1. MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

GR 135962 March 27, 2000

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting
the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the
perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for

the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of
Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an
agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body
politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of
the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of
1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its
inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
[LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no
grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA
is merely a development authority and not a political unit of government since
it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening
by the MMDA is illegal
2. Amigable vs Cuenca
G.R. No. L-26400
43 SCRA 360 February 29, 1972

Petitioner: Victoria Amigable

Respondent: Nicolas Cuenca, as Commissioner of Public Highways and the

Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was
used by the government for Mango and Gorordo Avenues without her
permission and without proper negotiation of sales. Because of this, she filed a
case in CFI Cebu.

Defendants argue that 1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already
been prescribed; 3) Government cannot be sued without its consent and; 4)
Cebu already agreed to use the land as such.

CFI rendered a decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and
recover her ownership and possession of the said land and thus dismissed the
complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government
without its consent

HELD: In the case of Ministerio vs Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was

held that when the government takes away She could then bring an action to
recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time
since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the
government to make due compensation of the exact amount, price or value of
the lot at the time of the taking.

property from a private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government

appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any
deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she
remains as the rightful owner of the lot.
Petition is partly GRANTED.

3. City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June

1983]
First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 5 concur

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the
Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery
Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing
Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and
where the area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the
application.
For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city
authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City
Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop
any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended
for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be
enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-
16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being
contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act,
and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the
questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang
Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI
rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and
void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government
and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries
for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of
private property without just compensation.

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least

6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people.
 The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial
of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of
the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance"
it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation.
The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are
very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments.
The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

4. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VIRON

TRANSPORTATION CO., INC
G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic
congestion problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila.

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain:
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport
terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely
the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate
and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different
transport modes;
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance with the plan proposed by
MMDA
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. The Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing
Agency for the project.

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of

traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the
streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the
MMDA had recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing
more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilitieswhich plan is
referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System
Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the
Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board
and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of
20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to
integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus
parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals
located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial
bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila.
Chairman Fernando, was poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order
closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and
in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation. This
impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in
Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O.
pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro
Manilas basic services including those of transport and traffic management.

ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional

HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of

the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing
agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no
legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended,
it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the
Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC
which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the
one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in
question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the

absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and
in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy
of the local government units concerning purely local matters
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it
could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondents terminals
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in
the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in
Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of
the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court
can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated
that it is the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming,
coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,
develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications which
has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the
Project subject of the case at bar.

5. Tanada v tuvera
Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA
446 (December 29, 1986)

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
 The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to
bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in
the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general

applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

5. TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on

April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability

and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.
HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to

inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.
The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like
a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn.

6. PITC V ANGELES
263 scra 420

Facts:
PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which
applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China
must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine
products.
PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from
China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of
the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld
and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional.
The court contends further authority to process and approve applications
for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144
has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the
PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order;
nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New
Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues
including those of local application and private laws shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive
in character.

Philippine International Trading Corporation vs Angeles GR 108461 21 October

1996

Facts: PITC is a GOCC created during Marcos regime to undertake trades

between Philippines and SOCPEC. During Aquinos presidency she made PITC
one of DTIs line agencies. This does not mean, however, that PITC has lost the
authority to issue AOs. PITC issued SOCPEC 89-08-01 where importation from
China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of
Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself or through a
tie-up with a legitimate importer with 1-1 ratio. Domestic corporations,
Remington and Firestone applied and were granted to import. Both failed to
comply with export credits with 1-1 ratio and their imports were withheld. Both
assailed the constitutionality of the AO. RTC decided in favour of Remington
and Firestone for AO was not published contrary to Article 2 of NCC. Hence the
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not SOCPEC 89-08-01 is valid on the ground of violating the
publication requirement?
Decision: Decision affirmed. The original AO issued on August 30, 1989, under
which the respondents filed their applications for importation, was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within
the context of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose
is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e.,
P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

7. BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO v. PALANCA

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the

subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and
made effective.

The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by

which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.

DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always

assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he
may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge
that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real

property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned
to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the
Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since
defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The
Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown
whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after
publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and
judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and
afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder.
On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about
seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of
this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered
thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and
the subject matter of the action

Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since
it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular
kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the
power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject
to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and
extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party

in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive
power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the
property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never
be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired
by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress,
and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register
the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem
over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all
the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to

be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not
strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application,
used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon
which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true
action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant,
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general
way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom

publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action
and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should
therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in
rem.
On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with

certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction
must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful
hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to
be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the
proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which
appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer
this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in
addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is
known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process
in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may
be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that
it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute
assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The
periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and
the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even
where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much
increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is
forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will
be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of
notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in
every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In
the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in
cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is
always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent;
and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with
knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and
sale.
Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last known address
constitute denial of due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the
failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not
such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence
in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this
case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form
of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that
was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a

difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a
question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be
no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has
jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice
should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction,
there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step
was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due
process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous.
The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter
requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication
was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold
that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the
requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes
of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle
underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the
light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress
declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process
of law has not been infringed.

8.Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995], also Gatchalian v. de

Leon [GR 121245], and Lejano v. de Leon [GR 121297]

Second Division, Puno (J) : 2 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and

involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a letter-
complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J.
Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith,
the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State
prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation of those
charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her
mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home at Paraaque. During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented
the sworn statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the
Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner
of Biong), 2 of Vizcondes maids, Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano
Gatmaitan (an engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving
Estrellita (12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab
wounds); and the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence of
spermatozoa. The NBI submitted photocopies of the documents requested by
Webb in his Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and
Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary
investigation that he did not commit the crime as he went to the United States
on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines on 27 October 1992. The
others Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong
submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their
complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to
file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last
known address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution
"finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that
an Information for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the
same date, it filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with the
RTC Paraaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon,
pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against
Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his
employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was
re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new
warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig.
Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1)
annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by
respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No.
95- 404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the
aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include
Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and Lejano likewise
gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before the
Court.

Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of their
right to fair trial.

Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can

deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however,
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors; and their long experience
in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can
easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. At no instance in the case did
Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the
ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
Further , on the contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show
that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent
haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause
against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile
criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair
administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in
every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a
silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the
business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice
shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an
acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

8. PEOPLE V TEEHANKEE
9. STATE PROSEC V MURO

State Prosecutors v Muros

236 SCRA 505, 19 September 1994 Facts:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel
of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge
Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution
 of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central
Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11
cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2
newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and
of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines
lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The

respondents

decision was founded on his belief that the reported

announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper
in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of
its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu
propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the
announcement of the President as published in the newspaper
has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for
the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his
part.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse

of discretion in taking notice on the statement of the president
lifting the foreign exchange published in the newspaper as
basis for dismissing the caes?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross
ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his

assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of

the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents

announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public

announcement is absolute and without qualification and is
immediately effective and such matter becomes a public
knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his
discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law
should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general
circulation
 before its effectivity. When the Presidents statement was
published in the newspaper,

the respondent admitted of not having seen the official

text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to
take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based
on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public
knowledge that the law requires for the court to take
judicial notice of. For the court to take judicial notice,
three material requisites should be presented: (1)

The matter must be one of common and general

knowledge; (2)

It must be well and authoritatively settled and not

doubtful or uncertain;

(3)

It must be known to be within the limits of the

jurisdiction of the court.

The court ruled that the information he obtained from the

newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in
taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and
ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the
prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The
court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service
for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for
erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice
on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a
reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

10. ESTRADA V SANDIGAN BAYAN

 11. Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February
1940]dEn Banc, Laurel (J): 6 concur
12. Office of the ombudsman v coronel

13. SEC OF JUSTICE VS JUDGE RALPH LANTION

Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax

evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA.
Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government,
pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have
Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the
complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the
USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising
that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a
preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive
such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court
ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.

HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case
against Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of
ones property or property right. No less is this true, but even more
so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible
deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself
and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property
can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is
irretrievable and beyond recompense.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

322 SCRA 160 (2000)

Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC

FACTS:

On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the

Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the
request. Charges include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel

proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the
extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be
addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the
documents included in the extradition request and for him to be
given ample time to assess it.

The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the

completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in
the process of evaluating whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069Philippine
Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the
DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in
criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure

of the information in the documents.

3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties

such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.

The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and

prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent.
Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested
papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

ISSUES:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process
rights of notice and hearing

Yes. 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an

accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by
the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA
to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels
for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the
deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of
the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request &
the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, theres an
impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the
evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting
an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or
commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of
liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has
ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an
administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or
penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the
case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing
of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his
arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must
be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3
14(1) & (2), as well as A3 7the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to
access to official records & documents

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature
of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result
in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable
action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual
extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of
the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have the same result the
arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.

The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil
& administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of
any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may
claim the right to appear therein & present their side.

Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:

a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive

suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy
restaurants, cancellation of passport).

b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the

respondent isnt prevented from enjoying the right to notice &
hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of
a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)

c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had
not been claimed.

2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal

commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under
the RP-US Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the
suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection
to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesnt
fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and
hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.

3. WON theres any conflict between private respondents basic due

process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty

RULING:

No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in

most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative
acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No
conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose
veil at any stage.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation

process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary
investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of
the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is
arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family
and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy,
liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from hima fate
as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this
reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him
and the right to controvert them.

Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of

an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at
 stake is our governments international obligation to surrender to a
foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged
offense committed within that jurisdiction.

14. Alcuaz v psba

15. Ateneo de Manila University v Capulong 222

SCRA 644 (1993)

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University,

died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation
rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at
the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean
Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report
within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa.
Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent
students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a
prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law
School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required
to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board
found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law
School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left
the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration.
Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a
TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO
was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas
andMendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the
respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was
totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due
process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was
ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent

students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly

procedural due process. Dean of theAteneo Law School, notified
and required respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.
The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled
out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice
and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to

file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed
to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court,
thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is
accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law,
as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent
students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary

sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university
herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and

cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
 (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case

16. Domingo v sheer

17. Philcomsat v alcuaz

Philcomsat v Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving

telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were
reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz commissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be
reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted
the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing
of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than
quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not
required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings
and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act,
providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing,
dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and
hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to

make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon
a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion
as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is
hereby SET ASIDE.

18. Globe telecoms v. ntc

19. Philippine merchant marine school v ca

20. Jaka v pacot

JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT
PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and
JONATHAN CAGABCAB.
G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005

Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing

Corporation until the latter terminated their employment because the
corporation was in dire financial straits. It is not disputed, however, that the
termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement under
Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the
employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date of termination. Respondents filed complaints
for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service
incentive leave and 13th month pay against JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered
a decision declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate
respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not
possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and ordered respondent
JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the
proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time
their employment was terminated.

Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is

dismissed for cause but such dismissal was effected without the employers
compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor Code?

Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents dismissal, i.e.,
retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated under Article
283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply
with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering the factual
circumstances in the instant case, the Court deem it proper to fix the
indemnity at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in error when it
ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service. In all cases of business closure or cessation of
operation or undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to
separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of treating labor as a
primary social economic force, affording full protection to its rights as well as
its welfare. The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of
operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved,
in which case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is lost for
obvious reasons.
 21. US v toribio

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

UNITED STATES VS. LUIS TORIBIO

Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be
slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be
unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary
license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His
counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should
acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking
of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a
just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and
restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under
the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of
others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

22. People v fajardo People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-

12172 August 29, 1958J. B. L . Reyes

Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council
passed the ordinance that prohibits the constructionof a building that blocks
the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the
mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside
the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied.
He continued with the construction under the rationale that he needed a
house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.

He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to
its obstructing view.

He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the
question of the ordinances constitutionality.
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No, petition granted.

Ratio:

The ordinance doesnt state any standard that limits the grant of power to the
mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.

Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely
arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are
unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited
above sustain this conclusion.

The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to

permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation.

While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the
state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for
urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they
must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not
be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and
must be recognized as a taking of the property.

The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:

SEC. 2243.Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The

municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary
powers:

x xx xxx xxx

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds

of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue
permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be
determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two
pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The
fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the
municipal school fund.

Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council
had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for
the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before
it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not
conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)

23. Ermita malate v city of manila

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOC., INC VS MAYOR

OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-24693

Police Power Due Process Clause

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the
same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate
hotels and motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd
class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the
demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled
hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of
their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that
such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well
as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws
enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a
strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there
was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption.
Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question
but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The
increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business
other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And
taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention
is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was
to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be
defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to
be vague.

24. Ynot v IAC

G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:

(1) notice; (2) hearing; exceptions

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest requires government

interference; (2) reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose

FACTS:

Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for

having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of
EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the
constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the
validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to
do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this
petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to
arbitrary confiscation of property without due process of law

RULING:

Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice and Hearing

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and

hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the
State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster
described almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are
to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause
into a worn and empty catchword.

Exceptions to Notice and Hearing

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in

every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the
admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions
action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the
loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate
danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people.
Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs
are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The
passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be
cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country
he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in
the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect
the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing
may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the
nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function

of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by
due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it
extends to all the great public needs and is described as the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of
the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation
and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before
he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb
to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns.
Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often
unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And
the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus
populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests
to the benefit of the greater number.
First Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Interests of the
Public Generally Require Interference

xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public
welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626.
The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably
necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited
doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of
these animals except where they are at least seven years old if
male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those
still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.

Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Reasonable

Means Necessary for the Accomplishment of Purpose, not
Unduly Oppressive Upon Individuals

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the

same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos
but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another." The object
of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial

transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no
less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so
says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply
killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the
live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end

were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao
or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine
and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

EO 626-A is unconstitutional

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by

the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old
guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when

notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the
exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for
the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the
urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or

action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require
their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the
offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being
accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the
violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police
only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial
and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the

disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the
said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who
shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee
as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an

invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

YNOT v. IAC

Police Power Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the

slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement
of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of
 carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6
carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in
violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right
to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-
A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that
the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter
of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed

violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based
on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being
transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that
the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because
the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A
case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case,
the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power

to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not
see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

25. Ople v torres

Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought
to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on

January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining its implementation.
Issue: Petitionercontends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE
ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."

Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely

implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a
National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr.
Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates
no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with
government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification
card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight
that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue
that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and
the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact
that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its
face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot
cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification
(ID) card.

In view of the need for Legislative Act

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It
must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and

enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables
the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject
that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An
administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."

Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a
law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O.
No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident,
and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the
lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the
demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of
power and cannot be allowed.

In view of right to privacy

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2)
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.
But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of
A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear
and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics
Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also
raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population
data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be
used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote
relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of
A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN .

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded

whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax
returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the
chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the
electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal
information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be
too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access
to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular
computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,
can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data
stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of
assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will
only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper
safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's
liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement;
it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information
and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of
the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on
his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the
very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared
that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing
his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe
on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in
public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions.

26. Corona v united harbor pilots assoc of the phil.

27. Abakada v ermita
28. Mirasol v dpwh
Mirasol vs. DPWH
 Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the
Department of Public Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among
others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly,
petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances.
Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways
and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.

Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to

travel? Are all motorized vehicles created equal?

Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to
declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the
DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. The
DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the
first place.

We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that
the only justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized
against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-
wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may
be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles
may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.46 We find that real and
substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child,
that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most
obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less
stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.
29. BF v city mayor of Paranaque
30. Carlos super drug
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL GR No. 166494, June 29,
2007

GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007

FACTS:
 Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing
the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise
known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. On February 26, 2004,
R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section
4(a) of the Act states:

SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior

citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative
to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h)
as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided,
further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes
and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso
that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue
Regulations to be issued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new
law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the
meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction
scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales
together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses
before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the
other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the
tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount.

The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount
shall include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether
branded or generic. It stated that such discount would be provided in the
purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for the
exclusive use of the senior citizens.

Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the
discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially that such law
failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the discount.

ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is

unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which
provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.

HELD:

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy

corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This
constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to
intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.

The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and
dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by
theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture,
leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization
of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior
citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable
of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances,
thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

31. Agustin v edu

Agustin vs Edu

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power

Facts: Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the

validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have
early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized
triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide
warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a
set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive

redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped
with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum
lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries
to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country
or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or
the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather
than decrease, the danger of collision.

On Police Power

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents.
It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a
category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in
an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu
v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence
in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court
in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense
the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice
Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,
extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its
scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of
the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power
is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted
in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the

fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended
to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called
to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in
point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads
. . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in
his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195

Facts:

Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of

Letter of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO
Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not
want to use this.

The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device
installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked
cars.

The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the
acquisition cost.

The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or
highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.

Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal
protection, and due process/

2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers

millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.

Hence the petition.

The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to
the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.

The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on

road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful
delegation of police power.

Issue:

Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed

Ratio:

Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is
nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every
sovereignty.

The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.

Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the

health, morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.

J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also

intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures
calculated to insure communal peace.

There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.

Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the

absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.

Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual

foundation in overthrowing the statute.

Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that
the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not
expensive.

SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of
the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its installed
when parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing
drivers to see clearly.

There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate
any constitutional provision.

LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the
LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement from any source.

The objective is public safety.

The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended

enforcement for installation of ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying
rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.

On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled

legal doctrines.

32. Ichong v Hernandez

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the

Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take
advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the
retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed
a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of
which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong
then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it
contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pactasundservanda). He said that as a
Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps
in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally
accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In
this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented
an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no
longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Ichong vs Hernandez

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a
stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or

corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade

aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are
allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of
juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this
Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry.

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually

engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it
unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
them of their liberty and property without due process
 2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations

4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the
aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.

RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class
are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis
for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control
by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the
alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his
living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot
rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the
needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and
the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of
pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control
on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis
and emergency.

33. People v. cayat

 34. Dumlao v comelec

Dumlao v Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)

Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.

Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city

official that already received retirement benefits and is
65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local
elective office from which he has retired.

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being

contrary to the equal protection and due process rights.

Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to

rational classification based on reasonable and real
differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age
have been classifieddifferently from younger employees. The
former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are
not.

Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local

officials because there can be retirees who are even younger and
a 65year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official
who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a
65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office
because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance.
When an official has retired he has already declared himself
tired and unavailable for the same government work.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas

pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

35. Binay v domingo

36. Npc v de guzman
37. Tablarin v gutierez
38. Phil judges v prado
39. Nolasco v comelec

FACTS A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan

Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds
for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election
functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for
spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position
papers. The case was decided against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco,

the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be
finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties
were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolascos
motions thus this petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws

2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming

Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

Held:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was
given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was
not strong. Blancos contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was
not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the
COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a

settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the
second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the
second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment
substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer
would have won the elections because in the situation where the disqualified
candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.
 41. telebap v comelec

42. tiu v ca

43. lacson v. exec secretary

44. dimaporo v hret

45. dimayuga v office of the ombudsman

46. beltran v sec of health

MMDA vs Bel Air Village Association

Date: March 27, 2000

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc

Ponente: Puno

Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services
in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a
road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its

Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA was
apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against petitioner before the RTC a

civil case for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting
the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order the following day. After due hearing, the trial court denied the
issuance of preliminary injunction.
 On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that
the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that
the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the public
Held: No.MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic
services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general
public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court
in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise that it has
police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to
enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the

power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for
the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety,
public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National

Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated,
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government

units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of
Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa,
Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of
Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA
7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA.

The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is

undertaken by the local government units, national government agencies,
accredited peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the
private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has
the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other
cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required
services within Metro Manila.

Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven
(7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which
includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to
rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the
use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and
goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system
of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations,
traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the
institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies
concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and
administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is,
as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in
the charter itself

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate

Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of
police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,
while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in
addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.

Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case
at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal
council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed
opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent
by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not
cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati
City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune
Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to
rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient
movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one
of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By
no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or
implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang.
Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of
Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the
latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present
MMDA. Jjlex

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed,
however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the
MMA. The MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services
requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila." The MMAs governing body, the
Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the
component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination
and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances,
approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The
MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic
services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its
power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in
the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power
it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative
assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the
comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local
governments accordingly."

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development
authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the
affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly
defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of
the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not
an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank
and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform
such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local
government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative
power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and
the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling
on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
 We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to
solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and
traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards
and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with
motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our
peoples productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the
country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are
limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion
of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234,

August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON

G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the
Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime
of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.
Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by

Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary
investigation.

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the
credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn
statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did
not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent
Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due

process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also
assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in
holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and
homicide

2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused

their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them

3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation

4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative
when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:

1. NO.
2. NO.

3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all
the opportunities to be heard.

4. NO.

REASONS:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their
discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of
Rule 112 simply provides that upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial
Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted
searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against
them.

3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their
behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

4. Petitioners argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that
the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of
the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their
violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro,
the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no
showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners complaint about the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records
that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the
DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on
the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March

26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the

subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and
made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he
may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge
that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real

property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned
to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the
Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since
defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The
Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown
whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after
publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and
judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and
afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder.
On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about
seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of
this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered
thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and
the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since
it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular
kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the
power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject
to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and
extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party

in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive
power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the
property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never
be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired
by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress,
and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register
the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem
over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all
the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to

be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not
strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application,
used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon
which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true
action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant,
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general
way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom

publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action
and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should
therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in
rem.

Page

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45
Constitutional Law II Cases Due Process

WEBB V DE LEON

247 SCRA 652

Facts:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a
letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a
panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to
conduct the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable
cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May
22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ
Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting
the required preliminary examination. Complain about the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial
investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide? (2) Did
respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of
arrest against the accused? (3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their
constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation? (4)
Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?

HELD:

(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. (2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a
probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested
committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that

upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should
have conducted searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants
of arrest against them.

(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all
the opportunities to be heard. The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to
adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully. (4) NO. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on
the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their
violators.

Tax Case Digest: British American Tobacco V. Camacho (2008)

British American Tobacco v. Camacho (2008)

G.R. No. 163583 August 20, 2008

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Lessons Applicable: Court of Tax Appeals Jurisdiction, Regional Trial Court

Jurisdiction, Equal Protection and Uniformity of Taxation (constitutional issue),
BIR Power to Conduct Resurvey and Reclassification (delegated by express
legislation)

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

June 2001, petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold Lucky
Strike, Lucky Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes w/ SRP
P 9.90/pack - Initial assessed excise tax: P 8.96/pack (Sec. 145 [c])

February 17, 2003: RR 9-2003: Periodic review every 2 years or earlier of the
current net retail price of new brands and variants thereof for the purpose of
the establishing and updating their tax classification

March 11, 2003: RMO 6-2003: Guidelines and procedures in establishing

current net retail prices of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products

August 8, 2003: RR 22-2003: Implement the revised tax classification of certain

new brands introduced in the market after January 1, 1997 based on the
survey of their current net retail prices. This increased the excise tax to P13.44
since the average net retail price is above P 10/pack. This cause petitioner to
file before the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction sought
to enjoin the implementation of Sec. 145 of the NIRC, RR No. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-
2003 and 6-2003 on the ground that they discriminate against new brands of
cigarettes in violation of the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the
Constitution

RTC: Dismissed

While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA 9334 amending Sec. 145 of the 1997
NIRC among other took effect on January 1, 2005 which in effect increased
petitioners excise tax to P25/pack

Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit attached supplement and a supplement to

the petition for review assailing the constitutionality of RA 9334 and praying a
downward classification of Lucky Strike products at the bracket taxable at P
8.96/pack since existing brands are still taxed based on their price as of
October 1996 eventhough they are equal or higher than petitioner's product
price.

Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Incorporated, Fortune Tobacco Corp.,

Mighty Corp. and JT International Intervened.

Fortune Tobacco claimed that the CTA should have the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the decision of the BIR in tax disputes

ISSUE:

W/N the RTC rather than the CTA has jurisdiction.

W/N RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is unconstitutional for

violating the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution

W/N RR Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and RA 8243 even prior to its amendment
by RA 9334 can authorize the BIR to conduct resurvey and reclassification.

HELD:

1. Yes. The jurisdiction of the CTA id defined in RA 1125 which confers on the
CTA jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes in general. BUT does NOT include
cases where the constitutionality of a law or rule is challenged which is a
judicial power belonging to regular courts.

2. No. In Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, the court held that "xxx It suffices then that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances
or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. If
the law be looked upon in tems of burden on charges, those that fall within a
class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest. xxx" Thus, classification if rational in
character is allowable. In Lutz v. Araneta: "it is inherent in the power to tax
that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class
for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation" SC previously
held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or
kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation"
Under the the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal
protection challenge, must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state
interest. The classifications must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation

A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional

guaranty of the equal protection of the laws. The classification is considered
valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all things being equal, to
both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all those
belonging to the same class.

Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact extent of such

impact as the price is not the only factor that affects competition.

3. NO. Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette
brands remains a prerogative of the legislature which cannot be usurped by the
former. These are however modified by RA 9334.