REMEDIAL - People Vs GSIS - 60 Days Limitation Period

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htm
"name="State"/>
RepublicofthePhilippines
SupremeCourt
Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

ELIGIOP.MALLARI,G.R.No.157659
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO,C.J.,Chairperson,
versusCARPIOMORALES,
LEONARDODE
CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,and
VILLARAMA,JR.,JJ.
GOVERNMENTSERVICE
INSURANCESYSTEMand
THEPROVINCIALSHERIFFPromulgated:
OFPAMPANGA,
Respondents.January25,2010
xx

DECISION

BERSAMIN,J.:

By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on
March17,2003,wherebytheCourtofAppeals(CA)dismissedhispetitionforcertiorari.

Antecedents

In1968,thepetitionerobtainedtwoloanstotalingP34,000.00fromrespondentGovernment
ServiceInsuranceSystem(GSIS).Tosecuretheperformanceofhisobligations,hemortgagedtwo
parcelsoflandregisteredunderhisandhiswifeMarcelinaMallarisnames.However,hepaidGSIS
abouttenyearsaftercontractingtheobligationsonlyP10,000.00onMay22,1978andP20,000.00
[1]
onAugust11,1978.

What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves of the petitioner to delay the
efforts of GSIS to recover on the debt, and to have the unhampered possession of the foreclosed
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efforts of GSIS to recover on the debt, and to have the unhampered possession of the foreclosed
property.

After reminding the petitioner of his unpaid obligation on May 2, 1979, GSIS sent on
November2,1981atelegraphicdemandtohimtoupdatehisaccount.OnNovember10,1981,he
requestedafinalaccounting,butdidnotdoanythingmore.Nearlythreeyearslater,onMarch 21,
1984,GSISappliedfortheextrajudicialforeclosureofthemortgagebyreasonofhisfailuretosettle
his account. On November 22, 1984, he requested an updated computation of his outstanding
account.OnNovember29,1984,hepersuadedthesherifftoholdthepublicationoftheforeclosure
noticeinabeyance,toawaitactiononhispendingrequestforfinalaccounting(thatis,takinghis
paymentsofP30,000.00madein1978intoaccount).OnDecember13,1984,GSISrespondedtohis
request and rendered a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30, 1985, it sent another
updated statement of account. On July 21, 1986, it finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedingsagainsthimbecausehehadmeanwhilemadenofurtherpayments.

OnAugust22,1986,thepetitionersuedGSISandtheProvincialSheriffofPampangainthe
RegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Branch44,inSanFernando,Pampanga,docketedasCivilCaseNo.
[2]
7802, ostensiblytoenjointhemfromproceedingagainsthimforinjunction(withanapplication
for preliminary injunction). The RTC ultimately decided Civil Case No. 7802 in his favor,
nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT)No.284272RandTCTNo.284273RalreadyissuedinthenameofGSISandreinstating
[3]
TCTNo.61171RandTCTNo.54835Rinhisandhiswifesnames.

GSISappealedtheadversedecisiontotheCA,whichreversedtheRTConMarch27,1996.
[4]

The petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari
[5]
(G.R.No.124468).

[6]
OnSeptember 16, 1996, this Court denied his petition for review. On January 15, 1997,
[7]
thisCourtturneddownhismotionforreconsideration.

As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became final and executory, rendering
unassailableboththeextrajudicialforeclosureandauctionsaleheldonSeptember22,1986,andthe
issuanceofTCTNo.284272RandTCTNo.284273RinthenameofGSIS.
issuanceofTCTNo.284272RandTCTNo.284273RinthenameofGSIS.

GSISthusfiledanexpartemotionforexecutionandforawritofpossessiononSeptember2,
[8] [9]
1999. GrantingtheexpartemotiononOctober 8, 1999, the RTC issued a writ of execution
[10]
cumwritofpossessiononOctober21,1999, orderingthesherifftoplaceGSISinpossessionof
theproperties.

Thesherifffailedtoservethewrit,however,partlybecauseofthepetitionersrequestforan
extensionoftimewithinwhichtovacatetheproperties.ItisnotedthatGSISaccededtotherequest.
[11]
Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a motion for
[12]
reconsiderationand/ortoquashthewritofexecutiononMarch27,2000. Also, the petitioner
commenced a second case against GSIS and the provincial sheriff in the RTC in San Fernando,
Pampanga(CivilCaseNo.12053),ostensiblyforconsignation(coupledwithaprayerforawritof
preliminaryinjunctionortemporaryrestrainingorder).However,theRTCdismissedCivilCaseNo.
12053onNovember10,2000onthegroundofresjudicata,impellinghimtoappealthedismissal
[13]
totheCA(C.A.G.R.CVNo.70300).

Inthemeanwhile,thepetitionerfiledamotiondatedApril5,2000inCivilCaseNo.7802to
[14]
hold GSIS, et al. in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during the
[15]
pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution. He filed
anothermotioninthesamecase,datedApril17,2000,toholdGSISanditslocalmanagerArnulfo
B.Cardenasincontemptofcourtfororderingtheelectriccompanytocutofftheelectricservicesto
the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of
[16]
execution.

TopreventthePresidingJudgeofBranch44oftheRTCfromresolvingthependingincidents
inCivilCaseNo.7802,GSISmovedtoinhibithimforallegedpartialitytowardsthepetitioneras
borneoutbyhisfailuretoactonthemotionforreconsiderationand/ortoquashwritofexecution,
motionsforcontemptofcourt, and motion for issuance of break open order for more than a year
[17]
from their filing, praying that the case be reraffled to another branch of the RTC.
Consequently, Civil Case No. 7802 was reassigned to Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge then
deniedthemotionsforcontemptofcourtonJuly30,2001,anddirectedtheBranchClerkofCourt
to cause the reimplementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21,
to cause the reimplementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21,
[18]
1999.

[19]
The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the Presiding Judge of Branch 48 denied his
[20]
motionforreconsiderationonFebruary11,2002.

RulingoftheCA

By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the
[21]
ordersofFebruary11,2002,July30,2001,October21,1999,andOctober8,1999.

OnMarch17,2003,however,theCAdismissedthepetitionforcertiorariforlackofmerit,
[22]
stating:

We find the instant petition patently devoid of merit.This Court is not unaware of the legal
tacticsandmaneuversemployedbythepetitionerindelayingthedispositionofthesubjectcase(Civil
Case No. 7802) which has already become final and executory upon the final resolution by the
SupremeCourtaffirmingthejudgmentrenderedbytheCourtofAppeals.Weconstruetheactuation
ofthepetitionerinresortingtoallkindsofavenuesaccordedbytheRulesofCourt,throughthefiling
ofseveralpleadingsand/ormotionsinlitigatingthiscase,asrunningcountertotheintendmentofthe
Rulestobeutilizedinpromotingtheobjectiveofsecuringajust,speedyandinexpensivedisposition
ofeveryactionandproceeding.

The issues raised in the present controversy have already been settled in our existing
jurisprudenceonthesubject.InthecaseofDeJesusvs.Obnamia,Jr.,theSupremeCourtruledthat
generally, no notice or even prior hearing of a motion for execution is required before a writ of
executionisissuedwhenadecisionhasalreadybecomefinal.

Therecentaccretiontothecorpusofourjurisprudencehasestablishedtheprincipleoflaw,as
enunciated in Buaya vs. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. that once a judgment becomes final and
executory,theprevailingpartycanhaveitexecutedasamatterofright,andtheissuanceofaWritof
Executionbecomesaministerialdutyofthecourt.

TheruleisalsofirmlyentrenchedintheaforecitedBuayacasethattheeffectiveandefficient
administrationofjusticerequiresthatonceajudgmenthasbecomefinal,theprevailingpartyshould
notbedeprivedofthefruitsoftheverdictbysubsequentsuitsonthesameissuesfiledbythesame
parties.Courtsaredutyboundtoputanendtocontroversies.Anyattempttoprolong,resurrector
jugglethemshouldbefirmlystruckdown.Thesystemofjudicialreviewshouldnotbemisusedand
abusedtoevadetheoperationoffinalandexecutoryjudgments.

As succinctly put in Tag Fibers, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme
Court is emphatic in saying that the finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event that cannot be
madetodependontheconvenienceofaparty.

Wefindnocogentreasontodiscomposethefindingsofthecourtbelow.Thus,wesustainthe
assailedOrdersofthecourtaquosincenoabuseofdiscretionhasbeenfoundtohavebeencommitted
assailedOrdersofthecourtaquosincenoabuseofdiscretionhasbeenfoundtohavebeencommitted
bythelatterintheirissuance.Moreover,thisCourtfindsthispetitiontobepartofthedilatorytactics
ofthepetitionertostalltheexecutionofafinalandexecutorydecisioninCivilCaseNo.7802which
hasalreadybeenresolvedwithfinalitybynolessthanthehighesttribunaloftheland.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.Costsagainstthepetitioner.

[23]
SOORDERED.

Issues

Hence,thisappeal.

ThepetitionerinsistshereinthattheCAgravelyerredinrefusingtoacceptthenullityofthe
followingordersoftheRTC,towit:

1. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 8, 1999, GRANTING THE EX
PARTEMOTIONFOREXECUTIONAND/ORISSUANCEOFTHEWRITOFEXECUTION
OFPOSSESSIONINFAVOROFTHERESPONDENTGSIS

2. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 21, 1999 GRANTING THE
ISSUANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF
POSSESSIONINFAVOROFRESPONDENTGSIS
3.THEORDEROFTHETRIALCOURTDATEDJULY30,2001DIRECTINGTOCAUSETHE
REIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHEWRITOFEXECUTIONCUMWRITOFPOSSESSIONIN
FAVOROFTHERESPONDENTGSISand

4. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2002, DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2001, IN
[24]
RELATIONTOTHECOURTORDERDATEDJULY30,2001.

RulingoftheCourt

Thepetitionforreviewoncertiorariabsolutelylacksmerit.

I
PetitionforCertiorariinCA
WasFiledBeyondReglementaryPeriod

ThepetitionassailedbeforetheCAoncertiorarithefollowingordersoftheRTC,towit:

1.TheorderdatedOctober8,1999(grantingtheexpartemotionforexecutionand/or
[25]
issuanceofthewritofexecutioncumwritofpossessionofGSIS)

2. TheorderdatedOctober21,1999(directingtheissuanceofthewritofexecution
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[26] 5/16
[26]
cumwritofpossessioninfavorofGSIS)

3.TheorderdatedJuly30,2001(requiringtheBranchClerkofCourttocausethere
implementationofthewritofexecutioncumwritofpossession,anddismissingthe
[27]
motionstoholdGSIS,etal.incontempt) and

4. TheorderdatedFebruary11,2002(denyingthemotionforreconsideration dated
[28]
August17,2001seekingthereconsiderationoftheorderdatedJuly30,2001).

TheJuly 30, 2001 order denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or to quash
writ of execution, and motion to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac, et al. and Arnulfo Cardenas in
contempt and declared GSISs motion for issuance of break open order and for designation of
special sheriff from GSIS Legal Services Group as premature. In turn, the motion for
reconsiderationand/ortoquashwritofexecutiondeniedbytheorderofJuly30,2001had merely
challengedtheordersofOctober8,1999andOctober21,1999(grantingthewritofexecutioncum
writofpossessionasamatterofcourse).

Consideringthatthemotionforreconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by theorder
dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for reconsideration
visvistheordersdatedOctober21,1999andOctober8,1999,theassailedordersdatedJuly30,
2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari.
Thus,thepetitionforcertiorarifiledonlyinMarch2002wasalreadyimproperandtardyforbeing
madebeyondthe60daylimitationdefinedinSection4,Rule65,1997RulesofCivilProcedure,as
[29]
amended, whichrequiresapetitionforcertioraritobefilednotlaterthansixty(60)daysfrom
noticeofthejudgment,orderorresolution,or,incaseamotionforreconsiderationornewtrialis
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
fromnoticeofthedenialofthesaidmotion.

It is worth emphasizing that the 60day limitation is considered inextendible, because the
limitationhasbeenprescribedtoavoidanyunreasonabledelaythatviolatestheconstitutionalrights
[30]
ofpartiestoaspeedydispositionoftheircases.

II
NatureoftheWritofPossession
anditsMinisterialIssuance


Thepetitionerclaimsthathehadnotbeennotifiedofthemotionseekingtheissuanceofthe
writofexecutioncumwritofpossessionhence,thewritwasinvalid.

Asearliershown,theCAdisagreedwithhim.

WesustaintheCA,andconfirmthatthepetitioner,asdefaultingmortgagor,wasnotentitled
underAct3135,asamended,anditspertinentjurisprudencetoanypriornoticeoftheapplication
fortheissuanceofthewritofpossession.

A writ of possession, which commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of real
property,maybeissuedin:(1)landregistrationproceedingsunderSection17ofActNo.496(2)
judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and no third
person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage, pending redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118and(4)executionsales,pursuanttothelastparagraphofSection33,Rule39oftheRulesof
[31]
Court.
Anenttheredemptionofpropertysoldinanextrajudicialforeclosuresalemadepursuantto
[32] [33]
the special power referred to in Section 1 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the debtor, his
successorininterest, or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person
havingalienonthepropertysubsequenttothemortgageordeedoftrustunderwhichtheproperty
issoldhastherighttoredeemthepropertyatanytimewithinthetermofoneyearfromandafterthe
dateofthesale,suchredemptiontobegovernedbytheprovisionsofSection 464 to Section
466oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,totheextentthatsaidprovisionswerenotinconsistentwiththe
[34]
provisionsofAct3135.

Inthisregard,weclarifythattheredemptionperiodenvisionedunderAct3135isreckoned
fromthedateoftheregistrationofthesale,notfromandafterthedateofthesale,asthetextofAct
3135shows.AlthoughtheoriginalRulesofCourt(effectiveonJuly1,1940)incorporatedSection
464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure as its Section 25 (Section 464) Section 26
(Section465)andSection27(Section466)ofRule39,withSection27stillexpresslyreckoning
the redemption period to be at any time within twelve months after the sale and although the
RevisedRulesofCourt(effectiveonJanuary1,1964)continuedtoprovideinSection30ofRule39
thattheredemptionbemadefromthepurchaseratanytimewithin

[35]
[35]
twelve (12) months after the sale, the 12month period of redemption came to be held as
beginningtorunnotfromthedateofthesalebutfromthetimeofregistrationofthesaleinthe
[36]
OfficeoftheRegisterofDeeds. Thisconstructionwasduetothefactthatthesheriffssaleof
registered (and unregistered) lands did not take effect as a conveyance, or did not bind the land,
[37]
untilthesalewasregisteredintheRegisterofDeeds.

Desiring to avoid any confusion arising from the conflict between the texts of the Rules of
Court (1940 and 1964) and Act No. 3135, on one hand, and the jurisprudence clarifying the
reckoningoftheredemptionperiodinjudicialsalesofrealproperty,ontheotherhand,theCourt
hasincorporatedinSection28ofRule39ofthecurrentRulesofCourt(effectiveonJuly1,1997)
the foregoing judicial construction of reckoning the redemption period from the date of the
registrationofthecertificateofsale,towit:

Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions notice to be
given and filed. The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the
purchaser,atanytimewithinone(1)yearfromthedateoftheregistrationofthecertificateof
sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest
thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or
taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named
amount at the same rate and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the
redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such
otherlien,withinterest.

Propertysoredeemedmayagainberedeemedwithinsixty(60)daysafterthelastredemption
uponpaymentofthesumpaidonthelastredemption,withtwopercentumthereoninaddition,and
the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after
redemptionbyhim,withinterestonsuchlastnamedamount,andinaddition,theamountofanyliens
heldbysaidlastredemptionerpriortohisown,withinterest.Thepropertymaybeagain,andasoften
as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days
after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption, with two per
centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which the last previous
redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens
heldbythelastredemptionerpriortohisown,withinterest.

Writtennoticeofanyredemptionmustbegiventotheofficerwhomadethesaleandaduplicate
filed with the registry of deeds of the place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the
redemptionerorifhehasoracquiresanylienotherthanthatuponwhichtheredemptionwasmade,
noticethereofmustinlikemannerbegiventotheofficerandfiledwiththeregistryofdeedsifsuch
noticebenotfiled,thepropertymayberedeemedwithoutpayingsuchassessments,taxes,orliens.
(30a)(Emphasissupplied).

Accordingly,themortgagororhissuccessorininterestmustredeemtheforeclosedproperty
withinoneyearfromtheregistrationofthesalewiththeRegisterofDeedsinordertoavoidthetitle
fromconsolidatinginthepurchaser.Byfailingtoredeemthuswise,themortgagorlosesallinterest
[38]
overtheforeclosedproperty. Thepurchaser,whohasarighttopossessionthatextendsbeyond
the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no
[39]
redemption is made, that it is no longer necessary for the purchaser to file the bond required
underSection7ofActNo.3135,asamended,consideringthatthepossessionofthelandbecomes
[40]
his absolute right as the lands confirmed owner. The consolidation of ownership in the
purchasersnameandtheissuancetohimofanewTCTthenentitleshimtodemandpossessionof
thepropertyatanytime,andtheissuanceofawritofpossessiontohimbecomesamatterofright
upontheconsolidationoftitleinhisname.

Thecourtcanneitherhaltnorhesitatetoissuethewritofpossession.Itcannotexerciseany
discretiontodeterminewhetherornottoissuethewrit,fortheissuanceofthewrittothepurchaser
[41]
inanextrajudicialforeclosuresalebecomesaministerialfunction. Verily,amarkeddistinction
existsbetweenadiscretionaryactandaministerialone.Apurelyministerialactordutyisonethat
anofficerortribunalperformsinagivenstateoffacts,inaprescribedmanner,inobediencetothe
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
proprietyorimproprietyoftheactdone.Ifthelawimposesadutyuponapublicofficerandgives
him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
ministerial.Thedutyisministerialonlywhenitsdischargerequiresneithertheexerciseofofficial
[42]
discretionnortheexerciseofjudgment.

The proceeding upon an application for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in
nature,broughtforthebenefitofonepartyonlyandwithoutnoticebeingsentbythecourttoany
personadverseininterest.Thereliefisgrantedevenwithoutgivinganopportunitytobeheardto
[43]
thepersonagainstwhomthereliefissought. Itsnature as an ex parte petition under Act No.
3135, as amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ of possession a nonlitigious
[44]
proceeding.

Itisclearfromtheforegoingthatanonredeemingmortgagorlikethepetitionerhadnomore
right to challenge the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession upon the ex parte
applicationofGSIS.Hecouldnotalsoimpugnanymoretheextrajudicialforeclosure,andcouldnot
undotheconsolidationinGSISoftheownershipofthepropertiescoveredbyTCTNo.284272R
andTCTNo.284273R,whichconsolidationwasalreadyirreversible.Hence,hismovesagainstthe
writofexecutioncumwritofpossessionweretaintedbybadfaith,forhewasonlytooaware,being
hisownlawyer,ofthedireconsequencesofhisnonredemptionwithintheperiodprovidedbylaw
forthatpurpose.


III
DismissalofPetitionersMotionforIndirectContempt
WasProperandInAccordwiththeRulesofCourt

The petitioner insists that the RTC gravely erred in dismissing his charges for indirect
contempt against GSIS, et al. and that the CA should have consequently granted his petition for
certiorari.

Thepetitionersinsistenceisplainlyunwarranted.

Firstofall,Section4,Rule71,1997RulesofCivilProcedure,providesasfollows:

Section4.Howproceedingscommenced.Proceedingsforindirectcontemptmaybeinitiated
motupropriobythecourtagainstwhichthecontemptwascommittedbyanorderoranyotherformal
chargerequiringtherespondenttoshowcausewhyheshouldnotbepunishedforcontempt.

Inallothercases,chargesforindirectcontemptshallbecommencedbyaverifiedpetition
withsupportingparticularsandcertifiedtruecopiesofdocumentsorpapersinvolvedtherein,
anduponfullcompliancewiththerequirementsforfilinginitiatorypleadingsforcivilactionsin
the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidationofthecontemptchargeandtheprincipalactionforjointhearinganddecision.(n)
(Emphasissupplied).

Indeed, a person may be charged with indirect contempt only by either of two alternative
ways, namely: (1) by a verified petition, if initiated by a party or (2) by an order or any other
formalchargerequiringtherespondenttoshowcausewhyheshouldnotbepunishedforcontempt,
ifmadebyacourtagainstwhichthecontemptiscommitted.Inshort,achargeofindirectcontempt
mustbeinitiatedthroughaverifiedpetition,unlessthechargeisdirectlymadebythecourtagainst
whichthecontemptuousactiscommitted.

Justice Regalado has explained why the requirement of the filing of a verified petition for
[45]
contemptismandatory:

1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing
contemptproceedings.Whilesuchproceedinghasbeenclassifiedasaspecialcivilactionunderthe
formerRules,theheterogeneouspractice,toleratedbythecourts,hasbeenforanypartytofileamere
motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the
requirementsforinitiatorypleadings,whichisnowrequiredinthesecondparagraphofthisamended
section.Worse,andasaconsequenceofunregulatedmotionsforcontempt,saidincidentssometimes
remain pending for resolution although the main case has already been decided. There are other
undesirableaspectsbut,atanyrate,thesamemaynowbeeliminatedbythisamendatoryprocedure.


Henceforth,exceptforindirectcontemptproceedingsinitiatedmotupropriobyorderofor
a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition
withfullcompliancewiththerequirementsthereforandshallbedisposedofinaccordancewith
thesecondparagraphofthissection.(Emphasissupplied).

Clearly,thepetitionerschargingGSIS,etal.withindirectcontemptbymeremotionswasnot
permittedbytheRulesofCourt.

And, secondly, even assuming that charges for contempt could be initiated by motion, the
petitionershouldhavetenderedfilingfees.Theneedtotenderfilingfeesderivedfromthefactthat
theprocedureforindirectcontemptunderRule71,RulesofCourtwasanindependentspecialcivil
action.Yet,thepetitionerdidnottenderandpayfilingfees,resultinginthetrialcourtnotacquiring
jurisdictionovertheaction.Truly,theomissiontotenderfilingfeeswouldhavealsowarrantedthe
dismissalofthecharges.

It seems to be indubitable from the foregoing that the petitioner initiated the charges for
indirectcontemptwithoutregardtotherequisitesoftheRulesofCourtsimplytovextheadverse
party. He thereby disrespected the orderly administration of justice and committed, yet again, an
abuseofprocedures.

IV
PetitionerWasGuiltyof
MisconductAsALawyer

The CA deemed it unavoidable to observe that the petition for certiorari brought by the
petitionertotheCAwaspartofthedilatorytacticsofthepetitionertostalltheexecutionofafinal
andexecutorydecisioninCivilCaseNo.7802whichhasalreadybeenresolvedwithfinalitybyno
[46]
lessthanthehighesttribunaloftheland.
TheobservationoftheCAdeservesourconcurrence.

Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his aforedescribed worthless and vexatious legal
maneuvers for no other purpose except to delay the full enforcement of the writ of possession,
despite knowing, being himself a lawyer, that as a nonredeeming mortgagor he could no longer
impugnboththeextrajudicialforeclosureandtheexparteissuanceofthewritofexecutioncumwrit
ofpossessionandthattheenforcementofthedulyissuedwritofpossessioncouldnotbedelayed.
Hethusdeliberatelyabusedcourtproceduresandprocesses,inordertoenablehimselftoobstruct
andstiflethefairandquickadministrationofjusticeinfavorofmortgageeandpurchaserGSIS.

HisconductcontravenedRule10.03,Canon10oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,by
whichhewasenjoinedasalawyertoobservetherulesofprocedureandxxxnot[to]misusethem
to defeat the ends of justice. By his dilatory moves, he further breached and dishonored his
[47]
LawyersOath,particularly:

xxxIwillnotwittinglyorwillinglypromoteorsueanygroundless,falseorunlawfulsuit,nor
giveaidnorconsenttothesameIwilldelaynomanformoneyormalice,andwillconductmyselfas
alawyeraccordingtothebestofmyknowledgeanddiscretionwithallgoodfidelityaswelltothe
courtsastomyclientsxxx

Westressthatthepetitionersbeingthepartylitiganthimselfdidnotgivehimthelicenseto
resorttodilatorymoves.Hiszealtodefendwhateverrightshethenbelievedhehadandtopromote
his perceived remaining interests in the property already lawfully transferred to GSIS should not
exceed the bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of the Court burdened to
[48]
conduct himself with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. His true
obligationasalawyershouldnotbewarpedbyanymisplacedsenseofhisrightsandinterestsasa
litigant,becausehewas,aboveall,boundnottoundulydelayacase,nottoimpedetheexecutionof
[49]
ajudgment,andnottomisuseCourtprocesses. Consequently,hemustbemadetoaccountfor
hismisconductasalawyer.

WHEREFORE,wedenythepetitionforreviewoncertiorariforlackofmerit,andaffirmthe
decisionoftheCourtofAppealspromulgatedonMarch17,2003,withthecostsofsuittobepaid
bythepetitioner.

The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is directed to
investigatethepetitionerforwhatappeartobe(a)hisdeliberatedisregardoftheRulesofCourtand
jurisprudencepertinenttotheissuanceandimplementationofthewritofpossessionunderActNo.
3135,asamendedand(b)hiswittingviolationsoftheLawyersOathandtheCodeofProfessional
Responsibility.

SOORDERED.

LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
Chairperson

CONCHITACARPIOMORALESTERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,Icertifythattheconclusionsinthe
aboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterofthe
opinionoftheCourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

[1]
Rollo,p.4243.
[2]
Id.,p.148.
[3]
Id.,p.44.
[3]
Id.,p.44.
[4]
Id.,pp.169179.
[5]
Id.,p.45.
[6]
Id.,p.45,180.
[7]
Id.,p.45.
[8]
Id.,pp.5154.
[9]
Id.,p.55.
[10]
Id.,p.56.
[11]
Id.,pp.4546.
[12]
Id.,pp.5762.
[13]
Id.,p.46.
[14]
TheotherrespondentsweredesignatedasTonyDimatulac,AllanDoe,JohnDoe,PeterDoe,RichardDoe,RomyDoe,RolandDoe,
andJuanDoe.
[15]
Rollo,pp.6466.
[16]
Id.,pp.7578.
[17]
Id.,pp.107108.
[18]
Id.,pp.120121.
[20]
Id.,pp.139144.
[21]
Id.,pp.4748.
[22]
Id.,pp.4250.
[23]
Id.,pp.4849.
[24]
Id.,pp.1213.
[25]
Id.,p.55.
[26]
Id.,p.56.
[27]
Id.,pp.120121.
[28]
Id.,pp.139141.
[29]
A.M.No.00203SC(Re:AmendmentToSection4,Rule65ofThe1997RulesofCivilProcedure)tookeffectSeptember1,2000.
Thisamendment,beingacurativeone,isappliedretroactively(Romerov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.142803,November20,2007,537
SCRA643DelaCruzv.GolarMaritimeServices,Inc.,G.R.No.141277,December16,2005,478SCRA173RamatekPhilippines,Inc.
v.DeLosReyes,G.R.No.139526,October25,2005,474SCRA129PCILeasingandFinance,Inc.v.GoKo,G.R.No.148641,March
31,2005,454SCRA586).
[30]
Peoplev.Gabriel,G.R.No.147832,December6,2006,510SCRA197Yutingcov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.137264,August1,
2002,386SCRA85.
[31]
PhilippineNationalBankv.SanaoMarketing,Inc.,G.R.No.153951,July29,2005,465SCRA287,301Autocorp.Groupand
Autographics,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.157553,September8,2004,437SCRA678,689.
[32]
Section1.Whenasaleismadeunderaspecialpowerinsertedinorattachedtoanyrealestatemortgagehereaftermadeassecurity
forthepaymentofmoneyorthefulfillmentofanyotherobligation,theprovisionsofthefollowingsectionsshallgovernastothemanner
inwhichthesaleandredemptionshallbeeffected,whetherornotprovisionforthesameismadeinthepower.
[33]
AnActtoRegulatetheSaleofPropertyunderSpecialPowersInsertedInorAnnexedToRealEstateMortgages(Approvedon
March6,1924).
[34]
Section6,ActNo.3135,asamended,provides:
Sec.6.Redemption.Inallcasesinwhichanextrajudicialsaleismadeunderthespecialpowerhereinbeforereferredto,thedebtor,
his successorsininterest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property
subsequenttothemortgageordeedoftrustunderwhichthepropertyissold,mayredeemthesameatanytimewithinthetermofoneyear
fromandafterthedateofthesaleandsuchredemptionshallbegovernedbytheprovisionsofsectionfourhundredandsixtyfourtofour
hundredandsixtysix,inclusive,oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,insofarasthesearenotinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisAct.
[35]
[35]
Sec.30.Timeandmannerof,andamountspayableon,successiveredemptions.Noticetobegivenandfiled.Thejudgment
debtor,orredemptioner,mayredeemthepropertyfromthepurchaser,atanytimewithintwelve(12)monthsafterthesale,onpayingthe
purchasertheamountofhispurchase,withonepercentumpermonthinterestthereoninaddition,uptothetimeofredemption,together
withtheamountofanyassessmentsortaxeswhichthepurchasermayhavepaidthereonafterpurchase,andinterestonsuchlastnamed
amountatthesamerateandifthepurchaserbealsoacreditorhavingapriorlientothatoftheredemptioner,otherthanthejudgment
underwhichsuchpurchasewasmade,theamountofsuchotherlien,withinterest.Propertysoredeemedmayagainberedeemedwithin
sixty(60)daysafterthelastredemptionuponpaymentofthesumpaidonthelastredemption,withtwopercentumthereoninaddition,
andtheamountofanyassessmentsortaxeswhichthelastredemptionermayhavepaidthereonafterredemptionbyhim,withintereston
such lastnamed amount, and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The
propertymaybeagain,andasoftenasaredemptionerissodisposed,redeemedfromanypreviousredemptionerwithinsixty(60)daysafter
thelastredemption,onpayingthesumpaidonthelastpreviousredemption,withtwopercentumthereoninaddition,andtheamountsof
anyassessmentsortaxeswhichthelastpreviousredemptionerpaidaftertheredemptionthereon,withinterestthereon,andtheamountof
anyliensheldbythelastredemptionerpriortohisown,withinterest.
Writtennoticeofanyredemptionmustbegiventotheofficerwhomadethesaleandaduplicatefiledwiththeregistrarofdeedsofthe
province,andifanyassessmentsortaxesarepaidbytheredemptionerorifhehasoracquiresanylienotherthanthatuponwhichthe
redemptionwasmade,noticethereofmustinlikemannerbegiventotheofficerandfiledwiththeregistrarofdeedsifsuchnoticebenot
filed,thepropertymayberedeemedwithoutpayingsuchassessments,taxes,orliens.
[36]
Garciav.Ocampo,105Phil.1102,1108(1959).
[37]
Section50,ActNo.496,states:
Sec.50.Anownerofregisteredlandmayconvey,mortgage,lease,charge,orotherwisedealwiththesameasfullyasifithadnotbeen
registered.Hemayuseformsofdeeds,mortgages,leases,orothervoluntaryinstrumentslikethosenowinuseandsufficientinlawforthe
purposeintended.Butnodeed,mortgage,lease,orothervoluntaryinstrument,exceptawill,purportingtoconveyoraffectregistered
land,shalltakeeffectasaconveyanceorbindtheland,butshalloperateonlyasacontractbetweenthepartiesandasevidenceof
authoritytotheclerkorregisterofdeedstomakeregistration.Theactofregistrationshallbetheoperativeacttoconveyandeffect
theland,andinallcasesunderthisActtheregistrationshallbemadeintheofficeofregisterofdeedsfortheprovinceorprovincesor
citywherethelandlies.
Section51,PresidentialDecreeNo.1529,provides:
Sec.51.Conveyanceandotherdealingsbyregisteredowner.Anownerofregisteredlandmayconvey,mortgage,lease,chargeor
otherwisedealwiththesameinaccordancewithexistinglaws.Hemayusesuchformsofdeeds,mortgages,leasesorothervoluntary
instrumentsasaresufficientinlaw.Butnodeed,mortgage,lease,orothervoluntaryinstrument,exceptawillpurportingtoconveyor
affectregisteredlandshalltakeeffectasaconveyanceorbindtheland,butshalloperateonlyasacontractbetweenthepartiesandas
evidenceofauthoritytotheRegisterofDeedstomakeregistration.
Theactofregistrationshallbetheoperativeacttoconveyoraffectthelandinsofarasthirdpersonsareconcerned,andinall
casesunderthisDecree,theregistrationshallbemadeintheofficeoftheRegisterofDeedsfortheprovinceorcitywheretheland
lies.
SeealsoStateInvestmentHouse,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.99308,November13,1992,215SCRA734Agbulosv.Albert,
G.R.No.L17483,July31,1962,5SCRA790Tuasonv.Raymundo,28Phil.635(1914)Sikatunav.Guevara,43Phil.371(1922)
Worcesterv.Ocampo,34Phil.646(1916).
[38]
Yuliencov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.141365,November27,2002,393SCRA143.
[39]
Samsonv.Rivera,G.R.No.154355,May20,2004,428SCRA759,771.
[40]
ChaileaseFinanceCorporationv.Ma,G.R.No.151941,August15,2003,409SCRA250,253.
[41]
DeVerav.Agloro,G.R.No.155673,January14,2005,448SCRA203,213314.
[42]
Espiridionv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.146933,June8,2006,490SCRA273,277.
[43]
Santiagov.MerchantsRuralBankofTalavera,Inc.,G.R.No.147820,March18,2005,453SCRA756,763764.
[44]
Pensonv.Maranan,G.R.No.148630,June20,2006,491SCRA396,407.
[45]
RemedialLawCompendium,SixthRevisedEdition,p.808seealsoLandBankofthePhilipinesv.Listana,Sr.,G.R.No.152611,
August5,2003,408SCRA328.
[46]
Rollo,p.49.
[47]
RulesofCourt,Rule138.Sec.3.
[48]
LawyersOath.
[49]
Rule12.04,Canon12,CodeofProfessionalResponsibility,states:
Alawyershallnotundulydelayacase,impedetheexecutionofajudgmentormisuseCourtprocesses.
fontfamily:"TimesNewRoman"msoansilanguage:ENUSmsofareastlanguage:ENUSmsobidilanguage:AR
SA'>[49]Rule12.04,Canon12,CodeofProfessionalResponsibility,states:
Alawyershallnotundulydelayacase,impedetheexecutionofajudgmentormisuseCourtprocesses.

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