and
changes in its market economy.

The Philippine Budget System has been greatly influenced by western public financial institutions. This is because of the countrys past as a
colony successively of Spain and the United States for a long period of time. Many aspects of the countrys public fiscal administration,
including its Budget System, have been naturally patterned after the practices and experiences of the western public financial institutions. At
any rate, the Philippine Budget System is presently guided by two principal objectives that are vital to the development of a progressive
democratic government, namely: (1) to carry on all government activities under a comprehensive fiscal plan developed, authorized and
executed in accordance with the Constitution, prevailing statutes and the principles of sound public management; and (2) to provide for the
periodic review and disclosure of the budgetary status of the Government in such detail so that persons entrusted by law with the responsibility
as well as the enlightened citizenry can determine the adequacy of the budget actions taken, authorized or proposed, as well as the true
financial position of the Government.59

b) Evolution of the Philippine Budget System

The budget process in the Philippines evolved from the early years of the American Regime up to the passage of the Jones Law in 1916. A
Budget Office was created within the Department of Finance by the Jones Law to discharge the budgeting function, and was given the
responsibility to assist in the preparation of an executive budget for submission to the Philippine Legislature. 60

As early as under the 1935 Constitution, a budget policy and a budget procedure were established, and subsequently strengthened through the
enactment of laws and executive acts.61 EO No. 25, issued by President Manuel L. Quezon on April 25, 1936, created the Budget Commission
to serve as the agency that carried out the Presidents responsibility of preparing the budget.62 CA No. 246, the first budget law, went into effect
on January 1, 1938 and established the Philippine budget process. The law also provided a line-item budget as the framework of the
Governments budgeting system,63 with emphasis on the observance of a "balanced budget" to tie up proposed expenditures with existing
revenues.

CA No. 246 governed the budget process until the passage on June 4, 1954 of Republic Act (RA) No. 992,whereby Congress introduced
performance-budgeting to give importance to functions, projects and activities in terms of expected results.64 RA No. 992 also enhanced the
role of the Budget Commission as the fiscal arm of the Government. 65

The 1973 Constitution and various presidential decrees directed a series of budgetary reforms that culminated in the enactment of PD No. 1177
that President Marcos issued on July30, 1977, and of PD No. 1405, issued on June 11, 1978. The latter decree converted the Budget
Commission into the Ministry of Budget, and gave its head the rank of a Cabinet member.

The Ministry of Budget was later renamed the Office of Budget and Management (OBM) under EO No. 711. The OBM became the DBM
pursuant to EO No. 292 effective on November 24, 1989.

c) The Philippine Budget Cycle66

Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4)
Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the others but they overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.

c.1.Budget Preparation67

The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call contains budget parameters
earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as policy guidelines and procedures to aid government
agencies in the preparation and submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call,
which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all
government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).

Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and agencies submit their respective Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM.
To boost citizen participation, the current administration has tasked the various departments and agencies to partner with civil society
organizations and other citizen-stakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget Proposals, which proposals are then presented before a
technical panel of the DBM in scheduled budget hearings wherein the various departments and agencies are given the opportunity to defend
their budget proposals. DBM bureaus thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and come up with recommendations for the Executive
Review Board, comprised by the DBM Secretary and the DBMs senior officials. The discussions of the Executive Review Board cover the
prioritization of programs and their corresponding support vis--vis the priority agenda of the National Government, and their implementation.

The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program (NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of spending for each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP),
and is submitted in the form of a proposed GAA. The Details of Selected Programs and Projects is the more detailed disaggregation of key
PAPs in the NEP, especially those in line with the National Governments development plan. The Staffing Summary provides the staffing
complement of each department and agency, including the number of positions and amounts allocated.

The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the President and the Cabinet for further refinements or
reprioritization. Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the Cabinet, the DBM prepares the budget documents for
submission to Congress. The budget documents consist of: (1) the Presidents Budget Message, through which the President explains the
policy framework and budget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution,68 which contains the
macroeconomic assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two
previous years; and (3) the NEP.

Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current
operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of
the Government, including investments in the capital of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. 69 Current operating
expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in current consumption the benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal
year.70 The two components of current expenditures are those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating
expenses(MOOE).

Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their functions into: (1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on
agriculture and natural resources, transportation and communications, commerce and industry, and other economic development efforts);71 (2)
social services or social development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public health and medicare, labor and welfare and
others);72(3) general government or general public services expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general government, legislative services, the
administration of justice, and for pensions and gratuities);73 (4) national defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into national security
expenditures and expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order); 74 and (5) public debt.75

Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature of funds, i.e., general fund, special fund or bond fund. 76

On the other hand, public revenues complement public expenditures and cover all income or receipts of the government treasury used to
support government expenditures.77
Classical economist Adam Smith categorized public revenues based on two principal sources, stating: "The revenue which must defraythe
necessary expenses of government may be drawn either, first from some fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and
which is independent of the revenue of the people, or, secondly, from the revenue of the people." 78 Adam Smiths classification relied on the
two aspects of the nature of the State: first, the State as a juristic person with an artificial personality, and, second, the State as a sovereign or
entity possessing supreme power. Under the first aspect, the State could hold property and engage in trade, thereby deriving what is called its
quasi private income or revenues, and which "peculiarly belonged to the sovereign." Under the second aspect, the State could collect by
imposing charges on the revenues of its subjects in the form of taxes. 79

In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the following sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues(i.e., compulsory contributions to
finance government activities); 80 (2) capital revenues(i.e., proceeds from sales of fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public domain, and
gains on such sales like sale of public lands, buildings and other structures, equipment, and other properties recorded as fixed assets); 81 (3)
grants(i.e., voluntary contributions and aids given to the Government for its operation on specific purposes in the form of money and/or
materials, and do not require any monetary commitment on the part of the recipient); 82 (4) extraordinary income(i.e., repayment of loans and
advances made by government corporations and local governments and the receipts and shares in income of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
and other receipts);83 and (5) public borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations generally with interest from domestic and foreign
creditors of the Government in general, including the National Government and its political subdivisions).84

More specifically, public revenues are classified as follows: 85

General Income Specific Income

1. Subsidy Income from National 1. Income Taxes

Government
2. Property Taxes
2. Subsidy from Central Office
3. Taxes on Goods and Services
3. Subsidy from Regional
Office/Staff Bureaus 4. Taxes on International Trade and
Transactions
4. Income from Government
Services 5. Other Taxes 6.Fines and Penalties-Tax Revenue

5. Income from Government 7. Other Specific Income

Business Operations

6. Sales Revenue

7. Rent Income

8. Insurance Income

9. Dividend Income

10. Interest Income

11. Sale of Confiscated Goods and

Properties

12. Foreign Exchange (FOREX)

Gains

13. Miscellaneous Operating and

Service Income

14. Fines and Penalties-Government

Services and Business Operations

15. Income from Grants and

Donations

c.2. Budget Legislation86

The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the Presidents Budget, which is inclusive of the
NEPand the BESF, up to the Presidents approval of the GAA. This phase is also known as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the
significant participation of the Legislative through its deliberations.

Initially, the Presidents Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on First Reading. The Appropriations
Committee and its various Sub-Committees schedule and conduct budget hearings to examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies.
Thereafter, the House of Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB). 87

The GABis sponsored, presented and defended by the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee and Sub-Committees in plenary
session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third Reading before the House of Representatives version is transmitted to the Senate.88

After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on the GAB. To expedite proceedings, the Senate may conduct its
committee hearings simultaneously with the House of Representatives deliberations. The Senates Finance Committee and its Sub-
Committees may submit the proposed amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate only after the House of Representatives has
formally transmitted its version to the Senate. The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on Third Reading. 89

The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose of
discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of the GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to
the President for approval.90 The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message where budget items are subjected to direct
veto,91 or are identified for conditional implementation.

If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal
year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is passed by the Congress. 92

c.3. Budget Execution93

With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the
function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of
funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.

The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the DBM. Prior to this, the various departments and agencies are
required to submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline their plans and performance targets by laying down the physical and financial
plan, the monthly cash program, the estimate of monthly income, and the list of obligations that are not yet due and demandable.

Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a Cash Release Program (CRP).The ARP sets a limit for allotments
issued in general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly, quarterly and annual disbursement levels.

Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued by the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope than appropriations, in
that the latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend. Allotments may be released in two forms through a comprehensive Agency
Budget Matrix (ABM),94 or, individually, by SARO.95

Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to incur obligations 96 on behalf of the Government in order to implement
their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like hiring of personnel, entering into contracts for the supply of goods and services,
and using utilities.

In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment
of the obligations. A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically issued is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),97 which
issuance is based upon an agencys submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other required documents. The NCA specifies the maximum
amount of cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period indicated. Apart from the NCA, the DBM may issue a
Non-Cash Availment Authority(NCAA) to authorize non-cash disbursements, or a Cash Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for departments with
overseas operations to allow the use of income collected by their foreign posts for their operating requirements.

Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Budget Execution Phase and is usually accomplished through the
Modified Disbursement Scheme under which disbursements chargeable against the National Treasury are coursed through the government
servicing banks.

c.4. Accountability98

Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government funds have been effectively and efficiently
utilized to achieve the States socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the
purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new policies.

An agencys accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1) performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports;
(3) review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit(COA).

2.

Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan

a. DAP was a program designed to

promote economic growth

Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any Administration. 99 The national budget the Executive prepares and presents to
Congress represents the Administrations "blueprint for public policy" and reflects the Governments goals and strategies. 100 As such, the
national budget becomes a tangible representation of the programs of the Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and
services for which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and allocated.101 Embodied in every national budget is government
spending.102

When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made efficiency and transparency in government spending a significant focus
of his Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an improved fiscal deficit of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January
to July of 2011, it also unfortunately decelerated government project implementation and payment schedules. 103 The World Bank observed that
the Philippines economic growth could be reduced, and potential growth could be weakened should the Government continue with its
underspending and fail to address the large deficiencies in infrastructure.104 The economic situation prevailing in the middle of 2011 thus paved
the way for the development and implementation of the DAP as a stimulus package intended to fast-track public spending and to push
economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary PAPs to be funded from the "savings" generated during the year as well as from
unprogrammed funds.105 In that respect, the DAP was the product of "plain executive policy-making" to stimulate the economy by way of
accelerated spending.106 The Administration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1) streamlining the implementation process
through the clustering of infrastructure projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education
(DepEd),and (2) front loading PPP-related projects107 due for implementation in the following year.108

Did the stimulus package work?

The March 2012 report of the World Bank,109 released after the initial implementation of the DAP, revealed that the DAP was partially
successful. The disbursements under the DAP contributed 1.3 percentage points to GDP growth by the fourth quarter of 2011. 110 The continued
implementation of the DAP strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29% contraction to a
34% growth as of September 2013.111
The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a policy instrument that the Government could use to direct the economies
towards growth and development.112 The Government, by spending on public infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring
profitability for prospective investors.113 The PAPs funded under the DAP were chosen for this reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on
the economy and infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation into disbursements.114

b. History of the implementation of

the DAP, and sources of funds
under the DAP

How the Administrations economic managers conceptualized and developed the DAP, and finally presented it to the President remains
unknown because the relevant documents appear to be scarce.

The earliest available document relating to the genesis of the DAP was the memorandum of October 12,2011 from Sec. Abad seeking the
approval of the President to implement the proposed DAP. The memorandum, which contained a list of the funding sources for P72.11 billion
and of the proposed priority projects to be funded,115reads:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

xxxx

SUBJECT: FY 2011 PROPOSED DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM (PROJECTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS)

DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2011

Mr. President, this is to formally confirm your approval of the Disbursement Acceleration Program totaling P72.11 billion. We are already
working with all the agencies concerned for the immediate execution of the projects therein.

A. Fund Sources for the Acceleration Program

Amount
Action
Fund Sources (In million Description
Requested
Php)

FY 2011 30,000 Unreleased Personnel Declare as

Unreleased Services (PS) savings and
Personal appropriations which approve/
Services (PS) will lapse at the end of authorize its use
Appropriations FY 2011 but may be for the 2011
pooled as savings and Disbursement
realigned for priority Acceleration
programs that require Program
immediate funding

FY 2011 482 Unreleased

Unreleased appropriations (slow
Appropriations moving projects and
programs for
discontinuance)

FY 2010 12,336 Supported by the GFI Approve and

Unprogrammed Dividends authorize its use
Fund for the 2011
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program

FY 2010 21,544 Unreleased With prior

Carryover appropriations (slow approval from
Appropriation moving projects and the President in
programs for November 2010
discontinuance) and to declare as
savings from Zero-based Budgeting savings and with
Initiative authority to use
for priority
projects

FY 2011 Budget 7,748 FY 2011 Agency For information

items for Budget items that can
realignment be realigned within the
agency to fund new fast
disbursing projects
DPWH-3.981 Billion
DA 2.497 Billion
DOT 1.000 Billion
DepEd 270 Million
TOTAL 72.110

B. Projects in the Disbursement Acceleration Program

(Descriptions of projects attached as Annex A)

GOCCs and GFIs

Agency/Project Allotment
(SARO and NCA Release) (in Million Php)

1. LRTA: Rehabilitation of LRT 1 and 2 1,868

2. NHA: 11,050

a. Resettlement of North Triangle residents to

450
Camarin A7
b. Housing for BFP/BJMP
500
c. On-site development for families living
10,000
along dangerous
d. Relocation sites for informal settlers
100
along Iloilo River and its tributaries

3. PHIL. HEART CENTER: Upgrading of 357

ageing physical plant and medical equipment

4. CREDIT INFO CORP: Establishment of 75

centralized credit information system

5. PIDS: purchase of land to relocate the PIDS 100

office and building construction

6. HGC: Equity infusion for credit insurance 400

and mortgage guaranty operations of HGC

7. PHIC: Obligations incurred (premium 1,496

subsidy for indigent families) in January-June
2010, booked for payment in Jul[y] Dec
2010. The delay in payment is due to the
delay in the certification of the LGU
counterpart. Without it, the NG is obliged to
pay the full amount.

8. Philpost: Purchase of foreclosed property. 644

Payment of Mandatory Obligations, (GSIS,
PhilHealth, ECC), Franking Privilege

9. BSP: First equity infusion out of Php 40B 10,000

capitalization under the BSP Law

10. PCMC: Capital and Equipment Renovation 280

11. LCOP: 105

a. Pediatric Pulmonary Program
b. Bio-regenerative Technology Program
35
(Stem-Cell Research subject to legal
review and presentation)
70

12. TIDCORP: NG Equity infusion 570

TOTAL 26,945

NGAs/LGUs

Agency/Project Allotment
(SARO) Cash
 (In Million Requirement
Php) (NCA)

13. DOF-BIR: NPSTAR

centralization of data
processing and others (To be
synchronized with GFMIS
activities) 758 758

14. COA: IT infrastructure

program and hiring of
additional litigational experts 144 144

15. DND-PAF: On Base Housing

Facilities and Communication
Equipment 30 30

16. DA: 2,959 2,223

a. Irrigation, FMRs and
Integrated Community Based Multi-Species
Hatchery and Aquasilvi
Farming 1,629 1,629
b. Mindanao Rural
Development Project 919 183

c. NIA Agno River Integrated

Irrigation Project 411 411

17. DAR: 1,293 1,293

a. Agrarian Reform
Communities Project 2 1,293 132
b. Landowners Compensation 5,432

18. DBM: Conduct of National

Survey of
Farmers/Fisherfolks/Ips 625 625

19. DOJ: Operating requirements

of 50 investigation agents and
15 state attorneys 11 11

20. DOT: Preservation of the Cine

Corregidor Complex 25 25

21. OPAPP: Activities for Peace

Process (PAMANA- Project
details: budget breakdown,
implementation plan, and
conditions on fund release
attached as Annex B) 1,819 1,819

22. DOST 425 425

a. Establishment of National
Meterological and Climate
Center 275 275
b. Enhancement of Doppler
Radar Network for National
Weather Watch, Accurate
Forecasting and Flood Early
Warning 190 190

23. DOF-BOC: To settle the

principal obligations with
PDIC consistent with the
agreement with the CISS and
SGS 2,800 2,800

24. OEO-FDCP: Establishment of

the National Film Archive and
local cinematheques, and other
local activities 20 20

25. DPWH: Various infrastructure

projects 5,500 5,500

26. DepEd/ERDT/DOST: Thin

Client Cloud Computing
Project 270 270

27. DOH: Hiring of nurses and

midwives 294 294

28. TESDA: Training Program in

partnership with BPO industry
and other sectors 1,100 1,100

29. DILG: Performance Challenge

Fund (People Empowered
Community Driven
Development with DSWD and
NAPC) 250 50

30. ARMM: Comprehensive Peace

and Development Intervention 8,592 8,592

31. DOTC-MRT: Purchase of

additional MRT cars 4,500 -

32. LGU Support Fund 6,500 6,500

33. Various Other Local Projects 6,500 6,500

34. Development Assistance to the

Province of Quezon 750 750

TOTAL 45,165 44,000

C. Summary

Fund Sources
Identified for Allotments Cash
Approval for Release Requirements for
(In Million Release in FY
Php) 2011

Total 72,110 72,110 70,895

GOCCs 26,895 26,895

NGAs/LGUs 45,165 44,000

For His Excellencys Consideration

(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD

[/] APPROVED

[ ] DISAPPROVED

(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III

OCT 12, 2011

The memorandum of October 12, 2011 was followed by another memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 116 requesting
omnibus authority to consolidate the savings and unutilized balances for fiscal year 2011. Pertinent portions of the memorandum of December
12, 2011 read:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

xxxx

SUBJECT: Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and its Realignment

DATE: December 12, 2011

This is to respectfully request for the grant of Omnibus Authority to consolidate savings/unutilized balances in FY 2011 corresponding to
completed or discontinued projects which may be pooled to fund additional projects or expenditures.

In addition, Mr. President, this measure will allow us to undertake projects even if their implementation carries over to 2012 without necessarily
impacting on our budget deficit cap next year.

BACKGROUND

1.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies operations, particularly on the implementation of their
projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the same, have identified savings out of the 2011 General Appropriations Act.
Said savings correspond to completed or discontinued projects under certain departments/agencies which may be pooled, for the following:

1.1 to provide for new activities which have not been anticipated during preparation of the budget;

1.2 to augment additional requirements of on-going priority projects; and

1.3 to provide for deficiencies under the Special Purpose Funds, e.g., PDAF, Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund

1.4 to cover for the modifications of the original allotment class allocation as a result of on-going priority projects and implementation of new
activities

2.0 x x x x

2.1 x x x

2.2 x x x

ON THE UTILIZATION OF POOLED SAVINGS

3.0 It may be recalled that the President approved our request for omnibus authority to pool savings/unutilized balances in FY 2010 last
November 25, 2010.

4.0 It is understood that in the utilization of the pooled savings, the DBM shall secure the corresponding approval/confirmation of the President.
Furthermore, it is assured that the proposed realignments shall be within the authorized Expenditure level.

5.0 Relative thereto, we have identified some expenditure items that may be sourced from the said pooled appropriations in FY 2010 that will
expire on December 31, 2011 and appropriations in FY 2011 that may be declared as savings to fund additional expenditures.

5.1 The 2010 Continuing Appropriations (pooled savings) is proposed to be spent for the projects that we have identified to be immediate actual
disbursements considering that this same fund source will expire on December 31, 2011.

5.2 With respect to the proposed expenditure items to be funded from the FY 2011 Unreleased Appropriations, most of these are the same
projects for which the DBM is directed by the Office of the President, thru the Executive Secretary, to source funds.

6.0 Among others, the following are such proposed additional projects that have been chosen given their multiplier impact on economy and
infrastructure development, their beneficial effect on the poor, and their translation into disbursements. Please note that we have classified the
list of proposed projects as follows:

7.0 x x x

FOR THE PRESIDENTS APPROVAL

8.0 Foregoing considered, may we respectfully request for the Presidents approval for the following:

8.1 Grant of omnibus authority to consolidate FY 2011 savings/unutilized balances and its realignment; and

8.2 The proposed additional projects identified for funding.

For His Excellencys consideration and approval.

(Sgd.)

[/] APPROVED

[ ] DISAPPROVED

(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III

DEC 21, 2011

Substantially identical requests for authority to pool savings and to fund proposed projects were contained in various other memoranda from
Sec. Abad dated June 25, 2012,117 September 4, 2012,118 December 19, 2012,119May 20, 2013,120 and September 25, 2013.121 The President
apparently approved all the requests, withholding approval only of the proposed projects contained in the June 25, 2012 memorandum, as
borne out by his marginal note therein to the effect that the proposed projects should still be "subject to further discussions."122

In order to implement the June25, 2012 memorandum, Sec. Abad issued NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure
Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), 123 reproduced herein as follows:

NATIONAL BUDGET CIRCULAR No. 541

July 18, 2012

TO: All Heads of Departments/Agencies/State Universities and Colleges and other Offices of the National Government, Budget and Planning
Officers; Heads of Accounting Units and All Others Concerned

SUBJECT : Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012
1.0 Rationale

The DBM, as mandated by Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), periodically reviews and evaluates the
departments/agencies efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing budgeted funds for the delivery of services and production of goods, consistent
with the government priorities.

In the event that a measure is necessary to further improve the operational efficiency of the government, the President is authorized to suspend
or stop further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act. Withdrawal and pooling of
unutilized allotment releases can be effected by DBM based on authority of the President, as mandated under Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 5,
Book VI of EO 292.

For the first five months of 2012, the National Government has not met its spending targets. In order to accelerate spending and sustain the
fiscal targets during the year, expenditure measures have to be implemented to optimize the utilization of available resources.

Departments/agencies have registered low spending levels, in terms of obligations and disbursements per initial review of their 2012
performance. To enhance agencies performance, the DBM conducts continuous consultation meetings and/or send call-up letters, requesting
them to identify slow-moving programs/projects and the factors/issues affecting their performance (both pertaining to internal systems and
those which are outside the agencies spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate strategies and improvement plans for the rest of
2012.

Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/agencies have continued to post low obligation levels as of end of first semester, thus
resulting to substantial unobligated allotments.

In line with this, the President, per directive dated June 27, 2012 authorized the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels
of obligations as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current allotments. This measure will allow the maximum utilization of available
allotments to fund and undertake other priority expenditures of the national government.

2.0 Purpose

2.1 To provide the conditions and parameters on the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies as of June 30, 2012 to fund priority
and/or fast-moving programs/projects of the national government;

2.2 To prescribe the reports and documents to be used as bases on the withdrawal of said unobligated allotments; and

2.3 To provide guidelines in the utilization or reallocation of the withdrawn allotments.

3.0 Coverage

3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all national government agencies (NGAs)
charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No.10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:

3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);

3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and projects, as well as capitalized
MOOE; and

3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies concerned based on their
updated/validated list of pensioners.

3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover the identified programs, projects and activities of the departments/agencies reflected in
the DBM list shown as Annex A or specific programs and projects as may be identified by the agencies.

4.0 Exemption

These guidelines shall not apply to the following:

4.1 NGAs

4.1.1 Constitutional Offices/Fiscal Autonomy Group, granted fiscal autonomy under the Philippine Constitution; and

4.1.2 State Universities and Colleges, adopting the Normative Funding allocation scheme i.e., distribution of a predetermined budget ceiling.

4.2 Fund Sources

4.2.1 Personal Services other than pension benefits;

4.2.2 MOOE items earmarked for specific purposes or subject to realignment conditions per General Provisions of the GAA:

Confidential and Intelligence Fund;

Savings from Traveling, Communication, Transportation and Delivery, Repair and Maintenance, Supplies and Materials and Utility which shall
be used for the grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement incentive benefit;

Savings from mandatory expenditures which can be realigned only in the last quarter after taking into consideration the agencys full year
requirements, i.e., Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants, Water, Illumination, Power Services, Telephone, other Communication Services and Rent.

4.2.3 Foreign-Assisted Projects (loan proceeds and peso counterpart);

4.2.4 Special Purpose Funds such as: E-Government Fund, International Commitments Fund, PAMANA, Priority Development Assistance
Fund, Calamity Fund, Budgetary Support to GOCCs and Allocation to LGUs, among others;

4.2.5 Quick Response Funds; and

4.2.6 Automatic Appropriations i.e., Retirement Life Insurance Premium and Special Accounts in the General Fund.

5.0 Guidelines
5.1 National government agencies shall continue to undertake procurement activities notwithstanding the implementation of the policy of
withdrawal of unobligated allotments until the end of the third quarter, FY 2012. Even without the allotments, the agency shall proceed in
undertaking the procurement processes (i.e., procurement planning up to the conduct of bidding but short of awarding of contract) pursuant to
GPPB Circular Nos. 02-2008 and 01-2009 and DBM Circular Letter No. 2010-9.

5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units
(OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;

Statement of Allotments, Obligations and Balances (SAOB);

Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and

Physical Report of Operations.

5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agencys latest report available shall be used by DBM
as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated
allotments as of same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level
shall approximate to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).

5.4 All released allotments in FY 2011 charged against R.A. No. 10147 which remained unobligated as of June 30, 2012 shall be immediately
considered for withdrawal. This policy is based on the following considerations:

5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be implementation-ready and doable during the
given fiscal year; and

5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower-than-programmed implementation
capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year timeframe.

5.5. Consistent with the Presidents directive, the DBM shall, based on evaluation of the reports cited above and results of consultations with
the departments/agencies, withdraw the unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 through issuance of negative Special Allotment Release
Orders (SAROs).

5.6 DBM shall prepare and submit to the President, a report on the magnitude of withdrawn allotments. The report shall highlight the agencies
which failed to submit the June 30 reports required under this Circular.

5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be:

5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn;

5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing programs and projects of the agency/OU; or

5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to fund priority programs and projects not considered in the 2012
budget but expected to be started or implemented during the current year.

5.8 For items 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 above, agencies/OUs concerned may submit to DBM a Special Budget Request (SBR), supported with the
following:

5.8.1 Physical and Financial Plan (PFP);

5.8.2 Monthly Cash Program (MCP); and

5.8.3 Proof that the project/activity has started the procurement processes i.e., Proof of Posting and/or Advertisement of the Invitation to Bid.

5.9 The deadline for submission of request/s pertaining to these categories shall be until the end of the third quarter i.e., September 30, 2012.
After said cut-off date, the withdrawn allotments shall be pooled and form part of the overall savings of the national government.

5.10 Utilization of the consolidated withdrawn allotments for other priority programs and projects as cited under item 5.7.3 of this Circular, shall
be subject to approval of the President. Based on the approval of the President, DBM shall issue the SARO to cover the approved priority
expenditures subject to submission by the agency/OU concerned of the SBR and supported with PFP and MCP.

5.11 It is understood that all releases to be made out of the withdrawn allotments (both 2011 and 2012 unobligated allotments) shall be within
the approved Expenditure Program level of the national government for the current year. The SAROs to be issued shall properly disclose the
appropriation source of the release to determine the extent of allotment validity, as follows:

For charges under R.A. 10147 allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2012; and

For charges under R.A. 10155 allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2013.

5.12 Timely compliance with the submission of existing BARs and other reportorial requirements is reiterated for monitoring purposes.

6.0 Effectivity

This circular shall take effect immediately.

(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD

Secretary

As can be seen, NBC No. 541 specified that the unobligated allotments of all agencies and departments as of June 30, 2012 that were charged
against the continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2011 and the 2012 GAA (R.A. No. 10155) were subject to withdrawal through the issuance
of negative SAROs, but such allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of the concerned agencies from which they were
withdrawn; or (2) realigned to cover additional funding for other existing PAPs of the concerned agencies; or (3) used to augment existing PAPs
of any agency and to fund priority PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented in 2012. Financing the
other priority PAPs was made subject to the approval of the President. Note here that NBC No. 541 used terminologies like "realignment" and
"augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn unobligated allotments.
Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be implemented and funded, that is (1) by declaring "savings" coming from
the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing
unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.

c. DAP was not an appropriation

measure; hence, no appropriation
law was required to adopt or to
implement it

Petitioners Syjuco, Luna, Villegas and PHILCONSA state that Congress did not enact a law to establish the DAP, or to authorize the
disbursement and release of public funds to implement the DAP. Villegas, PHILCONSA, IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE observe that the
appropriations funded under the DAP were not included in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs. To petitioners IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE, the
DAP, being actually an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law for its validity. VACC maintains
that the DAP, because it involved huge allocations that were separate and distinct from the GAAs, circumvented and duplicated the GAAs
without congressional authorization and control.

The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and implemented the DAP violated the mandate of Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor
an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the
authority of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.

We agree with the OSGs position.

The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs
adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its
constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which
Congress "designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be
applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense." 124 As pointed out in Gonzales v.
Raquiza:125 "In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors." 126

On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the
budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. 127 He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could
pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the
public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.

3.
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savings, and the use of such
appropriations contravened Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a plan or strategy validly adopted by the Executive to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic growth, the challenges posed by the petitioners constrain us to dissect the mechanics of the actual execution of the DAP. The
management and utilization of the public wealth inevitably demands a most careful scrutiny of whether the Executives implementation of the
DAP was consistent with the Constitution, the relevant GAAs and other existing laws.

a. Although executive discretion

and flexibility are necessary in
the execution of the budget, any
transfer of appropriated funds
should conform to Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution

We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come into play once the budget reaches
its execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget
implementation. The heads of offices, particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable
them to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under changing conditions. 128 In particular, the power to
transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the
PAPs set by Congress in the GAA.

Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs,129particularly when the funds are
grouped to form lump sum accounts.130 It is assumed that the agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide
broader appropriation items.131 This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the budget execution phase.
The DAP as a strategy to improve the countrys economic position was one policy that the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill
his mandate under the GAAs.

Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be counterproductive. In Presidential Spending Power, 132 Prof. Louis
Fisher, an American constitutional scholar whose specialties have included budget policy, has justified extending discretionary authority to the
Executive thusly:

[T]he impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be resisted. There are many number of reasons why obligations and outlays by
administrators may have to differ from appropriations by legislators. Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in advance
of expenditures. Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in trying to legislate in fields that are highly technical and constantly undergoing
change. New circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken the decisions reached by Congress at the appropriation stage. It is not
practicable for Congress to adjust to each new development by passing separate supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control
expenditures by confining administrators to narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its power of the purse but it would not protect the
purse itself. The realities and complexities of public policy require executive discretion for the sound management of public funds.

xxxx

x x x The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial discretion for administrators. They need to exercise judgment and take
responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed toward executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be
discretion, but channel it and use it to satisfy the programs and priorities established by Congress.

In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the
fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of powers among the three main branches of the Government.
The Court has recognized this, and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon, 133 viz:

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of
their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based.

In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has not been the mere offshoot of
established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the American Governors-General.134 Act No. 1902 (An Act
authorizing the Governor-General to direct any unexpended balances of appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury
and to transfer from the general fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine
Legislature,135was the first enabling law that granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority was without any
limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the Governor-General to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or office
to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for that bureau or office.

From 1916 until 1920, the appropriations laws set a cap on the amounts of funds that could be transferred, thereby limiting the power to transfer
funds. Only 10% of the amounts appropriated for contingent or miscellaneous expenses could be transferred to a bureau or office, and the
transferred funds were to be used to cover deficiencies in the appropriations also for miscellaneous expenses of said bureau or office.

In 1921, the ceiling on the amounts of funds to be transferred from items under miscellaneous expenses to any other item of a certain bureau or
office was removed.

During the Commonwealth period, the power of the President to transfer funds continued to be governed by the GAAs despite the enactment of
the Constitution in 1935. It is notable that the 1935 Constitution did not include a provision on the power to transfer funds. At any rate, a shift in
the extent of the Presidents power to transfer funds was again experienced during this era, with the President being given more flexibility in
implementing the budget. The GAAs provided that the power to transfer all or portions of the appropriations in the Executive Department could
be made in the "interest of the public, as the President may determine." 136

In its time, the 1971 Constitutional Convention wanted to curtail the Presidents seemingly unbounded discretion in transferring funds. 137 Its
Committee on the Budget and Appropriation proposed to prohibit the transfer of funds among the separate branches of the Government and
the independent constitutional bodies, but to allow instead their respective heads to augment items of appropriations from savings in their
respective budgets under certain limitations.138 The clear intention of the Convention was to further restrict, not to liberalize, the power to
transfer appropriations.139 Thus, the Committee on the Budget and Appropriation initially considered setting stringent limitations on the power to
augment, and suggested that the augmentation of an item of appropriation could be made "by not more than ten percent if the original item of
appropriation to be augmented does not exceed one million pesos, or by not more than five percent if the original item of appropriation to be
augmented exceeds one million pesos."140 But two members of the Committee objected to the P1,000,000.00 threshold, saying that the amount
was arbitrary and might not be reasonable in the future. The Committee agreed to eliminate theP1,000,000.00 threshold, and settled on the ten
percent limitation.141

In the end, the ten percent limitation was discarded during the plenary of the Convention, which adopted the following final version under
Section 16, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The 1973 Constitution explicitly and categorically prohibited the transfer of funds from one item to another, unless Congress enacted a law
authorizing the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
omissions to transfer funds for the purpose of augmenting any item from savings in another item in the GAA of their respective offices. The
leeway was limited to augmentation only, and was further constricted by the condition that the funds to be transferred should come from
savings from another item in the appropriation of the office.142

On July 30, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1177, providing in its Section 44 that:

Section 44. Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project, or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive Department in the General Appropriations Act,
from savings in the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of
Article VIII, Section 16 (5) of the Constitution.

In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first paragraph of Section 44 for contravening Section 16(5)of the 1973 Constitution,
ruling:

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.143
It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification by the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section 25(5) of
Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

Section 25. x x x

xxxx

5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

xxxx

The foregoing history makes it evident that the Constitutional Commission included Section 25(5), supra, to keep a tight rein on the exercise of
the power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the President and the other high officials of the Government named therein. The Court
stated in Nazareth v. Villar:144

In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the
appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception
is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The
plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioners posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.

It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to
transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in
Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.
The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather
than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former.
Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always
proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise
within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the
statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor
of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that
the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of a limitation on the Presidents discretion over the appropriations during
the Budget Execution Phase.

b. Requisites for the valid transfer of

appropriated funds under Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution

The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;

(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is
to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

b.1. First RequisiteGAAs of 2011 and

2012 lacked valid provisions to
authorize transfers of funds under
the DAP; hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional

Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law,
generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.

Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?

In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as follows:

Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:

Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by the DBM as justification for the use of savings under the DAP.145

A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not
carrying the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to
authorize only transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of appropriation within the
Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the
Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be
used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional commission.

Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in the counterpart provision in the 2013 GAA, to wit:

Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to use savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their respective
appropriations.

Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed, there still remained two other requisites to be
met, namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings from appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer
must be for the purpose of augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective offices.

b.2. Second Requisite There were

no savings from which funds
could be sourced for the DAP
Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?

The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments were not actual
savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant provisions of the GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be understood
to refer to the excess money after the items that needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have been paid
pursuant to the budget.146The petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the PAPs for which the funds had been appropriated were
actually implemented and completed, or finally discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could not be realized with certainty in the
middle of the fiscal year; and that the funds for "slow-moving" PAPs could not be considered as savings because such PAPs had not actually
been abandoned or discontinued yet.147 They stress that NBC No. 541, by allowing the withdrawn funds to be reissued to the "original program
or project from which it was withdrawn," conceded that the PAPs from which the supposed savings were taken had not been completed,
abandoned or discontinued.148

The OSG represents that "savings" were "appropriations balances," being the difference between the appropriation authorized by Congress
and the actual amount allotted for the appropriation; that the definition of "savings" in the GAAs set only the parameters for determining when
savings occurred; that it was still the President (as well as the other officers vested by the Constitution with the authority to augment) who
ultimately determined when savings actually existed because savings could be determined only during the stage of budget execution; that the
President must be given a wide discretion to accomplish his tasks; and that the withdrawn unobligated allotments were savings inasmuch as
they were clearly "portions or balances of any programmed appropriationfree from any obligation or encumbrances which are (i) still available
after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized"

We partially find for the petitioners.

In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in mind. The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the
purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second
principle is that the Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and
to spend the budget in accordance with the provisions of the GAA. 149 The Executive is expected to faithfully implement the PAPs for which
Congress allocated funds, and to limit the expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is
authorized, subject to the conditions provided by law. The third principle is that in making the Presidents power to augment operative under the
GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it
delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over the purse as
to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle is that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that is
real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or
hypothetical.150

The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against expanding the scope of the power to augment. It is then indubitable that
the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for
such funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.

The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected this interpretation and made it operational, viz:

Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still
available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized;
(ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies
and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

The three instances listed in the GAAs aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of
the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longer existent.

The phrase "free from any obligation or encumbrance" in the definition of savings in the GAAs conveyed the notion that the appropriation was
at that stage when the appropriation was already obligated and the appropriation was already released. This interpretation was reinforced by
the enumeration of the three instances for savings to arise, which showed that the appropriation referred to had reached the agency level. It
could not be otherwise, considering that only when the appropriation had reached the agency level could it be determined whether (a) the PAP
for which the appropriation had been authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and
leaves of absence without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost because of the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies.

The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased
Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued
projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings."

The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings.
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased.
They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if
there has already been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued
either an ABM (for those not needing clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the
case may be. Appropriations remain unreleased, for instance, because of noncompliance with documentary requirements (like the Special
Budget Request), or simply because of the unavailability of funds. But the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to which they were
allocated under the GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo, unreleased appropriations refer to appropriations with
allotments but without disbursement authority.

For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut the
congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis--vis the
PAPs for which Congress had allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an allotment and
NCA for such vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may already constitute savings for that agency under the
second instance.

Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further
qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately
declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed. This signified that the DBMs withdrawal of unobligated
allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.

Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring Opinion that MOOE appropriations are deemed divided into twelve monthly
allocations within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be generated monthly from the excess or unused MOOE appropriations other than the
Mandatory Expenditures and Expenditures for Business-type Activities because of the physical impossibility to obligate and spend such funds
as MOOE for a period that already lapsed. Following this observation, MOOE for future months are not savings and cannot be transferred.

The DBMs Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (which became the basis of NBC No. 541) stated:

ON THE AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW UNOBLIGATED ALLOTMENTS

5.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies operations, particularly on the implementation of their
projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the same, have been continuously calling the attention of all National
Government agencies (NGAs) with low levels of obligations as of end of the first quarter to speedup the implementation of their programs and
projects in the second quarter.

6.0 Said reminders were made in a series of consultation meetings with the concerned agencies and with call-up letters sent.

7.0 Despite said reminders and the availability of funds at the departments disposal, the level of financial performance of some departments
registered below program, with the targeted obligations/disbursements for the first semester still not being met.

8.0 In order to maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current
allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects.

9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the agencies
and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.

It is apparent from the foregoing text that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments would be based on whether the allotments pertained to slow-
moving projects, or not. However, NBC No. 541 did not set in clear terms the criteria for the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, viz:

3.1. These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 ofall national government agencies (NGAs)
charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No. 10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:

3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);

3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and projects, as well as capitalized
MOOE; and

3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies concerned based on their
undated/validated list of pensioners.

A perusal of its various provisions reveals that NBC No. 541 targeted the "withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of
obligations"151 "to fund priority and/or fast-moving programs/projects."152 But the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be "[r]eissued for the
original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn" 153 supported the conclusion that the
PAPs had not yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. Thus, the purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet
fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible.

Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released allotments in 2011 charged against the 2011 GAA that had remained
unobligated based on the following considerations, to wit:

5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be implementation-ready and doable during the
given fiscal year; and

5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower-than-programmed implementation
capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year timeframe.

Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the unobligated allotments for continuing and current appropriations as of
June 30, 2012, disregarded the 2-year period of availability of the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlay extended under Section 65,
General Provisions of the 2011 GAA, viz:

Section 65. Availability of Appropriations. Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release
and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year
after the end of the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays under R.A. No.
9970 shall be made available up to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be
submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations.
and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz:

Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release
and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year
after the end of the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be submitted
to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed form or by way of electronic document.154

Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and its relevant issuances shortened the period of availability of the
appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays.

Congress provided a one-year period of availability of the funds for all allotment classes in the 2013 GAA (R.A. No. 10352), to wit:

Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. All appropriations authorized in this Act shall be available for release and obligation for the
purposes specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, until the end of FY 2013: PROVIDED, That a report on these
releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed
form or by way of electronic document.

Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad sought omnibus authority to consolidate savings and unutilized
balances to fund the DAP on a quarterly basis, viz:

7.0 If the level of financial performance of some department will register below program, even with the availability of funds at their disposal, the
targeted obligations/disbursements for each quarter will not be met. It is important to note that these funds will lapse at the end of the fiscal year
if these remain unobligated.

8.0 To maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances at the end of every quarter, both for continuing and current
allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects.

9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the agencies
and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.

The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief Lifes pan of one year, was further shortened to only a quarter of a year
under the DBMs memorandum dated May 20, 2013.

The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending.
They aver that the respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with
existing appropriations under the GAAs.155

The respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated allotments were being withdrawn upon the instance of the implementing
agencies based on their own assessment that they could not obligate those allotments pursuant to the Presidents directive for them to spend
their appropriations as quickly as they could in order to ramp up the economy. 156

We agree with the petitioners.

Contrary to the respondents insistence, the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself. The text of NBC No. 541 bears this out, to
wit:

5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units
(OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;

Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);

Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and

Physical Report of Operations.

5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agencys latest report available shall be used by DBM
as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated
allotments as of same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level
shall approximate to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).

The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased
appropriations; and that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds were akin to the
impoundment of appropriations that could be allowed only in case of "unmanageable national government budget deficit" under the
GAAs,157 thus violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of allotments. 158

In contrast, the respondents emphasize that NBC No. 541 adopted a spending, not saving, policy as a last-ditch effort of the Executive to push
agencies into actually spending their appropriations; that such policy did not amount to an impoundment scheme, because impoundment
referred to the decision of the Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological reasons; and that the withdrawal of allotments under
NBC No. 541 was made pursuant to Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code, by which the President was granted the
authority to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his judgment the public interest so
required.

The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased
appropriations were invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of
appropriated funds cannot be considered as impoundment.

According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez: 159 "Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the GAA is
understood to mean the retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable
National Government budget deficit, to wit:

Section 66. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No appropriations authorized under this Act shall be impounded through
retention or deduction, unless in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, That all the funds
appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects and activities authorized under this Act, except those covered under the Unprogrammed
Fund, shall be released pursuant to Section 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Section 67. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act shall be
effected only in cases where there is an unmanageable national government budget deficit.

Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this section shall be construed to mean that (i) the actual national government
budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit as indicated in the FY 2011 Budget of

Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President and approved by Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution, or (ii) there are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee and approved by the President.

The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions.

The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be regarded as impoundment because it entailed only the transfer of funds,
not the retention or deduction of appropriations.

Nor could Section 68 of the 2011 GAA (and the similar provisions of the 2012 and 2013 GAAs) be applicable. They uniformly stated:

Section 68. Prohibition Against Retention/Deduction of Allotment. Fund releases from appropriations provided in this Act shall be transmitted
intact or in full to the office or agency concerned. No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead shall be made, except as authorized by
law, or upon direction of the President of the Philippines. The COA shall ensure compliance with this provision to the extent that sub-allotments
by agencies to their subordinate offices are in conformity with the release documents issued by the DBM.

The provision obviously pertained to the retention or deduction of allotments upon their release from the DBM, which was a different matter
altogether. The Court should not expand the meaning of the provision by applying it to the withdrawal of allotments.

The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 to justify the withdrawal of unobligated allotments.
But the provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, to wit:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.- Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his
judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop
further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal
services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.

Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance with Section 38, supra, but instead transferred the funds to
other PAPs.

It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be
reverted to the General Fund.1wphi1 This was the mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.- Unexpended balances of appropriations
authorized in the General Appropriation Act shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and shall
not thereafter be available for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment: Provided, that appropriations for capital outlays shall
remain valid until fully spent or reverted: provided, further, that continuing appropriations for current operating expenditures may be specifically
recommended and approved as such in support of projects whose effective implementation calls for multi-year expenditure commitments:
provided, finally, that the President may authorize the use of savings realized by an agency during given year to meet non-recurring
expenditures in a subsequent year.

The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the annual budget preparation process and the preparation process and
the President may approve upon recommendation of the Secretary, the reversion of funds no longer needed in connection with the activities
funded by said continuing appropriations.

The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the
end of the fiscal year.

b.3. Third Requisite No funds from

savings could be transferred under
the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA

The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer should be "to augment an item in the general appropriations
law for the respective offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree. 160

The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be
deficient, to wit:

x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or
subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be
funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.

In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Note is taken
of the fact that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear, thus:

Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to use savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their respective
appropriations.

As of 2013, a total of P144.4 billion worth of PAPs were implemented through the DAP. 161

Of this amount P82.5 billion were released in 2011 and P54.8 billion in 2012.162 Sec. Abad has reported that 9% of the total DAP releases were
applied to the PAPs identified by the legislators.163

The petitioners disagree, however, and insist that the DAP supported the following PAPs that had not been covered with appropriations in the
respective GAAs, namely:

(i) P1.5 billion for the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army;

(ii) P1.8 billion for the Moro National Liberation Front;

(iii) P700 million for assistance to Quezon Province;164

(iv) P50 million to P100 (million) each to certain senators;165

(v) P10 billion for the relocation of families living along dangerous zones under the National Housing Authority;

(vi) P10 billion and P20 billion equity infusion under the Bangko Sentral;

(vii) P5.4 billion landowners compensation under the Department of Agrarian Reform;

(viii) P8.6 billion for the ARMM comprehensive peace and development program;

(ix) P6.5 billion augmentation of LGU internal revenue allotments

(x) P5 billion for crucial projects like tourism road construction under the Department of Tourism and the Department of Public Works and
Highways;

(xi) P1.8 billion for the DAR-DPWH Tulay ng Pangulo;

(xii) P1.96 billion for the DOH-DPWH rehabilitation of regional health units; and

(xiii) P4 billion for the DepEd-PPP school infrastructure projects.166

In refutation, the OSG argues that a total of 116 DAP-financed PAPs were implemented, had appropriation covers, and could properly be
accounted for because the funds were released following and pursuant to the standard practices adopted by the DBM. 167 In support of its
argument, the OSG has submitted seven evidence packets containing memoranda, SAROs, and other pertinent documents relative to the
implementation and fund transfers under the DAP.168

Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we conclude that the "savings" pooled under the DAP were
allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.

For example, the SARO issued on December 22, 2011 for the highly vaunted Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM)
project under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) covered the amount ofP1.6 Billion, 169 broken down as follows:

APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS AMOUNT

CODE AUTHORIZED

A.03.a.01.a Generation of new knowledge and technologies and

research capability building in priority areas identified as
strategic to National Development
Personnel Services
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses P 43,504,024
Capital Outlays 1,164,517,589
391,978,387
P 1,600,000,000

the pertinent provision of the 2011 GAA (R.A. No. 10147) showed that Congress had appropriated onlyP537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing for
personnel services and capital outlays, to wit:

Personnel Maintenance Capital TOTAL

Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenditures

III. Operations

a. Funding Assistance to Science 177,406,000 1,887,365,000 49,090,000 2,113,861,000

and Technology Activities

1. Central Office 1,554,238,000 1,554,238,000

a. Generation of new
knowledge and
technologies and research
capability building in
priority areas identified as
strategic to National
Development 537,910,000 537,910,000

Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by almost 300% the appropriation by Congress for the program
Generation of new knowledge and technologies and research capability building in priority areas identified as strategic to National
Development, the Executive allotted funds for personnel services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby substituted its will to that of
Congress. Worse, the Executive had not earlier proposed any amount for personnel services and capital outlays in the NEP that became the
basis of the 2011 GAA.170

It is worth stressing in this connection that the failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an expense category sufficiently indicated that
Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the PAP concerned. This indication becomes clearer when even the President
himself did not recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP requiring expenditure that did not receive any
appropriation under the GAAs could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would go beyond the authority laid down by Congress in
enacting the GAAs. That happened in some instances under the DAP.

In relation to the December 22, 2011 SARO issued to the Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research and
Development (DOST-PCIEETRD)171 for Establishment of the Advanced Failure Analysis Laboratory, which reads:

APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS AMOUNT

CODE AUTHORIZED

Development, integration and coordination of the National

Research System for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology
A.02.a
and Related Fields
Capital Outlays P 300,000,000

the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond to the program specified in the GAA, whose particulars
were Research and Management Services(inclusive of the following activities: (1) Technological and Economic Assessment for Industry,
Energy and Utilities; (2) Dissemination of Science and Technology Information; and (3) Management of PCIERD Information System for
Industry, Energy and Utilities. Even assuming that Development, integration and coordination of the National Research System for Industry,
Energy and Emerging Technology and Related Fields the particulars stated in the SARO could fall under the broad program description of
Research and Management Services as appearing in the SARO, it would nonetheless remain a new activity by reason of its not being
specifically stated in the GAA. As such, the DBM, sans legislative authorization, could not validly fund and implement such PAP under the DAP.

In defending the disbursements, however, the OSG contends that the Executive enjoyed sound discretion in implementing the budget given the
generality in the language and the broad policy objectives identified under the GAAs; 172 and that the President enjoyed unlimited authority to
spend the initial appropriations under his authority to declare and utilize savings, 173 and in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws.

Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which
included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of
Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a
delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. 174 Moreover, leaving
the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers. 175

Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the
budget proposal submitted by the Executive.176 Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength,177 and
underpins "all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of
government."178 Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to
spend the money.179 Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public
money should be spent.

It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations. 180 For this purpose,
appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever
source by any part of the government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public
money without legislative authorization."181 To conform with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by
Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. 182 Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds
resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of
both appropriations will thereby be violated.

b.4 Third Requisite Cross-border

augmentations from savings were
prohibited by the Constitution

By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices,"
Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over
to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or
cross-border augmentations.

To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the
Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the
Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.

Did any cross-border transfers or augmentations transpire?

During the oral arguments on January 28, 2014, Sec. Abad admitted making some cross-border augmentations, to wit:

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

Alright, the whole time that you have been Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, did the Executive Department ever redirect
any part of savings of the National Government under your control cross border to another department?

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, in the Memos that we submitted to you, such an instance, Your Honor

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

Can you tell me two instances? I dont recall having read your material.

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, the first instance had to do with a request from the House of Representatives. They started building their e-library in 2010 and they had a
budget for about 207 Million but they lack about 43 Million to complete its 250 Million requirements. Prior to that, the COA, in an audit
observation informed the Speaker that they had to continue with that construction otherwise the whole building, as well as the equipments
therein may suffer from serious deterioration. And at that time, since the budget of the House of Representatives was not enough to complete
250 Million, they wrote to the President requesting for an augmentation of that particular item, which was granted, Your Honor. The second
instance in the Memos is a request from the Commission on Audit. At the time they were pushing very strongly the good governance programs
of the government and therefore, part of that is a requirement to conduct audits as well as review financial reports of many agencies. And in the
performance of that function, the Commission on Audit needed information technology equipment as well as hire consultants and litigators to
help them with their audit work and for that they requested funds from the Executive and the President saw that it was important for the
Commission to be provided with those IT equipments and litigators and consultants and the request was granted, Your Honor.

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

These cross border examples, cross border augmentations were not supported by appropriations

SECRETARY ABAD:

They were, we were augmenting existing items within their (interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

No, appropriations before you augmented because this is a cross border and the tenor or text of the Constitution is quite clear as far as I am
concerned. It says here, "The power to augment may only be made to increase any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective
offices." Did you not feel constricted by this provision?

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, as the Constitution provides, the prohibition we felt was on the transfer of appropriations, Your Honor. What we thought we did was to
transfer savings which was needed by the Commission to address deficiency in an existing item in both the Commission as well as in the
House of Representatives; thats how we saw(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

So your position as Secretary of Budget is that you could do that?

SECRETARY ABAD:

In an extreme instances because(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

No, no, in all instances, extreme or not extreme, you could do that, thats your feeling.

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, in that particular situation when the request was made by the Commission and the House of Representatives, we felt that we needed to
respond because we felt(interrupted).183

The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to P143,700,000.00 and P250,000,000.00 were transferred under the DAP respectively to the
COA184 and the House of Representatives.185 Those transfers of funds, which constituted cross-border augmentations for being from the
Executive to the COA and the House of Representatives, are graphed as follows: 186

AMOUNT
(In thousand pesos)
DATE
OFFICE PURPOSE
RELEASED
Reserve Releases
Imposed

Commission on IT Infrastructure Program and hiring of 11/11/11 143,700

Audit additional litigation experts

Congress Completion of the construction of the 07/23/12 207,034 250,000

House of Legislative Library and Archives (Savings of HOR)
Representatives Building/Congressional e-library

The respondents further stated in their memorandum that the President "made available" to the "Commission on Elections the savings of his
department upon [its] request for funds"187 This was another instance of a cross-border augmentation.

The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers thusly:

99. The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings of his department to another department upon the latters
request, provided it is the recipient department that uses such funds to augment its own appropriation. In such a case, the President merely
gives the other department access to public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that department whose fiscal autonomy is
guaranteed by the Constitution.188

In the oral arguments held on February 18, 2014, Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, representing Congress, announced a different characterization
of the cross-border transfers of funds as in the nature of "aid" instead of "augmentation," viz:

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, is not an application of the DAP. What were these cross-border transfers? They are
transfers of savings as defined in the various General Appropriations Act. So, that makes it similar to the DAP, the use of savings. There was a
cross-border which appears to be in violation of Section 25, paragraph 5 of Article VI, in the sense that the border was crossed. But never has it
been claimed that the purpose was to augment a deficient item in another department of the government or agency of the government. The
cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, were in the nature of [aid] rather than augmentations. Here is a government entity separate and
independent from the Executive Department solely in need of public funds. The President is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Hes in
charge of the whole operation although six or seven heads of government offices are given the power to augment. Only the President stationed
there and in effect in-charge and has the responsibility for the failure of any part of the government. You have election, for one reason or
another, the money is not enough to hold election. There would be chaos if no money is given as an aid, not to augment, but as an aid to a
department like COA. The President is responsible in a way that the other heads, given the power to augment, are not. So, he cannot very well
allow this, if Your Honor please.189

JUSTICE LEONEN:

May I move to another point, maybe just briefly. I am curious that the position now, I think, of government is that some transfers of savings is
now considered to be, if Im not mistaken, aid not augmentation. Am I correct in my hearing of your argument?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Thats our submission, if Your Honor, please.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

May I know, Justice, where can we situate this in the text of the Constitution? Where do we actually derive the concepts that transfers of
appropriation from one branch to the other or what happened in DAP can be considered a said? What particular text in the Constitution can we
situate this?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

There is no particular provision or statutory provision for that matter, if Your Honor please. It is drawn from the fact that the Executive is the
executive in-charge of the success of the government.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So, the residual powers labelled in Marcos v. Manglapus would be the basis for this theory of the government?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Yes, if Your Honor, please.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

A while ago, Justice Carpio mentioned that the remedy is might be to go to Congress. That there are opportunities and there have been
opportunities of the President to actually go to Congress and ask for supplemental budgets?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

If there is time to do that, I would say yes.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So, the theory of aid rather than augmentation applies in extra-ordinary situation?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Very extra-ordinary situations.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

But Counsel, this would be new doctrine, in case?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Yes, if Your Honor please.190

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing cross
border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.

4.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets
not having been exceeded was invalid

Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds provided in the GAAs for 2011, 2012,and 2013. The respondents stress,
however, that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under the DAP as savings, but as separate sources of funds; and that, consequently,
the release and use of unprogrammed funds were not subject to the restrictions under Section 25(5), supra.

The documents contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG have confirmed that the unprogrammed funds were treated as separate
sources of funds. Even so, the release and use of the unprogrammed funds were still subject to restrictions, for, to start with, the GAAs
precisely specified the instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released and the purposes for which they could be used.

The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the unprogrammed funds was that the revenue collections must exceed revenue
targets; and that the release of the unprogrammed funds was illegal because such condition was not met. 191

The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the unprogrammed funds under the DAP were in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that the unprogrammed funds could be availed of when any of the following three
instances occur, to wit: (1) the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets proposed in the BESFs submitted by the President to
Congress; (2) new revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally considered in the BESFs; or(3) newly-approved loans for
foreign assisted projects were secured, or when conditions were triggered for other sources of funds, such as perfected loan agreements for
foreign-assisted projects.192 This view of the DBM was adopted by all the respondents in their Consolidated Comment. 193

The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined "unprogrammed appropriations" as appropriations that provided standby authority to
incur additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue collections exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are
generated.194 Contrary to the DBMs averment that there were three instances when unprogrammed funds could be released, the BESFs
envisioned only two instances. The third mentioned by the DBM the collection of new revenues from sources not originally considered in the
BESFs was not included. This meant that the collection of additional revenues from new sources did not warrant the release of the
unprogrammed funds. Hence, even if the revenues not considered in the BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that the
revenue collections should exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in order to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds.

The view that there were only two instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released was bolstered by the following texts of the
Special Provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs, to wit:

2011 GAA

1. Release of Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets
submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including savings generated
from programmed appropriations for the year: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original
revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of newly approved loans
for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO
covering the loan proceeds: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That if there are savings generated from the programmed appropriations for the
first two quarters of the year, the DBM may, subject to the approval of the President, release the pertinent appropriations under the
Unprogrammed Fund corresponding to only fifty percent (50%) of the said savings net of revenue shortfall: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the
release of the balance of the total savings from programmed appropriations for the year shall be subject to fiscal programming and approval of
the President.

2012 GAA

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue
targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution: PROVIDED, That
collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in
this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan
agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.

As can be noted, the provisos in both provisions to the effect that "collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original
revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund" gave the authority to use such additional revenues for
appropriations funded from the unprogrammed funds. They did not at all waive compliance with the basic requirement that revenue collections
must still exceed the original revenue targets.

In contrast, the texts of the provisos with regard to additional revenues generated from newly-approved foreign loans were clear to the effect
that the perfected loan agreement would be in itself "sufficient basis" for the issuance of a SARO to release the funds but only to the extent of
the amount of the loan. In such instance, the revenue collections need not exceed the revenue targets to warrant the release of the loan
proceeds, and the mere perfection of the loan agreement would suffice.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that under these provisions of the GAAs the additional revenues from sources not considered in the BESFs
must be taken into account in determining if the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets. The text of the relevant provision of the
2013 GAA, which was substantially similar to those of the GAAs for 2011 and 2012, already made this explicit, thus:

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue
targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including collections
arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue target, as certified by the BTr: PROVIDED, That in case of newly
approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.

Consequently, that there were additional revenues from sources not considered in the revenue target would not be enough. The total revenue
collections must still exceed the original revenue targets to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds (other than those from newly-
approved foreign loans).

The present controversy on the unprogrammed funds was rooted in the correct interpretation of the phrase "revenue collections should exceed
the original revenue targets." The petitioners take the phrase to mean that the total revenue collections must exceed the total revenue target
stated in the BESF, but the respondents understand the phrase to refer only to the collections for each source of revenue as enumerated in the
BESF, with the condition being deemed complied with once the revenue collections from a particular source already exceeded the stated
target.

The BESF provided for the following sources of revenue, with the corresponding revenue target stated for each source of revenue, to wit:

TAX REVENUES

Taxes on Net Income and Profits

Taxes on Property
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services

General Sales, Turnover or VAT

Selected Excises on Goods

Selected Taxes on Services

Taxes on the Use of Goods or Property or Permission to Perform Activities
Other Taxes
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions

NON-TAX REVENUES

Fees and Charges

BTR Income

Government Services
Interest on NG Deposits
Interest on Advances to Government Corporations
Income from Investments
Interest on Bond Holdings

Guarantee Fee
Gain on Foreign Exchange
NG Income Collected by BTr

Dividends on Stocks
NG Share from Airport Terminal Fee
NG Share from PAGCOR Income
NG Share from MIAA Profit

Privatization
Foreign Grants

Thus, when the Court required the respondents to submit a certification from the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) to the effect that the revenue
collections had exceeded the original revenue targets, 195 they complied by submitting certifications from the BTr and Department of Finance
(DOF) pertaining to only one identified source of revenue the dividends from the shares of stock held by the Government in government-
owned and controlled corporations.

To justify the release of the unprogrammed funds for 2011, the OSG presented the certification dated March 4, 2011 issued by DOF
Undersecretary Gil S. Beltran, as follows:

This is to certify that under the Budget for Expenditures and Sources of Financing for 2011, the programmed income from dividends from
shares of stock in government-owned and controlled corporations is 5.5 billion.

This is to certify further that based on the records of the Bureau of Treasury, the National Government has recorded dividend income
amounting to P23.8 billion as of 31 January 2011.196

For 2012, the OSG submitted the certification dated April 26, 2012 issued by National Treasurer Roberto B. Tan, viz:

This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period January to March 2012 amounted
to P19.419 billion compared to the full year program of P5.5 billion for 2012.197

And, finally, for 2013, the OSG presented the certification dated July 3, 2013 issued by National Treasurer Rosalia V. De Leon, to wit:

This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period January to May 2013 amounted
to P12.438 billion compared to the full year program of P10.0198 billion for 2013.

Moreover, the National Government accounted for the sale of the right to build and operate the NAIA expressway amounting to P11.0 billion in
June 2013.199

The certifications reflected that by collecting dividends amounting to P23.8 billion in 2011, P19.419 billion in 2012, and P12.438 billion in 2013
the BTr had exceeded only the P5.5 billion in target revenues in the form of dividends from stocks in each of 2011 and 2012, and only the P10
billion in target revenues in the form of dividends from stocks in 2013.

However, the requirement that revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets was to be construed in light of the purpose for which the
unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs as standby appropriations to support additional expenditures for certain priority PAPs
should the revenue collections exceed the resource targets assumed in the budget or when additional foreign project loan proceeds were
realized. The unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as not to delay the implementation of the PAPs should
new or additional revenue sources be realized during the year. 200 Given the tenor of the certifications, the unprogrammed funds were thus not
yet supported by the corresponding resources.201

The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding requirements of the proposed programmed appropriations. In
contrast, the unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, were to be released only when there were revenues in excess of what the
programmed appropriations required. As such, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be
dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should be understood to mean
that the revenue collections must exceed the total of the revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds
simply because there was an excess revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure because it would
disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the Governments surplus budget policy. 202

We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents view.

5.
Equal protection, checks and balances,
and public accountability challenges

The DAP is further challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the system of checks and balances, and the principle of public
accountability.

With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal Protection Clause, 203 Luna argues that the implementation of the DAP was
"unfair as it [was] selective" because the funds released under the DAP was not made available to all the legislators, with some of them
refusing to avail themselves of the DAP funds, and others being unaware of the availability of such funds. Thus, the DAP practised "undue
favoritism" in favor of select legislators in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.

Similarly, COURAGE contends that the DAP violated the Equal Protection Clause because no reasonable classification was used in distributing
the funds under the DAP; and that the Senators who supposedly availed themselves of said funds were differently treated as to the amounts
they respectively received.

Anent the petitioners theory that the DAP violated the system of checks and balances, Luna submits that the grant of the funds under the DAP
to some legislators forced their silence about the issues and anomalies surrounding the DAP. Meanwhile, Belgica stresses that the DAP, by
allowing the legislators to identify PAPs, authorized them to take part in the implementation and execution of the GAAs, a function that
exclusively belonged to the Executive; that such situation constituted undue and unjustified legislative encroachment in the functions of the
Executive; and that the President arrogated unto himself the power of appropriation vested in Congress because NBC No. 541 authorized the
use of the funds under the DAP for PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget.
Finally, the petitioners insist that the DAP was repugnant to the principle of public accountability enshrined in the Constitution, 204 because the
legislators relinquished the power of appropriation to the Executive, and exhibited a reluctance to inquire into the legality of the DAP.

The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed discrimination in the release of funds under the DAP could be raised only by the
affected Members of Congress themselves, and if the challenge based on the violation of the Equal Protection Clause was really against the
constitutionality of the DAP, the arguments of the petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of the legislators to the funds, not to the
proposition that all of the legislators should have been given such entitlement.

The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators,
lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the
DAP, and about some of them having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the Executive
discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a finding of
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who
supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases
of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and
how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Consequently, the Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the Court do so despite the
inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the outcome would not do justice to those for
whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal protection has been made.

The argument that the release of funds under the DAP effectively stayed the hands of the legislators from conducting congressional inquiries
into the legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative. That deficiency eliminated any need to consider and resolve the argument, for it is
fundamental that speculation would not support any proper judicial determination of an issue simply because nothing concrete can thereby be
gained. In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official acts of the Government, the petitioners must discharge the basic
burden of proving that the constitutional infirmities actually existed. 205 Simply put, guesswork and speculation cannot overcome the presumption
of the constitutionality of the assailed executive act.

We do not need to discuss whether or not the DAP and its implementation through the various circulars and memoranda of the DBM
transgressed the system of checks and balances in place in our constitutional system. Our earlier expositions on the DAP and its implementing
issuances infringing the doctrine of separation of powers effectively addressed this particular concern.

Anent the principle of public accountability being transgressed because the adoption and implementation of the DAP constituted an assumption
by the Executive of Congress power of appropriation, we have already held that the DAP and its implementing issuances were policies and
acts that the Executive could properly adopt and do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement strategies to ramp
up or accelerate the economy of the country.

6.
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable

After declaring the DAP and its implementing issuances constitutionally infirm, we must now deal with the consequences of the declaration.

Article 7 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or obligation. 206 However, the
generality of the rule makes us ponder whether rigidly applying the rule may at times be impracticable or wasteful. Should we not recognize the
need to except from the rigid application of the rule the instances in which the void law or executive act produced an almost irreversible result?

The need is answered by the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine, definitely not a novel one, has been exhaustively explained in De
Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank:207

The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance
likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new
Civil Code puts it: When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms
cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt
that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is
so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under
it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done
while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its
being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality],
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive
act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. 208 But its use must
be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted
to only as a matter of equity and fair play. 209 It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.

We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity
and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.

To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad enough to include
any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. The Court held so in Hacienda Luisita,
Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council:210

Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in
nature. Thus, the minority concludes that the phrase executive act used in the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank refers only to
acts, orders, and rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law. The minority also made mention of the Concurring Opinion of
Justice Enrique Fernando in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, where it was supposedly made explicit that the operative fact doctrine applies
to executive acts, which are ultimately quasi-legislative in nature.

We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates what executive act mean. Moreover,
while orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative
Code and jurisprudence, the phrase executive act does not have such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the
cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it be found that the term executive act is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term executive act
is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently
revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.

A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma. In said case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is,
without a question, an executive act. Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were
made in good faith and in reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its subsequent invalidation.

In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over
civilians, certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have existed so as not to trample upon the rights of the accused therein. Relevant
thereto, in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, it was ruled that military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government
and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives.

Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded
the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.

Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations,
said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the agencies under the executive department.
This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive
branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the
reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which
were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and
fairness.

Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of
law, springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it
may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected. It is on this score that
the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 211 the Court likewise declared that "for the operative fact doctrine to
apply, there must be a legislative or executive measure, meaning a law or executive issuance." Thus, the Court opined there that the operative
fact doctrine did not apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz:

Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its
reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There
must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice,
not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied.
An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by those with
informal contacts with the government agency.

It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts.1avvphi1 The
DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing
various memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different agencies and
departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the third phase
of the budget cycle the budget execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary
responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could
and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.

As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were
not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the
Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior
implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the
Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere
as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be
enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably
positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like
public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine
of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by destruction, and would result in most
undesirable wastefulness.

Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always
the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects of what
used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice;212 but where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional
law is totally ineffective should apply.

In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and
whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,
unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other
liabilities.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices
under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained
in the General Appropriations Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.

The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the
revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200903 July 22, 2014

KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIBIRAP, INC., represented by its Vice-President, CARLITO BADION, CORAZON DE JESUS
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, represented by its President, ARNOLD REPIQUE, FERNANDO SEVILLA as President of Samahang
Pamata sa Kapatirang Kr.istiyano, ESTRELIETA BAGASBAS, JOCY LOPEZ, ELVIRA VIDOL, and DELIA FRA YRES, Petitioners,
vs.
JESSIE ROBREDO, in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Hon. GUIA GOMEZ, in her capacity as
MAYOR OF THE CITY. OF SAN JUAN, Hon. HERBERT BAUTISTA, in his capacity as the MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY, Hon. JOHN REY
TIANGCO, in his capacity as MAYOR OF NAVOTAS CITY, and the GENERAL MANAGER of the NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the public respondents from evicting the individual petitioners as well as the
petitionerassociations members from their dwellings in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon without any court order, and to compel the
respondents to afford them judicial process prior to evictions and demolitions. The petition primarily seeks to declare asunconstitutional Section
28 (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7279 (RA 7279), otherwise known as Urban Development Housing Act, which authorizes evictions and
demolitions under certain circumstances without any court order.

The Factual Antecedents

The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association as well as the individual
petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land owned by
and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs 1). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and
demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects2 in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners. 3

Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order when: (1) persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places suchas sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds; and (2) persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
be implemented.

The Petition

On March 23, 2012, the petitionersdirectly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public respondents)to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.

The petitioners justify their directrecourse before this Court by generally averring that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.4 They also posit that the respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
which are patently unconstitutional. They likewise insist that they stand to be directly injured by the respondentsthreats of evictions and
demolitions. In the alternative, they contend that the transcendental public importance of the issues raised in this case clothes them with legal
standing.5

The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their constitutional right to due process because they warrant evictions and
demolitions without any court order. Theypoint out that Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty
of abode unless there is a court order. Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right
recognized in Article 25 of Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279. The petitioners further complain that the
respondents had previously conducted evictions and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987
Constitution.6

The Respondents Case

A. The Position of the Mayor of Navotas

The Mayor of Navotas prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for its serious procedural defects. First, the petitioners ignored the
hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a Rule 65 petition before the Court.7 Second, the petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a
petition for prohibition and mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. According to the Mayor of Navotas,
the office of a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the public respondents usurpation of power or improper assumption of jurisdiction. On the
other hand, a writ of mandamus only commands the public respondent to perform his ministerial functions. Third, the petitioners failed to
particularly state the grave abuse of discretion that the Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed. Fourth, the petition does not present any
justiciable controversy since the City of Navotas had already successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque, Navotas on November 28,
2011. Fifth, the petition was filed out of time since the petitioners were personally notified of the intended eviction and demolition on September
23, 2011.8

The Mayor argues that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution allows evictions and demolitions to beconducted even without a court
order provided they are done in accordance withthe law and in a just and humane manner. According to him, RA 7279 isprecisely the law
referred to by Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution. The Mayor also disputes the petitioners claim that RA 7279 does notafford the
informal settlers procedural due process prior to evictions and demolitions. He points out that Section 28 of RA 7279 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) mandate that the affected persons or entities shall be given notice at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or
demolition. The respondents are likewise required to consult with the duly designated representatives of the affected families and communities
with respect to their relocation. He further asserts that his faithful implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, which are presumed to
be constitutional, cannotbe equated to grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, the Mayor of Navotas insists that the petitioners invocation of their
right to freely choose their abode is misplaced since they have no vested right to occupy properties that they do not own. 9

B. The Position of the Mayor of San Juan

The Mayor of San Juan similarly argues that the petitioners improperly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus before
the Court. She contends thatshe performed neither judicial nor ministerial functions in implementing RA 7279, the enabling law of Section 10,
Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution. She also maintains that the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the successful eviction of
some of the petitioners in Pinaglabanan, Corazon de Jesus, San Juan. The Mayor of San Juan further stresses that Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279 already lay down the procedure in evicting informal settlers in a just and humane manner. 10C. The Position of the Mayor of Quezon

The Mayor of Quezon City holds that the petitioners premature invocation of the Courts power of judicial review and their violation of the
principle of hierarchy of courts are fatal to their cause of action. Moreover, the petitioners failed to substantiate the material allegations in the
petition. He additionally argues that his faithful implementation of RA 7279, which the legislature enacted inthe exercise of police power, does
not amount to grave abuse of discretion.11

D. The Position of the Secretary ofInterior and Local Government

and the General Manager of the National Housing Authority

The Secretary of Interior and Local Government and the National Housing Authority (NHA)General Manager adopt the Mayor of Navotas
position that the petition is procedurally infirm. They further argue that the liberty of abode is not illimitable and does not include the right to
encroach upon other person properties. They also reiterate that Section 28 of RA 7279 provides sufficient safeguards in ensuring that evictions
and demolitions are carried out in a just and humane manner. 12

The Issues

This case presents to us the following issues:

(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects; and

(a) Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts;

(b) Whether the petitioners correctlyavailed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus;

(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

The Courts Ruling

We dismiss the petition.

The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they directly filed the petition before the Court.

The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court withtheir petition for prohibition and mandamus.
The petitioners appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort, not a court offirst instance. The hierarchy of courts
should serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before us, the petitioners
have unduly taxed the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to matters within our exclusive jurisdiction. Worse, the petitioners
only contributed to the overcrowding of the Court's docket. We also wish to emphasize that the trial court is better equipped to resolve cases
ofthis nature since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normallyundertake an examination of the contending parties evidence.13

The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus.

We cannot also ignore the petitioners glaring error in using a petition for prohibition and mandamus in the current case.

The petitioners seem to have forgotten that a writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer or persons exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.14 We issue a writ of prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief against the respondents
usurpation or grave abuse of jurisdiction or power.15
On the other hand, a petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person who unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station or who unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. 16 Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty. It will not control a public officers exercise of discretion as where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercisehis
judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to actprecisely because it is his judgment that is to be exercised, not that of the
court.17

In the present case, the petitionersseek to prohibit the respondents from implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 without a prior court
order of eviction and/or demolition. In relation to this, paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 provides:

Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, maybe allowed
under the following situations:

(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public placessuch as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented;or

(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. (emphasis and underline ours)

A reading of this provision clearly shows that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of a petition for prohibition and mandamus. The use
of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents have discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall
be performed. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.18

Consequently, the time when the public respondents shall carry out evictions and/or demolitions under Section 28 (a), (b), and (c) of RA 7279 is
merely discretionary, and not ministerial, judicial or quasi-judicial. The duty is discretionary if the law imposesa duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide when the duty shall be performed.

In contrast, a ministerial duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,in a prescribedmanner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.19

On the other hand, both judicial and quasi-judicial functions involve the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the
contending parties are, with respect tothe matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights.20

The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is not the lis motaof the case.

Even if we treat the present petition as one for certiorari since it assails the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, the petition
must necessarily fail for failure to show the essential requisites that would warrant the Courts exercise of judicial review. It is a rule firmly
entrenched in our jurisprudence thatthe courts will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present: (1) the
existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the existence of personal
and substantial interest on the part ofthe party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. 21

Save for the petition pertaining to the City of Quezons threat of eviction and demolition, this case no longer presents a justiciable controversy
with respect to the Mayors of Navotas and San Juan. We take note of the Comments of these Mayors who alleged that they had already
successfully evicted the concerned petitioners in their respective cities at the time of the filing of the petition.

What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of constitutionality is the fact that this issue is not the lis mota of this case. Lis
motaliterally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the
presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our coequal branches of the government.

This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved
unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest
its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. 22 Thus, to justify the nullification ofa law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 23

We carefully read the petitions and we conclude that they fail to compellingly show the necessity ofexamining the constitutionality of Section 28
(a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution. 24 In Magkalas v. NHA,25 this Court had already ruled
on the validity of evictions and demolitions without any court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity ofSection 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1472 which authorizes the NHA to summarily eject all informal settlers colonies on government resettlement projects as well as any illegal
occupant in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA. In that case, we held that Caridad Magkalas illegal
possession of the property should not hinder the NHAs development of Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project. We further stated that demolitions
and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order in the following instances: (1) when the property involved is an
expropriated property xxx pursuant to Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315;

(2) when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or
administered by the NHA pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472;

(3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and
other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant toSection 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279;

(4) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No.
7279.26 (emphasis ours)

We note that Section 10, Article13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling
demolished, except in accordance withlaw and in a just and humane manner. Paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions
and demolition in cases where persons orentities occupy danger areas and when persons or entities occupy areas where government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented.

To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner, paragraph 2, Section 28 of RA 7279 commands the
public respondents to comply with the following prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders:

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons orentities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected
communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;

(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;

(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;

(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected
families consent otherwise;

(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete materials;

(7) Proper uniforms for members ofthe Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe proper
disturbance control procedures; and

(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court
order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National
Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the
court, after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period,
financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the
affected families by the local government unit concerned.

This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.

Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, theymerely imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents through general averments in their
pleading, but without any basis to support their claim.

This is precisely the reason why we frown upon the direct filing of Rule 65 petitions before the Court.1wphi1 To the point of being repetitive,
we (xxx source text missing)

Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, they merely imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents through general averments in their
pleading, but without any basis to support their claim.

This is precisely the reason why we frown upon the direct filing of Rule 65 petitions before the Court. To the point of being repetitive, we
emphasize that we are not trier of facts and this applies with greater force to Rule 65 petitions which are original and independent actions. To
justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the executive department, the petitioners must establish facts that are
necessarily linked to the jurisdictional problem they presented in this case, i.e., whether the public respondents exercised their power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.

Since the petitioners failed to establish that the public respondents' alleged abuse of discretion was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, this petition must necessarily fail. 27

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for its serious procedural defects. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of supervening events it has become moot and
academic. It is not as simple as that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner himself. The
private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in
authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former
appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On
May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated
voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were
attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body.
The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took
his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad
daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing,
which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was
possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and
installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both
of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that
must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the
clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has
become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in
quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the
issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in
the main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns, and other
elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the confidence
of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and
on all levels of the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and referenda that also elicited the derision
and provoked the resentments of the people.

Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in other provinces dominated by the KBL.
Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of the main
protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters
were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.

What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the anomalies
being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did
was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and
honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the
tragedy.

Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in favor of the administration. This
prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.

Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on
Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the petitioner charged that the
elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was
made of the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election
returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or Manila paper.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with
the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division
ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. 4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second
Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the
province of Antique. 6

This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to
inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused. 7

The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.

The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate
its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases
shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.

While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are voluminous
and some of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the noble profession of the law-despite all the
canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of the truth.

The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving the members of the
Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more
careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need to be heard
and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.

The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove
his point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a
contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The
issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections, 9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.

A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in which the contestant seeks not only to oust
the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made when the petition was filed and later
decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time assumed office, there was no Member of the Batasang
Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications could be examined by the Commission on Elections en banc.

In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was
laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard
and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as
winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to
decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election cases."

As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over
matters arising before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over
matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise,
the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the
candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the Commission en banc could not
do what one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on
Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa,
all cases involving elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up to the election
protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction
would begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest was filedand not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the
exercise only of judicial power.

This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while denying to the banc. We
do not think this was the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an irrational rule.

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and
decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent
innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175
thereof provided:

Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of
its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may,motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order
the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in
Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.

Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came under the complete jurisdiction of the
competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not have been the intention of the
framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution was imposed, to divide the
electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage,
considering the first administrative and the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow
the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into
consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that could be filed by any
voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12

The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the
rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be
understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner,
whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and
understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and
"qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility
or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.

We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission on Elections, only by
division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and
decided en banc.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be
heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not
be achieved if the Commission could act en banconly after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-
too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the
frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible
for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without the care
and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.

After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the proclamation summarily and not very
judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because
the term of his office would have already expired.

It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to
prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it
wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the provision, which precisely
limited all questions affecting the election contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en
banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the Commission A decision made
on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard of care and deliberation ordained by the
Constitution

Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section 175, supra, the law was obviously
referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved inAratuc vs. Commission on Elections, 13 where the
said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.

Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is
due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it.
Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in
the case, denying he was biased.14

Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and the particular relationship between
Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be
adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to
another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and
proved the motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due
process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights
are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his
action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair
play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and
also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in
and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is
probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife,
he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of
judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could
act, and rendered the proceeding null and void. 17

Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant of which was the February revolution
of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled
by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared
with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous
regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without reason, to send the recrds of this
case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.

But not yet.

Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak against
tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he
chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-
exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot
and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race
too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very
real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."

A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez,
the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in the election eve ambush in
Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the early resolution
of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I
would like to see justice to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique have not stopped praying that the true winner of
the last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."

That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the February revolution. The despot has escaped, and
with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A new spirit is now upon our land. A new
vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly sovereign
in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.

This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal, to say
never again to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can we truly say that the case is
finished and the book is closed.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and
academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of
the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000]

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of
the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the
contrary, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No.
98-1419[1] dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body

"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same."

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections
for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." [2] The electoral body
believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist,
until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were
actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

The Issues

Petitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or
representatives from conducting exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections." [3]

In his Memorandum,[4] the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up additional issues: (1) mootness and (2) prematurity,
because of petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition[5] is meritorious.

Procedural Issues: Mootness and Prematurity

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with.
Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's
fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic
government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that
could well crop up again in future elections.[6]

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given
by constitutional guarantees."[7] Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle,
for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.

The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies before the
issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, [8] when the
issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, [9] when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,[10] or
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. [11]

The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself.
Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move
for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the
Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.

Main Issue: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the
probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially
cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how,
in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the
recent May 11, 1998 elections.

In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass media, committed to report balanced
election-related data, including "the exclusive results of Social Weather Station (SWS) surveys conducted in fifteen administrative regions."

It argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the
press. It submits that, in precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion and grossly violated the petitioner's constitutional rights.

Public respondent, on the other hand, vehemently denies that, in issuing the assailed Resolution, it gravely abused its discretion. It insists that
the issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998
elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might
unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who
are the winners and the [losers] in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."

Public respondent further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the
"voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution; [12] and relevant provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code.[13] It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the
State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.

The solicitor general, in support of the public respondent, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the credibility
and integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised by any government agency and can in general be manipulated
easily. He insists that these polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official tabulation of votes conducted by the
Commission, as well as the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel.

Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more narrowly defined: May the Comelec, in
the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on the freedoms of
speech and of the press.

Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press

The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher
level than substantive economic or other liberties. x x x [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that
freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."[14]

Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. [15] In the landmark
case Gonzales v. Comelec,[16] this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.

The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in
social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. [17] It represents a profound commitment to
the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. [18]It means more than the right to approve existing
political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter
of public consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, [19] we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought
we hate, no less than the thought we agree with.

Limitations

The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Such freedoms
could not remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all circumstances. [20] They are not immune to regulation by the State in the
exercise of its police power.[21] While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words and deeds has limitations.

In Cabansag v. Fernandez[22] this Court had occasion to discuss two theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms,
as follows:
"These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the
evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance
can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. x x x" [23]

"The 'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, x x x may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which
the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of
the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent." [24]

Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. It implicitly did in its earlier decisions in Primicias v.
Fugoso[25] and American Bible Society v. City of Manila;[26]as well as in later ones, Vera v. Arca,[27] Navarro v. Villegas,[28] Imbong v.
Ferrer,[29] Blo Umpar Adiong v. Comelec[30] and, more recently, in Iglesia ni Cristo v. MTRCB.[31] In setting the standard or test for the "clear and
present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of justice Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." [32]

A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent.
Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the
danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. [33] The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp
over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument.[34]

Justification for a Restriction

Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption. The power to exercise
prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity. [35] And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such
presumption. Any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows, [36] so it has been said.

To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. [37] Thus:

"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." [38]

Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly, stifle
fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved. [39]

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information
meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. [40] We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so
vital a constitutional right as free speech."[41] When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or
the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor
of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be
no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.[42]

True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe and accessible. It has the
duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a
restriction of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them.

These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may be used to study influencing
factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of
exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research.[43]

Comelec Ban on Exit Polling

In the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free,
orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election. While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll and the broadcast of the results thereof [are] x x
x an exercise of press freedom," it argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to
the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the
randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may
not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger
of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."

Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected
at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or
group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of
the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally,
not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls.
The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at
all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify
a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the
polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.[45] There is no
showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented
proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.

Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas
that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the
ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current
events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices.

In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro,[46] the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the purposes of which was to prevent the broadcasting of
early returns, was unconstitutional because such purpose was impermissible, and the statute was neither narrowly tailored to advance a state
interest nor the least restrictive alternative. Furthermore, the general interest of the State in insulating voters from outside influences is
insufficient to justify speech regulation. Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper editorials for the reason that they might
indirectly affect the voters' choices is impermissible, so is regulating speech via an exit poll restriction. [47]

The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to
gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to
achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.

For instance, a specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed to conduct
the same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain to voters that the latter may
refuse to be interviewed, and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The pollsters may further be required to wear
distinctive clothing that would show they are not election officials. [48] Additionally, they may be required to undertake an information campaign
on the nature of the exercise and the results to be obtained therefrom. These measures, together with a general prohibition of disruptive
behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly election.

For its part, Petitioner ABS-CBN explains its survey methodology as follows: (1) communities are randomly selected in each province; (2)
residences to be polled in such communities are also chosen at random; (3) only individuals who have already voted, as shown by the indelible
ink on their fingers, are interviewed; (4) the interviewers use no cameras of any sort; (5) the poll results are released to the public only on the
day after the elections.[49] These precautions, together with the possible measures earlier stated, may be undertaken to abate the Comelec's
fear, without consequently and unjustifiably stilling the people's voice.

With the foregoing premises, we conclude that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls -- properly
conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of
election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.

Violation of Ballot Secrecy

The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue.
Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting
the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be
identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters
who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the
votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters'
verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not
compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed
by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of
our people.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9,
1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continuedoperation would violate the
equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental
financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes
invidious discrimination on the2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

I.

The Case

First the facts.

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new
BSP.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc.,
filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of
all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound
principles of management.

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an
integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own
system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided,
however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]

The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the
BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-
and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on
the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653,
the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of
arguments:

a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill
No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law 3 of
establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied)

c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its
relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;5

d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of
government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and

e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their
compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality
of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-
and-file employeeshave been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal
nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should
take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved. 9

Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional
test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."

The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues
that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government. 11

II.

Issue

Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653,
runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." 12

III.

Ruling

A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,

SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.

Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face
and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.

It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it
is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as
enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)

Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. 15 The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. 16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. 17 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the
law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.18

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to
address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against
the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and
benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19

That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early
as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a
provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral
conference committee of both Houses.

Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute.21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23

B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -

EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws
exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.

1. The concept of relative constitutionality.

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of
the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. 24

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions.26

Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as
unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center
of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of automobiles,
and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to
constitutional due process. It ruled:

While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-considered
and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation
that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any
purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as
invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of
its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case. 28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant
changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid
exercise by the State of its police power30 - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be
unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set
aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:31

The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation
contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission
reasonable under the present circumstances?

It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war
and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due
and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of
the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their
prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have
gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy
that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders
Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be
unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain
language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and
should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect
collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is
not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.

xxx xxx xxx

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and
enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.

In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled
against the continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for
animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were
not subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes
became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their enactment.

In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute
which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or
cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:

The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the safety of persons
on a train and the protection of property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and
development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater
risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that
mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as
are railroad companies for killing them on their private rights of way.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed.
949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is
subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in
support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties
upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by
a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional
since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the
operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the law." 34 (emphasis supplied)

Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:

[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A
statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution.35 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be
fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.. In
other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted

3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763

+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause because after
it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from
the coverage of the SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.

Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of
the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:

1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);

2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);

3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);

4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);

5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);

6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and

7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).

It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket
exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)

Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 90. Personnel. -

xxx xxx xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the
Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall
be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than
once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall
therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It
shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis
supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)

Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:

xxx xxx xxx

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed
necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and
procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this
Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided,
further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the
confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be
subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758
and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)

3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)

Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:

xxx xxx xxx

The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the
Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and
personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and
personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)

4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)

Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and
staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the
GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective
management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the
Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)

Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:

Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and employees of the
Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be
governed by the compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation
plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly
merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its
system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)

6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)

Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all
positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and qualifications
standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the
private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from
other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and
the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)

Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:

xxx xxx xxx

3.

xxx xxx xxx

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an
integral component of the Corporation's human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be
governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job
analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation
plans of other government financial institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without
prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt from
existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to
make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)

Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that
was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000! 39

The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and
the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.

The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstancethat considerably alter the
reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing
the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a
consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must
not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. Theproviso may be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are
without differences.40

Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the
BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the
fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction
unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and
progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right
can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a
consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or
ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among
several similar enactments made over a period of time?

In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven
other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination - even
those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then
no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by
Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.

In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it
cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is
at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not thedeclared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent
and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in
its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the
effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional. 41

It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as
regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the
other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one
distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.

Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal work,
and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions.
P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among
government employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified
as a distinct class among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system
established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for their
employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical
government agencies."42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the principles governing the
Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing
comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."

Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System of the SSL, 43 but rates
of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the
Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of
compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private
sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as
guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:46

(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions;

(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;

(3) the kind of supervision received;

(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;

(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;

(6) kind of supervision exercised;

(7) decision-making responsibility;

(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;

(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and

(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.

The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.

Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation and position
classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.47

Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express
authority to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and
below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.

Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government financial institution (GFI) was not only
expressly authorized to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction
as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.

It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need "to
fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2)
the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their[sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or
services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling
up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with
the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental."

The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,48 and the banker of the government and all its
political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and authority to issue currency;50provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and
credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including
the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of
their institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.

Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each
institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was
granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as
Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs
was granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI
has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison d'tre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably
linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of
hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of
these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted
SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent
that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended,i.e., it
was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs
makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel
of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government entities.

It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring with each and every
consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC
- which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the
[BSP] and other [GFIs],"53 then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the
rank-and-file of the BSP.

The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had
enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file
employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not
a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what
he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be
lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a
legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally
explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."

The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the classification as there were quantitative and
qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational
benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:

First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative civilian service. A conscientious objector
performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a six-year
commitment

xxx xxx xxx

Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far
greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military
establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by
military service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment benefits 55 (citations omitted)

In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the
seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the
anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, 56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.

Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it - whether "being an employee of
a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from
other government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and
9302. These laws may have created a "preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the
wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured not
only by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate
exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.

Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, position classification and
qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new
Central Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant
had manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not
squarely raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would
also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the
constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.

It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its
subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's
right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and
prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is
superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct.59 As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment
already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61

The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of
invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any
rational basis.

Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which,
if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest. 62

In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven
other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.

IV.

Equal Protection Under International Lens

In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the"rational basis" test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications 63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. 64

A. Equal Protection in the United States

In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in
equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: 65

Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was
only that government must not impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the
classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not
typically concerned with identifying "fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement
was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends
was not required.

xxx xxx xxx

[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection" and the two-tier approach.]

From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s.
The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the
demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as everBut the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large
new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier approachevolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the
deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated with the new
equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny
required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal
protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal
protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state
interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.

The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect"
classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren Court's major
contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested
that there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient
of the new equal protection that proved particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests included voting,
criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel .]

xxx xxx xxx

The Burger Court and Equal Protection.

The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best established ingredient retains
vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine. It was prepared
to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection. [Among the fundamental
interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect" classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]

xxx xxx xxx

Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp
difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the
sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate
attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66

The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard
of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this
Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause.
This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I
believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon
which the particular classification is drawn.

Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a formulation that the majority refused to
embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the "old"
equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually
automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old
equal protection, proceed to find the statute unconstitutional.Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal
protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of
the "new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of an"intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the
Court said that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict
scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where means must be "necessary" under
the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive the
"intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

B. Equal Protection in Europe

The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in discriminatory legislation and
jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and
not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further
indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which,
while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits derogation by measures that
discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language, religion or social origin."67

Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies with the ground of discrimination. In
the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the
Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised.69 But over the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the
ECHR, a much higher level of justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality,
illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European Court declared that:

. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe. This means that very
weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the
Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could
regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention." 72 The European Court will
then permit States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application
of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73

C. Equality under International Law

The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims
that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal
protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights. 74

Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about equality. 75 The
general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the American Convention on Human
Rights;78 the African Charter on Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Human Rights;80 the European Social Charter of
1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the
Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member
States of the League.81

The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first generation" rights, commonly viewed as
concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective
protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full
and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.

In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the
ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations
body. 84 Additionally, many of the other international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to employment.85

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination
(Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory
provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that
discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the
ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as
discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in
ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other
international treaties such as the right to social security found in ICESCR:

Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters
that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security.
However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the
Covenant.89

Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has the purpose or effect of
violating the right to equal protection. International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights
Committee90 took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:

. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,
and which has thepurpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing,
of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by
subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international
law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational
discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to
labor, compel this approach.92

Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International School Alliance of
Educators v. Quisumbing: 93

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils.
The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith."

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The
Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the
State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal
and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.

xxx xxx xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which
ensure, in particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons
who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations
omitted)

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the
courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental
right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its
primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.

Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no
support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction.
At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. 95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon
them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our
own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. 96 Our laws must be construed in accordance
with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our
laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others. 97

In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."98 Indeed,
although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. 99

Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in
protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of
national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater
equality. [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a
reasonable measure of equality.100

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including
labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. 102 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only
on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. 103 Social justice calls for the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.104

V.

A Final Word

Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of
petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill
proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion
given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion
would be given deferential treatment. 105

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons
favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call
for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts
will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications
or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of
the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the
Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of
courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its
basic predicates. As a consequence,We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under
the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the
land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather
than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate,
the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the
manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking
through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders
of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments" of the government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction
based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of
the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited
to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of
the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher
compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose
status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real
economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." 108 Any act of Congress that runs
counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file
government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and
negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they
impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-
and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to
seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They
cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution
is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No.
7653 is unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO
and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the
petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not
complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial
movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of
carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive
Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in
this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right
to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there was the
necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the
requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly
affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction
under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that
the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted.
Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and
heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of
favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely
implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in
the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a
grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his
judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have
the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have
been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve
resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due
process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies
that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not
followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued
against it. He was sustained by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons
and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt
easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal
straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in
the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no
farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting
Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against
the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for
themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John
made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed
or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered
if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides
complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other
perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is
tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is
rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who,
out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for
expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose,
which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing
may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general
welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The
police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By
reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the
tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as
long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No.
626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in
one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers
who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the
increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken
steps to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was
sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic
had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had
caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had
spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned
statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for
human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private
ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by
greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct
relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited
doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven
years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is
made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if
the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the
measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine
and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such
trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited
to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for
the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to
correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved
were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should
have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned
executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain
for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what
criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and
in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order
No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in
damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare
the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of
Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached us
and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his
spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all
its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or
violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a
promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp
with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74621 February 7, 1990

BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES AND WORKER'S
UNION-FFW Represented by EDUARDO A. AFUAN, respondents.

Renato B. Pagatpatan for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

This petition for review by certiorari seeks the annulment or modification of the Order of public respondent Minister of Labor dated December 9,
1985 in a case for non-compliance with Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 docketed as ROXI-LSED Case No. 14-85 which 1) denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration dated February 3, 1986 and 2) affirmed the Order of Regional Director Eugenio I. Sagmit, Jr., Regional Office No. XI Davao
City, dated April 12, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Incorporated is hereby ordered to pay the above-named
workers, through this Office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, the total sum of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY- FOUR THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P284,625.00) PESOS representing their living allowance under Wage Order No. 5 covering the period from
October 16, 1984 to February 28, 1985 and under Wage Order No. 6 effective November 1, 1984 to February 28, 1985. Respondent is further
ordered to pay the employees who are likewise entitled to the claims here presented, but whose names were inadvertently omitted in the list
and computation. (Rollo, p. 7)

Petitioner contends that the respondent Minister of Labor and Employment acted without, or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in failing to hold:

A) That the Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion in asserting exclusive jurisdiction and in not certifying this case to the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission for a full-blown hearing on the merits;

B) That the Regional Director erred in not ruling on the counterclaim raised by the respondent (in the labor case, and now petitioner in this
case);

C) That the Regional Director erred -in skirting the constitutional and legal issues raised. (Rollo, p. 4)

This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner on September 21, 1984 with the Regional Office of the
MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the provisions of Wage Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director rendered a
decision dated November 16, 1984 in favor of private respondents. Judgment having become final and executory, the Regional Director issued
a Writ of Execution whereby some movable properties of the hospital (petitioner herein) were levied upon and its operating expenses kept with
the bank were garnished. The levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner hospital paid the claim of the private respondents (281 hospital
employees) directly, in the total amount of P163,047.50 covering the period from June 16 to October 15, 1984.

After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with Wage Order No. 5 and likewise, failed to comply with the new
Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on November 1, 1984, prompting private respondents to file against petitioner another complaint docketed
as ROXI-LSED-14-85, which is now the case at bar.

In its answer, petitioner raised the following affirmative defenses:

1) That the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor did not acquire jurisdiction over it for want of allegation that it has the capacity to be sued
and

2) That Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 are non-constitutional and therefore void. Significantly petitioner never averred any counterclaim in its
Answer.

After the complainants had filed their reply, petitioner filed a Motion for the Certification of the case to the National Labor Relations Commission
for a full-blown hearing on the matter, including the counterclaim interposed that the complainants had unpaid obligations with the Hospital
which might be offset with the latter's alleged obligation to the former.

Issues having been joined, the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor of the complainants (private respondents
herein) declaring that petitioner (respondent therein) is estopped from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance in the
hearing is in itself submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a previous case where the hospital already willingly
paid its obligations to the workers on orders of the Regional Office. On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the
Regional Director declared that only the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the Office of the
Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Office of the Minister of Labor, which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by said Office, giving rise to the instant petition reiterating the issues earlier mentioned.

The crucial issue We are tasked to resolve is whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over money claims of workers concurrent
with the Labor Arbiter.

It is worthy of note that the instant case was deliberated upon by this Court at the same time that Briad Agro Development Corporation v. de la
Cerna, G.R. No. 82805 and L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation v. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al. G.R. No. 83225, promulgated on June
29,1989 and Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 78909, promulgated 30 June 1989, where deliberated
upon; for all three (3) cases raised the same issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor to pass upon money
claims of employees. Hence, we will be referring to these cases, most especially the case of Briad Agro which, as will be seen later, was
reconsidered by the court.

Contrary to the claim of petitioners that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over said money claims is properly lodged in the Labor Arbiter
(relying on the case of Zambales Base Metals Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 146 SCRA 50) and the Regional Director has no jurisdiction over
workers' money claims, the Court in the three (3) cases above-mentioned ruled that in view of the promulgation of Executive Order No. 111, the
ruling in the earlier case of Zambales Base Metals is already abandoned. In accordance with the rulings in Briad Agro, L.M. Camus, and
Maternity Children's Hospital, the Regional Director exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter over money claims. Thus,

. . . . Executive Order No. 111 is in the character of a curative law, that is to say, it was intended to remedy a defect that, in the opinion of the
legislative (the incumbent Chief Executive in this case, in the exercise of her lawmaking power under the Freedom Constitution) had attached to
the provision subject of the amendment. This is clear from the proviso: "The provisions of Article 217 to the contrary notwithstanding . . ."
Plainly, the amendment was meant to make both the Secretary of Labor (or the various Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiter share
jurisdiction. (Briad Agro Dev. Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, supra).

Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore
empowered to adj udicate money claims, provided there stillexists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office
is not contested by the employer concerned. (Maternity Children's Hospital v. Sec. of Labor, supra).

However, it is very significant to note, at this point, that the decision in the consolidated cases of Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M.
Camus Engineering Corp. was reconsidered and set aside by this Court in a Resolution promulgated on November 9,1989. In view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 6715, approved on March 2, 1989, the Court found that reconsideration was proper.

RA 6715 amended Art. 129 and Art. 217 of the Labor Code, to read as follows:

ART. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits.Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional Director of the
Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, through summary
proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits,
including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper under this code, arising
from employer-employee relations, Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement; Provided, further, That the
aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing
officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same . . .

Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be appealed on the same grounds provided
in Article 223 of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from 11 receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution, to the National Labor Relations
Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its
rules.

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Except as otherwise provided under this code, the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision
without extension, even in the absence of steno graphic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

(1) Unfair labor practice cases;

(2) Termination disputes;

(3) If accompanied with a claim of reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment;

(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relation;

(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-
employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount not exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

It will be observed that what in fact conferred upon Regional Directors and other hearing officers of the Department of Labor (aside from the
Labor Arbiters) adjudicative powers, i.e., the power to try and decide, or hear and determine any claim brought before them for recovery of
wages, simple money claims, and other benefits, is Republic Act 6715, provided that the following requisites concur, to wit:

1) The claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper under the code;

2) The claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and

3) The aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

In the absence of any of the three (3) requisites, the Labor Arbiters have exclusive original jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-
employee relations, other than claims for employee's compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.

We hereby adopt the view taken by Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa in his Separate Opinion in the case of Briad Agro Dev. Corp., as reconsidered,
a portion of which reads:
In the resolution, therefore, of any question of jurisdiction over a money claim arising from employer-employee relations, the first inquiry should
be into whether the employment relation does indeed still exist between the claimant and the respondent.

If the relation no longer exists, and the claimant does not seek reinstatement, the case is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, not by the Regional
Director. On the other hand, if the employment relation still exists, or reinstatement is sought, the next inquiry should be into the amount
involved.

If the amount involved does not exceed P5,000.00, the Regional Director undeniably has jurisdiction. But even if the amount of the claim
exceeds P5,000.00, the claim is not on that account necessary removed from the Regional Director's competence. In respect thereof, he may
still exercise the visitorial and enforcement powers vested in him by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra; that is to say, he may
still direct his labor regulations officers or industrial safety engineers to inspect the employer's premises and examine his records; and if the
officers should find that there have been violations of labor standards provisions, the Regional Director may, after due notice and hearing, order
compliance by the employer therewith and issue a writ of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement thereof. However, this
power may not, to repeat, be exercised by him where the employer contests the labor regulation officers' findings and raises issues which
cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In such an event, the case will
have to be referred to the corresponding Labor Arbiter for adjudication, since it falls within the latter's exclusive original jurisdiction.

Anent the other issue involved in the instant case, petitioner's contention that the constitutionality of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should be
passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission, lacks merit. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to
ultimately declare a law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains operative and can be the source of rights
and duties especially so in the case at bar when petitioner complied with Wage Order No. 5 by paying the claimants the total amount of
P163,047.50, representing the latter's minimum wage increases up to October 16, 1984, instead of questioning immediately at that stage before
paying the amount due, the validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality. The Regional Director is plainly ,without the authority to declare
an order or law unconstitutional and his duty is merely to enforce the law which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be
unconstitutional. On our part, We hereby declare the assailed Wage Orders as constitutional, there being no provision of the 1973 Constitution
(or even of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution) violated by said Wage Orders, which Orders are without doubt for the
benefit of labor.

Based on the foregoing considerations, it is our shared view that the findings of the labor regulations officers may not be deemed uncontested
as to bring the case at bar within the competence of the Regional Director, as duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor,
pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended. Considering further that the aggregate claims involve an amount in excess of
P5,000.00, We find it more appropriate that the issue of petitioner hospital's liability therefor, including the proposal of petitioner that the
obligation of private respondents to the former in the aggregate amount of P507,237.57 be used to offset its obligations to them, be ventilated
and resolved, not in a summary proceeding before the Regional Director under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, but in accordance
With the more formal and extensive proceeding before the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the amount of the
employer's liability is not quite a factor in determining the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. However, the power to order compliance with
labor standards provisions may not be exercised where the employer contends or questions the findings of the labor regulation officers and
raises issues which cannot be determined without taking into account evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection, as in
the case at bar.

Viewed in the light of RA 6715 and read in consonance with the case of Briad Agro Development Corp., as reconsidered, We hold that the
instant case falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. Curative statutes
have long been considered valid in our jurisdiction, as long as they do not affect vested rights. In this case, We do not see any vested right that
will be impaired by the application of RA 6715. Inasmuch as petitioner had already paid the claims of private respondents in the amount of
P163,047.50 pursuant to the decision rendered in the first complaint, the only claim that should be deliberated upon by the Labor Arbiter should
be limited to the second amount given by the Regional Director in the second complaint together with the proposal to offset the obligations.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Director dated April 12, 1985, is SET ASIDE. The case is REFERRED, if the respondents
are so minded, to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA,- versus -

HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, both in his private and official capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo,

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision [1] dated 28 November 2006, rendered by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 15 July 2003, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
39, of Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 25843, dismissing the special civil action for Mandamus/Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, filed by petitioners Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya against respondent Mayor
Mariano Malones of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo.

Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market, which had just been newly renovated. In a letter[3] dated 6 August 1998, the Office of
the Municipal Mayor informed petitioners of a meeting scheduled on 11 August 1998 concerning the municipal public market. Revenue
measures were discussed during the said meeting, including the increase in the rentals for the market stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees
in the amount of P20,000.00,[4] payable every month.

On 17 August 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled The Municipal Revised Revenue
Code. The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount of P20,000.00
and P15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second floors of the municipal public market, respectively. The same Code authorized
respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls,[5] and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the
municipal public market.
Only a month later, on 18 September 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998,[6] moving to have
the meeting dated 11 August 1998 declared inoperative as a public hearing, because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of the
goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However, Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin was vetoed
by respondent on 30 September 1998.[7]

After Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was approved on 17 August 1998, another purported public hearing was held on 22 January 1999.[8]

On 9 June 1999, respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public
market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested
applicants.[9]

This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal public market,[10] to file before the RTC on 25 June
1999 a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,[11] against respondent. The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 25843.

Petitioners alleged that they were bona fide occupants of the stalls at the municipal public market, who had been religiously paying the monthly
rentals for the stalls they occupied.

Petitioners argued that public hearing was mandatory in the imposition of goodwill fees. Section 186 of the Local Government Code of 1991
provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges shall not be enacted without any prior hearing conducted for the purpose. Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, imposing goodwill fees, is invalid on the ground that the conferences held on 11 August 1998 and 22 January 1999 could
not be considered public hearings. According to Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code:

(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or hearings. The initial public hearing shall be held not
earlier than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or notices, or the last day of publication, or date of posting thereof, whichever is
later. (Emphasis ours.)

The letter from the Office of the Municipal Mayor was sent to stall holders on 6 August 1998, informing the latter of the meeting to be held, as
was in fact held, on 11 August 1998, only five days after notice.[12]

Hence, petitioners prayed that respondent be enjoined from imposing the goodwill fees pending the determination of the reasonableness
thereof, and from barring petitioners from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market and continuing with the operation of their
businesses.

Respondent, in answer, maintained that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is valid. He reasoned that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposed
goodwill fees to raise income to pay for the loan obtained by the Municipality of Maasin for the renovation of its public market. Said ordinance is
not per se a tax or revenue measure, but involves the operation and management of an economic enterprise of the Municipality of Maasin as a
local government unit; thus, there was no mandatory requirement to hold a public hearing for the enactment thereof. And, even granting that a
public hearing was required, respondent insisted that public hearings take place on 11 August 1998 and 22 January 1999.

Respondent further averred that petitioners were illegally occupying the market stalls, and the only way petitioners could legitimize their
occupancy of said market stalls would be to execute lease contracts with the Municipality of Maasin. While respondent admitted that petitioners
had been paying rentals for their market stalls in the amount of P45.00 per month prior to the renovation of the municipal public market,
respondent asserted that no rentals were paid or collected from petitioners ever since the renovation began.

Respondent sought from the RTC an award for moral damages in the amount of not less than P500,000.00, for the social humiliation and hurt
feelings he suffered by reason of the unjustified filing by petitioners of Civil Case No. 25843; and an order for petitioners to vacate the
renovated market stalls and pay reasonable rentals from the date they began to occupy said stalls until they vacate the same. [13]

The RTC subsequently rendered a Decision[14] on 15 July 2003 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. 25843.

The RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy of mandamus or prohibition. It reasoned that mandamus would not lie
in this case where petitioners failed to show a clear legal right to the use of the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees imposed by the
municipal government.Prohibition likewise would not apply to the present case where respondents acts, sought to be enjoined, did not involve
the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

The RTC also dismissed the Petition in Civil Case No. 25843 on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioners failure to
question the legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Secretary of Justice, as provided under Section 187 of the Local Government
Code,[15] rendered the Petition raising the very same issue before the RTC premature.
The dispositive part of the RTC Decision dated 15 July 2003 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding the petition without merit, the same is, as it is hereby ordered, dismissed. [16]

On 12 August 2003, petitioners and their co-plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[17] The RTC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 18 June 2004.[18]

While Civil Case No. 25843 was pending, respondent filed before the 12 th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan-
Maasin, Iloilo City a case in behalf of the Municipality of Maasin against petitioner Evelyn Ongsuco, entitled Municipality of Maasin v. Ongsuco,
a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Damages, docketed as MCTC Civil Case No. 257. On 18 June 2002, the MCTC decided in favor of
the Municipality of Maasin and ordered petitioner Ongsuco to vacate the market stalls she occupied, Stall No. 1-03 and Stall No. 1-04, and to
pay monthly rentals in the amount of P350.00 for each stall from October 2001 until she vacates the said market stalls. [19] On appeal, Branch 36
of the RTC of Maasin, Iloilo City, promulgated a Decision, dated 29 April 2003, in a case docketed as Civil Case No. 02-27229 affirming the
decision of the MCTC. A Writ of Execution was issued by the MCTC on 8 December 2003.[20]

Petitioners, in their appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, challenged the dismissal of their Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 25843 by the RTC. Petitioners explained that they did appeal the enactment of Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Department of Justice, but their appeal was not acted upon because of their failure to attach a copy of said
municipal ordinance. Petitioners claimed that one of their fellow stall holders, Ritchelle Mondejar, wrote a letter to the Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
Municipal Treasurer of Maasin, requesting a copy of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, but received no reply.[21]

In its Decision dated 28 November 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, the Court of Appeals again ruled in respondents favor.

The Court of Appeals declared that the goodwill fee was a form of revenue measure, which the Municipality of Maasin was empowered to
impose under Section 186 of the Local Government Code. Petitioners failed to establish any grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent in enforcing goodwill fees.

The Court of Appeals additionally held that even if respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion, petitioners resort to a petition for prohibition
was improper, since respondents acts in question herein did not involve the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as
required under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC
was premature, as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto. The appellate court did not give any weight to petitioners
assertion that they filed an appeal challenging the legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Secretary of Justice, as no proof was
presented to support the same.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the instant appeal bereft of merit. The assailed decision dated July 15, 2003 as well as
the subsequent resolution dated 18 June 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. [22]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the foregoing Decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution [24] dated 8
February 2008.

Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE EXHAUSTED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE FILING THE INSTANT CASE IN
COURT;

II

WHETHER OR NOT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE; AND

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE MARIANO MALONES WHO WAS THEN THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF MAASIN, ILOILO HAS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[25]
After a close scrutiny of the circumstances that gave rise to this case, the Court determines that there is no need for petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.

The findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that petitioners Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus in Civil Case No. 25843 was
premature is anchored on Section 187 of the Local Government Code, which reads:

Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings.The procedure for
approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings
shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of
tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of
Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not
have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:Provided,
finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon
the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis ours.)

It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or
herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then
such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court
is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are
several exceptions to this rule. [26]

The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly
constitute an exception.[27] Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an
exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish. [28]

In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised
before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to
its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.

Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly
recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction,ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphases ours.)

In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[29] Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[30] and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Santos,[31] the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include
local ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy.

Although not raised in the Petition at bar, the Court is compelled to discuss another procedural issue, specifically, the declaration by the RTC,
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy in filing a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus
before the RTC.

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances petitions for prohibition and mandamus may
be filed, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be
done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
(Emphases ours.)

In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person -- whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions -- who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered,
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition.[32] On the other hand, the remedy
of mandamus lies to compel performance of a ministerial duty.[33] The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.[34]

In this case, petitioners primary intention is to prevent respondent from implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the
goodwill fees from petitioners and barring them from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is
more in the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than mandamus (compelling performance).

For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[35]

The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or
bodies that are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is not called upon
to adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature.

A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard
for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.[36]

The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function.

It bears to emphasize that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 enjoys the presumption of validity, unless declared otherwise. Respondent has the
duty to carry out the provisions of the ordinance under Section 444 of the Local Government Code:

Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the
municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:

xxxx

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the municipality x x x.

xxxx

(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program
objectives sand priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-
industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx

(iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected, and that municipal funds are applied in accordance with
law or ordinance to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the municipality; x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposes increased rentals and goodwill fees on stall holders at the renovated municipal public market, leaving
respondent, or the municipal treasurer acting as his alter ego, no discretion on whether or not to collect the said rentals and fees from the stall
holders, or whether or to collect the same in the amounts fixed by the ordinance.

The Court further notes that respondent already deemed petitioners stalls at the municipal public market vacated. Without such stalls,
petitioners would be unable to conduct their businesses, thus, depriving them of their means of livelihood. It is imperative on petitioners part to
have the implementation of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 by respondent stopped the soonest. As this Court has established in its previous
discussion, there is no more need for petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies, considering that the fundamental issue between them and
respondent is one of law, over which the courts have competence and jurisdiction. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for
petitioners in the ordinary course of law, except to seek from the courts the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding respondent to desist
from continuing to implement what is allegedly an invalid ordinance.

This brings the Court to the substantive issue in this Petition on the validity of Municipal Ordinance N. 98-01.

Respondent maintains that the imposition of goodwill fees upon stall holders at the municipal public market is not a revenue measure that
requires a prior public hearing. Rentals and other consideration for occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market are not matters of
taxation.

Respondents argument is specious.

Article 219 of the Local Government Code provides that a local government unit exercising its power to impose taxes, fees and charges should
comply with the requirements set in Rule XXX, entitled Local Government Taxation:

Article 219. Power to Create Sources of Revenue.Consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, each LGU shall exercise its power to
create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, or charges, subject to the provisions of this Rule. Such taxes, fees, or charges
shall accrue exclusively to the LGU. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 221(g) of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines charges as:

Article 221. Definition of Terms.

xxxx

(g) Charges refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property. (Emphasis ours.)

Evidently, the revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes alone, but also other fees and charges. And rentals and goodwill
fees, imposed by Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 for the occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market, fall under the definition of
charges.

For the valid enactment of ordinances imposing charges, certain legal requisites must be met. Section 186 of the Local Government Code
identifies such requisites as follows:

Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges.Local government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on
any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or
contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted
without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis ours.)

Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code establishes in detail the procedure for the enactment of
such an ordinance, relevant provisions of which are reproduced below:

Section 277. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures.x x x.

xxxx

(b) The conduct of public hearings shall be governed by the following procedure:

xxxx

(2) In addition to the requirement for publication or posting, the sanggunian concerned shall cause the sending of written notices of the
proposed ordinance, enclosing a copy thereof, to the interested or affected parties operating or doing business within the territorial jurisdiction
of the LGU concerned.

(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or hearings. The initial public hearing shall be
held not earlier than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or notices, or the last day of publication, or date of posting thereof,
whichever is later;

xxxx

(c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the absence of a public hearing duly conducted in the
manner provided under this Article. (Emphases ours.)

It is categorical, therefore, that a public hearing be held prior to the enactment of an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges; and that such
public hearing be conducted as provided under Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.

There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders at the municipal public market were sent out on 6 August
1998, informing them of the supposed public hearing to be held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their notice also
on 6 August 1998, the public hearing was already scheduled, and actually conducted, only five days later, on 11 August 1998. This
contravenes Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing
be held no less than ten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or published.

When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, dated 18
September 1998, respondent vetoed the said resolution. Although the Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override respondents
veto,[37] it no longer did so.

The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public hearing was held on 22 January 1999, after the
questioned ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August 1998. Section 186 of the Local
Government Code prescribes that the public hearing be held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of an ordinance levying taxes,
fees, and charges.

Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void and cannot
be given any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance could not have conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction to order
petitioners stalls at the municipal public market vacant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86182 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and ineffective, and a writ of
prohibition isISSUED commanding the Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to permanently desist from enforcing the said
ordinance. Petitioners are alsoDECLARED as lawful occupants of the market stalls they occupied at the time they filed the Petition for
Mandamus/Prohibition docketed as Civil Case No. 25843. In the event that they were deprived of possession of the said market stalls,
petitioners are entitled to recover possession of these stalls.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971

FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN, defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, defendant-appellant.

Dionisio E. Moya for plaintiff-appellee.

Ramon B. de los Reyes for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any, to be attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of
this appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her
suit against defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently enjoining the other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan, from proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan
declared no longer enforceable, the prescriptive period having lapsed. There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant that if
the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation, then the
right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting. In arriving at such a conclusion, the lower court manifested a tenacious adherence to the
inflexible view that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus as inoperative as if it had never
been. It was oblivious to the force of the principle adopted by this Court that while a statute's repugnancy to the fundamental law deprives it of
its character as a juridical norm, its having been operative prior to its being nullified is a fact that is not devoid of legal consequences. As will
hereafter be explained, such a failing of the lower court resulted in an erroneous decision. We find for appellant Philippine National Bank, and
we reverse.

There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on
July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province of Pangasinan.
As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the
loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and
was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision now on
appeal. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription would not
be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative
act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took
no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of
plaintiff.

Hence this appeal, which, as made clear at the outset, possesses merit, there being a failure on the part of the lower court to adhere to the
applicable constitutional doctrine as to the effect to be given to a statute subsequently declared invalid.

1. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new
Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. 3 It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms
cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt
that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is
so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under
it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done
while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its
being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." 4 This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill 5 and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. 6 An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice
Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. 7

2. Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police power legislation intended to promote public welfare but adversely affecting
property rights is involved. While subject to be assailed on due process, equal protection and non-impairment grounds, all that is required to
avoid the corrosion of invalidity is that the rational basis or reasonableness test is satisfied. The legislature on the whole is not likely to allow an
enactment suffering, to paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of out running the bounds of reason and resulting in sheer oppression. It may be
of course that if challenged, an adverse judgment could be the result, as its running counter to the Constitution could still be shown. In the
meanwhile though, in the normal course of things, it has been acted upon by the public and accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would
indeed be the fruitful parent of injustice. Moreover, as its constitutionality is conditioned on its being fair or reasonable, which in turn is
dependent on the actual situation, never static but subject to change, a measure valid when enacted may subsequently, due to altered
circumstances, be stricken down.

That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32,
issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war
sufferers. So it was explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban8 where such enactment was considered in 1953 "unreasonable and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect." 9 At the time of the
issuance of the above Executive Order in 1945 and of the passage of such Act in 1948, there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The
Philippines was confronted with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her liberation from the Japanese military forces in 1945.
Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate. Measures, radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some semblance
of normalcy could be restored and an improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then that the suspension of enforcement of payment of
the obligations then existing was declared first by executive order and then by legislation. The Supreme Court was right therefore in rejecting
the contention that on its face, the Moratorium Law was unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
Considering the circumstances confronting the legitimate government upon its return to the Philippines, some such remedial device was
needed and badly so. An unyielding insistence then on the rights to property on the part of the creditors was not likely to meet with judicial
sympathy. Time passed however, and conditions did change.

When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question before it was its satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the time of its
enactment but as of such date. Clearly, if then it were found unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual obligations must prevail
over the assertion of community power to remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court was convinced that such indeed was the case. As stated
in the opinion of Justice Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a
result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12)
years before they could affect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us unreasonable, if not
oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And
the injustice is more patent when, under the law the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar
statutes in the United States. 10 The conclusion to which the foregoing considerations inevitably led was that as of the time of adjudication, it
was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified. That before
the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then to yield assent to the now prevailing
principle that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are
attached.

3. Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were
war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period
that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run. So it has been held from Day v. Court of First
Instance, 11 decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez, 12 handed down only last year. What is deplorable is that as of the time of the lower court
decision on January 27, 1960, at least eight decisions had left no doubt as to the prescriptive period being tolled in the meanwhile prior to such
adjudication of invalidity. 13 Speaking of the opposite view entertained by the lower court, the present Chief Justice, in Liboro v. Finance and
Mining Investments Corp. 14 has categorized it as having been "explicitly and consistently rejected by this Court." 15

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive
period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the
foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed. No costs.

G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993

ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P.
REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.

Isagani M. Jungco, Valeriano S. Peralta, Miguel Famularcano, Jr. and Virgilio E. Acierto for petitioners.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the
office . . . ." 2 Paragraph (d) reads

(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation
to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who
shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of
this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis
supplied).

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that theproviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes
on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," 3because the City Mayor of
Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint", 4 since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the
Mayor to the subject posts; 5and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, which says:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: . . . (g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new
position, promotion, or giving salary increases. During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special
election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates
and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless it is
satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be
filled in a manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of
urgent need:Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of the
appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void. (2) Any government official who promotes, or gives
any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations . . . .

for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was
within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.

The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however,That for the first year of its
operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.

The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may
serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job.
Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, 6 ". . . .
should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be
precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and
inefficiency . . . ."

Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents . . . ." 7

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription
seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no
moment.

It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his office. 8 But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the
constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its
validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores
the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointiveofficial when allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the
President as head of the economic and planning agency; 9 the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; 10 and, a
member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. 11

The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, was not accidental when drawn, and not without reason. It was
purposely sought by the drafters of the Constitution as shown in their deliberation, thus

MR. MONSOD. In other words, what then Commissioner is saying, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the prohibition is more strict with respect to
elective officials, because in the case of appointive officials, there may be a law that will allow them to hold other positions.

MR. FOZ. Yes, I suggest we make that difference, because in the case of appointive officials, there will be certain situations where the law
should allow them to hold some other positions. 12

The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who
are governed by the first paragraph.

It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance,
citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 13 where we stated that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment
by the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII,
of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to
perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.

This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or
automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed"
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been
the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex
officio" would have been used. 14

Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they
nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed, the Senators would not have been concerned
with the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio.
Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso was stated, Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that "if the
Conference Committee just said "the Mayor shall be the Chairman" then that should foreclose the issue. It is a legislative choice." 15 The
Senator took a view that the constitutional proscription against appointment of elective officials may have been sidestepped if Congress
attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of directing the President to appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this
view of Senator Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to be appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the argument that they
are ex officio.

The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Authority made by respondents cannot be applied to uphold the constitutionality
of the challenged proviso since it is not put in issue in the present case. In the same vein, the argument that if no elective official may be
appointed or designated to another post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double compensation 16 would be
useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an
elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec. 3, Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.

Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President
the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to
appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.

As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the
duties of some office or trust," 17 or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office
or public function and discharge the duties of the same. 18 In his treatise, Philippine Political
Law, 19 Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office."

Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury,
J., 20 "the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his appointment," 21and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment
to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion." 22 In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate
Court 23 we held:

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his
judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of
the appointing power . . . .

Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a
ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the
appointing power.

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the
discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to
divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed
by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. 24

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City.
Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such
supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be
the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can
qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his
choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign
first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. The
deliberation in the Constitutional Commission is enlightening:

MR. DAVIDE. On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the substitution of the word "term" with TENURE.

MR. FOZ. The effect of the proposed amendment is to make possible for one to resign from his position.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, we should allow that prerogative.

MR. FOZ. Resign from his position to accept an executive position.

MR. DAVIDE. Besides, it may turn out in a given case that because of, say, incapacity, he may leave the service, but if he is prohibited from
being appointed within the term for which he was elected, we may be depriving the government of the needed expertise of an individual. 25

Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government
posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an
incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his
disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his
seat . . . ." The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only
after they have been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they
can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that
ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that a person
holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a
second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his
election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable
(Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR 941)." 26 "Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be
ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the
incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 218
So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445)." 27

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of
SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains
Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose
acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the
public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the
officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in
its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or
pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell
[N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323)." 28

Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which may have been received by
respondent Gordon pursuant to his appointment may be retained by him.

The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now evident, other matters affecting the legality of the questioned proviso as well as
the appointment of said respondent made pursuant thereto need no longer be discussed.

In thus concluding as we do, we can only share the lament of Sen. Sotero Laurel which he expressed in the floor deliberations of S.B. 1648,
precursor of R.A. 7227, when he articulated

. . . . (much) as we would like to have the present Mayor of Olongapo City as the Chief Executive of this Authority that we are creating; (much)
as I, myself, would like to because I know the capacity, integrity, industry and dedication of Mayor Gordon; (much) as we would like to give him
this terrific, burdensome and heavy responsibility, we cannot do it because of the constitutional prohibition which is very clear. It says: "No
elective official shall be appointed or designated to another position in any capacity." 29

For, indeed, "a Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a mountain amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of
the waves." 30 One of the characteristics of the Constitution is permanence, i.e., "its capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated
not by legitimate needs but only by passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional infatuations of the people with ideas or personalities . . . .
Such a Constitution is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit political expediency, personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change." 31

Ergo, under the Constitution, Mayor Gordon has a choice. We have no choice.

WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from
the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority," is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J.
Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.

However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are
hereby UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102232 March 9, 1994

VIOLETA ALDOVINO, ALI ALIBASA, FELIX BALINO, DIONISIO BALLESTEROS, JOSE N. BALEIN, JR., FREDDIE CAUTON, JANE
CORROS, ROBERTO CRUZ, TRINIDAD DACUMOS, ANGELITA DIMAPILIS, ANDREA ESTONILO, EFREN FONTANILLA, MARY PAZ
FRIGILLANA, MANUEL HENSON, SAMUEL HIPOL, MERLENE IBALIO, MAGDALENA JAMILLA, ALEXANDER JUSTINIANI, ROMULO
MIRADOR, JULIO MIRAVITE, DANTE NAGTALON, CLARITA NAMUCO, ALICIA ORBITA, ANGELITA PUCAN, MYRNA P. SALVADOR,
LIBRADA TANTAY, and ARACELI J. DE VEYRA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY RAFAEL ALUNAN III, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM and SECRETARY GUILLERMO M. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

ASSERTING that their plight is similar to petitioners' in Mandani v. Gonzales, 1 and in the consolidated cases ofAbrogar v. Garrucho, Jr.,
and Arnaldo v. Garrucho, Jr., 2 herein petitioners and intervenors seek reinstatement and payment of back wages.

Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120, which took effect upon its approval on 30 January 1987, reorganizing the then Ministry of Tourism,
provides that incumbents whose positions are not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern or who are not reappointed are
deemed separated from the service. Pursuant thereto, the then Ministry of Tourism (MOT, now Department of Tourism, DOT) issued various
office orders and memoranda declaring all positions thereat vacant, 3 and effecting the separation of many of its employees, 4 which led to
theMandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo cases, as well as the instant petition.

In Mandani, we declared null and void all office orders and memoranda issued pursuant to E.O. 120 and directed "public respondents or their
successors . . . to immediately restore the petitioners to their positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed under
the new staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid terminations at rates not lower than their former salaries." 5

In Abrogar and Arnaldo, we ordered the reinstatement of petitioners "to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with back
salaries computed under the new staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissals at rates not lower than their former salaries,
provided, however, that no supervening event shall have occured which would otherwise disqualify them for such reinstatement, and provided,
further, that whatever benefits they may have received from the Government by reason of their termination shall be reimbursed through
reasonable salary deduction." 6
Herein petitioners and intervenors claiming that they should not be deprived of the relief granted to their former co-employees plead for
reinstatement "without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed under the new staffing pattern from dates of their invalid
termination at rates not lower than their former salaries." 7

Decisive in this recourse is the determination of whether the separation of herein petitioners and intervenors from service was pursuant to office
orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani.

Except for petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros and Myrna Salvador, intervenors Concepcion Timario, Efren Fontanilla, Ascension Padilla and
Evelyn Enriquez, public respondents do not dispute that petitioners and intervenors were unseated from the then Ministry of Tourism, pursuant
to office orders and memoranda issued under E.O. No. 120. Public respondents nevertheless pray for the denial of the petition not only
because petitioners and intervenors failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that their claims are barred by laches, but also in view of the
disruption of the present organizational set-up if reinstatement is directed.

The Solicitor General argues that while petitioners and intervenors (except petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros and Efren Fontanilla) were
dismissed contemporaneously with their colleagues in Mandani (filed 3 June 1987 and decided 4 June 1990), Abrogar (filed 31 October 1990
and decided
6 August 1991) and Arnaldo (filed 7 January 1991 and decided 6 August 1991), they filed this petition and the interventions only in October
1991, and February, March, May and July 1992, or more than four (4) years later, hence, laches has set in. In reply, petitioners and intervenors
explain

. . . since the time these DOT employees were illegally dismissed in May, 1987, most of them returned to the far away provinces of their origin
because they became jobless. It was only by the slow and unreliable communication of word of mouth that they came to know much later on
that they are (sic) entitled to be reinstated to the DOT . . . 8

The doctrine of laches is "principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in .
. . the relation of parties." 9 In the case at bar, equity, if ever invoked, must lean in favor of petitioners and intervenors who were unjustly injured
by public respondents' unlawful acts. The prejudice from the high-handed violation of the rights of petitioners and intervenors resulting in their
loss of employment is far more serious than the inconvenience to public respondents in rectifying their own mistakes.

Moreover, petitioners and intervenors cannot be deemed to have slept on their rights considering, as we should, the
following unrebutted allegations in the main petition:

7. Petitioners protested their illegal termination from the DOT. Many of them questioned their termination with the Department of Labor and
Employment where they filed a Complaint against the DOT and its top officials for illegal dismissal. . . . Some of them questioned their illegal
termination before the Civil Service Commission.

8. Many of petitioners joined a picket and demonstration held by illegally terminated employees of the DOT before its office at the DOT building
at the Luneta Park.

9. Petitioners were forced to receive their separation or retirement benefits from the DOT, but all under protest. The others continued to fight
their cases with the Department of Labor and Employment even if they got their separation and/or retirement benefits.

xxx xxx xxx

11. After the finality of this Decision (Mandani) . . . many other terminated employees of the DOT wrote to then DOT Secretary Peter D.
Garrucho, Jr., as the successor-in-interest of former Sec. Jose U. Gonzales, and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague, asking that following the
Decision in thisMandani vs. Gonzalez case and being similarly situated as the twenty-eight (28) petitioners therein, that they be reinstated to
their former or equivalent positions in the DOT and/or to be paid their back wages. Then . . . DOT Secretary Garrucho and DBM Sec. Carague
never responded to these letters and did not reinstate and/or pay any of their back wages.

xxx xxx xxx

16. Following the Decision of this Honorable Court in the Mandani vs. Gonzalez case and its Resolution in the consolidated cases of Abrogar
vs. Garrucho and Arnaldo vs. Garrucho, petitioners made representations with the DOT to be reinstated and/or paid their back
wages . . . . 10

Neither could petitioners and intervenors be faulted for not joining in the previous petitions because, as we held inCristobal v. Melchor (No. L-
43203, 29 July 1977; 78 SCRA 175, 183, 187)

More importantly, Cristobal could be expected without necessarily spending time and money by going to court to relie upon the outcome
of the case filed by his co-employees to protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein and the
identical relief being sought. On this point, We find a statement of Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court in
Southern Pacific vs. Bogert, relevant and persuasive, and We quote;

The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in
seeking a remedy. Here plaintiffs, or others representing them, protested . . . and ever since they have . . . persisted in the diligent pursuit of a
remedy . . .Where the cause of action is of such a nature that a suit to enforce it would be brought on behalf, not only of the plaintiff, but of all
persons similarly situated, it is not essential that each such person should intervened (sic) in the suit brought in order that he be deemed
thereafter free from the laches which bars those who sleep on their rights (citations omitted).

xxx xxx xxx

This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound by the rigid application of the law, but rather its action should conform to the
conditions or exigencies to a given problem or situation in order to grant a relief that will serve the ends of justice.

To paraphrase then Chief Justice John Edwin Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, let us to (do) complete justice and not do justice by
halves ("The court of equity in all cases delights to do complete justice and not by halves." Marshall, C. J. Knight vs. Knight, 3 P. Wms. 331,
334; Corbet v. Johnson, 1 Brock, 77, 81 both cited in Hefner, et al. vs. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 123 U.S., 309, 313).

We emphasize that prescription was never raised here as an issue; at most, it is deemed waived. In Fernandez v.Grolier International,
Inc., 11 we stated:

In the case of Director of Lands v. Dano (96 SCRA 161, 165), this Court held that "inasmuch as petitioner had never pleaded the statute of
limitations, he is deemed to have waived the same".
In the cited case of Directors of Lands v. Dano, the Director of Lands, who was similarly situated as public respondents herein who represent
the Government, was deemed to have waived the defense of prescription "inasmuch as petitioner had never pleaded the statute of limitations."

The matter of prescription, we reiterate, may not be considered at this late stage, not only because it was never raised and therefore now
foreclosed, but more importantly, because it must yield to the higher interest of justice. Incidentally, it is only in the dissent that the question of
prescription is introduced. Not even the Government raised it.

In 1977, we in fact relaxed the rule on prescription in Cristobal v. Melchor 12 to give way to a determination of the case on the merits where, like
in this case, "[i]t was an act of the government through its responsible
officials . . . which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of . . . complaint for reinstatement." But, we need not go back that far. On 15
August 1991, the Court En Banc granted the related petition in intervention of Alberto A. Peralta,
et al., 13 in the consolidated cases of Abrogar v. Garrucho, and Arnaldo v. Garrucho, even if filed on 1 August 1991 or two months after the four-
year prescriptive period, which lapsed on the 14th and 28th of May 1991. As we ruled inCristobal v. Melchor, 14 "it is indeed the better rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do
so manifest wrong and injustice would result."

The principle that prescription does not run against the State, which contemplates a situation where a private party cannot defeat the claim of
the State by raising the defense of prescription, is inapplicable because in this case the private parties are the ones filing a suit against the
State. Consequently, we reiterate our pronouncement in Fernandez v. Grolier International, Inc., 15 that "[i]t is true that there are exceptions to
the rule that an action will not be declared to have prescribed if prescription is not expressly invoked (Garcia vs. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250).
However, where considerations of substantial justice come in (as in this case when the very employment, and therefore the lifeblood, of each
petitioner/intervenor is involved), it is better to resolve the issues on the basic merits of the case instead of applying the rule on prescription
which the private respondent waived when it was not pleaded." Anyhow, it was public respondents who created the problem of petitioners and
intervenors by illegally abolishing their positions and terminating their services in outrageous disregard of the basic protection accorded civil
servants, hence our repeated pronouncement that it was unconstitutional.

An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at
all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor
may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity. 16 Plainly, it was as if petitioners and intervenors
were never served their termination orders and, consequently, were never separated from the service, The fact that they were not able to
assume office and exercise their duties is attributable to the continuing refusal of public respondents to take them in unless they first obtained
court orders, perhaps, for government budgetary and accounting purposes. Under the circumstances, the more prudent thing that public
respondents could have done upon receipt of the decision in Mandani, if they were earnest in making amends and restoring petitioners and
intervenors to their positions, was to inform the latter of the nullification of their termination orders and to return to work and resume their
functions. After all, many of them were supposed to be waiting for instructions from the DOT because in their termination orders it promised to
directly contact them by telephone, telegram or written notice as soon as funds for their separation would be available. 17

Furthermore, the representations to DOT made by petitioners and intervenors for their reinstatement partook of the nature of an administrative
proceeding, and public respondents also failed to raise the issue of prescription therein. As already adverted to, that issue was never raised
before us. In reciting the alleged instances of delay in bringing up this suit, the Solicitor General simply referred to laches, not prescription.
Since this case is an original action, and if we treat the petition and interventions as ordinary complaints, the failure of public respondents to
raise the issue of prescription in their comments cannot be interpreted any less than a waiver of that defense. For, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except the failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in
a later pleading, if one is permitted. 18

Above all, what public respondents brought up was the doctrine of laches, not prescription; and laches is different from prescription. The
defense of laches applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded
on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity,
whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not. 19 In any case, it can be said that the prescriptive period
was tolled with the filing of the termination cases before the Department of Labor and Employment and the Civil Service Commission, the
pendency of which is acknowledged in the Comment and Memorandum of public respondents.

Incidentally, even the picketing of the premises and the placards demanding their immediate reinstatement could not be any less than written
demands sufficient to interrupt the period of prescription. As we noted earlier, "[a]fter the finality of this Decision (Mandani) . . . many other
terminated employees of the DOT wrote to then DOT Secretary Peter D. Garrucho, Jr . . . and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague asking that
following the Decision in this Mandani vs. Gonzalez case and being similarly situated as the twenty-eight (28) petitioners therein . . . they be
reinstated to their former or equivalent positions in the DOT and/or to be paid their back wages." But "[t]hen . . . DOT Secretary Garrucho and
DBM Sec. Carague never responded to these
letters," 20 so that it may be said that the period that was interrupted never started to run again against petitioner and intervenors.

The requirement of prior resort to administrative remedies is not an absolute rule and this did not bar direct access to this Court in the
analogous cases of Dario v. Mison, 21 and Mandani v. Gonzalez, 22 thus

The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue
(this was raised by the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 86241, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies was raised in G.R. Nos.
81954 and 81917 by the Solicitor General), and other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the demands of public interest,
including the need for stability in the public service" (Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987, 153 SCRA 549, 551-552) and
because of the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the rights of public servants.

On the argument that existing organizational set-up would be disrupted if reinstatement be directed, we need only reiterate our 18 October
1990 Resolution in Mandani that

An erring head of a Department, Bureau, or Office cannot avoid reinstatement, payment of back pay, and other acts of compliance with the
orders of this Court by interposing changes effected subsequent to his unlawful acts and claiming that such changes make it difficult to obey
this Court's orders.

The basic principle to be applied whenever the Court declares an administrative official to have acted in an unlawful manner is for that official to
undo the harmful effects of his illegal act and to accord to the aggrieved parties restoration or restitution in good faith to make up for the
deprivations which may have been suffered because of his act. 23
Petitioners and intervenors, who are similarly situated as their counterparts in Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo, deserve no less than equal
treatment.

The Solicitor General takes exception to petitioner Samuel Hipol who was separated from the service under an order of 19 May 1986 issued
pursuant to Sec. 2, Art. III, of Proclamation No. 3, and not under E.O. No. 120. 24 In reply, petitioner Hipol admits that he was "in the process of
working for his reinstatement/reappointment at the DOT when . . . all positions thereat were declared vacant . . ." 25 Since his separation from
service was not under void orders issued pursuant to E.O. No. 120 and, worse, he was not even an incumbent when E.O. No. 120 was issued,
Hipol could not be considered as in the same situation as the petitioners in Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo.

A parallel case is that of intervenor Concepcion Timario who, according to the Solicitor General, resigned effective 28 May 1987 and was not
separated under any of the invalid orders. 26 Intervenor Timario however contends that she is entitled to relief because her courtesy resignation
was accepted on 9 June 1987 or during the period positions were declared vacant pursuant to MOT Office Order No. 9-87. 27 It is significant to
note that Timario's letter of resignation cited "professional reasons" as cause for her abdication 28 which, obviously, pertains to the nature of her
work. Moreover, conspicuously absent is the customary order requiring the filing of courtesy resignations. Timario may not be permitted to
characterize, by way of self-serving assertions, that her resignation was merely a courtesy resignation pursuant to any of the voided office
orders or memoranda.

The claim of the Solicitor General that petitioners Jane Corros and Efren Fontanilla were not employees of the Ministry of Tourism because
their names did not appear in the regular plantilla of the Ministry of Tourism, 29 is specious since the listing of names in the plantilla is not a
conclusive evidence of employment. Nonetheless, in view of the incessant allegation of the Solicitor General that Corros and Fontanilla were
not employees of the Ministry, and considering the photocopies of Fontanilla's appointment papers and termination order submitted by
him, 30 as well as the bare assertion of petitioner Corros that she was for 11 years PRO I in the Licensing Division of the Ministry and that her
name could not be found in the plantilla because she is now Jane Ombawa in view of her marriage, 31 the fact of employment should be
threshed out first in a proper forum as this Court is not a trier of facts.

The Solicitor General contends that since petitioner Myrna Salvador was a casual employee, 32 intervenor Ascension Padilla was a temporary
appointee whose appointment expired 20 February 1987, 33 and intervenor Evelyn Enriquez was also a temporary appointee, 34 their
appointments are terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Considering however that the office orders and memoranda which
directed the separation of petitioners and intervenors were annulled, hence in legal contemplation did not exist, the effect is, as if the
termination did not occur. However, since the determination in this case is limited only to the extent of the nullity of said orders and memoranda,
the reinstatement of Salvador, Padilla and Enriquez cannot be ordered in the instant proceeding.

The Solicitor General also seeks dismissal of the petition and intervention against intervenors Rizalina T. Espiritu, Abdulia T. Landingin,
Medardo Ilao, Rosita Somera, Armando Cruz, Catalino Dabu, Francisco Villaraiz, Norma Jumilia, Kennedy Basa, Rolando G. Cagasca and
Alfonso Angeles because they were already reinstated. However, because of the unrefuted allegation that these employees were not yet paid
their respective back wages, then to that extent, their petitions must be granted.

In computing back wages, we cannot blindly accept the allegation of petitioners and intervenors that since their separation from the service in
1987, or about seven (7) years ago, they have been jobless hence entitled to full back wages. Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the
award of back wages should not exceed a period of five (5) years. 35

In the final analysis, the dissent admits that petitioners and intervenors truly deserve the reliefs they pray for except that their cause of action
has allegedly prescribed. Shall we now frustrate their rightful claims on a ground that was never raised, nor even hinted at, by public
respondents in the entire proceeding? That would be antithetic to our concept of social justice; at the very least, it is subversive of the rudiments
of fairplay.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioners Violeta Aldovino, Ali Alibasa, Felix Balino, Dionisio Ballesteros, Jose N. Balein, Jr.,
Freddie Cauton, Roberto Cruz, Trinidad Dacumos, Angelita Dimapilis, Andrea Estonilo, Mary Paz Frigillana, Manuel Henson, Merlene Ibalio,
Magdalena Jamilla, Alexander Justiniani, Romulo Mirador, Julio Miravite, Dante Nagtalon, Clarita Namuco, Alicia Orbita, Angelita Pucan, Myrna
P. Salvador,
Librada Tantay, and Araceli De Veyra, and intervenors Josephine G. Andaya, Rosalinda T. Atienza, Jose M. Baldovino, Jr., Asuncion C.
Briones,
Maribelle A. Garcia, Florita O. Ocampo, Rolando Sison, Lourdes B. Tamayo, Rolando Valdez, Erlinda Piza, Eleonor Sagnit, Fidel Sevidal,
Eloisa Alonzo, Angelito Dela Cruz, Lynie Arcenas, Maria Emma Jasmin, Macacuna Pangandaman, Rosalia Mauna, Romeo Padilla, Ascencion
Padilla, Crispulo Padilla, Virgilio Dejero, Armando Mendoza, Anicita S. Baluyut, Antonio D. Edralin, Evelyn A. Enriquez, Ma. Victoria L. Jacobo,
Daniel M. Manamtam, Jessie C. Manrique, Encarnacion T. Radaza, Mario P. Ruivivar, Amor T. Medina, and Felix L. Poliquit, are ordered
REINSTATED immediately to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed under the new staffing
pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissals at rates not lower that their former salaries but not to exceed a period of five (5)
years, provided, however, that no supervening event shall have occured which would otherwise disqualify then from such reinstatement,
and provided, further, that whatever benefits they may have received from the Government by reason of their termination shall be reimbursed
through reasonable salary deductions.

Public respondents are likewise ordered to pay intervenors Rizalina P. Espiritu, Abdulia T. Landingin, Medardo Ilao, Rosita Somera, Armando
Cruz, Catalino Dabu, Francisco Villaraiz, Norma Jumilia, Kennedy Basa, Rolando G. Cagasca and Alfonso Angeles their back salaries similarly
under the above-quoted conditions.

As regards petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros and Efren Fontanilla, their petition is DISMISSED, as well as the petition in intervention of
Concepcion Timario.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

I fully agree with the majority opinion that the separation from the service of petitioners and intervenors (save petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane
Corros, and Efren Fontanilla) was made pursuant to the office orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani vs. Gonzales (186 SCRA 108
[1990]). Said case and the subsequent consolidated cases of Abrogar vs. Garrucho, Jr. and Arnaldo vs. Garrucho, Jr. (G.R. Nos. 95773 and
96533, 6 August 1991) would have necessarily benefited petitioners and intervenors and made their reinstatement inevitable were it not for
their failure to bring the action within the prescriptive period. It is on this point that I am constrained to disagree with the majority opinion.

I gather from the majority opinion that, as admitted by petitioners and intervenors, the illegal dismissal took place in May 1987. This petition was
filed only in October 1991. The interventions were filed in February, April, May and July, 1992 (Ponencia, 5, last paragraph) or more than four
years after the cause of action had accrued. The petitions in Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo were filed on 3 June 1987, 31 October 1990, and 7
January 1991, respectively, or all before the expiration of the four-year period. An illegal dismissal is an injury to a person's rights. Accordingly,
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action for reinstatement and back salaries must be filed within four years from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the illegal dismissal. Since the instant petition and the interventions were filed long after the lapse of the four-year
period, this Court is left with no other choice except to dismiss this case. The Office of the Solicitor General is correct on this point.

Another obstacle to this petition is that it is for mandamus (Petition, 2) which must be filed within one year after dismissal. In Madrigal
vs. Lecaroz (191 SCRA 20, 25-16 [1990], this Court, through Mr. Justice Leo Medialdea, held:

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto andmandamus affecting titles to public office
must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position (Galano, et al. v. Roxas, G.R. No. L-31241, September
12, 1975, 67 SCRA 8; Cornejo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-32818,
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663; Sison v. Pangramuyen, etc. et al., G.R. No.
L-40295, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 364; Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 755; Villaruz v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. L-22754,
December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 710; Villegas v. De la Cruz, G.R. No.
L-23752, December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 720; De la Maza v. Ochave, G.R. No. L-22336, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 142; Alejo v. Marquez, G.R.
No.
L-29053, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 762). The reason behind this ruling was expounded in the case of Unabia v. City Mayor, etc., 99 Phil.
253 where We said:

. . . [W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has
been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We
find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public
business may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following
considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees in the civil service:

Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one year could be validly considered as waiver,
i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.

And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly
(sic), and the peoples' interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable. (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off. Gaz., [8],
3693, 3695.)

Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or a position in civil service as
against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the
person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that
in view of the policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any
person claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year,
otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.

The principle of equity which the majority opinion invokes is inapplicable. Equity is available only in the absence of positive law. As beautifully
expressed by this Court through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Aguila vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas (160 SCRA 352, 359-360 [1988]):

For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside
legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said it in an earlier case [Zabat
Jr. vs. CA, 142 SCRA 587], and we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-
empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of
the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists and is
now still reverently observed is aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.

In my view, petitioners and intervenors only desire to take advantage of our rulings in Mandani, Abrogar andArnaldo. Initially, they had no
interest, or had lost any, in seeking judicial remedy after their dismissal. They really did not care much about their separation from the service.
Otherwise, they would not have wasted precious time waiting for a herald to bring them good tidings. In short, they chose to sleep on their
rights. The laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights.

To meet the above disquisition, the modified majority opinion now claims that since the defense of prescription was never raised by the
respondents, it is deemed waived; and that the following unrebutted allegations in the main petition bring them within our ruling in Cristobal
vs. Melchor (78 SCRA 175 [1977]):

7. Petitioners protested their illegal termination from the DOT. Many of them questioned their termination with the Department of Labor and
Employment where they filed a Complaint against the DOT and its top officials for illegal dismissal . . . Some of them questioned their illegal
termination before the Civil Service Commission.

8. Many of petitioners joined a picket and demonstration held by illegally terminated employees of the DOT before its office at the DOT building
at the Luneta Park.

9. Petitioners were forced to receive their separation or retirement benefits from the DOT, but all under protest. The others continued to fight
their cases with the Department of Labor and Employment even if they got their separation and/or retirement benefits.

xxx xxx xxx

11. After the finality of this Decision (Mandani) . . . many other terminated employees of the DOT wrote to then DOT Secretary Peter D.
Garrucho, Jr., as the successor-in-interest of former Sec. Jose U. Gonzalez, and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague, asking that following the
Decision in thisMandani vs. Gonzalez case and being similarly situated as the twenty-eight (28) petitioners therein, that they be reinstated to
their former or equivalent positions in the DOT and/or to be paid their back wages. Then . . . DOT Secretary Garrucho and DBM Sec. Carague
never responded to these letters and did not reinstate and/or pay any of their back wages.

xxx xxx xxx

16. Following the Decision of this Honorable Court in the Mandani vs. Gonzalez case and its Resolution in the consolidated cases of Abrogar
vs. Garrucho and Arnaldo vs. Garrucho, petitioners made representations with the DOT to be reinstated and/or paid their back
wages . . . (Ponencia, 6-7)

While it may be true that the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, did not raise the defense of prescription, it cannot
be denied that the allegations in the petition clearly show that the petitioners' cause of action has indeed prescribed. In Gulang
vs. Nadayag (214 SCRA 355, 362-363 [1992], citing Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House
(27 SCRA 766 [1969]; Garcia vs. Mathis (100 SCRA 250 [1980]); and Aznar III vs. Bernad (161 SCRA [1988]), we held:

There is also authority to the effect that the defense of prescription is not deemed waived, even if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, if plaintiff's allegation in the complaint or the evidence he present shows clearly that the action has prescribed.

Cristobal vs. Melchor has a very peculiar factual backdrop which justified an exception to the general rule. In the said case, this Court found the
following:

2. It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors
which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement.

The evidence of Cristobal establish the following: After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal included, continued
to seek reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Executive Secretary Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to the
continuation of the civil action, he would work for their reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the dismissed employees were recalled to their
respective positions in the Office of the President among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case and several others who were not parties
therein. Secretary Mutuc even tried to place the others outside of the Malacaang Office. An affidavit of Emiliano Punzal, retired Presidential
Records Officer, attests to the fact that Jose C. Cristobal "was among those in the list of separated employees ordered for placement to a
position commensurate to his qualification and experience." In the meantime, however, Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other Executive
Secretaries to whom Cristobal over and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that Cristobal
would be recalled and re-employed at "the opportune time".

It was this continued promise of the government officials concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the Office of the President
to comply with its commitment. Furthermore, he had behind him the decision of the Supreme Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which he believed
should be applied in his favor. But when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the
President denying his reinstatement and declaring the matters "definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action in court within one year
from his separation, it was only then that he saw the necessity of seeking redress from the courts.

In the instant case, the petitioners, as shown in the aforequoted paragraphs in their main petition, explicitly admit that they protested their illegal
termination from the DOT; many of them questioned their termination with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and some of
them questioned such illegal termination before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Considering that they ultimately took this recourse after
four years, it would be safe to presume that the decisions of the DOLE and the CSC were adverse to them; they took no further action thereon,
and allowed the decisions to become final. The petitioners then should not be permitted to belatedly re-litigate the matter by way of mandamus.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the petition for want of merit.

Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

# Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

I fully agree with the majority opinion that the separation from the service of petitioners and intervenors (save petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane
Corros, and Efren Fontanilla) was made pursuant to the office orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani vs. Gonzales (186 SCRA 108
[1990]). Said case and the subsequent consolidated cases of Abrogar vs. Garrucho, Jr. and Arnaldo vs. Garrucho, Jr. (G.R. Nos. 95773 and
96533, 6 August 1991) would have necessarily benefited petitioners and intervenors and made their reinstatement inevitable were it not for
their failure to bring the action within the prescriptive period. It is on this point that I am constrained to disagree with the majority opinion.

I gather from the majority opinion that, as admitted by petitioners and intervenors, the illegal dismissal took place in May 1987. This petition was
filed only in October 1991. The interventions were filed in February, April, May and July, 1992 (Ponencia, 5, last paragraph) or more than four
years after the cause of action had accrued. The petitions in Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo were filed on 3 June 1987, 31 October 1990, and 7
January 1991, respectively, or all before the expiration of the four-year period. An illegal dismissal is an injury to a person's rights. Accordingly,
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action for reinstatement and back salaries must be filed within four years from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the illegal dismissal. Since the instant petition and the interventions were filed long after the lapse of the four-year
period, this Court is left with no other choice except to dismiss this case. The Office of the Solicitor General is correct on this point.

Another obstacle to this petition is that it is for mandamus (Petition, 2) which must be filed within one year after dismissal. In Madrigal
vs. Lecaroz (191 SCRA 20, 25-16 [1990], this Court, through Mr. Justice Leo Medialdea, held:

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto andmandamus affecting titles to public office
must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position (Galano, et al. v. Roxas, G.R. No. L-31241, September
12, 1975, 67 SCRA 8; Cornejo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-32818,
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663; Sison v. Pangramuyen, etc. et al., G.R. No.
L-40295, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 364; Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 755; Villaruz v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. L-22754,
December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 710; Villegas v. De la Cruz, G.R.
No. L-23752, December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 720; De la Maza v. Ochave, G.R. No. L-22336, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 142; Alejo v. Marquez,
G.R. No. L-29053, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 762). The reason behind this ruling was expounded in the case of Unabia v. City Mayor, etc.,
99 Phil. 253 where We said:
. . . [W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has
been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We
find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public
business may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following
considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees in the civil service:

Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one year could be validly considered as
waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.

And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly
(sic), and the peoples' interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable. (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off. Gaz., [8],
3693, 3695.)

Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or a position in civil service as
against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the
person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that
in view of the policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any
person claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year,
otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.

The principle of equity which the majority opinion invokes is inapplicable. Equity is available only in the absence of positive law. As beautifully
expressed by this Court through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Aguila vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas (160 SCRA 352, 359-360 [1988]):

For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside
legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said it in an earlier case [Zabat
Jr. vs. CA, 142 SCRA 587], and we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-
empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of
the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists and is
now still reverently observed is aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.

In my view, petitioners and intervenors only desire to take advantage of our rulings in Mandani, Abrogar andArnaldo. Initially, they had no
interest, or had lost any, in seeking judicial remedy after their dismissal. They really did not care much about their separation from the service.
Otherwise, they would not have wasted precious time waiting for a herald to bring them good tidings. In short, they chose to sleep on their
rights. The laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights.

To meet the above disquisition, the modified majority opinion now claims that since the defense of prescription was never raised by the
respondents, it is deemed waived; and that the following unrebutted allegations in the main petition bring them within our ruling in Cristobal
vs. Melchor (78 SCRA 175 [1977]):

7. Petitioners protested their illegal termination from the DOT. Many of them questioned their termination with the Department of Labor and
Employment where they filed a Complaint against the DOT and its top officials for illegal dismissal . . . Some of them questioned their illegal
termination before the Civil Service Commission.

8. Many of petitioners joined a picket and demonstration held by illegally terminated employees of the DOT before its office at the DOT building
at the Luneta Park.

9. Petitioners were forced to receive their separation or retirement benefits from the DOT, but all under protest. The others continued to fight
their cases with the Department of Labor and Employment even if they got their separation and/or retirement benefits.

xxx xxx xxx

11. After the finality of this Decision (Mandani) . . . many other terminated employees of the DOT wrote to then DOT Secretary Peter D.
Garrucho, Jr., as the successor-in-interest of former Sec. Jose U. Gonzalez, and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague, asking that following the
Decision in thisMandani vs. Gonzalez case and being similarly situated as the twenty-eight (28) petitioners therein, that they be reinstated to
their former or equivalent positions in the DOT and/or to be paid their back wages. Then . . . DOT Secretary Garrucho and DBM Sec. Carague
never responded to these letters and did not reinstate and/or pay any of their back wages.

xxx xxx xxx

16. Following the Decision of this Honorable Court in the Mandani vs. Gonzalez case and its Resolution in the consolidated cases of Abrogar
vs. Garrucho and Arnaldo vs. Garrucho, petitioners made representations with the DOT to be reinstated and/or paid their back
wages . . . (Ponencia, 6-7)

While it may be true that the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, did not raise the defense of prescription, it cannot
be denied that the allegations in the petition clearly show that the petitioners' cause of action has indeed prescribed. In Gulang
vs. Nadayag (214 SCRA 355, 362-363 [1992], citing Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House
(27 SCRA 766 [1969]; Garcia vs. Mathis (100 SCRA 250 [1980]); and Aznar III vs. Bernad (161 SCRA [1988]), we held:

There is also authority to the effect that the defense of prescription is not deemed waived, even if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, if plaintiff's allegation in the complaint or the evidence he present shows clearly that the action has prescribed.

Cristobal vs. Melchor has a very peculiar factual backdrop which justified an exception to the general rule. In the said case, this Court found the
following:

2. It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors
which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement.

The evidence of Cristobal establish the following: After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal included, continued
to seek reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Executive Secretary Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to the
continuation of the civil action, he would work for their reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the dismissed employees were recalled to their
respective positions in the Office of the President among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case and several others who were not parties
therein. Secretary Mutuc even tried to place the others outside of the Malacaang Office. An affidavit of Emiliano Punzal, retired Presidential
Records Officer, attests to the fact that Jose C. Cristobal "was among those in the list of separated employees ordered for placement to a
position commensurate to his qualification and experience." In the meantime, however, Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other Executive
Secretaries to whom Cristobal over and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that Cristobal
would be recalled and re-employed at "the opportune time".

It was this continued promise of the government officials concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the Office of the President
to comply with its commitment. Furthermore, he had behind him the decision of the Supreme Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which he believed
should be applied in his favor. But when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the
President denying his reinstatement and declaring the matters "definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action in court within one year
from his separation, it was only then that he saw the necessity of seeking redress from the courts.

In the instant case, the petitioners, as shown in the aforequoted paragraphs in their main petition, explicitly admit that they protested their illegal
termination from the DOT; many of them questioned their termination with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and some of
them questioned such illegal termination before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Considering that they ultimately took this recourse after
four years, it would be safe to presume that the decisions of the DOLE and the CSC were adverse to them; they took no further action thereon,
and allowed the decisions to become final. The petitioners then should not be permitted to belatedly re-litigate the matter by way of mandamus.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the petition for want of merit.

G.R. No. 187485 February 12, 2013

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

The Cases

G.R. No. 187485 is a petitiOn for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 25 March 2009 as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 24
April 2009 by the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA EB) in CTA EB No. 408. The CTA EB affirmed the 29 November 2007 Amended
Decision4 as well as the 11 July 2008 Resolution5 of the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA Second Division) in CTA Case No.
6647. The CTA Second Division ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) to refund or issue a tax credit for
P483,797,599.65 to San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) for unutilized input value-added tax (VAT) on purchases of capital goods and
services for the taxable year 2001.

G.R. No. 196113 is a petition for review6 assailing the Decision7 promulgated on 8 December 2010 as well as the Resolution 8 promulgated on
14 March 2011 by the CTA EB in CTA EB No. 624. In its Decision, the CTA EB reversed the 8 January 2010 Decision 9 as well as the 7 April
2010 Resolution10of the CTA Second Division and granted the CIRs petition for review in CTA Case No. 7574. The CTA EB dismissed, for
having been prematurely filed, Taganito Mining Corporations (Taganito) judicial claim for P8,365,664.38 tax refund or credit.

G.R. No. 197156 is a petition for review11 assailing the Decision12promulgated on 3 December 2010 as well as the Resolution 13 promulgated on
17 May 2011 by the CTA EB in CTA EB No. 569. The CTA EB affirmed the 20 July 2009 Decision as well as the 10 November 2009 Resolution
of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 7687. The CTA Second Division denied, due to prescription, Philex Mining Corporations (Philex)
judicial claim for P23,956,732.44 tax refund or credit.

On 3 August 2011, the Second Division of this Court resolved 14 to consolidate G.R. No. 197156 with G.R. No. 196113, which were pending in
the same Division, and with G.R. No. 187485, which was assigned to the Court En Banc. The Second Division also resolved to refer G.R. Nos.
197156 and 196113 to the Court En Banc, where G.R. No. 187485, the lower-numbered case, was assigned.

G.R. No. 187485

CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation

The Facts

The CTA EBs narration of the pertinent facts is as follows:

[CIR] is the duly appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue, empowered, among others, to act upon and approve claims for refund or tax
credit, with office at the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City.

[San Roque] is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with principal office at
Barangay San Roque, San Manuel, Pangasinan. It was incorporated in October 1997 to design, construct, erect, assemble, own, commission
and operate power-generating plants and related facilities pursuant to and under contract with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any subdivision, instrumentality or agency thereof, or any governmentowned or controlled corporation, or other entity engaged in
the development, supply, or distribution of energy.

As a seller of services, [San Roque] is duly registered with the BIR with TIN/VAT No. 005-017-501. It is likewise registered with the Board of
Investments ("BOI") on a preferred pioneer status, to engage in the design, construction, erection, assembly, as well as to own, commission,
and operate electric power-generating plants and related activities, for which it was issued Certificate of Registration No. 97-356 on February
11, 1998.

On October 11, 1997, [San Roque] entered into a Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA") with the National Power Corporation ("NPC") to develop
hydro-potential of the Lower Agno River and generate additional power and energy for the Luzon Power Grid, by building the San Roque Multi-
Purpose Project located in San Manuel, Pangasinan. The PPA provides, among others, that [San Roque] shall be responsible for the design,
construction, installation, completion, testing and commissioning of the Power Station and shall operate and maintain the same, subject to NPC
instructions. During the cooperation period of twenty-five (25) years commencing from the completion date of the Power Station, NPC will take
and pay for all electricity available from the Power Station.

On the construction and development of the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project which comprises of the dam, spillway and power plant, [San
Roque] allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of 559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly VAT
Returns filed for the same year. [San Roque] duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, in the total amount of 559,709,337.54,
representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for taxable year 2001.

However, on March 28, 2003, [San Roque] filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year 2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT to
the amount of 560,200,283.14. Consequently, [San Roque] filed with the BIR on even date, separate amended claims for refund in the
aggregate amount of 560,200,283.14.

[CIRs] inaction on the subject claims led to the filing by [San Roque] of the Petition for Review with the Court [of Tax Appeals] in Division on
April 10, 2003.

Trial of the case ensued and on July 20, 2005, the case was submitted for decision. 15

The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: Division

The CTA Second Division initially denied San Roques claim. In its Decision16 dated 8 March 2006, it cited the following as bases for the denial
of San Roques claim: lack of recorded zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales; failure to submit documents specifically identifying the
purchased goods/services related to the claimed input VAT which were included in its Property, Plant and Equipment account; and failure to
prove that the related construction costs were capitalized in its books of account and subjected to depreciation.

The CTA Second Division required San Roque to show that it complied with the following requirements of Section 112(B) of Republic Act No.
8424 (RA 8424)17 to be entitled to a tax refund or credit of input VAT attributable to capital goods imported or locally purchased: (1) it is a VAT-
registered entity; (2) its input taxes claimed were paid on capital goods duly supported by VAT invoices and/or official receipts; (3) it did not
offset or apply the claimed input VAT payments on capital goods against any output VAT liability; and (4) its claim for refund was filed within the
two-year prescriptive period both in the administrative and judicial levels.

The CTA Second Division found that San Roque complied with the first, third, and fourth requirements, thus:

The fact that [San Roque] is a VAT registered entity is admitted (par. 4, Facts Admitted, Joint Stipulation of Facts, Records, p. 157). It was also
established that the instant claim of 560,200,823.14 is already net of the 11,509.09 output tax declared by [San Roque] in its amended VAT
return for the first quarter of 2001. Moreover, the entire amount of 560,200,823.14 was deducted by [San Roque] from the total available input
tax reflected in its amended VAT returns for the last two quarters of 2001 and first two quarters of 2002 (Exhibits M-6, O-6, OO-1 & QQ-1). This
means that the claimed input taxes of 560,200,823.14 did not form part of the excess input taxes of 83,692,257.83, as of the second quarter
of 2002 that was to be carried-over to the succeeding quarters. Further, [San Roques] claim for refund/tax credit certificate of excess input VAT
was filed within the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the dates of filing of the corresponding quarterly VAT returns.

For the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 2001, [San Roque] filed its VAT returns on April 25, 2001, July 25, 2001, October 23, 2001
and January 24, 2002, respectively (Exhibits "H, J, L, and N"). These returns were all subsequently amended on March 28, 2003 (Exhibits "I, K,
M, and O"). On the other hand, [San Roque] originally filed its separate claims for refund on July 10, 2001, October 10, 2001, February 21,
2002, and May 9, 2002 for the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 2001, respectively, (Exhibits "EE, FF, GG, and HH") and subsequently
filed amended claims for all quarters on March 28, 2003 (Exhibits "II, JJ, KK, and LL"). Moreover, the Petition for Review was filed on April 10,
2003. Counting from the respective dates when [San Roque] originally filed its VAT returns for the first, second, third and fourth quarters of
2001, the administrative claims for refund (original and amended) and the Petition for Review fall within the two-year prescriptive period.18

San Roque filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on 7 April 2006. In its 29 November 2007 Amended Decision,19 the CTA
Second Division found legal basis to partially grant San Roques claim. The CTA Second Division ordered the Commissioner to refund or issue
a tax credit in favor of San Roque in the amount of 483,797,599.65, which represents San Roques unutilized input VAT on its purchases of
capital goods and services for the taxable year 2001. The CTA based the adjustment in the amount on the findings of the independent certified
public accountant. The following reasons were cited for the disallowed claims: erroneous computation; failure to ascertain whether the related
purchases are in the nature of capital goods; and the purchases pertain to capital goods. Moreover, the reduction of claims was based on the
following: the difference between San Roques claim and that appearing on its books; the official receipts covering the claimed input VAT on
purchases of local services are not within the period of the claim; and the amount of VAT cannot be determined from the submitted official
receipts and invoices. The CTA Second Division denied San Roques claim for refund or tax credit of its unutilized input VAT attributable to its
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales because San Roque had no record of such sales for the four quarters of 2001.

The dispositive portion of the CTA Second Divisions 29 November 2007 Amended Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, [San Roques] "Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration" is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED and this Courts Decision
promulgated on March 8, 2006 in the instant case is hereby MODIFIED.

Accordingly, [the CIR] is hereby ORDERED to REFUND or in the alternative, to ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of [San Roque]
in the reduced amount of Four Hundred Eighty Three Million Seven Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and
Sixty Five Centavos (483,797,599.65) representing unutilized input VAT on purchases of capital goods and services for the taxable year 2001.

SO ORDERED.20

The Commissioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration on 20 December 2007. The CTA Second Division issued a Resolution dated 11
July 2008 which denied the CIRs motion for lack of merit.

The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: En Banc

The Commissioner filed a Petition for Review before the CTA EB praying for the denial of San Roques claim for refund or tax credit in its
entirety as well as for the setting aside of the 29 November 2007 Amended Decision and the 11 July 2008 Resolution in CTA Case No. 6647.

The CTA EB dismissed the CIRs petition for review and affirmed the challenged decision and resolution.

The CTA EB cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toledo Power, Inc.21 and Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-03,22 as its bases for
ruling that San Roques judicial claim was not prematurely filed. The pertinent portions of the Decision state:

More importantly, the Court En Banc has squarely and exhaustively ruled on this issue in this wise:

It is true that Section 112(D) of the abovementioned provision applies to the present case. However, what the petitioner failed to
consider is Section 112(A) of the same provision. The respondent is also covered by the two (2) year prescriptive period. We have
repeatedly held that the claim for refund with the BIR and the subsequent appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals must be filed within the two-year
period.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the two-year prescriptive period for filing a claim for input tax is reckoned from the date of the filing of the quarterly VAT return
and payment of the tax due. If the said period is about to expire but the BIR has not yet acted on the application for refund, the
taxpayer may interpose a petition for review with this Court within the two year period.

In the case of Gibbs vs. Collector, the Supreme Court held that if, however, the Collector (now Commissioner) takes time in deciding the claim,
and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the Court of Tax Appeals before the end of the two-year
period without awaiting the decision of the Collector.

Furthermore, in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The Honorable Court of Tax Appeals and
Planters Products, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer need not wait indefinitely for a decision or ruling which may or may
not be forthcoming and which he has no legal right to expect. It is disheartening enough to a taxpayer to keep him waiting for an indefinite
period of time for a ruling or decision of the Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal Revenue on his claim for refund. It would make matters
more exasperating for the taxpayer if we were to close the doors of the courts of justice for such a relief until after the Collector (now
Commissioner) of Internal Revenue, would have, at his personal convenience, given his go signal.

This Court ruled in several cases that once the petition is filed, the Court has already acquired jurisdiction over the claims and the Court is not
bound to wait indefinitely for no reason for whatever action respondent (herein petitioner) may take. At stake are claims for refund and unlike
disputed assessments, no decision of respondent (herein petitioner) is required before one can go to this Court. (Emphasis supplied
and citations omitted)
Lastly, it is apparent from the following provisions of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-03 dated August 18, 2003, that [the CIR] knows
that claims for VAT refund or tax credit filed with the Court [of Tax Appeals] can proceed simultaneously with the ones filed with the BIR and
that taxpayers need not wait for the lapse of the subject 120-day period, to wit:

In response to [the] request of selected taxpayers for adoption of procedures in handling refund cases that are aligned to the statutory
requirements that refund cases should be elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals before the lapse of the period prescribed by law, certain
provisions of RMC No. 42-2003 are hereby amended and new provisions are added thereto.

In consonance therewith, the following amendments are being introduced to RMC No. 42-2003, to wit:

I.) A-17 of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 42-2003 is hereby revised to read as follows:

In cases where the taxpayer has filed a "Petition for Review" with the Court of Tax Appeals involving a claim for refund/TCC that is
pending at the administrative agency (Bureau of Internal Revenue or OSS-DOF), the administrative agency and the tax court may act
on the case separately. While the case is pending in the tax court and at the same time is still under process by the administrative agency, the
litigation lawyer of the BIR, upon receipt of the summons from the tax court, shall request from the head of the investigating/processing office
for the docket containing certified true copies of all the documents pertinent to the claim. The docket shall be presented to the court as evidence
for the BIR in its defense on the tax credit/refund case filed by the taxpayer. In the meantime, the investigating/processing office of the
administrative agency shall continue processing the refund/TCC case until such time that a final decision has been reached by either the CTA
or the administrative agency.

If the CTA is able to release its decision ahead of the evaluation of the administrative agency, the latter shall cease from processing
the claim. On the other hand, if the administrative agency is able to process the claim of the taxpayer ahead of the CTA and the taxpayer is
amenable to the findings thereof, the concerned taxpayer must file a motion to withdraw the claim with the CTA. 23 (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 196113

Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR

The Facts

The CTA Second Divisions narration of the pertinent facts is as follows:

Petitioner, Taganito Mining Corporation, is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with
principal office at 4th Floor, Solid Mills Building, De La Rosa St., Lega[s]pi Village, Makati City. It is duly registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission with Certificate of Registration No. 138682 issued on March 4, 1987 with the following primary purpose:

To carry on the business, for itself and for others, of mining lode and/or placer mining, developing, exploiting, extracting, milling, concentrating,
converting, smelting, treating, refining, preparing for market, manufacturing, buying, selling, exchanging, shipping, transporting, and otherwise
producing and dealing in nickel, chromite, cobalt, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, brass, iron, steel, limestone, and all kinds of ores, metals and
their by-products and which by-products thereof of every kind and description and by whatsoever process the same can be or may hereafter be
produced, and generally and without limit as to amount, to buy, sell, locate, exchange, lease, acquire and deal in lands, mines, and mineral
rights and claims and to conduct all business appertaining thereto, to purchase, locate, lease or otherwise acquire, mining claims and rights,
timber rights, water rights, concessions and mines, buildings, dwellings, plants machinery, spare parts, tools and other properties whatsoever
which this corporation may from time to time find to be to its advantage to mine lands, and to explore, work, exercise, develop or turn to account
the same, and to acquire, develop and utilize water rights in such manner as may be authorized or permitted by law; to purchase, hire, make,
construct or otherwise, acquire, provide, maintain, equip, alter, erect, improve, repair, manage, work and operate private roads, barges,
vessels, aircraft and vehicles, private telegraph and telephone lines, and other communication media, as may be needed by the corporation for
its own purpose, and to purchase, import, construct, machine, fabricate, or otherwise acquire, and maintain and operate bridges, piers,
wharves, wells, reservoirs, plumes, watercourses, waterworks, aqueducts, shafts, tunnels, furnaces, cook ovens, crushing works, gasworks,
electric lights and power plants and compressed air plants, chemical works of all kinds, concentrators, smelters, smelting plants, and refineries,
matting plants, warehouses, workshops, factories, dwelling houses, stores, hotels or other buildings, engines, machinery, spare parts, tools,
implements and other works, conveniences and properties of any description in connection with or which may be directly or indirectly conducive
to any of the objects of the corporation, and to contribute to, subsidize or otherwise aid or take part in any operations;

and is a VAT-registered entity, with Certificate of Registration (BIR Form No. 2303) No. OCN 8RC0000017494. Likewise, [Taganito] is
registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as an exporter of beneficiated nickel silicate and chromite ores, with BOI Certificate of
Registration No. EP-88-306.

Respondent, on the other hand, is the duly appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue vested with authority to exercise the functions of the
said office, including inter alia, the power to decide refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees and other charges, penalties imposed in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) or other laws administered by Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) under Section 4 of the NIRC. He holds office at the BIR National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City.

[Taganito] filed all its Monthly VAT Declarations and Quarterly Vat Returns for the period January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005. For easy
reference, a summary of the filing dates of the original and amended Quarterly VAT Returns for taxable year 2005 of [Taganito] is as follows:

Exhibit(s) Quarter Nature of Mode of filing Filing Date

the Return

L to L-4 1st Original Electronic April 15, 2005

M to M-3 Amended Electronic July 20, 2005

N to N-4 Amended Electronic October 18, 2006

Q to Q-3 2nd Original Electronic July 20, 2005

R to R-4 Amended Electronic October 18, 2006

 U to U-4 3rd Original Electronic October 19, 2005

V to V-4 Amended Electronic October 18, 2006

Y to Y-4 4th Original Electronic January 20, 2006

Z to Z-4 Amended Electronic October 18, 2006

As can be gleaned from its amended Quarterly VAT Returns, [Taganito] reported zero-rated sales amounting to P1,446,854,034.68; input VAT
on its domestic purchases and importations of goods (other than capital goods) and services amounting to P2,314,730.43; and input VAT on its
domestic purchases and importations of capital goods amounting to P6,050,933.95, the details of which are summarized as follows:

Period Zero-Rated Sales Input VAT on Input VAT on Total Input VAT
Covered Domestic Domestic
Purchases and Purchases and
Importations Importations
of Goods and of Capital
Services Goods

01/01/05 - P551,179,871.58 P1,491,880.56 P239,803.22 P1,731,683.78

03/31/05

04/01/05 - 64,677,530.78 204,364.17 5,811,130.73 6,015,494.90

06/30/05

07/01/05 - 480,784,287.30 144,887.67 - 144,887.67

09/30/05

10/01/05 - 350,212,345.02 473,598.03 - 473,598.03

12/31/05

TOTAL P1,446,854,034.68 P2,314,730.43 P6,050,933.95 P8,365,664.38

On November 14, 2006, [Taganito] filed with [the CIR], through BIRs Large Taxpayers Audit and Investigation Division II (LTAID II), a letter
dated November 13, 2006 claiming a tax credit/refund of its supposed input VAT amounting to 8,365,664.38 for the period covering January 1,
2004 to December 31, 2004. On the same date, [Taganito] likewise filed an Application for Tax Credits/Refunds for the period covering January
1, 2005 to December 31, 2005 for the same amount.

On November 29, 2006, [Taganito] sent again another letter dated November 29, 2004 to [the CIR], to correct the period of the above claim for
tax credit/refund in the said amount of 8,365,664.38 as actually referring to the period covering January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005.

As the statutory period within which to file a claim for refund for said input VAT is about to lapse without action on the part of the [CIR],
[Taganito] filed the instant Petition for Review on February 17, 2007.

In his Answer filed on March 28, 2007, [the CIR] interposes the following defenses:

4. [Taganitos] alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation/examination by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);

5. The amount of 8,365,664.38 being claimed by [Taganito] as alleged unutilized input VAT on domestic purchases of goods and services and
on importation of capital goods for the period January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005 is not properly documented;

6. [Taganito] must prove that it has complied with the provisions of Sections 112 (A) and (D) and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997 (1997 Tax Code) on the prescriptive period for claiming tax refund/credit;

7. Proof of compliance with the prescribed checklist of requirements to be submitted involving claim for VAT refund pursuant to Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 53-98, otherwise there would be no sufficient compliance with the filing of administrative claim for refund, the
administrative claim thereof being mere proforma, which is a condition sine qua non prior to the filing of judicial claim in accordance
with the provision of Section 229 of the 1997 Tax Code. Further, Section 112 (D) of the Tax Code, as amended, requires the submission of
complete documents in support of the application filed with the BIR before the 120-day audit period shall apply, and before the taxpayer
could avail of judicial remedies as provided for in the law. Hence, [Taganitos] failure to submit proof of compliance with the above-stated
requirements warrants immediate dismissal of the petition for review.

8. [Taganito] must prove that it has complied with the invoicing requirements mentioned in Sections 110 and 113 of the 1997 Tax Code, as
amended, in relation to provisions of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.

9. In an action for refund/credit, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to
the claim for refund/credit (Asiatic Petroleum Co. vs. Llanes, 49 Phil. 466 cited in Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Jockey Club,
Inc., 98 Phil. 670);

10. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake the nature of exemption from taxation (Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Ledesma, 31 SCRA 95) and as such, they are looked upon with disfavor (Western Minolco Corp. vs. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 124 SCRA 1211).

SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

11. The Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for review for failure on the part of [Taganito] to comply with the
provision of Section 112 (D) of the 1997 Tax Code which provides, thus:

Section 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.

xxx xxx xxx

(D) Period within which refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue
the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in
support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.

In cases of full or partial denial for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the
period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the
expiration of the one hundred twenty dayperiod, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis
supplied.)

12. As stated, [Taganito] filed the administrative claim for refund with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on November 14, 2006. Subsequently on
February 14, 2007, the instant petition was filed. Obviously the 120 days given to the Commissioner to decide on the claim has not yet lapsed
when the petition was filed. The petition was prematurely filed, hence it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

During trial, [Taganito] presented testimonial and documentary evidence primarily aimed at proving its supposed entitlement to the refund in the
amount of 8,365,664.38, representing input taxes for the period covering January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005. [The CIR], on the other
hand, opted not to present evidence. Thus, in the Resolution promulgated on January 22, 2009, this case was submitted for decision as of such
date, considering [Taganitos] "Memorandum" filed on January 19, 2009 and [the CIRs] "Memorandum" filed on December 19, 2008. 24

The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: Division

The CTA Second Division partially granted Taganitos claim. In its Decision 25 dated 8 January 2010, the CTA Second Division found that
Taganito complied with the requirements of Section 112(A) of RA 8424, as amended, to be entitled to a tax refund or credit of input VAT
attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales.26

The pertinent portions of the CTA Second Divisions Decision read:

Finally, records show that [Taganitos] administrative claim filed on November 14, 2006, which was amended on November 29, 2006, and the
Petition for Review filed with this Court on February 14, 2007 are well within the two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from March 31, 2005,
June 30, 2005, September 30, 2005, and December 31, 2005, respectively, the close of each taxable quarter covering the period January 1,
2005 to December 31, 2005.

In fine, [Taganito] sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a tax credit certificate in the amount of 8,249,883.33 representing unutilized input VAT
for the four taxable quarters of 2005.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, [the CIR] is hereby
ORDERED to REFUND to [Taganito] the amount of EIGHT MILLION TWO HUNDRED FORTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY
THREE PESOS AND THIRTY THREE CENTAVOS (P8,249,883.33) representing its unutilized input taxes attributable to zero-rated sales from
January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005.

SO ORDERED.27

The Commissioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration on 29 January 2010. Taganito, in turn, filed a Comment/Opposition on the Motion
for Partial Reconsideration on 15 February 2010.

In a Resolution28 dated 7 April 2010, the CTA Second Division denied the CIRs motion. The CTA Second Division ruled that the legislature did
not intend that Section 112 (Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax) should be read in isolation from Section 229 (Recovery of Tax Erroneously or
Illegally Collected) or vice versa. The CTA Second Division applied the mandatory statute of limitations in seeking judicial recourse prescribed
under Section 229 to claims for refund or tax credit under Section 112.

The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: En Banc

On 29 April 2010, the Commissioner filed a Petition for Review before the CTA EB assailing the 8 January 2010 Decision and the 7 April 2010
Resolution in CTA Case No. 7574 and praying that Taganitos entire claim for refund be denied.

In its 8 December 2010 Decision,29 the CTA EB granted the CIRs petition for review and reversed and set aside the challenged decision and
resolution.

The CTA EB declared that Section 112(A) and (B) of the 1997 Tax Code both set forth the reckoning of the two-year prescriptive period for
filing a claim for tax refund or credit over input VAT to be the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. The CTA EB also relied
on this Courts rulings in the cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi) 30 and Commisioner of
Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Mirant).31 Both Aichi and Mirant ruled that the two-year prescriptive period to file a refund for
input VAT arising from zero-rated sales should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. Aichi further
emphasized that the failure to await the decision of the Commissioner or the lapse of 120-day period prescribed in Section 112(D) amounts to a
premature filing.

The CTA EB found that Taganito filed its administrative claim on 14 November 2006, which was well within the period prescribed under Section
112(A) and (B) of the 1997 Tax Code. However, the CTA EB found that Taganitos judicial claim was prematurely filed. Taganito filed its
Petition for Review before the CTA Second Division on 14 February 2007. The judicial claim was filed after the lapse of only 92 days from the
filing of its administrative claim before the CIR, in violation of the 120-day period prescribed in Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code.

The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated January 8, 2010 and Resolution dated April 7,
2010 of the Special Second Division of this Court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another one is hereby entered DISMISSING the
Petition for Review filed in CTA Case No. 7574 for having been prematurely filed.

SO ORDERED.32

In his dissent,33 Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista insisted that Taganito timely filed its claim before the CTA. Justice Bautista read Section
112(C) of the 1997 Tax Code (Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made) in conjunction with Section 229
(Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected). Justice Bautista also relied on this Courts ruling in Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Atlas),34 which stated that refundable or creditable input VAT and illegally or
erroneously collected national internal revenue tax are the same, insofar as both are monetary amounts which are currently in the hands of the
government but must rightfully be returned to the taxpayer. Justice Bautista concluded:

Being merely permissive, a taxpayer claimant has the option of seeking judicial redress for refund or tax credit of excess or unutilized input tax
with this Court, either within 30 days from receipt of the denial of its claim, or after the lapse of the 120-day period in the event of inaction by the
Commissioner, provided that both administrative and judicial remedies must be undertaken within the 2-year period.35

Taganito filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29 December 2010. The Commissioner filed an Opposition on 26 January 2011. The CTA EB
denied for lack of merit Taganitos motion in a Resolution 36 dated 14 March 2011. The CTA EB did not see any justifiable reason to depart from
this Courts rulings in Aichi and Mirant.

G.R. No. 197156

Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR

The Facts

The CTA EBs narration of the pertinent facts is as follows:

[Philex] is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, which is principally engaged in the mining
business, which includes the exploration and operation of mine properties and commercial production and marketing of mine products, with
office address at 27 Philex Building, Fairlaine St., Kapitolyo, Pasig City.

[The CIR], on the other hand, is the head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR"), the government entity tasked with the duties/functions of
assessing and collecting all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected
therewith, including the execution of judgments in all cases decided in its favor by [the Court of Tax Appeals] and the ordinary courts, where
she can be served with court processes at the BIR Head Office, BIR Road, Quezon City.

On October 21, 2005, [Philex] filed its Original VAT Return for the third quarter of taxable year 2005 and Amended VAT Return for the same
quarter on December 1, 2005.

On March 20, 2006, [Philex] filed its claim for refund/tax credit of the amount of 23,956,732.44 with the One Stop Shop Center of the
Department of Finance. However, due to [the CIRs] failure to act on such claim, on October 17, 2007, pursuant to Sections 112 and 229 of the
NIRC of 1997, as amended, [Philex] filed a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 7687.

In [her] Answer, respondent CIR alleged the following special and affirmative defenses:

4. Claims for refund are strictly construed against the taxpayer as the same partake the nature of an exemption;

5. The taxpayer has the burden to show that the taxes were erroneously or illegally paid. Failure on the part of [Philex] to prove the same is
fatal to its cause of action;

6. [Philex] should prove its legal basis for claiming for the amount being refunded. 37

The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: Division

The CTA Second Division, in its Decision dated 20 July 2009, denied Philexs claim due to prescription. The CTA Second Division ruled that the
two-year prescriptive period specified in Section 112(A) of RA 8424, as amended, applies not only to the filing of the administrative claim with
the BIR, but also to the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA. Since Philexs claim covered the 3rd quarter of 2005, its administrative claim
filed on 20 March 2006 was timely filed, while its judicial claim filed on 17 October 2007 was filed late and therefore barred by prescription.

On 10 November 2009, the CTA Second Division denied Philexs Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: En Banc

Philex filed a Petition for Review before the CTA EB praying for a reversal of the 20 July 2009 Decision and the 10 November 2009 Resolution
of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 7687.

The CTA EB, in its Decision38 dated 3 December 2010, denied Philexs petition and affirmed the CTA Second Divisions Decision and
Resolution.

The pertinent portions of the Decision read:

In this case, while there is no dispute that [Philexs] administrative claim for refund was filed within the two-year prescriptive period; however, as
to its judicial claim for refund/credit, records show that on March 20, 2006, [Philex] applied the administrative claim for refund of unutilized input
VAT in the amount of 23,956,732.44 with the One Stop Shop Center of the Department of Finance, per Application No. 52490. From March
20, 2006, which is also presumably the date [Philex] submitted supporting documents, together with the aforesaid application for refund, the
CIR has 120 days, or until July 18, 2006, within which to decide the claim. Within 30 days from the lapse of the 120-day period, or from July 19,
2006 until August 17, 2006, [Philex] should have elevated its claim for refund to the CTA. However, [Philex] filed its Petition for Review only on
October 17, 2007, which is 426 days way beyond the 30- day period prescribed by law.

Evidently, the Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 7687 was filed 426 days late. Thus, the Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 7687 should
have been dismissed on the ground that the Petition for Review was filed way beyond the 30-day prescribed period; thus, no jurisdiction was
acquired by the CTA in Division; and not due to prescription.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and accordingly, DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision dated July 20, 2009, dismissing the Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 7687 due to prescription, and Resolution dated
November 10, 2009 denying [Philexs] Motion for Reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED, with modification that the dismissal is based on the
ground that the Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 7687 was filed way beyond the 30-day prescribed period to appeal.

SO ORDERED.39

G.R. No. 187485

CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation

The Commissioner raised the following grounds in the Petition for Review:

I. The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc erred in holding that [San Roques] claim for refund was not prematurely filed.
II. The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc erred in affirming the amended decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (Second Division) granting [San
Roques] claim for refund of alleged unutilized input VAT on its purchases of capital goods and services for the taxable year 2001 in the amount
of P483,797,599.65. 40

G.R. No. 196113

Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR

Taganito raised the following grounds in its Petition for Review:

I. The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc committed serious error and acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in erroneously applying the Aichi doctrine in violation of [Taganitos] right to due process.

II. The Court of Tax Appeals committed serious error and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
erroneously interpreting the provisions of Section 112 (D). 41

G.R. No. 197156

Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR

Philex raised the following grounds in its Petition for Review:

I. The CTA En Banc erred in denying the petition due to alleged prescription. The fact is that the petition was filed with the CTA within the
period set by prevailing court rulings at the time it was filed.

II. The CTA En Banc erred in retroactively applying the Aichi ruling in denying the petition in this instant case. 42

The Courts Ruling

For ready reference, the following are the provisions of the Tax Code applicable to the present cases:

Section 105:

Persons Liable. Any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters, exchanges, leasesgoods or properties, renders
services, and any person who imports goods shall be subject to the value-added tax (VAT) imposed in Sections 106 to 108 of this Code.

The value-added tax is an indirect tax and the amount of tax may be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the
goods, properties or services. This rule shall likewise apply to existing contracts of sale or lease of goods, properties or services at the time
of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7716.

xxxx

Section 110(B):

Sec. 110. Tax Credits.

(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the input tax, the excess shall be paid by the
VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters:
[Provided, That the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed
seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT:]43 Provided, however, That any input tax attributable to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered
person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.

Section 112:44

Sec. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.

(A) Zero-Rated or Effectively Zero-Rated Sales. Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may,
within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate
or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has
not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2) (a)(1), (2) and (B) and
Section 108(B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or
paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of
sales.

(B) Capital Goods.- A VAT registered person may apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of input taxes paid on capital
goods imported or locally purchased, to the extent that such input taxes have not been applied against output taxes. The application may be
made only within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the importation or purchase was made.

(C) Cancellation of VAT Registration. A person whose registration has been cancelled due to retirement from or cessation of business, or
due to changes in or cessation of status under Section 106(C) of this Code may, within two (2) years from the date of cancellation, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate for any unused input tax which may be used in payment of his other internal revenue taxes

(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue
the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A) and (B) hereof.

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application
within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may,within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or
after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.

(E) Manner of Giving Refund. Refunds shall be made upon warrants drawn by the Commissioner or by his duly authorized representative
without the necessity of being countersigned by the Chairman, Commission on Audit, the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 to the
contrary notwithstanding: Provided, that refunds under this paragraph shall be subject to post audit by the Commission on Audit.

Section 229:
Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national
internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or
credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has
been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty
regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written
claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have
been erroneously paid.

(All emphases supplied)

I. Application of the 120+30 Day Periods

a. G.R. No. 187485 - CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation

On 10 April 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the Commissioner on 28 March 2003, San Roque filed a
Petition for Review with the CTA docketed as CTA Case No. 6647. From this we gather two crucial facts: first, San Roque did not wait for the
120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim;second, San Roque filed its judicial claim more than four (4)
years before the Atlas45 doctrine, which was promulgated by the Court on 8 June 2007.

Clearly, San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period, the time expressly given by law to the Commissioner to decide whether to
grant or deny San Roques application for tax refund or credit. It is indisputable that compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory
and jurisdictional. The waiting period, originally fixed at 60 days only, was part of the provisions of the first VAT law, Executive Order No. 273,
which took effect on 1 January 1988. The waiting period was extended to 120 days effective 1 January 1998 under RA 8424 or the Tax Reform
Act of 1997. Thus, the waiting period has been in our statute books for more than fifteen (15) years before San Roque filed its judicial
claim.

Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates a mandatory provision of law. It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over
the taxpayers petition. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases upholding and reiterating these doctrinal principles. 46

The charter of the CTA expressly provides that its jurisdiction is to review on appeal "decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
cases involving x x x refunds of internal revenue taxes." 47 When a taxpayer prematurely files a judicial claim for tax refund or credit with the
CTA without waiting for the decision of the Commissioner, there is no "decision" of the Commissioner to review and thus the CTA as a court of
special jurisdiction has no jurisdiction over the appeal. The charter of the CTA also expressly provides that if the Commissioner fails to decide
within "a specific period" required by law, such "inaction shall be deemed a denial"48 of the application for tax refund or credit. It is the
Commissioners decision, or inaction "deemed a denial," that the taxpayer can take to the CTA for review. Without a decision or an "inaction x x
x deemed a denial" of the Commissioner, the CTA has no jurisdiction over a petition for review. 49

San Roques failure to comply with the 120-day mandatory period renders its petition for review with the CTA void. Article 5 of the Civil Code
provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity."
San Roques void petition for review cannot be legitimized by the CTA or this Court because Article 5 of the Civil Code states that such void
petition cannot be legitimized "except when the law itself authorizes [its] validity." There is no law authorizing the petitions validity.

It is hornbook doctrine that a person committing a void act contrary to a mandatory provision of law cannot claim or acquire any right from his
void act. A right cannot spring in favor of a person from his own void or illegal act. This doctrine is repeated in Article 2254 of the Civil Code,
which states, "No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of
others."50 For violating a mandatory provision of law in filing its petition with the CTA, San Roque cannot claim any right arising from such void
petition. Thus, San Roques petition with the CTA is a mere scrap of paper.

This Court cannot brush aside the grave issue of the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period just because the Commissioner
merely asserts that the case was prematurely filed with the CTA and does not question the entitlement of San Roque to the refund. The mere
fact that a taxpayer has undisputed excess input VAT, or that the tax was admittedly illegally, erroneously or excessively collected from him,
does not entitle him as a matter of right to a tax refund or credit. Strict compliance with the mandatory and jurisdictional conditions prescribed
by law to claim such tax refund or credit is essential and necessary for such claim to prosper. Well-settled is the rule that tax refunds or
credits, just like tax exemptions, are strictly construed against the taxpayer.51 The burden is on the taxpayer to show that he has strictly
complied with the conditions for the grant of the tax refund or credit.

This Court cannot disregard mandatory and jurisdictional conditions mandated by law simply because the Commissioner chose not to contest
the numerical correctness of the claim for tax refund or credit of the taxpayer. Non-compliance with mandatory periods, non-observance of
prescriptive periods, and non-adherence to exhaustion of administrative remedies bar a taxpayers claim for tax refund or credit, whether or not
the Commissioner questions the numerical correctness of the claim of the taxpayer. This Court should not establish the precedent that non-
compliance with mandatory and jurisdictional conditions can be excused if the claim is otherwise meritorious, particularly in claims for tax
refunds or credit. Such precedent will render meaningless compliance with mandatory and jurisdictional requirements, for then every tax refund
case will have to be decided on the numerical correctness of the amounts claimed, regardless of non-compliance with mandatory and
jurisdictional conditions.

San Roque cannot also claim being misled, misguided or confused by the Atlas doctrine because San Roque filed its petition for review with
the CTA more than four years before Atlas was promulgated. The Atlas doctrine did not exist at the time San Roque failed to comply with
the 120- day period. Thus, San Roque cannot invoke theAtlas doctrine as an excuse for its failure to wait for the 120-day period to lapse. In any
event, the Atlas doctrine merely stated that the two-year prescriptive period should be counted from the date of payment of the output VAT, not
from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales involving the input VAT were made. The Atlas doctrine does not interpret, expressly or
impliedly, the 120+3052 day periods.

In fact, Section 106(b) and (e) of the Tax Code of 1977 as amended, which was the law cited by the Court in Atlasas the applicable provision of
the law did not yet provide for the 30-day period for the taxpayer to appeal to the CTA from the decision or inaction of the
Commissioner.53 Thus, the Atlas doctrine cannot be invoked by anyone to disregard compliance with the 30-day mandatory and
jurisdictional period. Also, the difference between the Atlas doctrine on one hand, and the Mirant54 doctrine on the other hand, is a mere 20
days. TheAtlas doctrine counts the two-year prescriptive period from the date of payment of the output VAT, which means within 20 days after
the close of the taxable quarter. The output VAT at that time must be paid at the time of filing of the quarterly tax returns, which were to be filed
"within 20 days following the end of each quarter."
Thus, in Atlas, the three tax refund claims listed below were deemed timely filed because the administrative claims filed with the Commissioner,
and the petitions for review filed with the CTA, were all filed within two years from the date of payment of the output VAT, following Section 229:

Date of Filing Return Date of Filing Date of Filing

Period Covered
& Payment of Tax Administrative Claim Petition With CTA

2nd Quarter, 1990 20 July 1990 21 August 1990 20 July 1992

Close of Quarter
30 June 1990

3rd Quarter, 1990 18 October 1990 21 November 1990 9 October 1992

Close of Quarter
30 September 1990

4th Quarter, 1990 20 January 1991 19 February 1991 14 January 1993

Close of Quarter
31 December 1990

Atlas paid the output VAT at the time it filed the quarterly tax returns on the 20th, 18th, and 20th day after the close of the taxable quarter. Had
the twoyear prescriptive period been counted from the "close of the taxable quarter" as expressly stated in the law, the tax refund claims of
Atlas would have already prescribed. In contrast, the Mirant doctrine counts the two-year prescriptive period from the "close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made" as expressly stated in the law, which means the last day of the taxable quarter. The 20-day
difference55 between the Atlas doctrine and the later Mirant doctrine is not material to San Roques claim for tax refund.

Whether the Atlas doctrine or the Mirant doctrine is applied to San Roque is immaterial because what is at issue in the present case is San
Roques non-compliance with the 120-day mandatory and jurisdictional period, which is counted from the date it filed its administrative claim
with the Commissioner. The 120-day period may extend beyond the two-year prescriptive period, as long as the administrative claim is filed
within the two-year prescriptive period. However, San Roques fatal mistake is that it did not wait for the Commissioner to decide within the 120-
day period, a mandatory period whether the Atlas or the Mirant doctrine is applied.

At the time San Roque filed its petition for review with the CTA, the 120+30 day mandatory periods were already in the law. Section
112(C)56 expressly grants the Commissioner 120 days within which to decide the taxpayers claim. The law is clear, plain, and unequivocal: "x x
x the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of submission of complete documents." Following the verba legis doctrine, this law must be applied exactly as worded since
it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. The taxpayer cannot simply file a petition with the CTA without waiting for the Commissioners decision within
the 120-day mandatory and jurisdictional period. The CTA will have no jurisdiction because there will be no "decision" or "deemed a denial"
decision of the Commissioner for the CTA to review. In San Roques case, it filed its petition with the CTA a mere 13 days after it filed its
administrative claim with the Commissioner. Indisputably, San Roque knowingly violated the mandatory 120-day period, and it cannot blame
anyone but itself.

Section 112(C) also expressly grants the taxpayer a 30-day period to appeal to the CTA the decision or inaction of the Commissioner, thus:

x x x the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the
one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

This law is clear, plain, and unequivocal. Following the well-settled verba legis doctrine, this law should be applied exactly as worded since it is
clear, plain, and unequivocal. As this law states, the taxpayer may, if he wishes, appeal the decision of the Commissioner to the CTA within 30
days from receipt of the Commissioners decision, or if the Commissioner does not act on the taxpayers claim within the 120-day period, the
taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period.

b. G.R. No. 196113 - Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR

Like San Roque, Taganito also filed its petition for review with the CTA without waiting for the 120-day period to lapse. Also, like San Roque,
Taganito filed its judicial claim before the promulgation of the Atlas doctrine. Taganito filed a Petition for Review on 14 February 2007 with the
CTA. This is almost four months before the adoption of the Atlas doctrine on 8 June 2007. Taganito is similarly situated as San Roque - both
cannot claim being misled, misguided, or confused by the Atlas doctrine.

However, Taganito can invoke BIR Ruling No. DA-489-0357 dated 10 December 2003, which expressly ruled that the "taxpayer-claimant need
not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review." Taganito
filed its judicial claim after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 but before the adoption of the Aichi doctrine. Thus, as will be explained
later, Taganito is deemed to have filed its judicial claim with the CTA on time.

c. G.R. No. 197156 Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR

Philex (1) filed on 21 October 2005 its original VAT Return for the third quarter of taxable year 2005; (2) filed on 20 March 2006 its
administrative claim for refund or credit; (3) filed on 17 October 2007 its Petition for Review with the CTA. The close of the third taxable quarter
in 2005 is 30 September 2005, which is the reckoning date in computing the two-year prescriptive period under Section 112(A).

Philex timely filed its administrative claim on 20 March 2006, within the two-year prescriptive period. Even if the two-year prescriptive period is
computed from the date of payment of the output VAT under Section 229, Philex still filed its administrative claim on time. Thus,
the Atlas doctrine is immaterial in this case. The Commissioner had until 17 July 2006, the last day of the 120-day period, to decide Philexs
claim. Since the Commissioner did not act on Philexs claim on or before 17 July 2006, Philex had until 17 August 2006, the last day of the 30-
day period, to file its judicial claim. The CTA EB held that 17 August 2006 was indeed the last day for Philex to file its judicial claim.
However, Philex filed its Petition for Review with the CTA only on 17 October 2007, or four hundred twenty-six (426) days after the last day of
filing. In short, Philex was late by one year and 61 days in filing its judicial claim. As the CTA EB correctly found:

Evidently, the Petition for Review in C.T.A. Case No. 7687 was filed 426 days late. Thus, the Petition for Review in C.T.A. Case No. 7687
should have been dismissed on the ground that the Petition for Review was filed way beyond the 30-day prescribed period; thus, no jurisdiction
was acquired by the CTA Division; x x x58(Emphasis supplied)
Unlike San Roque and Taganito, Philexs case is not one of premature filing but of late filing. Philex did not file any petition with the CTA within
the 120-day period. Philex did not also file any petition with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 120-day period. Philex filed its
judicial claim long after the expiration of the 120-day period, in fact 426 days after the lapse of the 120-day period. In any event, whether
governed by jurisprudence before, during, or after the Atlas case, Philexs judicial claim will have to be rejected because of late
filing. Whether the two-year prescriptive period is counted from the date of payment of the output VAT following the Atlas doctrine, or from the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales attributable to the input VAT were made following the Mirant and Aichi doctrines, Philexs judicial
claim was indisputably filed late.

The Atlas doctrine cannot save Philex from the late filing of its judicial claim. The inaction of the Commissioner on Philexs claim during the
120-day period is, by express provision of law, "deemed a denial" of Philexs claim. Philex had 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day
period to file its judicial claim with the CTA. Philexs failure to do so rendered the "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner final and
inappealable. The right to appeal to the CTA from a decision or "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner is merely a statutory privilege,
not a constitutional right. The exercise of such statutory privilege requires strict compliance with the conditions attached by the statute for its
exercise.59 Philex failed to comply with the statutory conditions and must thus bear the consequences.

II. Prescriptive Periods under Section 112(A) and (C)

There are three compelling reasons why the 30-day period need not necessarily fall within the two-year prescriptive period, as long as the
administrative claim is filed within the two-year prescriptive period.

First, Section 112(A) clearly, plainly, and unequivocally provides that the taxpayer "may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of the creditable input tax due or paid to such
sales." In short, the law states that the taxpayer may apply with the Commissioner for a refund or credit "within two (2) years," which means
at anytime within two years. Thus, the application for refund or credit may be filed by the taxpayer with the Commissioner on the last day of
the two-year prescriptive period and it will still strictly comply with the law. The twoyear prescriptive period is a grace period in favor of the
taxpayer and he can avail of the full period before his right to apply for a tax refund or credit is barred by prescription.

Second, Section 112(C) provides that the Commissioner shall decide the application for refund or credit "within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A)." The reference in
Section 112(C) of the submission of documents "in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection A" means that the application
in Section 112(A) is the administrative claim that the Commissioner must decide within the 120-day period. In short, the two-year prescriptive
period in Section 112(A) refers to the period within which the taxpayer can file an administrative claim for tax refund or credit. Stated
otherwise, the two-year prescriptive period does not refer to the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA but to the filing of the
administrative claim with the Commissioner. As held in Aichi, the "phrase within two years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit or
refund refers to applications for refund/credit with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA."

Third, if the 30-day period, or any part of it, is required to fall within the two-year prescriptive period (equivalent to 730 days60), then the
taxpayer must file his administrative claim for refund or credit within the first 610 days of the two-year prescriptive period. Otherwise, the filing
of the administrative claim beyond the first 610 days will result in the appeal to the CTA being filed beyond the two-year prescriptive
period. Thus, if the taxpayer files his administrative claim on the 611th day, the Commissioner, with his 120-day period, will have until the 731st
day to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides only on the 731st day, or does not decide at all, the taxpayer can no longer file his judicial
claim with the CTA because the two-year prescriptive period (equivalent to 730 days) has lapsed. The 30-day period granted by law to the
taxpayer to file an appeal before the CTA becomes utterly useless, even if the taxpayer complied with the law by filing his administrative claim
within the two-year prescriptive period.

The theory that the 30-day period must fall within the two-year prescriptive period adds a condition that is not found in the law. It results in
truncating 120 days from the 730 days that the law grants the taxpayer for filing his administrative claim with the Commissioner. This Court
cannot interpret a law to defeat, wholly or even partly, a remedy that the law expressly grants in clear, plain, and unequivocal language.

Section 112(A) and (C) must be interpreted according to its clear, plain, and unequivocal language. The taxpayer can file his administrative
claim for refund or credit at anytime within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the last day of the two-year prescriptive
period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the
claim on the 120th day, or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his judicial claim with the CTA. This is not only the
plain meaning but also the only logical interpretation of Section 112(A) and (C).

III. "Excess" Input VAT and "Excessively" Collected Tax

The input VAT is not "excessively" collected as understood under Section 229 because at the time the input VAT is collected the amount
paid is correct and proper. The input VAT is a tax liability of, and legally paid by, a VAT-registered seller61 of goods, properties or services
used as input by another VAT-registered person in the sale of his own goods, properties, or services. This tax liability is true even if the seller
passes on the input VAT to the buyer as part of the purchase price. The second VAT-registered person, who is not legally liable for the input
VAT, is the one who applies the input VAT as credit for his own output VAT. 62 If the input VAT is in fact "excessively" collected as understood
under Section 229, then it is the first VAT-registered person - the taxpayer who is legally liable and who is deemed to have legally paid for the
input VAT - who can ask for a tax refund or credit under Section 229 as an ordinary refund or credit outside of the VAT System. In such event,
the second VAT-registered taxpayer will have no input VAT to offset against his own output VAT.

In a claim for refund or credit of "excess" input VAT under Section 110(B) and Section 112(A), the input VAT is not "excessively" collected as
understood under Section 229. At the time of payment of the input VAT the amount paid is the correct and proper amount. Under the VAT
System, there is no claim or issue that the input VAT is "excessively" collected, that is, that the input VAT paid is more than what is legally due.
The person legally liable for the input VAT cannot claim that he overpaid the input VAT by the mere existence of an "excess" input VAT. The
term "excess" input VAT simply means that the input VAT available as credit exceeds the output VAT, not that the input VAT is excessively
collected because it is more than what is legally due. Thus, the taxpayer who legally paid the input VAT cannot claim for refund or credit of the
input VAT as "excessively" collected under Section 229.

Under Section 229, the prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for refund is two years from the date of payment of the tax "erroneously, x x
x illegally, x x x excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected." The prescriptive period is reckoned from the date the person liable for the
tax pays the tax. Thus, if the input VAT is in fact "excessively" collected, that is, the person liable for the tax actually pays more than what is
legally due, the taxpayer must file a judicial claim for refund within two years from his date of payment. Only the person legally liable to pay
the tax can file the judicial claim for refund. The person to whom the tax is passed on as part of the purchase price has no personality
to file the judicial claim under Section 229.63

Under Section 110(B) and Section 112(A), the prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for "excess" input VAT is two years from the close of
the taxable quarter when the sale was made by the person legally liable to pay theoutput VAT. This prescriptive period has no relation to the
date of payment of the "excess" input VAT. The "excess" input VAT may have been paid for more than two years but this does not bar the filing
of a judicial claim for "excess" VAT under Section 112(A), which has a different reckoning period from Section 229. Moreover, the person
claiming the refund or credit of the input VAT is not the person who legally paid the input VAT. Such person seeking the VAT refund or credit
does not claim that the input VAT was "excessively" collected from him, or that he paid an input VAT that is more than what is legally due. He is
not the taxpayer who legally paid the input VAT.

As its name implies, the Value-Added Tax system is a tax on the value added by the taxpayer in the chain of transactions. For simplicity and
efficiency in tax collection, the VAT is imposed not just on the value added by the taxpayer, but on the entire selling price of his goods,
properties or services. However, the taxpayer is allowed a refund or credit on the VAT previously paid by those who sold him the inputs for his
goods, properties, or services. The net effect is that the taxpayer pays the VAT only on the value that he adds to the goods, properties, or
services that he actually sells.

Under Section 110(B), a taxpayer can apply his input VAT only against his output VAT. The only exception is when the taxpayer is expressly
"zero-rated or effectively zero-rated" under the law, like companies generating power through renewable sources of energy. 64 Thus,
a non zero-rated VAT-registered taxpayer who has no output VAT because he has no sales cannot claim a tax refund or credit of his unused
input VAT under the VAT System. Even if the taxpayer has sales but his input VAT exceeds his output VAT, he cannot seek a tax refund or
credit of his "excess" input VAT under the VAT System. He can only carry-over and apply his "excess" input VAT against his future
output VAT. If such "excess" input VAT is an "excessively" collected tax, the taxpayer should be able to seek a refund or credit for such
"excess" input VAT whether or not he has output VAT. The VAT System does not allow such refund or credit. Such "excess" input VAT is not
an "excessively" collected tax under Section 229. The "excess" input VAT is a correctly and properly collected tax. However, such "excess"
input VAT can be applied against the output VAT because the VAT is a tax imposed only on the value added by the taxpayer. If the input VAT
is in fact "excessively" collected under Section 229, then it is the person legally liable to pay the input VAT, not the person to whom the tax was
passed on as part of the purchase price and claiming credit for the input VAT under the VAT System, who can file the judicial claim under
Section 229.

Any suggestion that the "excess" input VAT under the VAT System is an "excessively" collected tax under Section 229 may lead taxpayers to
file a claim for refund or credit for such "excess" input VAT under Section 229 as an ordinary tax refund or credit outside of the VAT System.
Under Section 229, mere payment of a tax beyond what is legally due can be claimed as a refund or credit. There is no requirement under
Section 229 for an output VAT or subsequent sale of goods, properties, or services using materials subject to input VAT.

From the plain text of Section 229, it is clear that what can be refunded or credited is a tax that is "erroneously, x x x illegally, x x x excessively
or in any manner wrongfully collected." In short, there must be a wrongful payment because what is paid, or part of it, is not legally due. As
the Court held in Mirant, Section 229 should "apply only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue
taxes." Erroneous or wrongful payment includes excessive payment because they all refer to payment of taxes not legally due. Under the
VAT System, there is no claim or issue that the "excess" input VAT is "excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected." In fact, if the
"excess" input VAT is an "excessively" collected tax under Section 229, then the taxpayer claiming to apply such "excessively" collected input
VAT to offset his output VAT may have no legal basis to make such offsetting. The person legally liable to pay the input VAT can claim a refund
or credit for such "excessively" collected tax, and thus there will no longer be any "excess" input VAT. This will upend the present VAT System
as we know it.

IV. Effectivity and Scope of the Atlas , Mirant and Aichi Doctrines

The Atlas doctrine, which held that claims for refund or credit of input VAT must comply with the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229,
should be effective only from its promulgation on 8 June 2007 until its abandonment on 12 September 2008
in Mirant. The Atlas doctrine was limited to the reckoning of the two-year prescriptive period from the date of payment of the output VAT. Prior
to the Atlas doctrine, the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund or credit of input VAT should be governed by Section 112(A) following
theverba legis rule. The Mirant ruling, which abandoned the Atlas doctrine, adopted the verba legis rule, thus applying Section 112(A) in
computing the two-year prescriptive period in claiming refund or credit of input VAT.

The Atlas doctrine has no relevance to the 120+30 day periods under Section 112(C) because the application of the 120+30 day periods was
not in issue in Atlas. The application of the 120+30 day periods was first raised inAichi, which adopted the verba legis rule in holding that the
120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. The language of Section 112(C) is plain, clear, and unambiguous. When Section 112(C)
states that "the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of
complete documents," the law clearly gives the Commissioner 120 days within which to decide the taxpayers claim. Resort to the courts prior
to the expiration of the 120-day period is a patent violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a ground for dismissing the
judicial suit due to prematurity. Philippine jurisprudence is awash with cases affirming and reiterating the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.65 Such doctrine is basic and elementary.

When Section 112(C) states that "the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the
expiration of the one hundred twenty-day period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals," the law does not
make the 120+30 day periods optional just because the law uses the word "may." The word "may" simply means that the taxpayer may or may
not appeal the decision of the Commissioner within 30 days from receipt of the decision, or within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day
period. Certainly, by no stretch of the imagination can the word "may" be construed as making the 120+30 day periods optional, allowing the
taxpayer to file a judicial claim one day after filing the administrative claim with the Commissioner.

The old rule66 that the taxpayer may file the judicial claim, without waiting for the Commissioners decision if the two-year prescriptive period is
about to expire, cannot apply because that rule was adopted before the enactment of the 30-day period. The 30-day period was adopted
precisely to do away with the old rule, so that under the VAT System the taxpayer will always have 30 days to file the judicial claim
even if the Commissioner acts only on the 120th day, or does not act at all during the 120-day period. With the 30-day period always
available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer can no longer file a judicial claim for refund or credit of input VAT without waiting for the Commissioner
to decide until the expiration of the 120-day period.

To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the taxpayer. One of the conditions for a
judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict
compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, whether before, during, or after the effectivity of
the Atlas doctrine, except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when
the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.

V. Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-03 (RMC 49-03) dated 15 April 2003

There is nothing in RMC 49-03 that states, expressly or impliedly, that the taxpayer need not wait for the 120-day period to expire before filing a
judicial claim with the CTA. RMC 49-03 merely authorizes the BIR to continue processing the administrative claim even after the taxpayer has
filed its judicial claim, without saying that the taxpayer can file its judicial claim before the expiration of the 120-day period. RMC 49-03 states:
"In cases where the taxpayer has filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals involving a claim for refund/TCC that is pending at
the administrative agency (either the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the One- Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of
the Department of Finance), the administrative agency and the court may act on the case separately." Thus, if the taxpayer files its judicial
claim before the expiration of the 120-day period, the BIR will nevertheless continue to act on the administrative claim because such premature
filing cannot divest the Commissioner of his statutory power and jurisdiction to decide the administrative claim within the 120-day period.

On the other hand, if the taxpayer files its judicial claim after the 120- day period, the Commissioner can still continue to evaluate the
administrative claim. There is nothing new in this because even after the expiration of the 120-day period, the Commissioner should still
evaluate internally the administrative claim for purposes of opposing the taxpayers judicial claim, or even for purposes of determining if the BIR
should actually concede to the taxpayers judicial claim. The internal administrative evaluation of the taxpayers claim
must necessarily continue to enable the BIR to oppose intelligently the judicial claim or, if the facts and the law warrant otherwise, for the BIR
to concede to the judicial claim, resulting in the termination of the judicial proceedings.

What is important, as far as the present cases are concerned, is that the mere filing by a taxpayer of a judicial claim with the CTA
before the expiration of the 120-day period cannot operate to divest the Commissioner of his jurisdiction to decide an administrative
claim within the 120-day mandatory period,unless the Commissioner has clearly given cause for equitable estoppel to apply as
expressly recognized in Section 246 of the Tax Code.67

VI. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10 December 2003

BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 does provide a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the Tax Code. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-
03 expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with
the CTA by way of Petition for Review." Prior to this ruling, the BIR held, as shown by its position in the Court of Appeals, 68 that the expiration
of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional before a judicial claim can be filed.

There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over a judicial claim
that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is if the
Commissioner, through a specific ruling, misleads a particular taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such specific ruling is
applicable only to such particular taxpayer. The second exception is where the Commissioner, through a general interpretative rule issued
under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into filing prematurely judicial claims with the CTA. In these cases, the Commissioner
cannot be allowed to later on question the CTAs assumption of jurisdiction over such claim since equitable estoppel has set in as expressly
authorized under Section 246 of the Tax Code.

Section 4 of the Tax Code, a new provision introduced by RA 8424, expressly grants to the Commissioner the power to interpret tax laws, thus:

Sec. 4. Power of the Commissioner To Interpret Tax Laws and To Decide Tax Cases. The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and
other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.

The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or
other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the
Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.

Since the Commissioner has exclusive and original jurisdiction to interpret tax laws, taxpayers acting in good faith should not be made to
suffer for adhering to general interpretative rules of the Commissioner interpreting tax laws, should such interpretation later turn out to be
erroneous and be reversed by the Commissioner or this Court. Indeed, Section 246 of the Tax Code expressly provides that a reversal of a BIR
regulation or ruling cannot adversely prejudice a taxpayer who in good faith relied on the BIR regulation or ruling prior to its reversal. Section
246 provides as follows:

Sec. 246. Non-Retroactivity of Rulings. Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in
accordance with the preceding Sections or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive
application if the revocation, modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in the following cases:

(a) Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;

(b) Where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is
based; or

(c) Where the taxpayer acted in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, a general interpretative rule issued by the Commissioner may be relied upon by taxpayers from the time the rule is issued up to its
reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. Section 246 is not limited to a reversal only by the Commissioner because this Section expressly
states, "Any revocation, modification or reversal" without specifying who made the revocation, modification or reversal. Hence, a reversal by
this Court is covered under Section 246.

Taxpayers should not be prejudiced by an erroneous interpretation by the Commissioner, particularly on a difficult question of law. The
abandonment of the Atlas doctrine by Mirant and Aichi69 is proof that the reckoning of the prescriptive periods for input VAT tax refund or credit
is a difficult question of law. The abandonment of the Atlasdoctrine did not result in Atlas, or other taxpayers similarly situated, being made to
return the tax refund or credit they received or could have received under Atlas prior to its abandonment. This Court is
applying Mirant and Aichiprospectively. Absent fraud, bad faith or misrepresentation, the reversal by this Court of a general interpretative rule
issued by the Commissioner, like the reversal of a specific BIR ruling under Section 246, should also apply prospectively. As held by this Court
in CIR v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc.:70

In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals, this Court held that under Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is precluded from adopting a position contrary to one previously taken where injustice would result to the taxpayer.
Hence, where an assessment for deficiency withholding income taxes was made, three years after a new BIR Circular reversed a previous one
upon which the taxpayer had relied upon, such an assessment was prejudicial to the taxpayer. To rule otherwise, opined the Court, would be
contrary to the tenets of good faith, equity, and fair play.

This Court has consistently reaffirmed its ruling in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp.1wphi1 in the later cases ofCommissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Borroughs, Ltd., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mega Gen. Mdsg. Corp., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Telefunken
Semiconductor (Phils.) Inc., and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. The rule is that the BIR rulings have no retroactive
effect where a grossly unfair deal would result to the prejudice of the taxpayer, as in this case.
More recently, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Benguet Corporation, wherein the taxpayer was entitled to tax refunds or credits based
on the BIRs own issuances but later was suddenly saddled with deficiency taxes due to its subsequent ruling changing the category of the
taxpayers transactions for the purpose of paying its VAT, this Court ruled that applying such ruling retroactively would be prejudicial to the
taxpayer. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the only issue is whether BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule applicable to all taxpayers or a specific ruling
applicable only to a particular taxpayer.

BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it was a response to a query made, not by a particular taxpayer, but by a
government agency tasked with processing tax refunds and credits, that is, the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback
Center of the Department of Finance. This government agency is also the addressee, or the entity responded to, in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-
03. Thus, while this government agency mentions in its query to the Commissioner the administrative claim of Lazi Bay Resources
Development, Inc., the agency was in fact asking the Commissioner what to do in cases like the tax claim of Lazi Bay Resources Development,
Inc., where the taxpayer did not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period.

Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule. Thus, all taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its
issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, where this Court held that the 120+30 day periods
are mandatory and jurisdictional

However, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 cannot be given retroactive effect for four reasons: first, it is admittedly an erroneous interpretation of the
law; second, prior to its issuance, the BIR held that the 120-day period was mandatory and jurisdictional, which is the correct interpretation of
the law; third, prior to its issuance, no taxpayer can claim that it was misled by the BIR into filing a judicial claim prematurely; and fourth, a claim
for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is strictly construed against the taxpayer.

San Roque, therefore, cannot benefit from BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 because it filed its judicial claim prematurely on 10 April 2003, before the
issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003. To repeat, San Roque cannot claim that it was misled by the BIR into filing its
judicial claim prematurely because BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued only after San Roque filed its judicial claim. At the time San Roque
filed its judicial claim, the law as applied and administered by the BIR was that the Commissioner had 120 days to act on administrative claims.
This was in fact the position of the BIR prior to the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. Indeed, San Roque never claimed the benefit of
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 or RMC 49-03, whether in this Court, the CTA, or before the Commissioner.

Taganito, however, filed its judicial claim with the CTA on 14 February 2007, after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December
2003. Truly, Taganito can claim that in filing its judicial claim prematurely without waiting for the 120-day period to expire, it was misled by BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03. Thus, Taganito can claim the benefit of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which shields the filing of its judicial claim from the
vice of prematurity.

Philexs situation is not a case of premature filing of its judicial claim but of late filing, indeed very late filing. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 allowed
premature filing of a judicial claim, which means non-exhaustion of the 120-day period for the Commissioner to act on an administrative claim.
Philex cannot claim the benefit of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 because Philex did not file its judicial claim prematurely but filed it long after the
lapse of the 30-day period following the expiration of the 120-day period. In fact, Philex filed its judicial claim 426 days after the lapse of the
30-day period.

VII. Existing Jurisprudence

There is no basis whatsoever to the claim that in five cases this Court had already made a ruling that the filing dates of the administrative and
judicial claims are inconsequential, as long as they are within the two-year prescriptive period. The effect of the claim of the dissenting opinions
is that San Roques failure to wait for the 120-day mandatory period to lapse is inconsequential, thus allowing San Roque to claim the tax
refund or credit. However, the five cases cited by the dissenting opinions do not support even remotely the claim that this Court had already
made such a ruling. None of these five cases mention, cite, discuss, rule or even hint that compliance with the 120-day mandatory
period is inconsequential as long as the administrative and judicial claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period.

In CIR v. Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc.,71 the issue was whether any output VAT was actually passed on to Toshiba that it could
claim as input VAT subject to tax credit or refund. The Commissioner argued that "although Toshiba may be a VAT-registered taxpayer, it is not
engaged in a VAT-taxable business." The Commissioner cited Section 4.106-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 75 that "refund of input taxes on
capital goods shall be allowed only to the extent that such capital goods are used in VAT-taxable business." In the words of the Court,
"Ultimately, however, the issue still to be resolved herein shall be whether respondent Toshiba is entitled to the tax credit/refund of its input VAT
on its purchases of capital goods and services, to which this Court answers in the affirmative." Nowhere in this case did the Court discuss,
state, or rule that the filing dates of the administrative and judicial claims are inconsequential, as long as they are within the two-year
prescriptive period.

In Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. v. CIR,72 the Court stated: "The issues to be resolved in the instant case are (1) whether the absence of the
BIR authority to print or the absence of the TIN-V in petitioners export sales invoices operates to forfeit its entitlement to a tax refund/credit of
its unutilized input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales; and (2) whether petitioners failure to indicate "TIN-V" in its sales invoices
automatically invalidates its claim for a tax credit certification." Again, nowhere in this case did the Court discuss, state, or rule that the filing
dates of the administrative and judicial claims are inconsequential, as long as they are within the two-year prescriptive period.

In AT&T Communications Services Philippines, Inc. v. CIR,73 the Court stated: "x x x the CTA First Division, conceding that petitioners
transactions fall under the classification of zero-rated sales, nevertheless denied petitioners claim for lack of substantiation, x x x." The
Court quoted the ruling of the First Division that "valid VAT official receipts, and not mere sale invoices, should have been submitted" by
petitioner to substantiate its claim. The Court further stated: "x x x the CTA En Banc, x x x affirmed x x x the CTA First Division," and
"petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied x x x, the present petition for review was filed." Clearly, the sole issue in this case is
whether petitioner complied with the substantiation requirements in claiming for tax refund or credit. Again, nowhere in this case did the Court
discuss, state, or rule that the filing dates of the administrative and judicial claims are inconsequential, as long as they are within the two-year
prescriptive period.

In CIR v. Ironcon Builders and Development Corporation,74 the Court put the issue in this manner: "Simply put, the sole issue the petition raises
is whether or not the CTA erred in granting respondent Ironcons application for refund of its excess creditable VAT withheld." The
Commissioner argued that "since the NIRC does not specifically grant taxpayers the option to refund excess creditable VAT withheld, it follows
that such refund cannot be allowed." Thus, this case is solely about whether the taxpayer has the right under the NIRC to ask for a cash refund
of excess creditable VAT withheld. Again, nowhere in this case did the Court discuss, state, or rule that the filing dates of the administrative
and judicial claims are inconsequential, as long as they are within the two-year prescriptive period.
In CIR v. Cebu Toyo Corporation,75 the issue was whether Cebu Toyo was exempt or subject to VAT. Compliance with the 120-day period was
never an issue in Cebu Toyo. As the Court explained:

Both the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Office of the Solicitor General argue that respondent Cebu Toyo Corporation, as a PEZA-
registered enterprise, is exempt from national and local taxes, including VAT, under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 7916 and Section 109 of
the NIRC. Thus, they contend that respondent Cebu Toyo Corporation is not entitled to any refund or credit on input taxes it previously paid as
provided under Section 4.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, notwithstanding its registration as a VAT taxpayer. For petitioner claims that
said registration was erroneous and did not confer upon the respondent any right to claim recognition of the input tax credit.

The respondent counters that it availed of the income tax holiday under E.O. No. 226 for four years from August 7, 1995 making it exempt from
income tax but not from other taxes such as VAT. Hence, according to respondent, its export sales are not exempt from VAT, contrary to
petitioners claim, but its export sales is subject to 0% VAT. Moreover, it argues that it was able to establish through a report certified by an
independent Certified Public Accountant that the input taxes it incurred from April 1, 1996 to December 31, 1997 were directly attributable to its
export sales. Since it did not have any output tax against which said input taxes may be offset, it had the option to file a claim for refund/tax
credit of its unutilized input taxes.

Considering the submission of the parties and the evidence on record, we find the petition bereft of merit.

Petitioners contention that respondent is not entitled to refund for being exempt from VAT is untenable. This argument turns a blind
eye to the fiscal incentives granted to PEZA-registered enterprises under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7916. Note that under said statute, the
respondent had two options with respect to its tax burden. It could avail of an income tax holiday pursuant to provisions of E.O. No. 226, thus
exempt it from income taxes for a number of years but not from other internal revenue taxes such as VAT; or it could avail of the tax
exemptions on all taxes, including VAT under P.D. No. 66 and pay only the preferential tax rate of 5% under Rep. Act No. 7916. Both the Court
of Appeals and the Court of Tax Appeals found that respondent availed of the income tax holiday for four (4) years starting from August 7,
1995, as clearly reflected in its 1996 and 1997 Annual Corporate Income Tax Returns, where respondent specified that it was availing of the tax
relief under E.O. No. 226. Hence, respondent is not exempt from VAT and it correctly registered itself as a VAT taxpayer. In fine, it is
engaged in taxable rather than exempt transactions. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the issue in Cebu Toyo was whether the taxpayer was exempt from VAT or subject to VAT at 0% tax rate. If subject to 0% VAT
rate, the taxpayer could claim a refund or credit of its input VAT. Again, nowhere in this case did the Court discuss, state, or rule that the filing
dates of the administrative and judicial claims are inconsequential, as long as they are within the two-year prescriptive period.

While this Court stated in the narration of facts in Cebu Toyo that the taxpayer "did not bother to wait for the Resolution of its (administrative)
claim by the CIR" before filing its judicial claim with the CTA, this issue was not raised before the Court. Certainly, this statement of the Court is
not a binding precedent that the taxpayer need not wait for the 120-day period to lapse.

Any issue, whether raised or not by the parties, but not passed upon by the Court, does not have any value as precedent. As this
Court has explained as early as 1926:

It is contended, however, that the question before us was answered and resolved against the contention of the appellant in the case of Bautista
vs. Fajardo (38 Phil. 624). In that case no question was raised nor was it even suggested that said section 216 did not apply to a public officer.
That question was not discussed nor referred to by any of the parties interested in that case. It has been frequently decided that the fact that a
statute has been accepted as valid, and invoked and applied for many years in cases where its validity was not raised or passed on, does not
prevent a court from later passing on its validity, where that question is squarely and properly raised and presented. Where a question passes
the Court sub silentio, the case in which the question was so passed is not binding on the Court (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30
Phil. 563), nor should it be considered as a precedent. (U.S. vs. Noriega and Tobias, 31 Phil. 310; Chicote vs. Acasio, 31 Phil. 401; U.S. vs.
More, 3 Cranch [U.S.] 159, 172; U.S. vs. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U.S. 82.) For the reasons given in the case
of McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, supra, the decision in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo, supra, can have no binding force in the interpretation
of the question presented here.76 (Emphasis supplied)

In Cebu Toyo, the nature of the 120-day period, whether it is mandatory or optional, was not even raised as an issue by any of the parties. The
Court never passed upon this issue. Thus, Cebu Toyo does not constitute binding precedent on the nature of the 120-day period.

There is also the claim that there are numerous CTA decisions allegedly supporting the argument that the filing dates of the administrative and
judicial claims are inconsequential, as long as they are within the two-year prescriptive period. Suffice it to state that CTA decisions do not
constitute precedents, and do not bind this Court or the public. That is why CTA decisions are appealable to this Court, which may affirm,
reverse or modify the CTA decisions as the facts and the law may warrant. Only decisions of this Court constitute binding precedents, forming
part of the Philippine legal system.77 As held by this Court in The Philippine Veterans Affairs Office v. Segundo:78

x x x Let it be admonished that decisions of the Supreme Court "applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution . . . form part of the legal
system of the Philippines," and, as it were, "laws" by their own right because they interpret what the laws say or mean. Unlike rulings of the
lower courts, which bind the parties to specific cases alone, our judgments are universal in their scope and application, and equally
mandatory in character. Let it be warned that to defy our decisions is to court contempt. (Emphasis supplied)

The same basic doctrine was reiterated by this Court in De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.:79

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. (Emphasis supplied)

VIII. Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 Effective 1 January 1996

Section 4.106-2(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, by its own express terms, applies only if the taxpayer files the judicial claim "after" the
lapse of the 60-day period, a period with which San Roque failed to comply. Under Section 4.106-2(c), the 60-day period is still mandatory
and jurisdictional.

Moreover, it is a hornbook principle that a prior administrative regulation can never prevail over a later contrary law, more so in this case where
the later law was enacted precisely to amend the prior administrative regulation and the law it implements.
The laws and regulation involved are as follows:

1977 Tax Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7716 (1994)

Sec. 106. Refunds or tax credits of creditable input tax.

(a) x x x x

(d) Period within which refund or tax credit of input tax shall be made - In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax
credit for creditable input taxes within sixty (60) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) hereof. In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the
part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the sixty-day period, appeal the decision or the unacted
claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.

Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 (1996)

Section 4.106-2. Procedures for claiming refunds or tax credits of input tax (a) x x x

xxxx

(c) Period within which refund or tax credit of input taxes shall be made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a tax credit/refund for
creditable input taxes within sixty (60) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance
with subparagraphs (a) and (b) above.

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax credit/refund as decided by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the taxpayer may appeal
to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from the receipt of said denial, otherwise the decision will become final. However, if no
action on the claim for tax credit/refund has been taken by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue after the sixty (60) day period from
the date of submission of the application but before the lapse of the two (2) year period from the date of filing of the VAT return for
the taxable quarter, the taxpayer may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.

xxxx

1997 Tax Code

Section 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax

(A) x x x

xxxx

(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant the refund or
issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the
application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision
denying the claim or after the expiration of the hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of
Tax Appeals.

There can be no dispute that under Section 106(d) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended by RA 7716, the Commissioner has a 60-day period to
act on the administrative claim. This 60-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Did Section 4.106-2(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 change this, so that the 60-day period is no longer mandatory and jurisdictional? The
obvious answer is no.

Section 4.106-2(c) itself expressly states that if, "after the sixty (60) day period," the Commissioner fails to act on the administrative claim, the
taxpayer may file the judicial claim even "before the lapse of the two (2) year period." Thus, under Section 4.106-2(c) the 60-day period is
still mandatory and jurisdictional.

Section 4.106-2(c) did not change Section 106(d) as amended by RA 7716, but merely implemented it, for two reasons. First, Section 4.106-
2(c) still expressly requires compliance with the 60-day period. This cannot be disputed.1wphi1

Second, under the novel amendment introduced by RA 7716, mere inaction by the Commissioner during the 60-day period is deemed a
denial of the claim. Thus, Section 4.106-2(c) states that "if no action on the claim for tax refund/credit has been taken by the
Commissioner after the sixty (60) day period," the taxpayer "may" already file the judicial claim even long before the lapse of the two-year
prescriptive period. Prior to the amendment by RA 7716, the taxpayer had to wait until the two-year prescriptive period was about to expire if
the Commissioner did not act on the claim.80 With the amendment by RA 7716, the taxpayer need not wait until the two-year prescriptive period
is about to expire before filing the judicial claim because mere inaction by the Commissioner during the 60-day period is deemed a denial of the
claim. This is the meaning of the phrase "but before the lapse of the two (2) year period" in Section 4.106-2(c). As Section 4.106- 2(c)
reiterates that the judicial claim can be filed only "after the sixty (60) day period," this period remains mandatory and jurisdictional. Clearly,
Section 4.106-2(c) did not amend Section 106(d) but merely faithfully implemented it.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Section 4.106-2(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, an administrative issuance, amended
Section 106(d) of the Tax Code to make the period given to the Commissioner non-mandatory, still the 1997 Tax Code, a much later law,
reinstated the original intent and provision of Section 106(d) by extending the 60-day period to 120 days and re-adopting the original
wordings of Section 106(d). Thus, Section 4.106-2(c), a mere administrative issuance, becomes inconsistent with Section 112(D), a later law.
Obviously, the later law prevails over a prior inconsistent administrative issuance.

Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code is clear, unequivocal, and categorical that the Commissioner has 120 days to act on an administrative
claim. The taxpayer can file the judicial claim (1) only within thirty days after the Commissioner partially or fully denies the claim within
the 120- day period, or (2) only within thirty days from the expiration of the 120- day period if the Commissioner does not act within the
120-day period.

There can be no dispute that upon effectivity of the 1997 Tax Code on 1 January 1998, or more than five yearsbefore San Roque filed its
administrative claim on 28 March 2003, the law has been clear: the 120- day period is mandatory and jurisdictional. San Roques claim,
having been filed administratively on 28 March 2003, is governed by the 1997 Tax Code, not the 1977 Tax Code. Since San Roque filed its
judicial claim before the expiration of the 120-day mandatory and jurisdictional period, San Roques claim cannot prosper.

San Roque cannot also invoke Section 4.106-2(c), which expressly provides that the taxpayer can only file the judicial claim "after" the lapse of
the 60-day period from the filing of the administrative claim. San Roque filed its judicial claim just 13 days after filing its administrative
claim. To recall, San Roque filed its judicial claim on 10 April 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its administrative claim.

Even if, contrary to all principles of statutory construction as well as plain common sense, we gratuitously apply now Section 4.106-2(c) of
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, still San Roque cannot recover any refund or credit because San Roque did not wait for the 60-day
period to lapse, contrary to the express requirement in Section 4.106-2(c). In short, San Roque does not even comply with Section 4.106-
2(c). A claim for tax refund or credit is strictly construed against the taxpayer, who must prove that his claim clearly complies with all the
conditions for granting the tax refund or credit. San Roque did not comply with the express condition for such statutory grant.

A final word. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. The Philippines has been struggling to improve its tax efficiency collection for the longest
time with minimal success. Consequently, the Philippines has suffered the economic adversities arising from poor tax collections, forcing the
government to continue borrowing to fund the budget deficits. This Court cannot turn a blind eye to this economic malaise by being unduly
liberal to taxpayers who do not comply with statutory requirements for tax refunds or credits. The tax refund claims in the present cases are not
a pittance. Many other companies stand to gain if this Court were to rule otherwise. The dissenting opinions will turn on its head the well-settled
doctrine that tax refunds are strictly construed against the taxpayer.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby (1) GRANTS the petition of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. No. 187485 to DENY the
P483,797,599.65 tax refund or credit claim of San Roque Power Corporation; (2) GRANTSthe petition of Taganito Mining Corporation in G.R.
No. 196113 for a tax refund or credit of P8,365,664.38; and (3)DENIES the petition of Philex Mining Corporation in G.R. No. 197156 for a tax
refund or credit of P23,956,732.44.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES
SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity
as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the systems conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel
stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels
coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct
federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislators district and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations. 8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, 9 although, as
will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the
utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release,
Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects 13"shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its members
to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same
section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes
of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the
area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects
selected by Members of Congress, they being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local
officials or civil leaders."16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals
appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and the amount
each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the
administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives
added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960s, however, pork barrel
legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man
controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local
Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began,
with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of
Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which
would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblymans locality. It has been further reported that
"Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also
"soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and
livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the
form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of P480
Million and P240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been
documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide
Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing
agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the
amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by
1992, Representatives were receivingP12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft
projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of
projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the
Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each, and the Vice-
President, P20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF
Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds. 33

Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were
directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a)
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published
by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in
the list herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were
reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministrations political
agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily
identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions. 38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education
(DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Nio Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the
legislative district concerned.40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent. 41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund," 43 the
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund," 44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund," 45 all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation
with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was
explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole
condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained
the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the release of the funds
directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same
single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003
budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways 51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on
the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the
national government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is
essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu
concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well
as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions
under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress61anent certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least P250 Million of the P500
Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in the
construction of public school buildings x x x." 62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd
Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board 64(GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007
(GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations 65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to
include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted
out to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million
for "hard projects" and P30 Million for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a P100
Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it
may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior
and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further
conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure
projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the
priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be
the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list. 74

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the
Vice-President, which was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to
be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the projects. 77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF
funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. 79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and
the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the terms usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such
as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to
help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or
the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he
amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985, 86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from
the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, 89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly
used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted.
Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government
money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." 91 He said that "the kickbacks were SOP (standard operating
procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from
dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings." 92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were
public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig." 93 "The publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage." 94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed. 95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government has
been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects." 96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds,
the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and
the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. 98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99 covering the use of legislators'
PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety
of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) 100 by the DBM, the application of these funds
and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and
32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly,
the Co As findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103

Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.

Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.

Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.

Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latters endorsement and without considering their mandated
functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.

Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.

The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.

Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to P6.156 Billion were either
found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.

Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant
with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." 104 According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on
the Malampaya Funds.105

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court
similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are
as follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even
date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as
the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating
funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant
thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego
(Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided
for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, 107 be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for
them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and
(b) "the use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from
the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary
funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR." 109 The Belgica Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno
Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund
priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH,
the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic
Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on
the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or
any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of
2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section
8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government
under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court,
seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Courts September
10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit. 113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a
separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013
(Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.

On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled
on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza
(Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able
to competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Courts resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision
dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of
res judicata and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as
prompted by the present cases.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, 117 namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important 119 and, therefore, shall be
discussed forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that
the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." 123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." 124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing
for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result
of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms
undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme
would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and
not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration
that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either
by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the
following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments: 126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the
laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and
that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to
investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code 128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend,
now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of
the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-
blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty .

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. Youve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has
done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it
unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they essentially allege grave violations of the
Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
 the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended
undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have
been lodged at a time when the systems flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the governments own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the
Court finds petitioners claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA, 131 a recent case wherein the
Court upheld the CoAs disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives
life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such
as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x.
(Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings
under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality.
As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office
in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen)
pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. 132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in
accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by
constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. 133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a
"PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends
a semblance of truth to petitioners claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." 135 In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading
review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the
myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine
which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 139applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or
"the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light,
respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in
response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140

The Court must deny respondents submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A
political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded
the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect
on the political question doctrine was explained as follows: 143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution." 144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Courts avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help
ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society.
For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute
to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing
"Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are
bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, 147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as
matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 148 The CoA Chairpersons
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its
prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional
scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus,
hardly a judgment on the merits in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct
releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to
demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress."
As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the
Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8 152 of the Civil Code, evokes
the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the
Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify
projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court
reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to
Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and
it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are
merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,
specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases
call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the
entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the
issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsas fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to
identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it
follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within
the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority,
as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion in the same
case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such
specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid,
would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the
CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority
of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies
which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that
the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsas allowance of post-enactment
legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed
in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional
Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to
accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political
largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the
appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or
expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects
funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official
by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds:
first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel,
specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. 159

Considering petitioners submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the
collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the funds utilization through various post-
enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork
Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; 160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated
words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." 163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, 165belongs the power to
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, 166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great
powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to
avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch
of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain
of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch
may interfere impermissibly with the others performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; 171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." 172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle
when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another departments functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague 173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of
budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent
in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives
which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing
the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its
own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as
not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive." 176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only
pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress role must be confined to mere oversight.
Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada: 178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1wphi1 In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF Article "wrecks the assignment of
responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have
ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed." 179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an
illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition
that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation.181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate
authority to control the execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators proposals.182 They maintain that
the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such
proposal and identification are recommendatory." 183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article
follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional." 184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to
participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3
as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as
evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general
program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is
passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the
legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be
identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the
case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional
committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2,
Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be
; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry 190 x x x to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is
with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona,
Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its
ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of
legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a
funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process: 192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislators identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the identification by the individual
legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor,
because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the
legislator.

xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that
he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify,
he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have,
after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of
constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of
the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought
that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we
should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or informal
practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has
conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the
process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments
which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for
the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the
case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the
nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund
from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. 203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or
tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the
"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada,
the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after
the required publication."205

Elaborating on the Presidents item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His
disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are
precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the
executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The
courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an
act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the Presidents item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal
restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branchs role in the budgetary process. 208 In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the Presidents item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated
to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad
laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An
item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of
the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of
appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law
which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto,
must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence meaning an
allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the
item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same.
Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto.
Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that
each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item.
Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes
shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the Presidents item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds
would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein
discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2
5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said
that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may
veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of
its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may
not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to
determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in
violation of the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislators identification of
the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." 212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item
veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a
modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a
GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-
grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is
passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between
(a) accepting the entireP24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it
would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion
would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which
may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds." 216 Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar
operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies
cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means
do not justify even commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it
renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each
legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-
interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective
officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, to well, accelerate the
decisions of senators."220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the peoples trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability, 221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring
of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF
Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before another office of government
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators control of his PDAF per
se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked to
this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-
to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department,
through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics
and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus
impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as
unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to
perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined
by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
guideline for legislative or executive action. 226Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated
how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The States policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local
autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, nongovernmental and peoples organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program
is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to
develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine
Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the
needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments
will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public
affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs
which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution. 229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. 230 The
Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project."231Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence
by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development
goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with
mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that
the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for
communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford. 233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
"making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrels original
intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction." 234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, 235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the
following wise:236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but
has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork
Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since
the "primary and specific purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the
Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law
allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a)
sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply
to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law," an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.: 241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may
be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes,
such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the
language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave: 242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to
allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion
of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly
manifested. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the
law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money
and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as
application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing
unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals,
production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form
part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a
Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable
amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less thanP150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount)
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional
provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013
PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made
by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-
discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.

On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the
funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus,
construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244

The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the
appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the
purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law
into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for
delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word
or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the
policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya
Funds would be used as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD
1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under
the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately
curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
"priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without
any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a
system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce
as well as economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by
any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.

Petitioners Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements
made in this Decision petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the
public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use
of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b)
"the use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty
to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right
may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State
are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner
is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information does not include the right to
compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has
a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required."
Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform
the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R.
No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
(Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed
to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF
Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the
bases of the latters duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be
allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court
recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure
are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners
prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate
petition.
It bears clarification that the Courts denial herein should only cover petitioners plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not
in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable
regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodians reasonable regulations,viz.:259

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the
latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that
undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum,
discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executives Social Funds."260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the political
branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In response to the Courts
September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No.
2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the
DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and
disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are:
first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the
Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the
PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]." 261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered
by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.

For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO
has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of
the TRO because they cannot be considered as remaining PDAF." They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the
DBM.262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered
moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting
the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for
2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBMs interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the
execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at
the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBMs interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be
"released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority." 263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically
speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In
fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual
release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, 264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from
the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments: 265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA,
Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after.
x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees
depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the
disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time
of this Decisions promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the
declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released meaning, those
merely covered by a SARO under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to
Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as
unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced
and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine
merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to
a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored." 268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike
down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it
has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system
has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has
authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it
has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended
by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of
"priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein
pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence
or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its
co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and
vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what
has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its
course. After all, this is the Courts bounden duty and no others.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators whether
individually or collectively organized into committees to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the
budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release
and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum
allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar
import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and
(2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the
disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1)
the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or
not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall
remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners prayer seeking that the
Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit
complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners access to
official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely
subjected to the custodians reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress
as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and
accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or
unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT;
REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG
KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH
ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that
"[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges
posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money
pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority
under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive
Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or
offices outside of the Executive.

Antecedents

What has precipitated the controversy?

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some
Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.

Responding to Sen. Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators
Part of Spending Acceleration Program,1 explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by
the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their
letters of request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been
instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down.
He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; 2 (2)
unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that
had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.

The DBM soon came out to claim in its website 3 that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel
Services4 appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects
per zero based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been
earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.

The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAPs use of savings,6 namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use
Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the
(a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.

As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained
in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.

The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first
time, and made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger
over Congressional pork barrel "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representatives district"7 excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows:
G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas), 8 on October 16,
2013; G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on
October 17, 2013; G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on November6, 2013; and G.R. No.
209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.

In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Courts attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure
Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP,
directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both
for continuing and current allotments.

In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised and joined.

Issues

Under the Advisory issued on November 14, 2013, the presentations of the parties during the oral arguments were limited to the following, to
wit:

Procedural Issue:

A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
Subsumed in this issue are whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.

Substantive Issues:

B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution insofar as:

(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the term is used
in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;

(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and

(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.

D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators.

E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP, NBC No.
541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.

In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG raised the matter of unprogrammed funds in order to support its argument regarding the Presidents
power to spend. During the oral arguments, the propriety of releasing unprogrammed funds to support projects under the DAP was
considerably discussed. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) dwelled on unprogrammed funds in their
respective memoranda. Hence, an additional issue for the oral arguments is stated as follows:

F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in accord with the GAAs.

During the oral arguments held on November 19, 2013, the Court directed Sec. Abad to submit a list of savings brought under the DAP that had
been sourced from (a) completed programs; (b) discontinued or abandoned programs; (c) unpaid appropriations for compensation; (d) a
certified copy of the Presidents directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in NBC No. 541; and (e) all circulars or orders issued in relation to the
DAP.9

In compliance, the OSG submitted several documents, as follows:

(1) A certified copy of the Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances
and their Realignment);10

(2) Circulars and orders, which the respondents identified as related to the DAP, namely:

a. NBC No. 528 dated January 3, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2011);

b. NBC No. 535 dated December 29, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2012);

c. NBC No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June
30, 2012);

d. NBC No. 545 dated January 2, 2013 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2013);

e. DBM Circular Letter No. 2004-2 dated January 26, 2004 (Budgetary Treatment of Commitments/Obligations of the National Government);

f. COA-DBM Joint Circular No. 2013-1 dated March 15, 2013 (Revised Guidelines on the Submission of Quarterly Accountability Reports on
Appropriations, Allotments, Obligations and Disbursements);

g. NBC No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 (Adoption of a Simplified Fund Release System in the Government).

(3) A breakdown of the sources of savings, including savings from discontinued projects and unpaid appropriations for compensation from 2011
to 2013
On January 28, 2014, the OSG, to comply with the Resolution issued on January 21, 2014 directing the respondents to submit the documents
not yet submitted in compliance with the directives of the Court or its Members, submitted several evidence packets to aid the Court in
understanding the factual bases of the DAP, to wit:

(1) First Evidence Packet11 containing seven memoranda issued by the DBM through Sec. Abad, inclusive of annexes, listing in detail the 116
DAP identified projects approved and duly signed by the President, as follows:

a. Memorandum for the President dated October 12, 2011 (FY 2011 Proposed Disbursement Acceleration Program (Projects and Sources of
Funds);

b. Memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and its
Realignment);

c. Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment);

d. Memorandum for the President dated September 4, 2012 (Release of funds for other priority projects and expenditures of the Government);

e. Memorandum for the President dated December 19, 2012 (Proposed Priority Projects and Expenditures of the Government);

f. Memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment to
Fund the Quarterly Disbursement Acceleration Program); and

g. Memorandum for the President dated September 25, 2013 (Funding for the Task Force Pablo Rehabilitation Plan).

(2) Second Evidence Packet12 consisting of 15 applications of the DAP, with their corresponding Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs)
and appropriation covers;

(3) Third Evidence Packet13 containing a list and descriptions of 12 projects under the DAP;

(4) Fourth Evidence Packet14 identifying the DAP-related portions of the Annual Financial Report (AFR) of the Commission on Audit for 2011
and 2012;

(5) Fifth Evidence Packet15 containing a letter of Department of Transportation and Communications(DOTC) Sec. Joseph Abaya addressed to
Sec. Abad recommending the withdrawal of funds from his agency, inclusive of annexes; and

(6) Sixth Evidence Packet16 a print-out of the Solicitor Generals visual presentation for the January 28, 2014 oral arguments.

On February 5, 2014,17 the OSG forwarded the Seventh Evidence Packet,18 which listed the sources of funds brought under the DAP, the uses
of such funds per project or activity pursuant to DAP, and the legal bases thereof.

On February 14, 2014, the OSG submitted another set of documents in further compliance with the Resolution dated January 28, 2014, viz:

(1) Certified copies of the certifications issued by the Bureau of Treasury to the effect that the revenue collections exceeded the original
revenue targets for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, including collections arising from sources not considered in the original revenue targets,
which certifications were required for the release of the unprogrammed funds as provided in Special Provision No. 1 of Article XLV, Article XVI,
and Article XLV of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs; and (2) A report on releases of savings of the Executive Department for the use of the
Constitutional Commissions and other branches of the Government, as well as the fund releases to the Senate and the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).

RULING

I.

Procedural Issue:

a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies

All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature of the petitions is individually set forth hereunder, to wit:

G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco) Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

G.R. No. 209136 (Luna) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209260 (IBP) Prohibition

G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) Certiorari

G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE) Certiorari and Prohibition

G.R. No. 209569 (VACC) Certiorari and Prohibition

The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of adverse claims between the
parties;19 that the petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a
result of the adoption of the DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners the
legal standing to sue considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of
the taxing or spending power of Congress;20 and that even if the petitioners had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law available to them, like assailing the regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the Commission
on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts.21

The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality
and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive issuances implementing the DAP. 22

In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the
constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or
any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the
President in violation of the principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and
NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render. 23

The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in the
COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts
by petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court.24

The respondents arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court,
Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one
of the repositories of judicial power.25 However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its
exercise of the legislative power.

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.

The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a former Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the
proposed provisions on the Judiciary, where he said:

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable
and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband
complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and
that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some
rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court
has, also, another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgmenton matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. (Bold emphasis supplied) 26

Upon interpellation by Commissioner Nolledo, Commissioner Concepcion clarified the scope of judicial power in the following manner:

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x

The second paragraph of Section 1 states: "Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies" The term
"actual controversies" according to the Commissioner should refer to questions which are political in nature and, therefore, the courts should
not refuse to decide those political questions. But do I understand it right that this is restrictive or only an example? I know there are cases
which are not actual yet the court can assume jurisdiction. An example is the petition for declaratory relief.

May I ask the Commissioners opinion about that?

MR. CONCEPCION. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments.

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other
lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a
difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had
authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the
court has the duty to decide.27

Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the great responsibility of the Judiciary in
maintaining the allocation of powers among the three great branches of Government. Speaking for the Court in Angara v. Electoral
Commission,28 Justice Jose P. Laurel intoned:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several department and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

xxxx

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x x
x29

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari
exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company:30

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the Kings Bench,
commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and
speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior courts judgment
was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the
petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in
matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not
proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction,
however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of
Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz:

xxxx

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 31

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it
is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower
court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court
itself.32 The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor: 33

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or
persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the
acts of legislative and executive officials.34

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the
challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication
with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.35

Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional
duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the
Chief Executives spending power.

b) Requisites for the exercise of the

power of judicial review were
complied with

The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must bean actual case or justiciable
controversy before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a
proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.36

The first requisite demands that there be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power by the Court. 37 An actual case or controversy,
in the words of Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa:38

x x x is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness,"
meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."

An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the
constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein
meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are
averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation
of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or
utilized by reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by
the Court.

It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28, 2014 oral arguments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued
because it had fully served its purpose, saying: "In conclusion, Your Honors, may I inform the Court that because the DAP has already fully
served its purpose, the Administrations economic managers have recommended its termination to the President. x x x." 39

The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as a program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the
challenges to the DAPs constitutionality, viz:

DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present cases brought to challenge its constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge
should no longer be at the level of the program, which is now extinct, but at the level of its prior applications or the specific disbursements under
the now defunct policy. We challenge the petitioners to pick and choose which among the 116 DAP projects they wish to nullify, the full details
we will have provided by February 5. We urge this Court to be cautious in limiting the constitutional authority of the President and the
Legislature to respond to the dynamic needs of the country and the evolving demands of governance, lest we end up straight jacketing our
elected representatives in ways not consistent with our constitutional structure and democratic principles.40

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.41

The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated
cases. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by
supervening events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional
character and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. 42

Assuming that the petitioners several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely
come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review.

Did the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?

Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 43 The
concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,44 where the Court said:

In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-
present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the
efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:

The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that
the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public
action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works.

Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental
importance." Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in
Araneta v. Dinglasan.

In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far
reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has
been adopted in several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring their suits involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.

However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action
rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action
complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the
Court in the vindication of a public right.

Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the
issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court aptly explains why:

Case law in most jurisdiction snow allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in
Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held
by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is
at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." 45

The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. 46 that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in
constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."

Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the
issuance and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in
preventing the further dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their
right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political branches of the Government.47

On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.48 Luna,
the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed
duty to work for the rule of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action, not to mention its civic duty as the official association
of all lawyers in this country."49

Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer
locus standi on each of them.

In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether
appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included.
As such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised." 50

II.
Substantive Issues

1.
Overview of the Budget System

An understanding of the Budget System of the Philippines will aid the Court in properly appreciating and justly resolving the substantive issues.

a) Origin of the Budget System

The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that had derived from the Latin word bulga (which means bag or purse).51

In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined "budget" as the financial program of the National Government
for a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to
be effective based on the results of operations during the preceding fiscal years. The term was given a different meaning under Republic Act
No. 992 (Revised Budget Act) by describing the budget as the delineation of the services and products, or benefits that would accrue to the
public together with the estimated unit cost of each type of service, product or benefit. 52 For a forthright definition, budget should simply be
identified as the financial plan of the Government, 53 or "the master plan of government."54

The concept of budgeting has not been the product of recent economies. In reality, financing public goals and activities was an idea that existed
from the creation of the State.55 To protect the people, the territory and sovereignty of the State, its government must perform vital functions
that required public expenditures. At the beginning, enormous public expenditures were spent for war activities, preservation of peace and
order, security, administration of justice, religion, and supply of limited goods and services. 56 In order to finance those expenditures, the State
raised revenues through taxes and impositions.57 Thus, budgeting became necessary to allocate public revenues for specific government
functions.58 The States budgeting mechanism eventually developed through the years with the growing functions of its government and
changes in its market economy.

The Philippine Budget System has been greatly influenced by western public financial institutions. This is because of the countrys past as a
colony successively of Spain and the United States for a long period of time. Many aspects of the countrys public fiscal administration,
including its Budget System, have been naturally patterned after the practices and experiences of the western public financial institutions. At
any rate, the Philippine Budget System is presently guided by two principal objectives that are vital to the development of a progressive
democratic government, namely: (1) to carry on all government activities under a comprehensive fiscal plan developed, authorized and
executed in accordance with the Constitution, prevailing statutes and the principles of sound public management; and (2) to provide for the
periodic review and disclosure of the budgetary status of the Government in such detail so that persons entrusted by law with the responsibility
as well as the enlightened citizenry can determine the adequacy of the budget actions taken, authorized or proposed, as well as the true
financial position of the Government.59

b) Evolution of the Philippine Budget System

The budget process in the Philippines evolved from the early years of the American Regime up to the passage of the Jones Law in 1916. A
Budget Office was created within the Department of Finance by the Jones Law to discharge the budgeting function, and was given the
responsibility to assist in the preparation of an executive budget for submission to the Philippine Legislature. 60

As early as under the 1935 Constitution, a budget policy and a budget procedure were established, and subsequently strengthened through the
enactment of laws and executive acts.61 EO No. 25, issued by President Manuel L. Quezon on April 25, 1936, created the Budget Commission
to serve as the agency that carried out the Presidents responsibility of preparing the budget.62 CA No. 246, the first budget law, went into effect
on January 1, 1938 and established the Philippine budget process. The law also provided a line-item budget as the framework of the
Governments budgeting system,63 with emphasis on the observance of a "balanced budget" to tie up proposed expenditures with existing
revenues.

CA No. 246 governed the budget process until the passage on June 4, 1954 of Republic Act (RA) No. 992,whereby Congress introduced
performance-budgeting to give importance to functions, projects and activities in terms of expected results.64 RA No. 992 also enhanced the
role of the Budget Commission as the fiscal arm of the Government. 65

The 1973 Constitution and various presidential decrees directed a series of budgetary reforms that culminated in the enactment of PD No. 1177
that President Marcos issued on July30, 1977, and of PD No. 1405, issued on June 11, 1978. The latter decree converted the Budget
Commission into the Ministry of Budget, and gave its head the rank of a Cabinet member.

The Ministry of Budget was later renamed the Office of Budget and Management (OBM) under EO No. 711. The OBM became the DBM
pursuant to EO No. 292 effective on November 24, 1989.

c) The Philippine Budget Cycle66

Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4)
Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the others but they overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.

c.1.Budget Preparation67

The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call contains budget parameters
earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as policy guidelines and procedures to aid government
agencies in the preparation and submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call,
which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all
government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).

Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and agencies submit their respective Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM.
To boost citizen participation, the current administration has tasked the various departments and agencies to partner with civil society
organizations and other citizen-stakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget Proposals, which proposals are then presented before a
technical panel of the DBM in scheduled budget hearings wherein the various departments and agencies are given the opportunity to defend
their budget proposals. DBM bureaus thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and come up with recommendations for the Executive
Review Board, comprised by the DBM Secretary and the DBMs senior officials. The discussions of the Executive Review Board cover the
prioritization of programs and their corresponding support vis--vis the priority agenda of the National Government, and their implementation.

The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program (NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of spending for each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP),
and is submitted in the form of a proposed GAA. The Details of Selected Programs and Projects is the more detailed disaggregation of key
PAPs in the NEP, especially those in line with the National Governments development plan. The Staffing Summary provides the staffing
complement of each department and agency, including the number of positions and amounts allocated.

The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the President and the Cabinet for further refinements or
reprioritization. Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the Cabinet, the DBM prepares the budget documents for
submission to Congress. The budget documents consist of: (1) the Presidents Budget Message, through which the President explains the
policy framework and budget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution,68 which contains the
macroeconomic assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two
previous years; and (3) the NEP.

Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current
operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of
the Government, including investments in the capital of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. 69 Current operating
expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in current consumption the benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal
year.70 The two components of current expenditures are those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating
expenses(MOOE).

Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their functions into: (1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on
agriculture and natural resources, transportation and communications, commerce and industry, and other economic development efforts);71 (2)
social services or social development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public health and medicare, labor and welfare and
others);72(3) general government or general public services expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general government, legislative services, the
administration of justice, and for pensions and gratuities);73 (4) national defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into national security
expenditures and expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order); 74 and (5) public debt.75

Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature of funds, i.e., general fund, special fund or bond fund. 76

On the other hand, public revenues complement public expenditures and cover all income or receipts of the government treasury used to
support government expenditures.77

Classical economist Adam Smith categorized public revenues based on two principal sources, stating: "The revenue which must defraythe
necessary expenses of government may be drawn either, first from some fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and
which is independent of the revenue of the people, or, secondly, from the revenue of the people." 78 Adam Smiths classification relied on the
two aspects of the nature of the State: first, the State as a juristic person with an artificial personality, and, second, the State as a sovereign or
entity possessing supreme power. Under the first aspect, the State could hold property and engage in trade, thereby deriving what is called its
quasi private income or revenues, and which "peculiarly belonged to the sovereign." Under the second aspect, the State could collect by
imposing charges on the revenues of its subjects in the form of taxes. 79

In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the following sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues(i.e., compulsory contributions to
finance government activities); 80 (2) capital revenues(i.e., proceeds from sales of fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public domain, and
gains on such sales like sale of public lands, buildings and other structures, equipment, and other properties recorded as fixed assets); 81 (3)
grants(i.e., voluntary contributions and aids given to the Government for its operation on specific purposes in the form of money and/or
materials, and do not require any monetary commitment on the part of the recipient); 82 (4) extraordinary income(i.e., repayment of loans and
advances made by government corporations and local governments and the receipts and shares in income of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
and other receipts);83 and (5) public borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations generally with interest from domestic and foreign
creditors of the Government in general, including the National Government and its political subdivisions).84

More specifically, public revenues are classified as follows: 85

General Income Specific Income

1. Subsidy Income from National 1. Income Taxes

Government
2. Property Taxes
2. Subsidy from Central Office
3. Taxes on Goods and Services
3. Subsidy from Regional
Office/Staff Bureaus 4. Taxes on International Trade and
Transactions
4. Income from Government
Services 5. Other Taxes 6.Fines and Penalties-Tax Revenue

5. Income from Government 7. Other Specific Income

Business Operations

6. Sales Revenue

7. Rent Income

8. Insurance Income

9. Dividend Income

10. Interest Income

11. Sale of Confiscated Goods and

Properties

12. Foreign Exchange (FOREX)

Gains

13. Miscellaneous Operating and

Service Income

14. Fines and Penalties-Government

Services and Business Operations

15. Income from Grants and

Donations

c.2. Budget Legislation86

The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the Presidents Budget, which is inclusive of the
NEPand the BESF, up to the Presidents approval of the GAA. This phase is also known as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the
significant participation of the Legislative through its deliberations.
Initially, the Presidents Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on First Reading. The Appropriations
Committee and its various Sub-Committees schedule and conduct budget hearings to examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies.
Thereafter, the House of Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB). 87

The GABis sponsored, presented and defended by the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee and Sub-Committees in plenary
session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third Reading before the House of Representatives version is transmitted to the Senate.88

After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on the GAB. To expedite proceedings, the Senate may conduct its
committee hearings simultaneously with the House of Representatives deliberations. The Senates Finance Committee and its Sub-
Committees may submit the proposed amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate only after the House of Representatives has
formally transmitted its version to the Senate. The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on Third Reading. 89

The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose of
discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of the GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to
the President for approval.90 The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message where budget items are subjected to direct
veto,91 or are identified for conditional implementation.

If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal
year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is passed by the Congress. 92

c.3. Budget Execution93

With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the
function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of
funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.

The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the DBM. Prior to this, the various departments and agencies are
required to submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline their plans and performance targets by laying down the physical and financial
plan, the monthly cash program, the estimate of monthly income, and the list of obligations that are not yet due and demandable.

Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a Cash Release Program (CRP).The ARP sets a limit for allotments
issued in general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly, quarterly and annual disbursement levels.

Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued by the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope than appropriations, in
that the latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend. Allotments may be released in two forms through a comprehensive Agency
Budget Matrix (ABM),94 or, individually, by SARO.95

Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to incur obligations 96 on behalf of the Government in order to implement
their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like hiring of personnel, entering into contracts for the supply of goods and services,
and using utilities.

In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment
of the obligations. A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically issued is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),97 which
issuance is based upon an agencys submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other required documents. The NCA specifies the maximum
amount of cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period indicated. Apart from the NCA, the DBM may issue a
Non-Cash Availment Authority(NCAA) to authorize non-cash disbursements, or a Cash Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for departments with
overseas operations to allow the use of income collected by their foreign posts for their operating requirements.

Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Budget Execution Phase and is usually accomplished through the
Modified Disbursement Scheme under which disbursements chargeable against the National Treasury are coursed through the government
servicing banks.

c.4. Accountability98

Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government funds have been effectively and efficiently
utilized to achieve the States socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the
purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new policies.

An agencys accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1) performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports;
(3) review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit(COA).

2.

Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan

a. DAP was a program designed to

promote economic growth

Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any Administration. 99 The national budget the Executive prepares and presents to
Congress represents the Administrations "blueprint for public policy" and reflects the Governments goals and strategies.100 As such, the
national budget becomes a tangible representation of the programs of the Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and
services for which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and allocated.101 Embodied in every national budget is government
spending.102

When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made efficiency and transparency in government spending a significant focus
of his Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an improved fiscal deficit of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January
to July of 2011, it also unfortunately decelerated government project implementation and payment schedules. 103 The World Bank observed that
the Philippines economic growth could be reduced, and potential growth could be weakened should the Government continue with its
underspending and fail to address the large deficiencies in infrastructure.104 The economic situation prevailing in the middle of 2011 thus paved
the way for the development and implementation of the DAP as a stimulus package intended to fast-track public spending and to push
economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary PAPs to be funded from the "savings" generated during the year as well as from
unprogrammed funds.105 In that respect, the DAP was the product of "plain executive policy-making" to stimulate the economy by way of
accelerated spending.106 The Administration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1) streamlining the implementation process
through the clustering of infrastructure projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education
(DepEd),and (2) front loading PPP-related projects107 due for implementation in the following year.108
Did the stimulus package work?

The March 2012 report of the World Bank,109 released after the initial implementation of the DAP, revealed that the DAP was partially
successful. The disbursements under the DAP contributed 1.3 percentage points to GDP growth by the fourth quarter of 2011. 110 The continued
implementation of the DAP strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29% contraction to a
34% growth as of September 2013.111

The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a policy instrument that the Government could use to direct the economies
towards growth and development.112 The Government, by spending on public infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring
profitability for prospective investors.113 The PAPs funded under the DAP were chosen for this reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on
the economy and infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation into disbursements. 114

b. History of the implementation of

the DAP, and sources of funds
under the DAP

How the Administrations economic managers conceptualized and developed the DAP, and finally presented it to the President remains
unknown because the relevant documents appear to be scarce.

The earliest available document relating to the genesis of the DAP was the memorandum of October 12,2011 from Sec. Abad seeking the
approval of the President to implement the proposed DAP. The memorandum, which contained a list of the funding sources for P72.11 billion
and of the proposed priority projects to be funded,115reads:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

xxxx

SUBJECT: FY 2011 PROPOSED DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM (PROJECTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS)

DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2011

Mr. President, this is to formally confirm your approval of the Disbursement Acceleration Program totaling P72.11 billion. We are already
working with all the agencies concerned for the immediate execution of the projects therein.

A. Fund Sources for the Acceleration Program

Amount
Action
Fund Sources (In million Description
Requested
Php)

FY 2011 30,000 Unreleased Personnel Declare as

Unreleased Services (PS) savings and
Personal appropriations which approve/
Services (PS) will lapse at the end of authorize its use
Appropriations FY 2011 but may be for the 2011
pooled as savings and Disbursement
realigned for priority Acceleration
programs that require Program
immediate funding

FY 2011 482 Unreleased

Unreleased appropriations (slow
Appropriations moving projects and
programs for
discontinuance)

FY 2010 12,336 Supported by the GFI Approve and

Unprogrammed Dividends authorize its use
Fund for the 2011
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program

FY 2010 21,544 Unreleased With prior

Carryover appropriations (slow approval from
Appropriation moving projects and the President in
programs for November 2010
discontinuance) and to declare as
savings from Zero-based Budgeting savings and with
Initiative authority to use
for priority
projects

FY 2011 Budget 7,748 FY 2011 Agency For information

items for Budget items that can
realignment be realigned within the
agency to fund new fast
 disbursing projects
DPWH-3.981 Billion
DA 2.497 Billion
DOT 1.000 Billion
DepEd 270 Million

TOTAL 72.110

B. Projects in the Disbursement Acceleration Program

(Descriptions of projects attached as Annex A)

GOCCs and GFIs

Agency/Project Allotment
(SARO and NCA Release) (in Million Php)

1. LRTA: Rehabilitation of LRT 1 and 2 1,868

2. NHA: 11,050

a. Resettlement of North Triangle residents to

450
Camarin A7
b. Housing for BFP/BJMP
500
c. On-site development for families living
10,000
along dangerous
d. Relocation sites for informal settlers
100
along Iloilo River and its tributaries

3. PHIL. HEART CENTER: Upgrading of 357

ageing physical plant and medical equipment

4. CREDIT INFO CORP: Establishment of 75

centralized credit information system

5. PIDS: purchase of land to relocate the PIDS 100

office and building construction

6. HGC: Equity infusion for credit insurance 400

and mortgage guaranty operations of HGC

7. PHIC: Obligations incurred (premium 1,496

subsidy for indigent families) in January-June
2010, booked for payment in Jul[y] Dec
2010. The delay in payment is due to the
delay in the certification of the LGU
counterpart. Without it, the NG is obliged to
pay the full amount.

8. Philpost: Purchase of foreclosed property. 644

Payment of Mandatory Obligations, (GSIS,
PhilHealth, ECC), Franking Privilege

9. BSP: First equity infusion out of Php 40B 10,000

capitalization under the BSP Law

10. PCMC: Capital and Equipment Renovation 280

11. LCOP: 105

a. Pediatric Pulmonary Program
b. Bio-regenerative Technology Program
35
(Stem-Cell Research subject to legal
review and presentation)
70

12. TIDCORP: NG Equity infusion 570

TOTAL 26,945
NGAs/LGUs

Agency/Project Allotment
(SARO) Cash
(In Million Requirement
Php) (NCA)

13. DOF-BIR: NPSTAR

centralization of data
processing and others (To be
synchronized with GFMIS
activities) 758 758

14. COA: IT infrastructure

program and hiring of
additional litigational experts 144 144

15. DND-PAF: On Base Housing

Facilities and Communication
Equipment 30 30

16. DA: 2,959 2,223

a. Irrigation, FMRs and
Integrated Community Based Multi-Species
Hatchery and Aquasilvi
Farming 1,629 1,629
b. Mindanao Rural
Development Project 919 183

c. NIA Agno River Integrated

Irrigation Project 411 411

17. DAR: 1,293 1,293

a. Agrarian Reform
Communities Project 2 1,293 132
b. Landowners Compensation 5,432

18. DBM: Conduct of National

Survey of
Farmers/Fisherfolks/Ips 625 625

19. DOJ: Operating requirements

of 50 investigation agents and
15 state attorneys 11 11

20. DOT: Preservation of the Cine

Corregidor Complex 25 25

21. OPAPP: Activities for Peace

Process (PAMANA- Project
details: budget breakdown,
implementation plan, and
conditions on fund release
attached as Annex B) 1,819 1,819

22. DOST 425 425

a. Establishment of National
Meterological and Climate
Center 275 275
b. Enhancement of Doppler
Radar Network for National
Weather Watch, Accurate
Forecasting and Flood Early
Warning 190 190

23. DOF-BOC: To settle the

principal obligations with
PDIC consistent with the
agreement with the CISS and
SGS 2,800 2,800
24. OEO-FDCP: Establishment of
the National Film Archive and
local cinematheques, and other
local activities 20 20

25. DPWH: Various infrastructure

projects 5,500 5,500

26. DepEd/ERDT/DOST: Thin

Client Cloud Computing
Project 270 270

27. DOH: Hiring of nurses and

midwives 294 294

28. TESDA: Training Program in

partnership with BPO industry
and other sectors 1,100 1,100

29. DILG: Performance Challenge

Fund (People Empowered
Community Driven
Development with DSWD and
NAPC) 250 50

30. ARMM: Comprehensive Peace

and Development Intervention 8,592 8,592

31. DOTC-MRT: Purchase of

additional MRT cars 4,500 -

32. LGU Support Fund 6,500 6,500

33. Various Other Local Projects 6,500 6,500

34. Development Assistance to the

Province of Quezon 750 750

TOTAL 45,165 44,000

C. Summary

Fund Sources
Identified for Allotments Cash
Approval for Release Requirements for
(In Million Release in FY
Php) 2011

Total 72,110 72,110 70,895

GOCCs 26,895 26,895

NGAs/LGUs 45,165 44,000

For His Excellencys Consideration

(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD

[/] APPROVED

[ ] DISAPPROVED

(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III

OCT 12, 2011

The memorandum of October 12, 2011 was followed by another memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 116 requesting
omnibus authority to consolidate the savings and unutilized balances for fiscal year 2011. Pertinent portions of the memorandum of December
12, 2011 read:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

xxxx
SUBJECT: Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and its Realignment

DATE: December 12, 2011

This is to respectfully request for the grant of Omnibus Authority to consolidate savings/unutilized balances in FY 2011 corresponding to
completed or discontinued projects which may be pooled to fund additional projects or expenditures.

In addition, Mr. President, this measure will allow us to undertake projects even if their implementation carries over to 2012 without necessarily
impacting on our budget deficit cap next year.

BACKGROUND

1.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies operations, particularly on the implementation of their
projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the same, have identified savings out of the 2011 General Appropriations Act.
Said savings correspond to completed or discontinued projects under certain departments/agencies which may be pooled, for the following:

1.1 to provide for new activities which have not been anticipated during preparation of the budget;

1.2 to augment additional requirements of on-going priority projects; and

1.3 to provide for deficiencies under the Special Purpose Funds, e.g., PDAF, Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund

1.4 to cover for the modifications of the original allotment class allocation as a result of on-going priority projects and implementation of new
activities

2.0 x x x x

2.1 x x x

2.2 x x x

ON THE UTILIZATION OF POOLED SAVINGS

3.0 It may be recalled that the President approved our request for omnibus authority to pool savings/unutilized balances in FY 2010 last
November 25, 2010.

4.0 It is understood that in the utilization of the pooled savings, the DBM shall secure the corresponding approval/confirmation of the President.
Furthermore, it is assured that the proposed realignments shall be within the authorized Expenditure level.

5.0 Relative thereto, we have identified some expenditure items that may be sourced from the said pooled appropriations in FY 2010 that will
expire on December 31, 2011 and appropriations in FY 2011 that may be declared as savings to fund additional expenditures.

5.1 The 2010 Continuing Appropriations (pooled savings) is proposed to be spent for the projects that we have identified to be immediate actual
disbursements considering that this same fund source will expire on December 31, 2011.

5.2 With respect to the proposed expenditure items to be funded from the FY 2011 Unreleased Appropriations, most of these are the same
projects for which the DBM is directed by the Office of the President, thru the Executive Secretary, to source funds.

6.0 Among others, the following are such proposed additional projects that have been chosen given their multiplier impact on economy and
infrastructure development, their beneficial effect on the poor, and their translation into disbursements. Please note that we have classified the
list of proposed projects as follows:

7.0 x x x

FOR THE PRESIDENTS APPROVAL

8.0 Foregoing considered, may we respectfully request for the Presidents approval for the following:

8.1 Grant of omnibus authority to consolidate FY 2011 savings/unutilized balances and its realignment; and

8.2 The proposed additional projects identified for funding.

For His Excellencys consideration and approval.

(Sgd.)

[/] APPROVED

[ ] DISAPPROVED

(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III

DEC 21, 2011

Substantially identical requests for authority to pool savings and to fund proposed projects were contained in various other memoranda from
Sec. Abad dated June 25, 2012,117 September 4, 2012,118 December 19, 2012,119May 20, 2013,120 and September 25, 2013.121 The President
apparently approved all the requests, withholding approval only of the proposed projects contained in the June 25, 2012 memorandum, as
borne out by his marginal note therein to the effect that the proposed projects should still be "subject to further discussions."122

In order to implement the June25, 2012 memorandum, Sec. Abad issued NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure
Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012),123 reproduced herein as follows:

NATIONAL BUDGET CIRCULAR No. 541

July 18, 2012

TO: All Heads of Departments/Agencies/State Universities and Colleges and other Offices of the National Government, Budget and Planning
Officers; Heads of Accounting Units and All Others Concerned
SUBJECT : Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012

1.0 Rationale

The DBM, as mandated by Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), periodically reviews and evaluates the
departments/agencies efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing budgeted funds for the delivery of services and production of goods, consistent
with the government priorities.

In the event that a measure is necessary to further improve the operational efficiency of the government, the President is authorized to suspend
or stop further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act. Withdrawal and pooling of
unutilized allotment releases can be effected by DBM based on authority of the President, as mandated under Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 5,
Book VI of EO 292.

For the first five months of 2012, the National Government has not met its spending targets. In order to accelerate spending and sustain the
fiscal targets during the year, expenditure measures have to be implemented to optimize the utilization of available resources.

Departments/agencies have registered low spending levels, in terms of obligations and disbursements per initial review of their 2012
performance. To enhance agencies performance, the DBM conducts continuous consultation meetings and/or send call-up letters, requesting
them to identify slow-moving programs/projects and the factors/issues affecting their performance (both pertaining to internal systems and
those which are outside the agencies spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate strategies and improvement plans for the rest of
2012.

Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/agencies have continued to post low obligation levels as of end of first semester, thus
resulting to substantial unobligated allotments.

In line with this, the President, per directive dated June 27, 2012 authorized the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels
of obligations as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current allotments. This measure will allow the maximum utilization of available
allotments to fund and undertake other priority expenditures of the national government.

2.0 Purpose

2.1 To provide the conditions and parameters on the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies as of June 30, 2012 to fund priority
and/or fast-moving programs/projects of the national government;

2.2 To prescribe the reports and documents to be used as bases on the withdrawal of said unobligated allotments; and

2.3 To provide guidelines in the utilization or reallocation of the withdrawn allotments.

3.0 Coverage

3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all national government agencies (NGAs)
charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No.10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:

3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);

3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and projects, as well as capitalized
MOOE; and

3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies concerned based on their
updated/validated list of pensioners.

3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover the identified programs, projects and activities of the departments/agencies reflected in
the DBM list shown as Annex A or specific programs and projects as may be identified by the agencies.

4.0 Exemption

These guidelines shall not apply to the following:

4.1 NGAs

4.1.1 Constitutional Offices/Fiscal Autonomy Group, granted fiscal autonomy under the Philippine Constitution; and

4.1.2 State Universities and Colleges, adopting the Normative Funding allocation scheme i.e., distribution of a predetermined budget ceiling.

4.2 Fund Sources

4.2.1 Personal Services other than pension benefits;

4.2.2 MOOE items earmarked for specific purposes or subject to realignment conditions per General Provisions of the GAA:

Confidential and Intelligence Fund;

Savings from Traveling, Communication, Transportation and Delivery, Repair and Maintenance, Supplies and Materials and Utility which shall
be used for the grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement incentive benefit;

Savings from mandatory expenditures which can be realigned only in the last quarter after taking into consideration the agencys full year
requirements, i.e., Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants, Water, Illumination, Power Services, Telephone, other Communication Services and Rent.

4.2.3 Foreign-Assisted Projects (loan proceeds and peso counterpart);

4.2.4 Special Purpose Funds such as: E-Government Fund, International Commitments Fund, PAMANA, Priority Development Assistance
Fund, Calamity Fund, Budgetary Support to GOCCs and Allocation to LGUs, among others;

4.2.5 Quick Response Funds; and

4.2.6 Automatic Appropriations i.e., Retirement Life Insurance Premium and Special Accounts in the General Fund.

5.0 Guidelines
5.1 National government agencies shall continue to undertake procurement activities notwithstanding the implementation of the policy of
withdrawal of unobligated allotments until the end of the third quarter, FY 2012. Even without the allotments, the agency shall proceed in
undertaking the procurement processes (i.e., procurement planning up to the conduct of bidding but short of awarding of contract) pursuant to
GPPB Circular Nos. 02-2008 and 01-2009 and DBM Circular Letter No. 2010-9.

5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units
(OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;

Statement of Allotments, Obligations and Balances (SAOB);

Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and

Physical Report of Operations.

5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agencys latest report available shall be used by DBM
as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated
allotments as of same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level
shall approximate to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).

5.4 All released allotments in FY 2011 charged against R.A. No. 10147 which remained unobligated as of June 30, 2012 shall be immediately
considered for withdrawal. This policy is based on the following considerations:

5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be implementation-ready and doable during the
given fiscal year; and

5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower-than-programmed implementation
capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year timeframe.

5.5. Consistent with the Presidents directive, the DBM shall, based on evaluation of the reports cited above and results of consultations with
the departments/agencies, withdraw the unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 through issuance of negative Special Allotment Release
Orders (SAROs).

5.6 DBM shall prepare and submit to the President, a report on the magnitude of withdrawn allotments. The report shall highlight the agencies
which failed to submit the June 30 reports required under this Circular.

5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be:

5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn;

5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing programs and projects of the agency/OU; or

5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to fund priority programs and projects not considered in the 2012
budget but expected to be started or implemented during the current year.

5.8 For items 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 above, agencies/OUs concerned may submit to DBM a Special Budget Request (SBR), supported with the
following:

5.8.1 Physical and Financial Plan (PFP);

5.8.2 Monthly Cash Program (MCP); and

5.8.3 Proof that the project/activity has started the procurement processes i.e., Proof of Posting and/or Advertisement of the Invitation to Bid.

5.9 The deadline for submission of request/s pertaining to these categories shall be until the end of the third quarter i.e., September 30, 2012.
After said cut-off date, the withdrawn allotments shall be pooled and form part of the overall savings of the national government.

5.10 Utilization of the consolidated withdrawn allotments for other priority programs and projects as cited under item 5.7.3 of this Circular, shall
be subject to approval of the President. Based on the approval of the President, DBM shall issue the SARO to cover the approved priority
expenditures subject to submission by the agency/OU concerned of the SBR and supported with PFP and MCP.

5.11 It is understood that all releases to be made out of the withdrawn allotments (both 2011 and 2012 unobligated allotments) shall be within
the approved Expenditure Program level of the national government for the current year. The SAROs to be issued shall properly disclose the
appropriation source of the release to determine the extent of allotment validity, as follows:

For charges under R.A. 10147 allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2012; and

For charges under R.A. 10155 allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2013.

5.12 Timely compliance with the submission of existing BARs and other reportorial requirements is reiterated for monitoring purposes.

6.0 Effectivity

This circular shall take effect immediately.

(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD

Secretary

As can be seen, NBC No. 541 specified that the unobligated allotments of all agencies and departments as of June 30, 2012 that were charged
against the continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2011 and the 2012 GAA (R.A. No. 10155) were subject to withdrawal through the issuance
of negative SAROs, but such allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of the concerned agencies from which they were
withdrawn; or (2) realigned to cover additional funding for other existing PAPs of the concerned agencies; or (3) used to augment existing PAPs
of any agency and to fund priority PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented in 2012. Financing the
other priority PAPs was made subject to the approval of the President. Note here that NBC No. 541 used terminologies like "realignment" and
"augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn unobligated allotments.
Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be implemented and funded, that is (1) by declaring "savings" coming from
the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing
unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.

c. DAP was not an appropriation

measure; hence, no appropriation
law was required to adopt or to
implement it

Petitioners Syjuco, Luna, Villegas and PHILCONSA state that Congress did not enact a law to establish the DAP, or to authorize the
disbursement and release of public funds to implement the DAP. Villegas, PHILCONSA, IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE observe that the
appropriations funded under the DAP were not included in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs. To petitioners IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE, the
DAP, being actually an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law for its validity. VACC maintains
that the DAP, because it involved huge allocations that were separate and distinct from the GAAs, circumvented and duplicated the GAAs
without congressional authorization and control.

The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and implemented the DAP violated the mandate of Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor
an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the
authority of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.

We agree with the OSGs position.

The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs
adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its
constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which
Congress "designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be
applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense."124 As pointed out in Gonzales v.
Raquiza:125 "In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors." 126

On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the
budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. 127 He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could
pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the
public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.

3.
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savings, and the use of such
appropriations contravened Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a plan or strategy validly adopted by the Executive to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic growth, the challenges posed by the petitioners constrain us to dissect the mechanics of the actual execution of the DAP. The
management and utilization of the public wealth inevitably demands a most careful scrutiny of whether the Executives implementation of the
DAP was consistent with the Constitution, the relevant GAAs and other existing laws.

a. Although executive discretion

and flexibility are necessary in
the execution of the budget, any
transfer of appropriated funds
should conform to Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution

We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come into play once the budget reaches
its execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget
implementation. The heads of offices, particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable
them to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under changing conditions. 128 In particular, the power to
transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the
PAPs set by Congress in the GAA.

Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs, 129particularly when the funds are
grouped to form lump sum accounts.130 It is assumed that the agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide
broader appropriation items.131 This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the budget execution phase.
The DAP as a strategy to improve the countrys economic position was one policy that the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill
his mandate under the GAAs.

Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be counterproductive. In Presidential Spending Power, 132 Prof. Louis
Fisher, an American constitutional scholar whose specialties have included budget policy, has justified extending discretionary authority to the
Executive thusly:

[T]he impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be resisted. There are many number of reasons why obligations and outlays by
administrators may have to differ from appropriations by legislators. Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in advance
of expenditures. Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in trying to legislate in fields that are highly technical and constantly undergoing
change. New circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken the decisions reached by Congress at the appropriation stage. It is not
practicable for Congress to adjust to each new development by passing separate supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control
expenditures by confining administrators to narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its power of the purse but it would not protect the
purse itself. The realities and complexities of public policy require executive discretion for the sound management of public funds.

xxxx

x x x The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial discretion for administrators. They need to exercise judgment and take
responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed toward executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be
discretion, but channel it and use it to satisfy the programs and priorities established by Congress.

In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the
fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of powers among the three main branches of the Government.
The Court has recognized this, and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon, 133 viz:

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of
their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based.

In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has not been the mere offshoot of
established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the American Governors-General.134 Act No. 1902 (An Act
authorizing the Governor-General to direct any unexpended balances of appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury
and to transfer from the general fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine
Legislature,135was the first enabling law that granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority was without any
limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the Governor-General to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or office
to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for that bureau or office.

From 1916 until 1920, the appropriations laws set a cap on the amounts of funds that could be transferred, thereby limiting the power to transfer
funds. Only 10% of the amounts appropriated for contingent or miscellaneous expenses could be transferred to a bureau or office, and the
transferred funds were to be used to cover deficiencies in the appropriations also for miscellaneous expenses of said bureau or office.

In 1921, the ceiling on the amounts of funds to be transferred from items under miscellaneous expenses to any other item of a certain bureau or
office was removed.

During the Commonwealth period, the power of the President to transfer funds continued to be governed by the GAAs despite the enactment of
the Constitution in 1935. It is notable that the 1935 Constitution did not include a provision on the power to transfer funds. At any rate, a shift in
the extent of the Presidents power to transfer funds was again experienced during this era, with the President being given more flexibility in
implementing the budget. The GAAs provided that the power to transfer all or portions of the appropriations in the Executive Department could
be made in the "interest of the public, as the President may determine." 136

In its time, the 1971 Constitutional Convention wanted to curtail the Presidents seemingly unbounded discretion in transferring funds.137 Its
Committee on the Budget and Appropriation proposed to prohibit the transfer of funds among the separate branches of the Government and
the independent constitutional bodies, but to allow instead their respective heads to augment items of appropriations from savings in their
respective budgets under certain limitations.138 The clear intention of the Convention was to further restrict, not to liberalize, the power to
transfer appropriations.139 Thus, the Committee on the Budget and Appropriation initially considered setting stringent limitations on the power to
augment, and suggested that the augmentation of an item of appropriation could be made "by not more than ten percent if the original item of
appropriation to be augmented does not exceed one million pesos, or by not more than five percent if the original item of appropriation to be
augmented exceeds one million pesos."140 But two members of the Committee objected to the P1,000,000.00 threshold, saying that the amount
was arbitrary and might not be reasonable in the future. The Committee agreed to eliminate theP1,000,000.00 threshold, and settled on the ten
percent limitation.141

In the end, the ten percent limitation was discarded during the plenary of the Convention, which adopted the following final version under
Section 16, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The 1973 Constitution explicitly and categorically prohibited the transfer of funds from one item to another, unless Congress enacted a law
authorizing the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
omissions to transfer funds for the purpose of augmenting any item from savings in another item in the GAA of their respective offices. The
leeway was limited to augmentation only, and was further constricted by the condition that the funds to be transferred should come from
savings from another item in the appropriation of the office.142

On July 30, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1177, providing in its Section 44 that:

Section 44. Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project, or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive Department in the General Appropriations Act,
from savings in the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of
Article VIII, Section 16 (5) of the Constitution.

In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first paragraph of Section 44 for contravening Section 16(5)of the 1973 Constitution,
ruling:

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.143
It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification by the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section 25(5) of
Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

Section 25. x x x

xxxx

5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

xxxx

The foregoing history makes it evident that the Constitutional Commission included Section 25(5), supra, to keep a tight rein on the exercise of
the power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the President and the other high officials of the Government named therein. The Court
stated in Nazareth v. Villar:144

In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the
appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception
is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The
plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioners posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.

It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to
transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in
Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.
The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather
than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former.
Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always
proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise
within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the
statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor
of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that
the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of a limitation on the Presidents discretion over the appropriations during
the Budget Execution Phase.

b. Requisites for the valid transfer of

appropriated funds under Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution

The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;

(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is
to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

b.1. First RequisiteGAAs of 2011 and

2012 lacked valid provisions to
authorize transfers of funds under
the DAP; hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional

Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law,
generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.

Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?

In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as follows:

Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:

Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by the DBM as justification for the use of savings under the DAP.145

A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not
carrying the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to
authorize only transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of appropriation within the
Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the
Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be
used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional commission.

Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in the counterpart provision in the 2013 GAA, to wit:

Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to use savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their respective
appropriations.

Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed, there still remained two other requisites to be
met, namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings from appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer
must be for the purpose of augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective offices.

b.2. Second Requisite There were

no savings from which funds
could be sourced for the DAP
Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?

The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments were not actual
savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant provisions of the GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be understood
to refer to the excess money after the items that needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have been paid
pursuant to the budget.146The petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the PAPs for which the funds had been appropriated were
actually implemented and completed, or finally discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could not be realized with certainty in the
middle of the fiscal year; and that the funds for "slow-moving" PAPs could not be considered as savings because such PAPs had not actually
been abandoned or discontinued yet.147 They stress that NBC No. 541, by allowing the withdrawn funds to be reissued to the "original program
or project from which it was withdrawn," conceded that the PAPs from which the supposed savings were taken had not been completed,
abandoned or discontinued.148

The OSG represents that "savings" were "appropriations balances," being the difference between the appropriation authorized by Congress
and the actual amount allotted for the appropriation; that the definition of "savings" in the GAAs set only the parameters for determining when
savings occurred; that it was still the President (as well as the other officers vested by the Constitution with the authority to augment) who
ultimately determined when savings actually existed because savings could be determined only during the stage of budget execution; that the
President must be given a wide discretion to accomplish his tasks; and that the withdrawn unobligated allotments were savings inasmuch as
they were clearly "portions or balances of any programmed appropriationfree from any obligation or encumbrances which are (i) still available
after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized"

We partially find for the petitioners.

In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in mind. The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the
purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second
principle is that the Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and
to spend the budget in accordance with the provisions of the GAA.149 The Executive is expected to faithfully implement the PAPs for which
Congress allocated funds, and to limit the expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is
authorized, subject to the conditions provided by law. The third principle is that in making the Presidents power to augment operative under the
GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it
delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over the purse as
to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle is that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that is
real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or
hypothetical.150

The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against expanding the scope of the power to augment. It is then indubitable that
the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for
such funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.

The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected this interpretation and made it operational, viz:

Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still
available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized;
(ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies
and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

The three instances listed in the GAAs aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of
the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longer existent.

The phrase "free from any obligation or encumbrance" in the definition of savings in the GAAs conveyed the notion that the appropriation was
at that stage when the appropriation was already obligated and the appropriation was already released. This interpretation was reinforced by
the enumeration of the three instances for savings to arise, which showed that the appropriation referred to had reached the agency level. It
could not be otherwise, considering that only when the appropriation had reached the agency level could it be determined whether (a) the PAP
for which the appropriation had been authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and
leaves of absence without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost because of the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies.

The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased
Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued
projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings."

The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings.
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased.
They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if
there has already been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued
either an ABM (for those not needing clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the
case may be. Appropriations remain unreleased, for instance, because of noncompliance with documentary requirements (like the Special
Budget Request), or simply because of the unavailability of funds. But the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to which they were
allocated under the GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo, unreleased appropriations refer to appropriations with
allotments but without disbursement authority.

For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut the
congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis--vis the
PAPs for which Congress had allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an allotment and
NCA for such vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may already constitute savings for that agency under the
second instance.

Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further
qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately
declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed. This signified that the DBMs withdrawal of unobligated
allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.

Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring Opinion that MOOE appropriations are deemed divided into twelve monthly
allocations within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be generated monthly from the excess or unused MOOE appropriations other than the
Mandatory Expenditures and Expenditures for Business-type Activities because of the physical impossibility to obligate and spend such funds
as MOOE for a period that already lapsed. Following this observation, MOOE for future months are not savings and cannot be transferred.

The DBMs Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (which became the basis of NBC No. 541) stated:

ON THE AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW UNOBLIGATED ALLOTMENTS

5.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies operations, particularly on the implementation of their
projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the same, have been continuously calling the attention of all National
Government agencies (NGAs) with low levels of obligations as of end of the first quarter to speedup the implementation of their programs and
projects in the second quarter.

6.0 Said reminders were made in a series of consultation meetings with the concerned agencies and with call-up letters sent.

7.0 Despite said reminders and the availability of funds at the departments disposal, the level of financial performance of some departments
registered below program, with the targeted obligations/disbursements for the first semester still not being met.

8.0 In order to maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current
allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects.

9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the agencies
and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.

It is apparent from the foregoing text that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments would be based on whether the allotments pertained to slow-
moving projects, or not. However, NBC No. 541 did not set in clear terms the criteria for the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, viz:

3.1. These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 ofall national government agencies (NGAs)
charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No. 10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:

3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);

3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and projects, as well as capitalized
MOOE; and

3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies concerned based on their
undated/validated list of pensioners.

A perusal of its various provisions reveals that NBC No. 541 targeted the "withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of
obligations"151 "to fund priority and/or fast-moving programs/projects."152 But the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be "[r]eissued for the
original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn"153 supported the conclusion that the
PAPs had not yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. Thus, the purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet
fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible.

Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released allotments in 2011 charged against the 2011 GAA that had remained
unobligated based on the following considerations, to wit:

5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be implementation-ready and doable during the
given fiscal year; and

5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slower-than-programmed implementation
capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year timeframe.

Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the unobligated allotments for continuing and current appropriations as of
June 30, 2012, disregarded the 2-year period of availability of the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlay extended under Section 65,
General Provisions of the 2011 GAA, viz:

Section 65. Availability of Appropriations. Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release
and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year
after the end of the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays under R.A. No.
9970 shall be made available up to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be
submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations.
and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz:

Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release
and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year
after the end of the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be submitted
to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed form or by way of electronic document.154

Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and its relevant issuances shortened the period of availability of the
appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays.

Congress provided a one-year period of availability of the funds for all allotment classes in the 2013 GAA (R.A. No. 10352), to wit:

Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. All appropriations authorized in this Act shall be available for release and obligation for the
purposes specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, until the end of FY 2013: PROVIDED, That a report on these
releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed
form or by way of electronic document.

Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad sought omnibus authority to consolidate savings and unutilized
balances to fund the DAP on a quarterly basis, viz:

7.0 If the level of financial performance of some department will register below program, even with the availability of funds at their disposal, the
targeted obligations/disbursements for each quarter will not be met. It is important to note that these funds will lapse at the end of the fiscal year
if these remain unobligated.

8.0 To maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances at the end of every quarter, both for continuing and current
allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects.

9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the agencies
and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.

The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief Lifes pan of one year, was further shortened to only a quarter of a year
under the DBMs memorandum dated May 20, 2013.

The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending.
They aver that the respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with
existing appropriations under the GAAs.155

The respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated allotments were being withdrawn upon the instance of the implementing
agencies based on their own assessment that they could not obligate those allotments pursuant to the Presidents directive for them to spend
their appropriations as quickly as they could in order to ramp up the economy. 156

We agree with the petitioners.

Contrary to the respondents insistence, the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself. The text of NBC No. 541 bears this out, to
wit:

5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units
(OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;

Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);

Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and

Physical Report of Operations.

5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agencys latest report available shall be used by DBM
as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated
allotments as of same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level
shall approximate to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).

The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased
appropriations; and that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds were akin to the
impoundment of appropriations that could be allowed only in case of "unmanageable national government budget deficit" under the
GAAs,157 thus violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of allotments. 158

In contrast, the respondents emphasize that NBC No. 541 adopted a spending, not saving, policy as a last-ditch effort of the Executive to push
agencies into actually spending their appropriations; that such policy did not amount to an impoundment scheme, because impoundment
referred to the decision of the Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological reasons; and that the withdrawal of allotments under
NBC No. 541 was made pursuant to Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code, by which the President was granted the
authority to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his judgment the public interest so
required.

The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased
appropriations were invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of
appropriated funds cannot be considered as impoundment.

According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez: 159 "Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the GAA is
understood to mean the retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable
National Government budget deficit, to wit:

Section 66. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No appropriations authorized under this Act shall be impounded through
retention or deduction, unless in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, That all the funds
appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects and activities authorized under this Act, except those covered under the Unprogrammed
Fund, shall be released pursuant to Section 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Section 67. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act shall be
effected only in cases where there is an unmanageable national government budget deficit.

Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this section shall be construed to mean that (i) the actual national government
budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit as indicated in the FY 2011 Budget of

Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President and approved by Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution, or (ii) there are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee and approved by the President.

The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions.

The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be regarded as impoundment because it entailed only the transfer of funds,
not the retention or deduction of appropriations.

Nor could Section 68 of the 2011 GAA (and the similar provisions of the 2012 and 2013 GAAs) be applicable. They uniformly stated:

Section 68. Prohibition Against Retention/Deduction of Allotment. Fund releases from appropriations provided in this Act shall be transmitted
intact or in full to the office or agency concerned. No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead shall be made, except as authorized by
law, or upon direction of the President of the Philippines. The COA shall ensure compliance with this provision to the extent that sub-allotments
by agencies to their subordinate offices are in conformity with the release documents issued by the DBM.

The provision obviously pertained to the retention or deduction of allotments upon their release from the DBM, which was a different matter
altogether. The Court should not expand the meaning of the provision by applying it to the withdrawal of allotments.

The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 to justify the withdrawal of unobligated allotments.
But the provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, to wit:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.- Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his
judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop
further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal
services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.

Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance with Section 38, supra, but instead transferred the funds to
other PAPs.

It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be
reverted to the General Fund.1wphi1 This was the mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.- Unexpended balances of appropriations
authorized in the General Appropriation Act shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and shall
not thereafter be available for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment: Provided, that appropriations for capital outlays shall
remain valid until fully spent or reverted: provided, further, that continuing appropriations for current operating expenditures may be specifically
recommended and approved as such in support of projects whose effective implementation calls for multi-year expenditure commitments:
provided, finally, that the President may authorize the use of savings realized by an agency during given year to meet non-recurring
expenditures in a subsequent year.

The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the annual budget preparation process and the preparation process and
the President may approve upon recommendation of the Secretary, the reversion of funds no longer needed in connection with the activities
funded by said continuing appropriations.

The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the
end of the fiscal year.

b.3. Third Requisite No funds from

savings could be transferred under
the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA

The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer should be "to augment an item in the general appropriations
law for the respective offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree. 160

The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be
deficient, to wit:

x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or
subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be
funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.

In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Note is taken
of the fact that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear, thus:

Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized
to use savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their respective
appropriations.

As of 2013, a total of P144.4 billion worth of PAPs were implemented through the DAP.161

Of this amount P82.5 billion were released in 2011 and P54.8 billion in 2012.162 Sec. Abad has reported that 9% of the total DAP releases were
applied to the PAPs identified by the legislators.163

The petitioners disagree, however, and insist that the DAP supported the following PAPs that had not been covered with appropriations in the
respective GAAs, namely:

(i) P1.5 billion for the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army;

(ii) P1.8 billion for the Moro National Liberation Front;

(iii) P700 million for assistance to Quezon Province;164

(iv) P50 million to P100 (million) each to certain senators;165

(v) P10 billion for the relocation of families living along dangerous zones under the National Housing Authority;

(vi) P10 billion and P20 billion equity infusion under the Bangko Sentral;

(vii) P5.4 billion landowners compensation under the Department of Agrarian Reform;

(viii) P8.6 billion for the ARMM comprehensive peace and development program;

(ix) P6.5 billion augmentation of LGU internal revenue allotments

(x) P5 billion for crucial projects like tourism road construction under the Department of Tourism and the Department of Public Works and
Highways;

(xi) P1.8 billion for the DAR-DPWH Tulay ng Pangulo;

(xii) P1.96 billion for the DOH-DPWH rehabilitation of regional health units; and

(xiii) P4 billion for the DepEd-PPP school infrastructure projects.166

In refutation, the OSG argues that a total of 116 DAP-financed PAPs were implemented, had appropriation covers, and could properly be
accounted for because the funds were released following and pursuant to the standard practices adopted by the DBM. 167 In support of its
argument, the OSG has submitted seven evidence packets containing memoranda, SAROs, and other pertinent documents relative to the
implementation and fund transfers under the DAP.168

Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we conclude that the "savings" pooled under the DAP were
allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.

For example, the SARO issued on December 22, 2011 for the highly vaunted Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM)
project under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) covered the amount ofP1.6 Billion,169 broken down as follows:

APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS AMOUNT

CODE AUTHORIZED

A.03.a.01.a Generation of new knowledge and technologies and

research capability building in priority areas identified as
strategic to National Development
Personnel Services
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses P 43,504,024
Capital Outlays 1,164,517,589
391,978,387
P 1,600,000,000

the pertinent provision of the 2011 GAA (R.A. No. 10147) showed that Congress had appropriated onlyP537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing for
personnel services and capital outlays, to wit:

Personnel Maintenance Capital TOTAL

Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenditures

III. Operations

a. Funding Assistance to Science 177,406,000 1,887,365,000 49,090,000 2,113,861,000

and Technology Activities

1. Central Office 1,554,238,000 1,554,238,000

a. Generation of new
knowledge and
technologies and research
capability building in
priority areas identified as
strategic to National
Development 537,910,000 537,910,000

Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by almost 300% the appropriation by Congress for the program
Generation of new knowledge and technologies and research capability building in priority areas identified as strategic to National
Development, the Executive allotted funds for personnel services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby substituted its will to that of
Congress. Worse, the Executive had not earlier proposed any amount for personnel services and capital outlays in the NEP that became the
basis of the 2011 GAA.170

It is worth stressing in this connection that the failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an expense category sufficiently indicated that
Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the PAP concerned. This indication becomes clearer when even the President
himself did not recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP requiring expenditure that did not receive any
appropriation under the GAAs could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would go beyond the authority laid down by Congress in
enacting the GAAs. That happened in some instances under the DAP.

In relation to the December 22, 2011 SARO issued to the Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research and
Development (DOST-PCIEETRD)171 for Establishment of the Advanced Failure Analysis Laboratory, which reads:

APPROPRIATION PARTICULARS AMOUNT

CODE AUTHORIZED

Development, integration and coordination of the National

Research System for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology
A.02.a
and Related Fields
Capital Outlays P 300,000,000

the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond to the program specified in the GAA, whose particulars
were Research and Management Services(inclusive of the following activities: (1) Technological and Economic Assessment for Industry,
Energy and Utilities; (2) Dissemination of Science and Technology Information; and (3) Management of PCIERD Information System for
Industry, Energy and Utilities. Even assuming that Development, integration and coordination of the National Research System for Industry,
Energy and Emerging Technology and Related Fields the particulars stated in the SARO could fall under the broad program description of
Research and Management Services as appearing in the SARO, it would nonetheless remain a new activity by reason of its not being
specifically stated in the GAA. As such, the DBM, sans legislative authorization, could not validly fund and implement such PAP under the DAP.

In defending the disbursements, however, the OSG contends that the Executive enjoyed sound discretion in implementing the budget given the
generality in the language and the broad policy objectives identified under the GAAs; 172 and that the President enjoyed unlimited authority to
spend the initial appropriations under his authority to declare and utilize savings, 173 and in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws.

Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which
included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of
Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a
delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. 174 Moreover, leaving
the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers. 175

Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the
budget proposal submitted by the Executive.176 Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength,177 and
underpins "all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of
government."178 Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to
spend the money.179 Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public
money should be spent.

It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations.180 For this purpose,
appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever
source by any part of the government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public
money without legislative authorization."181 To conform with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by
Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds.182 Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds
resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of
both appropriations will thereby be violated.

b.4 Third Requisite Cross-border

augmentations from savings were
prohibited by the Constitution

By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices,"
Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over
to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or
cross-border augmentations.

To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the
Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the
Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.

Did any cross-border transfers or augmentations transpire?

During the oral arguments on January 28, 2014, Sec. Abad admitted making some cross-border augmentations, to wit:

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

Alright, the whole time that you have been Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, did the Executive Department ever redirect
any part of savings of the National Government under your control cross border to another department?

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, in the Memos that we submitted to you, such an instance, Your Honor

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

Can you tell me two instances? I dont recall having read your material.

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, the first instance had to do with a request from the House of Representatives. They started building their e-library in 2010 and they had a
budget for about 207 Million but they lack about 43 Million to complete its 250 Million requirements. Prior to that, the COA, in an audit
observation informed the Speaker that they had to continue with that construction otherwise the whole building, as well as the equipments
therein may suffer from serious deterioration. And at that time, since the budget of the House of Representatives was not enough to complete
250 Million, they wrote to the President requesting for an augmentation of that particular item, which was granted, Your Honor. The second
instance in the Memos is a request from the Commission on Audit. At the time they were pushing very strongly the good governance programs
of the government and therefore, part of that is a requirement to conduct audits as well as review financial reports of many agencies. And in the
performance of that function, the Commission on Audit needed information technology equipment as well as hire consultants and litigators to
help them with their audit work and for that they requested funds from the Executive and the President saw that it was important for the
Commission to be provided with those IT equipments and litigators and consultants and the request was granted, Your Honor.

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

These cross border examples, cross border augmentations were not supported by appropriations

SECRETARY ABAD:

They were, we were augmenting existing items within their (interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

No, appropriations before you augmented because this is a cross border and the tenor or text of the Constitution is quite clear as far as I am
concerned. It says here, "The power to augment may only be made to increase any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective
offices." Did you not feel constricted by this provision?

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, as the Constitution provides, the prohibition we felt was on the transfer of appropriations, Your Honor. What we thought we did was to
transfer savings which was needed by the Commission to address deficiency in an existing item in both the Commission as well as in the
House of Representatives; thats how we saw(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

So your position as Secretary of Budget is that you could do that?

SECRETARY ABAD:

In an extreme instances because(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

No, no, in all instances, extreme or not extreme, you could do that, thats your feeling.

SECRETARY ABAD:

Well, in that particular situation when the request was made by the Commission and the House of Representatives, we felt that we needed to
respond because we felt(interrupted).183

The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to P143,700,000.00 and P250,000,000.00 were transferred under the DAP respectively to the
COA184 and the House of Representatives.185 Those transfers of funds, which constituted cross-border augmentations for being from the
Executive to the COA and the House of Representatives, are graphed as follows: 186

AMOUNT
(In thousand pesos)
DATE
OFFICE PURPOSE
RELEASED
Reserve Releases
Imposed

Commission on IT Infrastructure Program and hiring of 11/11/11 143,700

Audit additional litigation experts

Congress Completion of the construction of the 07/23/12 207,034 250,000

House of Legislative Library and Archives (Savings of HOR)
Representatives Building/Congressional e-library

The respondents further stated in their memorandum that the President "made available" to the "Commission on Elections the savings of his
department upon [its] request for funds"187 This was another instance of a cross-border augmentation.

The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers thusly:

99. The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings of his department to another department upon the latters
request, provided it is the recipient department that uses such funds to augment its own appropriation. In such a case, the President merely
gives the other department access to public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that department whose fiscal autonomy is
guaranteed by the Constitution.188

In the oral arguments held on February 18, 2014, Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, representing Congress, announced a different characterization
of the cross-border transfers of funds as in the nature of "aid" instead of "augmentation," viz:

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, is not an application of the DAP. What were these cross-border transfers? They are
transfers of savings as defined in the various General Appropriations Act. So, that makes it similar to the DAP, the use of savings. There was a
cross-border which appears to be in violation of Section 25, paragraph 5 of Article VI, in the sense that the border was crossed. But never has it
been claimed that the purpose was to augment a deficient item in another department of the government or agency of the government. The
cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, were in the nature of [aid] rather than augmentations. Here is a government entity separate and
independent from the Executive Department solely in need of public funds. The President is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Hes in
charge of the whole operation although six or seven heads of government offices are given the power to augment. Only the President stationed
there and in effect in-charge and has the responsibility for the failure of any part of the government. You have election, for one reason or
another, the money is not enough to hold election. There would be chaos if no money is given as an aid, not to augment, but as an aid to a
department like COA. The President is responsible in a way that the other heads, given the power to augment, are not. So, he cannot very well
allow this, if Your Honor please.189

JUSTICE LEONEN:

May I move to another point, maybe just briefly. I am curious that the position now, I think, of government is that some transfers of savings is
now considered to be, if Im not mistaken, aid not augmentation. Am I correct in my hearing of your argument?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Thats our submission, if Your Honor, please.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

May I know, Justice, where can we situate this in the text of the Constitution? Where do we actually derive the concepts that transfers of
appropriation from one branch to the other or what happened in DAP can be considered a said? What particular text in the Constitution can we
situate this?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

There is no particular provision or statutory provision for that matter, if Your Honor please. It is drawn from the fact that the Executive is the
executive in-charge of the success of the government.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So, the residual powers labelled in Marcos v. Manglapus would be the basis for this theory of the government?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Yes, if Your Honor, please.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

A while ago, Justice Carpio mentioned that the remedy is might be to go to Congress. That there are opportunities and there have been
opportunities of the President to actually go to Congress and ask for supplemental budgets?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

If there is time to do that, I would say yes.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So, the theory of aid rather than augmentation applies in extra-ordinary situation?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Very extra-ordinary situations.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

But Counsel, this would be new doctrine, in case?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:

Yes, if Your Honor please.190

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing cross
border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.

4.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets
not having been exceeded was invalid

Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds provided in the GAAs for 2011, 2012,and 2013. The respondents stress,
however, that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under the DAP as savings, but as separate sources of funds; and that, consequently,
the release and use of unprogrammed funds were not subject to the restrictions under Section 25(5), supra.

The documents contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG have confirmed that the unprogrammed funds were treated as separate
sources of funds. Even so, the release and use of the unprogrammed funds were still subject to restrictions, for, to start with, the GAAs
precisely specified the instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released and the purposes for which they could be used.

The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the unprogrammed funds was that the revenue collections must exceed revenue
targets; and that the release of the unprogrammed funds was illegal because such condition was not met.191

The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the unprogrammed funds under the DAP were in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that the unprogrammed funds could be availed of when any of the following three
instances occur, to wit: (1) the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets proposed in the BESFs submitted by the President to
Congress; (2) new revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally considered in the BESFs; or(3) newly-approved loans for
foreign assisted projects were secured, or when conditions were triggered for other sources of funds, such as perfected loan agreements for
foreign-assisted projects.192 This view of the DBM was adopted by all the respondents in their Consolidated Comment.193

The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined "unprogrammed appropriations" as appropriations that provided standby authority to
incur additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue collections exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are
generated.194 Contrary to the DBMs averment that there were three instances when unprogrammed funds could be released, the BESFs
envisioned only two instances. The third mentioned by the DBM the collection of new revenues from sources not originally considered in the
BESFs was not included. This meant that the collection of additional revenues from new sources did not warrant the release of the
unprogrammed funds. Hence, even if the revenues not considered in the BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that the
revenue collections should exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in order to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds.

The view that there were only two instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released was bolstered by the following texts of the
Special Provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs, to wit:

2011 GAA

1. Release of Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets
submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including savings generated
from programmed appropriations for the year: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original
revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of newly approved loans
for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO
covering the loan proceeds: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That if there are savings generated from the programmed appropriations for the
first two quarters of the year, the DBM may, subject to the approval of the President, release the pertinent appropriations under the
Unprogrammed Fund corresponding to only fifty percent (50%) of the said savings net of revenue shortfall: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the
release of the balance of the total savings from programmed appropriations for the year shall be subject to fiscal programming and approval of
the President.

2012 GAA

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue
targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution: PROVIDED, That
collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in
this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan
agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.

As can be noted, the provisos in both provisions to the effect that "collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original
revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund" gave the authority to use such additional revenues for
appropriations funded from the unprogrammed funds. They did not at all waive compliance with the basic requirement that revenue collections
must still exceed the original revenue targets.

In contrast, the texts of the provisos with regard to additional revenues generated from newly-approved foreign loans were clear to the effect
that the perfected loan agreement would be in itself "sufficient basis" for the issuance of a SARO to release the funds but only to the extent of
the amount of the loan. In such instance, the revenue collections need not exceed the revenue targets to warrant the release of the loan
proceeds, and the mere perfection of the loan agreement would suffice.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that under these provisions of the GAAs the additional revenues from sources not considered in the BESFs
must be taken into account in determining if the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets. The text of the relevant provision of the
2013 GAA, which was substantially similar to those of the GAAs for 2011 and 2012, already made this explicit, thus:

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue
targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including collections
arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue target, as certified by the BTr: PROVIDED, That in case of newly
approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.

Consequently, that there were additional revenues from sources not considered in the revenue target would not be enough. The total revenue
collections must still exceed the original revenue targets to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds (other than those from newly-
approved foreign loans).

The present controversy on the unprogrammed funds was rooted in the correct interpretation of the phrase "revenue collections should exceed
the original revenue targets." The petitioners take the phrase to mean that the total revenue collections must exceed the total revenue target
stated in the BESF, but the respondents understand the phrase to refer only to the collections for each source of revenue as enumerated in the
BESF, with the condition being deemed complied with once the revenue collections from a particular source already exceeded the stated
target.

The BESF provided for the following sources of revenue, with the corresponding revenue target stated for each source of revenue, to wit:

TAX REVENUES

Taxes on Net Income and Profits

Taxes on Property
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services

General Sales, Turnover or VAT

Selected Excises on Goods

Selected Taxes on Services

Taxes on the Use of Goods or Property or Permission to Perform Activities
Other Taxes
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions

NON-TAX REVENUES

Fees and Charges

BTR Income

Government Services
Interest on NG Deposits
Interest on Advances to Government Corporations
Income from Investments
Interest on Bond Holdings

Guarantee Fee
Gain on Foreign Exchange
NG Income Collected by BTr

Dividends on Stocks
NG Share from Airport Terminal Fee
NG Share from PAGCOR Income
NG Share from MIAA Profit

Privatization
Foreign Grants

Thus, when the Court required the respondents to submit a certification from the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) to the effect that the revenue
collections had exceeded the original revenue targets, 195 they complied by submitting certifications from the BTr and Department of Finance
(DOF) pertaining to only one identified source of revenue the dividends from the shares of stock held by the Government in government-
owned and controlled corporations.

To justify the release of the unprogrammed funds for 2011, the OSG presented the certification dated March 4, 2011 issued by DOF
Undersecretary Gil S. Beltran, as follows:

This is to certify that under the Budget for Expenditures and Sources of Financing for 2011, the programmed income from dividends from
shares of stock in government-owned and controlled corporations is 5.5 billion.

This is to certify further that based on the records of the Bureau of Treasury, the National Government has recorded dividend income
amounting to P23.8 billion as of 31 January 2011.196

For 2012, the OSG submitted the certification dated April 26, 2012 issued by National Treasurer Roberto B. Tan, viz:

This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period January to March 2012 amounted
to P19.419 billion compared to the full year program of P5.5 billion for 2012.197

And, finally, for 2013, the OSG presented the certification dated July 3, 2013 issued by National Treasurer Rosalia V. De Leon, to wit:

This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period January to May 2013 amounted
to P12.438 billion compared to the full year program of P10.0198 billion for 2013.

Moreover, the National Government accounted for the sale of the right to build and operate the NAIA expressway amounting to P11.0 billion in
June 2013.199

The certifications reflected that by collecting dividends amounting to P23.8 billion in 2011, P19.419 billion in 2012, and P12.438 billion in 2013
the BTr had exceeded only the P5.5 billion in target revenues in the form of dividends from stocks in each of 2011 and 2012, and only the P10
billion in target revenues in the form of dividends from stocks in 2013.

However, the requirement that revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets was to be construed in light of the purpose for which the
unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs as standby appropriations to support additional expenditures for certain priority PAPs
should the revenue collections exceed the resource targets assumed in the budget or when additional foreign project loan proceeds were
realized. The unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as not to delay the implementation of the PAPs should
new or additional revenue sources be realized during the year.200 Given the tenor of the certifications, the unprogrammed funds were thus not
yet supported by the corresponding resources.201

The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding requirements of the proposed programmed appropriations. In
contrast, the unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, were to be released only when there were revenues in excess of what the
programmed appropriations required. As such, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be
dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should be understood to mean
that the revenue collections must exceed the total of the revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds
simply because there was an excess revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure because it would
disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the Governments surplus budget policy.202

We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents view.

5.
Equal protection, checks and balances,
and public accountability challenges

The DAP is further challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the system of checks and balances, and the principle of public
accountability.

With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal Protection Clause, 203 Luna argues that the implementation of the DAP was
"unfair as it [was] selective" because the funds released under the DAP was not made available to all the legislators, with some of them
refusing to avail themselves of the DAP funds, and others being unaware of the availability of such funds. Thus, the DAP practised "undue
favoritism" in favor of select legislators in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.

Similarly, COURAGE contends that the DAP violated the Equal Protection Clause because no reasonable classification was used in distributing
the funds under the DAP; and that the Senators who supposedly availed themselves of said funds were differently treated as to the amounts
they respectively received.

Anent the petitioners theory that the DAP violated the system of checks and balances, Luna submits that the grant of the funds under the DAP
to some legislators forced their silence about the issues and anomalies surrounding the DAP. Meanwhile, Belgica stresses that the DAP, by
allowing the legislators to identify PAPs, authorized them to take part in the implementation and execution of the GAAs, a function that
exclusively belonged to the Executive; that such situation constituted undue and unjustified legislative encroachment in the functions of the
Executive; and that the President arrogated unto himself the power of appropriation vested in Congress because NBC No. 541 authorized the
use of the funds under the DAP for PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget.
Finally, the petitioners insist that the DAP was repugnant to the principle of public accountability enshrined in the Constitution,204 because the
legislators relinquished the power of appropriation to the Executive, and exhibited a reluctance to inquire into the legality of the DAP.

The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed discrimination in the release of funds under the DAP could be raised only by the
affected Members of Congress themselves, and if the challenge based on the violation of the Equal Protection Clause was really against the
constitutionality of the DAP, the arguments of the petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of the legislators to the funds, not to the
proposition that all of the legislators should have been given such entitlement.

The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators,
lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the
DAP, and about some of them having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the Executive
discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a finding of
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who
supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases
of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and
how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Consequently, the Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the Court do so despite the
inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the outcome would not do justice to those for
whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal protection has been made.

The argument that the release of funds under the DAP effectively stayed the hands of the legislators from conducting congressional inquiries
into the legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative. That deficiency eliminated any need to consider and resolve the argument, for it is
fundamental that speculation would not support any proper judicial determination of an issue simply because nothing concrete can thereby be
gained. In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official acts of the Government, the petitioners must discharge the basic
burden of proving that the constitutional infirmities actually existed. 205 Simply put, guesswork and speculation cannot overcome the presumption
of the constitutionality of the assailed executive act.

We do not need to discuss whether or not the DAP and its implementation through the various circulars and memoranda of the DBM
transgressed the system of checks and balances in place in our constitutional system. Our earlier expositions on the DAP and its implementing
issuances infringing the doctrine of separation of powers effectively addressed this particular concern.

Anent the principle of public accountability being transgressed because the adoption and implementation of the DAP constituted an assumption
by the Executive of Congress power of appropriation, we have already held that the DAP and its implementing issuances were policies and
acts that the Executive could properly adopt and do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement strategies to ramp
up or accelerate the economy of the country.

6.
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable

After declaring the DAP and its implementing issuances constitutionally infirm, we must now deal with the consequences of the declaration.

Article 7 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or obligation.206 However, the
generality of the rule makes us ponder whether rigidly applying the rule may at times be impracticable or wasteful. Should we not recognize the
need to except from the rigid application of the rule the instances in which the void law or executive act produced an almost irreversible result?

The need is answered by the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine, definitely not a novel one, has been exhaustively explained in De
Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank:207

The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance
likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new
Civil Code puts it: When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms
cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt
that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is
so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under
it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done
while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its
being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality],
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive
act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.208 But its use must
be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted
to only as a matter of equity and fair play. 209 It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.

We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity
and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.

To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad enough to include
any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. The Court held so in Hacienda Luisita,
Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council:210

Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in
nature. Thus, the minority concludes that the phrase executive act used in the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank refers only to
acts, orders, and rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law. The minority also made mention of the Concurring Opinion of
Justice Enrique Fernando in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, where it was supposedly made explicit that the operative fact doctrine applies
to executive acts, which are ultimately quasi-legislative in nature.

We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates what executive act mean. Moreover,
while orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative
Code and jurisprudence, the phrase executive act does not have such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the
cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it be found that the term executive act is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term executive act
is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently
revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.

A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma. In said case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is,
without a question, an executive act. Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were
made in good faith and in reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its subsequent invalidation.

In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over
civilians, certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have existed so as not to trample upon the rights of the accused therein. Relevant
thereto, in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, it was ruled that military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government
and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives.

Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded
the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.

Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations,
said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the agencies under the executive department.
This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive
branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the
reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which
were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and
fairness.

Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of
law, springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it
may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected. It is on this score that
the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,211 the Court likewise declared that "for the operative fact doctrine to
apply, there must be a legislative or executive measure, meaning a law or executive issuance." Thus, the Court opined there that the operative
fact doctrine did not apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz:

Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its
reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There
must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice,
not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied.
An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by those with
informal contacts with the government agency.

It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts.1avvphi1 The
DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing
various memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different agencies and
departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the third phase
of the budget cycle the budget execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary
responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could
and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.

As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were
not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the
Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior
implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the
Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere
as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be
enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably
positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like
public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine
of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by destruction, and would result in most
undesirable wastefulness.

Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always
the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects of what
used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice;212 but where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional
law is totally ineffective should apply.

In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and
whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,
unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other
liabilities.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices
under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained
in the General Appropriations Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.

The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the
revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO
and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO,
AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES,
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his
parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE,
all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA
MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE
MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO,
JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and
VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their
parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined
by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence
of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein
of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion
and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000)
cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's
land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated
in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity
as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who
may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section
1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section
16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation
and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental
law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of
the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and
the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in
this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted
in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore
assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law.
Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or
other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would
be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in
the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced
by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that
the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of
action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e.,
to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by
the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable
of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on
this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and,
therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law
in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section
3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the
use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which
reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative
to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of
the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said
right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue
to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as
law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume
that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e.,
to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by
the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can
be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been
passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
31
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To
be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court
and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms,
procedures and requirements.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision [2] and July 29, 2003 Order[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).[4]

The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief[5] filed before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice
Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao
Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question
whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in
urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x
x.[6]

Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion
and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration. In
response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:

x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts
are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a
redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take, is direct
appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court.[7]
The Antecedent Proceedings

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition) before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-
respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, [8] specifically on the separation of
church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office,
or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:

x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao
Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano,
filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the
common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by
way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva
and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file
memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. x x x.

x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and
Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss x x x.[9]

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in praying for a determination as to
whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a
question of law.[10] It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing,
to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the [e]ndorsement of
specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. [11]

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and
Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

Hence, this Petition for Review.[12]

This Court, in a Resolution[13] dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective
comments. In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the opportunity to
comment, if they so desired.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument. [14]

The Issues

In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:

1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;

2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief;

3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;

4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination;

5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,

6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent. [15]

During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows:

A. Procedural Issues

Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to
file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

B. Substantive Issues

1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?

2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may
they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?

The Courts Ruling

The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.

Procedural Issues:

Requisites of Petitions

for Declaratory Relief

Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief, provides in part:

Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action
in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder.

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. [16] The
essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [17]

Justiciable Controversy

Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish before the trial court, that there existed a justiciable
controversy or an adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated or threatened to be violated by
petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that
had not yet ripened into an actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural
or merely anticipatory.[18] The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or
dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the
petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the
Constitution.

As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment,[19] what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that
he does not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) yields nothing in this respect. His
Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003, the election season had not even started yet;
and that, in any event, he has not been actively involved in partisan politics.

An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim x x x.[20] Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.

Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below
had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement will
enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the
government[;][21] and pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their
belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections,[22] which would then be violative of the separation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable
controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an
electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer
speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be
prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are
legally demandable and enforceable[23] cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right.

All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved. [24] In other words, it merely sought
an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the
constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the
stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.[25]

Cause of Action

Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause of action need not be alleged or proven. Supposedly,
for such petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual wrong committed by one party against the other.

Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other
written instrument), a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the subject matter of the SJS Petition is the constitutionality
of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or to urge or require the members of the flock to vote
for a specified candidate.[26] According to petitioner, this subject matter is beyond the realm of an action for declaratory relief. [27] Petitioner avers
that in the absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence, should have been dismissed outright by the
court a quo.

A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter.[28] Its
essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
the former to the latter.[29]

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal. [30] However, in special civil actions for declaratory
relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for
declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.[31] Nevertheless,
a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought
to protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it has thousands of members who are citizens-
taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan participation of
religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x x. [32]

Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not personal in
character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain.[33] The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and
affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised. [34]

To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that the [p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to
enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future
conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need have been
committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will
occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded.[35]

SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference that there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted
rights will be invaded.Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-respondents below) might actively
participate in partisan politics, use the awesome voting strength of its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to
control the government.[36]

During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-respondents below all strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged
or intended to participate in partisan politics. They all firmly assured this Court that they had not done anything to trigger the issue raised and to
entitle SJS to the relief sought.

Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the
named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was
filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those
respondents.

Legal Standing

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.[37] Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. [38]

Petitioner alleges that [i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse, or require the members
of the religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy; [39] it has failed to establish
how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that
[they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way. [40]They must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or
privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.[41]

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation.[42] A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. [43] In the
present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed.

Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be
adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS
had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would
be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters is too general[44] and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. [45]

Transcendental Importance

In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal standing, considering that the issues raised are of
paramount public interest.

In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or
paramount importance to the people.[46] Recently, after holding that the IBP had no locus standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP v.
Zamora[47] nevertheless entertained the Petition therein. It noted that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. [48]

Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino
people. The issue did not simply concern a delineation of the separation between church and state, but ran smack into the governance of our
country. The issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in nature, since it had never been decided before.

The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve the constitutional issue despite the barren
allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the parties
-- particularly for Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove
discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case from the stringent locus standirequirement, such heroic effort would be futile
because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

Proper Proceedings Before

the Trial Court

To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates
the elementary procedure[49]that must be followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil cases. [50]

Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss a complaint[51] (or petition, in a special civil action) that
does not allege the plaintiffs (or petitioners) cause or causes of action. [52] A complaint or petition should contain a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense.[53] It should likewise clearly specify the relief
sought.[54]

Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
summons to the defendants or the respondents, with a directive that the defendant answer [55] within 15 days, unless a different period is fixed
by the court.[56] The summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default
and may be granted the relief applied for.[57] The court, however, may -- upon such terms as may be just -- allow an answer to be filed after the
time fixed by the Rules.[58]

If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered within ten (10) days from service. [59] A reply may be filed within ten
(10) days from service of the pleading responded to. [60]

When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation).[61] Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at
any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a summary judgment in its favor. [62]Similarly, a party against whom a claim, a
counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its favor. [63] After
the motion is heard, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[64]

Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on any of the
grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the
questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact.[65] After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or
order the amendment of the pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not
indubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. [66]

If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the period originally prescribed to file an answer, but not less than
five (5) days in any event, computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, the defendant shall
file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.[67]

After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for pretrial,[68] which is a mandatory proceeding.[69] A plaintiffs/
petitioners (or its duly authorized representatives) non-appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the
action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be a cause for allowing the
plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte, and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. [70]

The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial.[71] Upon the
termination thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the conference; the action taken on them, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by the parties regarding any of the matters
considered.[72] The parties may further avail themselves of any of the modes of discovery,[73] if they so wish.

Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,[74] in which the parties shall adduce their respective evidence in support of their claims and/or
defenses. By their written consent or upon the application of either party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or all of the issues
to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the parties. [75] The trial or hearing before the
commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court. [76]

Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with the court a written report on the matters referred by the
parties.[77] The report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or
recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the court. [78]

Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with
the clerk of court.[79]

Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before the trial court in the instant case.

First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petition immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It
contained no statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner relied for its claim. Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought from the
court, but merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.

Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a
petitioner.[80] As already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial court had no allegations of fact [81] or of any specific violation of the
petitioners rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency amounted to a failure to state a cause of action; hence, no
coercive relief could be sought and adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we repeat, should have been
dismissed at the outset.

Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to file their respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva
and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a priorly granted extended period, an Answer in which he
likewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. [82] SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-
Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were several scheduled settings, in which the [c]ourt was apprised of the respective positions of the
parties.[83] The nature of such settings -- whether pretrial or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in the records. Before ruling on the Motions to
Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order[84] dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit their memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was
another Order[85] dated May 14, 2003, denying all the Motions to Dismiss.

In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:

The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the memoranda are submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as
submitted for resolution.[86]

Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Motions were not heard. Worse, the Order purportedly
resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16. There was not
even any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the legal findings and conclusions of the trial court.

Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed
a Motion to suspend the filing of the parties memoranda. But instead of separately resolving the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trial
court again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to issue its Decision, even before tackling the issues raised in
those Motions.

Furthermore, the RTC issued its Decision without allowing the parties to file their answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues. If
only it had allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner and his co-
respondents below had not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -- the act that was supposedly
the factual basis of the suit.

Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition to the OSG, which was entitled to be heard upon questions
involving the constitutionality or validity of statutes and other measures. [87]

Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the trial court was utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the
law -- or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with grave abuse of discretion.

Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must still follow the process described above -- the
petition must state a cause of action; the proceedings must undergo the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision must adhere
to constitutional and legal requirements.

First Substantive Issue:

Fundamental Requirements

of a Decision

The Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the basis therefor.[88]

Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides:

Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk
of court.

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge
and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which
the judgment is based.

x x x x x x x x x.

Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all judges to make complete
findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid
the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.

In many cases,[89] this Court has time and time again reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of Appeals,[90] discussed at length the implications of this
provision and strongly exhorted thus:

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and
fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment
is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to
know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that,
the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus,
a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.

In People v. Bugarin,[91] the Court also explained:

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that
if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More
than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. x x x.

Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. [92]

In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,[93] this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their decisions would present a
comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties.

In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts -- much less an assessment or analysis
thereof -- or of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the
question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to
achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the
nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the
relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.

What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought
to be resolved by SJS?More important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings and
conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts
on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.

The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar
circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no
point of factual comparison?

Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called Decision. The importance of such portion was
explained in the early caseManalang v. Tuason de Rickards,[94] from which we quote:
The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor
that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or
declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.

The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was for
declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny? What rights of the parties did it conclusively declare? Its final statement says,
SO ORDERED. But what exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to label its issuance a Decision, when nothing was in fact decided.

Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body of the assailed Decision. It claims that the issue is disposed of and
the Petition finally resolved by the statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page Decision, which reads: Endorsement of specific
candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. [95]

We cannot agree.

In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,[96] the obligation of the party imposed by the Court was allegedly contained in the text of the original
Decision. The Court, however, held:

x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is
settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the
dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. (Italics in the original)

Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the
assailed 14-page Decision.If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial
court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -
- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders
issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.[97]

Parts of a Decision

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or
assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive
portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or
novel issues are involved.[98]

An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases --
particularly those concerning public interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- a
longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific nature of the controversy and the issues involved. An epilogue
may be a summation of the important principles applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or significance. It may also
lay down an enduring philosophy of law or guiding principle.

Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good decision.

1. Statement of the Case

The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. At the first instance, this part states whether the action is a
civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a criminal case, this part describes the specific
charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information -- and the plea of the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the
case is being decided on appeal or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of
the assailed decision.

In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide in determining the nature and the gravity of the
offense for which the accused may be found culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime different from or graver than that
charged.

Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a question on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether
qualifying and modifying circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.

To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of the proceedings regarding the plea of the
accused. Absence of an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the appellate
court would be futile. In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be useful to mention the fact of the appellants detention, in
order to dispose of the preliminary query -- whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping bail.

Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in facilitating the consolidation of the records of the case in both
the trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.

Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the reader of how the appealed case was decided by the
court a quo.

2. Statement of Facts

There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the objective or reportorial method, the judge summarizes -- without
comment -- the testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the synthesis method, the factual theory of the
plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized according to the judges best light. Third, in the subjective
method, the version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining what the parties versions are. Finally, through a
combination of objective and subjective means, the testimony of each witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version
of the facts.

In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense, in the interest of fairness and due
process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow. The resolution of most criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases,
depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence. The plausibility or the implausibility of each version can
sometimes be initially drawn from a reading of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings and conclusions should be
explained.
On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly resolved all factual and legal issues involved
may partly explain why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the former. Conversely, the lower courts
patent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.

In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for resolution usually involve questions of law, grave
abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by the parties. With few exceptions, factual issues
are not entertained in non-criminal cases.Consequently, the narration of facts by the lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced;
otherwise, the material factual antecedents should be restated in the words of the reviewing magistrate.

In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should be laid out, in order that the parties may clearly
understand why the lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds no reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.

3. Issues or Assignment of Errors

Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors, as mentioned in the appellants brief, may be reproduced in
toto and tackled seriatim, so as to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on the ground that the court failed to consider all
assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But when the appellant presents repetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not
strike at the main issue, these may be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.

Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be
rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal cases in which the reviewing court is generally
limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are errors of jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at
a just decision on the case; or unassigned errors that are closely related to those properly assigned, or upon which depends the determination
of the question properly raised.

4. The Courts Ruling

This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of
other issues the court deems essential to a just disposition of the case. Where there are several issues, each one of them should be separately
addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the parties should also be mentioned here. When procedural questions are
raised in addition to substantive ones, it is better to resolve the former preliminarily.

5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion

In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty imposed, the
participation of the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In case an acquittal is decreed, the court must
order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held for another cause) and order the director of the Bureau of
Corrections (or wherever the accused is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact date when the accused
were set free.

In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific
relief granted, and the costs. The following test of completeness may be applied. First, the parties should know their rights and
obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further
proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated by according the proper relief. The proper relief usually depends
upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their rights and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order
them to abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.

The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they should all be present and plainly identifiable in the
decision. Depending on the writers character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and free-flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in
a fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious.At all times, however, the decision must be clear, concise, complete and correct.

Second Substantive Issue:

Religious Leaders Endorsement

of Candidates for Public Office

The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of
paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural
transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to
entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.

Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount
issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition
and the assailed Decision.

We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for
SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the
assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion,
the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction. [99]

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final
disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just
modify.

Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a
time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. [100]

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for
Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and recommend whether the trial judge may, after
observing due process, be held administratively liable for rendering a decision violative of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
circulars of this Court. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC),
against the following highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3)
years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of
office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The present petition, filed by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC decision.[1]

THE ANTECEDENTS

Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of
severalbarangays of Caloocan City[2] filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-
highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:

I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.

II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of the law.

III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

The RTC agreed with the respondents contention that the challenged proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit for barangay officials
under the following reasoning:

When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect abrogating all other laws inconsistent therewith, a different term was ordained. Here, this
Court agrees with the position of the petitioners that Section 43 of the Code specifically exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage
of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule considering that the provision applicable to these (sic) class of elective officials was significantly
separated from the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed intended to qualify paragraph (a) of Section 43 as
regards to (sic) all local elective officials except barangay officials. Had the intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to
include barangay elective officials, then no excepting proviso should have been expressly made in paragraph (a) thereof or, by implication, the
contents of paragraph (c) should have been stated ahead of the contents of paragraph (b).

xxxx

Clearly, the intent of the framers of the constitution (sic) is to exempt the barangay officials from the three (3) term limits (sic) which are
otherwise applicable to other elected public officials from the Members of the House of Representatives down to the members of
the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for the Congress whether the three (3) term limit should be applied by enacting a law for the
purpose.
The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 merely increased the term of office of barangay elective officials from three (3) years to five (5)
years. Like the Local Government Code, it can be noted that no consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials was fixed
therein.

The advent of R.A. 9164 marked the revival of the consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials after the Local
Government Code took effect.Under the assailed provision of this Act, the term of office of barangay elective officials reverted back to three (3)
years from five (5) years, and, this time, the legislators expressly declared that no barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. The petitioners are very clear that they are not assailing the validity of such provision fixing the three
(3) consecutive term limit rule for the election of barangay elective officials to the same position. The particular provision the constitutionality of
which is under attack is that portion providing for the reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit of barangay elective officials beginning
from the 1994 barangay elections.

xxx

Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A. 9164 is not a mere restatement of Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code. As discussed above, Section
43(c) of the Local Government Code does not provide for the consecutive term limit rule of barangay elective officials. Such specific provision of
the Code has in fact amended the previous enactments (R.A. 6653 and R.A. 6679) providing for the consecutive term limit rule
of barangay elective officials. But, such specific provision of the Local Government Code was amended by R.A. 9164, which reverted back to
the previous policy of fixing consecutive term limits of barangay elective officials. [3]

In declaring this retroactive application unconstitutional, the RTC explained that:

By giving a retroactive reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for barangay officials to the 1994 barangay elections, Congress has
violated not only the principle of prospective application of statutes but also the equal protection clause of the Constitution inasmuch as
the barangay elective officials were singled out that their consecutive term limit shall be counted retroactively. There is no rhyme or reason why
the consecutive limit for these barangay officials shall be counted retroactively while the consecutive limit for other local and national elective
officials are counted prospectively. For if the purpose of Congress is [sic] to classify elective barangay officials as belonging to the same class
of public officers whose term of office are limited to three (3) consecutive terms, then to discriminate them by applying the proviso retroactively
violates the constitutionally enshrined principle of equal protection of the laws.

Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to determine such successive term limit of barangay elective officials, the exercise of the
authority granted shall not otherwise transgress other constitutional and statutory privileges.

This Court cannot subscribe to the position of the respondent that the legislature clearly intended that the provision of RA No. 9164 be made
effective in 1994 and that such provision is valid and constitutional. If we allow such premise, then the term of office for those officials elected in
the 1997 barangay elections should have ended in year 2000 and not year 2002 considering that RA No. 9164 provides for a three-year term
of barangay elective officials. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 would be rendered nugatory in view of such retroactive
application. This is absurd and illusory.

True, no person has a vested right to a public office, the same not being property within the contemplation of constitutional
guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the petition would show that the petitioners are not claiming vested right to their office but their right
to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by the assailed provision of the law that, in effect, rendered them ineligible to run for
their incumbent positions. Such right to run for office and be voted for by the electorate is the right being sought to be protected by assailing the
otherwise unconstitutional provision.

Moreover, the Court likewise agrees with the petitioners that the law violated the one-act-one subject rule embodied in the Constitution. x x x x
The challenged laws title is AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS,
AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. x x x x

xxxx

To this court, the non-inclusion in the title of the act on the retroactivity of the reckoning of the term limits posed a serious constitutional breach,
particularly on the provision of the constitution [sic] that every bill must embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.

x x x the Court is of the view that the affected barangay officials were not sufficiently given notice that they were already disqualified by a new
act, when under the previous enactments no such restrictions were imposed.

Even if this Court would apply the usual test in determining the sufficiency of the title of the bill, the challenged law would still be insufficient for
how can a retroactivity of the term limits be germane to the synchronization of an election x x x x. [4]
The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law.

The Petition

The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the
Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit,
according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It
further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair
vested rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive
application of RA No. 9164.

The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves the wisdom of the law the aspect of the law that the
RTC has no right to inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers principle. The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no violation of
the one subject-one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is actually embraced within the title of
the law.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious. The RTC legally erred when it declared the challenged proviso unconstitutional.

Preliminary Considerations

We find it appropriate, as a preliminary matter, to hark back to the pre-1987 Constitution history of the barangay political system as outlined by
this Court in David v. COMELEC,[5] and we quote:

As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. The word barangay is derived from the
Malay balangay, a boat which transported them (the Malays) to these shores. Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in
1577, Historian Conrado Benitez wrote that the barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised absolute powers of government. While the
Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic structure of government, they stripped the dato or rajah of his powers. Instead, power was
centralized nationally in the governor general and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and
the gobernadorcillo. Thedato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing
property. The position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a mere government employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter
how low, accepted the post.

After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as barrios. For some time, the laws governing barrio governments
were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Barrios were granted autonomy
by the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA
3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were declared or renamed barangays -- a reversion really to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No.
86 and PD No. 557. Their basic organization and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly adopted as theBarangay Charter, were
retained. However, the titles of the officials were changed to barangay captain, barangay councilman, barangay secretary
and barangay treasurer.

Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and
six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang
Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six years which began on June 7, 1982.

The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of office of local elective officials at six years. Under this Code, the chief officials of
the barangay were the punong barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay members, the kabataang barangay chairman,
a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.

B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated that barangay officials shall hold office for six years, and stated that their election was to
be held on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six years thereafter. [Emphasis supplied.]

The 1987 Philippine Constitution extended constitutional recognition to barangays under Article X, Section 1 by specifying barangays as one of
the territorial and political subdivisions of the country, supplemented by Section 8 of the same Article X, which provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. [Emphasis supplied.]

The Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 8 show that the authority of Congress to legislate relates not only to the fixing of the
term of office ofbarangay officials, but also to the application of the three-term limit. The following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission are particularly instructive on this point:

MR. NOLLEDO: One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of barangay officials as provided for?

MR. DAVIDE: As may be determined by law.

MR. NOLLEDO: As provided for in the Local Government Code?

MR. DAVIDE: Yes.

xxxxxxxxx

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to this proposed new section as submitted by Commissioner Davide and
accepted by the Committee?

MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more than three consecutive terms apply to barangay officials?

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office did not include the barangay officials because it was
then the stand of the Chairman of the Committee on Local Governments that the term of barangay officials must be determined by
law. So it is now for the law to determine whether the restriction on the number of reelections will be included in the Local
Government Code.

MR. RODRIGO: So that is up to Congress to decide.

MR. DAVIDE: Yes.

MR. RODRIGO: I just wanted that clear in the record.[6] [Emphasis supplied.]

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the barangay election originally scheduled by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881[7] on the second Monday
of May 1988 was reset to the second Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter by RA No. 6653.[8] Section 2 of RA No. 6653
changed the term of office of barangay officials and introduced a term limitation as follows:

SEC. 2. The term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years from the first day of January following their election. Provided,
however, That no kagawad shall serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms. [Emphasis supplied]

Under Section 5 of RA No. 6653, the punong barangay was to be chosen by seven kagawads from among themselves, and they in turn, were
to be elected at large by the barangay electorate. The punong barangay, under Section 6 of the law, may be recalled for loss of confidence by
an absolute majority vote of theSangguniang Barangay, embodied in a resolution that shall necessarily include
the punong barangays successor.

The election date set by RA No. 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was postponed yet again to March 28, 1989 by RA No.
6679 whose pertinent provision states:
SEC. 1. The elections of barangay officials set on the second Monday of November 1988 by Republic Act No. 6653 are hereby postponed and
reset to March 28, 1989. They shall serve a term which shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May
1994.

There shall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5) years
thereafter. Their term shall be for five (5) years which shall begin on the first day of June following the election and until their successors shall
have been elected and qualified: Provided, That nobarangay official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms.

The barangay elections shall be nonpartisan and shall be conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.

Significantly, the manner of election of the punong barangay was changed

Section 5 of the law provided that while the seven kagawads were to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay, (t)he candidate who
obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the
supervision of the Commission on Elections.

More than two (2) years after the 1989 barangay elections, RA No. 7160 (the LGC) introduced the following changes in the law:

SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong barangay shall be elected at large x x x by the qualified voters therein.

SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years,
starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all
local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin
after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.

SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang barangay members,
the sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.

xxxxxxxxx

SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as
presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sanguniang barangay members elected at large and the sanguniang kabataan chairman as
members. [Emphasis supplied.]

This law started the direct and separate election of the punong barangay by the qualified voters in the barangay and not by the seven
(7) kagawads from among themselves.[9]

Subsequently or on February 14, 1998, RA No. 8524 changed the three-year term of office of barangay officials under Section 43 of the LGC to
five (5) years. On March 19, 2002, RA No. 9164 introduced the following significant changes: (1) the term of office of barangay officials was
again fixed at three years on the reasoning that the barangay officials should not serve a longer term than their supervisors; [10] and (2) the
challenged proviso, which states that the 1994 election shall be the reckoning point for the application of the three-term limit, was
introduced. Yet another change was introduced three years after or on July 25, 2005 when RA No. 9340 extended the term of the then
incumbent barangay officials due to expire at noon of November 30, 2005 under RA No. 9164 to noon of November 30, 2007. The three-year
term limitation provision survived all these changes.
Congress Plenary Power to

Legislate Term Limits for Barangay Officials and Judicial Power

In passing upon the issues posed to us, we clarify at the outset the parameters of our powers.

As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by
legislation not only the duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term limit. Congress
invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.

Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of the term of office of barangay officials and
their term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term
duration and limition ofbarangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on
these matters are political questionsbeyond the pale of judicial scrutiny,[11] subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.[12]

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to whichfull discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with
issues dependent upon thewisdom, not legality of a particular measure.[13] These questions, previously impervious to judicial scrutiny can now
be inquired into under the limited window provided by Section 1, Article VIII. Estrada v. Desierto[14] best describes this constitutional
development, and we quote:

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this
court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of
its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did
not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the
so called political thicket. xxxx

Thus, we can inquire into a congressional enactment despite the political question doctrine, although the window provided us is narrow; the
challenge must show grave abuse of discretion to justify our intervention.

Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any provision of the Constitution. This requires
the appraisal of the challenged law against the legal standards provided by the Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the
enactment. To justify its nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or equivocal one, as every
law enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality. [15] These are the hurdles that those challenging the constitutional validity of a law must
overcome.

The present case, as framed by the respondents, poses no challenge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion. The legal issues posed relate
strictly to compliance with constitutional standards. It is from this prism that we shall therefore resolve this case.

The Retroactive Application Issue

a. Interpretative / Historical Consideration

The respondents first objection to the challenged provisos constitutionality is its purported retroactive application of the three-term limit when it
set the 1994 barangay elections as a reckoning point in the application of the three-term limit.

The respondents argued that the term limit, although present in the previous laws, was not in RA No. 7160 when it amended all
previous barangay election laws. Hence, it was re-introduced for the first time by RA No. 9164 (signed into law on March 19, 2002) and was
applied retroactively when it made the term limitation effective from the 1994 barangay elections. As the appealed ruling quoted above shows,
the RTC fully agreed with the respondents position.

Our first point of disagreement with the respondents and with the RTC is on their position that a retroactive application of the term limitation was
made under RA No. 9164. Our own reading shows that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all
along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC and
can still be found in the current law.We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law.
The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only
six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent
imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the
LGC followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials. We differ with
the RTC analysis of this issue.

Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide range of
subject matters, all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession
(Chapter II), c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III).

These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is
provided with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply
to barangay officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a general
rule, the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce
include barangay officials.

An alternative perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as independently standing and self-contained
provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials,
except barangay officials whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by its express terms, relates to all local
elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification.

Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section 43 in the context in which it is
found in Title II of the LGC.

To be sure, it may be argued, as the respondents and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 43 are the general law for elective
officials (other than barangay officials); and paragraph (c) is the specific law on barangay officials, such that the silence of paragraph (c) on
term limitation for barangayofficials indicates the legislative intent to exclude barangay officials from the application of the three-term limit. This
reading, however, is flawed for two reasons.

First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the exclusion of Section 43(c), is not justified by the plain texts of these provisions. Section 43(a)
plainly refers to local elective officials, except elective barangay officials. In comparison, Section 43(b) refers to all local elective officials without
exclusions or exceptions. Their respective coverages therefore vary so that one cannot be said to be of the same kind as the other. Their
separate topics additionally strengthen their distinction; Section 43(a) refers to the term of office while Section 43(b) refers to the three-term
limit. These differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be read together as one organic whole in the way the RTC suggested.
Significantly, these same distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c).

Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of its total disregard of the historical background of Section 43(c) a backdrop that we
painstakingly outlined above.

From a historical perspective of the law, the inclusion of Section 43(c) in the LGC is an absolute necessity to clarify the length of term
of barangayofficials. Recall that under RA No. 6679, the term of office of barangay officials was five (5) years. The real concern was how
Section 43 would interface with RA No. 6679. Without a categorical statement on the length of the term of office of barangay officials, a general
three-year term for all local elective officials under Section 43(a), standing alone, may not readily and completely erase doubts on the intended
abrogation of the 5-year term for barangay officials under RA No. 6679. Thus, Congress added Section 43(c) which provided a categorical
three-year term for these officials. History tells us, of course, that the unequivocal provision of Section 43(c) notwithstanding, an issue on what
is the exact term of office of barangay officials was still brought to us via a petition filed by no less than the President of the Liga ng Mga
Barangay in 1997. We fully resolved the issue in the cited David v. Comelec.

Section 43(c) should therefore be understood in this context and not in the sense that it intended to provide the complete rule for the election
of barangayofficials, so that in the absence of any term limitation proviso under this subsection, no term limitation applies
to barangay officials. That Congress had the LGCs three-term limit in mind when it enacted RA No. 9164 is clear from the following
deliberations in the House of Representatives (House) on House Bill No. 4456 which later became RA No. 9164:

MARCH 5, 2002:

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Majority Leader.

REP. ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker, next to interpellate is the Gentleman from Zamboanga City. I ask that the Honorable Lobregat be recognized.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). The Honorable Lobregat is recognized.
REP. LOBREGAT. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker, this is just

REP. MACIAS. Willingly to the Gentleman from Zamboanga City.

REP. LOBREGAT. points of clarification, Mr. Speaker, the term of office. It says in Section 4, The term of office of all Barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three years. Then it says, No Barangay elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is the position of the committee that the first term should be reckoned from election of what year, Mr. Speaker?

REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of the Local Government Code, Your Honor. So that the first election is to be reckoned on, would be May 8,
1994, as far as the Barangayelection is concerned.

REP. LOBREGAT. Yes, Mr. Speaker. So there was an election in 1994.

REP. MACIAS. Then an election in 1997.

REP. LOBREGAT. There was an election in 1997. And there will be an election this year

REP. LOBREGAT. election this year.

REP. MACIAS. That is correct. This will be the third.

xxx xxx

REP. SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.) The Honorable Sumulong is recognized.

REP. SUMULONG. Again, with the permission of my Chairman, I would like to address the question of Congressman Lobregat.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Please proceed.

REP. SUMULONG. With respect to the three-year consecutive term limits of Barangay Captains that is not provided for in the
Constitution and that is why the election prior to 1991 during the enactment of the Local Government Code is not counted because it
is not in the Constitution but in the Local Government Code where the three consecutive term limits has been placed. [Emphasis
supplied.]

which led to the following exchanges in the House Committee on Amendments:

March 6, 2002

COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS

REP. GONZALES. May we now proceed to committee amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Gonzalez). The Chair recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms.
REP. SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 2, line 7, after the word position, substitute the period (.) and add the following: PROVIDED HOWEVER
THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. So that the amended Section 4 now
reads as follows:

SEC. 4. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3)
years.

No barangay elective local official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position COLON (:) PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
was elected.

The House therefore clearly operated on the premise that the LGC imposed a three-term limit for barangay officials, and the challenged proviso
is its way of addressing any confusion that may arise from the numerous changes in the law.

All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the application of
the three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming
up with the challenged proviso.

With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the proviso based on retroactivity must fail.

b. No Involvement of Any

Constitutional Standard

Separately from the above reason, the constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental reason the respondents retroactivity objection
does not involve a violation of any constitutional standard.

Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, [16] not the Constitution. Article 4 of
the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. The application of the Civil Code is of course
self-explanatory laws enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil Code established a
statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.

The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application will impair vested
rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process
issue may arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones that may be considered
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves
concede that there is no vested right to public office. [17] As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post
in view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises.

Aware of this legal reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had a right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by
a law that effectively rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Again, the RTC agreed with this contention.

We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such right under the Constitution; if at all, this claimed right is merely a restatement of a claim of
vested right to a public office. What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for elective local
posts;[18] thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress, not for the courts, to decide. We dealt with a strikingly
similar issue in Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections[19] where we ruled that SK membership which was claimed as a property right within
the meaning of the Constitution is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Montesclaros instructively tells us:

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an
amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can
contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not
a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time
the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any
public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already
ruled:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a property. It is, however,
well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a
public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere
agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every
officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public
office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners
a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public
trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing equal access to opportunities for public service cannot
bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those who belong to the class of
people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of
Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In
government service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the
same manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their
SK membership. [Emphasis supplied.]

To recapitulate, we find no merit in the respondents retroactivity arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not provide for the
retroactive application to barangay officials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply continued what had been there before;
and (2) the constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm.

The Equal Protection Clause Issue

The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of
substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated
differently in law.[20]

Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an
equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself
provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction,
expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it
left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation.
Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.

From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not result
in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the
retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application.

Violation of the Constitutional

One Subject- One Title Rule

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Farias v. Executive
Secretary[21] provides the reasons for this constitutional requirement and the test for its application, as follows:

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered
encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the
Court laid down the rule that

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the
power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

xxxx

x x x This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

xxxx

x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.

We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule.

First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act No.
7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states the laws general subject matter the amendment of the
LGC to synchronize thebarangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the
reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term
is term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold office. This natural linkage
demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.

Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes,
nature and scope of the laws provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators and
the public.

Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by
law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of the challenged proviso under
Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162230 August 13, 2014

ISABELITA C. VINUY A, VICTORIA C. DELA PENA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMA WANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN,
MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA
MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA,
FLORENCIA M. DELA PENA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI,
ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M.
HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PENA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA,ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M.
GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A.
CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PENA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO,
PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA 0. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA,
EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA
LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA,
ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. in their capacityand as members of
the "Malaya Lolas Organizations," Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA
DOMINGOALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR
GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 1 and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,2 praying that the Court reverse its decision of
April 28, 2010, and grant their petition for certiorari.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the Courts ruling that the
foreign policy prerogatives ofthe Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such
prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and international conventions of which the Philippines is a party; that the Court, in
holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring petitioners claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy powers of
the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights; that the
foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian law as incorporated intothe laws of the land through
the Incorporation Clause; that the Court must re-visit its decisions in Yamashita v. Styer3 and Kuroda v. Jalandoni4 which have been noted for
their prescient articulation of the import of laws of humanity; that in said decision, the Court ruled that the State was bound to observe the laws
of war and humanity; that in Yamashita, the Court expressly recognized rape as an international crime under international humanitarian law,
and in Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if the Philippines had not acceded or signed the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare, the Rules and Regulations formed part of the law of the nation by virtue of the Incorporation Clause; that such
commitment to the laws ofwar and humanity has been enshrined in Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides "that the
Philippinesadopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."

The petitioners added that the statusand applicability of the generally accepted principles of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction
would be uncertain without the Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the general international law forms part of Philippine law
only insofar as they are expressly adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr. 5 and U.S. v. Guinto6 the Court has said that
international law is deemed part of the Philippine law as a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu, 7 the Court has declared that a
treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the
Incorporation Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnesobligations arising from the jus cogensnorms embodied in the laws of
war and humanity that include the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are proscribed
under international human rights law as there were undeniable violations of jus cogensnorms; that the need to punish crimes against the laws
of humanity has long become jus cogensnorms, and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that the Courts
invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is misplaced; and that the Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and
to give justice to the victims ofthe comfort women system in the Philippines. 8

Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader responsibility of states to protect the human rights
of their citizens, especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnesobligations and pertain to jus cogensnorms; that the claims
raised by petitioners are not simple private claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic protection; that the crimes committed against
petitioners are shocking to the conscience of humanity; and that the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against petitionersare not
subject to the statute of limitations under international law. 9

Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of
sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international law;
(2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women
against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the respondents.

Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort
women for an official apology,legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan. 10

In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was highly improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift
commentaries from at least three sources without proper attribution an article published in 2009 in the Yale Law Journal of International Law;
a book published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western ReserveJournal of International
Law and make it appear that such commentaries supported its arguments for dismissing the petition, when in truth the plagiarized sources
even made a strong case in favour of petitioners claims. 11

In their Comment,12 respondents disagree withpetitioners, maintaining that aside from the statements on plagiarism, the arguments raised by
petitioners merely rehashed those made in their June 7, 2005 Memorandum; that they already refuted such arguments in their Memorandumof
June 6, 2005 that the Court resolved through itsApril 28, 2010 decision, specifically as follows:

1. The contentions pertaining tothe alleged plagiarism were then already lodged withthe Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the
Court; hence, the matter of alleged plagiarism should not be discussed or resolved herein. 13

2. A writ of certioraridid not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the
failureof petitioners to show any arbitrary or despotic act on the part of respondents,the relief of the writ of certiorariwas not warranted.14

3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, being valid, bound the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda.The validity of the Treaty of Peace was the result of the ratification by two mutually
consenting parties. Consequently, the obligations embodied in the Treaty of Peace must be carried out in accordance with the common and
real intention of the parties at the time the treaty was concluded.15

4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have direct international remedies against any State that violated their human rights except
where such remedies are provided by an international agreement. Herein, neither of the Treaty of Peace and the Reparations Agreement,the
relevant agreements affecting herein petitioners, provided for the reparation of petitioners claims. Respondents aver that the formal apology by
the Government of Japan and the reparation the Government of Japan has provided through the Asian Womens Fund (AWF) are sufficient to
recompense petitioners on their claims, specifically:

a. About 700 million yen would be paid from the national treasury over the next 10 years as welfare and medical services;

b. Instead of paying the money directly to the former comfort women, the services would be provided through organizations delegated by
governmental bodies in the recipient countries (i.e., the Philippines, the Republic of Korea,and Taiwan); and

c. Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services (like home helpers), housing, environmental development, medical expenses,
and medical goods.16

Ruling

The Court DENIESthe Motion for Reconsiderationand Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for being devoid of merit.

1. Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing ofthe special civil action for certiorariwas timely, i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 4. When and where position filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) daysfrom notice of judgment, order or resolution.
In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of said motion.

As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the
denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To establish the timeliness of the
petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new
trial must be stated in the petition;otherwise, the petition for certiorarimust be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated,
for such dates determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge
Development Corporation:17

There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial
thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance with the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 18

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such
a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore,
that the petition for certiorariwas filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The
Court of Appeals was notin any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was
filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15)
days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly
disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy ofliberal construction.19

The petition for certioraricontains the following averments, viz:

82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the "comfort women system," approached the Executive Department through the Department of
Justice in order to request for assistance to file a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the
"comfort women" stations in the Philippines;

83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and refused to file a claim against the said Japanese officials and military
officers;

84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turnapproached the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Justice and Office of the of the Solicitor
General to file their claim against the responsible Japanese officials and military officers, but their efforts were similarly and carelessly
disregarded;20

The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners approached the Department ofJustice for assistance, but does not
specifically state when they received the denial of their request for assistance by the Executive Department of the Government. This alone
warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.

Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request for assistance in 1998, their filing of the petition only on March
8, 2004 was still way beyond the 60-day period. Only the most compelling reasons could justify the Courts acts of disregarding and lifting the
strictures of the rule on the period. As we pointed out inMTM Garment Mfg. Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 21

All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law
has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely: to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a
system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never
be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.

As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of certiorariis neither a natural right noran essential element of due
process; a writ of certiorariis a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorarimust apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law
and the Rules.

Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule and the requirements under current jurisprudence. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)

2. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial on the part of respondents.

Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorarithat the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtrequires such showing, to wit:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46. However, petitioners did notmake such a showing.

3. Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.

The Court cannot grant petitioners prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy
that is adjunct to the main case, and is subject to the latters outcome. It is not a cause of action itself.22 It is provisional because it constitutes a
temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the
result of the main action.23 Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is no more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction sought.
As an auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of the principal action. 24

In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act.1wphi1 Hence, it is an extreme remedy,25 to be granted only
if the following requisites are attendant, namely:

(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse;

(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and

(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists
to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.26

In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena City,27 we expounded as follows:

It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence
of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the grounds
expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of
such discretion. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The very
foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these
conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. 28

Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse
petitioners' claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court
cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the
Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.