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7 INTRODUCTION
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<> CHAPTER ONE
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS

Contents
23 1. METAPHYSICS AND ANTI-METAPHYSICS OF POSITIVISM
Index
Card 59 2. METAPHYSICS OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM
Formats: 104 3. SCIENTIFIC REALISM. METAPHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY

Text
PS CHAPTER TWO
PDF
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

Other
Titles: 1. POSITIVISM: OBJECTIVITY AS OBSERVABILITY OF
TA 139 EVENTS

Years: 2. OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND CRITICAL
1984 177 RATIONALISM

196 3. FROM PHYSICALISM TO SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM
###
CHAPTER THREE
MAP
DIALECTICAL BEARINGS
245 1. OVERCOMING HEGEL
268 2. MARX AND THE PROBLEM OF CONCRETE KNOWLEDGE
301 3. CONCRETENESS OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS
327 4. MATERIALISTIC DIALECTICS AND SPECIAL SCIENCES
357 5. DIALECTICS AND THE INTEGRATION OF SCIENCE
6. DIALECTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE

390 IN SCIENTIFIC COGNITION
449 CONCLUSION
461 NAME INDEX
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465 SUBJECT INDEX
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@LBiz: en/1984/AP469: 0-Introduction
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The scientific and technological revolution which started in the mid-20th century has p
<> proved to be a serious test not only for many scientific theories, but also for a
number of philosophical ideas, concepts and even major trends. It affected, first and
foremost, those philosophical schools which were, or claimed to be, connected with
Contents natural science. The global nature of many scientific problems, the high level of
theoretical abstractions, the wide scope of generalisations and the deep differentiation
Index and integration of scientific knowledge enhanced by the scientific and technological
Card revolution have increased the progressive scientists concern about the ethical aspects
and humanistic orientation of research and sharpened their sense of social
Formats: responsibility for the destinies of mankind. The acceleration of scientific and
Text technical progress has intensified their natural interest in the latest achievements of
PS philosophical thought and emphasised the need for a genuinely scientific 8
PDF philosophical theory that would make it possible to comprehend concrete scientific
problems in a broad theoretical, methodological and social context and provide a key
to the most crucial issues of our time.
Other
Titles: It is not fortuitous, therefore, that of all the major philosophical trends and schools p
TA those related more or less closely to science and representing it in some form or
other were the first to weather the storm. And no wonder that positivism and
Years: dialectical materialism, the two teachings that have always professed their adherence
1984
to science, recognised its great mission and expressed their readiness to serve its

lofty ideals turned out, as it were, to be the two poles of attraction for increasingly
### theory-minded natural scientists.
MAP Which of the two philosophical schools will be able to pass through the crucible of p
time and provide reliable guidance for creative thought in the epoch of scientific and
technological revolution? The author of this book undertakes to answer this crucial
question and to substantiate the answer to the extent a task of such dimensions is
accomplishable within the scope of a single monograph.
Many Soviet and foreign philosophers believe that contemporary positivism, despite p
its professed adherence to scientific thinking, is undergoing a deep ideological crisis
because of an obvious and ever growing rift between its methodological programme
and the tasks, tendencies and principles of modern science. The nature of this crisis
sharpened by the scientific and technological revolution deserves special attention, the
more so as there is a glaring contradiction between the actual results of the evolution 9
of positivism and its professed goals, between its pretentious claims and the real
contribution to scientific progress.
Speaking of positivism and its crisis, we shall mainly concentrate on the third stage p
of this philosophy known as logical positivism and often referred to as logical
empiricism or analytical philosophy, and make occasional digressions to the previous
stages in order to trace certain current concepts to their sources.
Positivism as a philosophical trend is known to derive from radical empiricism p

which is one of the pillars of this teaching in all its forms. According to the
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/0-Introduction[2012-12-17 15:15:15]
programme of logical positivism elaborated by the Vienna circle science begins; with
the observation of similarities and differences between phenomena, i.e. with the
observation of -single facts. Established facts provide a basis for initial empirical
generalisations which, after an additional study of separate phenomena and events,
are transformed into broader generalisations. Universality of statements can only be
attained at a theoretical level and such universal truths are regarded as empirical
laws constituting the basis and the core of all theoretical knowledge. The
development of science thus consists in the progressive expansion of empirical
generalisations, and inductive conclusion turns out to be the main instrument of such
development. Expressing the concept of empiricism in a concise logical form, Rudolf
Carnap, one of the leaders of logical positivism, wrote: ...science begins with direct
observations of single facts. Nothing else is observable. Certainly a regularity is not
directly observable. It is only when many observations are compared with one 10
another that regularities are discovered.[ 101
The rapid development of fundamental research in the 20th century has clearly p
shown the untenability of logical positivism based on radical empiricism. As a matter
of fact, the entire history of modern science, starting from the development of the
quantum theory and the theory of relativity and ending with cybernetics, is a
repudiation of the tenet of empiricism. It is not accidental that most contemporary
philosophers of science reject the reduction of theoretical knowledge to empirical
knowledge. They believe that knowledge does not begin with observations and
sensual experience, since observation is always preceded or attended by theoretical
concepts. Yet this general premise is still a long way from regular criticism of
empiricism as the core of positivist philosophy, as well as from a comprehensive
theory of scientific knowledge and its consistent substantiation. The actual
relationship and unity of the empirical and the theoretical in scientific cognition, their
concrete interaction in the history and logic of science, the passage from lower to
higher levels call for a detailed investigation. Nevertheless, the development of the
entire Western philosophy of science in the 1960s and 1970s is keynoted by a
revision of the programme of radical empiricism found to be untenable both
methodologically and theoretically. And this is a very grave symptom of an
ideological crisis of this philosophy.
Another sign of the predicament of the philosophy of science which follows in the p 11
wake of positivist traditions is a drastic change in its attitude towards metaphysics.
The struggle against metaphysics and the attempts to oust it from science and
philosophy have had both positive and negative aspects. The positive effect of the
campaign against metaphysics which was a characteristic feature of early positivism
consisted in its opposition to the traditional speculative, particularly religious and
idealistic, philosophy which showed little interest in concrete problems of scientific
cognition and practical life. On the other hand, positivists rejected as metaphysical
practically all most general and, in essence, traditional problems of philosophy as
unrelated to science. These included the problems of objectivity, necessity, causality,
essence, etc. Such problems, according to positivists, went beyond the limits of
experience, did not accord with the basic tenets and criteria of empiricism and were
therefore declared speculative, senseless, non-scientific, etc.
Unlike most pre-positivist critics of the so-called metaphysics who were not p
opposed to a philosophical theory dealing with traditional problems in one or another
form, positivism rejects metaphysics in principle both as a method and a specific
field of knowledge and declares all its problems to be irrational by nature. The
negative attitude towards traditional philosophy is regarded by positivists themselves
as a characteristic feature of their concept and as one of its fundamental principles.
If one wishes to characterize every view which denies the possibility of metaphysics
as positivistic, wrote Schlick, this is quite unobjectionable, as a mere definition, 12
and I should in this sense call myself a strict positivist.[ 121
In order to overcome metaphysics, logical positivism advanced an extensive p

programme providing for a logical restructuring of the whole edifice of science in
order to standardise the language of science, clear up its logical structure, identify the
basic elements of knowledge and reduce all the other concepts and propositions of
science to these elements. These tasks, according to the exponents of the new theory,
were to be accomplished through the agency of mathematical logic. At this stage the
so-called philosophy of science posed as the logic of science, claiming to give the
anatomy of science with the help of mathematical logic.
Yet all attempts by positivism to become a pure methodology were doomed to p

failure. In substantiating the platform of the philosophy of science positivism could
not but proceed from a set of definite philosophical principles, i.e. from a new
metaphysics of science. This metaphysics with its idealistic and anti-democratic
premises gave a distorted picture of the world in. which the existence of the object
was made conditional on its sensual perception by the subject, the reality was
construed as an aggregate of elementary facts, etc.
One of the symptoms of the current crisis of positivism consists in that the p
exponents of the philosophy of science have renounced yet another tenet of their
teaching and are turning their eyes to what they call metaphysics. Proposals are even 13
made to start developing a new metaphysics on a more or less regular basis. The
concept of metaphysics, however, is extremely broad and sometimes reflects a stable
interest in the problems of materialism and dialectics. The attempts to solve such
problems, though far from being consistent, testify to a search for a new
methodological basis and a new system of values.
Hebert Feigl, for instance, defends the scientific status of such metaphysical p
problems as the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Mario Bunge
believes that the main task of the new metaphysics is the construction of scientific
ontology. Marx Wartofsky writes that metaphysics represents the most general
method of articulating, in critical and systematic form, the alternative conceptual
frameworks within which theoretical understanding becomes possible. The heuristic
force of metaphysics lies in its closeness to our primary modes of understanding and
explaining (by means of the story, the re-enactment of nature in dramatic
form).[ 131 Recognising the methodological (and even the heuristic) role of
metaphysics, Wartofsky, however, fails to give a clear idea of its content. Despite
the obvious tendency towards a more realistic approach to the structure of scientific
knowledge, to general philosophical principles and categories and to their role in the
development of science, it is already clear that the philosophy of science remains
and will evidently remain loyal to some basic traditions laid down by the classics of 14
positivism, focusing on the problems of the logic of scientific cognition, the language
of science and special problems of the methodology of science, natural science in
the first place. Deviating from some dogmas of positivism, it does not relinquish its
claim to the title of the philosophy of science, thus determining the sphere of its
interest. In our subsequent discourse we shall use this name too, inasmuch as it is
associated with Western, particularly Anglo-American philosophy.
It will also be in place here to define our attitude to the term metaphysics which p
will be frequently used in the subsequent text. Though it has acquired a positive
sense in anti-positivist literature, being almost synonymous to general philosophical
problems, we shall abstain from equating these notions and use the term strictly in
the sense it has in the context of the philosophical doctrines under consideration
negative in positivist philosophy, positive in the concepts of scientific realism, etc.
Each of these doctrines will be treated separately and the reader will have no
difficulty in identifying the context in which the term is used thus making the
inverted commas unnecessary. As regards the methodological problems discussed in
the book, we shall call them all philosophical, distinguishing each time between their
specific types, such as theoretical, philosophical-methodological, ontological,
epistemological, logical and others.
In the already extensive critical literature on positivism the most controversial p

problems appear to be those connected with the relationship between theory and
sensory experience, the attitude to metaphysics, and the objectivity of knowledge. 15
The concepts of causality and determinism, by contrast, have been relegated to a
secondary plan and are usually discussed as separate issues independent of other
basic problems, though the most prominent exponents of positivism have always, at
all the stages of its evolution, focused their attention on causality, the nature of
scientific laws and scientific explanation. There is no doubt that their views on these
problems should be critically reappraised.
Besides, the problems of causality and determinism are obviously linked with a p
number of general epistemological and methodological issues and influenced by
radical empiricism, reductionism, induction logic, etc. One or another solution of
these general issuesand such solutions, despite the downright rejection or dodging
of metaphysics, could never be avoidedhas had a direct bearing on the concepts of
causality and scientific law. Conversely, any interpretation of the concepts of
causality and determinism could not but affect the general conclusions of the theory
of knowledge and the positivist methodology of science.
Similarly, the negative attitude towards metaphysics has predetermined the p

rejection of causality and determinism as pseudo-problems. In turn, the positivist
interpretation of causality was partly accountable for the negative attitude of
positivism in general and logical positivism in particular to general philosophical
(metaphysical) problems.
In a lecture delivered at Oxford in 1958, Friedrich Waismann, one of the pillars of p

positivism, referred to 1927 as the year of the funeral of causality[ 161 . 16
Explaining the title of his lecture The Decline and Fall of Causality, Waismann
contended that the collapse of the principle of causality was not unexpected as it had
been prepared by a long period of its general recognition. According to Waismann,
this recognition dated back to the 18th century, i.e. to the Laplatian concept of
determinism which inspired scientists with a hope that the location of all possible
systems in space and time, as well as their physical state could be accurately
predicted given the knowledge of their initial state. Laplace, in Waismanns opinion,
became the exponent of the principle of causal determinism which had prevailed for
more than a century and a half as an ideal of scientific explanation. For all the
power of human intellect, however, such an ideal was unattainable even in the realm
of classical mechanics which was greatly indebted to Laplace. It was called in
question as soon as scientists found it impossible to measure physical values with
ideal accuracy implicit in the Laplatian doctrine. The concept of causality was bound
to collapse as was the Laplatian ideal of scientific knowledge. According to
Waismann, causality was dealt a final blow in 1927 by Heisenbergs principle of
uncertainty as it dismissed completely the possibility of any prediction of events on
the subatom level.
Western philosophers were not slow to attack Waismanns views, yet even in the p
1960s most of his opponents stood but for a limited rehabilitation of the principle of 17
causality. Of late, the criticism of positivist views regarding causality and
determinism has become. sharper, broader and more elaborate. The opposing
concepts, inconsistent as they are, tend to restore causality to some of its
methodological and theoretical rights. Nevertheless, it is still hard to say which path
the philosophy of science will follow in treating these issues.
There is no doubt that logical positivism can be credited with posing a number of p
interesting scientific problems. No less obvious is the contribution made by its
outstanding representatives to the development of the logic of scientific cognition, the
investigation of some specific problems of the language of science, etc. There is no
denying the fact that this school has helped science to get rid of fruitless
speculations and dogmatism. We do not focus on the deserts of logical positivism
deliberately since our interest lies not so much in positivism perse as in the lessons
that could be learned from the analysis of its weaknesses, limitations and errors.
The sharp criticism of the positivist methodology is not the only obvious symptom p
of its current crisis. Using Thomas Kuhns terminology and his approach to the
analysis of crisis situations in sciences, one should attach special significance to the
emergence, within the framework of the contemporary philosophy of science, of a
multitude of rival concepts which go far beyond a critical revision of certain aspects
of the positivist methodology of science and lay claim to a new methodological
paradigm. In point of fact, they strive to develop a more or less complete
methodological alternative to positivism and work out a philosophical programme 18
defying positivism on all or nearly all key issues.
Such alternative programmes are represented by critical rationalism (Karl Popper, p

Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend), scientific (or critical) realism (Wilfrid Sellars, J.
Smart, Mario Bunge), historical trend (Tomas Kuhn, Joseph Agassi, Stephen
Toulmin) and other, perhaps less influential, schools of the contemporary philosophy
of science in the West.
Which course will the philosophy of science follow, what new theory, if any, is p
likely to emerge as a result of the present crisis? To answer these crucial questions
one ought to find out, first and foremost, the real relationship between the above-
mentioned schools and positivist philosophy, i.e. the depth of division between them,
the existing traditional and conceptual links, the ability of these schools to solve the
topical methodological and theoretical problems of contemporary science and the
adequacy of the proposed solutions from the viewpoint of scientific and technical
progress.
The crisis of positivism has been brought about not only by the internal p
contradictions of its platform, but also by the inadequacy of its understanding of the
real nature of scientific investigation, of the laws and history of scientific knowledge.
We shall not concentrate therefore on the issues that preoccupied positivism at
different stages of its evolution, but give our main attention to the most general,
fundamental problems connected with the world outlook and methodology which are
in the focus of attention of scientists, philosophers and practical workers at the
present time. What we mean is the relationship between philosophy and natural 19
science, the nature of scientific knowledge, the objective content of notions and
theories, i.e. their relation to the outside world, the role of the subject in the
construction of scientific theories, the reliability and verifiability of scientific
concepts, the role of the principles of causality and determinism in research, etc.
The fact that throughout its entire history positivism has either been ignoring some p
of these problems altogether or trying to dismiss them as irrelevant to scientific
investigation is, in fact, of little consequence. Willy-nilly, all masterminds of
positivism, starting with Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer and ending with Rudolf
Carnap and Alfred Ayer, were compelled to come to grips with them. What is more,
it is these fundamental problems and not the specifically positivist issues such as the
logical structure of statements, the meaning of reduction, the structure of explanation,
etc. that proved to be the main battlefield where the fate of positivism as a
philosophical teaching was decided.
It should be noted that the above problems will be considered in this book not as p
separate subjects divorced from one another and from other problems, but in their
logical connection with other problems and always in the context of the methodology
of scientific knowledge. For instance, the solution of the problem of the source of
knowledge predetermines, to a certain extent, the solution of the problem of causality
or the relationship of the philosophy to science. Conversely, the solution of the
problem of causality will influence the specific form of the analysis of
epistemological problems. Hence, we shall try to deal not with some random 20
distinctions and features of this or that school or some peculiarities in the
interpretation of a problem by different thinkers, but with a more or less connected
system of their basic principles. We shall focus, therefore, either on the essential
common features in the philosophical concepts of different representatives of one and
the same school or, on the contrary, on the basic differences in the views of the
adherents of different schools. Understandably, some specific features of different
philosophical trends and some peculiarities in the views of their representatives will
be, of necessity, left out of account.
The controversy over the fundamental problems of philosophical methodology is p

highly instructive as it highlights their contemporary significance. Thus, the attitude
to science on the part of the exponents of positivism is a logical consequence of
their absolutisation of the empirical methods of cognition, whereas the attitude to
science of critical rationalists stems from their interpretation of the verification
problems. Scientific realism as a philosophical trend regards science as practically
the only source of material for philosophical analysis and for any concepts of the
world. The conflict of opinions reveals weaknesses in each of the above
philosophical teachings, shows how they distort the actual process of cognition and
exposes their prognostication errors.
The present-day significance of the problem of causality, too, becomes more p

apparent if we, on the one hand, find out the reason for the negative attitude to it on
the part of the positivists and, on the other hand, show its revival in critical
rationalism as expounded by Popper who displays special interest in the forms of 21
theoretical explanation and in the deductive models of the process of cognition.
Highly instructive is also the collision between the concept of causality rehabilitated
and revised by scientific realism in the spirit of materialism and the logical
concept characteristic of the positivist approach inasmuch as this collision highlights
the specific demands of contemporary science on the means of a theoretical causal
explanation and prognostication and reveals the very essence of the principle of
causality.
It would be impossible to define the prospects of the methodology of scientific p

cognition without considering the confrontation between positivism and Marxist-
Leninist philosophy. The history of critical rationalism, scientific realism and
other new trends in the philosophy of science runs into several decades at most,
whereas the ideological struggle between Marxism and positivism dates from the
mid-19th century and is in fact as old as Marxist philosophy itself. Important as they
are, the old-time philosophical battles will not command our attention, since our
chief interest lies, as has already been indicated, in a comparative analysis of the
dialectical-materialist methodology and post-positivism[ 211 .
As regards the problems which will be considered in the light of dialectical

materialism, the author has not set himself the task of expounding in a systematic
form the commonly known Marxist concepts or the views of the classics of 22
Marxism-Leninism on these issues. Proceeding from the basic principles of their
solution known from Marxist literature the author has attempted to reveal their
topical aspects and new forms of interpretation and solution in accordance with the
latest scientific data and new philosophical tasks posed by the scientific and
technological revolution. The book, therefore, does not pretend to an exposition of
any set of truths, but rather underscores the need for a further investigation of the
problems of interest from the methodological positions which the author believes to
be the most fruitful and promising. It is the authors conviction that the mutual
understanding of philosophers investigating the methodology of scientific cognition is
more and more becoming a reality.
***

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Notes
[ 101 ] Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Basic Books, Inc.,

Publishers New York, 1966, p.6.
[ 121 ] Moritz Schlick, Positivism and Realism, in: Logical Positivism, Ed. by
A.J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, p.83.
[ 131 ] M.Wartofsky, Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science, in: Boston Studies in

the Philosophy of Science, Vol.III, Dordrecht, 1967, p.123.
[ 161 ] See A. C. Crombie, Turning Points in Physics, North-Holland Publishing

Company, Amsterdam, 1960, pp. 84154.
[ 211 ] We shall sometimes use this term to denote all modern schools of the
philosophy of science merely to save space, without implying that they form a single
homogeneous whole.
< >

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SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS

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BETWEEN SCIENCE
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AND METAPHYSICS
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1. METAPHYSICS AND
ANTI-METAPHYSICS OF POSITIVISM

Contents
There is hardly any trend or school in Western philosophy that could compare with p
Index positivism in the depth and durability of its influence on society, particularly on
Card intellectuals. Since the first half of the 19th century positivism has suffered many ups
and downs and the interest in this teaching has alternately risen and subsided. Its
Formats: founders have had the greatest of triumphs a thinker can dream of and sunk to the
Text depths of the bitterest humiliation and derision that may fall to the lot of an unlucky
PS philosopher. The powerful grip of positivist philosophy on intellectuals minds and
PDF the periodic tides of its universal popularity can only be accounted for by its sincere
devotion to, even worship of, science.

Other However biting todays remarks about the destiny of positivism as a philosophical p
Titles: trend, one can hardly question the sincerity of its intentions to enter into a firm and
TA durable alliance with science. Born in the atmosphere of universal ecstasies over the

successes of the natural sciences, positivism has preserved till nowadays its romantic 24
Years:
1984
faith in the power of experimental investigation, its appeal for realism in cognition
and genuine interest in the scientific analysis of everyday experience and language.
In the light of contemporary science and philosophy which have gone far ahead in
### the understanding of the laws of scientific cognition and the effectiveness of the
interaction of natural and social sciences a number of its concepts appear now to be
MAP naive and sometimes even ill-matched, the more so as positivism, like any other
philosophical trend, assumed different forms in the works of its exponents: John S.
Mill earnestly strove for accurate applied knowledge without realising the fatal
narrowness of his concept of such knowledge restricted within the bounds of the
bourgeois world outlook and system of values; Bertrand Russell hoped to find strict
logical rules for solving philosophical problems, including those in the sphere of
ethics; Rudolf Carnap made persistent attempts to resolve the growing contradictions
inherited from the previous forms of positivism.
In positivism, like in many other philosophical schools, one should always p

distinguish between the ideas of the classics and their followers. The former,
representing progressive tendencies in science, can usually be identified, first and
foremost, by their profound devotion to the goddess of philosophy and, alas, by
sometimes no less profound delusions. Unlike the wholehearted founders of
positivism, their numerous mediocre imitators lack the necessary critical spirit of
trailblazers in science and, instead of exploiting the success of their forerunners and
rising to a higher level, fall to aggravating their shortcomings and debasing their
fruitful ideas.
For all the delusions of the founders of positivism we cannot but pay tribute to the p 25
noble endeavours of such outstanding scholars of their time, scientists in the proper
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/1.1-Metaphysics.and.Anti-.of.Positivism[2012-12-17 15:15:19]
sense of the word as Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap and Ludwig Wittgenstein who
did everything possible to bring closer together science and philosophy even at the
expense of their personal self-disparagement. Indeed, there is something unnatural
about a professional philosopher contending for self-destruction of philosophy, its
abrogation and dissolution in positive scientific knowledge. People usually regard
this either as cunning, or as reprehensible folly, and are apt to overlook the
possibility of the scientists utter selflessness in the service of his goddess which
goes hand in hand with modesty and complete indifference to scientific degrees,
honorary academic titles, priority and material benefits. Such selflessness may induce
a true scientist of outstanding erudition and talent to be content with the role of a
humble clerk in attendance on an endless flow of scientific papers the meaning of
which will always remain unknown to him. His devotion to science may even cause
him to assume voluntarily the function of a cleaner of scientific Augean stables and
become, so to speak, a scientific scavenger.
In the 1830s, when German classical philosophy with its pledges to explain nature p
by itself, to penetrate the very core of the universe and establish eternal control over
its mechanism seemed to be at the summit of glory, the challenge of young
positivism and its promise to rid science of quackery, whoever the genius behind it,
came as a gust of fresh wind and deserved every respect and recognition. Positivism 26
was indeed a tree planted for the benefit of science and intended to promote its
greatness and glory however bitter the fruit that was eventually born by it.
The rapid development of experimental science in the 18th and early 19th centuries, p
the natural attraction held out to scientists by the empirical methods of research gave
rise to an illusion that all problems of natural science and social development could
be solved exclusively by empirical means and that the techniques used in the natural
sciences should be broadly applied to social research. Practicism and utilitarianism
characteristic of the way of life in the developing capitalist countries of Western
EuropeBritain, France, later Germany and still later the USA gradually became
a standard of scientific thinking. Referring to this feature in early positivism in the
first half of the 19th century one of its founders, Herbert Spencer, said that the wish
to possess a practical science which could serve the needs of life was so strong
that the interest in scientific investigation not directly applicable to practical activities
seemed ridiculous. Enthusiasm over the new methods of scientific investigation,
naturally, went side by side with growing scepticism towards the knowledge which
did not conform to everyday experience, could not be obtained within the framework
of the empirical approach or had no direct practical application.
Nevertheless, the ideology of positivism contributed to some extent to the p

development of natural science, particularly experimental investigations, and helped
science to free itself from the fetters of the religious world outlook and various 27
speculative doctrines and artificial, not infrequently mystic, concepts and theories.
Positivism as an embodiment of this tendency has served as a good purgative. In the
1830s, while still in its cradle, positivism came out with a demand to oust idealistic
philosophers from science and subjected idealism and religion to sharp criticism
regarding them both a product of the mythological stage in the development of
human spirit. According to the positivists, metaphysics had very much in common
with theology and differed from it in form only. Both of them represented different
systems of world outlook and, as such, were outside the limits of scientific
knowledge. Auguste Comte, another founder of positivism, repeatedly stressed the
affinity and, in some important aspects, even the identity of the theological and
metaphysical methods of thinking. In his opinion, the basic distinction of
metaphysical concepts consisted in regarding phenomena as being independent of
their carriers, and in attributing independent existence to the properties of each

substance. He considered it immaterial whether these personified abstractions were
later turned into souls or fluids. They came from one and the same source and were
the inevitable result of the method of studying the nature of things which was
characteristic in every respect of the infancy of human mind. This method, according
to Comte, inspired originally the idea of gods which were transformed later into
souls and finally into imaginary fluids.
Comte rejects metaphysics, i.e. everything that goes outside the limits of science p
(religion, mysticism, idealism, materialism, dialectics, etc.) and proclaims the ideal of 28
positive knowledge and, accordingly, a new philosophy. Yet metaphysics, according
to Comte, is not entirely identical with religious thinking. Moreover, it prepares
mankind for a transition to scientific thinking. A metaphysical thought is, so to
speak, an intermediary between the theological and the scientific ways of thinking
and performs simultaneously a critical function in relation to science. Owing to
imagination which prevails in metaphysical thinking over observation, the thought
becomes broader and is prepared unostentatiously for truly scientific work. According
to Comte, another contribution of metaphysics to the emergence of positive science
consisted in that it performed the vitally important function of theory until the mind
was able to develop it on the basis of observations.
Philosophy in its traditional guise is identical with metaphysics. Its existence can p
only be justified as long as science is unable to solve certain general problems.
Hence, philosophy is only destined to pave the way for science and ceases to exist
as soon as science takes over. It is only within this brief lifespan, measured off by
history, that philosophy contributes to the emergence of science. Its cognitive value
is limited to the preliminary formulation of problems. The social task of philosophy
consists in attracting the attention of the broad masses, even amateurs in different
fields, to these problems, but their solution should be the concern of the positive
sciences and narrow specialists.
Despite the long evolution of positivist philosophy, this understanding of science p

and of the relationship of science to metaphysics was shared by all exponents of 29
positivism. The problem of demarcation between science and metaphysics, in some
periods just implied, in others posed sharply and uncompromisingly, was one of the
key issues in the programme of positivism at all its stages and even the main driving
force of its development.
In the 1920s, logical positivism, starting from the investigations of the Vienna p
Circle, continued its struggle against metaphysics from the positions of empiricism,
though less radical than that of Auguste Comte, John S. Mill, Ernst Mach and
Richard Avenarius. According to the principle of verification first defined by Moritz
Schlick[ 291 and further generalised by Ludwig Wittgenstein,[ 292 the truth of
every scientific statement must be ascertained by comparing it directly with the
evidence of the senses.
In a later version Alfred Ayer described this principle as follows: The criterion p
which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion
of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person,
if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express
that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to
accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand,
the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or
falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his 30
future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere

pseudo-proposition. The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to
him; but it is not literally significant. And with regard to questions the procedure is
the same. We enquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer the
question, one way or the other; and if none can be discovered, we must conclude
that the sentence under consideration does not, as far as we are concerned, express a
genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it
does.[ 301
Hence, empirical verification was assigned a function which went far beyond its p
possibilities to appraise the truth-value of all statements without exception. As
compared with the previous forms of positivism, the new element here (actually
borrowed from Kant) was the division of all statements into two types: analytical and
synthetic. Analytical statements were regarded as tautological or identical, similar to
those often used in mathematics and mathematical logic. Synthetic statements were
regarded as object judgements characteristic of empirical, factual sciences and
claimed to be the only statements which carried any new information.
Regarding the first two types of statements as being of some scientific significance, p
logical positivism not only denies all other statements any scientific value, but
considers them simply senseless. If one or another statement does not lend itself to 31
direct verification, it must at least be reducible by logical means, as a theoretical,
nonanalytical statement, to a corresponding basic or protocol statement which can be
confirmed by direct observation. Statements which are neither analytical nor synthetic
are meaningless and subject to elimination from the language of science as
metaphysical.
The narrowness of the verification criterion induced the positivists to make repeated p
attempts at its modification. The watered-down (for instance, Ayers) version of this
criterion admits of both full and partial verification of statements, i.e. of their partial
confirmation by empirical data. A theory was needed, however, which being itself in
agreement with this criterion, would define more accurately the notion of
confirmation, on the one hand, and correspond to the general programme of
positivism (construction of the logical language of science) and to the traditions of
empiricism, on the other hand.
A most significant attempt to develop such a theory was Carnaps inductive logic p
expounded by him in Logical Foundations of Probability[ 311 and in The
Continuum of Inductive Methods,[ 312 and then, in an enlarged and elaborated
form, in A Basic System of Inductive Logic.[ 313 A characteristic feature of both
versions of his system consisted, first and foremost, in that the logical probability of 32
the meaningfulness of universal generalisations was recognised to equal zero and that
there existed a theoretically neutral language of observations. Out of the three phases
of inductive inferencethe selection of the language, the selection of the statements
of this language and the assessment of the degree of confirmation of a given
statement by other statementsCarnap focused on none other than the appraisal of
the probability of statements relative to the results of the observation (empirical data).
As we see, in Carnaps inductive logic the traditional problem of induction p

undergoes a considerable transformation. The main task of an inductive conclusion is
regarded to be the formulation of a probabilistic prognostication of a particular event
rather than of a universal assertion. Induction for Carnap is practically any non-
deductive conclusion and, primarily, a metalinguistic statement establishing, on the
basis of experimental data, a definite degree of confirmability of a hypothesis.
Consequently, Carnap expands the volume of the traditional concept of induction, on

the one hand, and, on the other, eliminates the problem of confirmation of universal
assertions, i.e. laws, from its content.
According to Carnap, universal laws appear to be senseless from the viewpoint of p

the verification principle and inconfirmable in inductive logic. In point of fact,
universal statements are useless: no one, in Carnaps opinion, will make a stand for
the universality of this or that theory in any part of the universe. All a scientist or a
practical worker may want is a hope that the next test will confirm his hypothesis. 33
The logical evolution of Carnaps views brought him later to an admission that a
shift in emphasis from confirmation to decision-making in the analysis of inductive
logics problems would provide even a more radical method of ousting universal
laws as the last remnants of metaphysics in science. Such a shift would indeed free
science from universal laws replacing them with specific hypotheses. Finally, in the
Foreword to the 2ndedition of Logical Foundations of Probability (1962), Carnap
altogether avoids mentioning the degree of confirmability in connection with the
assessment of inductive probability and prefers to speak of the significance of
inductive logic for the theory of solutions only (and not for the theory of
confirmation). This looks like the end of the last hope to construct the methodology
of science on a strictly logical foundation.
The failure to solve this problem cannot but tell on the prospects of the programme p
of empiricism, since it affects the two most important and interconnected premises of
positivist philosophy. A question is bound to arise: are the principles of Carnaps
inductive logic purported to be helpful in the solution of the main task of logical
empiricism compatible with the principles of empiricism itself?
It has already been pointed out that Carnaps inductive logic was focused on the p
evaluation of the degree of confirmation of hypotheses. It proceeded from the
assumption that the statements concerning such confirmations by empirical data were
the result of metalinguistic analysis and, as such, analytical statements. Carnap
emphasised that his inductive logic excluded any a priori synthetic principles and not 34
only remained loyal to empiricism but even in some respects corrected its
shortcomings, thereby strengthening its positions.
The principle of induction, as formulated by Carnap, was based on the assumption p

that the experimental data testified to a very high degree of probability of the
worlds uniformity. Since the probability in the formulation of this principle was
logical by nature, the statement as such was analytically true. Its truth was not
necessarily conditioned by the truth of the principle of inductionit was sufficient to
know that this principle was probable. The contradiction inherent in this proposition
consisted in that the principle of induction itself was assigned a role of the
foundation of logic and, consequently, its analytical truth value could not be deduced
from the very same logic, but was to be established within the framework of a more
general logical system.
All attempts made before Carnap to develop the logic of inductive conclusion p
pivoted, as it were, on the principle of the uniformity of nature which lay at the root
of the principle of induction. Yet this latter principle is ontological rather than logical
and cannot be obtained through inductive generalisation. According to Kant, it could
have been classified with good reason as an a priori synthetic generalisation. Carnap,
as we see, could not avoid this ill-fated dilemma either and had to make his choice
between an a priori synthetic generalisation and an ontological statement (in the spirit
of materialism). A detective story writer skilled at stock phrases could have summed
up the situation in these words: The fateful shadow of metaphysics has again 35
crossed his path.
It was not fortuitous that Carnap, seeking later to provide a rational substantiation p
for induction, pointed out that the axioms of inductive logic could only rest on a
priori statements and argued that inductive logic as such could be constructed in a
formal way. Yet inductive probability could only be justified in the context of the
theory of solutions where the concept of probability is linked with utility and rational
action.[ 351 The search for a non-inductive foundation of inductive logic as a
form of scientific cognition brought Carnap in the end to the understanding of
probability as a reasonable degree of faith. As a result, the theory of induction
turned out to be built on the sand of intuitive and subjective propositions. Each of
the paths tried by Carnap in his attempts to substantiate induction on the basis of
empiricism led him beyond its limits right into the arms of metaphysics.
It is noteworthy that logical positivism seeks to reinforce empiricism in its drive p

against metaphysics by a logical analysis of the structure of knowledge. For all the
internal contradictions of Carnaps version of logical positivism, it turned out to be
the most successful of all, as it revealed one of the main trends in the development
of positivism and displayed a characteristic feature of its understanding of the
subject-matter of philosophy. Significantly, both the adherents and opponents of
Carnaps theory often call it logical empiricism. The search for new ways in the 36
struggle against metaphysics was by no means accidental. Already in the 19th century
the development of theoretical sciences revealed the narrowness and inadequacy of
the empiricist programme for the revision and restructuring of science which had
been advanced by early positivism. It became clear even in that period that the
programme of struggle against metaphysics ran counter to the interests of science
and hampered the development of theoretical investigation. The theory of the atomic
structure of matter, quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity provided ample
proof that empiricism as a philosophical and methodological programme was useless
and even detrimental to scientific progress.
The rapid development of logico-mathematical studies in that period seemed to p

indicate an attractive and promising way out of the difficult situationto treat a
theory as an aggregate of logically interconnected facts. That anti-metaphysical line
was started by Russell and then developed by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus into an elaborate theory followed by their successors.
Russell did not yet shun many traditional philosophical problems which he hoped to p
solve through the agency of strict rules of mathematical logic. His failure on this
path caused Wittgenstein to take a more uncompromising position not only to
divorce science from metaphysics, but also to throw the latter overboard as senseless
mysticism. The centuries-old controversy over certain philosophical problems
pertaining to the world outlook was viewed by him either as a result of violation of
the elementary rules of logic, or as a linguistic confusion. Alfred J. Ayer, one of the 37
contemporary followers of these ideas, keeping his allegiance to more or less
orthodox logical positivism writes: We may accordingly define a metaphysical
sentence as a sentence which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in
fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and
empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified
in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are nonsensical.[ 371 According to
Ayer, the typical examples of metaphysical assertions are those underlying the
problems of the reality of experience, the unity of the world, the nature of true
reality as distinct from sensory experience, etc.
Richard von Mises who regarded his own position relative to traditional philosophy p
as the most conciliatory among the neo-positivists, was also of the opinion that
metaphysics constituted the sphere of pre-scientific propositions and was not entirely
devoid of future as people would always ask questions extending beyond the limits
of scientific knowledge. Even in new fields of research, while the adequate scientific
language was still nonexistent and the main linguistic rules and logical forms were
not yet known, new questions going beyond the familiar ground were bound to be at
first non-scientific, i.e. metaphysical. To become truly scientific, new concepts must
get a footing in their field, merge with the formal systems adopted earlier and
develop full ability to communicate, so to speak, with other fields of scientific 38
knowledge.
Clearly, this contraposition of scientific and non-scientific or metaphysical p

knowledge is rooted in a peculiar understanding of the ideal of scientific knowledge.
This ideal, according to positivism, is represented by empirical science with its
principle of empirical verification of any assertion. To become scientific, a
proposition must pass through the purgatory of sense-perceptions which alone are
capable of providing direct, really verifiable and really objective knowledge.
Metaphysics as a specific set of traditional philosophical problems derives, according p

to positivism, from the recognition of some unique reality which does not lend itself
to scientific cognition and can only be apprehended with the help of the
metaphysical, speculative faculties of the mind. A more ambitious conception of
metaphysics is one that places it in competition with the natural sciences, says Ayer.
The suggestion is that the sciences deal only with appearances: the metaphysician
penetrates to the underlying reality.[ 381 All positivists irrespective of the school
to which they belong hold that traditional philosophy postulates the existence of
some transcendental reality which is different from and independent of the sensual
world, but which determines its main features.
The pretension to know something beyond possible experience presupposes the p

existence of an extraempirical source of knowledge. The only method whereby
metaphysical philosophers obtain their truths can be the method of a priori 39
speculative reflection. For instance, Russell considered that one of the essential
features of the classical tradition in philosophy consisted in a conviction that a priori
reflection alone was capable of penetrating the mysteries of the universe. Nothing but
an a priori method was capable of proving that reality was different from what
appeared to direct observation. Emphasising that the a priori principle was the
essence of traditional philosophy, Mises wrote: As soon as one speaks of reaching
beyond experience and of the disclosure of the true core, one appeals to the
existence of extraempirical sources of knowledge. In spite of all their many
differences, such theories as Husserls Wesensschau and Platos doctrine of ideas,
Spinozas knowledge through apprehending insight, Kants a priori and
Schopenhauers transempirical metaphysics, ... are things of a similar kind.[ 391
This stand, despite certain modifications in different forms of positivist philosophy
has not changed till nowadays. There is nothing, asserts Ayer, that cannot be
expressed in the language of observations, and everything beyond these limits is of a
mystic nature. In point of fact, however, along with mystic entities Ayer throws
overboard everything that cannot be perceived by senses.
According to positivism, the unscientific character of metaphysics springs from its p

worldview function or, more precisely, from its social orientation and claim to
disclose the essence of the world, as well as from the fact that its propositions are 40
based on convictions. On these grounds metaphysics is regarded as a false projection
of subjective human qualities and emotions on knowledge and on the world in

general. The possibility of a scientific world outlook is dismissed altogether, since
scientific theories, according to positivism, cannot give answers to questions
pertaining to world views.
The positivists maintain that metaphysics meets mans psychological need for p
understanding the world as a whole and his place in the world, and is called to life
by the fateful questions as to the meaning of human life, moral responsibility, and
human values. Yet science is unable to tackle these questions as they cannot be
answered on the grounds of empirico-mathematical investigation which is regarded by
positivism as the only form of scientific knowledge. These questions, according to
the positivists, will always remain the objects of unscientific methods of
comprehension. Man is entitled to use any means to express his world views,
including the least suitable one, i.e. metaphysics, but in that case he should not claim
it to be what it is not and will never becomea science, a system of knowledge.
Carnap regards metaphysics not as actual knowledge, but rather as poetry giving but
an illusion of knowledge.
The world-view character of philosophy is considered by positivism as the main p

cause of its incompatibility with science. Justly underlining the inseparable ties
between the world view, on the one hand, and ideology and politics, on the other,
the positivists come to the conclusion that no problems relating to nature, society and
cognition can fee solved by philosophy (metaphysics) on a scientific basis for the 41
simple reason that these problems are treated in the broad context of the world
outlook and their solution depends, in the final analysis, on the views and ideological
stand of the philosopher. The desire to arrive at practically useful answers
(predictions) in the most difficult and most general questions of life, says Mises,
leads to the construction of systems of metaphysical propositions.[ 411
Ambitious and noble were the aspirations of positivism which set out to free p
philosophy from the fetters of religious and idealistic dogmas. The 20th century
seemed to have been destined to become the age of triumph of positivist philosophy.
Indeed, it has started with fundamental scientific discoveries and its closing decades
are marked by a profound revolution in the entire system of scientific knowledge,
technology and social relations which are being successfully restructured on truly
rational and scientific principles. Ironically, however, this century has also borne
witness to the decline and fall of the philosophy that has made science its fetish.
Dramatic as it may be, the situation is not likely to rouse our emotions unless we p
perceive a human drama behind the ideological vicissitudes. In point of fact, the
reverses of fortune in the realm of ideas are never divorced from the destinies of
human beings and usually entail a drama of a whole galaxy of outstanding
personalities, who believed in the viability of the principles they had advanced and
did everything possible to defend and elaborate them. One can hardly blame any one 42
of them personally for the long and, alas, futile wanderings in the labyrinths of
methodology. If only it were a matter of personal fallacies, mankind would have
long ago found a way to avoid them.
Yet the bitterest irony consisted, perhaps, in that positivism, whose credo was p
service to science, failed to find a common language with its master for any
appreciable length of time. True, there were periods when positivism was in vogue.
Its shares went up at the turn of the 20th century with the discoveries of the
complex structure of the atom and of the electromagnetic field. Hopes also soared in
the 1920s which were marked by the successful development of quantum mechanics
and the theory of relativity. Another spell of good luck came with the intensive
investigations into the problems of linguistics and psychology in the 1930s and
1940s. Finally, the last boom was connected with the rapid development of
cybernetics and genetics, neurophysiology and psycho physiology.
The philosophy of science has been favourably commented upon and can even boast p
of the homage paid to it by Henri Poincare, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Niels
Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Jacques Monod. Yet it is also known that the heights
of their mutual sympathies invariably coincided with the periods of abrupt breakdown
of old fundamental theories rather than with constructive periods in the history of
science. Once a crisis in science comes to an end and the gulfs are bridged, the
philosophy of science in its logico-empirical version would inevitably reveal its
inability to offer a positive programme for scientific, technological or social progress. 43
Each new upswing of theoretical thought was a sure sign of approaching depression
in positivist philosophy. Yesterdays followers and adherents of positivism would
promptly turn away from the friends of science and the short-lived mutual
understanding would give place to even a more profound and lasting mutual distrust
than before. These tides remind one of something like intermittent fever in Western
science, and the blame for it can hardly be put on any particular individual. The
disease must evidently be traced to a source other than the human qualities of each
separate thinkerbe he great or mediocre, honest or hypocritical, egoistic or
unselfish. It proved to be contagious for altruist Einstein and misanthrope
Heisenberg, great Bohr and mediocre Paul Volkmann[ 431 . The true cause of the
illness lies not in the merits or demerits of individuals, outstanding or at least
interesting as they are, but in the conditions of contemporary society.
The role of social conditions in the emergence and development of positivism is a p

separate subject that lies outside the scope of this work. Here I shall confine myself
to discussing the general laws and tendencies of scientific cognition which provide,
as it were, an epistemological background of the developing ideological drama.
Paradoxical as it may seem, this drama is contained in embryo in the basic tenet of
positivism determining its attitude to science. It is precisely the glorification of
science and the disparagement of philosophy that did positivism an ill turn
accounting for the scepticism and even for the downright denial of the value of 44
scientific cognition that are characteristic of positivist works. How did the extremes
meet? To answer this question, let us turn once again to the positive platform of the
philosophy of science.
Rejecting traditional philosophy as unscientific and metaphysical and using many p

other disparaging epithets to belittle its role, positivism has never denied the need for
philosophy in general. On the contrary, the exponents of positivism have underscored
the significance of a new, scientific philosophy which was called a philosophy of
science and given it many other no less pretentious titles. What was the real
meaning of their contentions?
Philosophy as a theory of the most general and essential laws of being was p
eliminated by Comte in favour of some universal system of scientific knowledge. All
scientific knowledge, according to Comte, can only be obtained by special sciences
through observation, experiment, description and generalisation with the help of
broadly used mathematical means. There can be no specifically philosophic
understanding of nature different from that ensured by the natural sciences. Whatever
the particular distinctions in the understanding of the subject matter of positivist
philosophy revealed by different representatives of the first form of positivism,
there is every reason to assert that their views are in the main identical: new
philosophy has in fact nothing in common with old metaphysics and does not
basically differ from other positive sciences: both the positive sciences and
scientific philosophy are absolutely neutral in the metaphysical sense, i.e. in relation
to materialism and idealism. The main object of a philosophical investigation is 45
science, its concepts and method. The methods of philosophical investigations .are
also borrowed directly from science. In short, science is its own philosophy. It is
these ideas, developed and elaborated during the evolution of positivism that underlie
its understanding of the subject matter of philosophy.
Just like the rapid development of special sciences and the strengthening of their p
experimental base in the 18th century gave the early positivists occasion to contend
that scientific investigation should substitute for philosophic cognition of the world,
so the development of biology and psychological sciences was in the late 19th
century interpreted by Machism as the elimination of metaphysics from the studies of
mans cognitive activities in favour of a scientific theory of knowledge. This idea
was clearly expressed by Machs follower and commentator V. V. Lesevich, one of
the first Russian positivists: What will remain of philosophy after the theory of
knowledge, too, gains the status of a separate and independent science? he asks and
proceeds as follows: When psychology, thanks to its successes, rose to a truly
scientific level, no fragment was left of the old all-embracing and undivided science,
philosophy, which could be said to possess the property of universal and
comprehensive knowledge: its place was taken up by a number of separate
independent sciences, and philosophy in the old sense of the word
disappeared.[ 451
The achievements of biology and psychology in the study of man, his psychical and p 46
cognitive activity were interpreted by the second form of positivism as the
emergence of a scientific theory of knowledge opposing traditional epistemology as
unscientific metaphysics. Machism, like classical positivism, made the concepts and
methods of special sciences the object of philosophy which, consequently, was to be
metascientific by nature. According to Mach, a philosopher differs from a natural
scientist in that the former has to deal with a broader range of facts. Justly stressing
the need for a broad approach to philosophical matters, Mach maintains, in full
agreement with the positivist principles, that it is achieved not through the
generalisation of the process of cognition in philosophical categories and its
interpretation on the basis of a definite world view and methodology, but with the
help of some new specialised science which would study knowledge with the use of
special scientific means of investigation. Such means, according to Mach, could best
be borrowed from biology and psychology, since it was precisely these disciplines
that studied man as the subject of cognition and could provide a reliable basis for
the understanding of his cognitive activity.
The most explicit presentation of the positivist concept of the relationship between p
science and philosophy can be found in the works of Schlick, Carnap, Wittgenstein
and other members of the Vienna Circle which is usually associated with the
emergence of logical positivism. The representatives of the new trend fully agreed
with their predecessors in that scientific philosophy was an immanent product of the
development of science, that philosophy should give up metaphysical problems if it 47
was to be promoted to a rank of science and that it should get both its object of
inquiry and its method from science itself. According to neopositivists, the only
reason why philosophy had been unable to become scientific for a long period
consisted in the insufficient development of science itself which could not provide
the necessary means for philosophy to fulfil its metascientific functions. The
emergence of scientific philosophy at the present stage of the evolution of science
was a result of the development of mathematical logic which devised the technical
means for the analysis of science. The initial methodological models developed
within the framework of positivism were in fact nothing but the application of the
ready-made body of mathematical logic borrowed from Principia Matematica by
Russell and Whitehead to the logical development of some hypothetical system of
ideal scientific knowledge.
Logical positivism was a full-scale realisation of the analytical tendency in the p

understanding of scientific philosophy. Yet unlike Mill and Mach, who initiated
this tendency, logical positivism did not regard philosophy as a theory dealing with
the principles of the classification of sciences, the system of laws common to all
sciences and with cognition as such (interpreted in terms of either inductive logic or
the psychology of cognition), but as an instrument for the analysis of science. This
approach reduced philosophy to a scientific system of actions, a kind of analytical
activity. Wittgensteins thesis that philosophy is not a theory but an
activity[ 471 became the banner of an influential trend in analytical philosophy. 48
The great contemporary turning point, wrote Schlick, is characterised by the fact
that we see in philosophy not a system of cognitions, but a system of acts.[ 481
The attempts of the earlier positivists to construct scientific philosophy as a theory
are regarded by neopositivists as a relapse of old metaphysics.
In view of the growing proportion of highly specific logico-methodological problems p

in scientific investigations, logical positivism demanded that methodology should be
completely independent of philosophy and that a new pure methodology, free from
any presuppositions should be developed that would banish philosophical
epistemology together with other philosophical worldview elements from genuine
science. According to the logical positivists, the reflection upon scientific
knowledge, hitherto the domain of philosophy, turns into a special field of concrete
scientific investigation. In this respect the only distinction of logical positivism from
other forms of positivist philosophy consists in that it turns into an absolute the
logico-methodological analysis of knowledge instead of empirical science in general
and psychology and biology in particular. Logical positivism regards the use of
accurate logico-methodological means in the investigation of the structure of
scientific knowledge as a scientific method of the formulation and solution of
philosophical problems. The emphasis on logic as an instrument of philosophical
research is the keynote of the latest stage in the realization of the principal aim of 49
positivist philosophy, viz. discarding traditional philosophical problems and
substituting formal-logical and linguistic methods of analysis for the philosophical
approach to science.
It should be noted that positivism denouncing the so-called extrascientific p

metaphysics is in effect carrying out a programme based on entirely extrascientific
principles. It is wrong to take for granted the assertions of the positivists that their
philosophy is free from metaphysics as the premises of positivism, unlike those of
other forms of philosophy, are allegedly self-evident. Positivism is shy of declaring
and exposing to analysis the postulates underlying the entire system of its arguments.
The metaphysical content of the philosophy of science is admitted retrospectively by p

the positivists themselves. It has become a peculiar tradition with the positivist
philosophers to accuse their predecessors of metaphysicism, inconsistency in the
struggle with metaphysics, various concessions to metaphysics and deviations from
the principle of neutrality in philosophy. Spencer reproached Comte for concessions
to metaphysics, the Machists are advancing similar charges against both of them. As
regards the neo-positivists, they are laying claims to a final break with metaphysics
which allegedly has never been banished completely from the writings of all
positivist philosophers. Defending the concept of phenomenalistic analysis, Gustav
Bergman reproaches physicalists for their inclination to metaphysics, which term, as
it transpires, he applies to some of their materialistic statements. Even within logical
positivism itself the palm of the most consistent fighter against metaphysics is 50
claimed now by one, now by another of its representatives.
It will be shown later that despite all attempts of positivism to discard such p
problems as the relation of man to being, consciousness to matter, interdependence of
space, time and movement, causality, the nature of contradictions, etc. it is in fact
unable to ignore them altogether and has to tackle them in one way or another, often
in a disguised form. Moreover, the more persistent the attempts of each new
generation of positivist philosophers to dismiss the above problems as metaphysical
and nonsensical, the more obvious their importance for science and philosophy. All
positivist theories invariably started from some sort of denunciationbe it the
denunciation of metaphysics, idealism, dualism or materialism. Yet all their criticism
designed to clear the way for the new scientific methodology always contains in a
hidden form some positive, assertory elements.
The metaphysics of positivism is all the more dangerous as it is concealed behind p

loud phrases about the need to fight it and rid science of the cobweb of the past.
The oversimplified idea of scientific knowledge and the disregard of its hierarchical
multilayer structure, as well as the primitive understanding of the nature of the
scientific reflection of the world that leaves no room for the throbbing thought
proved detrimental to positivism even in its self-evaluation and prevented it from
understanding the hidden purpose of its own dogmas. Not only did positivism fail to
uncover its social face and state its social aims, it proved unable even to define its
place in the general process of cognition. The hidden part of the positivist 51
programme, its basic general postulates covered up by loud and pretentious
declarations have never been brought to light for open examination. Yet for the
purpose of this analysis it is advisable that acquaintance be made of these ghosts of
metaphysics kept from the public eye in the backyard.
A curious paradox with the positivist philosophy, besides its unhappy relations with p
science, consists in that in its struggle against metaphysics (which happened to be
now the speculations of German classical philosophy, now the philosophical
principles of classical science, i.e. mechanistic materialism, now Freudism, now
dialectical materialism which has synthesised the most valuable achievements of
progressive philosophical thought), positivism at all the stages of its evolution has
invariably found itself in a snare of metaphysical concepts, sometimes not a bit more
elaborate than those of the 18th-century materialism or Hegels idealistic dialectics.
Incidentally, the metaphysical fallacies of German classical philosophy and the p

Enlighteners materialism have at least the justification that their speculativeness was
partly a result of the immaturity of science and social relations ruling out the
possibility of the profound, truly scientific understanding of the laws and tendencies
of social development. But can there be any justification for positivism wallowing in
metaphysics and idealism at our time when philosophy became a branch of science
way back in the middle of the 19th century, when the problem of the relationship
between philosophy and special sciences has been successfully solved and they have 52
developed their own powerful means of theoretical investigation?
If Minervas night-flying owl had ventured to make its appearance in broad p

daylight, it would have inevitably struck against various obstacles and could have
hardly become the ancient symbol of wisdom. Positivism, unlike the mythological
bird, has appeared too late to win the scientists faith for long and become the
foundation of scientific knowledge. It has never, even in the days of its so-called
triumphs, been able to overcome the somewhat ironic attitude of the scientists to
most of its claims.
Positivism combines in itself the belated faith in empirical science which was the p
foundation of the industrial power of capitalism in the 18th century with the youthful
illusions of its ideologists that the prosperity of capitalist society was inseparable
from scientific progress. Yet it is already infected with early scepticism in the
anticipation of its inevitable decline and does not believe either in science, industry
or in human values. The metaphysical principles making the foundation of positivist
philosophy are similar to those metaphysical doctrines which were characteristic- of
both the 19th-centurys idealistic philosophy and mechanistic materialism. How can
they tally with the latest versions of positivism, with its refined logic of scientific
discovery, semantic philosophy, pseudo-scientific terms such as explication,
denotation, verification and the like?
The rejection by positivism of such traditional philosophical problems as the p

relationship of consciousness to being, spirit to nature is by no means tantamount to 53
the rejection of idealistic and materialistic metaphysics. Just like in the case of
Machism which claimed to rise above the antithesis between materialism and
idealism with the help of neutral world elements, introjection, the principal of
coordination, economy of thought, it simply means that the only object of
scientific investigation is, according to positivism, the scientists sensory experience,
which allegedly does not represent any metaphysical, transcendental reality. The true
significance of the empirical theory of verification advanced by neo-positivism
consisted in that its adherents, despite all their anti-metaphysical declarations, were
forced in the end to revert to the traditional, essentially metaphysical, problem of
philosophy that of the basic, ultimate elements of knowledge. Instead of the
objective reality the title absolute was conferred on sensations. According to the
positivists, mans activity proceeds not in real space and time, but within the narrow
confines of logical formulae binding the sensory experience. Man is incapable of
breaking out of the jail built by positivist philosophers.
The mystification of the relation of knowledge to reality is characteristic of all p

idealistic philosophy which regards the world as the materialisation of an ideal form,
as logic incarnate represented in language. Carnap, like Berkeley, Hume and any
other subjective idealist, puts the true relation of knowledge to objective reality
upside down. He starts his analysis not from objective reality, but from the logical
structure of the language as it exists today, i.e. the language which has already taken
a definite shape and is no longer a living organism, In other words, the accumulated 54
factual material represented in the modern language is the eternal truthnot relative,
inaccurate, approximate, but Her Majesty Reality personified. To be intelligible,
reality must have the same parameters as the logical structure of language. Man
cannot go beyond the facts arranged in accordance with the logical structure of
language. Such transcendence would call for a truly mystic ability to adandon the
sphere of language and intellect.
According to Ayer, for instance, the world is a logical structure made up of p

sensations, which, in his modernised parlance, are called sensuous content. Since
the sensuous content is inseparable from the forms in which it is expressed, we are
unable to pass beyond the bounds of even our statements of sensations. Ayer does
not deny the existence of material objects, yet such existence, in his opinion, cannot
be proved with the same certainty as the existence of sensuous images.
In the positivist picture of the world, like in a frequently staged play, the action p
always follows one and the same pattern set by the producer: subject to change are
only the actors, i.e. concrete facts. Not only do the present logical schemes substitute
for real relations between objects which are infinitely richer, more complex and
contradictory than their logical counterparts; no less important is the fact that such
schemes turn out to be even more speculative than the natural-philosophical doctrines
of the 18th century, except that they take into account some results of the scientific
progress during the past two centuries. In other words, the artificial positivist
schemes ignore the crucial fact that the logical links and relations are by no means 55
identical with the real ones.
Positivism sees its main task in binding together the ultimate elements of scientific p
knowledge rather than in searching for them. Nevertheless, such elements do have to
be defined, if only vaguely. The more resolute the opposition of positivism to
objective reality as something that stands behind the elements and is different from
them, the more it turns these elements into the absolute source of knowledge. By
the ultimate elements of knowledge logical positivism understands facts. For all the
ambiguity of this term which can denote both the fragments of objective reality and
events registered by language, the so-called facts are turned into an absolute similar
to Machs neutral world elements or Berkeleys sensations. The certitude of these
original sources of knowledge does not need any further confirmationit is self-
evident. All other structures of knowledge rest on this solid foundation given directly
in experience.
Wittgensteins selected propositions such as the world is all that has place, the p
world is an aggregate of facts, but not things, the atom fact is the connection of
objects (things), objects make the substance of the world and therefore cannot be
composite, are in fact nothing but vaguely defined ontology not much different from
that of Hume or Berkeley: it is the ontology of atom events given in sensations.
The only difference consists, perhaps, in that in the ontology of the classics the
atoms are connected by association, through the agency of mental links, whereas in
logical positivism the connection must be purely logical.
Positivism takes for granted Humes doctrine that the laws of science do not moan p 56
anything but habitual concomitance of events (conjunction of facts) and sets itself the
task of showing the soundness of this. It has also borrowed the empiricist concept of
observation as a simple self-evident act which only calls for distinguishing the
observation of objects from the observation of their properties. Observation is not
only the initial, but also the final point of cognition, since the only method of the
verification of knowledge is also observation.
Hence, it would not be correct to regard the positivist doctrine as free from any p
ontology. Recognising that observation represents something that exists independent
of man and his consciousness, positivism projects outside the result of observation.
The positivist philosophers world appears to be made up of separate, unconnected
objects united only by some kind of affinity which, incidentally, is taken for granted
and requires no explanation. These logically independent and empirically indifferent
facts are joined with one another solely through the relation of similarity, just as
distinctions are the only form of their separation.
Consequently, each object can change without affecting the properties of other p
objects or can remain immutable despite the existing alternatives. This, however, is
not the premise, but rather the conclusion following from the logical independence of
statements of facts. In Ayers doctrine all facts are particular or represent
conjunctions of separate events so that any generalisation of such facts can only be
purely formal. Causality has no other empirical basis than permanent conjunction 57
since, according to Ayer, there can be no obvious links between them. Hence,
relations between facts can only be external. Even if one speaks of internal
relations, the phrase can only mean a combination of simple elements as component
parts of larger objects. Ayer avers that even if the process of identifying an element
in the system carries some reference to other elements, there will be no two elements
of which it can be said that they are necessarily related, and this is as much as
Humes argument requires.
Hence, the obvious paradox consists in that positivism, despite its own declarations p
about the need to overcome metaphysics and free philosophy from myths and
Utopias remains itself metaphysical and even a mythological system substituting
speculative logical schemes both for objective reality and for the real processes of
cognition.
Advocating a strictly scientific approach to knowledge and demanding the p

elimination of all a priori propositions from scientific analysis, the positivists
proceed from a very definite system of values which were established way back in
the ideological battles with scholastic metaphysics. We shall yet have not one
opportunity to see that positivism, even in its latest forms, has not been averse to the
classical tradition in philosophy and in science in general. On the contrary, it has
proved its strong affinity, remote in time but not in spirit, for this tradition,
attempting to reconcile Lockes and Humes views, incompatible in many respects as
they are.
The inherent metaphysics of positivist philosophy, incapable of critical self-analysis, p

combines in itself some characteristic features of 18th-century natural philosophy and 58
mechanistic materialism manifesting themselves in the irresistible urge of positivism
towards formal simplicity, rigidity and completeness of scientific knowledge, with the
principles of Humes and Berkeleys subjective-idealistic philosophy underlying the
positivist absolutisation of empirical facts regarded as the only source of self-evident
certitude and the true foundation of scientific knowledge. Indeed, beware of
metaphysics!
The widely advertised neutrality of positivist philosophy is in fact nothing but a

philosophical eclecticism leading inevitably to idealism, just as the proclaimed
freedom from metaphysics is nothing but a smokescreen for more subtle metaphysics.
Lucien Seve has justly observed that positivism is a typical form of the decline of
metaphysics which has not yet managed to find its way to scientific
materialism.[ 581 It stands to reason that the inner contradictions of positivism
inherent in its basic dogmas, let alone the contradictions between the premises and
conclusions, could not but lead positivism from one crisis to another and stimulated
its attempts to find a way out with the help of one or another stopgap theory. The
philosophy of science was bound in the end to reject the positivist programme of
struggle against metaphysics and give up attempts to discard all general problems
pertaining to being, nature, society and thinking. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the tendency towards the revival of metaphysics has at last prevailed in the
philosophy of science itself.
***

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Notes
[ 291 ] Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Springer, Berlin, 1925.
[ 292 ] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge &

Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1949, p. 77.
[ 301 ] A.J. Ayer The Elimination of Metaphysics, in: Philosophy Matters, Ed. by
A.J. Lisska, Charles E. Merril Publishing Comp., Columbia, Toronto, London,
Sydney, 1977, p.236.
[ 311 ] Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago, 1951.
[ 312 ] Rudolf Carnap, The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago, 1952.
[ 313 ] Rudolf Carnap, A Basic System of Inductive Logic, in: Studies in Inductive
Logic and Probability, Ed. by R.Carnap and R.Jeffrey, Berkeley, 1971.
[ 351 ] See Rudolf Carnap, Inductive Logic arid Rational Decisions, in: Studies in
Inductive Logic and Probability, op. cit., pp. 531.
[ 371 ] A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books, Ltd.,

Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1978, p.56.
[ 381 ] A. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy, London, 1973, p.4.
[ 391 ] Richard von Mises, Positivism. A Study in Human Understanding, Harvard

University Press, Cambridge, 1951, p. 277.
[ 411 ] Richard von Mises, op. cit., p. 370.
[ 431 ] Paul Volkmann (18561938) was a professor of theoretical physics in

Konigsberg and wrote several philosophical works.
[ 451 ] V. V. Lesevich, Collected Works, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1915, pp. 78 (in

Russian).
[ 471 ] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., p. 77.
[ 481 ] M. Schlick, The Turning Point in Philosophy, in: Logical Positivism, Ed.
by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, p. 56.
[ 581 ] L. Sve, La philosophie franaise contemporaine, Editions sociales, Paris,

1962, p. 294.
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One of the radical attempts to solve the problem of the relationship between science p
and metaphysics on a non-positivist basis has been undertaken by Karl Popper, a
prominent English philosopher, who proposed a doctrine of the structure and
Contents
development of scientific knowledge and gave it the name of critical rationalism. It
is noteworthy that the main principles of his doctrine, alternative in a way to logical
Index positivism, were developed by Popper within the walls of its citadelthe Vienna
Card Circle. The ideas of Popper who had been a member of this circle from its very
foundation foreshadowed, as it were, the inevitable crisis and disintegration of the
Formats: new school long before it reached the peak of its glory when nothing seemed to
Text betoken the impending end.
PS
PDF From the very beginning Popper was a severe critic of the new trend in the p
philosophy of science which was budding within the Vienna Circle among the
philosophers and natural scientists interested in the logic and methodology of science.
Other However, Popper was no alien in this circle, though there is an obvious tendency
Titles: now to leave this fact out of account in considering his relation to logical positivism.
TA
Poppers alliance with the new school was by no means accidental even if we put

Years:
aside his formal membership of the Vienna Circle. One could evidently speak of a
1984 certain difference of opinions concerning the means, yet the aim as such was
undoubtedly common. This is true at least of the early period of Poppers activity
when he advocated the restructuring of scientific knowledge on the basis of an 60
### empiricist interpretation of its laws and categories and underscored the need for
complete elimination of metaphysics from scientific studies. Hence, not only did he
MAP identify himself with the tasks set by logical positivism in that early period of his
research, but he strove wholeheartedly to solve them in a most consistent and
effective manner.
True, the way which Popper considered to be the most expedient and logically p
sound fell off the tracks chosen by most of the other adherents of the Vienna Circle.
Giving him credit for scientific intuition one ought to note that he sensed the
inherent weakness of the verification theory when it was still in the cradle and
discerned the seeds of contradictions bound to undermine this theory when it was to
start revealing its philosophical content, particularly when the principles proclaimed
by the Vienna Circle were to be applied to the problems of real scientific cognition.
In his polemics with logical positivism Popper stressed, not without reason, that p
modern physical theories were too abstract, even speculative, to meet in any degree
the criterion of verification. This criterion, according to which the truth of any
theoretical statement must be confirmed by direct experience, could not provide
reliable guidelines even for a most general appraisal of their scientific value. All
attempts to reduce them to experimental data and to show that such statements, if
only in the field of classical mechanics, were based on direct observation have
proved to be futile. Even the basic laws making the backbone of a theory were too
remote from what was called the empirical foundation of science. On the other hand, 61
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/1.2-Metaphysics.of.Critical.Rationalism[2012-12-17 15:15:25]
the treatises devoted to dreams and spiritualistic seances appeared at first sight much
closer to everyday experience than theoretical propositions and even seemed to use
something like the induction method which held undivided sway in empiricist natural
science.
Popper also noted the fact that many scientific theories had originated from myths. p
It was yet another proof that there existed no sharp demarcation between science and
metaphysics, particularly in terms of the verification theory. According to Popper,
Copernicuss heliocentric theory of the Universe was inspired by the neo-Platonists
worship of the Sun which they placed in the centre of the Universe. Ancient
atomistics was another example of a myth that played an extremely important role in
the development of science. As opposed to logical positivism which reduced the
difference between science and metaphysics to the difference between meaningful
and senseless propositions, Popper underscored already in his first mature works that
the problem of meaningfulness and senselessness was a pseudo-problem.
Metaphysics, according to Popper, was neither a science nor a set of nonsensical
assertions. Hence, already in the early period of his ideological evolution Popper held
a different view of metaphysics than the founders of the Vienna school influenced to
a considerable extent by Wittgensteins and Schlicks ideas.
According to the verification version of logical positivism, the criterion of the p

scientific value of different forms of human knowledge is their confirmability by
inductive methods: an assertion can only be regarded scientifically (empirically) valid 62
if it can be confirmed by inductive methods or an inductive inference.[ 621 As
regards a theoretical proposition, it must permit logical reduction to a protocol
statement confirmable by an experiment. The basic distinction of Poppers criterion
of scientific knowledge from the verification principle consisted in that he regarded
refutability (or falsifiability) and not confirmability as the main characteristic
feature of a scientific statement. Hence, Poppers solution of the problem of
demarcation between scientific and non-scientific assertions is the direct logical
opposite of the neopositivistic criterion. The immunity, even if only thinkable, of a
proposed hypothesis against refutation is a sure sign of its metaphysical nature. A
system of assertions can only be considered scientific if it is at least capable of
being at variance with observation. From this it follows that the verifiability of a
theory coincides not with its confirmability, but with its refutability, and this is just
what makes the difference between science and nonscience. For instance, the
existence of God, according to Popper, is asserted in approximately this form: God is 63
because he is. Since this statement is practically tautological, the degree of its
confirmability is very high. Yet it is quite obvious that a statement, of this kind is
completely immune from refutation and is, therefore, non-scientific.
Poppers argument against the verification principle and in favour of his p

falsification criterion are serious enough, though not at all as original as he claims.
Putting aside the authors pretence, let us take a more close look at his arguments
against the verification version of anti-metaphysical philosophy.
First, Popper contends that observation is always preceded by certain theoretical p

assumptions and scientific knowledge, contrary to the positivist concept, does not
start with sensory experience. Second, the traditional problem of empiricism, that of
the substantiation of the inductive conclusion, derives, according to Popper, from
Humes error concerning the nature of the scientific method. In Poppers opinion,
Hume indeed showed that a theory cannot be deduced logically from observation
statements, yet he overlooked a very important circumstance: his arguments do not
prove that a theory cannot be refuted by observation. Therefore, contrary to the
expectations of the positivists, empirical generalizations are immaterial for scientific

cognition. A scientist is usually not guided by generalised observations, but makes a
resolute step and puts forward bold proposals which are subject to subsequent
empirical verification. Popper maintains that scientists test new theories not in an
attempt to deduce them from a certain imaginary basis, but by creating experimental
situations whereby they try to refute or falsify them. 64
One cannot but admit that Popper did pinpoint the vulnerable spot of empiricism. p
Yet the full significance of his criticism can only be assessed in the light of the
programme which he proposes as an alternative. It may seem at first sight that his
epistemological principles are radically different from those of positivism. Indeed,
according to Popper, knowledge cannot start from nothingfrom a tabula rasa
nor yet from observation. The advance of knowledge consists, mainly, in the
modification of earlier knowledge. Although we may sometimes, for example in
archaeology, advance through a chance observation, the significance of the discovery
will usually depend upon its power to modify our earlier theories.[ 641
Refutation in science, according to Popper, is a motive force of progressa refuted p

hypothesis gives place to another one intended to eliminate or avoid the error. Some
conclusion ensuing from an adopted theory or from a hypothesis may be refuted
this will cause the scientists to improve and transform the theory or the hypothesis.
It may also happen that the very premises of a theory will prove to be invalidin
that case the theory should be resolutely rejected. In any case, a scientist himself
must always strive to subject his hypotheses to severe criticism as it stimulates
continuous progress of science. Refute! calls Popper on scientists. A refutation, 65
in his opinion, is a scientists victory since any act of rejection represents the essence
of sciencof elimination of errors and perpetual progress e: knowledge.
According to Popper, the test of a theory amounts in fact to an attempt to refute it, p
and refutability is the fundamental property of scientific knowledge, whereas the
critical spirit is one of the basic characteristics of scientific life, the ethical
imperative, so to speak, of a scientists behaviour. In assessing a hypothesis a
scientist should first of all decide whether it lends itself to a critical examination and,
if so, whether it is capable of withstanding a critical charge. Newtons theory, says
Popper, predicted a deviation of the Suns planets from Keplers orbits owing to
their interaction and thereby exposed itself to a possibility of being refuted by
experience. Einsteins theories were tested in a similar manner as the conclusions
they suggested did not follow from Newtons theory.
By contrast with the metaphysicians striving for an ever broader generalisation and p
confirmations of their ideas, the scientists do not seek a high degree of probability of
their assertions or, to be more precise, it is not their main aim. The more a statement
asserts, the less probable it is, says Popper. For instance, a theory giving exact
quantitative predictions in relation to the splitting of lines in the atom emission
spectrum under the influence of magnetic fields of different intensity is more
vulnerable to experimental refutation than a theory predicting merely the effect of a
magnetic field on such emission. In that respect, according to Popper, the more 66
definite and refutable a theory is the more verifiable it also is, as it lends itself to
more accurate and exacting tests. In other words, contrary, for instance, to Carnap,
Popper maintains that a high degree of verifiability cannot represent the aim of
science. If that were so, the scientists would confine themselves to tautological
statements alone. Actually, however, their task consists in developing science, i.e. in
enriching its content, and that is bound to lower the probability of its propositions.
As we see, Popper presents rather a dramatic picture of the evolution of science p

which consists essentially in a continuous struggle of theories and in the survival of
the fittest. Unlike Carnap who regarded the victory of a theory to be in no way
damaging to the prestige of its rivals, Popper maintains that the triumph of one
hypothesis inevitably spells the doom of all others. With Carnap, scientific theories
move in a respectable and civilised society, whereas Popper sees them waging
relentless struggle for existence in which the rise of a theory can only be achieved
by murdering its opponent. Explaining his understanding of the difference between
science and metaphysics, Popper used to say that a believer perishes together with
his false convictions, whereas a scientist sacrifices his creation, a theory, for the sake
of the progress of science.
As regards each individual scientific theory, it begins, according to Popper, with a p

problem. Then follows a tentative solution, a conjecture, criticism and correction of
errors. The tentative solution may prove partly or even completely erroneous. Yet
this does not mean, says Popper, that a scientist is entitled to a deliberate error. To 67
avoid it, he must, first of all, look deeper into the problem and comprehend it.
And how can he do this? Popper says: To understand a problem means to
understand its difficulties, and to understand its difficulties means to understand why
it is not easily solublewhy the more obvious solutions do not work.[ 671 The
step that follows a tentative solution consists in discussing and criticising the theory.
At this stage everybody tries to find faults with it, to refute it or to correct the
errors. Popper writes: The critical attitude may be described as the conscious
attempt to make our theories, or conjectures, suffer in our stead in the struggle for
the survival of the fittest. It gives us a chance to survive the elimination of an
inadequate hypothesiswhen a more dogmatic attitude would eliminate it by
eliminating us.[ 672
This attitude, according to Popper, is true of the animal, pre-scientific and scientific p
knowledge and, consequently, characterises the mechanism of its evolution in
general. A specific feature of scientific knowledge consists in that the struggle for
existence in human society becomes more difficult because of conscious and
systematic criticism.
In Poppers opinion, one can only speak of any progress in science (as well as of p
the demarcation line between science and metaphysics) in connection with the
possibility of falsification. Poppers falsification concept is closely linked with his 68
peculiar notions of the genealogical tree of knowledge. If we take a tree in its
natural position, i.e. with its crown up, for a model of the evolutionary process, we
shall have, according to Popper, the picture of the development of applied sciences,
since they are characterised by the ever increasing diversification and specialisation.
Yet to visualise the development of pure knowledge, of fundamental sciences, one
should set the tree with the crown down, since the leading tendency in the sphere of
pure knowledge consists in the growing integration and unification of theories.
From the epistemological viewpoint, Poppers concept is different from the p

traditional empiricist stand only in that it dismisses the question of the source of
knowledge, since the logic of a scientific discovery which is what Poppers
epistemology boils down to, does not concern itself with questions of this kind. In
point of fact, this question lies on the other side of the demarcation line which
Popper draws between science and metaphysics. Yet even within the narrow limits
of a purely logical model of the process of cognition Poppers concept gives rise to
serious contradictions. Indeed, in investigating the relation between knowledge in
general and a concrete discovery or theory one must answer at least two questions:
(1) which element of knowledge and at which stage of its maturity is taken as the
basic proposition; (2) which proposition in a given specific case can be confirmed or
refuted with the help of an experiment. The second question remains, in fact,
unanswered by Popper. As regards the first one, the answer is as follows: the initial, 69
basic propositions are a product of arbitrary convention among scientists. Popper
does not deny the connection of basic propositions with experience. In The Logic of
Scientific Discovery he writes that the decision to adopt a basic proposition stands in
causal relation to our sense perceptions. Experience, according to Popper, can only
go to the extent of motivating a decision which is needed for the adoption or
rejection of a proposition. Yet any attempt to trace basic propositions to perceptions
would be entirely fruitless.
As we see, despite the ostensible opposition to empiricism, Poppers concept reveals p

a curious similarity to logical positivism in at least two aspects: (1) in its tendency
to limit the subject-matter of epistemology to purely logical problems and to reject
some general problems (e.g. the problem of the source of knowledge); (2) Popper,
like the leading theorists of the Vienna school, is forced to resort to conventionalism
when it comes to explaining the origin of basic propositions, though he substitutes
conventionalism from below for the traditional conventionalism from above used
by logical positivism in its attempt to account for scientific laws and theories.
Poppers conventionalism is a result of his far-reaching logicism, leading to the
dismissal of philosophical and sociological problems of science as insoluble. The
basic propositions introduced by Popper are intended to replace the protocol
statements of the Vienna school and differ from them in that they reflect a system of
conventional knowledge rather than the transient individual experience.
The rational kernel in Poppers criticism of the verification theory consists in that p 70
Popper considers science as an endless chain of theories that replace one another. He
effects a radical change in the traditional orientation of the logical analysis of
scientific knowledge. Having started with the investigation into the rules of refutation
of scientific theories, Popper made the progress of science the pivotal point of his
concept. The problem of the criterion of scientificity now organically merges with
the concept of the development of science: crises in science, i.e. the collapse of
traditional theories are declared to be inherent in the main postulates of the logic of
scientific development. The new logic of science is a logic of scientific discovery, of
the radical transformation of the existing systems of knowledge. Popper has shifted
the focus of attention from the formal logical analysis of systems and propositions to
the problem of the logical reconstruction of historical events in scientific
development.
In his person the logic of science has made a step towards the history of science in p
the hope of creating a new tradition in the analysis of scientific knowledge. New
horizons have been opened up before logic both in terms of theory and heuristics.
Poppers logical notions show a clear tendency towards historicism in the
presentation of scientific progress. Historical analysis, of course, would have been
highly helpful in the solution of such problems as the criterion of scientific theories,
the role of philosophical knowledge in the development of science, and many others.
But such analysis proved to be beyond Poppers possibilities. Logicism has got the
better of his aspirations.
Development, a traditional metaphysical problem, has also been treated with p 71

reference to scientific knowledge by Thomas S. Kuhn, who gave it even a more
pronounced anti-positivist turn.
In opposition to Popper, Kuhn put forward a thesis that scientific development p

cannot be explained by means of rational logical notions in principle. The sharp
controversy that was initiated by his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first
published in 1972 is still unabated centering around Kuhns polemics with Poppers
school. This polemics is playing rather an important role in weakening the positions
of critical rationalism.
A crucial feature of scientific life which, according to Kuhn, was ignored by p

Popper, consists in the presence of some dogmatic elements in the scientists work
which bolster up their faith in the success of their investigations and help them to
persist in their studies without arguing with their colleagues. As distinct from Popper
who underscores the significance of criticism in science, Kuhn emphasises the
function of dogma in scientific investigation. Contrary to Popper, who avers that bold
refutations and tough competition of theories pave the way for scientific progress,
Kuhn sees the starting point of progress in a transition from debates and competitive
theories to a common viewpoint shared by all specialists.
According to Kuhn, the true creator of science is the scientific community, a group p
of professionals who decide to adopt a certain scientific achievement or theory as a
model and make it a basis for their investigations. No scientific community can start
investigating natural phenomena without a definite system of generally recognised 72
notions. Such a system of notions also includes certain metaphysical propositions or
models of the type: heat is kinetic energy of particles making a body or all
perceptible phenomena are essentially interaction of qualitatively homogeneous atoms
in free space, etc. Within the scientific community a model theory is a paradigm,
whereas the study of nature within the framework of a paradigm is normal science.
If there is a paradigm, the solution of concrete scientific problems resembles the
solution of puzzles: the scientist has a model of the solution (the paradigm), the rules
to be followed, and knows that the problem is soluble. The conditions being set, his
success depends on his personal ingenuity. The secret of scientific achievements lies
largely in the self-organisation of the scientific community. No other professional
group has succeeded to such an extent in fencing itself off from everyday life and
laymens questions as the scientific community. To be sure, such isolation can never
be complete, yet it is very essential. A scientist always does his individual research
with an eye to his colleagues in the first place, whereas a poet or a writer addresses
a non-professional audience and depends to a great extent on its appreciation. Just
because he is working only for an audience of colleagues, an audience that shares his
own values and beliefs, the scientist can take a single set of standards for
granted,[ 721 writes Kuhn. He does not even have to select his problems they
themselves are waiting for him.
However, this is only the first stage of the scientific process. The next stage consists p 73
in a break-down of old paradigms, a crisis and a formation of a new paradigm. It is
a period of extraordinary investigations and controversy leading to the development
of the new principles of investigation and to the creation of a new picture of the
world. The main task of this period is to select a theory that would play the role of
a paradigm. This selection, according to Kuhn, is not a logical problem as it appears
to logicians. The criterion for the selection lies in a socio-psychological sphere: the
scientific community selects for a paradigm the theory which appears to be best
suited to ensure the normal functioning of the scientific mechanism. Therefore each
critical period gives way to a new upsurge of creative activity and another step
forward in the onward march of natural science. To an individual scientist, however,
a change of basic theories (paradigms) is tantamount to conversion to a new faith: he
feels like entering a new world with entirely different objects, notions, problems and
tasks.
Hence, a scientific revolution consists essentially in a change of paradigms. This p

change does not yield to rational explanation in terms of logic as it is rooted in the
professional feeling of the scientific community: either the community possesses the
necessary means for solving puzzles, or, if such means are not available, the
community has to create them.
The main turning points in the history of science are associated with the names of p
Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein. According to Kuhn, each of these turning
points signified that a group of professional scientists had to discard one age-old 74
theory in favour of another incompatible with the former.
Paradoxical as it may seem, Poppers logical concept of scientific revolutions and of p

the downfall of famous theories has been constructed on the basis of the same
historical material. In this connection Kuhn justly observed that Popper had no
reason for characterising all scientific activity in the terms applicable to its rare
revolutionary periods only.
The severity of the test criteria referred to by Popper is only one side of the medal, p
the other one being the tradition of normal science, the solution of puzzles.
Subject to testing is not the basic theory, but the scientists conjecture, his ingenuity.
An erroneous conjecture is a setback for the scientist, but not for his paradigm.
Poppers idea of the elimination of errors which accompanies a change of theories p

is yet another concept which meets Kuhns resolute opposition. Popper regarded as
erroneous Ptolemys geocentric astronomy, the flogiston theory, Newtons mechanics.
Kuhn refuses to accept this point of view: no error has been committed in the
development of these theories and the notion of error in general is absolutely
irrelevant in the assessment of an obsolete scientific theory. In his opinion, the most
one can say in such cases is that a theory which had once been correct later became
erroneous, or that a scientist made a mistake by adhering to a theory too long.
In the final analysis the basic distinction between Poppers and Kuhns concepts lies p
in their different understanding of the nature of science and progress. Popper has
repeatedly emphasised the need to cast off psychologism in the solution of such 75
problems. He was never tired of repeating that his concern was the logical rules of
scientific progress rather than the scientists psychological incentives; yet he could
not but admit that the rules of logic followed by scientists in their investigations are
something like their professional imperatives. In contrast to Popper, Kuhn contends
that such imperatives alone can account for a scientists selection of one solution
instead of another and that his preference cannot be explained on purely logical or
experimental grounds. In other words, it is only the analysis of socio-psychological
factors in the development of science that provides a key to the correct
understanding of the historical aspects of scientific progress. Poppers science is
impersonal whereas Kuhn strives to introduce a human element into the logical
problems of scientific cognition and highlights its sociological and psychological
aspects. Both concepts, however, are completely divorced from the problem of the
interaction between philosophy and particular sciences. Moreover, Kuhn even makes
a special point of substantiating this indifference. A question, naturally, arises if such
an abstraction in the investigation of the history of science is justifiable and if it is
not likely to distort the true picture of scientific progress.
A serious attempt to save the logical tradition in the analysis of historical changes p
in science was made by Poppers disciple Imre Lakatos, a prominent representative

of critical rationalism and a talented expounder of his schools principles.
Lakatos holds that it is necessary to discard completely the tradition of logical p 76

positivism which focused on formal logical means in the analysis of scientific
knowledge.[ 761 He shares Poppers opinion that the only way in the investigation
of the logic of science is to turn to the real practice of scientific thinking. To
substantiate this view he shows that even mathematics which has long been regarded
as the main bastion of the adherents of formal logical analysis needs the substantive
analysis of its history so as to get a basis for the development of the logical and
methodological scheme of scientific discovery.
Each time the historical process of scientific cognition reveals a need for a change p
in the existing system of knowledge there appears a possibility for different strategies
and for different ways of development. Being always faced with the necessity of
casting lots in selecting one of the alternatives that would prove the most
beneficial for further scientific progress, the scientists never stop seeking for a
guideline. This guideline, according to Lakatos, must be provided by the modern
logic of science. It is precisely for this reason that it should break off with the
tradition of formalism. Formal logical analysis deals with deductive, formalised
theories which represent science in the artificially frozen state, whereas the real
object of logical analysis and explanation should be the methods and mechanisms of
changes in the structure of knowledge. Criticism gives scientists a rich situation
logic, i.e. opens up a broad range of possible lines of behaviour in different
situations.
Lakatos points out that Poppers solution of the demarcation puzzle and his p 77
criterion of scientific knowledge have brought about a radical change in the very
formulation of the problem. After Popper, the logical appraisal of a scientific theory
turned in fact into the analysis of conditions under which a given theory or
hypothesis can be adopted for scientific use. In other words, Poppers new approach
to the traditional problems of the logic of science brought to the forefront the
question of the acceptability of a scientific theory or a hypothesis. According to
Popper, a theory can only be accepted as scientific if it is falsifiable. Lakatos,
however, regards this criterion as only one of the requirements a theory must meet
in order to become acceptable.
Kuhns controversy with Popper about scientific revolutions raised the crucial p
question of the possibility of representing the endless change of fundamental
scientific theories as a rational process interpretable in terms of logic. As for Lakatos,
his main object was to give a logical explanation of the victory of a new paradigm.
He is firmly convinced that logic is capable of giving the scientist a rational
guideline for his behaviour during a critical period in the development of science.
Proceeding from this aim, Lakatos develops his concept known as the methodology
of research programmes.
Lakatos sides with Kuhn in his criticism of Poppers rule: having falsified p
reject!. According to Lakatos, the comparison of a theory with the results of an
experiment is a more complex procedure than Popper originally thought it to be. This
comparison involves, as it were, three layers of knowledge: (1) the theory under
test itself; (2) the sensory data explained by the theory (for instance, the light images 78
observed with the help of an optical instrument); (3) the so-called background
knowledge embodied, for instance, in the instrument design. We cannot know what
the experiment demonstrates and how it can pass a final judgement on the theory
under test. Rather, says Lakatos, we subject to testing a tangle of our theories and
the experiments verdict is: incompatible. Which of the theories must be rejected is
still a big question. Generally speaking, there are no absolutely indisputable facts
which would compel an ardent adherent of a theory to surrender immediately and
unconditionally. On these grounds Lakatos comes to the conclusion that a theory
cannot be invalidated by a single empirical counter-example. Its rejection can only
come about in the process of adoption of a new, better theory.
Broadly speaking, it means that the true object of a logical evaluation is a series of p
theories in their succession rather than an individual theory. Several series cluster
around propositions playing the role of something like a dogmahere, according to
Lakatos, Kuhn was right. It can therefore be affirmed with good reason that the
scientists in their investigations of nature translate into reality some more or less
developed programmes.
Lakatos understands science as activity aimed at solving concrete problems within p

the framework of a certain programme. Each programme can be viewed as consisting
of two components: a rigid core and a safety zone of sacrificial theories. The rigid
core consists of one or several propositions which are not subject to refutation. Such 79
are, for instance, the three laws of thermodynamics and the law of gravitation for the
adherents of Newtons theory. These propositions must be preserved under any
onslaught of falsifying data. The salvation of the core is achieved at the expense of
auxiliary hypotheses which replace one another and are intended to neutralise
counter-examples and preserve the core with the help of various amendments and
modifications.
By way of illustration Lakatos refers to Newtons gradual elaboration of his p

theoretical models.[ 791 Having first worked out his programme for a planetary
system with a fixed pointlike the Sun and one single point-like planet, Newton
derived his inverse square law for Keplers ellipse. But this model was forbidden by
Newtons own third law of dynamics, therefore the model had to be replaced by one
in which both the Sun and the planet revolved round their common centre of gravity.
Later he introduced more planets as if there were only heliocentric but no
interplanetary forces. However, the results obtained at this stage ran counter to
observations, and later Newton worked out the case where the Sun and planets were
not mass points but mass-balls and also introduced interplanetary forces. Such
multistage elaboration, according to Lakatos, reveals the true course of the scientists
thought.
The history of science, according to Lakatos, is the history of the birth, life and p
death of research programmes. While a programme is being realised, science runs its
normal courseit is Kuhns normal science. During a change of programmes, or a 80
change of paradigms, science undergoes a revolution. As distinct from Kuhn,
however, Lakatos believes that programmes are logically commensurable and can be
compared to one another. Their comparative analysis can provide a scientist with a
reasonably reliable guideline for selecting one programme and rejecting another.
According to Lakatos, any theoretical concept of knowledge provides a framework p

for the rational restructuring of the history of scientific knowledge. Though not every
detail in the history of science fits in with rational explanation, logico-methodological
concepts should provide the closest possible approximation to real processes in order
to permit their description. For instance, an inductivist who considers Newtons
theory an error, and its lasting prevalence a delusion would find no rational
justification for it. Poppers type of logic would provide a rational explanation for a
scientists failure to recognize the collapse of his theory by referring to his

metaphysical views. In Lakatos opinion, preference should be given to a concept
which permits the rational restructuring and interpretation of the largest possible
number of facts in the history of science. Proceeding from this criterion, Lakatos
considers his concepts to be the most expedient. However that may be, his ultimate
conclusion is this: it is the history of science which is the touchstone of any logico-
methodological concept, its strict and uncompromising judge.
The controversy between the critical rationalists and the adherents of Kuhns- p
concept of the history of science had greatly affected the assessment of the very
possibility of constructing a purely logical concept of scientific knowledge and its 81
development. The most sceptical views in relation to this problem were expressed by
Paul Feyerabend. In one of his works, after expounding the basic principles of
Poppers logic of scientific investigation, Feyerabend puts two questions which he
considers to be of prime importance: (1) whether it is desirable to live up to the
rules of critical rationalism and (2) whether science can be brought in accord with
these rules.[ 811 Feyerabend gives negative answers to both questions.
According to Feyerabend, the highly specialised thinking characteristic of modern p

civilisation is accountable for a corresponding narrow approach to the study of mans
cognitive activity and for a tendency to rationalise the process of cognition by
simplifying its participants, strictly delimiting the field under investigation and by
abstracting from historical context. Feyerabend contends that such abstraction from
the external factors of scientific development becomes fatal for philosophy, since
human inclinations, interests and ideological influences have a greater effect on the
progress of knowledge than is generally believed. Despite his general opposition to
Kuhns understanding of the nature of scientific activity, Feyerabend, as he himself
admitted, had wholeheartedly accepted his thesis of the incommensurability of basic
scientific theories that succeed one another in history. Incommensurability was the
point on which the views of both authors completely coincided when they were
discussing the basic ideas of Kuhns book. Kuhn was fond of comparing the world 82
as it appeared to Aristotle with the world depicted by the 17th-century science.
Having taken the cue, Feyerabend carries out a detailed comparative analysis of
classical celestial mechanics and the special theory of relativity and strives to show
that even the concepts of length, mass and speed in these theories were entirely
different. According to both Kuhn and Feyerabend, the meaning of observation terms
is completely determined by the theoretical context in which they are used. From this
it follows that theories replacing one another are mutually incompatible and even
incommensurable. They belong to different worlds. The field of application of a new
theory is not necessarily the extended field of application of the previous theory,
these fields may only overlap each other. The view according to which a new theory
is bound to be commensurable with the previous one cannot be accepted as a
universal principle. Incommensurability may be eliminated in one aspect, but holds
good or even becomes more complete in another.
The thesis of the incommensurability of theories succeeding one another is so p

important for Feyerabend that he considers it imperative for the logical analysis of
scientific theories to start with revealing and emphasising the qualitative distinction
of the new theory over the old one. A new theory must not only explain new facts,
but also show the causes of the failure of the old theory. It is only on this condition
that a new theory can be admitted to the temple of science. According to
Feyerabend, a scientific theory can only be identified by its novelty and complete
break from its predecessor. This criterion should also be applied to epistemology and 83
to the logic of science.
Feyerabend contends that the history of science testifies to the absence of any norms p
and standards of scientific activity valid for all times. Proceeding from his own
understanding of Hegelian dialectics, Feyerabend maintains that any phenomenon can
only be investigated in terms of the dialectics of the subjective and the objective,
chance and necessity. Any absolutisation of norms and rules tends to bar the way to
cognition. The true task of philosophy is to neutralise the baneful trends towards the
stability and rigidity of methodological norms. Philosophy should embody the whole
gamut of mans creative potentialities, all his individual qualities. To achieve this
end, however, it must do away with the stability of all norms of scientific
knowledge. Consequently, the logic of science should renounce the very idea of
standards which hold good throughout history. Such standards can at best be treated
as a verbal ornament or, more accurately, as a remembrance of those happy days
when it was believed possible to gain success in science just by observing a few
simple and rational rules and when scientific investigation was not yet known to be
a risky and hazardous venture that it is, with endless upheavals and cataclysms.
Feyerabends methodology calls for rejection of the theoretical monism characteristic p

of positivist and some other philosophical doctrines. The plurality of theories, in his
opinion, must not be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will be
replaced later by a single true theory. Theoretical pluralism is assumed to be an 84
essential feature of all knowledge that claims to be objective, writes Feyerabend.
Nor can one rest content with a plurality, that is merely abstract and created by
arbitrarily denying now this and now that component of the dominant point of view,
as is the plurality created by the various attempts of modern artists to free
themselves from the conventions of their predecessors.[ 841
In its methodological orientation the theory of science should proceed from the idea p
of epistemological anarchism. The development of science, according to Feyerabend,
is a process of the continuous combination of standards and their violations, dogmas
and heresies, norms and errors. Kuhns normal science does exist, but it has to be
opposed in every way as it reflects the ideology of professional specialist. Kuhns
concept of paradigm is deficient in that it consoles the specialists instead of
subjecting their views to criticism. Feyerabends motto is an uninterrupted revolution.
Proceeding from his own interpretation of Hegels words about human practice, p
mans spiritual and practical activity, Feyerabend avers that it excludes any
regularities. A theory of science should only provide some general hints, rules of
thumb and heuristic methods, but not general injunctions. Knowledge is ... an ever-
increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps even incommensurable)
alternatives.[ 842 Nor is philosophy itself amenable to rational analysis in view 85
of the disorderliness, complexity and wholeness of its structure.
Feyerabend proposes a broad programme of struggle to attain the ideal of anarchic p

epistemology and overcome the ideas of critical rationalism which seeks to alienate
science and enslave human spirit. He points out three means to achieve this goal: (1)
scrupulous analysis of the works of such revolutionaries as Galilei, Newton, Luther,
Marx and Lenin; (2) study of Hegels philosophy and its alternative as.expounded by
Kierkegaard; (3) integration of science and art. According to Feyerabend, their
present separation is not natural and results from the idea of professionalism which
must be discarded. A poem or a play can be intellectual and informative in equal
degree (Aristophanes, Brecht), whereas scientific theories are capable of giving
pleasure (Galilei, Dirac). In Feyerabends opinion, we can change science and make
it conform to our tastes.
Being indeed anarchical and wide open to all winds of theoretical thought, this p
model of scientific knowledge nevertheless leaves enough room for metaphysical
ideas. Moreover, their function, as defined by Feyerabend, makes them a decisive
factor both in the criticism and in the development of what is generally believed and
highly confirmed. Hence, they must be present at any stage of the development of
scientific knowledge. Feyerabend contends that a science free from all metaphysics is
on the way of becoming a dogmatic metaphysical system. Metaphysics performs the
role of an instrument of criticism of existing theories, on the one hand, and, just 86
because of the possibility of such criticism, is an argument in favour of these
theories. The postulate of Feyerabends philosophy affirming the absence of any
certainty, stability and system in methodology assumes itself the character of a
dogma. Its absolutisation results in the restoration of a new variety of metaphysics
which is anything but refined.
Joseph Agassi also shares the view that the claim of logic to the role of the theory p
of scientific knowledge can hardly be considered justifiable. As for himself, he is
inspired by the idea of reproducing the real history of science with all its wealth of
conflicting tendencies, and the methodology of science has no special appeal for him.
The keynote of his works is the futility of preconceived viewpoints and the need for
a scrupulous and unbiased reproduction of the entire history of science with all its
real conflicting tendencies.
In Agassis opinion, one ought to start with asking himself a question: what do we p
know about science in general and about its history? The existing historiography is
too raw to provide a basis even for a most abstract theoretical discussion of the
criterion of scientificity and the logical principles of cognition.
Agassi contends that a broad programme of historiographic investigations of science p

should be based on Poppers situation logic which makes it possible to reveal the
historical context of various scientific theories or hypotheses. He warns, however,
that such investigations should not be influenced by any preconceived idea of
science, since the present-day task consists in disclosing and singling out concrete
genetic links between scientific theories rather than in their reduction to some ideal 87
type or logical model.
Agassi holds that the core of science reveals itself in the scientists metaphysical, p
i.e. philosophical, views which should therefore be given priority attention in
historiographic studies. He shows that philosophical ideas tend to degrade to current
opinions if their authors are shy of exposing them to criticism. Those and only those
scientists can develop new fruitful theories who are willing to subject their
philosophical principles to a serious examination. According to Agassi, the priority
objective of a historian of science is to disclose the nature of the metaphysical
nucleus of scientific theories and doctrines. He therefore contends that there should
be a radical change in the very orientation of the logical analysis of knowledge
which, in his opinion, should be focused on historiographic investigations. The
history of science should be written anew, since the existing historiography of
science is unsatisfactory.
It is evidently for the accomplishment of this task that Agassi sets out to revive p
metaphysics.
Significantly, Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos and some other representatives of the p

modern philosophy of science follow different paths and are interested in different
aspects of scientific cognition. Yet they have one point in common all of them
stand for the rehabilitation of metaphysics which has been held in contempt by
positivism for many years. Of course, the difference in their approach to the process
of cognition and their different aims cannot but tell on their concepts of metaphysics, 88
their understanding of its role in scientific cognition and their attitude to traditional
philosophical problems. For instance, unlike Popper who does not go beyond the
formal justification of metaphysics, and unlike Lakatos who confines himself to
asserting the irreducibility of theory to the empirical basis, Agassis doctrine tends to
endow metaphysics with certain substance.
Accepting in principle the view that metaphysical proposition can be identified by p

its empirical unfalsifiability, Agassi nevertheless brings his metaphysics closer to the
traditional philosophical problems. It is indicative that his assessment of the
scientificity of one or another theory depends to a certain extent on its relation to
metaphysics. Thus the selection of scientific problems which are to be studied should
be governed, according to Agassi, not by the degree or their verifiability or
falsifiability, but by their importance for arising metaphysical problems. Metaphysics
is regarded by Agassi as a coordinating factor in the development of science, since
the criterion of the importance of a scientific problem is its metaphysical
significance.
It is noteworthy that Agassis understanding of the concrete historical conditions p

affecting the development of science appears to be more profound than that of
Popper, as he takes into account or, at least, shows interest in the factors
determining the selection of problems to be tackled and the change of scientific
interests (including the change of vogue in science). An important role, in his
opinion, belongs not only to the techniques and equipment used in experiments, but
also to the general socio-economic situation, to societys needs, etc. For all that, his 89
doctrine assigns the role of the main factor to none other than metaphysics. Some
scientific problems, he writes, are relevant to metaphysics; and as a rule it is the
class of scientific problems that exhibit this relevance which is chosen to be
studied.[ 891
In his analysis Agassi deals not so much with a single theory as with a totality of p
theories, problems and methods of investigation characteristic of a given period and
viewed by him as a single whole. It enables him to make comparisons and deduce
general principles governing scientific progress in different fields, e.g. in physics,
biology, social sciences in a given period. In Agassis interpretation, metaphysics is
no longer a specialised theory divorced from science. Hence, the focus of attention
should be shifted from the problem of demarcation between science and non-science
to that of demarcation between science, on the one hand, and metaphysics (bad or
good), on the other.
This leads to a corresponding modification of the criterion of such demarcation: the p

aim of scientific investigation, according to Agassi and contrary to Popper, is not to
find and verify plausible hypotheses, but to search for and to test those hypotheses
which appear to be relevant to metaphysics.
Reasoning in a purely metaphysical manner, Popper regards the transition from p

observations to a good theory not as a result of some inductive conclusion, but as a 90
tentative solution subject to testing, as an advancement of any new theory. The
criterion of a theory which is to be given priority in testing should be, according to
Popper, its falsifiability. Contrary to Popper, Agassi contends that the choice among
rival theories should be made on an heuristic basis and governed by metaphysical
considerations. He also contends that metaphysics itself takes part in the development
of theories considered important in given problem situations. Scientific physics, he

writes, belongs to the rational debate concerning metaphysical ideas. Some of the
greatest single experiments in the history of modern physics are experiments related
to metaphysics. I suggest that their relevance to metaphysics contributes to their
uncontested high status. And yet, I contend, the metaphysical theories related to these
experiments were not parts of science.[ 901
Metaphysics for Agassi is not something homogeneous. As has been indicated p

above, it can be bad or good. The former merges with pseudoscience, the latter,
with science. Bad metaphysics, such as existentialism or Hegels philosophy is not
capable of exerting serious influence on the development of science. Good
metaphysics, on the contrary, not only provides something like a methodological
programme for science in point of fact, it blends with science and can hardly be
distinguished from it.
Agassi regards metaphysics as a programme for future scientific development and p

stresses that it cannot be characterised as true or false it can be either 91
commendable or condemnable. Here Agassi practically follows in Poppers footsteps
adopting the main principles of his doctrine. Metaphysical theories themselves may
engender an attractive programme such as that of Faraday, but the attractiveness or
unattractiveness of a programme is not directly connected with the truth or falsity of
the metaphysical theory that produced it. According to Agassi, the significance of a
programme is only determined by the heuristic value of this theory. At this point,
however, we arrive at a contradiction: if the criterion of demarcation between science
and metaphysics holds good, the truth or falsity of metaphysical theories will not
depend on their refutability, or else there must exist a method for establishing the
truth or falsity of theories without resorting to their falsification.
In his concept Agassi strives to fence off bad metaphysics which claims to be on p
an equal footing with empirical science. He says: Metaphysics may be viewed as a
research program, and the false claims of pseudo-science as the result of confusing a
program with the finished product.[ 911 Yet he fails to draw a distinct
demarcation line between true science and the pseudo-scientific style of thinking
characteristic of old natural philosophy. Unlike Lakatos who either merges
metaphysics with special sciences and practically makes it their integral part, or
altogether eliminates metaphysics from scientific investigations regarding it as some
obscure source of inspiration for the scientist, some purely subjective factor akin to
his personal inclinations, aesthetic tastes or peculiarities of biography, Agassi strives 92
to resolve the contradiction by turning this subjective factor into something immanent
in the very substance of science. A scientific theory in his doctrine appears as some
kind of interpretation of a metaphysical concept, but not as its logical consequence.
It should be rioted, however, that this part of Agassis programme of reviving p

metaphysics is patently beneath any criticism. What with metaphysical theories being
neither true, nor false, there remains at best but one way out: to assume that there
are no practical means, or even no possibility in general to come to a definite
conclusion as regards their status. In that case, however, one has to give up all
attempts at distinguishing between metaphysics and science and to leave the reader
in the dark regarding the ways whereby metaphysics becomes immanent in scientific
theories undergoing strict verification procedures. It proves impossible to reconcile
the understanding of philosophy as an external factor determining the development of
science with its role of an internal factor determining its content. The sphere of
metaphysics, too, though including some traditional philosophical problems, appears
to be both too narrow and too vaguely defined for all Agassis pretensions to having
developed a highly efficient working model, something like a matrix for production
of new theories. All that a scientist now needs, according to Agassi, is but a few
comparatively simple parameters having a purely technical meaning. In Agassis
doctrine metaphysical propositions have no basic distinctions from empirical
generalisations. On the other hand, they must meet the rigid rules of formal logic. 93
This kind of approach which appears more or less compatible with Lakatos concept
does not tally with Agassis historiographic orientation and runs counter to his
intention of giving a sufficiently accurate, adequate and broad representation of the
historical process of scientific cognition.
The history of critical rationalism shows that Poppers initial call to.turn to the p
analysis of the development of science has proved, as it were, a Trojan horse for
critical rationalism. Having taken his cue from Popper, Feyerabend comes to doubt
the very possibility of maintaining a logical, normative stand in the analysis of
scientific knowledge. The criterion and the norms of scientificity advanced by critical
rationalism prove untenable when applied to the real practice of scientific thinking, to
the study of the history of science. As a result, Agassi puts forward a new
programme of the investigation of science focusing not on the logic, but on the
history of its development.
Would it be correct, then, to draw the conclusion that the history of science indeed p
attests to the fallacy of the existing logical concepts of scientific knowledge and its
development? It would rather be more correct to say, paraphrasing Lakatos, that life
itself has compared the logical and historical pictures of science and showed that
these pictures are incompatible. Hence, the conclusion of the critical rationalists
about the necessity of radical changes both in the history and logic of science
appears to be quite sound.
Critical rationalism is undoubtedly one-sided in all its variants of scientific p

development as it does not strive to present science as an integral part of the life of 94
society. Yet this school has succeeded in showing one important thing, namely, that
the progress of science is not a simple accumulation of knowledge or a gradual
increase of its certainty, but a complex contradictory process.
The positivist logic of science was only capable of reflecting the norms and p
standards of a certain synchronous level of science. Critical rationalism has
made an attempt to construct a logic of scientific development, i.e. a logic capable of
reflecting diachronous transformations. This attempt, however, has called in
question the very idea of such a logic. Indeed, the history of critical rationalism
has vividly demonstrated that the traditional logical approach with its orientation on
the natural laws of rational thinking suffers a complete fiasco whenever it is
applied to the problems of growth and development of knowledge. The critical
rationalists cannot accept this fact as all of them, even such a radical as
Feyerabend, have committed themselves to the logical tradition. Nevertheless, the
tendency to tone down the rigours of the positivist attitude to metaphysics and to
link philosophico-methodological analysis (without reducing it to sensory experience)
with the 20th-century theoretical investigations clearly revealed itself already in
Poppers early fundamental works. This tendency became even more manifest in his
subsequent studies and particularly in the investigations of other critical rationalists.
Poppers concept of science as a chain of successive theories replacing one another
accounts to some extent for an important change in the traditional positivist 95
orientation of logical analysis. Starting out with the doctrine of falsification, Popper
has come to the problems of the development of science and reassessed the criterion
of scientificity in terms of historical progress. Crises in science, i.e. the periods of
the collapse of its traditional theories, are not only explained by his logic, but ensue
from its main postulates. A theory which is found to be fully confirmable turns,
according to Popper, into technology, know-how or something of the kind and has
no more room in the temple of science.
Poppers logic of science is the logic of scientific discovery, the logic of a radical p
transformation of the existing system of knowledge. His emphasis on the history of
science is an important point of his programme of logical analysis marking a
considerable deviation from the positivist traditions if only for the fact that he
focused his attention not on the formal logical analysis of systems of statements, but
on the problem of the logical representation of scientific development. To be sure,
his emphasis on the relative independence of theoretical knowledge afforded greater
freedom for creative thinking and allowed for a possibility of generic links between
scientific theories. and metaphysics. Nevertheless, despite the deductive character of
the logical structure of knowledge, Poppers concept, as has already been pointed
out, did not go beyond the limits of empiricism since it proceeded from the direct
dependence of a theory on its empirical verification, post factum though it was. This
dependence on empirical data was perhaps even more rigid than allowed by the
verification version. On these grounds early Poppers concept should be regarded 96
on the whole as essentially logico-positivistic. Its assessment by critical realism
focusing on the formal structure of Poppers logico-methodological system rather than
on its philosophical orientation need not be taken into account too seriously.
Poppers attitude to metaphysics, i.e. to general ontological problems, as well as his p

definition of the falsification principle have been gradually changing. His later works
present a modified falsification variant watered down in accordance with his growing
interest in metaphysical problems and in the question of autonomy of the so-called
World 3. To be sure, from the very beginning Poppers philosophical system as a
whole did not fit the Procrustean bed of the falsification principle devised by him to
eliminate metaphysics and looked, from the viewpoint of this principle, quite
metaphysical even in its initial explication. Yet late Poppers blunt turn to
metaphysics was evidently somewhat unexpected and amusing even for his most
ardent adherents despite the obvious trend towards such a development traceable
already in his early publications. Poppers new stand was clearly expressed in his
works Objective Knowledge (1972) and The Self and Its Brain (1977) in which he
set out to construct a cosmic methodological system, though already in the 1950s
and 1960s Popper had criticised the physicalist and behaviourist theories of
consciousness questioning at the same time the fruitfulness of the linguistic approach
to the problems of matter, spirit, the brain and psychological phenomena.
Poppers recognition of refutability as a characteristic feature of scientific knowledge p

and his assessment of metaphysics as a historically inevitable, though mythological 97
stage of scientific cognition were in themselves important steps towards his own
metaphysics. No less important was his idea that the mysterious process of
scientific cognition manifests itself in the strife of hypotheses and theories, i.e. in the
sphere of rational thinking, but not in the depths of the scientists individual
consciousness. This concept was also instrumental in paving the way for metaphysics
and contributed to the materialisation of consciousness. All these fragmentary notions
developed later into an evolutionary concept of consciousness and knowledge, into a
metaphysical system of three worlds which shall be considered in more detail in
the next chapter.
Poppers main epistemological or logico-methodological doctrine denies the validity p

of any final explanations or final truths. Yet Popper abandons his principles when it
comes to the primary source of objective knowledge. Rejecting Platos metaphysics

of ideas, he evolves his own metaphysics which resembles to some extent 18th-
century natural philosophy and is supplemented by notions borrowed from
evolutionism and genetics. Popper maintains that active human consciousness capable
of influencing the environment through the mediation of culture had its forerunner
the biological evolution of organisms. The aims and preferences of the organism
influence the environment which, in turn, affects the evolution of the organism.
According to Popper, this emergent process is not only analogous to the
consciousness and vital activity of the organism, but also provides a key to the 98
understanding of the origin of science.
Already in his Objective Knowledge Popper makes an attempt to reveal the embryo p
of science in its incipiency in the vegitable and animal kingdoms. I assert, he
writes, that every animal is born with expectations or anticipations which could be
framed as hypotheses, a kind of hypothetical knowledge.[ 981 This, according to
Popper, is the secret of the phylogenesis of scientific knowledge which provides a
clue to its ontogenesis. In his opinion, this inborn knowledge, these inborn
expectations will ... create our first problems; and the ensuing growth of our
knowledge may therefore be described as consisting throughout of corrections and
modifications of previous knowledge.[ 982
Hence, there is no and cannot be any exoteric history of science. Its history is the p
logic of scientific discoveries which is nothing but a chain of successive problems or
theories.
The genetic structure of man also contains in incipiency the faculty of speech which p
plays an important part in natural selection and, according to Popper, participates in
some obscure way in the social process of language study. Thus Popper comes to the
problem of the relationship between consciousness and the brain, spirit and matter,
not only from the logical, but also from the historical viewpoint. However,
handicapped by his earlier commitments, Popper in fact disregards the historical
aspect in the development of consciousness and ignores the real, social context of its 99
formation and progress. The emergence of language, according to Popper, leads to
the formation of the cortex and, consequently, to the development of consciousness.
Poppers biological approach to the problem of the origin and development of p

knowledge prompted by his studies of modern evolutionary biology and genetics
must have become yet another stepping stone towards his concept of emergent
realism. In recent years this concept has been contrasted not only to positivism with
its physicalist and behaviourist tendencies in the approach to the problems of the
nature of consciousness, history, etc. but also to the ideas of the so-called scientific
realism and scientific materialism. Investigating the origin of objective knowledge,
Popper has been engaged of late in a controversy against idealism, phenomenalism,
positivism, materialism and behaviourism simultaneously or, using his own words,
against all forms of anti-pluralism[ 991 . Explaining the reason for his critical
attitude towards reductionism, Popper describes life as an inherent property of all
physical bodies. He declares: If the situation is such that, on the one hand, living
organisms may originate by a natural process from non-living systems, and that, on
the other hand, there is no complete theoretical understanding of life possible in
physical terms, then we might speak of life as an emergent property of physical
bodies, of matter.[ 992
Coming out against positivist reductionism, Popper specially emphasises the p 100
uselessness of purely linguistic solutions whereby the behaviour of an individual once
explained in terms of postulated psychical states is translated into the language of

physiological states, or an account of a physiological state is reduced by linguistic
means to the Schrdinger equation. Particularly characteristic in this respect is
Poppers reappraisal of the problems which he recently qualified as metaphysical:
We must beware, he writes, of solving, or dissolving, factual problems
linguistically, that is, by the all too simple method of refusing to talk about them. On
the contrary, we must be pluralists, at least to start with: we should first emphasize
the difficulties, even if they look insoluble, as the body-mind problem may look to
some.[ 1001 According to Popper, the hopes that the objective meaning of a
theory can be reduced to the states of consciousness of those who propound it rest
on a trivial errorfailure to distinguish between the two meanings of the word
thinking. In the subjective sense thinking describes perceptions or the processes
of consciousness, but different perceptions or acts of individual consciousness cannot
be logically related even if they are causally connected to one another.
Another problem which has come of late to be interpreted by Popper in terms of p

emergent realism is the relationship between the self and its brain. Popper agrees
with scientific materialism in that all spiritual activities of the individual are
accompanied by certain brain processes. Yet his concept of the self is entirely 101
different from that of scientific materialism as he regards it essentially as a self-
contained entity identical with what was earlier called soul and what actually
constitutes mans true essence less the religious envelope. Popper ranks himself
among the interactionists who disagree with the materialists in the understanding of
the relationship between the consciousness and the brain and regard the problem
basically in terms of the interaction between two levels of realitythe psychic and
the physical. Moreover, they assign the active role in this system not to the physical
world, i.e. the brain as a material object, but to what they consider to be the self.
Popper even goes so far as to assume that the self is a quasi-substantial entity if
substance is understood as a process or as activity in general.
Traditional materialism, according to Popper, usually linked man to machine, p

modern materialism identifies him with computer, whereas the self is in fact the
ghost in the machine and at the .same time the active programmer of the thinking
activity. The self is the embodiment of wishes, plans, hopes, the determination to act
and the acute awareness of its being the acting centre. The self is the motive force
of activity. What makes the self is different from the chemical and biological
processes attending the act of thinking and other kinds of activity by one unique
quality the integration and coherence of experience. Expounding his views, Popper
writes: What characterizes the self (as opposed to the electrochemical processes of
the brain on which the self largely dependsa dependence which seems far from
one-sided) is that all our experiences are closely related and integrated; not only with 102
past experiences but also with our changing programmes for action, our expectations,
and our theories with our models of the physical and the cultural environment,
past, present, and future, including the problems which they raise for our evaluations,
and for our programmes for action. But all these belong, at least in part, to
World3.[ 1021
The important conclusion that Popper makes reflects the socio-ethical and p
ideological thrust of his concept: the emergence of the self signifies the transition of
nature to a socio-cultural level of development and the transformation of the laws of
evolution and natural selection in accordance with the new environment. The main
function of mind and of World 3, writes Popper, is that they make possible the
application of the method of trial and the elimination of error without the violent
elimination of ourselves... Thus in bringing about the emergence of mind, and
World3, natural selection transcends itself and its originally violent character... Non-
violent cultural evolution is not just a Utopian dream; it is, rather, a possible result
of the emergence of mind through natural selection.[ 1022
Hence, Poppers scheme of cognition, his understanding of its sources and trends is p
falling under the increasing influence of the concept of natural selection and
biological inheritance. It stands to reason that this concept can in no way be
subjected to empirical verification. Being a simple extrapolation of biological laws to
the sphere of scientific cognition it is postulated as premise which does not have to 103
be proved and is in fact rooted in Poppers interest in biology. The notions of
evolutionary biology are introduced into the system of epistemological categories by
analogy rather than on the basis of a serious investigation into the nature of cognitive
processes. Biological laws are declared to be universal, governing the development of
the world in general and the process of cognition in particular. Poppers former
logicism gives way here to a biologised concept of scientific development which
seems to contain more of a substance than a purely formal logical theory. Yet this
ostensibly more profound concept is essentially metaphysical, and that in the worst
sense of the word, because of its undisguised apriorism, subjectivism and speculative
nature.
Rejecting the principle of the universality of physico-mathematical knowledge which p

underlies the concept of logical positivism, Popper comes in the end, as a result of
his own evolution, to the ontologisation of biological knowledge substituting
biological laws and notions for general philosophical principles and traditional
philosophical problems. Using the falsification theory as a foundation, and the
notions of special sciences, mainly biology, as building blocks, Popper erects his
own metaphysical building that has no room for categories and problems with long-
standing historical tradition behind them. Even if he speaks of the active essence of
consciousness materialising in culture, i.e. in the universal, and strives to find some
culturological approach to the solution of different problems, this approach is limited
to the self-programmed wholeness of World3. As to social reality, it is reduced
by Popper to an indefinite combination of physical reality and World 3. 104
All in all, Poppers doctrine with all its weaknesses inherent in any metaphysical
system and often justly criticised by both positivists and scientific realists, and
handicapped by its speculativeness, apriorism, empirical contestability and dogmatism
proves rather a meagre replica of more profound systems. It offers but very
schematic, embryonic versions of new metaphysics which is far behind 18th-
century materialistic natural philosophy and Hegels idealistic metaphysics in terms
of profoundness, informativeness and wealth of concrete material. It is not
improbable that the further evolution of critical realism and the views of its
inspirer, who has evidently embarked on the final stage of his scientific career, will
somewhat enrich and elaborate the schematic solutions proposed so far. Yet the very
return of positivism to metaphysics, and a crude one at that which aggravates the old
weaknesses of natural philosophy by new idealistic fallacies, proves better than
anything else that this philosophical trend has outlived itself and is now, very much
in the manner of a scorpion, stinging itself to death with its own venom.
***

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Notes
[ 621 ] The weakness of empiricism and inductivism as methodological concepts was
noted long ago. The most exhaustive assessment of these trends was given by Engels
who, in particular, wrote in his Dialectics of Nature: These people have got into
such a dead-lock over the opposition between induction and deduction that they
reduce all logical forms of conclusion to these two, and in so doing do not notice
that they (1) unconsciously employ quite different forms of conclusion under those
names, (2) deprive themselves of the whole wealth of forms of conclusion in so far
as it cannot be forced under these two, and (3) thereby convert both forms, induction
and deduction, into sheer nonsense (Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p.226).
[ 641 ] K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific

Knowledge, Harper and Row Publishers, New York and Evanston, 1963, p.28; see
also Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1960.
[ 671 ] Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, At the

Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p.260.
[ 672 ] Challenges to Empiricism, Ed. by Harold Morick, Wadsworth Publishing

Company, Ltd., Belmont, California, 1972, p.149.
[ 721 ] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of

Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, p.164.
[ 761 ] See I.Lakatos, Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic, in: The
Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam, 1968, pp. 32530.
[ 791 ] See Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes, in: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, 1970, pp.
14359.
[ 811 ] See Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of

Knowledge, London, 1975.
[ 841 ] Paul K. Feyerabend, Problems of Empiricism, in: Beyond the Edge of

Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, Vol.2, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965, p. 149.
[ 842 ] Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit., p.30.
[ 891 ] Joseph Agassi, The Nature of Scientific Problems and Their Roots in
Metaphysics, in: The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, Ed. by Mario
Bunge, Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., London, 1964. p.192.
[ 901 ] Ibid., p.193.
[ 911 ] Ibid., p.204.
[ 981 ] Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford

University Press, Oxford, 1979, p.258.
[ 982 ] Ibid., pp. 25859.
[ 991 ] See K.R. Popper, A Realist View of Logic, Physics and History, in:
Physics, Logic and History, Ed. by Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck, Plenum
Press, New York, 1970, pp. 69.
[ 992 ] Ibid., p.7.
[ 1001] Ibid., p.9.
[ 1021] Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, Springer
International, Berlin, 1977, pp. 14647
[ 1022] Ibid., p.210.
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The internal contradictions of positivism and the growing rift between its concepts p
and the real scientific development were bound to lead to a profound crisis which
will evidently mark the end of this school as an independent philosophical trend, 105
Contents
though its traditions and certain achievements in the logic and methodology of
science have been adopted by many schools of the modern philosophy of science.
Index Equally inevitable was a more radical, compared with critical realism, revision of
Card the notorious positivist demand for elimination of metaphysics, i.e. concepts,
theories and problems that failed to meet the rigid empirical criterion of verification
Formats: or falsification. Not only did this demand run counter to the very essence of
Text positivism which has always rested on certain non-empirical postulates. It was also
PS untenable from the viewpoint of the laws, problems and tendencies of scientific
PDF cognition as it tended to restrict the scientists outlook to the moles horizons and
kill the very spirit of creative scientific endeavour.

Other The philosophical platform of positivism despite the periodic revivals of interest in p
Titles: its evolution was bound sooner or later to arouse dissatisfaction among scientists as it
TA
deprived them of the stimulating effect of theoretical and philosophical knowledge

Years:
and shut them off from the wealth of human culture. Discontent with the isolationist
1984 concept alienating science from humanitarian and social values was also to be
expected and had in fact been predicted, e.g. by the Marxist philosophers, among the
intellectuals, particularly in the humanitarian circles. Natural, too, was the antipathy
### to positivism on the part of various philosophical schools and trends which could
never stomach some or all of its tenets.
MAP
The storm which had long been gathering over positivism was precipitated by the p
scientific and technological revolution with its imperative demand for immediate 106
solutions to a number of fundamental problems of scientific, technical and cultural
progress, and the decrepit vessel of the philosophy of science was swept over by a
powerful wave of general discontent. The critical fervour of different schools has
been centring largely around the demand to revive metaphysics. Naturally enough,
such a revival, as well as the content of metaphysics itself, are receiving widely
varying interpretations ensuing from no less widely varying intentions. Idealism, for
one, resentful over the hesitating position of positivism between the objective
knowledge of the physical world and subjective perceptions is insistent on the
unequivocal recognition of the primacy of the mind and consciousness. The scientific
community, long deprived by positivism of solid grounds in theoretical investigations
is demanding of the realists a reliable ontology, a materialistic one at that. The
scientists whose interests mainly lie in the sphere of empirical investigations are
expressing their grave concern over the theoretical vacuum, partly traceable to the
antropogenic influence of positivism. All these trends are unanimous in their
demand to concentrate on the solution of fundamental philosophical problems and are
keenly aware of the inability of traditional philosophy to meet the challenge of
natural sciences.
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/1.3-Scientific.Realism[2012-12-17 15:15:31]
It stands to reason that the concept of constructive revivified metaphysics advanced p

by such heterogeneous opposition to positivism with its wide diversity of interests
and views on the subject-matter of philosophy cannot but be very vague or at least
extremely polysemantic. Problems regarded a$ metaphysical include general scientific 107
and metatheoretical doctrines, the so-called ontology or the general doctrine of being
rejected by.positivism, as well as the traditional eternal philosophical problems of
value, ethical norms, etc. Such an approach will be quite understandable if we take
into account the fact that the attempts to revive metaphysics are based on the specific
material of the history of science, history of philosophy, ethics, psychology,
linguistics, etc. In his Afterword to a collection of articles entitled The Future of
Metaphysics one of its exponents Richard McKeon writes: The future of
metaphysics is determined by the controversies of philosophers as well as by the
ontology of things or the epistemology of thoughts; and its course is often marked
more clearly by suggestive paradoxes than by indubitable certainties.[ 1071 We
need not characterise all the trends of metaphysics, the more so as some of them
continuing the line of idealism and religious philosophy have always fed on such
problems and the crisis of positivism has simply added fuel to their fire.[ 1072
Far more important to us is the variety of new metaphysics, known as scientific
realism, which springs up on the ruins of positivist philosophy and pretends to the
role of its alternative in the methodology of science.
The name scientific realism which is currently used alongside other names, such p
as scientific materialism, new ontology, critical realism and others is purely
conventional, since this school has not yet offered its solutions to the problems of 108
scientific progress, nor defined its objectives or methods of analysis. The name
represents what may be termed the nucleus of the programmethe criticism of
positivist views on the structure, foundation and future development of scientific
knowledge. It is noteworthy, however, that the so-called materialism of the new
school proves in some respects to be but a new version of reductionism, whereas its
criticism is sometimes markedly uncritical and its newness often goes back to
the concepts of the 19th or even 18th centuries. Vague as it is, the new teaching has
evidently revealed so far only one positive featurerecognition of the objective
reality as the starting point of scientific cognition. To this can be added its intention
to analyse the real process of scientific development and the real history of science
rather than to indulge in the invention of speculative schemes based on new
metaphysical concepts. It is undoubtedly a sober approach which corresponds to the
present level and to the prospects of scientific development.
To be sure, critical attitude to positivism is an important asset of the new school. Its p
criticism is all the more effective as it exposes the inner contradictions of the
philosophy which has in fact been source of the youthful inspiration of practically all
modern prominent expounders of scientific realism. Willard Van Orman Quine,
Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, Mario Bunge and many other contemporary leaders of
this trend were under a strong influence of positivist philosophy at least in their
early period, even though they did not completely share its views. Understandably,
the general crisis of positivism which revealed itself not only in the internal 109
contradictions of the positivist methodological programme but also in the conflict
with the general trend of scientific cognition marked a turning point in the attitude
towards the ideas of Carnap, Schlick, Reichenbach, Ayer, and other positivists. No
less significant is the opposition of scientific realism to critical rationalism which is
often considered to be the direct successor of positivist philosophy. One cannot deny,
however, the mutual influence of these trends which is manifested, for instance, in
that Popper, Feyerabend and others not infrequently identify themselves with the
realists. True, their statements are not immune from verification.
The realism of the new school implies a critical reappraisal of the positivist p
methodological programme prompted, as has already been pointed out, by the
practical needs of the scientific and technological revolution in the late 1940s- early
1950s. This reappraisal has involved almost all the essential points of this
programme: the problems of the objectivity of knowledge, causality, determinism, the
relationship of matter and consciousness and, to a lesser extent, the problems of the
development and structure of science. To be sure, the actual range of problems
requiring a different approach in connection with the methodological criticism of
positivist philosophy is much broader and extends far beyond the narrow scope of
the positivist programme which, in fact, determines the horizon of scientific realism
and prevents it from opening up broader fields of scientific cognition. We shall
consider the attitude of the new trend to these problems later and concentrate now on
its interpretation of the scientificity of philosophy and the relationship of philosophy 110
and science, the two main topics of this chapter. The anti-positivist solution of these
issues by scientific realism has led, first and foremost, to the revival of ontology.
It is noteworthy that realism connects the revival of ontology as a philosophical p

doctrine of being and as a philosophical explication of the properties, objects and
relations of the external world with the recognition of the external world, i.e. the
reality which existed prior to and independently of man. Significantly, most of the
followers of scientific realism declare themselves modern materialists, exponents
of scientific materialism, etc. But how true are such declarations? Do the claims of
scientific realists correspond to the content of their doctrine and its premises to its
conclusions?
The new school directs its criticism first and foremost at the extremes of the p
positivist slogan of struggle against metaphysics under the cover of both
verificationism and falsificationism. According to the realists, this slogan is
untenable for several reasons: first, in everyday practice scientific investigation
ignores the facts which contradict theory; second, facts are not primary in scientific
cognition, they are born, so to speak, in theoretical diapers; third, theories deal not
with the objects of observation, but only with their idealised models; fourth, the
verification of a scientific assertion is not, as a rule, a simple consequence of a
theory, but rather follows from a theory combined with additional assumptions which
must also be tested by experience. Hence, neither verification nor falsification taken
separately can provide a satisfactory criterion for establishing the truth of a theory 111
and recognising its scientificity and, consequently, for distinguishing metaphysical
statements from true science.
Quine, one of the early opponents of positivism representing the views of the new p
school, clearly reveals the unsoundness of the main dogmas of the traditional
philosophy of science: its belief in the possibility of sharply demarcating the
analytical truths independent of empirical facts (i.e. deducible from definitions and
therefore tautological by nature) from the synthetic propositions based on empirical
facts, and its reduction principle whereby each meaningful assertion can be reduced
by purely logical means to basic empirical facts or propositions of the protocol-
statement type. He points out that the basic concept of logical positivism which
regarded language to be the starting point of analysis was fallacious, since the so-
called physical-object language proposed by this school was at variance with its own
demandto be the language of sensually perceptible physical phenomena. Including
the notions of a logically developed theory, language incorporated of necessity certain
elements of mathematical theories related, for instance, to mathematical logic. The
presence of such notions as a class of objects and a class of classes in the concept
of logical empiricism was in itself a linguistic indulgence incompatible with the

monastic vows of positivism.
Quine admits that ontological problems are unavoidable and emphasises that their p
formulation can only be sensible and free from contradictions if ontological
statements meet the demands of modern logical analysis. The adopted ontology can
only be regarded as unambiguous after the confusion resulting from the use of 112
individual terms has been eliminated with the help of Russells description theory,
quantification methods, etc. According to Quine, the fundamental ontological question
can be put as follows: what kind of objects can be considered real if we believe in
the truth of a given theory? The criterion of being which is the subject-matter of
ontology is no less definite: to be is to be the meaning of the variable. From this it
follows that any theory recognises in fact only those objects which can be classified
as variables connected with one another in such a way as to confirm the truth of the
propositions of the given theory.
Quine as a realist declares in favour not only of the existence of objective reality, p
but also of a possibility to construct scientific ontology, thus overcoming the general
anthropocentrism of positivist philosophy. In his opinion, no special philosophical
system of knowledge is required for this purpose, since ontology is entirely a product
of scientific theory.
Quine contends that our knowledge, on the one hand, maintains contact with the p
external world through sense perception. Yet it also comprises entities outside
sensory experience. Mans knowledge is predetermined by his sense perception, but
different people need not necessarily get identical sensory data under identical
conditions. This accounts for a possibility of switching over from the empirical
language to the language of theory. It is precisely the intersubjective language which
makes it possible, according to Quine, to perceive different empirical facts, i.e. to
agree or disagree with the observers propositions. It is this, writes Quine, that
enables the child to learn when to assent to the observation sentence. And it is this 113
also, intersubjective observability at the time, that qualifies observation sentences as
check points for scientific theory. Observation sentences state the evidence, to which
all witnesses must accede.[ 1131
As distinct from Feyerabend, Quine is ready to go beyond the empirical evidence. p

Even if two theories are equivalent in terms of empirical evidence, they may be very
different. This suggests, according to Quine, that the preference in selecting a true
theory is determined by its simplicity rather than by a criterion related to empirical
material. Hence, the judgements regarding the truth of a theory can only be passed
after the theory has been accepted or rejected. It is only within the framework of the
existing conceptual scheme that one can assess the true content of a theory.
Consequently, reality as the true content of knowledge is entirely out of the question,
except in the language of the adopted conceptual scheme. Quine prefers not to speak
of things-in-themselves or of some other special philosophical interpretation of a
scientific theory. Reality, according to Quine, is in fact what we believe to be
existing. Therefore he regards science as primary, and epistemology as secondary, or,
as he puts it, as science self-applied. Its task, according to Quine, is to show how
we know what we ought to know about science.
Quine does not concern himself about the metaphysical status of propositions but is p
rather interested in what we should do with them. Epistemology, according to Quine, 114
is not something outside science, it is incorporated in our judgement about it. The
decision as regards what is existent and what is non-existent depends on the
contemporary state of science.
Quine takes special note of Carnaps well-known attempt to water-down the rigid p
dogma of radical reductionism by conceding that each proposition taken by itself and
isolated from other propositions can be confirmed or disproved as a whole. Yet even
this thesis does not seem to him quite satisfactory and he contrasts to it his own
version according to which our statements about the external world face the tribunal
of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body. According to
Quine, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are
experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the
interior of the field.[ 1141 Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation
of others, because of their logical interconnections, but the total field is so
undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of
choice. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the
interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting
the field as a whole.
If this view is right, reasons Quine further, there is no ground for speaking about p
the empirical content of an individual statement, particularly if it be a statement at
all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore, it becomes folly 115
to seek a boundary between synthetic and analytical statements. Any statement can
be held true if the theoretical system is subjected to drastic enough adjustments.
Mario Bunge, one of the most influential adherents of scientific realism also p
points out the sketchy character of the positivist concept of the relation of theory to
experience. He maintains that the procedure of checking a theory is, generally
speaking, far more complex than is suggested by those simplified schemes imposed
both by the verification and falsification principles. The task of the philosophy of
science is to bring the description of this procedure as close as possible to the
scientists real work. In one of his articles he writes: We must start afresh, keeping
closer to actual scientific research than to the philosophical [positivist]
traditions.[ 1151 The empirical test alone is far from being sufficient. A scientific
theory must be subjected not only to an empirical, but also to a non-empirical test
which should have at least three aspects: metatheoretical, intertheoretical and
philosophical. The object of the metatheoretical checking of a theory should consist
in ascertaining that it is not inwardly contradictory, that its consequences have factual
content and that there exists a procedure for a transition from unobservable causes to
observable ones. The intertheoretical checking consists in ascertaining that the theory
in question is consistent with other theories, already recognised. The purpose of the
philosophical checking is to establish to what extent the new theory corresponds to 116
the dominant philosophy. Bunge has no doubts about the need to bring our scientific
theories in accord with the dominant philosophical concepts. The world view,
according to Bunge, has a direct bearing on the selection of research problems, the
formation of hypotheses and the evaluation of ideas and procedures.[ 1161 This
correspondence has always been sought for and alleged even if it did not exist, as
was the case with the relativist and atomic theories in relation to positivism. The
latter circumstance makes it absolutely imperative to check the soundness of the
philosophical principles themselves.
According to scientific realism, Poppers falsification theory is no less contradictory p

than the verification theory and both of them are equally far removed from the real
practice of scientific cognition. Not a single scientist, says Bunge, would like to see
his own creation dead. On the contrary, he would do everything possible to make it
viable, i.e. to corroborate his theory. A closer look at the process of consolidation of
a scientific theory reveals in it two more or less distinct stages. At the first stage, the
theory advanced by a scientist gains ground and his colleagues, no less than the
author himself, are busy searching for facts to support it. At the second stage, the
new theory struggling for existence and for the right to develop comes across
phenomena which do not fall within its framework. The theory becomes the object of
criticism and the process of the revaluation of facts begins.
A lot of theories highly beneficial to science have won the right to existence p 117
without applying to the falsification criterion. There are many methods whereby a
theory can be constructed. Theories can adapt themselves to new data which seemed
at first inconvenient, develop additional and auxiliary hypotheses and, once they
reached the necessary level of corroboration, are never discarded at once. A way of
building a scientific theory, writes Bunge, is to surround the central hypotheses
with well-meaning protectors hoping they will eventually turn out to be
true.[ 1171 There is nothing wrong about protecting a hypothesis by ad hoc
hypotheses as long as the latter are in principle independently testable. This method
permits building quite a viable hypothetico-deductive system and may ensue in a
new crop of experiments, whereas a strict application of Poppers criterion would nip
the whole development in the bud.
After a detailed analysis of the applicability of Poppers falsification criterion to p

some important scientific theories Bunge comes to the conclusion that it is useless in
the assessment of many general theories such as, for instance, the concept of
continuum mechanics, the evolution theory, etc. They can only be tested in
combination with additional (ad hoc) hypotheses or specific data pertaining to the
components of the systems, their interaction or spatial configuration, etc.
Unlike the lever, simple pendulum and other specific theories which lend themselves p
to fullscale testing (i.e. to verification and falsification), the field theory or, for 118
instance, the concept of quantum mechanics cannot be subjected to exhaustive
testing. In this connection Bunge singles out three types of scientific theories: (1)
specific theories, such as particle mechanics or the quantum theory of the Helium
atom; (2) generic fully-interpreted theories, such as classical mechanics, quantum
mechanics, general relativity, the evolution theory; (3) generic semi-interpreted
theories, such as games theory, information theory, field theory, etc. Characterising
the third-type theories most of the symbols of which are assigned no factual
interpretation, Bunge points out that such theories are particularly valuable in case of
insufficient, incomplete knowledge of facts. Emphasising also their extremely general
character and empirical untestability, Bunge points out that many such theories seem
in fact to qualify as metaphysical ones. From this he makes the conclusion that there
is no sharp line of demarcation between science and metaphysics. Surely, contends
Bunge, there is a line between wild metaphysics and scienceas well as a
boundary between exact metaphysics and pseudosciencebut there seems to be no
frontier between exact metaphysics and the set of most general (typeIII) scientific
theories: in fact, there is a good deal of overlap.[ 1181
Bunge further points out that the term metaphysics had different shades of p
meaning in the history of philosophy and concentrates on two of them. Plain
metaphysics, according to Bunge, ranges from elaborate nonsense through archaic
common sense to deep and sophisticated yet outdated good sense.[ 1191 It is 119
removed too far from modern knowledge. Kant, says Bunge, was certainly right in
his day in stressing the difference between science and metaphysics and in claiming
that it was impossible to conceive of metaphysics as a science. So were probably the
Vienna Circle and Popperin their own time, that is.[ 1192 Now, according to
Bunge, the situation has radically changed with the appearance of exact ontological
theories relevant to science. Conditions are now ripe for the emergence of exact
metaphysics which seeks to solve some problems put off by plain metaphysics and
strives to keep tune both with formal and factual sciences.
Bunges requirements to scientific metaphysics on which he dwells at length deserve p

special attention. In his opinion, scientific metaphysics should (1) concern itself
primarily with the most general properties of reality and real objects, rather than with
spiritual objects; (2) it should be a systematic theory or a part thereof rather than
expound somebodys views; (3) it should make use of logic and mathematics; (4) it
should expound key philosophical concepts and fundamentals of science; (5) it
should contain elements which can be found among the postulates of scientific
theories. Scientific metaphysics can itself become a scientific theory as a result of
specification or additional conditions for its application. Metatheories, according to
Bunge, can also be constructed with the use of elements borrowed from other fields
of knowledge, as well as with the help of analogy and extrapolation. In Bunges 120
opinion, all means are good for this purpose. He considers in detail the analysis and
synthesis theory as an example of metaphysical theories and maintains that it is
growing beyond the bounds of chemistry where it originated. Among metaphysical
he also rates the automata theory on the grounds that it can be referred to the
object-medium system of any type: mechanical, electrical, biological or
behavioural.
The author classifies the problems pertaining to the methodological analysis of p

scientific metaphysics under three categories. The first relates to the form of
metaphysical theories, which, in the authors view, must have a mathematical
structure to qualify as exact theories. This structure must be at least algebraic or
logical, if not quantitative. The second category of problems is pertinent to the
content of metaphysical theories. Here the author points out that scientific
metaphysics, unlike factual sciences, is concerned primarily with the world at large.
Consequently, the logically possible models of natural processes lie outside its sphere
(in Bunges opinion, scientific metaphysics includes two systems of theories:
universal or multilevel theories and regional theories limited to one integration level.
Yet even the most special of metaphysical theories are not specific enough to cover
in detail individual objects). Finally, the third category of problems is connected with
the testing of metaphysical theories.
Rejecting both the empirical-positivist and Poppers concepts of the testability of p

scientific knowledge, Bunge proposes a special criterion of scientificitythe
conceptual testability of theories understood as their compatibility with the
fundamentals of our prior knowledge. What is more, conceptual testability is but the 121
indispensable condition of scientificity. To qualify as scientific, theories of any type
must also meet additional requirements which depend on the nature of the problem
being considered. These additional requirements, according to Bunge, are as follows:
(1) a hypothesis should be at least indirectly confirmable; (2) a specific theory
should include components which are both empirically confirmable and refutable
when enriched with empirical data; (3) a generic interpreted theory should be
susceptible of becoming a specific theory upon the adjunction of subsidiary
assumptions and their interpretation; (4) a generic semi-interpreted theory should be
capable of turning into a generic interpreted theory. Bunge avers that conceptual
testability jointly with any of the above four conditions constitute necessary and
sufficient conditions for a hypothesis or a theory to be called scientific. Hence,
testability in the broad sense is in fact the equivalent of scientificity: testable
knowledge is scientific and vice versa.
As regards the testability of metaphysical theories the author does not go beyond p
generalities. A metaphysical theory should be enlightening, as well as capable of
being inserted in the nonformal axiomatic background of some scientific theory, i.e.
it should be susceptible of becoming a presupposition of theoretical science. To be
scientifically valid, metaphysical theories, according to Bunge, should be exact,
consistent with scientific knowledge, and capable of clarifying and systematising
philosophical concepts (such as event and chance) or principles (such as law and 122
interdependence of integration levels).
As we see, Bunges testability concept is patently contradictory. Denying a sharp p

line of demarcation between metaphysical and generic scientific theories, he
nevertheless does not admit that metaphysical theories, unlike scientific ones, do not
lend themselves even to a conceptual verification. They cannot be true or false, they
can be applicable or non-applicable. They are useful in the sense that they are
always motivated and constitute sweeping generalisations of actual or possible
specific theories. The theories of this kind are corrigible, but not refutable: they can
be improved upon formally (logically or mathematically) or they can be made more
complex. In short, theories in scientific metaphysics cannot be refuted, but, on the
other hand, they can be confirmedif not through prediction but at least by showing
that they are compatible with a whole family of specific theories or that they take
part in the design of viable systems. Strangely enough, writes Bunge, such
theories can be adequate and convenient without being true and they can never be
falsified: at most they can be shown to be irrelevant or pointless or
useless.[ 1221
According to Bunge, the theories of the second and third types can raise the level p
of generalisations and serve as a basis for predictions owing to the introduction of
additional specific premises. If that is so, there seems to be no reason why the
theories called by him metaphysical cannot be specified in a similar manner. Sure
enough, the general systems theory or the theory of integration levels classed by the 123
author as metaphysical cannot give concrete predictions in such fields as, for
instance, economics, biology, cybernetics where they have set up, so to speak, their
specialised divisions. Yet it is obvious that these theories can provide a basis for
some general conclusions which, in turn, enable scientists to make forecasts and
inferences of a less general level, and so on. Hence, there is no sharp line of
demarcation between metaphysical theories and the theories of the second and third
type from the viewpoint of their testability either.
Bunge writes: While the Vienna Circle rejected metaphysics as the enemy of p
science (which it was in most cases), and Popper tolerated it for its heuristic value
(which it often has), we have come to regard metaphysics as capable of becoming
scientific and moreover as constituting, together with logic and semantics, the
common part of philosophy and science.[ 1231 However, contrasting his
viewpoint to the positivist concept, Bunge fails to take into account that positivism
has qualified as metaphysical not only and even not so much the general theories of
science as the most general philosophical principles of materialism and dialectics.
That is why any consistent criticism of positivist philosophy must of necessity show
the real methodological and worldview significance of these principles for special
sciences. Critical as he is of positivism, Bunge undoubtedly makes here an important
concession: bridging the gap between science and metaphysics, he disregards the
difference between philosophical concepts and the general theories of modern science 124
reducing the former to the latter.
Among the important components of scientific metaphysics Bunge ranks, for p
instance, the concept of the structural levels of matter. Giving this concept the
conventional interpretation reflected in relevant scientific literature Bunge, however,
treats it not only as a metaphysical theory, but also as a set of definite
epistemological principles. Moreover, he also presents it in a methodological form as
a set of conditions which scientific investigation must comply with.
One may ask here if other metaphysical theories too must have both the p
epistemological and general methodological form. The answer to this question should
evidently be in the negative, since the level of generalisation in the concept of the
structural levels of matter is much higher than in such metaphysical theories as the
automata theory or the theory of games. The automata theory cannot provide a basis
for the general methodology of science and epistemology. Here Bunge, evidently,
eliminates the line of demarcation which does existthat between special scientific
theories and philosophical concepts. However broad the generalisations in such
theories as the theory of games, the automata theory and the general theory of
systems, all of them remain within the sphere of special sciences, whereas the
concept of structural levels has long since become the object of philosophical
investigations. Such vagueness in demarcating special sciences and philosophy is by
no means accidental. In the context of Bunges concept it attests to a tendency to
reduce philosophy to the level of metaphysical principles and theories rather than to
include metaphysical theories into the system of philosophical knowledge. This 125
becomes even more evident when we acquaint ourselves with Bunges attitude
towards materialism and dialectics. Substantiating his views on the scientific value of
metaphysical theories, Bunge evidently intends to dispel in this way the prejudices of
positivism against the so-called metaphysical problems. His efforts, however, go wide
of the mark since he deprives materialism and dialectics of their methodological and
world-view role in science without any reason whatsoever and ascribes all
methodological functions to general theories, such as the automata theory, the general
systems theory, etc.
This trend towards the identification of ontology with science is characteristic, with p
some variations, of many other representatives of scientific realism, though some of
them attempt to distinguish between philosophical and scientific ontology.[ 1251
The task of the philosopher, writes Errol Harris, is thus two-fold. He must use the
evidence provided by the sciences to construct a comprehensive and coherent
conception of the universe, and he must examine the methods of scientific
investigation and discovery and the process by which the science advances, in order
to discern the insignia of reliability that entitle any discipline to be called by the
name of knowledgethat is, science.[ 1252 As a rule, the defence of a scientific
theory by realism is not based on ontological convictionsrather on the contrary, 126
the reliability of a theory guaranteed by the use of adopted means and methods of
scientific investigation can serve as a basis for ascribing ontological existence to its
postulates, motions and concepts. Of course, besides the scientific perception of
reality by man, there also exists the conventional everyday perception. Wilfrid
Sellars, for instance, even writes about a tragic dualism of the two antagonistic
ways of thinking: the scientific and the manifest. The first makes use of the
techniques, methods and language of natural sciences. The second is guided by the
common sense and traditional thinking adopted in everyday life. In Sellars opinion,
the task of philosophy consists in a harmonious integration of these two ways of
thinking. Yet in his ontology he shows obvious preference for the paradigms of
scientific thinking. For him, the worlds ultimate constituents are primarily the
theoretical postulates and principles of science. Speaking as a philosopher, he
notes, I am quite prepared to say that the common sense world of physical object in
Space and Time is unrealthat is, that there are no such things. Or, to put it less
paradoxically, that in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science
is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is
not.[ 1261
As we see, scientific realism, gradually detaching itself from positivism, step by p

step shapes its anti-positivist programme aimed at reviving metaphysics. The central
point of this programme is the relation of consciousness to the brain the problem 127
which was completely ignored by the former philosophy of science. Indeed, the
development of scientific ontology is impossible without its solution. Positivism has
eliminated the consciousness-brain (or psychophysical) problem as patently
metaphysical. Thus Carnap wrote: Are the so-called mental processes really physical
processes or not? Are the so-called physical processes really spiritual or not? It
seems doubtful whether we can find any theoretical content in such philosophical
questions as discussed by monism, dualism and pluralism.[ 1271
The attempt to get rid of the psychophysical problem, like of other so-called p
metaphysical problems, was not and could not be successful it proved to be yet
another delusion of positivism. In point of fact, positivist literature itself gives quite a
definite solution to this problem in the monistic spirit of subjective idealism. This
solution which has nothing in common with materialist views is plainly stated by
Moritz Schlick who writes that the adjectives physical and mental formulate only
two different representational models[ 1272 , or by Alfred Ayer who tries to
substantiate the thesis that statements of mental phenomena and statements of bodily
phenomena are two different methods of the classification and interpretation of our 128
experience. The authors of these views are far from asserting the primacy of
electromagnetic, thermal, mechanical or other physical processes which underlie
psychic phenomena. They do not deal with the phenomena of objective realitytheir
main intent is to emphasise the unity of science or sciences which study sensory
experience or facts entirely different by nature. All they are aiming at is to provide a
single description of sense data on psychical processes, on the one hand, and of
sense data on the outer world, on the other. They seek reduction within the
framework of a theory only and do not turn to the actual processes taking place in
the physical world. Consequently, sensory experience remains the origin of all
origins, the cause of all causes and the task only consists in harmonising the
languages of physics and psychology within the present framework. The sum total of
this reduction is bluntly stated by Carl Hempel who contends that psychology is an
integral part of physics and even asserts that all sciences have in principle one and
the same nature and belong to physics as its branches.[ 1281
Searching for the ontology of knowledge, scientific realism, naturally, could not p
sidestep the problem of the relation of consciousness and the brain not only as a
specific issue directly involved in all the problems being raised by the new trend, but
as an independent problem of crucial importance for the very status of scientific
ontology. It is not accidental that the branch of scientific realism directly concerned
with the investigation of this problem has actually turned into a more or less 129
independent school of scientific materialism, the name suggesting a definite anti-
positivist and anti-idealistic orientation of the new teaching.
Nevertheless, the difference between positivism and scientific realism is not p

infrequently hard to determine, mainly owing to the fact that both schools bear a
distinct mark of reductionism. Logical positivism coming out against dualism strives
to overcome it by reducing psychic to physical phenomena within the framework of
scientific descriptions. The followers of scientific materialism are also engaged in
reductions with practically the same aim as the positivists to eliminate dualism.
The difference between these two schools consists in that scientific materialism, in
contrast to positivism, is concerned not with theoretical reductions, but with
ontological ones, i.e. it strives to reduce psychic phenomena as such to physical
phenomena. It is, in fact, the confusion of these two types of reduction that underlies
endless debates in the literature on psychophysical problems.
Positivistic reductionism tends to treat the psychophysical problem within the narrow p
confines of the concept of unity of scientific knowledge casting aside all its so-called
metaphysical aspects. The possibility of reducing the psychic to the physical is based
here, and by no means accidentally, on the theory of meaning alone: the description
of an object in psychical terms must have the same meaning as its description in
physical terms. The proof of the unity, naturally, boils down to the logico-semantic
analysis of statements. Logical positivism maintains that psychological statements 130
cannot be directly translated into physical ones. Yet one can speak of them as being
identical if they are considered to be just different methods of describing one and
the same object. The direct experience of human beings, as well as the experience
we sometimes ascribe to some higher animals is identical with certain aspects of
nervous processes in the organism. What is had-in-experience, and (in the case of
human beings) knowable by acquaintance, is identical with the object of knowledge
by description provided first by moral behavior theory and this is in turn identical
with what the science of neuro-physiology describes.[ 1301 The author of this
statement, as we see, does not accentuate physical identityhe emphasises the fact
that in the two kinds of knowledge, the knowledge through the realisation of ones
own raw sensations and the knowledge by description differing from each other
both in the source of information or language and in the method of verification we
in fact deal with one and the same object which gives us the right to speak of their
identity.
Very characteristic is also Feigls pronounced positivistic approach to the problem: p

he sincerely believes that the identity thesis eliminates any ontological interpretation
of the psychophysical problem and thereby abolishes psychophysical dualism.
According to Feigl, the mental and the physical are identical in that the mental p
terms, on the one hand, and some neuro-physiological terms, on the other, have 131
similar meanings and, as scientific progress goes on, tend to converge so that their
correlation gradually turns into actual identity. Feigl distinguishes between direct
sense experience (raw sensations) which carries direct knowledge of our mental
states, and the experience expressed in some very personal language. All empirical
concepts are based entirely on this personal language, since they form a higher
degree of certainty.[ 1311
Despite a certain deviation from the positivist paradigm noted by numerous authors, p
Feigl nevertheless does not desert it completely. The physicalism of his position is,
on the whole, far removed from consistent, i.e. dialectical, materialism, though Feigl
sometimes notes (hat the term physical in the personal language denotes an
aggregate of molecules whose action produces a sensory impression.
In its solution of the mind-body problem scientific materialism (realism) seeks p

to overcome the barrier set up by positivism and find a way to objective reality
which is pictured as having its own existence independent of the process of
cognition, yet being knowable only through the medium of science. Here the
function of reduction is differentit consists in creating a scientific image of the
world, ontology, representing the real processes as they actually happen.
Determining whether or not materialism can be true, writes Jerry Fodor, is part of
understanding the relation between theories in psychology and theories in neurology

a relation that many philosophers believe poses a stumbling block for the doctrine 132
of the unity of science. In particular, it is sometimes maintained that the unity of
science requires that it prove possible to reduce psychological theories to
neurological theories, the model of reduction being provided by the relation between
constructs in chemistry and those in physics[ 1321 .
The treatment of the mind-body problem by positivism is also criticised by p

Australian philosopher J.J. Smart who unequivocally dissociates himself from its
dualism. He writes: In so far as after-image or ache is report of a process, it is
report of a process that happens to be a brain process. It follows that the thesis does
not claim that sensation statements can be translated into statements about brain
processes. Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as
that of a brain-process statement. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation
statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process.
Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes.[ 1322 Criticising dualism,
Smart counterposes to it what he styles as his materialistic metaphysics.
According to Smart, every year science provides more and more convincing proof p
that man is nothing but a psychophysical mechanism. Sooner or later his behaviour
will be exhaustively characterised in the corresponding terms. In point of fact, there
is nothing in the world besides a complex aggregate of physical particles, protons
and electrons, and their interaction, and the only real laws of science are the laws of 133
physics and chemistry.
As we see, unlike former materialism which gravitated towards ontological p

reductionism, i.e. tended to reduce real psychic and mental processes to physical
phenomena, modern scientific materialism strives to substitute the knowledge of
physical objects for the objects themselves thereby identifying reality with its
linguistic image. The difference of the approaches to the mental-physical or mind-
body problem on the part of Feigl, on the one hand, and Smart or Sellars, on the
other, consists in that the neopositivist faction focuses on this problem in order to
discard it as metaphysical by reducing the mental to the physical, whereas scientific
materialism as a form of scientific realism pursues quite a different aimto
translate the descriptive language used to characterise mental processes into the
language of science in order to be able to construct a scientific ontology of mental
processes. The reductionist approach to the consciousness-brain problem characteristic
of scientific realism and positivism, the attempts of both schools to reduce all
spiritual phenomena exclusively to neuro-physiological processes are largely traceable
to their common traditions. The similarity of the realistic and positivist views also
shows up in their exaggerated emphasis on the analysis of the language used to
describe processes in interest. For all that, one ought to distinguish between positivist
reductions and the reductions proposed by the scientific materialists who sincerely
strive for a materialistic solution of the above problem.
It should be noted that in its approach to the mind-body problem aimed at creating p 134
a new scientific ontology of mental processes scientific materialism, like scientific
realism in general, makes certain concessions to idealism and cannot be credited
with consistency. scientific realism as a whole regards the ontology of mental
processes and, for that matter, ontology at large as a peculiar projection of scientific
knowledge on the outer world, as a certain theoretical assumption which follows of
necessity from the adopted system of scientific knowledge. Hence, reality as
understood by realism is identified with the current scientific picture of the world
and even with the language whereby the present or eventually possible reality is
described. The specific input to NPP [new philosophy of physics] should be the
whole of physics, past and present, classical and quantal, writes Bunge. The
corresponding output should be a realistic account (analysis and theory) of actual and
optimal research procedures, of conceived and conceivable ideas, of currently pursued
and possible goals both in theoretical and experimental physics.[ 1341
As we see, realism offers no criterion for distinguishing between the really p

existing objects of science and purely mental, theoretical ones which, consequently,
need not necessarily have their analogues in the material world. It proceeds from the
conviction that reality outside the language of science, i.e. reality as such, is
nonsensical since all true judgements of reality can only be expressed in scientific
notions.
According to R.Rorty, the traditional description of psychic and spiritual p 135

phenomena in modern culture must also be replaced by scientific description which
is to be given priority. All other languages are not only inadequate, they are simply
anachronistic, akin to demons and evil spirits.[ 1351 On the face of it, this thesis
is directed against phenomenalism and the later views of Wittgenstein who
underscored the decisive significance of the analysis of everyday language as a
panacea for all unpleasant dilemmas of modern science and advocated the concept of
the plurality of languages. Yet it is quite obvious that the language of science
reflects primarily the most general or universal properties and links of being and is
incapable of conveying the boundless richness of relations in the real world. The
deficiencies of scientific knowledge are to be made up for by literature, painting,
music, sculpture and other forms of human culture. The underestimation of the
humanitarian forms of culture by all scientific realism is yet another feature which
draws it closer to positivist philosophy. It is not fortuitous that both positivism and
realism seek to reduce the broad diversity of individual traits to a few rather lean
abstractions and show undisguised scepticism regarding the possibility of penetrating
the inmost recesses of human heart. The conceptual framework of persons, writes
Sellars, is not something that needs to be reconciled with the scientific image, but
rather something to be joined to it.[ 1352
It should be noted that distinguishing between ontology and objective reality as such p 136
calls for analysis of scientific knowledge from the angle of the relation of the
objective to the subjective in its content. The accomplishment of this task, in turn,
presupposes a comprehensive study of the subjects role in scientific cognition, of his
intellectual possibilities and limitations, merits and demerits, the theoretical heritage
and the new concepts and hypotheses, abstractions and assumptions, philosophical
and theoretical premises, etc. It is only through such a comprehensive study that one
can reveal the objective component of theoretical knowledge and regard it as truly
scientific ontology. As to the ontology which is being constructed by scientific
realism outside the crucible of philosophical examination, it does not go beyond the
generalisation of special knowledge and the extrapolation or even direct
ontologisation of current scientific theories.
The example of Bunge, Quine and other representatives of scientific realism p

shows that this school, having made some obvious concessions to idealism, has also
failed so far to dissociate itself completely from the idealistic understanding of
metaphysics as such. Scientific metaphysics which is identified with ontology by
most of the scientific realists should in fact be regarded as a sphere of general
scientific or metatheoretical research. It lies beyond the limits of theoretical
knowledge proper, though its generalisation level is below the level of philosophical
laws and principles as understood by dialectical materialism. From the viewpoint of
scientific realism, the analysis of problems belonging to this sphere does not call 137
for their serious examination either in terms of materialism or dialectics, the latter
being in special disfavour with this philosophical school.
It is only natural, therefore, that the ontology thus constructed turns out to be indeed p
metaphysical, and sometimes in the worst sense of the word at that, as it is not
amenable to any critical analysis in terms of either philosophical (dialectical and
materialist) or special scientific concepts.
Scientific realism makes a very vague distinction between ontological and p

scientific theoretical problems and this in fact amounts to postulating a new
philosophical discipline. Philosophy, or what appeals to me under that head, writes
Quine, is continuous with science. It is a wing of science in which aspects of
method are examined more deeply, or in a wider perspective than elsewhere. It is
also a wing in which the objectives of a science receive more than average scrutiny,
and the significance of the results receives special appreciation.[ 1371
To sum up, the characteristic features of scientific realism are its anti-positivist
orientation and persistent search for non-traditional ways in the development of the
methodology of science. Life shows, however, that this school has no future as an
independent philosophical trend and as a serious alternative to positivism because it
proceeds from the incompatibility of materialism and dialectics within a single 138
philosophical doctrine. Assessed in general terms, scientific realism represents a
certain tendency of the bourgeois philosophy of science to turn from positivism to
the objective analysis of scientific knowledge.
***

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normal
Notes
[ 1071] Richard McKeon, The Future of Metaphysics, in: The Future of

Metaphysics, Ed. by E.Wood, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1970, p.288.
[ 1072] See, for instance, E.Sprague, Metaphysical Thinking, Oxford University

Press, New York, 1978, p.3.
[ 1131] W. V. O. Quine, The Nature of Natural Knowledge, in: Mind and

Language, Ed. by Samuel Guttenplan, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p.74.
[ 1141] W.V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review, Vol.60,

No.1, 1951, pp. 3839.
[ 1151] Mario Bunge, Theory Meets Experience, in: Mind, Science and History,
State University of New York Press, Albany, 1970, p.164.
[ 1161] Ibid., p.142.
[ 1171] Mario Bunge, Method, Model and Matter, D.Reidel Publishing Company,
Dordrecht, Holland, 1973, p.28.
[ 1181] Ibid., pp. 3940.
[ 1191] Ibid., p.145.
[ 1192] Ibid., p.41.
[ 1221] Ibid., p.37.
[ 1231] Mario Bunge, Method, Model and Matter, op. cit., pp. 4243.
[ 1251] See, for example, Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, Hassocks, New
Jersey, 1978, pp. 2930.
[ 1252] Errol E. Harris, The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science, Humanities

Press, New York, 1965, p.30.
[ 1261] Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
London, 1963, p.173.
[ 1271] Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science, in: Readings
in Philosophical Analysis, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1949, p.413;
see also K.G. Hempel, The Logical Analysis of Psychology, in: Readings in
Philosophical Analysis, op. cit., p.380.
[ 1272] Moritz Schlick, On the Relation Between Psychological and Physical

Concepts, in: Readings in Philosophical Analysis, op cit., p.403.
[ 1281] See Carl G. Hempel, The Logical Analysis of Psychology, in: Readings in
Philosophical Analysis, op. cit., pp. 378, 382.
[ 1301] Herbert Feigl, The Mental and the Physical~, in: Minnesota Studies in
the Philosophy of Science, Vol.II, Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem,
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958, p.446.
[ 1311] Ibid., p.392.
[ 1321] J.A. Fodor, Materialism, in: Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem,
Ed. by D.M. Rosenthal, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971, p.128.
[ 1322] J. J. Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, in: Materialism and the
Mind-Body Problem, op. cit., p.56.
[ 1341] Mario Bunge, Philosophy of Physics, D.Reidel Publishing Company,

[ 1351] See R.Rorty, Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories, in: Materialism
and the Mind-Body Problem, op. cit., p.179.
[ 1352] Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, op. cit. p.40.
[ 1371] W. V. Quine, Philosophical Progress in Language Theory, in: Language,

Belief, and Metaphysics, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1970. p.3.
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1. POSITIVISM: OBJECTIVITY
AS OBSERVABILITY OF EVENTS

Contents
Objectivity of knowledge has been a key issue in the course of the entire history of p
Index philosophical thought. In our time, too, it remains a touchstone of the true attitude of
Card one or another philosophical school to science revealing the extent of its influence
on social and practical life. Those philosophers who show interest in this problem
Formats: have always been aware, vaguely or keenly, that knowledge which cannot be
Text regarded as objective is powerless or useless, and that the practices relying on such
PS pseudo-knowledge are adventurist and even harmful. Failing to meet the
PDF requirements of objectivity, they are bound to become arbitrary.
Philosophical schools do not always focus their attention on the problem of p

Other objectivity, let alone placing it in the foreground. Wittingly or unwittingly, it is often
Titles: overshadowed by other issues, seemingly more concrete and, at first sight, more
TA pressing. Yet it always underlies all controversies over the place and role of

metaphysics, i.e. over the subject-matter of philosophy, and has a direct bearing on 140
Years:
1984
such problems as the relation of sensory experience to theory, induction to deduction,
truth to error, etc. Therefore the problem of the objectivity of knowledge sometimes
becomes, as it were, a concentrate of many issues pertaining to different aspects of
### the theory of knowledge.
MAP It would not be correct to say that this problem has been treated separately from all p
other problems of the methodology of science, such as causality, determinism, laws
of development, etc. Yet its solution has always been determined primarily by the
answer to the question if reality exists outside and independently of man. Any
answer to this, be it positive, negative or fifty-fifty, and even abstention from any
answer at all, is in itself a sufficiently clear indication of the philosophers views on
the content and nature of knowledge. Attempts to elude the issue have never helped
to make the philosophers and scientists life easieron the contrary, the muddle has
always grown worse.
In its attempts to reject all unscientific, metaphysical problems, including the p

problem of the independent existence of objective reality and such absolutes as
matter, substance, space, causality and others, positivism has proved to be no more
fortunate than other philosophical schools. However, it would be interesting and
instructive to trace the impact of the objectivity problem on positivist philosophy in
general, and on its specific concepts and notions in particular. This question deserves
special attention if only for the fact that numerous gullible authors take in all good
faith the rejection by positivism of the problem of the existence of objective reality 141
as metaphysical, whereas others, aware of the latent contradiction in the views of the
positivist writers, suspect them of a crafty intention to conceal the true meaning of
their philosophy and its subjectivism. As a matter of fact, neither of these views can
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/2.1-Objectivity.and.Observability.of.Events[2012-12-17 15:15:37]
be accepted without serious reservations. The issue is much more complicated than is
implied by the proposed explanations.
There is yet another aspect to the problem of the objectivity of knowledge in p

positivist philosophythe understanding of its true attitude to this problem provides
a key to understanding the modern criticism of the positivist programme by critical
rationalism, scientific realism, scientific materialism, etc.
Being always opposed, as it was, to the discussion of the so-called metaphysical p

problems and, in particular, refusing to investigate the relation of knowledge to the
objective world and bother about the origin of scientific knowledge and what lies
behind this knowledge, positivism could not afford to discard completely the
principle of the objectivity of knowledge. Declaring against this principle would be
tantamount to opposing the fundamental scientific tradition, in fact, the entire history
of science which has always held that objectivity was its chief goal and basic trait
distinguishing it from other forms of knowledge and intellectual culture.
Positivism has regarded traditional philosophy to be metaphysical first and foremost p

because it postulates the existence of transcendental reality different from and
independent of the sensuous world. The question of the existence of the physical
world independent of sensory experience has always been viewed by positivism from 142
Comte to Reichenbach as a pseudo-problem at best. Refusing to discuss the origin of
scientific knowledge, positivism has also regarded as metaphysical the question of its
development not only from the historical, but also from the logical angle. Both these
negative premises of positivist philosophy have led to a number of dramatic
conclusions. For instance, Mach not only discards the absolutes of Newtons
mechanics, for which he had good reason, but also declares himself against the
atomic theory. Accepting the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, Carnap and
Reichenbach interpret them merely as logical devices to systematise and harmonise
sensory experience.
In the notes to his article The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis p
of Language (1957) Carnap comes out against idealism as a metaphysical tendency.
At the same time, expressing his attitude to metaphysics he writes: This term is
used for the field of alleged knowledge of the essence of things which transcends
the realm of empirically founded, inductive science. Metaphysics in this sense
includes systems like those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson,
Heidegger.[ 1421 Carnap is evidently not aware of the fact that this criticism
reaches far beyond his target and hits the theoretical pillars of all modern science, as
well as its material foundation. Reichenbach, on his part, ignores the real dialectical
unity of the corpuscular and wave properties of matter which was not known to
classical physics and which is considered in Bohrs concept of complementarity 143
developed and elaborated, among others, by Vladimir Fock and his disciples. In his
philosophical discourse on quantum mechanics Reichenbach makes certain
assumptions regarding the terms particle and wave which, in his opinion, are
neither true nor false and proposes a theory of equivalent descriptions according to
which both the corpuscular and wave interpretations are admissible under certain
conditions as they say the same thing, merely using different languages.[ 1431
The independent existence of objects made no serious problem for the researchers in p
classical science. First, their attention was mainly focused on the external side of the
physical world and science was only building up strength to penetrate the hidden
mechanisms of phenomena and processes, the structure of physical bodies, the earths
bowels, the intricate heredity carriers and the laws of cosmic processes. Second, the
notions expressing the properties of objects and phenomena under observation

differed but little . from current everyday concepts. Third, the distorting influence of
the researcher on objects and phenomena under investigation was incommensurate,
even in terms of energy alone, with real processes in nature and could not therefore
affect to any appreciable degree the course or direction of these processes. Finally,
progress in scientific cognition was very slow and scientific concepts and theories
were not subject to rapid change, at least on a historical scale. Knowledge
accumulated and grew in scope without any serious breakdowns. Revolutionary 144
changes in science were regarded by scientists themselves as something quite out of
the ordinary.
Positivism as a philosophical teaching was a typical product of its time, though it p

was not destined to have a long life. As physics and other sciences were passing on
from macroscopic objects familiar to man from his everyday experience to the inner
structure of matter, the problem of objectivity was acquiring essentially new scope
and dimensions. Scientific notions were more departing from the ideal of sensual
certitude, observability. Particularly heavy was the blow delivered on the principle of
sensual certitude by the discovery of electron and other microparticles at the end of
the 19th century.
The crisis in physics at the turn of the century was regarded as crisis of all former p
scientific ideals, including the ideal of objective knowledge and, consequently, as a
crisis of materialism. The fact that objects under investigation could be observed no
longer was used by positivist philosophy not for revising its mistaken views, but for
confusing the issue, namely, for rejecting the idea of any reality beyond the limits of
sensory experience. Incidentally, it is precisely this philosophy clinging to the
obsolete ideals of empirical science that bears responsibility for the survival of the
dogmas of metaphysical materialism in natural sciences till the end of the 19th
centurythe dogmas which had been discredited and buried by dialectical
materialism half a century earlier.
If objective reality is only what is observable, the task and the function of theory p
consist merely in finding as yet unknown observable and measurable objects 145
proceeding from the available sensory experience and taking into account the body of
mathematics. In this case theory does not play any independent role and its function
is confined to purely logical analysis leading a scientist from one sensory experience
to another.
The obvious implication of this approach is that a non-classical theory should be p

free from any new notions, i.e. notions having any new physical meaning, new
objective content. A physical theory is merely a new logical means to systematise the
observable.
Quantum mechanics, however, proved to be not only far removed from the ideals of p
positivismit was a direct challenge to it, despite some temporary rapprochement
between them regarding the principles of causality and objectivity which ended in a
complete alienation, evidently final. The positivists regarded quantum mechanics as
an expression of experience or its elements connected by formal logical means. By
contrast, Bohrs aim was rather to find out the conditions making experience
possible, i.e. its necessary premises. The so-called Copenhagen interpretation is often
associated with the assertion that the non-existent cannot be observable. Its essence,
however, will be more accurately summed up in this statement: the observable is
definitely existent, the nonobservable allows of certain suppositions.
The purpose of research in classical physics was to establish definite phenomena p

taking place in space and time and to investigate laws determining the course of
processes. A problem was considered solved if the researcher succeeded in proving 146
that a process did take place in space and time. The method whereby the process had
been cognised, the observations which had made it possible to ascertain its existence
experimentally were absolutely immaterial. In the quantum theory the physicist is
faced with an entirely different situation. The very fact that the mathematical scheme
of quantum mechanics is not a graphic representation of processes taking place in
space and time shows that it can only permit calculating the probability of one or
another result of an experiment based on the experimental knowledge of the previous
state of the atom system, in so far as the latter has not been subjected to any other
disturbances except those needed by the experimentalists themselves. Even a most
complete set of experimental conditions cannot give more than a mere probability of
the result expected in the next experiment on the system. To the positivists it was a
sure sign that any objectivity of the processes in interest was entirely out of the
question. Each observation led to a certain discrete change of the mathematical
values characterising the atomic process and, consequently, to a discrete change of
the physical phenomenon itself. In contrast to the classical theory, where the method
of observation was immaterial for the process under investigation, in the quantum
theory the disturbance produced by each observation of atom phenomena plays a
decisive role. Further, since any observation can only be summed up in probability
statements as regards the results of later observations, the account of the essentially
uncontrollable disturbance component must become, according to Bohr, a decisive
factor in constructing a quantum theory free from contradictions. 147
As distinct from positivism in general or, at least, from its most radical (or most p
naive) versions, Bohr did not consider sensory data to be elementary entities. What
he called phenomena could only be defined within a broader context of reality.
This reality as the context of experience could be set by concepts performing the role
of definite conditions or premises of classical physics. Bohr usually meant two such
conditions: spatial-time description and causality which were only compatible within
the classical model of events. In his opinion, the discovery of the quantum of action
had led to a break between them and to the adoption of the principle of
complementarity of descriptions.
Things being as they were, Bohr and a number of his followers made an attempt to p
combine the object of observations, the measuring apparatus and the observer into a
single quantum-mechanical system and thus to eliminate uncertainty. In his speech on
receiving a Nobel prize, Werner Heisenberg said that classical physics was the kind
of aspiration for the knowledge of nature in which scientists strove to make
conclusions on objective processes proceeding in fact from their sensations and
refusing to take into account the influences of all observations on the object being
observed. Quantum mechanics, on the contrary, obtained the possibility of
considering atomic processes by partly refusing to objectivise them and describe in
terms of space and time.
Despite the controversies lasting many years this interpretation known as the p
Copenhagen approach has not yet completely lost its grip on the minds of 148
philosophers and physicists many of whom are still inclined to think that by breaking
with the traditions of classical science quantum mechanics has opened up a new
epoch. Quantum mechanics, writes, for instance, J.A. Wheeler, has led us to take
seriously and explore the ... view that the observer is as essential to the creation of
the universe as the universe is to the creation of the observer... Unless the blind dice
of mutation and natural selection lead to life and consciousness and observership at
some point down the road, the universe could not have come into being in the first
place; ... there would be nothing rather than something.[ 1481 Hence, quantum
mechanics provides a new point of reference for understanding all events in the
universe, including its emergence in the form which engendered our life itself.
Reality, according to Wheeler, can no longer be regarded as independent of the
observer.
Eugene Wigner, too, is inclined to share the opinion that quantum mechanics deals p
with nothing else but measurements or observations. He maintains that the
equations of movement both in classical and quantum mechanics do not describe
reality but are merely instruments to calculate the probability of certain results of
observations. His opinion is in full conformity with the positivist views that the
observation becomes fulfilled when the observers consciousness is brought into play 149
and that not a single system has any definite measurement attributes of its own
they appear only as a result of the very process of measurement or simultaneously
with it. In this connection Wigner writes: It is the entering of an impression into
our consciousness which alters the wave function because it modifies our appraisal of
the probabilities for different impressions which we expect to receive in the future. It
is at this point that the consciousness enters the theory unavoidably and unalterably.
If one speaks in terms of the wave function, its changes are coupled with the
entering of impressions into our consciousness.[ 1491 There is nothing surprising,
according to Wigner, in that idealism provides the most relevant representation of the
world. Even if it were possible to exclude the observer (or sensations) from the
analysis of a quantum-mechanical situation, it would be necessary, in Wigners
opinion, to project him mentally.
Indeed, observation and measurement are important requisites for the construction of p
quantum mechanics. The admission of this fact, however, leaves open the question of
the relations between the components of this unity the system, the instrument and
the observer. Wigners method reduces the first two to the last one. The independent
existence of physical objects is called in question. To be sure, Wigner does not aver
that consciousness creates its images in absolute vacuum or that physical theories are 150
products of immaterial elements. His viewpoint, rather, consists in that scientific
research is limited to the sphere of actually existing, i.e. observable, events. Wigner
does not simply repeat the arguments of Machist philosophy but goes further making
the object more and more dependent on observation. This view leads, in fact, to the
elimination of the positivist concept of system-instrument unity in favour of the
logical primacy of the observer.
As a result, reality becomes the world of experience or the empirical world. p

Modern physicist S.W. Hawking goes even as far as asserting the existence of some
impenetrable curtain which completely shuts out everything that lies behind it. In
his opinion, gravitational collapse sets an obvious barrier to scientific cognition which
can hardly be expected to be overcome even in the distant future. The thing is that
the inner state of the black hole is, according to theoretical calculation,
unobservable in principle. Hence, gravitation provides an example of uncertainty
regarding the existence of real objects, which is even of a higher order than the
uncertainty in quantum mechanics. Recalling Einsteins winged words God does not
play dice in his well-known controversy with Bohr, the author even attempts to
strengthen Bohrs arguments. In his opinion, God not only plays dice, he sometimes
throws the dice where they cannot be seen.[ 1501
Another threat to the objectivity of scientific knowledge comes from the probability p
interpretation of the so-called -function. According to Bohr, the wave and 151
corpuscular theories of microparticles need not necessarily be contradictory in reality

despite their conceptual incompatibility. Both theories are equally important for the
physical reality, each covering a definite type of situations, and consequently, are
complementary. Proceeding from this viewpoint, some physicists and philosophers
came to the conclusion that the -function is a wave function representing the
density of probability and, consequently, is merely a mental projection of theory on a
physical situation.
In point of fact, nothing but the form of mathematical equations makes it possible p
to treat a particle as a certain density of probability which can represent it in an
experiment. The function provides but a partial description of physical reality and,
besides, merges the object and the subject into a single whole. Though, according to
Heisenberg, we can separate them temporarily in different specific situations, they
can never be completely detached from each other.[ 1511
Erwin Schrodinger contends that one can hardly assert the existence of waves in p
nature if probability is their characteristic feature. In his opinion, one can only speak
of the probability of an event if one believes that it does occur now and then. If the
probability function does not describe any physical reality in an experiment it
definitely does not give any information on what takes place between two 152
experiments.
As we see, some of the above arguments boil down to the assertion that what is not p
observable cannot be accepted by science. Others emphasise the fact that wave is the
only form of quantum movement in space, which is attested to by such physical
phenomena as interference, diffraction and others. Since waves represent nothing but
probability, doubt is cast on the existence of particles in the period between the
experiments ascertaining their presence.
It should be noted that the above viewpoint leaves out of account two important p
circumstances. First, any experimental set is a macrosystem. Analysing the results of
experiments, a physicist cannot but proceed from certain laws governing physical
phenomena. As a rule, he does not have to resort to probability functions. Second,
the idea of the inseparable unity of the subject and the object reflects the simple fact
that dynamic and spatial parameters cannot be defined simultaneously in a single
experiment. Indeed, certainty can only be attained within definite limits. This fact,
however, gives no grounds at all for a conclusion that the unity of the object and the
subject is inseparable in general. Besides, even if particles do appear in the course of
an experiment only, as is the case with excited vacuum (virtual particles), probability
as a state is no less objective than actuality. From the viewpoint of the positivist
interpretation of physical reality the very idea of such objectivity is bound to look
preposterous indeed.
The real obstacle confronting the experimentalist and preventing him from accurately p
defining the parameters of a moving particle consists at present in the objective and 153
glaring contradiction between the absense of any system capable of emanating or
absorbing less than one quantum of energy, on the one hand, and the inevitability of
the exchange of energy, however negligible, between the instrument and the object in
any measurement or experiment, on the other. As regards the microworld, where one
quantum of action and the object under measurement are commensurate, any process
of measurement will cause a substantial change in the state of the object. All that
does not prove, however, that the existence of the object in microphysics is
completely dependent on the subject.
It stands to reason that the observability of an object as such does not provide a p
solid ground for scientific cognition. The progress of theoretical research and
particularly quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, have revealed the
inadequacy and limitations of observation as a method of cognition to the positivists
themselves. The development of theoretical science has enhanced the danger of
solipsism which was evident even to the Machists way back in the late 19th century.
The very fact that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity appear to be
equally meaningful to different people irrespective of their nationality and ideological
affiliation has called for a considerable extension of the notion of objectivity. From
the methodological viewpoint, the philosophers of science have begun to attach ever
growing significance to Humes old idea that the focus of attention should be shifted
from the observation of individual phenomena to the regular repetition of events, 154
their regular concomitance or sequence. A separate experiment can neither confirm,
nor refute a hypothesisit takes a whole series or succession of observations.
Philipp Frank, a representative of late logical positivism, wrote: A single experiment
can only refute a theory if we mean by theory a system of specific statements
with no allowance for modification. But what is actually called a theory in science
is never such a system... Therefore, no crucial experiment can refute any such
theories.[ 1541 From this it follows that one of the main requirements to an
experiment is its reproducibility at different times and in different parts of the
universe.
What is the purpose of this methodological principle leading to the denial of the p
decisive role of experiments in science? Its aim is to replace the criterion of
observability by the criterion of inter subjective verification of knowledge. As a
result, objectivity becomes equivalent to intersubjectivity. Solipsism can be avoided
(without resorting, like Berkeley, to God) by recognising at least the existence of
other people. But this is not all, of course. It must also be postulated that people are
alike everywhere, consequently, the reality constructed by them will also be similar
everywhere. Contrary to common sense which accepts only one physical world, the
emphasis on the subject who is the architect of reality leads to a tempting idea that
different scientific theories and, consequently, their authors represent different worlds
which they themselves construct. To avoid absolute relativism ensuing from this 155
concept, it is necessary to show additionally how one experience can be compared
with another, i.e. to solve the problem of their mutual correction. Naturally enough,
subjective experience may fail to tally with what is regarded true by common
consent. Let us consider at least one of the answers to this question proposed by
Max Born which is sufficiently typical of all attempts of the positivists to find a way
out of a difficult situation without forfeiting their main dogmas.
Expounding his views, Born describes a conversation with his cousin who asked p
him a puzzling question way back in his school years: What do you mean exactly
when you call this leaf, here, green or the sky, there, blue? Dissatisfied with Borns
reference to the impressions of other people who all saw green and blue like he did,
the cousin said: There are colourblind people who see the colours differently; some
of them, for example, cannot distinguish red and green.[ 1551
The answer to this question appeared to be far from simple and the question itself p
was evidently not at all as superfluous as it had seemed at first to Born, if he
deemed it necessary to return to it time and again in his declining years. Moreover,
Born admitted that he had found the meaning of this question even more profound
after he had got acquainted with the classical answers to it given by Kant, Russell,
Mach, and Hume. Assessing the positivist doctrine alongside those of other 156
philosophical schools he was to some degree familiar with, Born wrote: In the most
radical interpretation this theory means a denial of the existence of an external

world, or at least the negation of its knowability. In practical life a follower of this
doctrine would hardly behave as if there were no external world.[ 1561
Born, however, does not accept the materialist view either. In his opinion, dialectical p
materialism has so broadened the concept of matter that its initial meaning has been
completely lost and the concept itself has become too far removed from concrete
problems of physics. The existence of the real, objective, knowable world, according
to Born, has turned into a sanctified creed.
Born offers his own solution to the problem of objectivity of knowledge. In his p
opinion, the impossibility to prove the objective existence of green leaves and the
blue sky is rooted in the attempt to reach an agreement on a single sensory
impression. Such a task, according to Born, is nonsensical. Objective knowledge can
only be reached by obtaining the perceptions of two communicable impressions
which lend themselves to intersubjective verification. The equality or inequality of
such impressions can already be ascertained quite definitely. Born lays special
emphasis on the communicability of impressions. One person cannot give an
adequate description of his sensations which he experiences when looking at a green
leaf, but two persons together can come to an agreement regarding the colour of the
leaf they observe.
Objectivity is thus reduced to the equality of impressions. An important means of p 157

comparing impressions is a symbol, i.e. a visual or a sound signal the exact form of
which is not important what matters is the information conveyed by this symbol.
One and the same set of data can be represented by different signals. Symbols
performing the function of data carriers during intercourse between individuals are of
decisive importance in attaining objective knowledge.
The process of cognition is visualised by Born as follows. A child assimilates p

language as the totality of symbols and learns to correlate them with one another. It
is worth noting that Born does not speak of the correlation between symbols and the
objective world, but of the correlation between different symbols with definite
meanings. Hence, given the ability to manipulate symbols, the measurement of heat
intensity can be presented as the process of correlation of the sensation of heat with
a geometrical value (the height of the mercury column in a thermometer). Learning
provides man with a dictionary and enables him to correlate sensations through the
agency of thermometer readings, i.e. to correlate his sensations with other peoples
sensations. Similarly, chemistry teaches people to correlate different substances with
a combination of symbols denoting elementary basic components (atoms). By
correlating atomic weights with the symbols of elements one can learn the
corresponding molecular weights, whereas the correlation of valency with the
symbols of atoms makes it possible to forecast the results of chemical reactions.
Such correspondence of sense data (perceptions and the corresponding symbols) is p 158
established, according to Born, in all spheres of experience. Born notes the existence
and coincidence of structures which are identified with the help of the sense organs
and indicates that the corresponding impressions can be passed from one individual
to another. He is even inclined to call these structures after Kant things-in-
themselves. Physical formulae and systems of equations need not necessarily
symbolise what is known from experience and what can be visualised. Yet Born is
convinced that all these formulae are deduced from experience through abstraction
and a continuous process of experimental test.
For the sake of objectivity, the scientists should describe the essence of their p
abstract formulae in the plain language, using self-evident notions. Yet modern
science, according to Born, cannot avoid subjectivity, no matter how hard the
scientists may try to do so. On the whole, Borns interpretation of the
complementarity principle falls in line with the principles of the Copenhagen school:
a scientist is free to choose the experimental apparatus which is to be used in his
experiment. However, the selection of the apparatus determines the picture of reality.
Thus a subjective trend, writes Born, is reintroduced into physics and cannot be
eliminated. Another loss of objectivity is due to the fact that the theory makes only
probability predictions, which produce graded expectations.[ 1581
As we see, Born in fact substitutes the process of tuition and learning for the p
cognition of reality. He proceeds from an already existing system of knowledge 159
which enables the individual experience of every man to be harmonised. This
approach implies that individual experiences are identical and therefore do not need
any comparison, elaboration and correction of their content. It is quite sufficient to
correlate the symbols denoting one or another totality of impressions. Such a model
has in fact nothing in common with the real process of scientific cognition which
aims first and foremost at investigating new, unknown phenomena, but not at
harmonising and systematising individual experiences with the help of an arbitrarily
selected aggregate of symbols described by Born.
Of course, the communicative aspect of scientific cognition is in itself an interesting p

philosophical problem, but it should not overshadow the essence of scientific
cognition. Criticising Mach for his attempts to reduce the world to sense perceptions
and the scientific theory to a means for establishing logical links between sense
perceptions, Born is in fact very close to positivism in his understanding of the
process of cognition. The world lying beyond phenomena indeed remains for Born
something like the Kantian thing-in-itself which is not amenable to any
determination. As a result, the problems of truth, of the certitude of knowledge and
of the means for improving incomplete and inaccurate knowledge become
superfluous. No reason whatsoever is given for the identity of our perceptions of
reality, except for the reference to the selected system of symbols and to an
agreement on their meaningssuch identity is the more strange as the subjective
perceptions of different people vary to a considerable extent and as there are no 160
similar people with equal abilities for perception, equal personal experiences, equal
interests and equal stocks of knowledge, let alone many important personal qualities.
The investigation of these problems has long since transcended the bounds of p
physical science, though the problems themselves have not become any easier for
that reason. On the contrary in such fields as chemistry, biology, the psychology of
public opinion, and others where the possibilities for observation are limited, it has
proved even more difficult to explain how subjective knowledge can be turned into
objective knowledge, verifiable and applicable for practical purposes as it is. To save
the principle of objectivity in these fields on the basis of empiricism, the philosophy
of science had but one way out onlyto sacrifice its traditional phenomenalist
approach in favour of physicalism. This did not mean, however, a complete break
with traditions, since the philosophical thinking of the positivists has always been
characteristic of a peculiar symbiosis of both the phenomenalist and the physicalist
approaches. Whereas the philosophers advocating phenomenalist analysis contended
that sensory experience was the basis of knowledge from the epistemological
viewpoint and that the statements expressing such experience formed the language of
all meaningful propositions, the physicalists believed that the foundation of all
knowledge was the observation of material things and that the statements of
observation made the core of the language which was used for expressing the
meaningful propositions of cognitive value. Carnap, for one, represented both these
tendencies in different periods of his life. Siding up first with the phenomenological 161
branch of positivism, he became later one of the most persistent and, perhaps, most
profound expounders of the second branch too. As a result of the evolution of his
views, Carnap became, willy-nilly, an instrument for a considerable deflation of the
initial claims of physicalism, though the latter has not lost its ground completely till
nowadays.
For later-time Carnap, the foundation of knowledge is not irrefutable statements, as p

he believed earlier, but statements which underlie any scientific investigation and
provide a psychological basis of cognition not only for a scientist, but also for any
individual in general. It is these initial statements that can be connected
intersubjectively with other statements and therefore make the objective foundation of
knowledge. Carnaps radical physicalism boils down to the assertion that all
meaningful statements can be connected in one way or another with a statement of
the type: the temperature in this place varies within 5 to 10 C. According to
Carnap, the statements of such sciences as biology, chemistry, geology, etc. can be
reduced to physical notions because the type of determinism prevailing in these
sciences can be reduced to physical determinism. All laws of nature, he writes,
including those which hold for organisms, human beings, and human societies, are
logical consequences of the physical laws, i.e. of those laws, which are needed for
the explanation of inorganic processes.[ 1611 For instance, the notion of 162
impregnation can be interpreted in terms of merger of sperm and ovum accompanied
by some redistribution of elements. Similarly, psychological knowledge, in Carnaps
opinion, can be reduced to physical knowledge. Thus, a statement to the effect that
somebody has been very angry at 10 a.m. today can be translated without any
detriment to the scientific value of this statement into the language of physics by
stating that the persons breathing and pulse have quickened, the muscles have
strained, etc. True, Carnap concedes that this reduction may perhaps fail to provide a
clear idea of the laws underlying impregnation in the first case, and the emotional
process, in the second. Making this concession, Carnap does not concern himself
about the nature of the impregnation process or the individuals inner world. He
views the problem from the angle of verbal descriptions only. If such descriptions
prove to be impossible for some reason or other, there can be no question of
attaining intersubjectivity, i.e. the objectivity of biological and psychological
phenomena as they are understood by different scientists.
In turn, the correctness of the initial statements of observation is made by Carnap p

contingent on the extent of agreement between the sense data of different observers.
If the sense data of each of the observers are consistent with the interpretation of the
indications of a certain apparatus designed to fulfil a given task, it means that the
initial statements required to form a scientific proposition have passed the test for
viability.
True, intersubjective observability has certain advantages over the phenomenologic p

language from the standpoint of the development of scientific knowledge. 163
Nevertheless, one can hardly take seriously the attempt, to construct all sciences,
psychology and social disciplines including, on the basis of physics, arid expect all
theoretical concepts and laws to be derived from physical concepts and laws. Being
aware of the weakness of his position, Carnap later proposed several modified
variants of the physicalist programme limiting it, for instance, to the reduction of all
descriptive terms in the languages of different sciences to terms denoting sensuously
perceived properties of things. In his opinion, the class of observable material
predicates can provide a reliable basis for the reduction of all statements and for
language integrity. For instance, the ability to be dissolved in water is revealed and
confirmed by the observation of the fact of dissolution. It was a significant
moderation of Carnaps initial stand, as the sphere of observable empirical and
dispositional predicates is markedly broader than the .sphere of terms expressing our
sense data in purely physical parameters. Finally, in one of his latest works entitled
Philosophical Foundations of Physics Carnap beats a further retreat and confines
himself to a mere recommendation of a very general character, an admonition rather
than an injunction, advising the scientists to base their language on the language of
physics wherever possible. This is all that remained of his formerly uncompromising
physicalism.
Of certain interest in this context is also the position of Ernst Nagel, one of the p
latest and sufficiently radical adherents of the physicalist principle of reductibility. 164
Like all other philosophers siding with the modern philosophy of science and
upholding some essential traditions of positivism, Nagel sees the meaningfulness of
empirical statements in their connection with direct observation, considering logical
links between them chiefly formal or linguistic. In his opinion, a theory can only be
meaningful if its statements relate to potentially observable things and do not run
counter to its principles. He denies meaningfulness to those statements which have
no empirical confirmation. According to Nagel, the data of experience, observation
statements and logical links play each their special role in the process of cognition.
Nagel maintains that any attempt to base the knowledge of physical facts on sensory p
data is doomed to failure. If the whole edifice of science were built on direct
sensory experience, knowledge would never go beyond its limits.
Nagel contends that our knowledge includes objective facts, but not simple sensory p
data or some of their complexes localised in the sphere of sensory experience. It is
only after investigation and by no means before it that we can claim the possession
of sensory data. Investigation alone enables us to assert that the earth is round and
that President Roosevelt remained in office longer than his predecessors.
In Nagels opinion, the objectivity of our knowledge does not lead to metaphysical p
realism. He supports the view of some other physicalists that the doctrine whereby
all statements on directly observable objects can be translated into the so-called
physicalist language should be replaced by semantic realism in which non-observable 165
objects are represented by a system of nomological statements.
According to Nagel, in proposing the reduction of one theory to another we p

implicitly proceed from the assumption that there exist some methods to demonstrate
the deducibility of one theory from another. In reductions of the sort so far
mentioned, Nagel writes, the laws of the secondary science employ no descriptive
terms that are not also used with approximately the same meanings in the primary
science. Reductions of this type can therefore be regarded as establishing deductive
relations between two sets of statements that employ a homogeneous
vocabulary.[ 1651 Nagel admits that the secondary science sometimes includes
notions which are absent from the primary science.
Understandably, positivist physicalism is directed against openly idealistic concepts p

which not only fail to provide adequate answers to acute theoretical questions, but in
every way hamper the development of modern science. The biologists, for instance,
can hardly be encouraged in their investigations by philosophical doctrines explaining
all the processes in living organisms by the operation of mysterious immaterial
agents such as entelechy or the vital force which do not yield to any rational
determination or even description. Central to all these doctrines from Emil Dubois-
Reymonds time till nowadays has been the idea of blessed ignoranceignoramus et
ignorabimus. A prominent biologist Konrad Lorenz says in his book The Reverse of
the Mirror that this view not only acts as a brake on scientific progress, but is also 166
one of the gravest errors having a dire consequencea doubt about the reality of the
external world.[ 1661 Lorenz deplores the belatedness of his enlightenment and
notes that the practical problems of medicine and natural science have made him an
opponent of idealism. This materialist tendency of modern science causes many
biologists to turn their eyes to philosophical materialism.
Confessions of this kind are not exceptions with prominent representatives of p

modern biology. Another well-known biologist, Francisco Ayala, makes this
significant statement: The goal of science is the systematic organization of
knowledge about the universe on the basis of explanatory principles that are
genuinely testable.[ 1662 The reappraisal of values is characteristic not only of
modern biology. Idealism is being subjected to devastating criticism in many works
on the physiology of higher nervous activity, on neuropsychology, neurophysiology,
etc.
Contrary to idealistic theories of knowledge the latest investigations in biology and p

psychology provide convincing evidence that human thinking is not entirely
autonomous. Viewed from both the psychological and epistemological angles, it
represents the ability of highly organised living systems to reflect, i.e. to cognise, the
external world and themselves.
How does this materialistic tendency reveal itself in the modern philosophy of p 167
science?
Several trends are in evidence here. The beaten track for the adherents of this p
philosophy is to restrict the problem of objectivity to the problem of observation and
accumulation of empirical data. Since the observation of intimate biological processes
is identified by many scientists with the analysis of their physical manifestations,
their materialism not infrequently borders on physicalism. When it comes to the
analysis of new phenomena, particularly in biology, psychology and sociology, the
researchers seek in the first place to trace them to the operation of physical or
chemical mechanisms. Naturally enough, it is the only way to transfer many
biological, psychological, social, demographic and other processes to the sphere of
the observable. Carnap writes that the physical language is universal. This is the
thesis of physicalism. If the physical language on the grounds of its universality were
adopted as the system language of science, all science would become physics. The
various domains of science would become parts of unified science. According to
Carnap, the laws of psychology are special cases of physical laws holding in
inorganic physics as well. Identifying all materialism with its mechanistic trend,
Carnap believes that the materialist system corresponds to the viewpoint of the
empirical sciences, since in this system all concepts are reduced to the
physical.[ 1671
It is common knowledge that molecular genetics and molecular biology owe their p
achievements to modern physics and chemistry. Physico-chemical investigations have 168
enabled scientists to make the greatest discoveries in modern geneticsto reveal the
molecular structure of DNA (desoxyribonucleic acid) as the carrier of genetic
information and to define the role of nucleic acids, their molecular and sub-molecular
structures, in heredity. These epoch-making achievements of molecular genetics and
molecular biology have given a new impetus to the mechanistic doctrine and
mechanistic reductionism according to which all life processes and properties of
living organisms, as well as the origin and evolution of living matter can be
explained with the help of physico-chemical investigations of microstructures and
microprocesses in living organisms.
The history of science shows that the ideas stimulating scientific investigations in p
their initial stage do not always prove beneficial for the subsequent progress of
science. The inception of molecular biology was indeed marked by the influence of
the physicalist paradigm. Noting this fact, E.N. Lightfoot, however, seeks to
perpetuate it: in his opinion, the investigations in molecular biology have been based
on the view that living organisms are subjected to the same laws as inanimate
objects and can be denoted by terms corresponding to these laws. Now, says Ayer,
he holds the same view, though on a higher level of complexity and comprehension.
This mechanistic approach has been expressed in a most uncompromising form by p

the discoverers of the molecular structure of DNA, John Watson and Francis Crick.
In one of his lectures in 1966, Crick declared that the ultimate goal of the modern 169
development of biology was explanation of all biological phenomena on the basis of
achievements in physical and chemical sciences. In his opinion, there were very good
reasons for that. The revolution in physics in the mid-1920s provided a solid
theoretical basis for chemistry and for the corresponding departments of physics.
According to Crick, it would not be presumptuous to assert that the quantum theory
and the available empirical knowledge in chemistry provide at present a no less
reliable foundation for the construction of biological science.
Cricks reference to quantum rather than to classical mechanics is indicative of a p

new trend in the modern doctrine of physicalism. Nevertheless, the essence of this
doctrine does not change as before, it represents a tendency to express biological
phenomena, processes and laws in the physico-chemical language.
Taking exception to organicism and holism one of the representatives of this p

trend Jacques Monod writes: Some philosophical schools (all of them being
consciously or unconsciously under Hegels influence) are known to contest the
significance of analytical approach to such complex systems as living beings.
According to these schools (organicists or holists) which rise from ashes like Phoenix
with every new generation, the analytical approach qualified as reductionist has
always been sterile since it tends to reduce, purely and simply, the properties of
extremely complex organisations to a mechanical aggregate of the properties of their
parts. Harmful and useless is any argument with holists which testifies to nothing but
their utter ignorance regarding the scientific method and the essential part played in 170
it by analysis.[ 1701
Monod also rejects the general theory of systems[ 1702 and any dialectical p
description[ 1703 of living organisms. According to Monod, the cell is indeed a
machine which defies any dialectical description. In its essence it is not Hegelian,
but Cartesian. According to Kenneth Schaffner, regarded to be a typical
representative of modern mechanistic reductionism and physicalism, the discovery of
Watson and Crick also contributes to a general development towards a complete
chemical explanation of biological organisms and processes and substantiates the
view that genetics, and other biological sciences, are reduced to physics and
chemistry.[ 1704
It is noteworthy, however, that while repeating the familiar propositions of radical p
mechanistic reductionism in relation to living organisms and biological science,

Schaffner is forced to make reservations after each of his statements thereby
confirming the irreducibility of biological phenomena to physico-chemical ones.
Schaffners views are apparently anti-vitalistic and anti-idealistic. He cannot but
admit qualitative distinctions between the living organisms and the dead nature, yet
he persists in his mechanistic reductionism as he sees no alternative to it except for 171
the idealistic doctrine which he does not accept.
The crisis of biological chemism and mechanistic reductionism in modern biology is p

at the same time the crisis of neopositivistic physicalism, the logico-empirical
analysis of science, whose representatives from Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and
Percy W. Bridgeman to Rudolf B. Braithwaite, M. Brodbeck and Carl G. Hempel
have invariably pursued one and the same aim, viz. to reduce the biological to the
physical.
Until recently the neopositivistic philosophy of science was predominantly the p

philosophy of physics and made no serious attempts to apply its logico-empirical
analysis to biology. However, the gap has started filling up. The most important
contribution in this direction appears to be Michael Ruses book The Philosophy of
Biology, which is remarkable, for one, in that it convincingly shows the difficulties
facing the positivists in their attempts to apply the logicoempirical analysis of
science, i.e. physical reductionism, to biology. Ruse is out to prove that such
application is possible. He stresses, for instance, that there are now no theoretical
barriers in the way of a Nagelian-type reduction and that there are obvious signposts
about how this should be done, as that such a reduction has been rigorously
accomplished... It is only after this development that the physico-chemical and the
biological came into harmony, opening the way for a reduction, or at least, for a
possible reduction.[ 1711
Ruse obviously strives for a consistent implementation of the logico-empiricist, i.e. p 172
positivist, approach to the present problems of biology and to the future of biological
science. At the same time he is aware of the appeal of organicism to the biologists
and admits that many branches of biological science, such as systematics and
palaeontology seek to develop their own theories, genuinely biological, without
resorting to molecular-biological, i.e. essentially physical, explanations. He regards
such trends as transient phenomena and expresses a hope that biology would
ultimately take the course of reductionism and translate its theories into the language
of physics and chemistry. In his opinion, the existing state of affairs can only be
explained by the stubborn reluctance of prominent modern biologists to join the new
school of molecularbiological reductionism.
In positivist philosophy empiricism as the criterion of the objectivity of knowledge p

is inseparably linked with reductionism. Epistemological reductionism tending to
reduce all scientific knowledge to its empirical basis was supplemented by theoretical
reductionism which revealed itself in persistent attempts to translate all the wealth of
accumulated knowledge together with its theoretical explanations in the language of
physics. From the viewpoint of logic, this transition is understandable: the laws of
physics permit experimental checks of theoretical propositions making them testable.
Hence, theoretical reductionism leads to and finds its logical expression in
physicalism. The language used in the description of physical objects appears to be
natural, too, since it is the first language of man starting to master the external 173
world. The type of experience expressed in this language precedes chronologically,
psychologically and even logically other types expressed in other languages, the
phenomenological one inclusive.
The fallacy of this stand is not hard to expose. The perception of physical objects p
by man at an early stage of his development is indeed natural and goes side by side
with the mastery of the physical world. Yet this experience in the childs
development is preceded by more primitive forms of perception, such as the
perceptions of colours, smells and tastes which are very different with the infant
from modern physical notions. Besides, the development of man does not stop at
perceptions and his growing knowledge of the external world extending to the animal
kingdom, thinking and psychological processes, the sphere of social phenomena such
as the relations of production, freedom, solidarity, etc. can by no means be squeezed
into the physicalist paradigm.
Seeking to substantiate their doctrine, the adepts of physicalism also refer to the p
intersubjectivity of the language of observable physical phenomena as its
characteristic feature. In their opinion, this feature accounts for the fact that it is
much easier to ascertain the objectivity of one or another scientific proposition
through physical reduction than through phenomenalistic analysis. Hence, they make
the objectivity of knowledge contingent on the possibility of its intersubjective
expression, i.e. on the community of notions and their usability with different people
and different scientific quarters. In turn, intersubjectivity is made contingent on the
possibility of reducing this knowledge to physical terms. Such a concept of the 174
objectivity of knowledge is far removed from the materialistic concept identifying
objectivity with independence from man and his consciousness in general, particularly
if we take into account that most physical terms except those testable by direct
sensory experience are considered conventional.
True, the language of physics provides a basis for intersubjective certainty in the p
sense that it does not deal with abstract sensory data or even perceptions, but reflects
universal or general, recurrent, stable and therefore regularly observable phenomena,
which is in full accord with the requirements of scientific cognition. Yet the
requirements of universality and recurrence, being important as they are, do not yet
ensure the objectivity of knowledge. Such physicalist views suggest the idea that
intersubjectivity is characteristic not only of objects under observation, but of the
observations themselves. Hence, they may be considered final in the analysis of
epistemological problems. Here is, so to speak, a feedback linkfrom theoretical
reductionism back to epistemological reductionism. One strengthens the other. Yet all
observations, no matter how complete they may be and whatever their objects,
remain, from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge, the perceptions of
individuals.
The language of physics is incapable of providing the intersubjective basis for p

science in general and for scientific epistemology, in particular, if only for the fact
that it constitutes a smaller part of our language and that the perceptions of physical
facts are not more important indeed, they can sometimes be even less important 175
than the perceptions of biological or psychological phenomena, since the perception
of the physical world is inconceivable outside the human brain. Another weakness of
the physicalist programme which becomes ever more obvious with the advance of
science ensues from the growing differentiation of physical science itself. A question,
naturally, arises: where is the limit of the reduction process? Do we have to reduce
biological, psychical and social phenomena to the physics of the macroworld? Or to
molecular physics-chemistry? Or to the atomic level? Suppose, we adopt the
physicalist doctrine and stop at the atomic level. But what about the future? What if
the world of the electron or some other elementary particle indeed opens into
infinity? One can only be sorry for a philosophy which will attempt to shut the door
in the face of a new generation of scientists.
Expounding some of the weaknesses of the physicalist doctrine mentioned above, p

many philosophers propose, in fact, to go back where positivism has started. All their
ardent criticism thus turns out to be merely aimed at reinstating the phenomenologic
approach (we leave aside here the numerous pluralistic versions of the combination
of the empirical and the theoretical, the physical and the mental, etc.). Yet the
unsuccessful attempts to reduce the mental to the physical, the biological to the
chemical, the theoretical to the empirical, etc. do not mean that biology is doomed to
stay forever in the cradle and content itself with exclusively empirical approach. Nor
does it mean that the irreducible residue of biology which could not be rationalised 176
by physics and made part of respectable science should always remain purely
empirical.
The dialectical synthesis of the achievements of phenomenological analysis, be it in p

biology, psychology, social sciences or elsewhere, with the results of consistent and
rational reduction is the only path to a new theory, a new theoretical fundamental
discipline destined to turn biology, sociology, etc. into independent sciences which
will not confine themselves, on the one hand, to the superficial description of
phenomena, too specific in their external manifestations to be reduced to coarse
physical terms, and will not dissolve, on the other hand, in physical notions
degrading to a commonplace.
There has been growing evidence of late that biology, psychology, sociology and
other specific sciences are beginning to turn onto this path and gain independence
not as primitive phenomenological schools, but as full-fledged scientific disciplines.
Darwins phenomenological theory synthesised with the achievements of molecular
biology and genetics exemplifies a solution to the dilemma of reductionism or
organicism. The same path is evidently being taken now by the modern theory of
knowledge despite the predictions of epistemological reductionism. It is emerging as
a product of integration of general epistemological concepts with the results of
specific investigations into the nature of consciousness as such (including the social
and historical factors of its development), on the one hand, and into the
neurophysiological mechanisms of conscious and unconscious activity, on the other.
In its advancement new scientific epistemology is casting off both the
phenomenological fetters and the physicalist dogmas. 177
***

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normal
Notes
[ 1421] Rudolf Carnap, The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis

of Language, in: Logical Positivism, op. cit., p.80.
[ 1431] Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time, University of California Press,

Berkeley, 1956, p.218.
[ 1481] J.A. Wheeler, Genesis and Observership, in: Foundational Problems in

the Special Sciences, Ed. by R.E. Butts and J.Hintikka, Dordrecht, 1977, p.27 ff.
[ 1491] E.P. Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections, Bloomington, Indiana, 1967,

p.175.
[ 1501] S.W. Hawking, Breakdown of Predictability in Gravitational Collapse,

Physical Review, Vol.14, No.10, 1976, p.2464.
[ 1511] See W.Heisenberg, The Physicists Conception of Nature, London, 1958,

pp.22, 2829; see also Physics and Philosophy, London, 1959, Ch.III.
[ 1541] Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs,

N.J., 1957, p.31.
[ 1551] Max Born, My Life and My Views, Charles Scribners Sons, New York,
1968, pp. 16162.
[ 1561] Ibid., p.166.
[ 1581] Ibid., p.187.
[ 1611] The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Ed. by P.A. Schillp, Open Court,
London, 1963, p.883.
[ 1651] E.Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York, 1961, p.339.
[ 1661] See K.Lorenz, Die Rckseite des Spiegels. Versuch einer Naturgeschichte
menschlicher Erkennens, R.Piper & Co. Verlag, Mnchen, 1975, S.27.
[ 1662] F.J. Ayala, Biology as an Autonomous Science, in: Topics in the

Philosophy of Biology, M.Grene and E.Mendelsohn (eds.), Reidel Publishing
Company, Dordrecht, 1976, p.312.
[ 1671] See Logical Positivism, op. cit., pp. 16667, 144.
[ 1701] Jacques Monod, Le hasard et la ncessit. Essai sur la philosophic naturelle

de la biologie moderne, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 9293.
[ 1702] Ibid., p.94.
[ 1703] Ibid., pp.47, 50.
[ 1704] K.F. Schaffner, The Watson-Crick Model and Reductionism, The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol.20, No.4, December 1969, p.338.
[ 1711] M. Ruse, The Philosophy of Biology, Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, Ltd.,
London, 1973, p.207.
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Since the 1920s, when Karl Popper proclaimed his principle of falsification as the p
basis for the testability of knowledge and for distinguishing between scientific
propositions and pseudo-science, he has invariably criticised positivist philosophy and
Contents
its understanding of objectivity as the observability of events. His arguments against
empiricism are serious enough. Popper maintains, first, that observation is always
Index based on some theoretical premises and that scientific knowledge, contrary to the
Card positivists, does not start with sensory data. Hence, the objectivity of knowledge
cannot be identified with the observability of events. Second, the traditional problem
Formats: of inductive conclusion regarded by empiricism as the principal argument in favour
Text of the objectivity of a theory is rooted in Humes error regarding the nature of the
PS scientific method.
PDF
However, the true significance of this criticism can only be assessed in the light of p
Poppers positive programme. It may appear at first sight that the principles of his
Other epistemology are indeed radically different from those of positivism. Knowledge,
Titles: according to Popper, cannot start from nothingfrom a tabula rasanot yet from
TA
observation. Science, philosophy, rational thought, must all start from common

Years:
sense.[ 1771 Yet the main principle of common sense is the faith in the existence 178
1984 of the real world. Realism which asserts the existence of the world outside and
independent of its perception cannot, in Poppers opinion, be proved or disproved. In
other words, it belongs to the sphere of metaphysics. Realism should be accepted
### as the only sensible hypothesisas a conjecture to which no sensible alternative has
ever been offered.[ 1781 Poppers realism, however, has little in common with
MAP scientific realism or scientific materialism, particularly in the understanding of
objectivity. In Poppers opinion, shared also by enlightened common sense, realism
should be at least tentatively pluralistic.[ 1782 A rationalist seeks to reduce all
the diversity of the world to several fundamental entities or processes. In Poppers
words, Ockhams razor can only be applied after recognising the plurality of what
there is in the world.[ 1783
As has been indicated earlier, Popper distinguishes three autonomous and relatively p
independent worlds noting that the term world is conventional and that there may
be different criteria for their classification. The first world is physical reality, the
second world the subjective knowledge of an individual, and the third world,
objective knowledge as understood by Popper. My first thesis, Popper writes,
involves the existence of two different senses of knowledge or of thought: (1)
knowledge or thought in the subjective sense, consisting of a state of consciousness 179
or a disposition to behave or to react, and (2) knowledge or thought in an objective
sense, consisting of problems, theories, and arguments as such. Knowledge in this
objective sense is totally independent of anybodys claim to know; it is also
independent of anybodys belief, or disposition to assent; or to assert, or to act.
Knowledge in the objective sense is knowledge without a knower: it is knowledge
without a knowing subject.[ 1791 The elements of the third world comprise,
according to Popper, not only theories and ideas, but also problems or problem
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/2.2-Objective.Knowledge.and.Critical.Rationalism[2012-12-17 15:15:45]
situations. By analogy with physical states he also qualifies as the third worlds
elements the states of discussion or the states of critical arguments, as well as
information carriers, i.e. books, magazines, libraries, etc.
It is indicative in itself that Poppers evolution has brought him to the recognition of p
the existence of the physical world. Yet the sequence of the worlds as listed above
by Popper does not correspond to their significance in Poppers logic of science. It is
not at all the physical world occupying the first place on Poppers list that constitutes
the essence of scientific knowledge. Nor is the second world, i.e. the world of
emotions, sensations and individual knowledge, of any great significance. In Poppers
opinion, it is just because of its exclusive interest in the subjective knowledge as
expressed in everyday phrases I know or I am thinking that traditional
epistemology has lost its influence. It was concerned with what was not, in fact,
scientific knowledge. Popper writes: For scientific knowledge simply is not 180
knowledge in the sense of the ordinary usage of the words I know. While
knowledge in the sense of I know belongs to what I call the second world, the
world of subjects, scientific knowledge belongs to the third world, to the world of
objective theories, objective problems, and objective arguments.[ 1801 Hence, the
third world or world3 alone is truly autonomous and objective.
From the epistemological viewpoint this thesis does not offer any new solutions. It p
only counters empiricism in that it eliminates the question of the source of
knowledge, as the logic of scientific discovery which is the core of Poppers entire
epistemology has no place for such question. It lies on the other side of the line of
demarcation drawn by Popper between science and metaphysics. Yet even within
the narrow limits of the logico-theoretical model of knowledge the concept of the
third world gives rise to serious contradictions. If we analyse the relation of the
third world to a concrete discovery or theory, we are bound to answer at least two
questions: first, which element of our knowledge and at what stage of its maturity is
regarded as the initial one? Second, which elements in a given discovery or theory
can be confirmed or disproved by an experiment? Popper gives in fact no answer to
the second question. As regards the first one, the answer is as follows: the selection
of the initial, basic propositions is a conventional one. Popper does not deny the
connection of basic propositions with experience. In The Logic of Scientific 181
Discovery he writes that a decision to adopt a basic proposition is not prompted by
our sense-perceptions. According to Popper, experience can only motivate a decision
to adopt a proposition or reject it, but any attempt to trace basic propositions to
perceptions will prove completely futile.
Hence, despite Poppers resolute opposition to empiricism, his concept reveals p

curious likeness to logical positivism in at least two respects. First, Popper strives to
confine the subjectmatter of epistemology to purely logical problems and to dismiss
some problems of general significance (e.g. the problem of the source of knowledge).
Second, like the representatives of the Vienna school Popper is forced to resort to
conventionalism as regards the origin of basic propositions. In point of fact, he
replaces the conventionalism from above (in relation to laws and theories)
characteristic of logical positivism by conventionalism from below (in relation to
basic propositions). His conventionalism stems from deeply rooted logicism which
manifested itself already in his early works by the rejection of philosophical and
sociological problems of science. Understandably, Poppers basic propositions do not
relate to current individual experience, but reflect the system of established
knowledge. His concept has not gone beyond a slight displacement of the border
between our knowledge and the material world. All we know from Popper about our
relation to this world is that our knowledge exerts active influence upon it. He
sidesteps the question of the primacy in this interaction which is embarrassing to

both the positivist and Popperian epistemology and constitutes the key issue of the 182
theory of knowledge.
According to Popper, the third world emerged as a result of the spontaneous p

activity of man and this is just what accounts for its objectivity. The unpremeditated
build-up of knowledge by man is akin to the spinning of a web by a spider or to
the making of honey by a bee. And I assert, writes Popper, that even though this
third world is a human product, there are many theories in themselves and arguments
in themselves and problem situations in themselves which have never been produced
or understood and may never be produced or understood by men.[ 1821 Such
theories and problem situations, according to Popper, do not appear according to
plan, they are not even needed before their emergence. Once they have made their
appearance, however, they may create new problems or a new system of ideas. The
objectivity of a theory is understood by Popper as its independence from individual
consciousness. In order to substantiate his viewpoint, he concentrates, first and
foremost, on the problem of the acceptance and understanding of scientific
discoveries.
It should be noted that this problem is not alien to Marxist philosophy either. It has p
long since been the object of serious discussions in Soviet literature relative to
concrete dialectical issues. The true meaning of ideas, theories and projects is indeed
often realised by scientists long after the corresponding discovery or invention is
made. This fact, characteristic of one of the aspects of objectivity, is not regarded by
Popper as something requiring any special attention. Actually, however, the gradual 183
realisation and acceptance of a discovery is nothing but the result of the objectivity
of knowledge understood as the reflection of objective processes, i.e. as a fact which
can only be explained through the analysis of social factors influencing the
development of science and its relation to the material world.
Ideas, theories and other components of social consciousness are indeed relatively p
autonomous and independent of individual consciousness. The existence of the theory
of relativity or Darwins theory of evolution does not depend on anyones
consciousness. Moreover, we can go even so far as to assert that it was not Einstein
or Darwin who had to decide on whether their theories were to be or not to be.
These theories were bound to appear, and not at the scientists wish or by force of
coincidence, but mainly because they reflected the objective processes of reality.
Besides, to understand the inevitability of these discoveries, one ought to take into
account the general laws of scientific development determined in the end by practical
needs. Hence, the correct statement of the problem of objectivity is the following:
what is the objective content of scientific theories and what are their subjective
elements?
Frankly speaking, Poppers analysis of a scientific theory cannot boast of subtlety. p

Knowledge is construed as both a process of cognition and a result thereof,
embodied in various theories, ideas and problems. In Poppers opinion, however, the
process of thinking lies outside the concept of scientific knowledge which should be
mainly understood as the product of this process, i.e. as theories and their logical 184
relations. The process of thinking is always individual and subjective, whereas its
general results, i.e. problems, ideas and theories are objective. In Poppers opinion,
the incompatibility of certain theories is a logical fact which is absolutely irrelevant
to whether somebody is aware of it or not. These purely objective logical relations
are the characteristic features of entities which are called by Popper theories or
knowledge in the objective sense of the word.
Should we defy Poppers scheme, overstep the boundary set by him and consider p
the connection between scientific knowledge (the third world) and material reality
in all details, i.e. in the process, sum, tendency, origin, we shall find out that there is
no sharp line of demarcation between the knowledge of an individual and the system
of scientific knowledge developed by mankind. They differ, as it were, by the
objective/subjective ratios. Hence, both the thinking processes and their results
deserve special philosophical analysis. The electromagnetic theory as developed by
James Maxwell was evidently just as much indicative of its authors subjective
demerits (and, for that matter, his subjective merits), as were his mental processes,
notions and ideas. To be sure, science cannot be too tolerant. The amendments made
by Heinrich Hertz and Oliver Heaviside, as well as the subsequent elaboration of the
electromagnetic theory in the light of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics
have corrected a number of Maxwells errors. Yet it is not criticism or mutual
rational verification which guarantees, according to Popper, the objectivity of the 185
electromagnetic theory. Such criticism can at best eliminate some subjective
imperfections thereby helping to reveal the objective content of the theory. It does
not mean at all that a scientific theory owes its objectivity exclusively to criticism
and falsification of erroneous conclusions.
Despite the proclaimed objectivity of the third world, Popper fails to provide an p
appropriate substantiation for this thesis. His objectivity can only be defined by
comparison with individual experience, and the criterion of the testability of theories
is, in fact, intersubjective by nature. Popper himself makes no bones about his stand
when he writes: Now I hold that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or
verifiable, but that they are nevertheless testable. I shall therefore say that the
objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter subjectively
tested.[ 1851 Intersubjective testing need not go beyond a mutual rational control
which is the common objective of critical discussions. Such rational control,
according to Popper, is only possible through multiple checks and repeated
comparisons with the obvious. No observations should be taken into account if they
cannot be repeated and checked. Such repetitions alone can provide sufficient
evidence that we deal not with accidental coincidences, but with events which are
intersubjectively testable owing to their recurrence. In other words the objective
world as defined in Poppers epistemological scheme is mainly referred to by 186
scientists for falsification of one or another theory.
According to Popper, the essence of scientific activity, its distinguishing feature p

consists in systematic attempts to refute ideas, hypotheses and theories which are
being advanced, and in eliminating errors. The tests should result in the selection of
a hypothesis which is more resistant to criticism than other hypotheses. In other
words, all tests should aim at finding weak points and eliminating untenable theories
by their falsification. But just because it is our aim to establish theories as well as
we can, writes Popper, we must test them as severely as we can... This is the
reason why the discovery of instances which confirm a theory means very little if we
have not tried, and failed, to discover refutations.[ 1861 Yet Popper overlooks
the fact that every experiment tests not only a theory as such, but also a host of its
logical and non-logical premises. All of them participate in the interpretation of an
experiment in one way or another. Therefore, if an experiment testifies against a
theory, we can never be sure whether the falsification applies to the theory itself, or
to the attending premises. The conclusion that an experiment falsifies a theory is
purely conventional. Any theory can be saved by introducing additional premises or
by modifying the basic ones. Realising the contradictory nature of the situation,
Popper offers, on purely conventional grounds, to adopt a postulate prohibiting the
187
introduction of hypotheses intended to protect a theory against a death sentence.
Consequently, in Poppers opinion, theories and ideas must become the objects of p
merciless falsification. The refutation of theories becomes for scientific cognition the
end in itself.
In accordance with his model of scientific cognition Popper contends that not a p
single scientist can claim the truth of his ideas and theories. Scientists act, he
writes, on the basis of a guess or, if you like, of a subjective belief (for we may so
call the subjective basis of an action) concerning what is promising of impending
growth in the third world of objective knowledge.[ 1871 In developing their
research programmes scientists, according to Popper, are guided by their conjectures
as regards which trend is likely to be the most fruitful in the third world. A
scientist therefore must once and for all discard the self-confident I know or I
suppose. Since his individual notions are inevitably subjective, he has but very
modest rights which only entitle him to say: I am trying to understand a problem,
I am trying to think of alternatives to this problem, I am thinking of an
experimental check for the given theory, I am trying to axiomise the theory, and
the like.
According to Popper, the worlds are real if they can interact with the physical p
world, and they are autonomous if their irreducibility to one another is postulated.
The main problem of his pluralistic philosophy hinges upon the relations between the
worlds. Of the three worlds, the two first and the two last ones can directly interact. 188
The second world, the world of individual experience, subjective knowledge, can
interact with the two other worlds, but the physical world and the world of
knowledge cannot directly contact each other in a similar manner, they have to use
the mediation of the second world. In principle, it is possible to assume the
reducibility of the mental world to the physical world, but the existence of objective
knowledge, its obvious influence on the physical world, on the one hand, and the no
less obvious impossibility of the direct causal effect of abstract entities on physical
processes, on the other, force the inevitable conclusion about the plurality of the
worlds and the autonomy of the mental as the necessary mediator between the
physical and the ideal.
One of the important functions of the second world is to comprehend the objects p
of the third world, i.e. the objective content of thinking. Almost all subjective
knowledge depends on objective knowledge. The third world is autonomous,
though we constantly act upon it and are subjected to its influence. Cognition is
traditionally defined as the activity of a cognising subject. Popper holds that this
definition is only applicable to subjective cognition which should better be called
organic cognition as it consists of certain inborn dispositions to act, and of their
acquired modifications.[ 1881
Objective cognition does not depend on the cognitive aims, opinions and actions of p
the cognising individual. Cognition in the objective sense is cognition without the 189
cognising individual. Objective knowledge consists of the logical content of scientific
theories, conjectures, suppositions and logical content of their genetic code. Objective
knowledge can be exemplified by scientific theories expounded in journals and
books, discussions of these theories, as well as by problems, problem situations, etc.
From the viewpoint of traditional subjectivist epistemology, the third world can p
only exist as the content of some consciousness. For instance, a book only exists as
a factor of culture if somebody reads it. A book remains a book even if it is a table
of logarithms composed by a computer and not written by any man. A book belongs
to the third world provided it can be understood and decipheredeven if such a
possibility is never translated into reality. In Poppers opinion, Plato was the first
philosopher who discovered the existence of the third world, its influence upon us
and began to use the ideas of the third world to explain the phenomena of the
first and second worlds.
The history of epistemology knows a far more influential tradition than the one p
Popper claims to represent. Epistemological subjectivism, like its antagonist,
ontological realism, are both rooted in common sense. The everyday concept of
knowledge rests on the conviction that sensory data are the source of knowledge. In
philosophy this concept is known as the theory of tabula rasa. It underlies Lockes,
Berkeleys and Humes empiricism, as well as many theories of modern positivists
and empiricists. Traditional non-critical rationalism contrasting itself to empiricism
and subjectivism has also, proved unable to overstep the bounds of common sense. 190
The subjectivist theory of knowledge is incapable of distinguishing between p

subjective and objective knowledge. In its attempts to disclose the process of
scientific cognition traditional (positivist) epistemology proceeded either from sense
data, or from the self-consciousness of a cognising individual (I know, I think),
remaining in both cases within the narrow confines of subjective knowledge.
Naturally enough, it could not understand it either, since the comprehension of the
second world is only possible from the positions of the third world.
According to Popper, the theory of knowledge of common sense is almost entirely p

false, yet its main error consists in the search for a self-evident starting point of the
process of cognition. Classical epistemology was incapable of understanding that
sensory data were nothing but adaptive reactions of an organism. The organs of
sense, such as the eyes, are not indiscriminate in their perception of the surrounding
world; they take in only those events which are being expected, and no others.
Like theories (and prejudices), they must be indifferent to other events which they
do not perceive and cannot interpret. Any sensuously perceived material, according
to Popper, is already an interpretation based on a theory or on prejudice. There can
be no pure sensory experience, just as there can be no pure language of
observation: all languages are full of myths and theories.
Rejecting epistemological reductionism, Popper also comes out against ontological p

reductionism (physicalism). Criticising physicalism as a variety of radical
materialism, Popper alleges that the latter is incapable of explaining the qualitative 191
diversity of reality. In his opinion, materialism could have had some sense before the
appearance of life on the earth. After that, owing to the development of human
culture and self-reflection of man, physicalist explanations lost their universality. As
man has created a new objective world, the world of the products of the human
mind, a world of myths, of fairy tales and scientific theories, of poetry and art and
music, the emergent, creative nature of the universe becomes, in his opinion, quite
obvious.[ 1911
All the three worlds, according to Popper, are real. Speaking of the reality of p
world1, Popper agrees with the physicalist materialists that notions used by a
physicist, such as fields, forces, quanta, etc., refer to real entities. Yet, in his opinion,
traditional materialism with its paradigm of reality in the form of solid material
bodies is closer to the truth. He shares the viewpoint of common sense that physical
entities are just as real as consciousness understood as subjective mental process, as
well as the content of consciousness embodied in culture. The central point of
Poppers concept is his assertion of reality and the relative independence of

world3, the world of the products of human spirit such as legends, explanatory
myths, instruments of knowledge, scientific theories (both true and false), scientific
problems, social institutions and works of art.
It is noteworthy that Popper links the existence of the objects of world3 with the p
embodiment of the products of human intellect in books, sculptures, etc. However, 192
the mere objectification of these phenomena in material culture and in the systems
of signs does not yet testify to their independence. Poppers crucial argument in
favour of the autonomy of world3 consists in that the development of theories and
ideas follows their own laws and they produce consequences which cannot be
foreseen by their creators. Being ideal as they are, they can also give rise to material
effects: for instance, they can induce people to produce their own kind and other
ideal objects thereby exercising influence on world1. All civilisation, according to
Popper, can be regarded as the realisation of mans aims, ideals and plans, i.e. the
objects of world3.
The distinction of Poppers concept from physicalist theories stands out quite clearly p
here: he refuses to substitute the epistemological problems of the correlation of the
mentalist and physicalist languages for ontological problems, seeks to deduce the
qualitative diversity of the external world from reality and posits the problem of
consciousness in the context of cosmic and cultural evolution. On the other hand,
Popper reveals no less clearly the inadequacy of his understanding of the
interdependence of the subjective and the objective consciousness. The concept of
autonomous world3 gives grounds for a supposition that the emergence of new
ideas is determined by logical possibilities which have already materialised in the
objects of this world, i.e. in theories, problem situations, etc. In that case ideas and
theories must have ideal existence even before they enter individual consciousness 193
and the task of the subjective spirit must consist in provoking the realisation of ideal
possibilities lying dormant in human culture, i.e. in translating possibility into reality.
More, if we assume that the activity of the subjective spirit is confined merely to
grasping and manipulating the objects of world3, we are bound to deny the
spontaneous creative activity of human consciousness and to admit that individual
consciousness and new ideas are products of culture, but not of concrete individuals.
Popper is evidently not completely unaware of this Platonic tendency in his concept
and therefore lays special emphasis on the genetic-biological foundation of
consciousness and knowledge.
Denouncing the philosophy of neopositivism, particularly its claim to the role of the p
methodology of modern scientific cognition, Popper in fact offers an idealistic
epistemological alternative.
To substantiate his understanding of the progress of scientific cognition, Popper p

introduces a concept of verisimilitude. In his opinion, the verisimilitude of a theory
consists in the superiority of a multitude of true logical consequences of this theory
over a multitude of false logical consequences. From this viewpoint, of crucial
importance is the content of a theory. It includes a class of all logical consequences,
both true and false. Popper intends to divide this system, evidently infinite, into two
subclassesthe true and the false consequences of the given theory, and to discard
successively those which themselves ensue from false consequences.
It should be noted that the very notion of logical consequence is not used by Popper p
with due accuracy. Individual statements, some of which are based on or expressed 194
in theories, evidently have no consequences at all (true or false). A consequence is
only possible in situations where certain initial conditions are indicated. In that case,
however, the number of consequences will be equal to the number of statements
contained in the description of initial conditions. Most of them will probably turn out
to be false in the strictly logical sense of the word, since the accuracy possible under
experimental conditions can hardly compare with the accuracy of mathematical
operations associated by Popper with the notions of truth and objectivity.
Besides, in a situation with the infinite number of consequences there will be only p
two degrees of verisimilitude, the maximum and the zero one, depending on whether
the true content is infinite and the false content is finite, or both of them are infinite.
The vulnerability of Poppers concept of verisimilitude is noted, for instance, by
American philosopher G.S. Robinson, who writes: If scientists were to take
Poppers conception of verisimilitude and progress seriously it would have the effect
of stultifying growth and progress because what he calls verisimilitude and
progress could be increased or even maximized by a policy of incurious repetition
of safe experiments.[ 1941
Contrary to Popper, scientists do distinguish between theories and predictions p

ensuing from them considering some of them truer than others. For instance,
planning a flight to Venus, they are sure that the theory of relativity is more reliable 195
than the theory of Newton, Ptolemy or Aristotle and that the predictions based on the
former must be more accurate than those based on the latter. Of course, scientists
may err in their judgements of relative probability. Their inductive criterion of truth
may sometimes fail them. Yet they do use it and rely on one theory more than upon
another. If Popper refuses to admit that we can and must express judgements on
comparative probability based on an inductive conclusion, his theory of verisimilitude
and progress proves untenable. If the predictions of an old theory (except a small
number of tested ones) have turned out false and the predictions of a new theory
(except a small number of rejected ones) have turned out true, it is obvious that the
new theory is closer to the truth than the old one. It stands to reason that a scientific
theory owes its reputation for dependability to a successful experimental or practical
test. Why, then, is its rational confirmation not possible? If any and every failure to
fit were ground for theory rejection, Thomas Kuhn justly observes, all theories
ought to be rejected at all times. On the other hand, if only severe failure to fit
justifies theory rejection, then the Popperians will require some criterion of
improbability or of degree of falsification. In developing one they will almost
certainly encounter the same network of difficulties that has haunted the advocates of
the various probabilistic verification theories.[ 1951
Poppers concept of the development of scientific knowledge is in fact the opposite p 196
of Kuhns concept. It leaves no room for the normal activity of scientists aimed at
the consolidation and development of a newly created theory. On the other hand,
Popper does not single out a revolution in science as a specific stage of its
development. In point of fact, he regards every new theory, every new discovery as
a revolutionary step in science.
Hence, the evolution of scientific knowledge is represented in Poppers concept as p

an endless chain of revolutions and can, therefore, be regarded with good reason as a
concept of permanent revolution in science.
This model of scientific development does not reproduce the true course of science.
The lack of historicism in Poppers analysis has been noted by numerous
philosophers and historians of science. For instance, according to Maurice
Finnochiaro, Poppers principle is not sound. All Popper can say on the basis of
historical evidence sums up in that the play of science is endless. In Finnochiaros

opinion the one who may once decide that his scientific assertions need no
subsequent test and should be regarded as ultimately correct may be quite right, from
his own viewpoint, that is. Yet it is likely that sooner or later a different viewpoint
will prevail in science and his own one will be refuted.
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 1771] See K.R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford

University Press, Oxford, 1979, p.33.
[ 1781] Ibid., p.42.
[ 1782] Ibid., p.294.
[ 1783] Ibid., p.301.
[ 1791] Ibid., pp. 10809.
[ 1801] Ibid., p.108.
[ 1821] Ibid., p.116.
[ 1851] Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Basic Books, Inc., New
York, 1959, p.44.
[ 1861] Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1960, pp. 13334.
[ 1871] Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge, op. cit., p.111.
[ 1881] Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, op. cit., p.121.
[ 1911] See Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, Springer
International, Berlin, 1977, pp. 1516.
[ 1941] G.S. Robinson, Poppers Verisimilitude, Analysis (Oxford), Vol.31,

No.6, June 1971, p.195.
[ 1951] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of

Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, pp. 14647.
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The turn from positivism to scientific realism is very characteristic of the modern p
philosophy of science. This trend, which is only two decades old, has already 197
managed to define its stand with sufficient clarity despite all the diversity of the
Contents
individual approaches and opinions of its adherents. However, none of the current
views of scientific realism as a methodological alternative to positivist philosophy
Index is ripe enough to claim authority. Representing the materialistic viewpoint, scientific
Card realism somehow falls out of line with the general historical trend of philosophical
development and seems rather odd because of its apparent spontaneity. Indeed, in its
Formats: attempt to evolve a new philosophical doctrine scientific realism has started from
Text scratch and is denying or passing over in silence any affinity with traditional
PS philosophical trends. This is partly attributable to the fact that many of the newly
PDF converted active exponents of materialistic ideas reflect the direct needs of science
rather than some purely philosophical tradition.

Other It cannot be said, however, that new materialism is completely free from any p
Titles: philosophical links in general. The new school, for one, admits in some form or
TA
other to its inheritance of certain aspects, problems and principles from positivist

Years:
philosophy. scientific realism represents an obvious attempt to smooth over the
1984 contradictions which have led to a complete break of science with positivist
philosophy. This feature also accounts for the attitude of scientific realism to the
problem of the objectivity of knowledge. On the one hand, the new trend discards
### the positivist interpretation of objective knowledge, including its latest versions; on
the other, it shows an obvious influence of many positivist dogmas.
MAP
Coming out against the concept of intersubjectivity, most of the realists oppose p 198
both the positivist and Poppers doctrines. Neither do they accept the Kuhn-Lakatos
concept as manifestly relativistic. Yet they do not go beyond postulating reality
independent of man and sidestep the main issuethe concrete solution of the
question of the nature of objectivity and relationship between the objective and the
subjective in scientific knowledge. This circumstance essentially weakens the position
of scientific realism exposing it to criticism on the part of its opponents. The
realist, writes, for instance, Roger Trigg, starting from objective reality rather than
mans knowledge of it, will not be surprised if some portions of it elude mans grasp
for ever. He will insist that though this limits mans knowledge, it cannot affect the
nature of what exists, since reality is self-subsistent.[ 1981
As regards the problem of intersubjectivity, the realists maintain that the presence p
of some common elements in different theories is accounted for by none other than
reality, whether perceptible or not. Some realists go even as far as distinguishing
between the ontological and the epistemological aspects of the problem, i.e. between
reality as such and the reality that we know. According to Roy Bhaskar, for instance,
the positivists make a typical epistemological error considering that statements about
being can be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that
ontological questions can always be transposed into epistemological terms.[ 1991 199
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/2.3.From.Physicalism.to.Scientific.Materialism[2012-12-17 15:15:51]
Many adherents of the realistic trend, however, believe that ontological realism p
should be supplemented with epistemological relativism. This opinion is based on
the well-known thesis according to which we are incapable of going beyond the
limits of the particular, the concrete, i.e. the knowledge available at a given moment
though we are aware of the existence of being. In Bhaskars opinion, whenever we
speak of things or of events etc. in science we must always speak of them and know
them under particular descriptions, descriptions which will always be to a greater or
lesser extent theoretically determined, which are not neutral reflections of a given
world. Epistemological relativism, in this sense, is the handmaiden of ontological
realism and must be accepted.[ 1992
The confusion regarding the relationship between ontology and epistemology, the p
objective and the subjective sometimes leads the realists to counterposing realistic
and materialistic viewpoints. A distinction between them does exist, of course, but its
actual significance, in the realists~ opinion, evidently lies elsewhere. Trigg
contends that realism represents a broader viewpoint than materialism, as it permits
accepting the reality of what is not material. Even a theist, he writes, can assert a
realist notion of God existing independently of mens conceptions of Him, and not
espouse idealism, because he also accepts the independent reality of the material 200
world.[ 2001
Realism and materialism, according to Trigg, are different in the sense that realism p
pretends to be a neutral doctrine taking no interest in the content of reality. In
Triggs opinion, many idealistic trends insist only on the independence of reality
from human consciousness or sensations and do not accept the existence of God,
whereas numerous forms of empiricism could be anti-realistic and atheistic at the
same time.
According to Trigg, the controversy between realists and anti-realists was of crucial p
importance for philosophy. Realism opposes the doctrine which accepts the
dependence of the external world on man and restricts the world to what man
knows about it. Is the world indeed what we take it for? asks Trigg, and answers
emphatically: No! There may exist galaxies we cannot even conceive of. Besides,
many of our scientific beliefs are probably wrong. It is exceedingly rash, he says,
to equate reality with the views we happen to have at the moment.[ 2002 In a
sense, reality is considered to be mental rather than material, as the reason which
comprehends it simultaneously creates it in one way or another.
Whereas realism underscores the existence of reality independent of our notions of p

it, idealism considers everything to be a function of reason and regards being in
terms of mans mental images or perceptions. Hence, subjective experience may be
in contradiction with what is considered true by general consent. According to Trigg, 201
~subjective can be the opposite of intersubjective rather than objective. To put
it another way, the word objective can refer in a weak sense to what is agreed on,
rather than in a strong sense to what is really the case.[ 2011
In Triggs opinion, the anti-realist will prefer to emphasise the necessity for p
intersubjective agreement. Anti-realists are inevitably forced, if they conceive the
problem in terms of the opposition of mind and matter, to admit the independent
reality of other minds. Idealism inevitably becomes objectivist even when
objectivist is understood in its strong sense.
Epistemological realism, according to Trigg, is sometimes distinguished from the p

ontological sort, so that one can be an epistemological realist and an ontological
idealist. In that case, he writes, only minds would exist, but there would be an
external world beyond our judgements. What we know would be in no way
dependent on our knowing it, but the reality which is the source of knowledge would
be ultimately mental. This means that reality is not ultimately independent of
judgement as such. It may be unconnected with what you think or what I think, but
it is not unconnected with all minds.[ 2012 Trigg asserts that the only alternative
to epistemological realism is solipsism. Epistemological realism is the inevitable
consequence of accepting that the world is not ones own creation, and that as a
result one may be mistaken about its nature.
According to Trigg, the principal disagreement between the realists and their p 202
opponents springs not so much from the difference in their understanding of the
relationship between reality and man in general, as from the distinction between the
weak and strong objectivity, between intersubjectivity and objectivity. In Triggs
opinion, one should not identify objectivity with what one believes in here and now.
The history of science shows that even the most firmly established theories can be
modified or even refuted.
Scientific realists generally avoid identifying their stand, even on special issues, p
such as the mind-body problem, with the concepts of dialectical materialism.
Expounding his views, Trigg definitely dissociates himself from materialism p

considering its approach too narrow. He strives to justify his prejudice against
materialism by alleging that it disregards subjective reality and grants the status of
being to matter only. The origin of this prejudice is not far to seek: Trigg, like many
Western philosophers who cannot boast of too close an acquaintance with the
materialist tradition in philosophy, particularly with the essence of dialectical
materialism, equates materialism with physicalism.
As a result, Trigg identifies Lenins views with physicalist concepts widely spread p
in Western literature, overlooking the fact that it is just against physicalism and its
understanding of matter, space, time and causality that Lenin has directed its main
philosophical work Materialism and Empiric-Criticism. The irony of the situation
consists in that Trigg, coming out in defence of realism, opens a wide door for
fideism and actually sets it on an equal footing with science. As we see, the response 203
of scientists to the disintegration of positivism does not always accord with the needs
of scientific cognition. Despite the repeated assurances that he is opposed to idealism
and anti-realism, Trigg, in fact, sees no possibility of passing beyond the bounds of
experience and language.
We cannot, he writes, talk or think about reality without talking or thinking p

about it... We cannot have a conception of something without employing the
conceptual scheme we have at our disposal... We cannot conceptualize reality and
then check the concepts we have produced against reality. It is self-defeating to
attempt to think of reality as it exists beyond our thoughts. There is no way that we
can somehow hold our concepts in suspense, while we compare them with
reality.[ 2031
Triggs realism consists in that he accepts the existence of realty beyond the limits p
of mans present knowledge, this reality including not only what is not yet known,
but also, it appears, what is unknowable in principle. He writes: Realists leave open
what is to be meant by the world. We have used the term rather broadly to mean
what there is. The realist can accept that mind, matter and even other kinds of
entities might exist. His argument with the idealist is not concerned with the reality
of mind. He is merely concerned to hold that the mental does not exhaust
reality.[ 2032 Trigg draws a purely external line of demarcation between what
appears to be two different worldsthe reality which is independent of man and has 204
not yet become the object of his knowledge and the reality which has already been
drawn into the sphere of mans cognitive activity and is no longer independent of his
thoughts. Such an external border does not seem to be a good solution, as it makes
it impossible to correlate more accurately the objective and subjective realities and
investigate their relationship in the second world. As a matter of fact, the same
applies to Triggs first, unattainable, world, since it exists beyond our thoughts and
cannot, according to his logic, be extracted from our conceptual scheme by any
means. The concept of God, for that matter, can also be regarded as one of the
versions of conceptualising the uncognisable.
Dialectical materialism is far from ignoring the reality of the concept of God as an p
element of religious systems. Moreover, it regards this false concept as a reality
which should be eliminated by practical means. Marxism not only admits the reality
of religious rites but also takes it in all seriousness. It is obvious to any Marxist that
religion (but not God) is only one of the elements of a highly complex and
heterogeneous subjective reality which includes mans entire spiritual world with all
its diversity and contradictions. Trigg and other realist authors may rest assured that
their intellectual stand as well as the books they publish are real to us in a no lesser
degree.
Triggs realism is a graphic illustration of the confusion resulting from the p

application of loose criteria of objectivity and lack of dialectical flexibility in the
philosophical analysis of scientific development. What is more, after such a 205
cultivation vast areas of terra ignorationis are allowed to lie fallow, grow thick
with weeds and spread pseudo-scientific seeds all over the adjacent areas of science
and philosophy. These weeds often infect the still healthy field of scientific realism
which, according to Trigg, is called upon to give an accurate theoretical description
of reality. In Triggs opinion, a scientist will always aspire for the true knowledge of
the world though not all reality can be accessible for observation. Some theories may
be true at all times, others may need modification, yet they all reflect reality to some
extent, though we do not know how profoundly. The realist in science, writes
Trigg, does not merely oppose the empiricists view about the pivotal role of
observations. He also emphasizes that science is about something and that theories
attempt to capture reality as it is. It follows that only one completely correct account
of the world is forthcoming. Different, competing theories will each view the world
differently, but the realist will not be as content with that situation as Feyerabend
seems to be and will want to ask which is the right one.[ 2051
Contrary to Trigg, Quine contends that competing theories of reality do not give a p
unique and simple picture of the world. Defending all the basic propositions of
realism he writes: We have no reason to suppose that mans surface irritations
even unto eternity admit of any one systematization that is scientifically better or
simpler than all possible others... Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords
even in principle no unique definition of truth.[ 2061 Quine also appears to be 206
appreciably closer to positivism in his attachment to the concept of intersubjective
test. In his opinion, intersubjective contact assures a single dimension deriving from
the similarity of sensuous stimuli. This intersubjective contact provides a basis both
for the language of learning and for the construction of a scientific theory. The
relevant circumstances attending the utterance of statements are combined by Quine
in the notion of intersubjective observability. Intersubjective contact enables the
child to learn when to assent to the observation sentence. And it is this also,
intersubjective observability at the time, that qualifies observation sentences as check

points for scientific theory. Observation sentences state the evidence, to which all
witnesses must accede.[ 2062 According to Quine, this rules out solipsism, since
the general accessibility of circumstances attending the utterance of observation
statements ensures that we learn one and the same language and that a scientific
theory may have a solid foundation.
The leaning towards realism gets the better of Quine in his concept of self- p
sufficient reality, though he underscores that true judgements can only be made after
the adoption of a theory. It causes him, like Feyerabend, to regard theories as being
relatively true, but here Quine escapes relativism characteristic of Feyerabend. Any
statements, in his opinion, can only be made within the framework of a conceptual 207
scheme and serve as its expression. As a result, no reality is conceivable except
through a conceptual scheme which we ourselves adopt. Hence, the real world
which does exist must be described in terms of our conceptual scheme. Quine avoids
speaking of things-in-themselves or of any philosophical interpretation of scientific
propositions. In his understanding, a scientific theory is something taken at its face
value.
As an empiricist, Quine says, I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of p

science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past
experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as
convenient intermediariesnot by definition in terms of experience, but simply as
irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. For my part I
do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homers gods; and I
consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological
footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in
kind.[ 2071
Quine, thus, refuses to admit that there is any difference between the posits of a p
theory and reality. In his opinion, reality is what we believe to be existing.
It is significant, however, that physicalism remains a characteristic feature of p

scientific realism and its understanding of the problem of objectivity. This
circumstance complicates the task of distinguishing between the positivist and 208
realist ideas of objectivity. The distinction, rather a subtle one, consists in that for
scientific realism the programme of the physicalist reduction of scientific
knowledge combines with the programme of constructing a scientific ontology.
scientific realism not only strives to reduce the language of any science to the
physical language and theoretical propositions to observation statements based, in the
final analysis, on physical experience, but is bent on reducing chemical, biological,
geographical, psychological and other processes as such to physical processes. In
other words, it seeks to explain all objects and phenomena of reality through their
physical properties and mechanisms. What is more, it regards such reductionism not
as a purely scientific procedure intended for a physical explanation that would be
quite justifiablebut defends it as a universal all-embracing scheme thus giving it a
status of a philosophical or, in relation to the problem of objectivity, an ontological,
principle.
Understandably, the true significance of this feature can only be assessed in the p
context of the entire philosophical programme of scientific realism. The emphasis
on the objectivity of biological, physiological and other processes and the attempts to
explain them on the basis of the laws of physics represent a manifestly realistic or
even materialistic trend, requiring, however, further methodological development. On
the other hand, the epistemological reductionism, consisting in attempts to interpret

biological, physiological or mental phenomena in terms of physical notions with a
view to overcoming metaphysics identifies scientific realism with one or another 209
variety of positivist physicalism. The distinction between them is often quite
impalpable and reveals itself in the general tendency and orientation rather than in
some tangibles. But then certain atavistic features of the new school are not to be
wondered at if we bear in mind that the realistic methodology of science is still in
its infancy.
The subtle difference between the positivist and realistic programmes can already be p
discerned in the philosophical concept of Herbert Feigl, formerly a member of the
Vienna Circle, whose evolution has reflected numerous contradictions and vicissitudes
of the transition from the positivist paradigm to the scientific-realist world view. The
watered-down variants of the main dogmas of the logico-empiricist doctrine, the
doubts regarding the distinction between the analytical and synthetic statements, the
greater flexibility in the interpretation of the empirical criteria of scientific value
characteristic of Feigls early works gradually gave way to a more radical departure
from the positivist tradition. Physicalism which still holds in Feigls concept as the
hangover of the early period is evidently regarded by him as the foundation of the
new system.
Having outlined his general methodological views mainly with reference to physics, p
Feigl later devoted much attention to the mind-body problem, i.e. to the relationship
between the brain and consciousness. He was at first inclined to regard statements on
mental and physical phenomena as two different languages referring to the same
facts, but later gave preference to the monistic theory or the theory of identity in
which the data of experience and certain deduced notions of neurophysiological 210
structures have one and the same reference object and are regarded as two different
ways of cognising one and the same thing. Such an identity of the mental and the
physical is not yet tantamount to the logical identity of mind and body. Parallelism
between them should be established by science, but not by philosophy. Feigl believes
that such parallelism is already in evidence and the further drawing together of the
two systems is inevitable. From the standpoint of common sense this eliminates any
basis for the hypothesis of the existence of two different entities. This line of
reasoning brings Feigl to the conclusion that the referents of mental terms are
identical with those of physical terms.
Feigls evolution from positivism to realism vividly illustrates all the most p
essential stages or steps of this transition: passage beyond the bounds of a purely
linguistic approach to the problem, extension of the scope of semantic analysis,
emphasis on objective neurophysiological processes as referents of the corresponding
theoretical terms.
Feigl distinguishes two different meanings of the term physical, the broader and p
the narrower ones. He writes: By physical1 terms I mean all (empirical) terms
whose specification of meaning essentially involves logical (necessary or, more
usually, probabilistic) connections with the intersubjective observation languages... By
physical2 I mean the kind of theoretical concepts (and statements) which are
sufficient for the explanation, i.e. the deductive or probabilistic derivation, of the
observation statements regarding the inorganic (lifeless) domain of nature.[ 2111 211
According to Feigl, the mental or the so-called raw sensations are identifiable with
physical 2 .
Feigl regards the volumes of these terms to be equal if the theory of identity is true. p
However, in case of emergence, i.e. logical non-deducibility of organic, mental and

social phenomena from physical phenomena, the sphere of physical 2 is obviously
narrower than that of physical 1 .
As we see, Feigls programme implies the reduction of all sciences to physics. One p
cannot but admit, however, that it is not entirely divorced from the existing practice
of theoretical investigations. The peculiarity of this practice was aptly expressed by
Einstein who once said that reason was commonly believed to be an unseemly
word that ought to be avoided in a society of wellbred scientists. Reductionism, as
we have already pointed out, is a kind of a semi-official ideology of the modern
biological establishment. The practical significance of this tradition, however, is not
very large as it reflects a transitory stage in the development of biological, as well as
psychological sciences. As Soviet scientists I.Frolov and B.Yudin have justly
observed, reductionism is evidently the natural consequence of every situation in
which investigation methods and experimental facilities come to the foreground in
scientific research and dictate the selection of problems. Under such conditions the
issues prompted by the inner logic of scientific development are relegated to a
secondary plan and preference is given to problems whose solution is made possible 212
owing to the application of specific research techniques or experimental
facilities.[ 2121
Feigls concept reveals strong links not only with physicalism, but also with p
empiricism. According to Feigl, knowledge starts with direct sensory experience,
sensory acquaintance, as it were. He notes that the meaning of scientific statements
actually consists in that they state the conditions of truth. These conditions, in turn,
are evidently represented in the factual content of the relation of the stated
knowledge which is represented by sensations. Hence, Feigl understands the theory of
truth as a theory of correspondence. The meaning of a statement, in his opinion,
should be identified in its factual relation, whereas the meaning of scientific terms
should be adapted to the set reality. As distinct from the positivist concept of the
Vienna Circle, according to which the meaning of a statement determines the method
of verification, Feigl lays special emphasis on a different aspect: After the recovery
from radical behaviorism and operationism, we need no longer hesitate to distinguish
between evidence and reference, i.e., between manifestations or symptoms on the one
hand, and central states on the other.[ 2122
As has already been noted in the first chapter, scientific realism is characterised p
in most cases by very arbitrary attempts to join or separate various empirical and
theoretical premises of general philosophical nature. A similar tendency manifests 213
itself in the solution of the mind-body problem. Underscoring the empirical status of
the identity of mind and body, Feigl, Smart and other realists often resort to
metaphysical principles in order to substantiate the theory of identity. Moreover,
the problem itself is regarded by them as metaphysical. Sometimes the metaphysical
nature of the terms mental and physical, as well as of the problem of their
relationship is emphasised deliberately in defiance of the positivist doctrine. The term
physical in this sense apparently acquires a new shade of meaning which does not
fall within the framework of physical 1 or physical 2 . It approximates the concept
of the world as a whole and can be regarded as physical 3 gravitating to, though
not coinciding with, the materialist concept of matter.
The presence of two or even three levels in the understanding of the physical p
complicates the mind-body problem, difficult as it is, the more so as the above
levels are not defined accurately enough. As a matter of fact, the description of the
physical in terms of space-time and causal relations is characteristic of any

theoretical science. Physical 1 related by Feigl to this description can be related to
any other scientific description. From my realistic point of view, writes Feigl, it
makes perfectly good sense to explain in terms of physical, psychophysical, and
psychophysiological theories how e.g. a bell by reflecting light, producing sound
waves and being a solid, hard body affects our retina, cochlea, and our tactile nerve
endings (under specifiable perceptual conditions) and thus produces the visual, 214
tactual, and auditory data in our direct experience. This is indeed the causal theory
of perception so much maligned by phenomenalists.[ 2141
The excessively broad definition of the physical is in fact at variance with the real p
meaning of this term in physical science which alone gives it quite definite
methodological significance. The extension of its limits leads to undesirable.
methodological paradoxes. Such an expansion, as is justly noted by Soviet scientist
D. Dubrovsky, is tantamount to the absolutisation of the physicaleither by
postulating a single all-embracing physical substance, or, given the epistemological
emphasis, by implying the unavoidable absorption by physics of all other scientific
disciplines. Physicalism is thus linked with the extension of the concept of the
physical and this alone is bound to have an adverse effect on the development of
physics condemning it to endless and futile wanderings. If unduly extended, the
concept of the physical loses its concrete meaning and turns into an empty
abstraction.
Feigls doctrine leads to the identification of any objective reality with physical p
reality. The world is nothing but physical reality painted in different colours. All
phenomena are essentially physical processes. This applies also to mental phenomena
which are but a subclass of physical phenomena. The mental is identified with the
physiological, i.e. with the processes which take place in the human brain. In turn,
neurophysiological or biological processes are explained in terms of physical
phenomena. This double reduction, given the extension of the chain, must be applied 215
to developing neurophysiology, biochemistry, biophysics, etc. The tendencies in
modern natural science are alleged to hold out much promise for such development.
According to the new doctrine, materialist philosophy loses its status of a theoretical
premise and turns into just another ontological hypothesis which is yet to be proved.
This pretentious claim, by the way, underlies the title of scientific materialism p
assumed by the new school in an attempt to define its own place among the
numerous trends representing the modern philosophy of science. True, physicalism
has also sprouted in biology and cybernetics, but its models in these fields add but
little to the basic physicalist concepts from the methodological angle. Feigl singles
out a theoretical level represented by physical 1 or the physical in the broader sense
of the word, linking it with the categories of causality, space, time, etc. As a result,
one may get an impression that this level is identical with the general philosophical
concept of matter. Feigl also links this level with the intersubjective perception of
language, though he gives no clear indication regarding the scope of such
intersubjectivity. For Feigl, it is, evidently, confined within the limits of the
physicalist theory. As regards his interpretation of the category of causality, it is
based, as one can gather, not on a philosophical, e.g. dialectical-materialist concept
of cause, but on the so-called causal theory of perception. This theory, instructive as
it is and containing not a few interesting ideas (which have not received, by the way,
due Coverage in Marxist literature on causality), has not yet been properly elaborated
from the philosophical standpoint. Thus the identity of the mental and the physical in 216
Feigls concept rests on the identification of cause and consequence as it is assumed
that both the causes and their consequences must of necessity, possess all
characteristics of matter.
Hence, Feigls crucial concept of physical 1 is also implicitly based on empirical p

observations. This concept is unacceptable, for instance, to a theoretical physicist
investigating the problems of quantum mechanics as it is quite obvious to him that a
physical theory at its present level cannot be adequately translated into the language
of sensory experience even if it is the intersubjective language of observations, as
conceded by Feigl and other advocates of the identity of the mental and the physical.
The qualitative difference between the theoretical and empirical levels in the
reflection of objective reality has made it clear to many theoretical physicists that
one cannot be reduced to the other in principle. The illusions that such a reduction is
possible have already revealed their groundlessness in physical science. The more
groundless are such illusions with regard to the reducibility of, say, the physiological
to the physical.
The exponents of the identity of the mental and the physical often refer to their p
empirical identity, and that in spite of the fact that the empirical language proves
inadequate to express the theoretical content of unobservable phenomena even in
physics itself. It holds even more true of mental phenomena characterised by a higher
level and greater complexity.
The vulnerability of Feigls concept lies already in his assumption of the mental p
identity of physical 1 and physical 2 , since the former as the theoretical level in 217
the investigation of phenomena and processes is restricted, on the strength of its
definition, to the limits of intersubjectivity, i.e. the empirical level of cognition.
Consequently, this assumption is untenable even from the viewpoint of physical
science itself which has developed a keen insight into these problems. The
controversies in quantum mechanics are in fact much more instructive in this respect
than some authors are inclined to think. These questions will be discussed later when
characterising the dialectical-materialist methodology of science. Of course, the
problem of causality has its own gradations, and qualitative at that, in different fields
of modern science. The analysis of the specificity of this problem in physics,
biology, chemistry, physiology, psychology and other fields could be helpful in
preparing scientists for the acceptance of perhaps even a greater specificity of mental
processes and causal relations in the boundary area of psychic and neuro-
physiological phenomena. Yet the works published by scientific materialists have
not revealed, so far, any evidence of such a tendency, nor any sufficiently
differentiated approach to processes which could be regarded as psychological,
psychophysiological, neuro-psychological, neuro-physiological, biopsychological and
biochemicalpsychological.
It stands to reason that the oversimplified idea of the relationship between different p
levels of reality falls an easy prey to all critics of scientific materialism ranging
from the less orthodox adherents of physicalism (such as Mario Bunge, Roger Trigg,
Joseph Margolis) to the supporters of psycho physical dualism and interactionism 218
(such as John Eccles, Erik Polten, and Karl Popper). In the context of such criticism
their stand is presented as purely positivistic. In point of fact, this accusation is not
entirely groundless, particularly in the case of Feigl. His present viewpoint differs
from the empiricist programme of positivist philosophy by its general orientation,
promises and expectations rather than by the actual content. Indeed, Feigl does not
go beyond proclaiming the need for an ontology and accepting, together with the
entire school of scientific realism, the ontological existence of physical reality
independent of man and his consciousness though he restricts their relationship to the
extent of identifying the mental with the physical.
Feigls special emphasis on the ontological aspect of the causality problem must p
serve as a warning against equating his stand with the paradigm of logical
empiricism, i.e. positivism in its latest variants. Polten, like other Feigls critics,
disregards this warning and confuses Feigls viewpoint now with the positivist stand,
now with the dialectical materialist concept, thereby revealing a not too profound
knowledge of the Marxist views. Nevertheless, he does find the weak spots in the
theory of identity. Now, he writes, scientific materialises are committed to hold
that all causes and effects have all characteristics of matter. Yet I maintain that the
causes of what I distinguish as outer sense are indeed always physical, but the
ultimate phenomenal effectsthe data which are directly experiencedare mental
without exception. I go onto claim that the pauses or grounds of what I distinguish 219
as inner sense cannot be exclusively physical, and that the ultimate effects are also
mental in nature.[ 2191
In substantiating his viewpoint Polten reasons as follows. Some material [i.e. p

physical] cause Z, which is lake Ontario, produces probably identical consequences:
similar perceptions on a sensory, empirical level of two different observers A and B.
This does not mean at all that the same lake will be the cause of similar perceptions
of lake Ontario with other observers. Should we consider not external, but internal
perceptions we shall have to admit that not only the consequence, but the cause itself
cannot be subjected to a material test. When our imagination is building up castles
in the air, they have nothing in common with material objects. They are purely
mental attributes of one man and nobody else is capable of seeing these castles in
his brain.
The causal theory of perception is based on the principle identical causesidentical p

consequences and does not identify causes if they do not produce identical
consequences. Proceeding from this principle, Polten infers that physical and mental
processes are independent of one another and that mind is not identical with the
central nervous system. But he goes further. Without any profound and concrete
analysis he postulates parallel existence and mutual independence of physical and
mental processes, asserting, on the one hand, the presence of the world of things-in- 220
themselves as the external cause of material phenomena belonging to the sphere of
perceptions of the external world and, on the other, the presence of the world of
mental events as things-in-themselves or the world of pure Myself as the cause
of mental phenomena belonging to the sphere of perceptions of mans internal state.
Having thus defined his concept, Polten, as is often the case, begins to doubt the p
soundness of the dualistic viewpoint, since he proposes in the end to deduce the
existence of the physical world from mind: And it ought not to be supposed that
mind is anything derivative in this relationship. On the contrary, mind matters in
perhaps every relevant sense: psychologically, chronologically, epistemologically,
logically, normatively, and ontologically.[ 2201 True, he hastens to specify that
this assertion is not substantiated in his work which means that he adheres for the
present to a more moderate opinion seeking to prove that mind does exist and that it
is different from matter. It goes without saying that matter is understood by Polten in
the purely physicalist sense: It is perhaps of some interest to note, he writes, that
Feigls physicalist definition of existence is quite like the Marxist-Leninist account of
matter. Any Marxist text will repeat the definition of Lenin that the sole property of
matter is the property of being objective reality, existing outside consciousness, given
to us in sensation. Of course, even consciousness is material for Marxists, as for
Feigl.[ 2202
We do not mean to say that Polten deliberately distorts the Marxist viewpoint. We p 221
are rather inclined to think that Polten has rather a vague idea of it and very scanty
knowledge of the corresponding works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In any case, his
views on the Marxist-Leninist account of matter are very far from the truth. First,
the dialectical materialist concept of matter does not coincide with the notion of the
physical as understood by Feigl, even if we compare it with his more general
interpretation of the physical as physical 1 . Besides objective reality, Marxism
recognises subjective reality, the reality of senses, emotions, thoughts, ideas, etc.
Moreover, Marxism not only recognises these realities, but demands that they be
considered in their interaction. In this context it would be in place to recall Lenins
well known words: Of course, even the antithesis of matter and mind has absolute
significance only within the bounds of a very limited fieldin this case exclusively
within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be
regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative
character of this antithesis is indubitable.[ 2211 Second, Lenins stand has very
little in common with positivist empiricism which is characteristic of Feigls views,
since sensations to Lenin are by no means the only source of knowledge and the
only means for the cognition of reality, but they are indeed the only form of mans
connection with the surroundings and even with his own inner world. 222
Every philosopher more or less familiar with Lenins works knows perfectly well p
that Lenin made a clear distinction between the physical concept of matter subject to
elaboration with every new significant discovery in physics and the philosophical or
epistemological concept representing the sole property of the infinitely diverse objects
and phenomena of the worldthe property of being an objective reality. None other
than Lenin, developing the ideas of Marx and Engels, came out against the
identification of these different levels in the cognition of reality. Later on we shall
dwell on this aspect of the problem at greater length but at present our point is to
emphasise that Poltens criticism of scientific materialism in the person of Feigl,
Smart, Armstrong and others distorts their viewpoints in at least three aspects: in
their attitude to positivism, i.e. logical empiricism, in their attitude to dialectical
materialism and in the confusion of the methodological and ontological treatment of
the mind-body problem.
As we see, the viability of the programme of scientific realism depends primarily p

on its ability to overcome the physicalist viewpoint. It is all the more important as
physicalism is in fact entirely alien to true philosophical materialism and seriously
limits its theoretical and methodological possibilities. Physicalism, as well as
reductionism in general, restricts the scope of scientific investigations and tends to
turn them onto a beaten track paved with elaborate physical theories. Everyone
knows how easy it is to tread along such tracks, yet every true scientist is equally 223
aware that the easiest way is not the shortest one. Science which represents the
forefront of human thought has always followed and will follow untrodden paths.
Widely known are Marxs winged words: There is no royal road to science, and
only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of
gaining its luminous summits.[ 2231
Of course, physicalism and reductionism are not a transient phenomenon. They are p
not brought about by some specific concurrence of circumstances in scientific
development, but make themselves manifest each time the philosophers, natural
scientists or sociologists attempt to apply certain general principles and methods of
scientific explanation beyond the sphere where they hold good. Reductionism can be
likened to intermittent fever of scientific cognition which seizes now this, now that
field of science. It is essentially connected with the passage from one level of
knowledge to another and plays an important part in a scientific explanation, though

it is evidently not confined to the limits of this cognitive pattern alone.
Physicalism is but one of the forms of reductionism which seeks to translate p

specific phenomena and processes into the language of physical mechanisms and
laws. It should be noted that we do not apply the terms physicalism and
reductionism to scientific explanations which reflect the laws of objective processes
and fall in line with the trends of scientific cognition. With us, these terms always
carry a negative meaning denoting an attempt to squeeze certain phenomena into the 224
Procrustean bed of known laws relating to different systems and phenomena.
The modern philosophy of science is characterised by complex internal processes p

and sweeping reappraisal of values. No sooner had Michael Ruse published his
Philosophy of Biology, advocating reductionist and patently logico-empiricist views,
than the scientific community produced other works, such as David Hulls Philosophy
of Biological Science which treats practically the same range of problems, but from
an entirely new position claiming to represent the realistic approach. Contrary to
Ruse who denies theoretical biology the status of a science, Hull proceeds from the
actual status of biology in a typically scientific realist manner. For him, the
existence of a highly ramified and systematised biological science featuring a high
level of theoretical development needs no proofit is selfevident. Understandably,
this initial premise lays a foundation for an entirely different system of reasoning.
Defining his attitude to positivism and its methodological programme, Hull declares p
that the logico-empiricist analysis of reduction is at best inadequate, and at worst
utterly wrong. The paradigm of physicalism proceeds from the possibility of solving
all problems at the lowest level of analysis, i.e. at the level of quantum mechanics,
whereas biologists use not only analysis, but also synthesis to investigate the
phenomena in interest since they deal with highly organised living systems.
Between the living and the dead Hull sees not only a quantitative, but also a p
qualitative difference. This is particularly true of man as a living being. It is 225
certainly true, he writes, that nothing is more obvious in the study of nature than
the existence of complexity and levels of organisation. Now here are the levels of
organisation more stratified and the complexity more complex than in the organic
world. But ontological levels, individuals, parts, wholes, and so forth are hardly the
givens of experiencerather these notions emerge as phenomena are investigated
and need not coincide with common sense notions... Man is qualitatively different
from other species.[ 2251 It is also indicative that Hull stands for the
independence of biology as a science not only on the empirical, but also on the
theoretical levels recognising the right of biology to have its own laws and theories
which have not been formulated by physics and are not reducible to physical laws
and theories. Biology, in his opinion, provides convincing evidence that the concept
of life leaves no room for any metaphysical entity. The ability to create and
reproduce ever more complex structures is inherent in the elements themselves which
constitute living matter. The ascent from elementary particles to man includes a
series of different integration levels and interruptions in development. Yet it is a
continuous process, both in time and space, with no vacuum to be filled with
immaterial entities. The transition from inanimate nature to the world of living
beings is so continuous that the analysis of molecules and organels of the cell has
already got into the hands of physicists. This does not mean, however, that biology 226
is turning into an appendage to physics and that its field of investigations is
becoming, so to speak, a subsidiary to a more complex system. Each level of
organisation features new properties and new laws. Not a single separate molecule
can reproduce itself. This ability is only inherent in such a formation as cell. Yet the
emergence of life changes the rules of the game. Natural selection makes a greater
demand on a higher level system, such as a population of cells, yet simultaneously
offers it new forming possibilities. Living organisms remaining subject to the laws
that govern inert systems acquire new properties which do not play any part at a
lower level. Biology calls for a new theory.
Of certain interest is also Hulls criticism of vitalism. In his opinion, the vitalist p
doctrine results from the failure to understand the connection between such key
categories as things and substances, on the one hand, and properties, on the other.
Life, according to Hull, is nothing but time, space, gravitation and magnetism. To
this must be added the organisational property of living systems. The materialistic
approach to the problem of life is quite obvious here, at least within the limits
typical of scientific realism: Hull offers to explain life by the specific features of
the organisation of living matter itself, but not by postulating some spirit or vital
force. Hull agrees with some anti-reductionists in that the successful development of
biology calls for the ontology of many levels, stressing at the same time that it is far
from sufficient to divide all reality into several layers and levelsthe main thing is
to determine the specific properties and laws characteristic of each of them. 227
Hulls recognition of the existence of specific, qualitatively different levels, p

important as it is, cannot yet ensure the solution of the problems facing modern
biology. His approach, though essentially materialistic, is still limited. Hull has
inherited from positivism its special accent on cognitive structures and carries it onto
static organic structures. Yet one of the fundamental properties of living matter at all
levels consists in its ability for development and self-reproduction. Hence, one can
hardly expect any essential progress in the creation of theoretical biology without a
general theory of development, i.e. dialectics. Moreover, such progress cannot be
ensured by mechanically applying dialectics to the analysis of living systemsit
calls for a new approach which is to be worked out by biological science itself. It
means that the processes of differentiation should be considered in unity with those
of integration, synthesis, and that the structural approach should be combined with
the historical one.
In order to study differentiation phenomena, the scientist must possess some kind of p
an analytical instrument. Good headway has already been made towards this goal in
the field of investigation of molecular-biological mechanisms. More difficult appears
to be the development of a comprehensive approach to such regulating and
controlling systems as the endocrine or nervous system, as it must take into account
the specificity of each system and each level of living matter. Biology could
evidently greatly benefit from the principle of historicism which would help it to
explain the reactions of a developing organism to changing external conditions in 228
terms of adaptability, i.e. to regard the interaction of the organism and the
environment as a unity resulting from a prolonged adaptive evolution. Without a
historical approach all reactions of an organism may look like a heap of absurdities
determined exclusively by the.internal factors of development, quite fortuitous at that
and in no way connected with external condition. In order to use to advantage all
available analytical means of investigation, the biologists must first of all overcome
their prejudice against dialectics and get down in earnest to studying its real
theoretical and methodological content from classical works permeated with truly
creative spirit.
The results achieved in molecular biology could not have been duly appreciated if it p
had not been for the intensive development of the idea of selfdevelopment and for
the turn to Darwins theory of evolution. The synthesis of genetics and the evolution
theory carried out in the 1930s and expounded by S. Chetverikov, R. Fischer, S.
Wright, and other scientists undoubtedly played an important part in paving the way
for the ideas and methods of molecular biology. The concept of microevolution,
disputable as it is, has had a beneficial influence on the development of biology if
only for its role in preparing appropriate coordination between structure analysis and
evolutionary research, i.e. in the integration of experimental biology and theoretical
investigations. It should be remembered that though the elimination of the principles
of integrity and historism in favour of analytical methods and means does produce
an immediate effect and gives tangible and demonstrable results, it can never be 229
anything more than just the first, though sufficiently flexible, approximation to the
truth in the process of cognition of living organisms. As A. Szentgjrgji has
figuratively put it, with reductionism employed as a universal method, life passes, as
it were, between ones fingers. The significance of each of the above methods in the
development of modern biology can only be assessed from the standpoint of
dialectics as a science concerned with the most general laws of development.
Numerous philosophers and biologists showing interest in the above problems note p
the paradoxical fact that such outstanding physicists as Schrodinger, Bohr,
Heisenberg, and Wigner have sided of late with the most resolute opponents of
reductionism in many fields, including biology which is far removed from their
special interests and which is regarded by some physicists as a kind of their private
domain. In making such observations they overlook the fact that physics has already
recovered, in the main if not completely, from this intermittent fever. There are few
physicists now who still hope to reduce the theory of relativity in its present
dominion to the principles of classical mechanics or to translate quantum
phenomena into the language of classical Laplatian determinism[ 2291 . It becomes
increasingly clear to scientists that reality cannot be reduced to the totality of
observable facts and that epistemological reduction as one of the dogmas of 230
positivism is untenable. It should be noted in this context that physics with its
philosophical theories appears to be again far more instructive to biology than vice
versa. As regards the approach to the problem of objectivity, the solutions offered by
physics and its philosophers feature a notably higher standard of both empirical and
theoretical investigations.
It looks as if experimental biology were only approaching the stage at which it will p
be confronted with the problems of the inseparable connection between the object,
subject and instrument, and the relations between the object and the means of
measurement. So far, we have not yet come across a philosophical work discussing
these problems in the light of experimental investigations in biology. The theoretical
level of biological science is evidently not yet high enough to permit a serious
philosophical analysis of the means of the objective cognition of biological
phenomena. By contrast, all these problems are not only given extensive coverage,
but are also treated at a high theoretical level in the literature on physical problems,
e.g. in the works by scientific realist Bunge. This philosophical trend occupies far
more advanced positions in physics than in other fields of science.
One of the important aspects of Bunges concept appears to be his analysis of the p
problem of the conceptual representation of facts in theory. In his opinion, theory
can hardly be regarded as simply an image of reality, something like a picture. It is
rather a conceptual reconstruction of reality. Yet conceptual representations of facts
are no less objective, though they are only partial and provide at best but an
approximation to the truth. Not every theoretical construct represents something. For 231
instance, logical notions are not representative at all, even if they have their
referents. According to Bunge, reference and presentation are independent of each

other, since non-referential constructs, such as multitudes, can be used for
representation whereas non-referential constructs, e.g. a tautology, may be completely
unrepresentative. The truth is that scientific theories can be both referential and
representative.
The difference between the referent and the representation is of no small p

significance for philosophy. According to Bunge, biologists are more and more
frequently engaged in controversies over which of the three biological systems is the
true referent of the synthetic theory of evolutionthe individual organism, the
population or the species. No convincing argument has been presented so far in
favour of any of the contending theses. The difference between the referents and the
representations becomes clear in developed sciences, such as theoretical physics. Here
a certain function probability will refer to some system or state, whereas the values
of this function may represent certain dispositions of this system, like, for instance,
the function of mass refers to bodies in general, whereas its particular value will
represent the mass of a given body. In quantum mechanics each dynamic property of
a system, such as a pulse, is represented by a certain operator in the Guilbertian
space, i.e. a given operator represents a certain property of its referent. If the
relationship of reference in factual sciences compares constructs with things or with
aggregates of things, the relationship of representation compares a construct with a 232
certain aspect or property of a given thing or an aggregate of things. Hence, the
purpose and the result of a theory is not the representation of selected aspects of
alleged things. Theoretical notions are nothing but developed mathematical structures
which cannot be defined in terms of empirical operations or constructed as logical
functions on the basis of given observations. Empirical checks consist of operations
planned in the light of subsequent theories. Besides the experience bridging the gap
between theory and reality, there also exists a semantic bridge constructed with the
help of the semantic propositions of the given theory.
According to Bunge, the ideal of objectivity characteristic of factual theory is p

preserved in quantum mechanics to no lesser degree than in classical mechanics. The
object neither disappears nor merges with the subject. The only change consists in
that our modern notions of microobjects are incorporated in a whole chain of
connecting (mediating) links. The subject, notes Bunge, does not occur among the
basic predicates of our version of QM [quantum mechanics]. Neither does he occur
in the theory of measurement: indeed, physical theory is unconcerned with the
psychical events going on inside the observers skull: a physical theory of
measurement is concerned only with the physical intersection between two or more
physical entities, at least one of which must be a macrosystem.[ 2321
From Bunges viewpoint, the standard formalism of quantum mechanics can be p 233
adequately expressed in terms of physics without any reference to the subject, i.e.
psychology. In other words, quantum mechanics can be interpreted in the same way
as classical mechanics on the assumption that the entities referred to by theory, such
as electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. have an independent status. That does not mean,
of course, that the experimentalist cannot modify them, for instance, by filtering out
certain states or by providing evidence that some microsystems are purely imaginary.
Yet to achieve this aim the experimentalist must use physical means without
summoning the ghost of the Copenhagen school. Bunge views the observer as an
entity capable of influencing physical events with the help of physical means either
directly, through the agency of his body, or indirectly, through the mediation of
automated devices. The physicists mind invents formulae used for prediction of
physical events and for interpretation of physical phenomena under investigation and
therefore has no direct bearing on theory itself.
For objective interpretation of quantum mechanics Bunge proposes to free it, first, p
from the notion of observable value and, second, from subjective probability. In his
opinion, it is irrelevant to speak of an observable value, of the observer changing
it, of obtaining the true knowledge of the observable value, etc. All of these notions
relate to the subject, as well as to some of his actions and mental states. Typical
quantum properties are not observable (in the epistemological sense of the word), and
changeable values are nothing but approximations to values calculated theoretically. 234
The notion of certainty is no less alien to physical theory. The latter must contain the
objective interpretation of probability as an ordinary physical property, but not as a
degree of faith or a measure of certainty.
According to Bunge, the axiomatisation of the existing quantum theory is the radical p
means of its restructuring. Axiomatic substantiation should rest on such notions as
the microsystem (or quanton), the surroundings (macro- or microphysical
systems), the conventional (configurational) space or the space of states, the
property of the microsystem, the operator representing it (the observable in the
Copenhagen version), etc. These notions will give the quantum theory a kind of an
initial basis subject to no further determination. The postulates of this realistic
version of quantum mechanics determining each of the initial notions must be
justified by their ability to give successful theoretical explanations of experimental
facts. Hence, axioms are determined both formally and semantically. Measurements
only come into play at the checking stage. As regards the properties of the
microsystem and their conceptual representation, Bunge always strives to avoid the
term observable. He contends that, first, they cannot be perceived, though they are
amenable to indirect investigation; second, there is no complete clarity about the
specific methods of their measurement. In Bunges opinion, the subject should be
barred from theoretical physics if we do not wish to confuse it with psychology or
epistemology. The subjects role consists in constructing and checking a theory, but
not in posing as its referent. It is for these reasons, according to Bunge, that we
should not use the word observable with dynamic variables in quantum mechanics. 235
Specific parameters inherent in quantum-mechanical systems are chance variables in p

the sense that they are associated with a definite distribution of probabilities. It is
true, in particular, of the position and momentum of a microsystem which should
rather be called a quantum position (quosition) and a quantum momentum
(quomentum), to emphasise their non-classical nature. Bunge points out that the
function representing the quantum state meets the axioms of the calculation of
probabilities. It means that quantum mechanics today contains no latent variables.
According to Bunge, Bohms prohibition of latent variables directly ensues from the
conventional approach to the notions of the axiomatic system and from the proof of
the chance character of all dynamic variables.
In Bunges opinion, the fundamentalism of quantum mechanics can be understood in p

two different ways. One way is to assume that it refers not to an individual quanton,
but to a statistical ensemble. From this assumption it logically follows that different
components of a certain ensemble in a given quantum state have different values of
the coordinates and of the momentum. Yet quantum mechanics is also applicable to
an individual microsystem (e.g. to an electron passing through a crystal grid and
getting onto a screen). The theory is not checked by means of large quantum
ensembles. Thus, a calculated distribution of positions is compared with a
diffraction pattern on the screen when the number of collisions increases. In other
words, the function of the state (like any other chance variable) refers to an 236
individual quanton and its exact form is checked with the help of the quanton
statistical totalities.
The other way referred to by Bunge consists in regarding quantum-mechanical p

properties as latent or potential rather than actual, i.e. as properties which reveal
themselves in the interaction of the system with the measuring instrument. During
this interaction the properties become dependent on the observer, since it is in his
power to conduct or suspend the experiment. Yet here, too, Bunge strives to free
quantummechanical properties from the subjects influence. As a rule, a quanton has
neither an accurately defined position, nor a definite momentum, possessing only
point distributions. These distributions change with time under the influence of the
environment irrespective of whether this environment is included in the experiment or
not. Specifically, a quanton can be fairly well localised in space, for which purpose
it is necessary to fulfil appropriate operations in order to prepare a localised state.
Such operations quite often take place under natural conditions. According to Bunge,
we only repeat the experiments staged by nature itself by fixing, for instance, the
position of the atoms or by producing a monochromatic electron beam.
From Bunges viewpoint, the quantum theory does not lend itself to an empirical p
interpretation since none of its basic symbols has any empirical content. Moreover
not a single basic symbol of quantum mechanics can be explained in empirical terms
whence it follows that the quantum theory has no empirical content whatsoever. It
does not mean, however, that it is not testable it simply means, in Bunges 237
opinion, that its facts are quantum transitions lying above the level of sensory
experience. Here Bunge somewhat exaggerates the existing gap between classical and
quantum mechanics, sensory experience and theory, observability and non-
observability. Though not directly observable, many quantummechanical formalisms
and symbols can at any rate be visualised and therefore lend themselves, at least
partially, to empirical interpretation. Besides, an empirical test involves the use of
additional theories connecting microprocesses with macroprocesses, as well as
theories explaining the behaviour of the macrosystems included in the process of
measurement. The semantic content of the quantum theory is thus determined not
only by the factual level reflected in theoretical concepts, but also by concepts which
can be translated, at least partially, into the empirical language. To be sure, this
circumstance makes the test of the quantum theory much more difficult and is
accountable for the controversies (still going on) over the possibility of the
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bunge strives for the simplest and most radical
solution of the problem of objectivity in quantum mechanics proposing complete
separation of the empirical and theoretical levels and banishment of all observable
and measurable values from theory. In point of fact, it is the reverse of ousting
metaphysics. This way can hardly lead to a satisfactory result. Just like an
experiment cannot be freed from its theoretical canvas, so the quantum theory cannot
and evidently need not be relieved of all the observables. If compared with the
stand of the Copenhagen school, it is just the other extreme, prompted by the desire 238
to solve the problem of objectivity in quantum mechanics by surgical means.
One will hardly take exception to Bunges contention that a notion cannot be p
defined as primary or secondary outside a definite theoretical context, that the
axiomatisation of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics has made it clear
that they deal with objects rather than measurements and that these theories are not
directly related to the observer and his mental states. It is not quite clear, however,
in which way the axiomatisation of the above theories helps to reveal their objective
content or, the more so, serves as a means for making knowledge more objective.
Nevertheless, Bunges idea appears to be constructive enough, particularly if the
proposed axiomatisation could be supplemented with other methods of the objective

interpretation of the quantum theory. As we shall try to show later, such possibilities
should evidently not be discarded.
Besides the weaknesses noted above, Bunges concept is depreciated by the mutual p
isolation of classical and quantum mechanics. He draws a sharp line of demarcation
between the two theories leaving just one connecting linkthe instrument whose
indications are described in terms of classical physics but at the same time do not
yield to empirical interpretation. Here Bunge appears to be unable to fit things to
one another and shape them into a streamlined philosophical-methodological system.
He stops in hesitation when confronted with the need for a more flexible, i.e.
dialectical, approach to the relationship of theories. What is needed, however, is not 239
only a more flexible apparatus to investigate the relations and links between theories,
as well as between a theory and its empirical basis. Of crucial importance, alongside
a greater determination to delimit theory and sensory experience, is an effective
methodological concept of development. A concept of this kind is necessary not only
for understanding the interdependence of the classical and quantum theories, but also
for defining the future trends of the development of modern physics. It is very
important, for instance, to envisage the prospects of the modern non-relativistic
quantum theory and the theory of relativity, as well as the effect of their possible
integration on the theory of elementary particles. It is quite obvious that the solution
of these problems calls for a dialectical approach to the analysis of modern scientific
knowledge and for abandoning the view that the quantum theory revised in
accordance with Bunges requirements is the ideal for all sciences. The materialistic
substantiation of the latest physical theories cannot be complete without dialectical
analysis. It is not fortuitous that the weakness of this link in the system of Bunges
views leads him to a number of idealistic conclusions. As has been shown above,
Bunges approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the general problems
of the relationship of philosophy and science, as well as to the mind-body problem
cannot but suffer from certain eclecticism due to his prejudice against dialectics.
Bunges concept features rather a contradictory and even odd combination of the p
objective understanding of probability in quantum mechanics with the mechanistic
interpretation of causality. Bunges mechanicism in this field is traceable to his 240
earlier works and, as his latest ideas show, has not been completely cured. It must
be admitted that Bunge has come out with argumentative criticism against the
Machist concept of causality and opposed the attempts of Schlick, Frank and Mach
himself to substitute functional dependence or the connection of states for causal
relations. He repeatedly disclosed the futility of all attempts of positivism to contrast
causality and quantum mechanics and to undermine the idea of causality by
counterposing it to Heisenbergs correlation of uncertainties. His efforts, given a most
serious attitude to dialectics, could be very fruitful in achieving a common goalto
give an objective substantiation to the microworld theory. However, Bunge has
always refused to avail himself of this methodological support.
Bunges stand is largely attributable to the fact that his concept of causality is based p
on the simplest form of causal relations lying on the surface in everyday experience:
the action of one object on another. Expressing the principle of causality in a more
strict logical form, Bunge presents it as follows: If C happens under the same
conditions, then (and only then) E is always produced by it.[ 2401 According to
the author, this formula includes all the obligatory components of causality, namely,
the conditionality of the consequence upon the cause, the uniqueness of the
connection, the unilateral dependence of the consequence on the cause, the constancy
of the connection and its genetic nature (or productivity). 241
Ascribing such features as uniqueness and necessity to causal relations, Bunge p

discards by his formula the possibility of one and the same consequence being
brought about by different causes. In his analysis of different definitions of causality
Bunge gives preference to the one identifying the cause with the necessary and
sufficient condition. He includes all the accompanying conditions in the concept of
the efficient cause. In his opinion, if the accompanying conditions were contingent
upon the cause, the formula of causality would express more than a simple, direct
causal bond and the cause would then be regarded as the unchainer or triggerer of a
process[ 2411 . Bunges formula, however, complicates the problem of the
relationship of the internal and external conditions in the analysis of some complex
process, particularly in a living organism or any developing system. No less difficult
becomes also the analysis of the behaviour of a quantum-mechanical system which
figures prominently in Bunges works.
The solution to the internal-external dilemma in the causality problem proposed by p

Bunge is very, if not too, simple: he identifies both the internal and external
conditions either with the necessary or with the sufficient conditions required to
ensure the causal process. This brings him in obvious contradiction with his own
concept of determinism. It should be noted that Bunge distinguishes between the
principle of causality and the principle of determinism. The latter rests on a broader
notion of determination which includes the processes of simple causality. One 242
might infer from this stand that causality in its simplest and clearest form must
underlie any kind of determination, including the statistical one. Yet Bunge, though
never giving a clear-cut definition of necessity and chance, makes it quite plain that
the changes contingent on the very nature of phenomena and resulting from the
operation of internal factors should be regarded as the necessary ones. Chance,
according to Bunge, is what results from external circumstances. Now let us see if
this approach will help in any way to understand the nature of quanum-mechanical
processes or throw additional light on the problem of completeness of the quantum
theory.
In his book on causality Bunge still regards with favour Bohms hypothesis of the p
existence of latent parameters determining the statistical behaviour of microparticles
and contends that, once defined, they would enable the scientists to abandon the
probability interpretation of quantum mechanics and of the behaviour of
microparticles. Yet in his Philosophy of Physics, written later, he changes his views
and offers a different programme: to eliminate completely the subject (psychological
determinations, measurements, observable values) from the quantum theory. In this
way he evidently seeks to eliminate the subjective interpretation of probability as
well. To this end Bunge uses the expression mean value instead of the
psychological expectation value and prefers the terminology of probability of
quantons presence in a given volume to the vocabulary of the Copenhagen school
and Percy Bridgemans operationalist concept (presence is a given volume when the 243
measurement is practically completed). Bunge goes even as far as substituting the
terms scatter and spread for uncertainty and indeterminacy.
Here, however, a tricky question suggests itself: is it to be inferred that a statistical p

process proceeding at a certain level of the organisation of matter is a direct effect
of the cause operating at a deeper level? Schrodingers equation is known to be in
some sense mechanistic, just like Newtons. Both equations describe the changes
caused by external effects, yet the latter, unlike the former, represents a simple causal
relationship. The quantisation of states brings in a new qualitative element which
distinguishes modern from classical mechanics. The essential difference consists in
that the former equation regards matter as a wave process, whereas the latter one
treats it as the totality of particles. The difference here is brought about by the inner
quality and not by external forces. Yet in both situations the principle of causality is
used to explain motion in terms of mechanics (wave mechanics and classical
mechanics respectively). Should it be assumed, then, that simple causality rejected at
one level owing to statistical interpretation must be restored at the next basic level
as being better suited for the explanation and prediction of processes?
When we pass on to microprocesses, we encounter a relative increase in the role of p

internal factors and a corresponding decrease in the role of external factors in
determining the properties of physical systems. Here again, how are we to tally
necessity resulting, according to Bunge, from the operation of internal factors of
physical and all other phenomena, and chance regarded by him as a totality of 244
external conditions with the view that any future theory explaining the mechanical
displacement of microparticles in space and time will be a statistical theory?
Suppose now we still hope that one fine day it will prove possible to describe the p
behaviour of microparticles in terms of simple causal relations. All the same, the
lessons taught by quantum mechanics have not been lost on us and we now
understand that causality need not at all be rigidly and for ever linked with necessity
and that necessity, for that matter, cannot be divorced from chance, except by the
sheer force of abstraction from concrete conditions. Hence, any causal connection
includes both necessity and chance. If that is so, as surely it is, causality can never
be separated from probability unless it is viewed as a fixed relationship, something
in the nature of a bronze casting, which cannot be different from what it is.
So, we are again bound to come to the conclusion that disregard for dialectics and
the inapt use of its instruments let down even the most talented representatives of
scientific realism and account, directly or indirectly, for their inconsistencies and
concessions to idealism despite the ostensibly materialistic premises of their concepts.
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 1981] Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk: A Defence of Realism in Philosophy and the
Sciences, The Harvester Press, Ltd., Barnes & Noble Books, Sussex, N.J., 1980,
p.IX.
[ 1991] Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, The Harvester Press, Ltd.,
Hassocks, N.J., 1978, p.36.
[ 1992] Ibid., p.249.
[ 2001] Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk..., op. cit., p.XIX.
[ 2002] Ibid., p.2.
[ 2011] Ibid., p.22.
[ 2012] Ibid., p.23.
[ 2031] Ibid., p.1.
[ 2032] Ibid., p.28.
[ 2051] Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk..., op. cit., p.66.
[ 2061] Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
New York, 1960, p.23.
[ 2062] Willard Van Orman Quine, The Nature of Natural Knowledge, in: Mind
and Language, Ed. by S. Guttenplan, Oxford, 1975, p.74.
[ 2071] Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View. Logico-
Philosophical Essays, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1963, p.44.
[ 2111] Herbert Feigl, The Mental and the Physical, University of Minnesota
Press, Minneapolis, 1967, p.57.
[ 2121] I.T. Frolov, B.G. Yudin, Preface to the Russian translation of M.Ruses
book Philosophy of Biology, Moscow, 1977, p.18.
[ 2122] Herbert Feigl, The Mental and the Physical, op. cit., p.28.
[ 2141] Ibid., pp. 8485.
[ 2191] E.P. Polten, Critique of the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory. A Refutation

of Scientific Materialism and an Establishment of Mind-Matter Dualism by Means of
Philosophy and Scientific Method, Mouton, The Hague, Paris, 1973, p.19.
[ 2201] Ibid., pp. 2122.
[ 2202] Ibid., p.113.
[ 2211] V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empiric-Criticism, Collected Works, Vol.14,

1977, p.147 (here and hereafter Progress Publishers, Moscow).
[ 2231] Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p.30.
[ 2251] D.Hull, Philosophy of Biological Science, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974,

p.131.
[ 2291] Hopes for such a reduction were once expressed by Einstein, and later by
David Bohm and other scientists in the hypothesis of latent parameters. Now these
hopes are considered groundless.
[ 2321] Mario Bunge, Philosophy of Physics, D.Reidel Publishing Company,

[ 2401] Mario Bunge, Causality. The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern
Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1959, pp. 4849.
[ 2411] Ibid.
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While assessing the significance of various schools of the modern philosophy of p
Contents science and comparing their programmes and views on fundamental methodological
problems, we have never missed an opportunity to outline, if only schematically, the

attitude of dialectical materialism (or materialistic dialectics) to each issue under
Index
Card
consideration. Now, in order to characterise materialistic dialectics as an alternative
to positivism, we ought to take a somewhat closer look at its basic concepts and
present them in a broader perspective.
Formats:
Text Of course, it would be presumptuous even to attempt to give an exhaustive account p
PS of Marxist philosophy within the scope of this publication. We shall therefore
PDF
confine ourselves to the relationship of philosophy and special sciences, the
objectivity of scientific knowledge and causality, i.e. to the main problems which we

Other
have already discussed in connection with the crisis of positivism and with the 246
Titles: programmes of alternative doctrines within the framework of the modern philosophy
TA of science and which constitute, as we have shown, the core of any methodological
programme.
Years:
1984 From its very first steps Marxist philosophy, continuing the materialistic and p
dialectical traditions of all previous philosophy has been the antipode of positivism.
There is no need to reproduce here the history of their struggle, the more so as its
### outcome is well known. The prestige of materialistic dialectics as the methodology of
MAP cognition and as the world view is steadily growing, winning over to its side the
most prominent representatives of modern science. Marxist philosophy, assimilating
every new achievement of social and scientific progress and constantly enriching
itself, is extending its influence to ever new regions of the world, the only means of
its expansion being, as before, the logic of truth. It is precisely this logic,
confirmed by life itself, that underlies its high scientific repute. By contrast, positivist
philosophy, represented now by a dozen or so of its champions, the living relics of
the past, is undergoing a profound ideological crisis evidently marking the closing
stage of its history.
The dramatic story of the struggle between Marxist philosophy and various trends of p
positivism suggests certain conclusions which appear to be particularly instructive in
the light of the present-day debate on the methodology of scientific cognition, as
they are directly related to the main controversial issues. In this connection special
importance attaches to the difference between the Marxist and positivist views on the
relation of philosophy to special sciences, as well as on the relation of science in 247
general to the unscientific forms of consciousness.
As we have earlier indicated, one of the key points in the programmes of all p
positivist schools without exception has always been the opposition to metaphysics,
i.e. to everything that passes beyond the limits of scientific knowledge. Indeed, the
only difference between the successive stages or phases of the evolution of
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/3.1-Overcoming.Hegel[2012-12-17 15:16:00]
positivism consisted, perhaps, in the difference of the concepts of scientificity and,

consequently, in different lines of demarcation between science and non-science.
This circumstance, however, has nothing to do with the ill luck of positivist p
philosophy, since the delimitation of these two spheres of human and social
consciousness is indeed absolutely necessary. No one in our time, except, perhaps,
theologists (who are not averse to partaking in the fruit of science either), would
raise any objections to the separation of science and religion if only for the simple
reason that they represent entirely different forms of social consciousness with their
own traditions, specific features and functions in society, not to speak of the
religious prejudices that have always been a formidable obstacle in the way of
scientific progress.
Besides religion, there exist other forms of nonscientific consciousness, such as, for p
instance, aesthetic consciousness and common sense. They should also be
distinguished from science as such, though there is no sharp line of demarcation
between them. Indeed, scientific knowledge grows on the rich soil of mans everyday
experience, and the artistic perception of the world inspires creative scientific 248
endeavour. It would be impossible to understand science, its origin, motive forces
and the nature of scientific thinking itself if we left out of account the blood vessels
connecting science with living humanity, its everyday needs and aspirations, as well
as the enormous wealth of labour experience accumulated by mankind. Said Goethe:
All theory, dear friend, is grey, but the golden tree of actual life springs ever
green.
The fact that the links between science and the arts have not yet been properly p
explored gives no grounds for ignoring their obvious mutually beneficial influence.
On the contrary, the more complex and uncommon their relations, the greater should
be the philosophers desire to get at the root of their extraordinary alliance, since
they may find there a clue to the mystery of human thinking. The discoveries that
may await them on this path are being eagerly looked forward to by science, as they
will essentially affect the further course of scientific and technological progress,
rationalise the development of technology and raise the intellectual standards of
human life.
There is no need to discuss these problems in detail, since our purpose at present is p
to underscore the importance of demarcating science and non-scientific knowledge.
However, such a demarcation cannot be an aim in itself. The close links existing
between science and everyday life, science and the arts, common sense and true
knowledge, as well as between science and other fields of social life indicate that it
should be but a preliminary stage for further investigations. When social life and
social consciousness are divided respectively into more or less independent spheres 249
and forms, the next step will be to focus our attention on their interconnection. This
stage, however, will hardly be the final one either, since the investigation of their
links will lead to a more profound and concrete understanding of differences between
them. This process, alas, has no end, just like the process of cognition in general.
We may sound not very optimistic, but one of the tasks of science, as distinct from p
religion and other forms of myths consists in giving man correct ideas of himself
and of the surrounding world, the ideas that would be concrete, connected with
reality and therefore testable, rather than in his illusory consolation. As to the arts
and common sense, science differs from them by the precision of its statements,
accuracy of calculations and forecasts, as well as by the reliability of its conclusions.
As is seen from these considerations, very general and sketchy as they are, the p
nature of scientific knowledge can only be understood after it is singled out of other
forms of human consciousness and presented as- a historical process, i.e. with its
essential links, both logical and historical. It should be noted that the rapid scientific
development over the past decades and the crucial changes of many fundamental
concepts of the world have exposed the links between science and other social
activities and made their interdependence common knowledge. The immaturity of
these links in the period of the inception of positivism, however, cannot justify this
philosophy for their methodological distortion, particularly at the later stages of its 250
evolution when these links became more apparent.
As early as the beginning of the 19th century Hegel defined the basic principles p
underlying the approach to this question. These principles, though in idealistic attire,
carried profound dialectical meaning which ensured their viability till our time. All
that was needed (in Hegels time at any rate) in order to solve in principle the
problem of the relationship of science to the non-scientific forms of human
consciousness was dialectics. It was to show the complexity and the contradictory
nature of this relationship: on the one hand, the opposition of science and religion,
of scientific and pictorial thinking, intuition and logic, practice and theory; on the
other, the diversity of bonds, mediating and intermediate links, as well as the
transitions from one form of consciousness to another.
The question of the scientific value of philosophy aroused Hegels special interest. p
In 1802, he emphasised the importance of this question in the Critical Philosophical
Journal and discussed the attitude to it on the part of Kant and Fichte. Philosophy,
wrote Hegel, since it is to be Ordered Knowledge, cannot borrow its Method from
a subordinate science, such as Mathematics.[ 2501 In his opinion, philosophy
was capable of being an objective, conclusive science based on the immanent
development of the notion and the absolute method of knowledge.[ 2502 The
content of logic as the highest type of philosophical science is its scientific method,
the notion of science itself which is its ultimate result, as well as the concept of its 251
subject-matter, thinking in concepts which is engendered in the course of
development of the Science, and therefore cannot precede it.[ 2511 According to
Hegel, the one and only thing for securing scientific progress is understanding that
the method of logic is spontaneous development of its content and that its essence is
a dialectical, i.e. definite negation.[ 2512
Having mastered Hegels dialectics, Marx and Engels gave a profound comparative p
analysis of their own and Hegels views proceeding from the materialistic idea of the
primacy of social being over social consciousness, of the determination of
consciousness, its content and structure by the content and structure of the social,
practical activity of man. Reuniting dialectics and materialism, Marx and Engels
turned dialectics into a real science, and this in the terms that have preserved their
validity till nowadays: objectivity, connection with reality and testability of its
propositions in practice. Having retained the universality of logical categories and
principles, materialist dialectics at the same time got rid of the speculativeness,
scholasticism and abstractness which were characteristic of German classical
philosophy.
Disclosing the mystified form of Hegelian dialectics in his Economic Manuscripts of p

18571859, Marx described his own method as being the direct opposite of the
Hegelian method. One of the features of Marxs method, also contrasting with 252
Hegels idealistic dialectics, consisted, according to Marx, in that it leads from
abstract definitions by way of reasoning to the reproduction of the concrete
situation,... as a summing-up, a result, and not as the starting point.[ 2521
The categories and laws of materialistic dialectics are indeed universal and in this p
sense irrefutable. Yet their status is entirely different from the status of a priori,
absolute Hegelian ideas. The universality of the categories and laws of dialectics
interpreted materialistically does not mean that they can be used everywhere, at all
times, in all cases and under any circumstances. They are only universal in the sense
that they apply to all fields of reality, namely, to nature, society and thinking. When
we say that they are universally confirmable, we mean that they are confirmed in all
fields of reality. This, and only this is the meaning of universality characterising
dialectical laws and categories. Of course, such an understanding of universality
limits the competence of philosophy which claimed to be the science of sciences by
denying it the right to explain or analyse every individual object or phenomena,
every relationship or dependence. One can speak of dialectics as the science of
sciences in a figurative sense only, meaning that it rises above particulars, trivial
problems and petty everyday situations. If Marx and Engels had not risen above their
surroundings, they would hardly have managed to discern the essence of capitalism,
its basic laws and working of hidden mechanisms behind the Mont Blanc of
individual facts. Moreover, had they not risen above reality, they would not have 253
been able to see the outlines of future human society.
This looking from above has nothing in common with looking down upon p
something and does not by any means imply a derogatory attitude to specialised
sciences, everyday human life and their specific reflection in human consciousness. It
is rather an epistemological position indicative of the relative independence of
philosophical knowledge and of the specific character of the subject-matter of
dialectics as a science. Philosophy and dialectics should be concerned with more
general problems than those which come within the scope of special sciences.
It stands to reason that the links and relationships connecting the most general p
properties of objects and phenomena of reality are different from those connecting
specific objects and phenomena. They constitute a specific field of knowledge which
cannot be covered in full measure by physics, chemistry, biology, history or any
other particular sciences. On the other hand, the tree of science would hardly be able
to flourish without its crown transforming the power and tenacity of philosophical
ideas into the energy of scientific cognition.
Having preserved the universality of dialectical categories which reflect eternal p

human problems and link the wonderings of mans spirit in the depths of outer
space, atom or living cell with his earthly existence, Marxism has shown at the same
time the real connection of most general philosophical problems with mans social
life, practical activity and problems of special sciences. In that sense Marxism
revealed the specific nature of philosophical categories and, consequently, showed the 254
way to test them, i.e. to confirm true ideas and views and to refute false ones. This
idea of the unity of the universality (abstractness) of philosophical knowledge and its
concreteness was beyond Hegels understanding owing to the speculativeness of his
philosophy, its detachment from real (material) being rooted in the conception of the
identity of being and thinking. This idea, however, is also beyond the comprehension
of modern positivism with its fixation on the direct empirical testing of any scientific
knowledge and obsession with the struggle against metaphysics condemned
together with dialectics by the positivist court of verification or falsification.
The irony consists in that dialectics which had provided the real basis for alliance p
between philosophy and science way back by the middle of the 19th century has
become one of the main objects of positivist attacks against metaphysics and
speculativeness. One of the greatest achievements of human mind was treated by the
philosophy of science equally with religion and other distorted forms of social
consciousness. Fighting against dialectics and striving to tear it away from science,
positivism was at the same time pretending to give a correct explanation of the
nature and essence of scientific cognition, distinguish science from other forms of
human activity and delimit religion and mythology. It is this paradox that lies at the
root of all the misfortunes of positivism.
The evolution of positivism, which is now almost one and a half century old, has p
not brought about any appreciable change in its attitude to dialectics. Spencer and 255
Comte underscored the empirical untestability of the categories and laws of
dialectics. Mach and Avenarius opposed the dialectics of Marx and Engels even
more uncompromisingly. Attempting to disprove dialectics, the logical positivists have
seized upon the criterion of verification, and their arguments, if only slightly
modified, are now currently used by all modern representatives of the philosophy of
science. They allege, for instance, that dialectics is being substantiated by non-
scientific methods and that its propositions are just illustrated by examples instead of
being mathematically correlated with experience. In support of their charges they
usually refer to textbooks on philosophy which sometimes do expound dialectics in
an oversimplified didactic manner. Such accusations, however, cannot be taken
seriously. Criticism of dialectics requires a far more profound knowledge of the
subject than just superficial acquaintance with students aids.
The real thrust of positivist criticism consists in the contention that dialectics is p
nothing but natural philosophy, since it concerns itself with the most general laws of
being. A philosopher, according to positivism, has no right to express his views not
only on reality as a whole, but even on any of its components. One of the most
serious positivist arguments against dialectics is the assertion that it has no empirical
content and that its propositions are nonsensical in cognitive terms. According to the
positivist critics, this conclusion is borne out by the impossibility of any empirical
verification of dialectical statements.
It is commonly argued in present-day positivist literature that dialectics does not p 256
disprove anything and that its propositions are universally confirmable, i.e. not
falsifiable. In contrast to Russell, Schlickand Wittgenstein who underscored the
empirical non-testability, non-verifiability of dialectics and therefore qualified it as
metaphysics, Popper and his numerous followers apply a different criterion in the
assessment of dialectics. Yet one would vainly expect them to recognise it as the
methodology of scientific cognition. Significantly, in Poppers system which is based
on an entirely different and even, in a sense, the opposite approach to the problem
of testability of scientific knowledge dialectics, nevertheless, is again classified as
metaphysics, this time, however, on different grounds: since the Occam razor for
Popper is falsifiability, he condemns dialectics for universal confirmability or
nonfalsifiability of its propositions and principles.
In Poppers opinion, no facts can be cited which would run counter to the, p
principles of dialectics, if only potentially. At the same time, dialectical statements
are not analytical like those of logic or mathematics. Their fallacy therefore is
inherent and can be neither circumvented, nor neutralised. That, according to critical
rationalism, means that dialectics is just another kind of metaphysics and its
statements have but a semblance of empirical content. However, Poppers prolonged
debate with the Vienna school was bound to effect a serious change in his views and
to make him reproduce increasingly, though unconsciously, the ideas of German
classical and, in particular, Hegelian dialectics. The more anti-positivistic he became,

the louder sounded the Hegelian notes in his concept of objective knowledge, 257
inherent knowledge, cosmic, physical, biological and cultural evolution. Poppers
militant anti-historicism was giving way to evolutionism, etc. Seeking a clue to
Poppers spontaneous gravitation to Hegelian metaphysics, one should take into
account the similarity of the situations in European bourgeois philosophy in the
middle of the 20th and the early 19th centuries. Like Hegels dialectics born in the
midst of the struggle against the mechanical-naturalistic and empirical-
phenomenological forms of philosophy, as well as against the reductionist concepts
of consciousness, Poppers evolution towards the dialectical forms of thought takes
place in the atmosphere of criticism of the mechanistic dogmas of neopositivism: the
static-cumulativistic concept of science, the empirical and inductivist methodology,
the physicalist theory of cognition, etc.
Referring to the universality of dialectical categories and laws, representatives of the p

modern philosophy of science speak of the triviality of its conclusions. In their
opinion, dialectics applicable to all cognitive situations without exception is nothing
but a set of tautological assertions which give no grounds for any differentiations
and, consequently, are devoid of analytical possibilities.
They further argue that a philosopher does not base his conclusions on sensory data p
and does not resort to an experiment. He can only reason within the limits of his
professional capability. Hence the conclusion: philosophy must not claim to be
anything more than logic. Since formal logic is the development of its own postulates
and not related in any way to the outer world, it must not be regarded as knowledge 258
of anything. The logician and, consequently, the philosopher must look after the
scientist ensuring that his formal calculations are not nonsensical, but the calculations
themselves should be based on linguistic agreements. For the philosopher, as an
analyst, writes Ayer, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of
things. He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them...
Philosophy is a department of logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of
a purely logical inquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our
definitions and not with questions of empirical fact.[ 2581
Whatever the viewpoints as to the scientific value of various propositions p

(verification or falsification), the difference between them consists in the adherence to
a definite method of comparing such propositions with sensory experience. Laying
aside the details, i.e. the question of the methods of checking which are in fact
diametrically opposite in each of the concepts and equally one-sided, each concept
centres around the problem of testability, at least in principle, of various statements
and refutability of false ideas.
It stands to reason that Marxist philosophy also regards the testability of any p
assertion, i.e. its confirmability or refutability, as the main criterion of scientific
knowledge. Marxism holds that the testability of propositions presupposes their
concreteness and meaningfulness, and this is just the crux of the matter.
If philosophy is a system of abstract knowledge, the testability of its propositions, p 259

in contrast to specialised or positive sciences, is entirely out of the question. Since
the categories, laws and principles of dialectics and materialism are indeed expressed
in abstract terms, positivism may seem to be justified in asserting that dialectical
propositions are nonsensical, unscientific and metaphysical.
True, the categories of materialistic dialectics are the most abstract, i.e. the most p
general concepts which constitute the initial postulates not only in the system of
special knowledge, but also in philosophy itself. These are the ultimate, most
comprehensive concepts, Lenin wrote, which epistemology has in point of fact so
far not surpassed (apart from changes in nomenclature, which are always
possible).[ 2591 These Lenins words characterising the concepts of matter and
consciousness are fully applicable to many other categories of dialectics. They cannot
be deduced in a purely logical way, la Hegel, from other conceptsthey are
abstracted from reality itself and raised to a level of universal philosophical
generalisations on the basis of centuries-old human experience and scientific
knowledge.
Indeed, if we identify the concrete with sensory experience and regard as concrete p
an individual object or a phenomenon given us in direct sense perceptions dialectics
will inevitably appear as an abstract science, a field of abstract knowledge free from
any sensory experience and concreteness since it is far removed from the sensuous
world and is least of all concerned with individual phenomena and objects 260
concentrating primarily on their general properties and relations. It is just this
understanding of the abstract and the concrete in which the former represents the
universal properties and relations, and the latter, the sensually perceived individual
objects, that is prevalent in literature and underlies the attempts to counterpose
philosophy and special sciences.
Before we proceed to philosophical categories, let us have a closer look at the most p
concrete, at first sight, knowledge, the knowledge of what is given us in everyday
sensory experience, and see how concrete and, consequently, testable it is.
What can be said about sensory experience as the primary source of our p
knowledge? If we are to rely upon it for its critical and informative values as
proposed by positivism, it must be the real standard of clarity and we should have
no doubt as regards its content or possible limits. Yet the very first pages of Hegels
Phenomenology of Spirit show that there is nothing more obscure than sensory
experience. If we want to get pure sensory experience and abstract from all rational
elements, all structures of the mind, we shall find ourselves in possession not of
the richest, but of the poorest content conceivable. We shall have to throw away all
universal or rational forms, all categories such as quality, contradiction,
necessity, matter, etc. in order to find absolutely possible pure this, here,
now.
Having arrived at this point, we shall realise that instead of a well of knowledge we p
have got an iridescent soap bubble ready to burst under the slightest whiff of
scientific air and absolutely empty at that. What we find, writes Hegel, is in itself 261
unstable and indefinite, since even with a minor change of our view or attention we
find a different thisherenow. However, even these categories must preserve
some remnant of the abstract, if they are to have any sense at all. This, here and
now turn out to be the least definite of all categories when we attempt to define or
fix them with the help of experience. They acquire their stable meaning due to the
work of mind only.
Hegels concepts of the abstract and the concrete are much more refined and p
promising, if only for the fact that he does not necessarily connect the concrete with
sensual perception. A murderer is an abstract definition for a crowd of idlers not
because it is a legal notion abstracted from mans other definitions (though it is also
true), but mainly because he ceases to be anything else but a murderer for an
onlooker watching the execution. A handsome murderer? Can one think so badly,
can one call a murderer handsome?[ 2611 His personality with all the richness
of his life, his appearance, upbringing, etc. are all squeezed into a single definition
severing all other ties and relations with the world. The abstract for Hegel is the
separate, isolated, alienated from the multitude of ties and relations of an object. By
contrast, the concrete is the richness of the fully reproduced properties and qualities
in their totality. According to Hegel, a wise judge of human heart thinking in
concrete terms will consider the entire course of events shaping the criminals
character, trace the influence of bad relations between his father and mother on his 262
life and his upbringing, reveal, perhaps, the injustice or cruelty to which he was
exposed, etc.
Hegel evidently intended to reconcile society with itself, the society which, on the p
one hand, disregards abstract thinking without suffering the pangs of remorse, and,
on the other, feels at heart certain respect for it as for something elevated, and
avoids it not because of contempt for it but because of glorification, not because it
seems something commonplace but because it is taken for something notable or, on
the contrary, for something special.[ 2621
Yet Hegels irony which, for that matter, permeates his entire article, is too obvious p
to make the opponents of the abstract more tolerant. The examples of the average
mans concrete thinking displayed by Hegel are too unattractive to make his eulogy
of concrete thinking flattering for the champions of empirical concreteness. Here
Hegel hasnt got the slightest chance to win their sympathy. It is the more
regrettable as even this publicistic article is, in fact, very instructive. Hegel
convincingly shows that what appears at first sight very concrete knowledge with
lots of down-to-earth and juicy details turns out to be extremely incomplete, i.e.
abstract.
True, Hegel hardly shows here the depth of the abstract, the concreteness of general p
determinations. The abstract and the concrete do not yet merge in organic synthesis.
They are still held apart by the idea that knowledge can be concrete and abstract and
that abstract knowledge can pass into concrete knowledge through ever more
substantive determinations. We should not, however, demand too much from Hegel. 263
What he said gives grounds for further inferences and suggests, if only implicitly,
new ideas. Hegel is known to be helpful in overcoming Hegel and in enabling his
successors to open up new horizons, standing on his own shoulders.
Hence, none other than Hegel enables us to make the first critical remark about p
positivism: the highest positivist criterion of meaningfulness ^nd scientificity proves
itself to be extremely indefinite and badly needing clarification. Yet neither
definiteness, nor clarity can be borrowed from the formal logic which is nothing but
a set of conventional rules for formulating statements. Of course, sensory experience
can play the part of a cognitive method, but it can only be defined and harmonised
within a broader rational system, such as the one conceived by Hegel, but not within
sensory experience itself or the logical syntax. Positivism strives, so to speak, to
freeze arbitrarily the cognitive method at one of the levels, important though it may
be.
Since the criterion of sensory experience is itself uncertain, one should not be p
surprised at the controversies flaring up now and again within positivist philosophy
over the nature of experience. Experience was first believed to consist of fragmentary
sensory data. Later it became clear that such fragments were themselves abstractions
singled out by the mind from more concrete and continuous whole. What were then
the pure sense data? Were they to include relations having different abstract
components?
Nor was it clear which categories expected to be discovered within the sphere of p
pure experience were genuine, and which were purely logical, i.e. verbal structures. 264
More, was sensory experience to be regarded as the manifestation of something
called qualities (if this term had any meaning at all at the given level) and wasnt
even the most primitive experience mingled with our conviction surfacing, for
instance, in the vagueness of assertions and statements on facts and situations?
Finally, whence the assurance that sensory experience was to be placed in the
foreground?
It is again Hegel who helps us reveal this important omission of positivist p

philosophy. The mind is denied the ability to comprehend reality, since every
statement about reality must, by force of its synthetic nature, express pure chance,
and the mind does not produce anything but only elaborates the conclusions obtained
from clear verbal statements. For Hegel, statements of chance represent but a
moment which is barren of any thought and signifies that mind has already
completed its work.
Positivism, on the contrary, regards as meaningful only those statements which p

relate to accidental (or probable) facts. Yet to point out a fact does not mean to
comprehend it. A synthetic statement a posteriori is nothing but a record of what has
occurred, but it has no explaining force. Such statements cannot become explanatory
through generalisation processes. They remain synthetic irrespective of whether they
refer to one, some, most or all objects. A statement which is now called law remains
a simple assertion that something is accidental and gives no understanding of the
causes of the given occurrence.
It is obvious that the process of generalisation enhances the force of prediction. To p 265
speak of the object as a whole is to give a more reliable prediction of the future
state of affairs. Yet the ability for prediction is something different from
comprehension. Even if we eventually succeeded, through hard work, in obtaining
generalisations covering the broadest possible field of events and were able to predict
the course of every experiment, we would not take a single step towards
understanding any of them.
The function of the mind, according to Hegel, is neither the singling out of p
tautological statements, nor the generalisation of synthetic statements of facts. Its
function is comprehension. Rational comprehension for Hegel results from at least
two factors: the ontological status of the mind and the impossibility to find
something which can be completely determinable or completely comprehensible. The
first factor prevents logic from being conventional and purely verbal, the second
factor does not allow it to bog down at the very beginning.
One of the obvious meanings of the concept concreteness is that our knowledge p
reflects empirical objective reality and that every notion, judgement or scientific
theory has quite definite objective content which we call empirical. The empirical
concreteness of our knowledge is its conformity with sensory experience. Our
everyday experience, practical activity, the experimental side of scientific cognition
evidently possess the highest degree of empirical concreteness. But does it mean that
empirical concreteness is not inherent in the theoretical knowledge of special
sciences? Besides, can we make a categorical assertion that the knowledge resulting
from empirical investigation is really the most concrete knowledge? It is indeed 266
concrete in the sense that it is close to reality and rich in detail and colour. Yet one
cannot help feeling that such knowledge of details can very easily turn into a useless
toy if it fails to distinguish the main, the significant, the essential, the necessary.
The empirical knowledge of separate isolated facts permits tearing out individual p
parts or features of a whole and turning them into an absolute, a senseless
abstraction. If the concrete is understood as the direct connection with the objective
world, as the exact reproduction of sensually perceived properties and sides of an
object, such knowledge will be the most concrete. On the other hand, if concreteness
is understood as the fullness of all determinations of an object or a phenomenon, as
a unity in the diversity or a diversity in the unity, such knowledge should be
regarded with good reason as abstract. Conversely, if abstract knowledge is
characterised by the separation, isolation of one or another element from the totality
of other determinations, empirical knowledge which does not reveal all links and
relations of a given object with the multitude of other objects can also be called
abstract, sometimes even in the worst sense of this word.
A purely empirical idea of a tree growing under my window and having, for p
instance, slightly drooping branches, a trunk reaching the height of the first floor and
covered with grey-green bark, with light-green buds on its branches the size of a
wheat grain, etc. will be an abstract description despite the fact that I could add to it
lots of such details which are known to no one but myself, since this tree was and 267
will hardly be interesting for anyone as a possible object of an empirical description.
Hence, the concepts of the concrete and the abstract themselves need a serious p
analysis. A detailed description of a tree growing in front of my window and
presented to me in all its sensual concreteness turns out to be quite abstract since my
detailed description based entirely on the sense-perceptions of the colour of the bark,
buds, the shape of the crown, the size of the trunk, etc. will hardly be helpful in
determining its species. Any student of biology will find my description non-
scientific and abstract as it covers millions of trees in the middle part of Russia.
Hence, an empirical description can be justly regarded as abstract, arbitrarily
subjective, non-scientific etc. since it does not permit distinguishing with certainty
one object from a multitude of others.
As we see, even a very detailed description of the external side of objects and
phenomena can .far from always be regarded as concrete knowledge without any
reservations. It moans that the direct relationship between knowledge and reality, i.e.
the sensual basis of knowledge, is not yet sufficient to make it concrete. Such
knowledge is still incomplete and inaccurate since it reflects but partially the real
links and relations between a given object and a multitude of others. As to the
reflection of the internal properties,; bonds, contradictions and laws governing the
development of this object, such knowledge is even less satisfactory. Consequently,
the knowledge of separate observable objects and phenomena, their properties and
sides can be regarded both as concrete, in the sense that it is directly related to 268
reality, and as abstract (theoretically abstract), in the sense that it does not reveal the
latent processes and internal laws and does not single out the main, the essential.
***

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Notes
[ 2501] Hegels Science of Logic, Vol.1, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London,
1929, p.36.
[ 2502] Ibid., pp. 3637.
[ 2511] Ibid., p.53.
[ 2512] Ibid., pp. 6465.
[ 2521] K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Progress

Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 206.
[ 2581] A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, op. tit., p.76.
[ 2591] V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empiric-Criticism, Collected Works, Vol.14,

1977, p.146.
[ 2611] G. W. F. Hegel, Smtliche Werke, Band 20, Stuttgart, 1930, S.44748.
[ 2621] Ibid., S.447.
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Now we come to the problem of concreteness in theoretical knowledge. If the p
scientific value of knowledge, the possibility of its verification and practical use
derives from its concreteness, direct relation to objective reality, then the striving of
Contents
scientists for ever broader generalisations, for universal statements and conclusions
must seem strange indeed, since the more general a statement, the farther it is
Index removed from individual (empirically concrete) objects and phenomena. Again, it is
Card evidently not without reason that theoretical notions and ideas are commonly believed
to be abstract. And this would indeed be so if we identified concreteness with just
Formats: one kind of itempirical concreteness.
Text
PS Of course, it would not be correct to deny concreteness to sensual perceptions. Yet p
PDF in dialectical logic the concrete is by no means tantamount to the sensually
perceptible. The concrete in dialectics is regarded as a unity in diversity, as a full
representation of different aspects and relations of objects and phenomena and,
Other understood like this, is one of the central categories of logic, an expression of the
Titles: real general, multidimensional which is inherent both in reality and in our
TA
knowledge. Another aspect of the concrete is that it represents the objective diversity

Years:
of a whole object, the totality of all its relations, both internal and external. 269
1984
As regards the abstract as a logical or epistemological category, it expresses not p
only the specific distinction of thinking from reality and its sensual perception, but
### also represents a form of development common to both reality and cognition. In
Marx, the problem of the relation of the abstract to the concrete includes not only
MAP the .relation of thought to the sensually perceptible but also the problem of the
internal division of any object and its theoretical reproduction in the movement of
notions. The question of the relation of the abstract to the concrete presents itself in
two aspects: first, as the relation between partial and limited knowledge to fuller
knowledge and, second, as the relation of the whole to its own moments standing
out objectively in its content.[ 2691
For Marx, the abstract and the concrete express internal contradictions, the p
movement of which is the life of the object of investigation. It is . not a pure
epistemological definition of the methods of work of the human brain in which one
element (the concrete) can be identified with a sense perception, and the other
element (the abstract), with the theoretical generalisation of the data of sensual
experience. It is not a simple definition of the different poles of cognitive activity,
even if they are regarded as connected with each other, but also an expression of the
internal separation of objects and links between separate sides and phenomena
existing objectively outside and * independently of human consciousness. Hence, the 270
abstract, according to Marx, can express both the particular and the general to the
extent to which these sides stand out objectively in the whole and represent internally
dependent, but externally isolated formations.
Engels shows the same understanding of the categories of the abstract and the p
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/3.2-Marx.and.Problem.of.Concrete.Knowledge[2012-12-17 15:16:06]
concrete. For him, the formation of general concepts is the process of abstraction
from the multitude of inessential properties, features, objects and phenomena and of
the retention of their common, stable, essential properties and features. On the other
hand, the formation of theoretical concepts is at the same time a process of
concretisation, integration, enrichment and retention in thought of the real content of
all relations and links embraced by the given concept. It was Engels who defined
exhaustive knowledge as the transformation of the single (concrete) into the universal
(abstraction, law) and maintained that the general law of change of the form of
motion is much more concrete than any single concrete example of it.
According to Marx, the coordination and combination of abstractions, the ascent p

from the simple to the complex is not the mental reproduction of the concrete. ...
The method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete, he wrote, is simply the
way in which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete
mental category. This is, however, by no means the process of evolution of the
concrete world itself.[ 2701 Hence, Marx regards the concrete as the unity of 271
diverse aspects and as diverse aspects of the unity both in reality itself and in
cognition. It is true of dialectically interpreted laws and abstractions, as well as of
the particular phenomena they reflect. If an investigator proceeding from a general
abstract law does not lose sight of the actual circumstances conditioning the
operation of this law, if he takes into account the interdependence of this law and
other laws and the numerous links connecting them, his thinking is concrete. The
concrete concept, wrote Marx, is concrete because it is a synthesis of many
definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects. It appears therefore in
reasoning as a summing-up, a result, and not as the starting point, although it is the
real point of origin, and thus also the point of origin of perception and
imagination.[ 2711
The interpretation of the concrete and the abstract by Marx and Engels was by no p
means playing up to the Hegelian manner of reasoning. It was a conscious and
deliberate use of Hegels language, transformed and amended, which conveyed
profound dialectical ideas.
Proceeding from his concepts of the abstract and the concrete, Marx, naturally, p
regards the ascent from the abstract to the concrete as the only possible and
therefore correct scientific method whereby the concrete can be assimilated and
mentally reproduced in theoretical analysis.
It should be noted, however, that some philosophers enthusiasm about the method p
of Marxs analysis carries them sometimes too far and they begin to absolutise it and 272
even counterpose the abstract and the concrete which is entirely alien to Marxs
analysis. In our opinion, such absolutisation is traceable to two inaccuracies in the
interpretation of Marx. First, the abstract and the concrete as such are ascribed to
reality itself as is evidenced, for instance, from the commonly used and nonetheless
confusing expression this concrete (i.e. sensually perceived) object. Second, the
abstract and the concrete as the starting and the final points of theoretical analysis
are regarded as two poles in the development of scientific knowledge without taking
into account their dialectical unity, mutual penetration similar to that of the magnet
poles which can only exist as a single whole.
It is assumed, for instance, that the abstract and the concrete exist in reality as p
separate, isolated objects and phenomena. Marxs abstract labour, abstract man,
abstract wealth are sometimes regarded as objective: entities existing, so to speak,
in a pure form. The analysis of these concepts, objective as they are, calls for a
more subtle approach which would better accord with Marxs conception. The
acceptance of the reality of such things as abstract labour, abstract man, etc.
would be tantamount to recognising the actual existence of matter, space and other
special entities alongside definite objects and phenomena of the objective world.
Speaking of such things as abstract labour and abstract individual, Marx p

regarded them as clear-cut abstractions in a definite conceptual context and never
treated them as actually existing independent separate entities.
Some literary critic may seize upon these words in an attempt to substantiate his p 273
own opinion that it is only concrete things which exist in objective reality. To
forestall his argument, we shall state at once that this current view which is often
expressed in literature and has many persistent advocates seems to us one-sided if
only for the fact that the concepts of the abstract and the concrete are correlative
and, as such, are only meaningful in inseparable unity with each other. The
elimination of one concept makes its counterpart nonsensical. Understandably, this
only holds true if the problem is treated from the same epistemological angle and
within the framework of one and the same subject.
It stands to reason that the isolation and relative independence of objects and p
phenomena makes it in principle impossible to form an absolutely concrete notion of
an object, whereas the objectification of the concrete tends in fact to absolutising it.
A given object can never possess at a given moment all the possible properties and
features which may reveal themselves in a different place and at a different time.
One and the same man turns out to be different or, at least, not quite the same
among his friends, in the office and at home. In which surroundings, then, are we to
consider him concrete? Evidently, in all, but each time differently. Concreteness is
relative, but not absolute.
Now, are all these subtleties really so important that we have to accentuate them? p
May be it is simply a question of terminology, and the objectivity of concrete
objects and phenomena is identical with the objective foundation of concrete
analysis?
We suppose that some philosophers accepting so far our reasoning might just p 274
intervene at this point and add that objective reality has neither abstract nor concrete
objects and, consequently, the concepts of the abstract and the concrete are nothing
but the product of our exalted materialistic imagination inventing the absolutes of the
abstract and the concrete and striving to impose them on the virgin scientific mind
with its natural aversion to metaphysical concoctions. So, they may conclude, we
come in the end to what they have been trying to prove all along.
As regards the real existence of abstract and concrete objects, we might perhaps p
accept this view, characteristic of positivist philosophy, even at the risk of being
censured by those who reject any shades and halftones in a philosophical controversy
and recognise but one rigid scheme. We feel obliged, however, to make one
important reservation and are ready to hold on to it as a matter of principle: we are
convinced that objects in reality itself stand in different relations to one another and
we can speak of some objects and phenomena as being relatively abstract (or, to be
more precise, isolated, limited, specific), and of others as being relatively concrete
(interconnected, united, integrated). When considering the relations of the first kind
we form abstract notions, categories and ideas and then set about concretising them.
The unity of the abstract and the concrete, i.e. the unity in diversity, gives a
complete idea of an object, an idea which Marx calls concrete-universal as distinct
from just concrete.
The real links between the concrete and the abstract being established, they become p
correlated concepts, and not metaphysical absolutes. It is through the interaction with 275
each other that they get the measure of their truth, as well as the measure of their
concreteness. Each concept turns out to be abstract to the extent to which it reflects
the separateness, isolation and specificity which are objectively inherent in things.
Similarly, category becomes concrete to the extent to which it reflects the
integration, unity and mutual complementarity of things. Logical concepts, wrote
Lenin, are subjective so long as they remain abstract, in their abstract form, but at
the same time they express also the Things-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete
and abstract, [italics supplied], both phenomenon and essence, both moment and
relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but
objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency...[ 2751
The objective interpretation of the categories of the concrete and the abstract not p
only makes the presentation of material more difficult and the language more
cumbersome. It brings in new entities which do not exist as independent objects of
reality, tends to absolutise them breaking the inseparable bonds, the unity of mutually
penetrating sides of the material world and is, in fact, incompatible with the
dialectics of the abstract and the concrete.
This interpretation can at best postulate the transition from one isolated concept to p
another, e.g. from the abstract to the concrete. Important as it is, such transition is
but one of the aspects of the dialectical relationship between these categories. 276
However, to understand their relationship in a stronger, more profound sense as a a
inseparable connection of two different aspects of scientific cognition, as a
correlation, it is necessary to investigate the relation of these categories to objective
reality and to define their counterparts in the objective world.
Analysing the transition from the abstract to the concrete, Soviet scholar E.V. p
Ilyenkov writes: Understandably, concrete knowledge (or, more precisely, the
knowledge of concreteness) can only appear as a result, a sum-total, a product of
special work, and the abstract, as its starting point and material. This is undoubtedly
true in relation to some definite level of knowledge, theoretical knowledge in this
particular case. In his analysis of the system of capitalist production Marx strictly
adheres to the principle of ascent from the abstract to the concrete. Yet in presenting
the dialectical relationship between these two categories one should also take into
account the titanic work carried out by Marx in order to accumulate and screen the
Mont Blanc of facts.
The concreteness in the implementation of the principle of concreteness itself calls p

also for differentiation between different levels of scientific cognition: empirical,
theoretical, applied, philosophical, etc. At each of these levels the dialectical
relationship between the abstract and the concrete inevitably acquires specific
features. In this relationship one thing only remains constant, invariable, something
like the space-time interval in Einsteins theory of relativity: the inseparable unity of
the abstract and the concrete in the process of cognition.
There can be no absolutely abstract or absolutely concrete knowledge, just as there p 277
are no absolutely abstract and absolutely concrete notions certain knowledge and
certain notions can be more abstract (less concrete) and more concrete (less abstract)
than others. Since all our knowledge at any stage is realised through the interaction
(collision) of the abstract and the concrete (more abstract and more concrete), it can
be viewed as a constant process of transition from one level of concreteness to

another and from one level of abstractness to another. For instance, from the sensual
form of concreteness and its specific form of abstractness we pass to the empirical
form of their interaction at the lower floor of scientific cognition. Science ascends
from the empirical forms of the concrete and the abstract to the theoretical level of
their relationship and further rises to the philosophical level. It is evidently within
the limits of one level of cognition only that we can speak of the method of ascent
from the abstract to the concrete, meaning a strictly definite form of either category.
The formation of abstractions, the deduction of the general, similar, identical has p
never been and will evidently never be a special aim of science. As a matter of fact,
it takes no great effort to find similarity even between most different objects, such
as, for instance, a shoe brush and a mammal. Science, for that matter, is notable for
just the opposite tendencythe striving for mental reproduction, restoration of the
concrete whole which is split in the process of abstraction.
Sensual cognition also reproduces an object in its wholeness, joining, however, only p
its external aspects and properties in a single sensual perceptible image. Each level 278
of cognition, be it empirical or theoretical, has its own forms of concreteness and
abstractness and the knowledge at each of these levels develops from the abstract to
the concrete. On the whole, however, it passes on from one form of abstractness to
another, and from one form of concreteness to another.
Generally speaking, the concreteness of a notion or any other form of knowledge p

should be linked, in our opinion, not only with the sense perceptions of the object
under investigation, but also with the degree of reflection of all its bonds and
relations of mediation with other objects and phenomena, with other aspects,
tendencies and changes. Knowledge is concrete not only when it gives a detailed
reflection of the properties and aspects of the object or phenomena under
investigation, but also when it is capable of reproducing all its links and relations
with other objects and phenomena, including their internal aspects and elements.
Conversely, a notion, an idea or any other element of knowledge are abstract to a
degree to which they are isolated from other objects and phenomena connected with
them. An abstraction is concrete if it mentally reproduces the unity, diversity and
manysidedness of real objects, if it singles out and indicates those aspects of the
object or objects of interest which appear to be topical or important for human
activity at a given moment.
An analyst can evidently always find at least one common objective feature of any p
two objects or phenomena whereby they can be placed into a single category. Such
generalisations have no methodological value until they acquire theoretical 279
concreteness. They are also very abstract in the sense that they do not indicate any
concrete conditions under which the generalisation is of any scientific significance.
Scientific abstractions are a powerful means of cognition but they remain useless p
without close ties with the concrete, without practice. If an abstraction (a law, a
principle) is combined with the diversity of the objective content of phenomena, and
thinking concentrates on those elements of this diversity which have been placed in
the foreground by life itself, such thinking is concrete, scientific and true. If
scientific analysis proceeding from facts reveals underlying regularities and makes it
possible to draw theoretical conclusions, we have the unity of the abstract and the
concrete. Should thinking prove unable to find the unity, the order in a system,
should it fail to single out the prevailing tendency in the actual diversity of
phenomena, in that case a concrete approach to the problem gives way to empirical
vacillations between the .concrete and the abstract and the investigator cannot see the
wood for the trees.
Consequently, knowledge remains abstract, though not in the empirical sense of the p
word, as long as it does not distinguish between the essential, necessary and the
inessential, accidental features and tendencies and does not reveal the law governing
a given process. Abstract also will be the knowledge which does not show the
opposite aspects and tendencies inherent in every phenomenon or process.
The number of such abstract, in the methodological sense, generalisations can be p

increased indefinitely, yet they would hardly add to the potential of science. 280
Generalisations of this kind do not carry any new information, they are
methodologically barren. Indeed, as Engels has wittily remarked in Anti-Dhring, a
shoe brush grouped with mammals will not grow mammary glands and,
consequently, such a generalisation will hardly do any good to humanity.
True, a lot of pseudo-scientific investigations are in fact concerned with inventing p

ever new abstract generalisations claiming to contribute to science. Paradoxical as it
is, the empirical soundness of such investigations is usually unquestionable: most of
the generalisations of this kind are indeed based on the common features of real
things. It should be noted that such tendencies are particularly characteristic of
philosophical investigations aimed exclusively at generalising the material of special
sciences. The authors of such investigations can at best claim the invention of new
terms of doubtful scientific value. It hardly needs mentioning that the growing
number of abstract generalisations tend to clutter up knowledge with all kinds of
pseudoscientific nonsense and turn science into a depot of useless ideas that will
never be applied to real scientific and life problems.
Every generalisation which is to qualify as scientific (philosophical inclusive) should p

be concrete not only in the empirical, but also in the theoretical sense. Giving new
information, it should also have a theoretical value, i.e. indicate ways for the further
progress of scientific knowledge and disclose new links and relations of a given
object with other objects and phenomena.
As long as a concept has a heuristic value and opens up new ways for scientific p
cognition, it remains scientifically valid, and not only historically significant. It 281
should be noted, however, that the actual validity of a scientific concept, a theory or
even a law is not an honorary title conferred on them in perpetuity, since
methodological or heuristic value may not only be acquired, but also lost. Filling up
a gap in our knowledge, scientific concepts give a fresh impetus to thought, but
subsequent events may prove their empirical untenability. This problem, by the way,
has given rise to continuous debates among the historians of science as to whether
the concepts of ether, thermogen, phlogiston, vital force and the like should be
regarded scientific. The answer to this question can never be a blunt yes or no.
In order to qualify as scientific, a concept must possess at least one of the above p
forms of concreteness and, besides, must help towards further progress of scientific
knowledge. An abstract generalisation of empirical data is at best a prerequisite for
scientificity. It is concerned with the knowledge already available and gives no new
information, thus providing no basis for the analysis of reality, for distinguishing
between separate properties and aspects of the world. Such concepts and statements
result, as a rule, from the striving for unduly broad generalisations. The concept-of
control relating, for instance, to social phenomena will be quite concrete if used in
the analysis of social development. It will evidently be also concrete when applied to
animate nature, since here, too, it can be connected with the ideas of feedback, data
transmission, etc. In this field, like in the field of social phenomena, a comparatively
weak information signal can actuate the feedback mechanism and bring about 282
considerable changes, and not only in terms of power. Suppose now we comply with
the insistent demands of some authors and extend the concept of control to the
phenomena of inanimate nature. Of course, given the will, we should also discover
here certain analogies with the feedback mechanism. Yet the character of interaction
in inanimate nature (viewed independently from mans activity) is different from that
in living organisms, particularly in what concerns power relationships. Hence, we
cannot speak of anything more than just a formal similarity between physical
interaction in inorganic nature and feedback mechanisms in the organic world and in
society. Any attempt to extend the concept of control to natural physical, geological
or geographical processes will result in an untenable generalisation yielding no
scientific results.
Take another example. The scientific value of the concept 01 information is common p
knowledge. This concept which is now widely used in different branches of
knowledge has played an important role in the successful development of cybernetics
and in the solution of numerous problems in genetics, neuropsychology and other
sciences. It has also proved very helpful in defining the essence of consciousness and
in studying the nature of the ideal as opposed to the material since it provided a
link between the processes of mans conscious activity and its neurophysiological
mechanism. On these grounds some philosophers propose to regard the concept of
information as a universal one and classify it as philosophical. Here, however, they
transgress the demarcation line beyond which the concept of information loses its 283
scientific concreteness without becoming concrete in the philosophical sense. A
simple generalisation on the basis of empirical analogies deprives it of the necessary
heuristic value. Hooker, for instance, identifies information with consciousness, on the
one hand, and with brain processes, on the other, calling both information
concepts. He in fact discards the problem of the relationship between consciousness
and the brain by simply identifying them as equivalent information-processing
structures.[ 2831
This solution, purely phenomenalistic as it is, is nevertheless regarded as sufficient p

grounds for proclaiming a new systematic ontology since the proposed concept
endows consciousness with time-spatial and even causal characteristics without
depriving it at the same time of some properties of mental activity. It is not hard to
see that Hookers way leads to an ontology in the spirit of Plato.
The current attempts to identify the concepts of consciousness, the brain and p
information often go even further and tend to universalise the concept of information
which is alleged to characterise any existing system in general. To substantiate this
viewpoint, references are made to cybernetics which has purportedly provided
conclusive evidence to the effect that the concept of information expresses the
property of any moving matter. Such a broad interpretation of the concept of 284
information, however, deprives it of its analytical possibilities and obliterates the
border between inorganic processes in nature and the processes of control which are
distinguished by the transmission, reception and coding of signals rather than by a
specific power relationship.
As is evidenced from the above, the scientific value of a concept or other form of p
knowledge is directly connected with its concreteness and depends on whether it
gives new information in the field where it is introduced. In modern science fruitless
abstractions are still very numerous and constitute what may be called pseudoscience
or metaphysics in the bad sense of the word. They are a useless ballast and science
should get rid of them. In its struggle against the anti-metaphysical positivist
programme dialectics definitely dissociates itself from fruitless abstractions. It should
always be borne in mind, however, that the weak sprouts of new knowledge are
sometimes not easy to distinguish from stunted and useless metaphysical concepts
and that they can only turn into full-fledged concrete concepts of great scientific
value as a result of subsequent development.
Abstract generalisations and metaphysical conclusions should by no means be p

regarded as just a nuisance having no serious effect on scientific cognition. In social
sciences such abstractions are not infrequently connected with quite definite
ideological aims. In view of their pseudo-scientific form and apparent empirical
certainty they are taken for a solution to one or another problem, whereas they in
fact detract science-from the true course. The seeming concreteness of a proposed 285
concept is but empirical concreteness which levels up all facts and features relevant
to this concept and equates the main and the secondary, the necessary and the
accidental, the external and the internal traits. Such a concept, of course, is a
platitude in the first place as it gives no grounds for some differentiation and analysis
in a given field of knowledge. Yet it becomes something more than just a truism, a
meaningless phraseit turns into an instrument for deliberately juggling with facts
instead of conducting a concrete scientific investigation. With positivism, by the way,
it was a common and rather well elaborated trick which was time and again exposed
by Marx, Engels, and Lenin.
Formally imitating the external features of the specialised language used in p

mathematics, linguistics, physics and biology, the positivist philosophers create an
illusion that the representatives of these sciences understand the language of their
philosophy. It sometimes escapes the natural scientists that the terms borrowed from
their language lose their concreteness and turn into verbal dummies preserving,
however, the form and the reputation of scientific certitude and clarity. It is not
fortuitous that Lenin has always been intransigent to play with words. The
application of various terms borrowed from biology and energy physics, such as
exchange of substances, assimilation and dissimilation, power balance,
enthropy and the like to such socio-economic phenomena as crises, class struggle,
competition, capital, etc. is in a sense a verbal ornament which adds nothing to the
understanding of these phenomena for all its seeming newness. Yet it is not a
harmless play, particularly when it comes to analysing the trends of social 286
development. Such a terminological confusion tends to mislead a biologist or a
physicist just as much as a sociologist or a political economist. With an
indiscriminate approach to philosophical generalisations it becomes, in fact, inessential
whether new scientific data are translated into the language of some special science
or are given a philosophical interpretation: in both these metaphysical variants the
concrete meaning of the scientific data is reduced to naught.
Modern bourgeois philosophy also abounds in the substitutions of special scientific p

terms for concrete concepts in sociology or political economy. It is true not only of
positivism, but also of other philosophical trends which claim to offer alternative
solutions.
For instance, according to Jurgen Habermas, historical materialism is a one-sided, p

excessively concrete doctrine badly in need of a generalisation i.e. of a broader,
more general, outlook. This generalisation, as proposed by Habermas, boils down
to replacing Marxs concept of productive forces by a concept of labour or purpose-
oriented rational actions covering both the selection of means for given purposes and
the selection of purposes themselves out of a multitude of possible variants. The

concept of the relations of production is to be eliminated in favour of such concepts
as interaction, communicative activity, institutional framework, organisational
principle, etc.
In Habermass opinion, labour is the sphere of learning and assimilation of useful p

technical information, whereas interaction is characterised by the processes of 287
socialisation and moulding of personality on the basis of the generally recognised
system of social norms. Hence, the first sphere corresponds to technical interest, and
the second, to practical interest. The Marxist concept of superstructure becomes
irrelevant. Some phenomena classified as superstructural, such as culture, social
norms, and educational establishments, are to be transferred to the sphere of
interaction. Other components of the superstructure, such as power and ideology are
interpreted either as a deviation or a distortion and, consequently, as some secondary
phenomenon in the sphere of communicative relations.
This kind of interpretation of history, its inner content cannot be accepted, first of p
all, from the methodological viewpoint, the more so as it claims to restructure the
Marxist concept. Habermas seeks to consider classes, power and ideology from the
theoretical-informative aspect, qualifying them at that as a distortion of the normal
process of human relations. Being restricted to .the appearance of things, such an
approach is at best superficial. But it is not so harmless as it may seem: speaking of
the distortion in the communicative systems, Habermas completely ignores the real,
essential differences between communicative processes in the opposite social systems
capitalism and socialism.
Starting with a seemingly modest proposal to amend Marxs concept of the p

determining role of the mode of production in the historical process and to
supplement it with a second dimension, the communicative one, Habermas actually
seeks to turn Marxs concrete definition into an empty abstraction and thus deprive it
of its scientific value. The interpersonal communicative factor introduced by him by 288
way of supplementing the dialectical understanding of the nature of man immediately
calls for a new sacrifice: the generalisation of the Marxist understanding of mans
nature. The new way of thinking advocated by the Frankfurt School is obviously
constrained by the concepts of the mode of production, social relations and the
socio-economic formation, particularly when it comes to the analysis of such
concepts as capitalism and socialism, the bourgeoisie and the working class. The
concept of communicative processes is more congenial to this way of thinking if
only for the fact that it is abstract.
Habermas goes even as far as claiming certain affinity between Marxism and p
positivism, alleging that they both reduce, restrict history to its one dimension
labour and production activity. According to Habermas, the dimension of
communication, intersubjectivity and interpersonal relations obvious in Marxs
concrete analysis completely disappears in his philosophical and historical
generalisations resolving in the concept of practical actions aimed at nature.
This model, according to Habermas, had an adverse effect on Marxs understanding p

of anthropogenesis. The process of labour and production activity regarded by Marx
as the determining factor in the evolution of man from the animal world is confined
exclusively to the sphere of instrumental activity characteristic of the animal world.
Contrary to Marx, Habermas maintains that the determining factor in the process of
anthropogenesis was the emergence of the communicative dimension (language), i.e.
the replacement of the institutional control by the behavioural control effected with 289
the help of norms and linguistic incentives. Thus mankind regarded by Marx as the
object of evolution becomes, according to Habermas, its subject.
There are absolutely no grounds for regarding Marxs view on anthropogenesis as p

limited or lopsided. He has developed a consistent theory of mans practical activity
directed to the external world as the motive force of anthropogenesis. This activity
contributed to the formation of erect gait, the appearance of the first signs of the
community of interests and joint labour, as well as to a considerable weakening of
the instincts that determined primitive mans behaviour. It also accounted for such
new phenomena as the deepening process of socialisation, the development of
consciousness and language, the emergence of a new type of behavioural control, etc.
The factors singled out by Habermas were operative either in the first, or in the
second group of changes accompanying the process of mans evolution. Neither of
them would anyway be regarded by Marx as having an independent value.
Habermass views do not supplement, but distort Marxism.
Habermas and other philosophers make a serious error believing that Marxs concept p
of the essence of man can be supplemented by introducing at least one more feature
the factor of personal intercourse. This insignificant, at first sight, addition turns
the Marxist conception of man into an empty abstraction which gives no
methodological guidelines for understanding mans nature as the concrete expression
of social relations. Yet it would be even more naive to think that the introduction of
this abstraction does not do any harm to social sciences. The new concept of man 290
shifts the emphasis and substitutes a secondary feature for an essential one. It can
hardly be expected to provide a solid basis for a more profound understanding of
social development.
What complicates the matter is that such an approach seems to be quite relevant p
and even necessary from the empirical viewpoint: it ostensibly concentrates on those
aspects of the concepts of man and society which have not received sufficient
attention and appears therefore scientifically valid. However, for all the seeming
empirical soundness and even appropriateness of the proposed amendments they are
basically fallacious: the fault lies with the methodology itself which presents the
empirical material in an entirely wrong light.
It would probably be unnecessary to focus attention on such attempts to p

complement Marx if they were merely aimed at filling up gaps in our concepts of
society and man and did not represent a methodology incompatible with Marxism. In
point of fact, they remind one of the behaviour of a cuckoo trying to lay an egg into
another birds nest. The eggs do look very similar, yet the nestlings are quite
different. Since the methodological principles of Marx (and Habermas, too) do not
always lie on the surface, one might get an impression that the point at issue is a
purely factual one. Let us see if it is really so.
Suppose, you allow your minds eye to dwell on an array of well-known p

personalities: Pushkin and Dantes, Gandhi and Goebbels, Raskolnikov and Pyotr
Zalomov, Mozart and Salieri... Nothing seems to be simpler than to define the
essence of man by passing from one personality to another. Similarities and 291
differences, differences and similarities, the twists of characters, the vicissitudes of
life... It may be that we shall succeed in determining the general traits and the
specific features of each mans character. Having thus defined mans essence, we
may turn our attention to his surroundings and project his behaviour in different
circumstances in order to reproduce the make-up of every single individual and thus
to understand the relations between people. After that we may go even further and
try to understand the nature of society as a whole, proceeding again from the
obtained definition of man.
Such an approach appears to be quite relevant by virtue of its empirical p

concreteness. Indeed, we are seemingly concerned with concrete individuals, concrete
biographies reproducing each mans life story with all its details, both significant and
otherwise. One would naturally expect it to be the only correct path that would lead
us to the comprehension of a concrete living being... Yet it is precisely this path that
leads nowhere. True, the real scientific value of empirical concreteness is not quick
to reveal itself. We only find it out after discovering that the single standard needed
for comparing the heroes of our scientific drama turns out to be nothing better than
just their general biological characteristic. The only catch that the empirical net thus
brings us is a lean and meagre abstraction indicating that each of our heroes belongs
to the species of Homo sapiens. And that is all that remains of the living, thinking,
feeling and acting individual.
After the empiricist has thus stripped his Man of every possible garment, he p
desperately starts covering him up with interpersonal intercourse, thinking ability, and 292
what not...
Then comes the turn of logic. Following its strict rules and proceeding from the p
obtained definition of Man, the empiricist sets about reconstructing society at large.
David Hilbert once noted that every man has a definite horizon and when it narrows p
down to a point, the man starts talking about his viewpoint. We do not think
Hilberts statement is applicable to the whole of mankind, but in the situation we are
dealing with his joke evidently hits the nail on the head. What can the empiricist see
from his viewpoint? Evidently, what appears to Marcuse (or Adorno, or Habermas)
and what he is horrified by.
The biological nature of manonce we decide to start with it in accordance with p

Marcuses logicis, first and foremost, the sphere of instincts and attractions which
have always been kept in check, at least till nowadays. Repression, in Marcuses
opinion, marks the entire history of man. Speaking of repression, Marcuse
distinguishes basic repression connected with the general conditions of human
existence, i.e. with the environmental influences, and the additional repression,
resulting from the system of class domination and state power. According to
Marcuse, it was the mind .or human intellect alone that succeeded in escaping the
effect of this omnipotent press. However, representing a pure cognitive ability and
being free from the bodily functions of physical enjoyment and satisfaction of natural
needs, intellect can be put to the task of practical and technical conquest of the
world. The mind, alas, betrayed the pleasure-oriented body. Human sensuality was 293
also seriously affected, though the senses are suppression-resistant too. Their power
of resistance derives from the dual nature of the senses: they are the source of
knowledge, on the one hand, and the instrument of pleasure and physical satisfaction,
on the other. The system of suppression is therefore unable to cope with the senses
and keep them in check by restricting their sphere to investigation activities only. As
a result of the general distortion of mans sensuality, the cognitive function of the
organs of perception was separated from the pleasure-seeking function. The senses
were generally distrusted as a source of information, the data provided by them had
a limited cognitive value, and they were suppressed by the mind. Above all, the
senses could not serve as a basis for technical activity.
This withering influence was exercised by civilisation on practically all sides of the p
individual. Suppression was in fact the only, or at least the main feature of
socialisation.
Labour is treated by Marcuse in a similar vein. One of the results of the total p
suppression of the individual in all extant industrial civilisations was the
transformation of man from an instrument of pleasure into an instrument of
labour. It was just to prepare man for productive activity that history remoulded
both his biology and his psyche. The concept of production is brought in by Marcuse
for the sole purpose of putting a finishing touch to the sombre picture of the
suppression of the individual by industrial civilisation which adds yet another set of
restrictions to the natural repressive forces. Marcuses Conclusions are based on a
conviction that man as a biopsychical system is predestined to live exclusively for 294
pleasure. Later, however, the author has substantially modified this view. Pleasure as
understood by Marcuse cannot be derived from productive labour, nor from the
extension of mans domination over matter. It must be, first and foremost, a result of
the complete satisfaction of mans natural needs and of the free play of the natural
forces inherent in the human body.
In Marcuses opinion, dialectics must free itself from the abstract universal forms of p
objectivity, as well as from the abstract universal forms of thinking. To this end, it
should conceive its world as a definite historical whole in which present reality is a
result of the historical practice of man.[ 2941 Yet practice is understood by
Marcuse in accordance with his productivity principle, i.e. as activity detrimental to
man. History thus turns into a continuous process of mans own enslavement, the
restructuring of his whole organism aimed at suppressing to a maximum his
biological pleasure centres. This process goes side by side with the expansion of the
possibilities of using man as an instrument of labour, a working machine and a
means for conquering nature.
Marcuse comes out with great fervour against industrial civilisation, the p
technological mode of thinking, scientism, etc., and also criticises positivism, linking
it with modern trends toward rationalisation. Yet it needs no special insight to
perceive that Marcuses own methodology underlying his criticism is a typical 295
expression of the very rationalisation he speaks about with such disfavour. Indeed,
his empirical approach, the denial of objective laws in nature and society, the
atomised picture of social life (cf. the atomisation of the world by Hume, Ayer and
the Vienna Circle), etc. are nothing but the characteristic features of the positivist
method. Ironically, despite the premises which are not typically positivist, Marcuses
methodology reflecting the standard patterns of the technical style of thinking, is
indeed eloquent proof of the existence of a powerful ideological press acting on such
different people as Ayer and himself.
Marcuses reasoning, like that of all positivists, is traceable to the old empiricist p
tradition. Roughly speaking, its logic boils down to the following. To form a concept
of society, a philosopher takes the features common to every individual and
supplements them with other features conditioned by the environment, thus obtaining
human nature. Proceeding from this basis, he constructs the ideal model of
relations among people fitting it as close as possible to his abstract concept of man.
Then he compares this ideal model with the actual relations interpreted in the light
of his theoretical premises and proposes to restructure the actual relations, i.e.
society, bringing it in conformity with human nature. The starting point in such
concrete analysis is nothing but the abstract inherent in each single individual, i.e.
the features common to all people. This approach, seemingly very concrete, is in
fact extremely abstract if only for the fact that the analysis concentrates on the
personal qualities of a single individual taken at that outside the process of their 296
formation and development and regarded as something static, immutable,
accomplished.
If the abstraction of man is to be scientifically valid, it must represent him not as p

an atom, but as a social being, and take into account both his place in society and
the system of social relations. Another essential, though subordinate, characteristic of
this abstraction is that it must reflect mans relation to nature. Speaking of man as
an individual, we have no right to ignore the general factors determining his personal
qualities. This is just a paraphrase in terms of methodology of what Marx wrote
almost a century and a half ago: ... the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in
each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social
relations.[ 2961
Taking typical atomised individuals, outstanding or otherwise, for the starting p

point in the analysis of mans essence is attempting to revive obsolete
methodological standards, long since discredited. To be sure, it is not easy to carry
out the investigation in such a way as to start from the concept of the system of
social relations and, using it then as a premise, proceed to the analysis of mans
essence, nor is it easier to start analysing social relations abstracting them from an
individual. To arrive at this starting point in theoretical analysis, this elementary cell
of the socium, Marx and Engels had to study all the history and prehistory of
human society. It was titanic work indeed.
The essential characteristic of Marxs analysis is that it permits revealing not only p 297
the general qualities inherent in every individual, but also the necessary features and
relationships reflecting the laws of mans historical development. It is the analysis of
the sum total, the ensemble of the socio-historical forms of social relations which
reveals the real trend of this development in its concreteness from the theoretical,
and not empirical point of view. The universal is not equivalent to the similar
represented in each individual object and regarded as their common feature. It is,
first and foremost, a law-governed relationship of two or more individuals in which
they pose as the moments of one and the same concrete and real, and not only
formal, unity. According to Hegel, whose view was also shared by Marx, the form of
universality as a law or the principle of connection of details within a whole which
is totality. The universal can only be obtained through analysis, and not through
abstraction.
A single individual is essentially a man only because his unique make-up p

embodies historical necessity, and not because he possesses certain features,
sometimes of secondary importance, common to other individuals. This viewpoint
makes it possible to regard an individual as a personality not in the abstract sense,
but as an embodiment (more or less adequate) of the entire history of mankind, of
human civilisation as a whole. This viewpoint alone provides a basis for
understanding every single individual as a human being since it reveals a core in the
totality of his personal traits. This viewpoint, too, will undoubtedly prevent us from
placing in the same category Mozart and Salieri, Gandhi and Goebbels who may 298
appear to be absolutely similar from the viewpoint of abstract logic.
The concreteness understood dialectically has nothing to do with the establishment p

of such similarity of individuals. It represents the unity of all features and qualities
of a man in their real connection with one another, in their dependence both on the
biological nature of man and on the totality of all social conditions which play the
dominant role. This approach alone can give us a theoretically concrete, and not an
abstract concept of man. In other words, the theoretical definition of the universal in
man is called upon to correct all the fallacies, contradictions and errors of empirical
analysis without denying its role in principle. Attempting in our times to construct a
philosophical system or even a concept of man on an empirical basis is very much
like starting to advocate the idea of the earths flatness. The concrete concept of man
can only be developed if we proceed from the dialectical unity and interaction of the
diverse forms, of specifically human activity, mans social abilities and social needs.
According to the materialistic concept of the essense of man, the universal form of p
mans existence is represented in labour, in social mans direct transformation of
nature (his own nature inclusive) with the help of instruments which he himself
makes. It is not accidental that Marx was of such a high opinion of Benjamin
Franklins famous definition: Man is a tool-making animal. In making tools man
does not simply accept natures demands, but creates a new system of relations;
however, these relations on which he depends are out of his control. Such is Marxs
viewpoint. The definition of man as a tool-making animal is a characteristic example 299
providing a vivid illustration to the Marxist understanding of the universal as
concrete and as related to necessity.
The universal understood as concrete is opposed to the multitude of individuals not p

as an abstraction, but as their own substance, as a concrete form of their interaction.
It is only in this capacity that the universal as concrete determination embodies all
the richness of the particular and the individual, and this not only as possibility, but
also as necessity. The universal therefore cannot be understood as the abstract
identity of a multitude of events which serves as a basis for their classification under
a single category. It implies additionally the singling out of essential links and
relations and becomes, as it were, the substance of law. The universal is thus
conceived as divided internally, as the identity of contradictions, i.e. as a living,
concrete unity.
The universal, as we see, turns out to be concrete only if it reflects the essential p
features of the objects and phenomena of reality and does not take into account the
inessential, accidental features and properties. Thus, we can speak of theoretical
concreteness which consists not in direct connection with objective reality, not in the
detailed representation of individual aspects and properties, not in direct sensual
perception, but in the singling out of the main, the essential, the necessary, the
regular. From the empirical viewpoint, theoretical knowledge is indeed abstract in the
sense that it is removed from sensual perceptions and its links with the external
world are mediated. Yet it is concrete in the sense that it reveals those links and 300
relations which are outside the sphere of empirical knowledge. In point of fact,
theoretical concreteness includes empirical concreteness which is preserved in the
body of a deeper and more concrete conception not in the sense that theory is
specific and demonstrative in accordance with the requirement of empirical
concreteness, but only in the sense that it preserves in most cases more or less direct
links with experience, experiment, practice. Without revealing the main, the essential,
the necessary, i.e. the substance of scientific law, knowledge would remain quite
abstract from the theoretical viewpoint.
Lenin wrote: Essentially, Hegel is completely right as opposed to Kant. Thought p

proceeding from the concrete to the abstractprovided it is correct (NB) (and Kant,
like all philosophers, speaks of correct thought)does not get away from the truth
but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction
of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect
nature more deeply, truly and completely.[ 3001
Indeed, without the knowledge of law individual facts, even a multitude of them, p
remain abstract. They may be snatched out of the context and their significance may
be arbitrarily overemphasised, they may be opposed to all other facts and events. It
stands to reason that such knowledge would not be truly scientific. Moreover, one
and the same fact or a totality of facts may be interpreted in entirely different ways 301
in the context of different theories. Hence, one and the same empirical basis may be
used to construct very different scientific (not to speak of speculative and pseudo-
scientific) theories. It should also be borne in mind that the significance of various
facts, their real scientific value cannot be established if we ignore laws.
The thing is that facts characterising one or another object or event prove, as a rule,
contradictory. If we see an apple falling and trust our own eyes, we should expect it
to fly upward or sideways on the other side of the planet. Standing on the shore, we
can see the ocean retreating and then advancing again, we can observe a bird soaring
up or falling or evenly descending. Examples of this kind can be cited ad infinitum,
and in any of them the correctness of our observation, the scientific value of our
knowledge can only be proved if we reveal the operation of laws behind them: the
law of gravitation in the first example, the law of tidal motion in the second, the
aerostation law in the third, etc. In other words, in each of the phenomena we
observe we must define the internal links which do not lie on the surface. The
knowledge of laws, undoubtedly, makes our cognition more concrete, though it is
quite obvious that laws are abstract statements.
***

normal
TEXT SIZE
Notes
[ 2691] For detailed analysis of this question see E.V. Ilyenkov, The Dialectics of
the Abstract and the Concrete in Marxs Capital, Progress Publishers, Moscow,
1982.
[ 2701] Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, op. cit.,
p.206.
[ 2711] Ibid.
[ 2751] V.I. Lenin, Conspectus of Hegels Book The Science of Logic, Collected
Works, Vol.38, 1972, p.208.
[ 2831] See C.A. Hooker, The Information-Processing Approach to the Brain-Mind

and Its Philosophical Ramifications, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
Vol.XXXVI, No.1, September 1975, p.1.
[ 2941] Herbert Marcuse, Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der
fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft, Luchterhand, Neuwied, 1967, S.156.
[ 2961] Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels,
Collected Works, Vol.5, Progress Publishers. Moscow, 1976. p.4.
[ 3001] V.I. Lenin, Conspectus of Hegels Book The Science of Logic, Collected
Works, Vol.38, p.171.
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We have been concerned so far with special sciences or, more precisely, with those p
forms of concreteness which are characteristic of empirical and theoretical 302
investigations in physics, biology, psychology, etc. What about the concreteness of
Contents
philosophical categories themselves? This is, in fact, the essence of the matter, the
more so as the very idea of concreteness of such laws and categories of dialectics as
Index the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes, the unity and struggle of
Card opposites, the negation of negation, necessity and chance, cause and effect seem to
be quite paradoxical at first sight.
Formats:
Text The question of the concreteness of philosophical knowledge (laws, categories, p
PS principles) evidently calls for special investigation which goes beyond the scope of
PDF this work. Since our object is to compare the basic principles of the philosophy of
science and dialectical materialism, we feel justified in confining our analysis to just
a few laws and categories.
Other
Titles: It is not at all accidental that Lenin has taken special note of this idea in Hegels p
TA Lectures on the History of Philosophy: If the truth is abstract it must be untrue.

Healthy human reason goes out towards what is concrete... Philosophy is what is
Years:
1984
most antagonistic to abstraction, it leads back to the concrete...[ 3021 To Lenin,
this statement has evidently carried profound meaning, as is evidenced not only from
his philosophical ideas, but also from numerous economic and political works. As
### regards Lenins philosophical works proper, he has always placed special emphasis
on the principle of concreteness and pursued it with remarkable consistency. This
MAP particular aspect of his philosophical heritage deserves special attention. Do we 303
always realise, for instance, the profoundness of his well-known statement that the
contrast between matter and mind is meaningful within the framework of the
fundamental question of philosophy only?
The assertion of positivist philosophy that the concepts of matter and consciousness p
are metaphysical and can be replaced by more concrete notions of special sciences,
such as physics, mechanics, biology, psychophysiology, neuropsychology and others
results, in the final analysis, from its inability to understand the philosophical
concreteness of the concepts of matter and consciousness. At all stages of the
evolution of positivism its adherents have persisted in declaring the concept of matter
to be a fruitless abstraction, an absolute and useless symbol, on the grounds that all
materials needed for scientific investigation are given to man in the senses, in
individual experience. Hence, there is no need, according to positivism, to project
something transcendental, something that extends beyond the limits of sensual
perceptions. It is significant that the concept of matter or of the physical world
proves to be a useless abstraction within the framework of positivist philosophy only.
Recognising formally the existence of this world, none of the adherents of this
philosophy goes beyond the abstract, metaphysical understanding of matter. Setting
up an impassable barrier between matter and the cognising subject, positivism,
naturally, is unable to provide a concrete solution to the problem of the relationship
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/3.3-Concreteness.of.Materialist.Dialectics[2012-12-17 15:16:12]
between the material world and the world of human consciousness. In this field
positivism did not go beyond Kant, and Hegels assessment of Kants philosophy is 304
fully applicable to positivist views: "The essential inadequacy of the standpoint at
which philosophy halts consists in this, that it clings to the abstract Thing-in-itself as
an ultimate determination; it opposes Reflection, or the determinateness and
multiplicity of the Properties, to the Thingin-itself; while in fact the Thing-in-itself
essentially has this External Reflection in itself, and determines itself as an entity
endowed with its proper determinations, or Properties; whence it is seen that the
abstraction of the Thing, which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is an untrue
determination.[ 3041
No one denies that matter is given man in his sensations and that we should resort p
to a very high degree of abstraction in order to oppose mentally matter to
consciousness, sensations, perception. Yet such abstraction is inevitable if we want to
have a more concrete understanding of their relationship. Positivism makes a stand
for the inseparable connection between matter and consciousness knowing, in fact,
nothing about what is connected with what. By contrast, Marxist scientific analysis is
aimed at creating abstractions in order to obtain a concrete understanding of the real,
specific forms of the interconnection of matter, the objective world, with
consciousness.
As is evidenced from the above, the concepts of matter and consciousness are only p
valid within the framework of the fundamental question of philosophy. In order to
get a profound understanding of the relationship between matter and consciousness, it 305
is necessary to reveal all the forms of their interaction which is not confined to the
reflection of objective reality in our consciousness, but also includes the influence of
consciousness on the outer world (to the extent to which the reflection of reality is
correct). "Of course, Lenin writes, "even the antithesis of matter and mind has
absolute significance only within the bounds of a very limited field in this case
exclusively within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is
to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative
character of this antithesis is indubitable."[ 3051
The concept of matter is not correlated with the individual forms of the cognition of p
reality, nor with the concepts of information, code or something else of this kind. It
is correlated with the concept of consciousness only. What is more, this correlation
has any sense in connection with the problem of the dependence of consciousness on
matter and the historical formation of matter and consciousness. The concept of
matter which is seemingly extremely abstract as it takes no account of all aspects and
properties of things except just onetheir existence outside and independent of our
mindis in fact epistemologically concrete as it is meaningful in the context of the
fundamental question of philosophy only. Outside these bounds the concept of matter
has no independent philosophical meaning though it can be iused as a stylistic
substitude for some other, special terms (for instance, physicists speak of the density 306
of matter in the Universe). At the same time, no knowledge in general can be
concrete without the abstractions of matter and consciousness as the opposite sides of
reality if only for the fact that without the solution of this fundamental problem it
would be impossible to decide which elements of our knowledge can be regarded as
true, objective and independent of man no matter how far our science may advance,
and which elements are connected with consciousness in one way or another, and,
hence, are subject to testing and verification in the general context of human
experience and available scientific data. As we shall try to show later, distinguishing
between the objective and the subjective in our knowledge is absolutely essential for
making our knowledge concrete.
Consequently, no particular experiment aimed at testing the materialist solution of p

the fundamental question of philosophy will be of any use if it fails to take into
account the epistemological concreteness of the concepts of matter and consciousness.
This question can only be solved if we abstract from the interconnection of matter
and consciousness. Not many experiments can meet this requirement. Yet if science
can provide evidence that consciousness appears as a result of the activity of the
brain, that certain functions of consciousness can be exercised by a computer and
that nature existed prior to man, this scientific evidence is sufficient to confirm the
soundness of the materialist viewpoint. Conversely, should the reasonable beings who
assumed the title of Homo sapience choose to destroy the abode of their reason, this
act, alas, will evidently be the last argument for materialism.
Throughout its entire history positivism has been denouncing, in one or another p 307
form and more or less resolutely, the principle of causality as typically metaphysical.
Significantly, Machism and logical positivism rejected this principle and the
meaningfulness of the categories cause and effect on the grounds that they could
not be tested empirically, i.e. verified or confirmed. The new generation of positivist
philosophers armed with Poppers principle of falsification hold the same view yet on
different grounds, namely, that this principle cannot be falsified. Since, they reason,
it is confirmed by all human experience, without any exception, the categories of
causality are applicable always and everywhere and therefore turn into commonplace
devoid of any analytical, i.e. scientific significance.
Popper does not deny the real scientific value of causal explanations, but presents p
their logical schema as follows: there is some universal judgement, i.e. a law, and a
proposition characterising the initial conditions in terms of individual events. From
these two premises we infer a supposition regarding another individual event. The
concepts of cause and effect are eliminated as unnecessary. Popper rejects completely
the principle of causality in the general, philosophical sense. For him causality
rather has an instrumental meaning as an assertion that any event can be explained
in terms of causality, i.e. predicted through deduction, which is the same thing.
Depending on the interpretation of the words can be in this assertion, it may p

prove either an analytical statement (tautology) or a synthetic statement (a statement 308
of reality). If we interpret these words as a logical possibility to construct a causal
explanation, this statement is tautological, since for any prediction we can always
find a universal proposition and initial conditions so. that it can be easily deduced
from them. In some situations, however, the words can be are regarded as an
indication that the world is governed by strict laws and that every phenomenon is an
example of universal regularity or law., In that case the above statement should be
regarded as a synthetic one, which is not, however, verifiable. Proceeding from this
consideration, Popper concludes: I shall, therefore, neither adopt nor reject the
principle of causality; I shall be content simply to exclude it, as metaphysical,
from the sphere of science. I shall, however, propose a methodological rule which
corresponds so closely to the principle of causality that the latter might be regarded
as its metaphysical version. It is the simple rule that we are not to abandon the
search for universal laws and for a coherent theoretical system, nor ever give up our
attempts to explain causally any kind of event we can describe.[ 3081
Thus causality as something elusive is metaphysically identified with the concept of p

universal law. The principle of causality is understood in a very trivial manner: it is
quite sufficient to know that the phenomenon in interest belongs to a certain class of
phenomena in order to draw a conclusion that the effect or, more precisely, the
predictable event belongs to just another definite class. Any violation of this 309
necessary relationship indicates that one of the classes has been determined
incorrectly and should be either broadened or narrowed. Such a concept of causality
is indeed trivial from the methodological viewpoint as it is aimed primarily at
bringing every phenomenon in accord with the universal law or, more precisely, with
a universal empirical generalisation. As to its objective content, this concept does not
postulate anything but the regular sequence or regular concomitance of events
belonging to different classes. Oddly enough, such an understanding of causality
underlies the entire logic of scientific discovery, though it is quite obvious that this
methodological scheme rules out in principle the possibility of any discovery of new
phenomena which go beyond the limits of the universal law or, at any rate, sets
them in opposition to it. The universal law understood as regularity of events is
incompatible with any new phenomenon in principle. Inversely, any new
phenomenon, i.e. what Kuhn calls an anomaly in relation to the existing theory is
incompatible with the universal law. Consequently, it is not the principle of causality
as such which is metaphysical, but its narrow, instrumentalist interpretation by
Popper. His interpretation in fact eliminates causality from real science and reflects
the ideal of Laplatian determinism, since Popper identifies causality with logical
dependence, logical necessity. It is only natural, therefore, that such a canonised
concept of causality and law has practically no appeal to science, particularly modern
science. As we see, Poppers own errors lead him to the conclusion that the principle
of causality is trivial, unscientific and metaphysical. The truth is that his 310
interpretation of the concepts of cause and effect are indeed alien to the spirit of real
science.
The scientists, particularly the natural scientists, never understand causality in such a p
narrow way as to throw doubt upon it each time an exact prediction proves
impossible. Such a prediction requires the knowledge not only of the causal
dependence, but also of the specific conditions of cognition. The strictly Laplatian
ideal of prediction identified by positivists with causality is generally attainable in
such sciences as the mechanics of macroscopic objects, astronomy, and loses its
sense when we pass to such fields as hydrodynamics and the theory of elasticity.
Despite the universality of the principle of causality, it is by no means simple to p

establish the true, objective causal relationship separating it from a multitude of
intertwined and overlapping events and phenomena. The singling out of causal
dependence from other kinds of relations is in itself a difficult problem from the
methodological viewpoint. Even if an observer or an experimentalist have good
reasons to expect a causal relationship, they have to display sometimes a high degree
of ingenuity in order to create appropriate conditions for the identification of causal
dependence. Even in those cases when the signs of causality seem to lie on the
surface, it proves to be extremely important methodologically to define those
abstractions and assumptions which have to be adopted each time the concept of
causality is used in scientific cognition. The need for abstractions in cognising causal
relationships has been stressed by Lenin: Hence, the human conception of cause and 311
effect always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of
nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of
a single world process.[ 3111
For instance, the kinetic theory of gases explained the chaotic motion of molecules, p
the distribution of the concentration of molecules in the field of terrestrial attraction,
the emission of electrons from heated metal, the viscosity and heat conductivity of
gases and other phenomena on the basis of the principle of causality. All these
explanations proceeded from the assumption that gas consists of absolutely resilient
minute spherical particles, that these particles possess kinetic energy only, that the
magnitude of this kinetic energy depends on the absolute temperature of gas only
and that such molecules do not collide with one another.
Though such assumptions somewhat distort the objective processes as there are no p
gases in nature with the above ideal properties, they nevertheless reflect the
conditions under which these processes actually take place. Indeed, under the
conditions of moderate temperatures and relatively low pressures the distortions
allowed for numerous gases do not have any appreciable effect either on their
qualitative or quantitative characteristics.
Hence, the explanations and predictions are based not only on the recognition of p
causal relations, but also on certain assumptions presupposing the exact knowledge of
conditions under which the process in interest takes place. These aspects of scientific 312
investigation are closely connected with one another: explanations and predictions are
impossible without objectively grounded assumptions, whereas the assumptions
themselves have any sense only in the context of the above explanations or
predictions. Yet in the philosophical analysis of the principle of causality it is
advisable to distinguish these aspects as more or less independent objects of
investigation which could be called an explanation, a prediction and a substantiation
of assumptions.
The problem of the subtantiation of assumptions in the context of an explanation or p

a prediction is not infrequently left out of account in philosophical investigations so
that the analysis is often confined to the concept of causality and to the solution of
various methodological problems arising in natural sciences in connection with
explanation and prediction. The study of initial conditions seems a secondary task
which is always subordinated to explanation and prediction proper. Yet it is not
difficult to show that the exact knowledge of these conditions sometimes turns out to
be problem No.1 which has to be solved before any explanation or prediction is
ever attempted. Besides, if an existing law or theory suggests the existence of a
certain causal relationship, the search for conditions under which this relationship can
materialise becomes quite an independent research problem and calls for serious
creative efforts which may lead to important scientific discoveries. Such
investigations often give a powerful impetus to the development of experimental
facilities, computers, conceptual and mathematical bodies.
An experiment staged by the outstanding Russian physicist, Pyotr Lebedev, was p 313
intended, for instance, to prove the existence of light pressure by demonstrating the
effect of a light beam on a metal blade, and also to compare the obtained value of
this pressure with the value predicted on the basis of Maxwells theory. The most
difficult part of the experiment (like of the experiment staged later by E.F. Nickols
and Philip Hall) consisted in creating the necessary conditions to ensure the
fulfilment of the rules of abstraction. There was no special difficulty in observing the
rotation of the experimental blade after switching on the source of light. Yet it was
just here that an error might slip in, since the blade could be caused to rotate by
other factors as well, such as radiometric forces, the forces of gas convection, etc.,
the more so as they exceeded many times the weak force of light pressure. It took
not only the experimentalists resourcefulness in developing the appropriate apparatus,
but also called for a profound analysis of the nature of convection and radiometric
forces. Hence, attempts to prove the existence of causal relations may lead to the
discovery of new phenomena, to new interesting and unexpected explanations
pertaining to the conditions under which the main investigation is carried out, and,
finally, to the improvement of experimental equipment, as the scientist always tries
to envisage its response to various side effects.
It may so happen that the forecast of a causal relationship does not come true under p
the given set of circumstances. Does it mean that we should question the principle of
causality in general? Of course, not. In that case we are faced with this alternative: 314
either our prediction of a causal relationship is not correct and the existing
correlation is the result of other indirect links (and we must study them), or the
causal relationship does exist, but the experiment or the observations give wrong
results due to the presence of unknown interfering factors. In both cases the principle
of causality leads to new problem and stimulates new discoveries, often quite
unexpected.
Hence, the principle of causality not only fulfils the functions of explanation and p
prediction, but is also of great heuristic importance. To assess correctly the heuristic
role of the principle of causality, one should take into account the fact that the
scientific discoveries resulting from the evaluation of specific conditions, the
revelation of hitherto unheeded factors, the rejection of ungrounded assumptions, etc.
are of ten more important than those sought by scientists in their attempts to explain
or predict one or another event. It may seem all the more paradoxical as conditions,
according to our own assertion, are inessential for the causal dependence to the
extent making it possible to disregard them altogether. Yet the dialectics of these two
aspects of objective reality consists in that the conditions inessential for a given
causal relationship may prove highly essential for another relationship.
One of the main objects of criticism levelled against dialectics by its present-day p
opponents is the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. According to an ancient
and at the same time the latest argument against dialectics, an objective contradiction
is incompatible with the logical principle or law of contradiction whereby two
opposite statements cannot be true if they relate to the same time and to the same 315
content. Accordingly, an object of reality cannot possess two mutually excluding
properties or be in two mutually excluding states in one and the same respect.
It should be noted first of all that the term dialectical is by no means applicable p
to any opposites or any contradictions. We can only speak of contradictions within
the framework of a concrete relationship in which two phenomena, two aspects of
one and the same object can be regarded as opposite and mutually contradictory.
Accusing dialectics of speculativeness, scholasticism and absence of any scientific
value, positivist philosophers and other modern opponents and interpreters of
dialectics refer to a vice which is absolutely alien to Marxist dialectics.
The concreteness of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites is violated each p
time its critics tear apart the two inseparable aspects: the unity and the mutual
exclusion of opposites. One cannot speak of the opposition of certain aspects of an
object or a phenomenon until after their unity has been established, the degree of
their opposition corresponding to the degree of their unity. It was senseless, for
instance, to speak of the opposition of the Sun and the Earth before it was found out
that both of them are two celestial bodies belonging to one and the same planetary
system. Likewise, it is senseless to speak of the opposition of science and, for
instance, art till we establish that both of them have the same nature as two forms of
social consciousness. Hence, there are no and cannot be any objects or phenomena
which are absolute opposites, opposites in general, in the abstract sense.
Conversely, there are no and cannot be any two absolutely identical phenomena 316
such identity from the dialectical viewpoint is also abstract.
Any knowledge will be abstract, partial, incomplete, if it does not properly reflect p
the contradictions inherent in the object under investigation, if it is presented as
something immutable, frozen, lifeless. Lenin has closely linked the question of the
concreteness of knowledge with the question of the mutability and contradictoriness
of the objects and phenomena of reality as is seen from his following emphatic
remark: Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object.
The reflection of nature in mans thought must be understood not lifelessly, not
abstractly, not devoid of movement, not without contradictions, but in the eternal
process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution.[ 3161
From the positivist viewpoint this statement is nonsensical. Limiting the subject- p
matter of philosophy to the analysis of existing scientific knowledge, and this mainly
in terms of its correspondence with the standards of formal logic, positivism has
once and for all defined its stand in relation to contradictions. Contradictions are
only possible in thinking and therefore must be removed from our knowledge as
their very presence testifies, according to formal logic, to the falsity of at least one
of the opposing statements.
Dialectical contradictions in nature and society differ from the so-called logical p
contradictions. In contrast to formal logic, which understands contradiction as 317
incompatibility of statements, dialectics regards it as conflict of opposing forces or
tendencies. Such dialectical contradictions can be exemplified by the phenomenon of
class struggle, the relationship between nature and society, etc.
In thinking and cognition, the concepts of dialectical and logical contradictions p

coincide, i.e. the dialectical contradiction assumes the form of the logical one. It is
important, however, that one should distinguish between the role of contradiction in
the development of cognition as empirical phenomenon, on the one hand, and the
consequences of contradiction for concrete knowledge, i.e. for cognition in the logical
sense, on the other. As regards the former, the revelation and resolution of
contradictions is the motive force of cognition (this applies, of course, to essential
contradictions inherent in the very nature of cognition, but not to the ones resulting
from the subjective inability to think correctly). As to the latter, a contradiction in
the logical structure of knowledge is always objectionable as either one of the two
contradicting propositions within a given system can be used for deducing logically
correct statements. Hence, it is not logical contradiction, but the search for the ways
to eliminate it that constitutes the source of the development of scientific knowledge.
The logical principle of concrete identity, the identity of opposites was for Marx p
(and Hegel) the main logical criterion of concreteness in the approach to the objects
and phenomena of the objective world. It was this approach, according to Marx, that
made the difference between the trivial, uncritical description of phenomena as they 318
appeared to everyone and their theoretical comprehension.
The dual nature of the commodity was by no means Marxs discovery. Even before p
Ricardo and Smith, any man in the street knew quite well that a commodity had use
value and exchange value or, in other words, that it could satisfy some human need,
or be exchanged for another commodity, more necessary at the moment for a given
owner (though both commodities were equivalent in terms of money, i.e. their prices
were equal). The assertion that the commodity is a carrier of use and exchange
values has nothing in common with the theoretical proposition disclosing the nature
of value in general. The former is a mere statement of two isolated abstractions in
no way connected with each other, whereas the latter proceeds from the
understanding of the use value of a commodity as a method or form of the
manifestation of its own oppositethe exchange value or, more precisely, simply
value. This concept represents a transition from the abstract (from two equally
abstract notions) to the concrete (the unity of the notions of use value and exchange
value).
Consequently, knowledge cannot be sufficiently concrete unless it reveals some p

general aspects and properties of the objects and phenomena of the objective world:
their essence, main contradictions, content, necessity, etc. Yet it is precisely these
aspects and properties which constitute the subject-matter of philosophical
investigation proper. Therefore, philosophical concreteness is not a contradictio in
adjecto, but a profound theoretical concept. As it turns out, the knowledge given us 319
by physics, chemistry, biology, geography and other special sciences should also be
concrete from the philosophical viewpoint. Without such abstract (in the traditional
sense) categories as quantity and quality, chance and necessity, essence and
appearance, etc. the concepts of atom and elementary particle, organism and living
cell, man and society turn out to be insufficiently concrete.
There is yet another important side to this problem. If we leave out of account the p
above categories, any scientific knowledge will only be testable within the scope of
the links and relations that have already been revealed. In other words, the test will
be confined to examining the empirical content of our knowledge, the object or
phenomenon in interest being isolated from other objects and phenomena, and to
establishing logical links between this empirical content and the theoretical
knowledge already available. Hence, the possibility of a comprehensive test of any
knowledge for scientific value and authenticity will be ruled out altogether and,
consciously or unconsciously, new concepts or theories will be left exposed to
eventual criticism. Knowledge which has not passed through the crucible of a
philosophical trial is not only vulnerable to critical attacks, but also liable to various
distortions and misinterpretations.
Here is an example. Before the establishment of the contradictory nature of light, its p
complex quantum-mechanical properties, it would have been impossible, as we are
fully aware now, to adopt either the wave or the corpuscular theory. Each of these
theories could have been tested by corresponding experiments, yet these experiments 320
contradicting one another would only have been regarded by the adherents of the
rival theory as a temporary misunderstanding.
The way of abstract identities leads away from, but not towards dialectics. Dialectics p
unfolds the analysis of concrete, living objective contradictions, whereas eclecticism,
being in fact a counterfeit of dialectics, is engaged in the arbitrary combination of
any opposites and identities.
No better appears to be the alternative solution to the problem of contradiction p

offered by the representatives of the Frankfurt School. This solution, in contrast to
the one proposed by positivism, is based on the absolutisation of contradiction and
negation and on the rejection of any identity whatsoever. The approach of the
Frankfurt School which is distinguished by utter disregard for the concreteness of the
categories of identity and opposition can be well illustrated by Theodor Adornos
proposition concerning non-identity. According to him, identity is the enemy of all
that is factual, single, particular and, strange as it may seem, concrete. Concreteness,
as it turns out, can only be saved through non-identity[ 3201 . The trouble,
however, is that identity itself in Adornos interpretation loses concreteness and turns
into something lifeless, static and absolute. Yet the identical, as has been pointed out
by Hegel, includes the necessary seed of distinction, discord (Unterschied). Already
in his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel came out against the understanding of negation 321
as activity consisting only in refuting, nullifying the attained result. In the preface to
that book Hegel calls true that thinking which emerges in the process of development
as a definite negative and therefore as some positive content. Adornos negative,
by contrast, remains abstract and lopsided, pathetically inferior to Hegels profound
concept though, according to good Adorno, Hegel has failed to rise to the required
level of thinking. Adorno interprets Marx in a similar manner, making special effort
to find in his works everything related to the negative or negation and
counterpose it to the positive or negation of the negation. In point of fact, the
only difference between Marx and Hegel in the interpretation of identity and
distinction, positive and negative, assertion and negation is that Marx had
placed all these categories on a materialistic basis. Freed from speculativeness and
abstractness, they have acquired new forms of concreteness and preserved at the
same time their interdependence disclosed by Hegel who has correlated each pair and
regarded it as an indissoluble unity. The creator of negativist logic which is full of
contradictions, writes Soviet scientist I.S. Narsky about Adorno, manipulates, like
Proudhon, static antitheses, such as society and nature, democracy and technocracy,
history and theory, criticism and apology, process and system, action and cognition,
practice and reflection, humanism and scientism, discarding, though, almost any one
of these alternatives just as easily or turning them into arbitrarily interpreted
symbols... His method is anti-dialectical, dialectics with Adorno ceases to be
dialectics and turns into the metaphysics of the rigid models of non- 322
identity.[ 3221
It stands to reason that the exposure of trivial contradictions can little contribute to p
scientific investigation except by bringing in a few odd empirical details. Yet even
these meagre scraps of knowledge reveal their utter uselessness when it comes to
moulding them into a single concept. Just imagine for a moment a toy factory run
by an eclectic in accordance with his theoretical notions. The toyshops would be
cram-full of little monsters having an ear instead of an eye and an eye instead of an
ear, a kneecap on the shoulder, a frying-pan instead of a hat, gloves instead of
shoes, trousers instead of a shirt, etc. This comparison, though, perhaps, a little too
blunt, is by no means far-fetched.
Of course, from the viewpoint of logic an ear and an eye, a shoulder and a knee- p
cap are opposites in a way, just like the right and the left eye, the right and the left
foot, hand, etc. Each object is the opposite of another object in some abstract sense.
It would be absurd to engage in studying such contradictions without specifying the
concrete relationship within which such contradictions are considered.
In his critical analysis of Dhrings book, Engels wrote that his opponents views on p
the question of contradiction can be summed up in the statement that
contradiction=absurdity, and therefore cannot occur in the real world. People who in 323
other respects show a fair degree of common sense may regard this statement as
having the same self-evident validity as the statement that a straight line cannot be a
curve and a curve cannot be straight. But, regardless of all protests made by common
sense, the differential calculus under certain circumstances [italics supplied]
nevertheless equates straight lines and curves, and thus obtains results which common
sense, insisting on the absurdity of straight lines being identical with curves, can
never attain.[ 3231
Referring to the universality of the laws of dialectics, its opponents allege that p
dialectics can prove or confirm anything in the world, it can be used to justify any
political act. Since the laws of dialectics are applicable everywhere and at all times,
they cannot be of any help in discovering something new.
Herbert Feigl who honestly confesses to having not read a single Soviet publication p
in philosophy over the past few years, regards the laws of dialectics as hackneyed
banalities. The vague .principles of dialectics, according to Feigl, are handicapped
by Hegelian logic consisting, in fact, of illogicalities. They are scientifically useless
both in terms of ontology and methodology. Dialectics, in Feigls opinion, adds
nothing new to the special solution of the mind-body problem or the problem of the
corpuscular-wave dualism. All that is needed to solve such problems is the good old
two-valued logic plus the required natural scientific data. The slogan about the
transition of quantity into quality, writes Feigl, is just as vague as the triad, or the 324
negation of the negation.[ 3241
No Marxist philosopher would deny the universality of the categories of dialectics. p

The crucial point is the understanding of this universality. From the Marxist
viewpoint, the universality of categories and laws consists in that they reflect the
processes and phenomena in nature, society and cognition. It does not mean,
however, that the laws of dialectics are applicable to any situation regardless of
conditions and that they exist outside and independent of the corresponding
phenomena and processes to which they relate. The law of the interdependence of
quantitative and qualitative changes is very concrete for all its universality and
abstractness (in the empirical sense). It does not apply to any quantity or quality, but
only to the quantity of a given quality.
It means that not any, but only strictly definite quantitative and qualitative changes p
can be linked in a scientific context.
The concrete unity of the quantity and quality of a given object is known to be p
reflected in the dialectical category of measure which lays special emphasis on the
concreteness of this unity. The quantitative changes of a given quality are restricted
within the limits of a given measure beyond which the unity under consideration
breaks up and is replaced by another unity having its own measure.
The concreteness of quantity and quality accounts for the relativeness of the p
distinction between quantitative and qualitative changes. It is only in relation to a 325
given quality that one can speak of certain quantitative changes. Outside the bounds
of the measure such a counterposition becomes senseless. The number of the
electrons on the outermost shell of the atom is directly related to its qualitative
characteristics, to the quality as a whole. Yet this number does not affect the
aggregate state of the matter which includes the electrons under consideration. We do
not mention here the trivial approach to this dialectical category exemplified, for
instance, by an attempt to link daylight illumination with the number of stars in the
sky.
Proceeding from the abstract logical pattern advocated by the opponents of p

dialectics, we might say that any quantitative change in general involves one or
another qualitative alteration. Take, for instance, the budding of leaves on a tree. The
appearance of a new leaf on a branch is in itself a qualitative changeit involves
the emergence of a bud, the concentration of chlorophyll, the absorption of light, etc.
One might even speak of many qualitative changes. Similarly, the evaporation of
several molecules of water from its surface which brings about but a minor
quantitative change in the volume of liquid in a vessel is connected with such a
qualitative change as the process of evaporation. The same quantity of molecules
could have been removed from the same volume by means of, for instance, a
sprayer.
Can we indeed speak of quantitative and qualitative changes in this latter case? If p
we do, we shall make a common, even a typical mistake which leads sometimes to
serious misunderstandings. Of course, if we speak in an abstract manner, the 326
elimination of a certain amount of molecules is a quantitative process. But in relation
to what? This is just the point, since the principle of concreteness calls for a very
definite reference system without which any scientific analysis turns into nonsense.
Whereas the aggregate state of liquid in a vessel does not change (the qualitative
state of water remains invariable), molecules pass into a new state, acquire a new
quality, the humidity of ambient air increases, etc., i.e. qualitative changes do take
place but in a different system of relations. The law of the interdependence of
quantitative and qualitative changes would indeed turn into commonplace if we did
not define in each particular case the relationship between a certain quantity and a
certain quality, i.e. did not determine the system the development of which is the
object of our analysis.
Taking exception to the law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative p

changes, Herman Wetter writes that if the new quality were of a higher order, it
would be bound to have something which cannot be explained in terms of the laws
of the lower order. That means that the effect would be bigger in some respect than
the cause or, to put it another way, it would have no corresponding cause, at least
with regard to the increment. Consequently, according to Wetter, the law of the
transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes does not explain anything, it
merely describes the transition from the old quality to a new one.
As has been pointed out above, the laws of dialectics, though universal by nature, p
are not confirmable under any arbitrary set of conditions. They are operative within
quite definite epistemological limits and become senseless beyond them. In other 327
words, they can be falsified in principle, if we come across a sufficiently large body
of contradicting facts. The absurd contentions that the categories and laws of
materialist dialectics are trivial and unscientific derive from sheer ignorance. Such
contentions are based on the subjective interpretation of dialectics and have nothing
to do with its true nature. In most contemporary concepts of Western philosophers
claiming to carry on the dialectical tradition, dialectics is replaced by eclecticism, the
semblance of dialectics.
To sum up. Philosophical knowledge represents all forms of scientific concreteness:

empirical, theoretical and epistemological. It can be confirmed experimentally, given
conditions for appropriate abstraction, and it can be falsified outside the limits of the
objective field. Philosophical knowledge is theoretically concrete in the sense that it
rests on the theoretical foundation of modern science, formulates its laws and
provides answers to philosophical questions prompted by the development of science
itself. Finally, philosophical knowledge is concrete from the epistemological
viewpoint in the sense that each dialectical category and law is based on and
relevant to the entire system of philosophical knowledge in terms of its logic and
history.
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 3021] V.I. Lenin, Conspectus of Hegels Book Lectures on the History of

Philosophy, op. cit., p.245.
[ 3041] Hegels Science of Logic, Vol. II, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.,
1929, p. 118.
[ 3051] V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empiric-Criticism, Collected Works, Vol. 14,

p. 147.
[ 3081] Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Basic Books, Inc., New
York, 1959, p.61.
[ 3111] V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit., p.156.
[ 3161] V.I. Lenin, Conspectus of Hegels Book The Science of Logic, op, cit.,
p.195.
[ 3201] See Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt

am Main, 1966, S.138.
[ 3221] I.S. Narsky, The Problem of Negation and the Negative Dialectics of T.
Adorno, Filosofskiye nauki, No.3, 1973, p.77.
[ 3231] Frederick Engels, Anti-Dhring, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p.144.
[ 3241] Herbert Feigl, Critique of Dialectical Materialism, in: Dialogues on the

Philosophy of Marxism, Ed. by J. Somerville and H. L. Parsons, Greenwood Press,
Westport, Connecticut, 1974, p.114.
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The nihilistic attitude towards philosophy and towards broad theoretical concepts in p
the period of the inception of positivism is closely connected with (though cannot be 328
fully excused by) the stormy growth of empirical sciences in the late 18th and the
Contents
early 19th centuries. The universal enthusiasm about their remarkable successes
created an illusion that all mankinds problems without exception could and ought to
Index be solved exclusively by the methods of natural sciences which not only provided
Card the exhaustive explanation of phenomena, but also predicted the existence of
unknown phenomena and thus opened the way for new discoveries. Of special
Formats: interest to us, however, is the connection between this philosophical nihilism and the
Text boom of empirical investigations. This question is the more topical as in our time,
PS too, the extensive development of empirical methods of investigation in one or
PDF another scientific field brings about a very similar phenomenona certain
estrangement, if not downright victimisation of philosophy.

Other As is commonly known, empirical investigations usually aim at studying individual, p
Titles: sensually perceptible objects and phenomena of reality. Besides, the sphere of
TA
empirical investigation includes inductive generalisations and even the formulation of

Years:
empirical laws. Most researchers associate theoretical knowledge with a higher level
1984 of abstraction, with the explanation of empirical laws, revelation of their links with
other laws and existing theories, i.e. with their theoretical substantiation, as well as
with the discovery of new laws which do not always lend themselves to empirical
### interpretation.
MAP The very nature of empirical knowledge, like that of applied knowledge in general, p
accounts for the fact that the scientist engaged in concrete empirical investigations is 329
seldom forced by the specific problems he studies to concern himself with
philosophical generalisations. At any rate, the logic of his research does not lead him
to philosophical concepts of universal significance.
It does not mean, however, that a natural scientist does not concern himself with p
philosophical problems and is in general far removed from philosophy. Even in a
purely empirical investigation a scientist cannot make a step without adhering, for
instance, to the principle of objectivity. His task consists in excluding the effect of
the subjective factor, i.e. the influence of his own manipulations, particularly of his
personal perception and his individual experience from the conditions of his
experiment or observation. Every experimentalist knows only too well the difficulties
involved in the fulfilment of this task, as well as the severity of the requirement for
the purity of the experiment. Not every scientist, however, is fully aware of the
fact that this requirement does not stem from the nature of his specific investigation
but is of general methodological significance, i.e. that it is a philosophical principle.
Similarly, a scientist cannot disregard the principle of causality or determinism from
the viewpoint of methodology. The experimentalists work largely consists in a
search for the causes of the event or phenomenon under observation, or in defining
its possible effects. Here, too, the patterns of his thinking and experimental activities
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/3.4-Materialist.Dialectics.and.Special.Sciences[2012-12-17 15:16:28]
are predetermined methodologically so that he proceeds from events to their causes,

then to their consequences, conditions, etc, In such standard situations a scientist 330
relies on the available philosophical knowledge and seldom questions its validity.
Moreover, not infrequently he is not even aware of the philosophical basis which
provides, as it were, the methodological framework for his research. The problems he
is concerned with cannot be qualified either as purely philosophical or as specifically
scientific. The solution of his problems calls for bridging the gap between
philosophical and specialised knowledge so as to permit philosophical ideas to
fertilise his practical work and give it a new meaning and new dimensions. Such
problems can be called philosophico-methodological since they are philosophically
oriented and their solution is guided by general philosophical principles. Yet they are
not regarded as philosophical, since their emergence does not cast doubt on the
content of philosophical categories, nor does it question the role of philosophical
laws. It is not surprising therefore that a scientist may delude himself into thinking
that he is completely free of any philosophical propositions or principles.
It should be noted that empirical investigations in one or another specific field are p
not likely to add much to the arguments for or against some philosophical trend,
even if the facts the scientist deals with are quite extraordinary. Numerous evidences
regarding flying saucers and the abundance of documentary reports about
catastrophes in the area of the Bermuda triangle give rather impressive data and stir
up imagination. On the basis of such information a layman may come to most
fantastic conclusions. Generally speaking, the thinking of a man in the street is apt
to overcome very easily the compatibility barriers which often make a tremendous 331
problem for a serious scientist.
A laymans imagination can easily carry him from the rumours of flying saucers to p
a very plausible image of a visitor from outer space described sometimes in great
detail (down to the number of fingers on his hand) and further to fantastic pictures
of the arrival of reasonable beings on the Earth. Then he may plunge into
speculations on the nature of reason, on the origin of the solar system, etc. Strange
as it may seem, what is easily accessible to the laymans fanciful imagination proves
to be beyond the power of thinking of a scientist who cannot resort either to
Pegasus wings or to Hermes sandals but has to follow his thorny path with a
heavy tread of an experimentalist. His every step must be thought out and well
measured. To be sure, science has also learned to build castles in the air now
called orbital stations... Yet how very careful and arduous its every step forward,
how modest its achievements in comparison with the ages of hard work and
relentless struggle against the unknown and therefore terrifying forces of natureand
how very different the sober and restrained approach of true scientists from the
unfounded conceit of dilettantes relishing mans would-be power over nature! Alas,
the position of an empirically-minded natural scientist differs but little from the
thinking of a dilettante venturing to expound his views on the philosophical doctrines
he knows only by hearsay... He is doomed to vacillate from the extreme exaggeration
of the significance of his own achievements and the derogation of the role of theory,
particularly philosophy, to the concoction of astounding theories and original 332
philosophical doctrines...
It is the empiricist style of scientific thinking and investigation, the empiricist p

standard of scientific progress that lies at the root of metaphysical ideas and
speculative propositions which fill in the gaps between individual isolated facts torn
out of the context and viewed outside and independent of their links and
relationships. It is narrow empiricism in science that often takes a disdainful and
intransigent stand against consistent materialist approach to reality and tends to
replace serious scientific investigation by pretentious, extravagant ideas without

bothering to trace them to the corresponding historical or historical-scientific
anticedents in the age-old history of science and philosophy. This unwillingness to
study philosophical traditions and historical links accounts, above all, for uncritical
attitude toward general theoretical and philosophical ideas which are unavoidable in
any scientific investigation.
Every researcher seeks to transgress the bounds of his immediate investigation and p
take a broader view of the problem he is concerned with. Yet such transgressions
need not necessarily testify to the expansion of his scientific horizons and broadening
of his intereststhey may also result from scientific adventurism which goes hand in
hand with the condemnation of primitive materialism, theoretical dogmatism, etc.
This militant empiricism which has always chafed under the so-called harshness of
dialectics and complained about the pedestrian style of Marxs thinking and the
intransigence of Leninist materialism proves to be capable of getting on quite well 333
with those theories and philosophical concepts which suit it in one way or another in
a given situation, gratify its weaknesses. This attitude is usually expressed in overall
hostility to any methodology, in anarchical opposition to any world outlook and
results from the absence of a solid theoretical foundation.
The uncritical attitude to the philosophical environment leads to a paradoxical p

situation: on the one hand, ostensible independence, the absence of any philosophical
commitments and freedom to choose any philosophical concept that is suitable from
the practical, utilitarian viewpoint and justifies all sorts of wild digressions into the
history of science or depth of the Universe; on the other hand, actual bondage to
current philosophical tastes and intellectual fashion. The illusion of freedom from
philosophical systems turns out to be overall dependence on obsolete philosophical
theories. The champions of the freedom of intellect find themselves in the position
of those natural scientists who were so aptly ridiculed by Engels: Natural scientists
believe that they free themselves from philosophy by ignoring it or abusing it. They
cannot, however, make any headway without thought, and for thought they need
thought determinations. But they take these categories unreflectingly from the
common consciousness of so-called educated persons, which is dominated by the
relics of long obsolete philosophies, or from the little bit of philosophy compulsorily
listened to at the University (which is not only fragmentary, but also a medley of
views of people belonging to the most varied and usually the worst schools), or from
uncritical and unsystematic reading of philosophical writings of all kinds. Hence they 334
are no less in bondage to philosophy, but unfortunately in most cases to the worst
philosophy, and those who abuse philosophy most are slaves to precisely the worst
vulgarised relics of the worst philosophies.[ 3341
Among such slaves found itself not only positivism, but also other philosophical p
schools which undertook to express the empiricists curtailed world view and carried
to excess all the demerits (and merits, for that matter) of empirical investigation. The
empiricists stand is in fact hypocritical in that his abuse of philosophy and
metaphysics often serves as a smokescreen for his own philosophical system
intended to espouse his views.
It would be wrong to think that the tendency to exaggerate the role of sensory p
experience characteristic of earlier empirical science will die away by itself in the
age of the maturity of science with its high level of abstractions and complex
mathematical formalisation of whole branches. The empirical investigation of
individual objects and phenomena will always remain an important task of science
however attractive and promising theoretical research may be. It is essential,
therefore, that alongside the encouragement of young scientists in fundamental

investigations due attention be paid to experimental work and that appropriate
incentives be constantly sought to improve and stimulate it. Sometimes an individual
fact discovered by mere chance may lead to the emergence of a new scientific trend 335
or to the reappraisal of current scientific theories.
On the other hand, as long as scientific investigations in certain fields are based on p
empirical data, there exists a nutrient medium for empiricism as a philosophical
trend.
There is yet another paradoxical aspect of the evolution of positivism. The p

dominance of empirical methods in natural science and the universal enthusiasm
about its achievements had come to an end or at least considerably subsided by the
mid-19th century. At the turn of the 20th century the prestige of empiricism was
completely undermined by the rapid development of physics, chemistry, biology and
psychology. Yet it is precisely this period that reanimated the influence of positivist
philosophy.
The development of theoretical natural science and elaboration of fundamental p

theories did not change the attitude of positivism to general philosophical problems.
Logical positivism that came to the foreground in that period with renewed
determination to eliminate metaphysics from science was nurtured by the hopes
that all theoretical propositions could be reduced to empirical knowledge. This stand
was well illustrated by Russells attitude to the principle of causality in scientific
cognition. Characterising this principle as purely metaphysical, as a relic of the pre-
scientific stage of knowledge, he pointed out that theoretically developed sciences
had already got rid of all remnants of causality. Alongside the principle of causality,
positivism threw overboard all other philosophical principles and laws, first and
foremost those of dialectics and materialism, on the grounds that the categories of 336
quality, matter, necessity, essence and the like are alien to theoretical knowledge.
Modern philosophers of science in their works devoted to the concept of law and to p
the principle of determinism in fact identify law with universal assertions on the
grounds that the language of science does not express any necessity except the
logical one. Necessity itself is identified with universality which, in their opinion, is
all that is demanded of scientific statements, theoretical generalisations and even the
most advanced modern theories. Similar is their attitude to the categories of
contradiction, essence and practically all other main categories and laws of dialectics.
Such oversimplified understanding of the structure of scientific knowledge revealing p

itself in present-day positivist literature is a natural consequence of the main
premises of the philosophy of science limiting the philosophy and methodology of
science exclusively to the logic and language of scientific cognition. Regarding the
available knowledge as reality itself embodied in language, the positivists cannot but
overlook the infrastructure of science, i.e. its abstractions, premises and assumptions.
True, the latest variants of positivist philosophy, e.g. critical rationalism and other p
postpositivist trends, go as far as recognising the methodological, instrumental role
of some principles of dialectics, such as causality and determinism. Yet they also
stop short of recognising the theoretical significance of philosophical categories and
laws pointing out that they do not reveal themselves openly either in theoretical or in
empirical knowledge.
The view that philosophical substratum does not lie on the surface of scientific p 337
theories and empirical investigations is on the whole not objectionable. The question,
however, consists in whether the principles and laws of dialectics are indeed devoid
of any scientific significance and play no part in theoretical investigations.
To answer this question, it is necessary first of all to take into account some p
specific features of theoretical knowledge. Understandably, the formulation of
philosophical propositions and principles goes beyond the limits of a special
scientific investigation. Philosophical principles seldom come to the forefront in a
scientific system and their cognitive value is seldom conspicuous. As long as any
philosophical principle or, for that matter, any theoretical premise in general serves
the purposes of scientific investigation the scientist is not confronted with the task of
its further elaboration or improvement. And it is quite natural. His immediate aim is
to solve a specific problem within a more or less narrow field of his interests. He
achieves this aim directly, using the means of his particular science physics,
chemistry, biology, psychology, etc. Philosophical principles for the scientist are
something like air which he does not think of as long as his breathing is not
difficult.
What is more, this approach is evidently suggested by the very object under p
investigation since it appears to be the most promising and likely to yield the best
results. As a matter of fact, the object of investigation often proves, so to speak,
more dialectical and more materialistic than the theoretical views of the investigator
himself, particularly if his philosophical baggage consists of meagre positivist 338
abstractions.
In any case, the scientist does not pose any philosophical problems in his field of p
investigations as long as the concepts he relies upon in his practical work perform
the function of the foundation of science. The theoretical significance of
philosophical principles and laws would, perhaps, never come to light if they always
remained but implicit. Yet sooner or later the time comes when philosophical
concepts do reveal themselves to celebrate their victory and claim universal
recognition. Unlike experimental data and theoretical principles which lie at the root
of specific theories, philosophical principles and laws should be regarded as their
premises since it is impossible to deduce from them any particular scientific doctrine.
At the same time, no scientific theory is conceivable without the corresponding
philosophical basis. Hence, philosophical premises are essential, but not sufficient
conditions for theoretical and empirical cognition.
As distinct from theoretical concepts which serve as a basis for a nascent theory so p
that it is largely deducible from them, philosophical concepts constituting its
foundation cannot be used for deducing one or another variant of this theory. As a
matter of fact, there may be several ways of solving a problem which would meet
the requirements of materialism and dialectics, i.e. scientific philosophy, under given
conditions.
Speaking, for instance, of the philosophical foundation of classical physics, we can p

single out at least four philosophical ideas deeply rooted in all the theories of 19th-
century natural scientists. They are: (1) the idea of materiality of the world, the
identity of matter and substance, impenetrability of matter, etc.; (2) the idea of the 339
absoluteness of space and time regarded as receptacles of matter and as having
properties not connected with one another and independent of the movement of
material bodies; (3) the idea of absolute determinateness of all changes and events in
nature owing to universal interaction governed by the dynamic laws of mechanics
and expressed in the concept of Laplatian determinism; (4) the idea of the
independence of the object from the subject of investigation, i.e. the concept of the
objectivity of knowledge.
Since these ideas were linked with the theoretical foundation of contemporary p
science, they assumed even more concrete forms. For instance, materiality was
identified with several material properties such as constant mass, atomic structure,
impenetrability, etc.; space was assumed to be filled up with hypothetical material
medium called ether (hence the corpuscular and wave theories of light); interaction
was believed to spread instantaneously (hence the idea of remote action); matter and
motion were regarded to be indestructible (hence the law of conservation of energy).
The existing philosophical premises allowed of several alternative solutions to p

theoretical problems making equally plausible the corpuscular and the wave theories,
the theory of ether and the theory denying the existence of any mechanical elastic
medium, Laplatian determinism and statistical physics, etc. Metaphysical materialism
with its one-sided mechanistic conceptions of motion and matter brought natural
science to a crisis which was not confined to just one or several fields but affected
the very foundation of scienceits instinctively materialistic world view. Radium, 340
the great revolutionary, according to Henri Poincare, cast doubt on the law of
conservation of energy and, consequently, on the idea of the indestructibility of
matter. The electron shook the concepts of the indivisibility of atoms and the
immutability of the mass of a body thus undermining the idea of materiality. Albert
Michelsons experiments (1881) called in question the existence of ether and absolute
space in which the velocity of light should have been higher in the direction of the
movement of the source of light, but proved to be variable and independent of the
speed of the source of light. In 1901, Pyotr Lebedevs experiments revealed the
pressure of light. The discovery of X-rays in 1895 followed by the discovery of the
electron as the atoms main component (in 1897) and of radioactivity refuted the
idea of the indivisibility of atoms. Other philosophical foundations of classical
physics were undermined too: the concept of the immutability of natures primary
substances and attributes, of the universality and absolute identity of the operation of
mechanical laws both on the infinite and infinitesimal scales.
It became obvious that the philosophical doctrines inherited from the mechanistic p
materialism of the 17th-18th centuries could not provide a reliable theoretical
foundation for the solution of the pressing problems of physics and natural science in
general. The essence of the crisis in modern physics, wrote Lenin, consists in the
break-down of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective
reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the replacement of materialism by 341
idealism and agnosticism. Matter has disappearedone may thus express the
fundamental and characteristic difficulty in relation to many particular questions
which has created this crisis.[ 3411
Turning to the philosophical premises of 19th-century physics, the physicists p

unfamiliar with dialectics could not but identify metaphysical materialism with
materialism in general. We need not enlarge on this subject, as it has received
extensive coverage in relevant Marxist literature and is not, in fact, directly connected
with the main point we want to make here, namely, that the philosophical premises
of science have no independent significance as long as they do not come in a more
or less sharp conflict with the results of scientific investigations and the latest
theoretical views.
However, an impending crisis in science causes scientists to start revising its p

theoretical and experimental principles.
Yet a crisis may sometimes go deeper and involve also the philosophical foundation p
of science if it fails to meet the latest requirements. Hence, crises in the development
of science can only be avoided if scientists are fully aware of the philosophical
principles which underlie the fundamental theories in their fields of investigation. Of
special importance here is not only a profound theoretical background of scientific
personnel and a thorough knowledge of the history of science, but also sufficient
philosophical culture and good acquaintance with the historical sources of 342
philosophical problems. Most serious attitude to the philosophical foundation of a
given science is extremely important.
It is no secret that the philosophical principles of modern physics were formulated p

in a general form by Marx and Engels way back in the middle of the 19th century.
The definition of matter as a philosophical category denoting the objective reality
which exists independently of consciousness provided the necessary guideline for
scientific investigations in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. Progress in
physics could only be attained if the electron was regarded not as a purely theoretical
construct, not as an object with free will, but as a component part of the atom
with a complex structure of its own. The dialectical solution of the problem of the
relationship between necessity and chance constituting a single whole laid or was to
lay the foundation for the probability approach to the interpretation of quantum-
mechanical processes, for the correct understanding of probability and the relationship
between indeterminacies, i.e. the discoveries made in the first half of the 20th
century. The concept of the unity of space, time and motion advanced by Marx and
Engels also gave a clue to the special and general theories of relativity.
It stands to reason that the implementation of these philosophical concepts required p

of natural scientists conscious assimilation and further development of the
philosophical ideas of Marx and Engels providing a theoretical basis for dialectical
interpretation of concrete physical, biological, chemical and other data. Of great
importance for the accomplishment of this task was close cooperation between 343
philosophers and natural scientists. However, conditions at that time were not yet ripe
for such cooperation.
Even this short historical survey shows that philosophical knowledge is not doomed p
to remain forever behind the scenes. Sooner or later it is bound to come to the
forefront of scientific progress.
An essential distinction of fundamental theoretical investigations from empirical p

cognition consists in that theory is capable of setting and solving a number of
philosophical, tasks on its own. This feature, naturally, is largely accountable for the
difference in the attitude of scientists representing the two tendencies in the
development of science to the significance and value of philosophical problems and
to philosophy in general. The task of fundamental investigations consists in
explaining the established laws, revealing the links between them, predicting and
foreseeing new facts and new trends in the development of science. Theoretical laws
and concepts .therefore express necessity and are of a general nature. Theory no less
than empirical sciences rests on a philosophical basis in the form of adopted and
tested philosophical doctrines and principles, instrumental methodologically in the
formulation and explanation of new laws and relationships.
Hence, theoretical investigations also involve problems which we call philosophico- p

methodological and which are mainly connected with the use of the available
philosophical propositions, principles and laws in the solution of methodological
problems and in the fulfilment of concrete theoretical tasks. To be sure, the
philosophico-methodological approach to the problems dealt with in a theoretical 344

investigation is essentially different from the approach to the same problems in an
empirical investigation aimed at revealing and explaining individual facts of scientific
importance. For instance, the problem of the objectivity of knowledge viewed from
the philosophico-methodological angle at the theoretical level of cognition may boil
down to deciding on whether the theoretical analysis of a quantummechanical
ensemble should be carried out with the help of a certain apparatus or whether a
basically new means of investigation should be sought in order to make the process
under observation independent of the observer. Of course, the effect of an apparatus
on the micro-object is an objective phenomenon, but the nature of the apparatus and
the form of its influence cannot but tell, in one way or another, on the subjective
perception of the processes in interest. It would be wrong, therefore, to deny the fact
that object-subject problems do arise in such investigations. Moreover, it can be
asserted that no effective solution has been found to this problem so far. The
problem of causality regarded from the philosophico-methodological viewpoint at the
level of theoretical cognition may consist, for instance, in the theoretical explanation
of discovered laws, in the logical deduction of a certain proposition from several
premises, in the forecasting scientific and technological progress, etc. Here, too, the
content of the principle of causality, the meaning of the categories are not subject to
any special analysis.
Hence, the problems which we call philosophico-methodological have to be solved p

both by a theorist and an empirical scientist. Just like in the case of empirical 345
investigations, they are not regarded as philosophical problems mainly due to the fact
that the solutions sought are expected to help in the fulfilment of a specific scientific
task rather than in the formulation of a philosophical conclusion. The solution of the
specific problem in question is subordinated to the- principal aimthe solution of a
definite puzzle, a special theoretical problem.
Similarly to empirical knowledge, theoretical knowledge also has its limits. A p

theorist takes over where the empiricist leaves off. He formulates empirical laws,
explains them, links to other laws having the same degree of universality or to even
more general laws, gives them a theoretical substantiation. Scientific conclusions have
different degrees of universality expressing the necessary links and relationships at
different levels of generalisation. Some theories, e.g. the lever theory, differ but little
from empirical generalisations as they describe the properties of concrete objects and
phenomena. Other theories, such as the general systems theory, the set theory, the
games theory, the modern cosmological theories, and others come very close to
philosophical concepts and conclusions.
As is known, a scientific principle can only be refuted by another one if they p

represent similar or at least comparable degrees of generalisation. Consequently,
critical attitude to existing philosophical concepts, as well as real interest in the
development of philosophical knowledge which is indicative of the growing
understanding of its role and significance in modern science can only appear at the
theoretical level of scientific cognition. It does not mean, of course, that the 346
responsibility for developing philosophical knowledge rests exclusively with the
natural scientists. The point is that the revision of philosophical principles, however
partial, calls for their reassessment and creative development, since the problem is
not confined to the concrete expression or application of current philosophical laws.
It is laws themselves, their content, that become the object of scrutiny. The problems
which arise in such situations can be called theoretico-philosophical or world-view
problems.
The very nature of these problems makes it impossible for the natural scientists to p
tackle them on their own, though their solution may predetermine the results of
investigations in the specific fields they are concerned with. The professional
philosophers, for their part, need profound theoretical knowledge in highly specialised
fields of positive science in order to undertake this task. They must have a clear
understanding of the conflicting theoretical views in the given branch, know its
history and traditions. History knows many examples when the natural scientists set
themselves the task of solving philosophico-theoretical problems arising in their
fields in order to help overcome the crisis. Among prominent natural scientists who
made invaluable contribution to the theory and philosophy of science are such
famous names as Albert Einstein, Wolfgang Pauli, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg,
Vladimir Bekhterev, Ivan Pavlov, Nikolai Vavilov, Ernst Bauer, Vladimir Fock,
Dmitri Blokhintsev, and others.
In this context utterly absurd appear to be the repealed attempts of the positivists to p
lay the blame for unsolved philosophico-theoretical problems and deadlocks in 347
science on none other than philosophy, Marxist philosophy in the first place.
Positivism has always been trying to make Marxist philosophy the scapegoat for the
difficulties encountered in the process of scientific cognition. Be it the comprehension
of the philosophical problems of the theory of relativity or the painful process of
consolidation of the quantum theory, the guilt for the protracted debates and
controversies was invariably laid at the door of materialist dialectics and the Marxist
philosophers who were allegedly opposed to the adoption of new ideas in physics.
The development of genetics, too, purports to have been hampered by ill-intentioned
dialectics which, according to the positivist historians of science did not serve as a
guide for scientific thought but acted as a brake on its progress.
The history of science shows that theoretico-philosophical problems emerge as an p

expression of contradictions between the available theoretical basis of science and its
philosophical foundation. Philosophical arguments are only resorted to when a
theoretical problem cannot be solved by purely theoretical means and when it
becomes necessary, on the one hand, to analyse its scientific roots and, on the other,
to formulate its essence in philosophical terms and to indicate the possible ways for
its solution. This, in turn, calls for a sufficiently high philosophical culture. The
history of science knows a great many examples when the natural scientists proved
incapable of solving important philosophical problems only because they allowed
themselves to be enslaved by obsolete or basically false philosophical doctrines. On 348
the other hand, cases are on record when even prominent philosophers adhering to an
advanced philosophical teaching were unable to understand the significance of
pressing theoretico-philosophical problems as they lacked sufficient scientific
background or specific knowledge in the particular field of science.
Neither physics, biology, nor any other special science can be blamed for the p
inability of individual scientists to provide correct answers to topical problems of
world-view significance. Physics cannot be held responsible for the inability of such
scientists as Mach and Poincar to interpret materialistically the results of their own
scientific investigations. Similarly, it is not the fault of Marxist philosophy that some
of its ill-starred representatives abused and denounced cybernetics as a bourgeois
pseudo-science because they were unable to distinguish between its real scientific
content and the misrepresentation of its discoveries in Western philosophical
literature.
Hence, neither side alone can be held responsible for inability to understand and p
overcome one or another crisis in the theoretico-philosophical field: the fault lies
both with natural scientists and philosophers. Once physicists misjudge a certain
discovery, their error is seized upon by philosophers and becomes a source of
groundless philosophical illusions and absolutisations leading, as a rule, to idealism
and priestcraft. Should a slip be made by philosophers, their delusion will
immediately tell on the relations between the rival schools in the corresponding field
of positive science. Any controversy over methodological or philosophico-theoretical
problems is equally sensitive to both philosophical and specifically scientific 349
arguments.
Of course, it always takes scientists some time to realise that they are faced with a p
theoretico-philosophical problem. If any symptom of an impending crisis in science
becomes evident, philosophical concepts and principles are always the last to be
called in question. A wrong prediction or explanation in some specific field of
science leads first of all to the revision of theoretical principles and corresponding
scientific theories. Such a revision takes several years of scrupulous and wearisome
work even in our age of the scientific and technological revolution. The turn of the
philosophical concepts constituting the foundation of a given theory comes only after
scientists complete a most exacting test of the empirical basis and axiomatic
premises of the theory in question. There are many hot areas in modern science
where philosophical concepts and ideas are tested for strength by new scientific
discoveries. As in Engelss time, nature remains the touchstone of dialectics and
gives ever new evidence that it is governed by the laws of dialectics, and not
metaphysics.
The intensive development of modern science characterised by the ever increasing p

complexity of its structure and growing sophistication of its theoretical framework
expands further the sphere of mans knowledge. Scientific investigations extend to
ever new fields, new objects, phenomena and properties of the material world. This
statement may seem quite trivial, yet it is not always realised that the expansion of
scientific horizons is a transgression not only of the bounds of available knowledge,
but also of the bounds of the current theories and adopted paradigms. This latter 350
circumstance is of special significance since the current view tending towards some
kind of pantheorism maintains that practically all new facts discovered by modern
science do not go outside the framework of commonly professed theories, at least the
fundamental ones, such as the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, the theory of
the atomic structure of matter, and the Darwin theory.
True, so far as the modern means of scientific investigation are concerned, there are p
no grounds to question the validity of at least one of the above fundamental theories
both in the macro- and microworlds. Nonetheless, it is rather a weak argument in
favour of pantheorism. First of all, science has already received certain empirical
data and theoretical conclusions which are not quite compatible with current theories,
even with such a comprehensive one as the general theory of relativity. The
explanation of these facts calls for a special scientific investigation. It is quite likely
that a more thorough analysis will bring these facts in full conformity with the
theory in question. Yet a possibility cannot be excluded altogether that it will have to
be modified, generalised or even replaced by a basically new theory.
Besides, it is never to be forgotten that all current theories, however broad they may p
be, cannot claim to account for all the properties and aspects of the objective world.
In other words, science can still reveal vast areas, explored but partially or
unexplored at all, even in those fields where one or another fundamental theory
appears to be indisputable. Take, for instance, the complex ecological processes or 351
meteorological phenomena we are still trying to find a clue to and sometimes get the
badly needed answers when they are already useless. The earths bowels, too, are
full of mysteries, not to speak of our nearest neighbours, the Moon and Mars, which
are to be explored in the near future here we have no proven theoretical concepts
whatsoever to rely upon.
One can hardly expect to get the right perspective of the relationship between p
philosophy and science if he ignores the present trends of scientific development,
however inconspicuous and insignificant they may seem. One should take into
account the fact that the relations between philosophy and some natural sciences or
their departments concerned with these latest trends tend to become ever more direct
and unmediated.
The point is that, in the absence of a developed theory providing a direct and p
specific explanation of a given phenomenon and predicting its consequences, the
functions of such a theory largely pass to general philosophical concepts and
principles. To be sure, an essential role in the development of specific scientific
theories giving an exhaustive and concrete interpretation of facts belongs also to
theoretical or general scientific categories and principles. Yet philosophy plays an
independent theoretical part, too, and advances problems which may be called
philosophico-theoretical.
What are, for instance, those basic scientific principles which constitute now the p
theoretical core of ecological knowledge, the embryo of the future special theory?
They are nothing but a set of philosophical categories concretised to meet specific 352
conditions.
In geography, these basic categories represent the concepts of structure, dynamics, p

development and others. Thus, the landscape axiom is formulated as follows: In
each point of the earths surface individual elements, components and factors of
geographic substance are interconnected within a system of diverse and law-regulated
orderly ties. The chorological axiom postulating spatial interdependence reads thus:
All geographical phenomena are related to some geographical places which are
identified by their location and particularly by the connection of this location with
neighbouring places and areas. Here is the distinguishing feature of geographical
objects: In geographic reality there are no objects which do not possess such
geographical properties as location and spatial ties.
As one can see, all these initial theoretical propositions are essentially concretised p
basic methodological and world-view principles. Alongside the world view and
methodological functions dialectico-materialist philosophy performs an important
theoretical role.
Such an understanding of the functions of philosophical knowledge may at first p

seem to be a revival of the concept of natural philosophy discarded by Marxism way
back in the 19th century. Yet the emphasis on the theoretical significance of
philosophy has nothing in common with old natural philosophy if only for the fact
that materialist dialectics providing the initial theoretical basis for natural science
does not by any means claim to substitute philosophical principles and speculative
hypotheses for the subsequent detailed investigation of the object and for the specific 353
laws governing its functioning and development. The absolutisation of philosophical
knowledge, the speculativeness characterristic of the natural philosophy of the 17th
and 18th centuries are ruled out by dialectical materialist methodology itself. Marxist-
Leninist philosophy points the way for science to a more profound knowledge of the
world, stressing the need to pass from general philosophical principles to concrete
objects, and proves the necessity of discovering ever new aspects and empirical laws
of reality. According to dialectical materialism, philosophy should not keep aloof
from this process letting science stew in its own juice and expecting it to ripen all
by itself, evolve true philosophical principles or provide yet another proof of
dialectics.
Bad natural philosophy cannot spring from the methodology of dialectical p

materialism. It flourishes where the theoretical progress of science is made contingent
on pseudo-philosophical generalisations and ontological interpretations of physical,
chemical, biological and other specific data. Such generalisations and interpretations
claiming the role of philosophical categories actually tend to replace true
philosophical knowledge by speculative, natural-philosophical concepts.
It would be a mistake to presume that the appearance of natural-philosophical p

concepts can be effectively prevented in our time by the spontaneous development of
science and by Marxist criticism. That is not so. When propounding the Marxist-
Leninist understanding of philosophy, it is necessary to analyse not only the positivist
views, but also the natural philosophical concepts, e.g. within the framework of so- 354
called scientific realism, even if they spring up from a seemingly materialistic soil.
This circumstance deserves special attention, since the present crisis of positivist
philosophy tends to stimulate the revival of metaphysics as one of the alternatives
to the positivist methodological programme. It is precisely this alternative offered by
Western specialists in the methodology of science that leads to the reanimation of
natural philosophy in its modern form. Numerous publications by American and
British authors confirm it with utmost clarity.
It has already been pointed out in philosophical literature that the mere process of p
the generalisation of scientific data resulting in the creation of universal theories and
concepts does not yet produce any increment in philosophical knowledge. In point
of fact, such an increment gives grounds for various speculative, scholastic
concepts and hypotheses.
This approach is untenable for several reasons. First, the conclusions based on the p
simple generalisation of concrete scientific data cannot but be trivial as they do not
solve any real philosophical or special scientific problems. In fact, any generalisation
can only be regarded as scientifically valid if it ensues from the solution of a real
philosophical problem. Hence, to qualify as philosophical categories or principles,
any notions and generalisations should be interpreted in the light of the basic
principles of dialectical materialism, tested for relevance and consistence with other
philosophical categories and laws.
Second, such conclusions are scientifically barren as they do not lead to any new p 355
problems.
Third, such conclusions tend to distort the philosophical picture of reality, and this p
is perhaps the most serious defect of the method under consideration. Not a single
notion can gain circulation and be used in a philosophical context, in debates or
discussions, unless it is assessed from the viewpoint of the main question of
philosophy. Why is it so important? First and foremost, because philosophical
analysis is based, at least in relation to the world view and methodology, on the
already existing concepts and theories which, understandably, possess both the
objective content and subjective elements. One should clearly understand the
dialectics of these two aspects of scientific knowledge and distinguish one from the
other in order to avoid errors in manipulating the new notion and trying to solve
philosophical problems.
Suppose, we discuss the cause-effect problem in the light of the feedback concept. p
Its solution can only be obtained if we present the above categories as abstractions.
For a physicist, biologist, a specialist in cybernetics or, for that matter, in any other
field of natural science this problem simply does not exist. Specialists do not deal
with the categories of causality and feedback, but with objective processes
themselves. In this context the above categories are not regarded as abstractions with
corresponding approximations, assumptions, etc. In objective reality feedback links
are inseparable from causal links. Besides, analysing the processes of control in
terms of feedback relations, a scientist practically does not resort to the concept of
causality. It means that these concepts have quite definite epistemological limits 356
which also determine the sphere of their application. Hence, the applicability of one
or another conceptand we are speaking here about scientific concepts of a very
general naturedepends not only on the specific field of objective reality, but also
on the epistemological bounds. The transgression of such bounds, as well as the use
of theoretical categories in an alien field renders them nonsensical.
The solution of one or another question from the philosophical angle requires p
special attention to the epistemological bounds of notions and concepts. In this
respect the philosophical approach making a sharp distinction between the objective
and subjective aspects of scientific facts and ideas is essentially different from the
approach of the natural scientists, just like philosophy in general is different from the
knowledge accumulated in physics, biology, chemistry and other particular sciences.
Of course, the basic question of philosophy is not the only filter for scientific p
generalisations which are to qualify as truly philosophical categories of world-view
significance. No less important in this respect are the fundamental laws and
categories of materialistic dialectics.
It should never be forgotten that the transition from the special knowledge obtained
within the framework of some positive science to the philosophical level of thinking,
like the process of scientific cognition in general, has very little in common with a
linear and unidimensional process of successive generalisations, something in the
nature of epigenesis. This transition is a qualitative change, a swing to a different 357
level of universality and, accordingly, to a different level of comprehension of the
necessary links and relations of the objective world.
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 3341] Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974,

pp. 20910.
[ 3411] V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit., p.258.
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The contemporary development of scientific knowledge is characterised by certain p
peculiar trends very important for understanding the relationship between philosophy
and science. These trends testify to the fact that dialectics is a replica of objective
Contents
reality and therefore provides the best method for its cognition. For one, dialectics
highlights the objective character of such a profound intrinsic contradiction of
Index scientific and technical progress as the unity of integration and differentiation of
Card science. These two processes account to a considerable extent for the growing
complexity of the structure of scientific knowledge and cannot but affect the progress
Formats: of philosophy itself. Their objective and veracious presentation and assessment can
Text only be undertaken by a philosophy which is fully cognizant of its own dependence
PS on the general trend of scientific development yet is not susceptible to particular
PDF influences within each special science. It is only this kind of philosophy that is
capable of viewing the development of science from the inside by virtue of its
being its integral part and, as it were, its spokesman, and from the outside, as
Other the exponent of its most general laws, principles and categories.
Titles:
TA
From the viewpoint of dialectical materialism which is the only philosophy capable p 358

Years:
of the above approach, the main and most essential trend in the development of
1984 modern science consists in the growing interdependence of natural, social and
technical sciences. This trend does not fall in with either positivist or any of the
post-positivist models of the development of science. It is highly significant that
### this fruitful cooperation is based on modern production and its achievements, on the
one hand, and unsolved problems, on the other. Marxs prediction that science will
MAP eventually turn into a direct productive force of society is coming true and this fact
is gaining ever wider recognition. Understandably, this applies primarily to natural
and technical sciences. Their increasingly close interaction stems not only from the
needs of production and from social tasks, but also from the inner logic of scientific
development, from the vital tasks of fundamental and applied research. The very
links between science and production, the effectiveness of scientific investigations
and fundamental research depend to a considerable extent on the depth of integration
of scientific knowledge.
An important feature of scientific progress in our time which is overlooked or p

deliberately ignored by all modern philosophy of science is the rapidly increasing
significance and theoretical independence of social sciences. Their growing prestige is
connected with spectacular achievements of Marxist thought in transforming social
relations and in the successful management of society in the socialist countries, with
the consolidation of the principles of socialist ethics and social humanism. Yet the
immediate objective cause of this process is the increasing role of social sciences in 359
the sphere of social production.
Under the conditions of modern scientific and technical progress profound p

knowledge of the achievements and problems of social sciences becomes a
prerequisite for the successful development of natural science and should be regarded
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/3.5-Dialectics.and.Integration.of.Science[2012-12-17 15:16:33]
as an important element in the general scientific and cultural background of a

modern scientist. The role of social sciences should not be confined to giving a
specialist in natural or technical sciences a certain minimum of knowledge just to
broaden his outlook. They should also provide him with relevant social information
to permit solving complex problems he may encounter in his more or less narrow
field of activity, let alone the tasks of preparing him for socially useful activity,
solving organisational problems, broadening his philosophical horizon and improving
ideological education. The very logic of scientific progress, the law of the
development of modern science calls for a broad humanitarian education of the so-
called narrow specialists.
Under the impact of the current scientific and technological revolution social p
sciences, particularly some of their applied disciplines, penetrate into the very core of
production processes revealing new possibilities for the solution of important
theoretical and practical problems and for enhancing the efficiency of production.
The revolution gives a powerful impetus to the development of new forms of
interaction between theoretical and experimental investigations within the framework
of natural, social and technical sciences.
The current scientific and technological revolution is connected primarily with the p 360
discovery and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, with the development of
automation and computers, breathtaking achievements of chemistry, rapid progress of
biology and space flights. Natural science plays today a crucial role in developing
qualitatively new instruments of labour and new materials, in introducing basically
new technological systems, designing automatic machine lines, introducing on a wide
scale automated control systems and in solving many other important problems.
Tremendous achievements of modern science and technology have made it possible
to start fundamental investigations of the structure of matter in micro- and
macrocosm, to design and develop complex technical systems, investigate and
reproduce the most intricate systems of living nature, including the human organism.
The current scientific and technological revolution is also characterised by the p

essential enhancement of the human factor in production, i.e. of the role of man as
the subject of the production process, by a radical change in the man-science-
technology system and by the growing complexity of organisation and management.
A crucial role in the investigation of all these phenomena belongs to social sciences
whose representatives take an active part in the development of the theoretical
principles of scientific control over socio-economic processes, in the study of
numerous factors stimulating creative activity and in improving industrial engineering
and production schemes. The influence of social sciences in the sphere of production
is constantly growing and its cooperation with natural and technical sciences is 361
becoming ever closer and more fruitful.
The penetration of social sciences into the sphere of production affects not only the p
systems of control and organisation. Changes in the man-science-technology complex
go side by side with the revolution in the very foundation of production processes.
The growing complexity of the design and operation of modern machines, their
increasing role in the automation and management of production make ever more
exacting demands not only on natural, but also on social sciences which have to
supply the necessary data for engineering solutions. The present level of integration
of social, natural and technical sciences makes it incumbent on engineers, designers
and specialists in cybernetics to take accurate account of social, psychological and
other human factors in production, in the service industry and in other fields.
The development of new technology and the extensive use of automation, data- p
processing equipment and computers are primarily the result of the labour of
mathematicians and specialists in cybernetics and electronics, yet the achievements in
these fields are also creditable to the creative endeavour of logicians, linguists,
psychologists, specialists in mathematical economy and economic cybernetics. It is
common knowledge that computers which are indispensable in modern production
systems cannot be constructed and operated without the solution of economic,
psychological, logical and linguistic problems. As a result, new sciences come into
being, such as applied linguistics, human engineering, and economic cybernetics, The
computerisation of industrial processes is impossible without the modelling of 362
numerous thinking operations, so far comparatively simple, and without solving the
problems connected with translation from human language into machine language.
The highly accurate operation of automatons is known to be controlled by algorithm-
base programmes representing the models of production and social processes. The
creation of artificial languages, the systematisation of terms and symbols, the
development of modelling systems have expanded the scope of application of
linguistics which was originally confined to the problems of teaching the native or
foreign languages and translating from one language into another, and had very little
to do with direct production processes.
The extreme complexity of systems which include man as their component, calls for p
new research methods essentially different from the traditional physico-mathematical
analysis. Linguistics, for instance, holds out much promise in the field of modelling
such systems as it permits using not only digits, but also words and even whole
sentences of the natural language. Profound investigations into the structure of the
natural language, the analysis of the laws governing its formation and functioning are
also helpful in the solution of certain technical problems, such as the improvement of
the quality standards and responsiveness of the press, automation of some editing and
publishing processes, etc.
The acceleration of scientific and technical progress, the development of effective p

control systems result in the rapid increase of information flows which have to be
processed at an ever growing rate. The participation of linguists in the improvement 363
of production and social processes with the use of computers finds its expression
today in a new linguistic method of investigationthe modelling of the linguistic
system and speech processes. The results of this modelling are materialised in special
artificial languages and various linguistic algorithms. Particularly accurate should be
the modelling of speech processes when developing dialogue-type systems and other
advanced methods of man-machine interaction.
Applied linguistics is called upon to make its contribution to the essential p

improvement of all systems using the natural language and to the enhancement of
their effectiveness. Specifically, it should enable computers to receive information in
its natural forms, without any preliminary preparation by man. Computers should
manipulate semantic units instead of textual elements, sharply expand the volume of
information required for the automatic solution of intellectual problems and open up
new possibilities for its complex logical processing. To achieve these aims, it is
necessary to develop machine languages approximating to the natural one, create
identification devices capable of recognising human voice or its optical images, and
improve the general standard of self-control and self-perfection of machines within
the man-machine system. The solution of this latter task is now becoming quite
feasible owing to the fact that the substance of mans creative activity yields ever
more readily to mathematical description. An important role in this process belongs,
for one, to human engineering which describes mans mental characteristics and
functions in terms of mathematical language. This can be easily translated into a 364
machine language to fit in human and machine characteristics. A similar function is
performed by bionics, particularly psychological bionics.
The investigation into the role of the human factor in modern technology throws a p
new light on such philosophical problems as the man-machine relationship, the
specific features of man-machine languages, substantive and formal moments in
reproductive and creative thinking, artificial intellect and self-organisation, the unity
of the algorithmic and heuristic principles of thinking.
Social sciences play an increasingly important role in the solution of questions p

pertaining to the development of a single classification system for various items and
terms, to the unification and standardisation of documents with a view to producing
uniform information for various control systems in production and other fields of
social life. In this connection a need arises to start a more profound investigation
into the theoretical problems of terminology, the language of science, and to join the
efforts of scientists studying these problems. The creation of such classifiers, as well
as the development and introduction of uniform documents, single systems of
technical, economic, financial and other indices should not only reflect the growing
information unity of social, natural and technical sciences, but also take into account
new trends in the improvement of the organisational structure of the economy, the
new level of the development of democratic centralism in the sphere of management
and control. Classifiers not only record essential balance links between the economy 365
and control systems, but also serve as the source material for economic and
mathematical modelling in all spheres of the national economy.
Automation of production and many other problems of social, scientific and p

technical progress provide yet another channel for the penetration of social sciences
into the sphere of production and for their drawing closer to natural sciences. The
more difficult the tasks and the more complex the processes subject to automation,
the more imperative the need for studying man and the full diversity of his
individual qualities, the social ones inclusive. The focus of attention is shifted on
mans activity, and the results achieved in these studies determine to a considerable
extent the solution of many crucial problems, both practical and theoretical.
From the viewpoint of theory, the investigation of human activity acquires special p
importance in modelling mans actions and thinking processes. Computers can only
simulate the operational and technical functions of human thinking. The procedures
characteristic of the actions of machine and man are entirely different, let alone the
difference of the mechanisms themselves. The extremely complex nature of human
activity cannot be reduced to logico-mathematical algorithms. Attempts at formalising
certain elements of thinking processes, extremely useful as they are, do not yet give
grounds for excessive optimism about the possibility of all-round modelling of mans
mental activities, developing a full-scale artificial or hybrid intellect, etc. Computers
can essentially facilitate, speed up and improve the accuracy of the decision-making
process, yet they can also accelerate the implementation of an incorrect decision. 366
The experience gained in the operation of computers has provided convincing p

evidence that, in contrast to the solution of simple and similar type problems when
mans role in automated control systems is limited to setting a task, inserting initial
data into the computer and interpreting the formal decision, the attainment of
substantive solutions is only possible on the condition that man intervenes in the
decision-making process at each stage of the machine operation. It has turned out
that the elements of creative approach to the solution of complex problems,
particularly in unforeseen circumstances and in cases when logical and mathematical

formalisation proves difficult, are needed much more often than in the case of
simpler problems. Such operations as the identification of new targets in research, the
breaking up of the general task into subtasks, the development of new criteria for a
new situation, the selection of the classification base and methods of equivalent
transformations and many others include numerous elements which do not yet lend
themselves to formal and algorithmic presentation. Therefore the need for direct
interaction between man and machine, i.e. for the man-machine dialogue becomes
more and more imperative.
As a result, social and technical sciences find themselves confronted with the p
extremely interesting problems of the organisation and design of human activity in its
unity with automation facilities ranging from elementary means to most complex and
sophisticated equipment.
The difficulties and miscalculations in the development of automatic control systems p 367
and automatic devices are not infrequently traceable to the underestimation of the
data provided by social sciences. The specificity of economic processes characteristic
of a given industry, industrial amalgamation or enterprise is not always taken into
account by automation development engineers who tend to concentrate on secondary
problems, mainly related to accounting, rather than to tackle the key issues of
control such as scientific prognostication, scientific and technical progress, etc.
New technical means not only make work easier, they change essentially the very p
nature of labour and shift the emphasis onto mans intellectual abilities by
complicating the process of data apprehension and analysis and increasing demands
on his ingenuity, creative powers and ability to make quick decisions in a changing
situation. These features of modern production account for the need to extend
scientific investigations beyond the traditional field of physical and chemical
characteristics of the instruments of labour, quality of materials and energy problems,
and to enlist the services of social sciences. Scientific investigations in the field of
labour activity should not be confined to technical facilities as such and to man as
the subject of production. They should concentrate more and more on the
correspondence between mans physical and mental possibilities, aesthetic tastes and
other social qualities, on the one hand, and the properties of modern technical
systems, on the other.
The problem of man, his concrete role in the transformation of nature and society is p
becoming one of the key issues stimulating the most profound integration of social, 368
natural and technical sciences. Therefore, in considering the task of optimising
human activity as part of the general problem of the rationalisation of labour,
philosophers jointly with sociologists, psychologists and engineers ought to think of
how to avoid the restriction of mans creative activity by the further automation of
production. Non-automated and semi-automated production processes not only limit
the workers freedom of action, but also make it difficult to change from one
occupation to another. While projecting new trades and professions in connection
with the deepening processes of automation, special measures should be taken to
neutralise these negative trends. Seeking to make work easier and more interesting,
the development engineers engaged in the rationalisation of production processes and
technical means and in the improvement of environmental conditions at industrial
enterprises are already confronted with the need for designing specific labour
operations. These should relate both to individual elements of production (a concrete
working place, a specific man-machine system), and to technical complexes (a
production line, a shop, etc). The designing of new kinds of labour activity, of more
rational forms of interaction between man and nature, man and machine, etc. is still
behind practical needs. However, this trend represents yet another important field
where natural, social and technical sciences join their efforts to achieve a common
goal.
Modern science regards man, machine and the production environment as a complex p
dynamic system, with man playing the leading part. A comparatively new branch of 369
science known as ergonomics or human engineering studies the role of human factors
in modern production and other spheres of activity and analyses the integral
characteristics of the man-machine system. Investigations in this field cannot be
reduced to the analysis of the characteristic features of man, machine and production
environment separately from one another, even if they are viewed in the aggregate.
Ergonomics as a science is evidently confronted with the task of developing its own
theory and devising its specific methods of investigation into the man-technology-
production environment system.
A comprehensive approach to the problem of mans labour activity based on the p

achievements of social, natural and technical sciences throws a new light on many
theoretical and practical problems. It makes it possible to correctly assess not only
the role of the instruments of labour, technical means and the real significance of the
factors of production environment, but also the place of man in modern social
production. Such an important category as the quality of labour, for instance,
acquires a new meaning. Economists are at present mainly concerned with such
characteristics of labour as its complexity (calling for the workers appropriate
qualification), intensity, physical hardness, importance for society, etc. All these
characteristics are taken into account in wage rating practices at state enterprises.
However, they cannot reveal in full scope the social effectiveness of labour. The
analysis of its quality only from the viewpoint of narrow practical criteria does not
fully reflect the specificity of labour under the conditions of developed socialism. Yet 370
the quality of labour is an integral characteristic which represents the product quality
and quantity indicators referred to the indicators of mans health and intellectual
level.
At the present stage of industrial development it becomes technically possible to p

realise projects on the basis of a comprehensive approach to mans activity. Under
the conventional pattern, design work on a system generally starts from its estimated
technical characteristics which determine the place and the functions of the man-
operator, the latters role being mainly assessed in terms of limitations (a relatively
small amount of information the operator is capable of processing within a unit of
time, a relatively slow response, a comparatively weak resistance to noise, etc.).
Time has evidently come to reverse this order and try the alternative method. p
Specifically, in developing a technical assignment the designers should proceed from
the idea of the secondary, auxiliary function of machines and, consequently, take into
account, first and foremost, the positive qualities of man as the real subject of
labour, i.e. his advantages over the machine, but not his demerits. This approach
opens up basically new possibilities for enhancing the efficiency of labour and will
eventually make it possible to shift the focus of attention from the solution of the
pressing problems of industrial engineering, the improvement of available technical
means and the adaptation of man to the existing technological norms onto the design
of new forms of human activity based on comprehensive theoretical investigations
into mans physical, mental and intellectual potentialities now being studied by 371
ergonomics. As has been pointed out in the recommendations of the Second
International Conference of Scientists and Specialists of CMEA Countries and
Yugoslavia on Ergonomics (Bulgaria, 1975), the trends in the development of modern

production will evidently bring about a situation in which the main design problems
will .be connected not with the investigation of equipment characteristics, but with
the search for ways and means ensuring optimal interaction between man and
technical means. The main criteria for such optimisation must be the provision of the
most rational equipment (depending on the concrete achievements of scientific and
technical progress) and the maximum satisfaction of mans need for creative work.
Besides the mutual influence of their ideas and methods, the growing p
interdependence of social, natural and technical sciences finds its expression in the
emergence of new branches of knowledge on the borderlines between them.
Ergonomics, engineering aesthetics, applied linguistics, economic cybernetics, etc. can
hardly be classified among purely natural or purely social sciences. They do not
study man as such or objective relations between people, or the technical aspect of
production. The subjectmatter of these disciplines which constitutes the basis for the
synthesis of social and natural sciences is the interaction of man and technical
systems, production and natural environments, etc.
In this context special importance attaches to the analysis of complex p

methodological problems underlying the synthesis of social, natural and technical 372
knowledge. It is the diversity of possible approaches to mans labour activity in
modern production that presents the main difficulty in developing a single language
for different specialists concerned with ergonomical problems. Understanding among
economists, designers and psychologists can only be achieved on condition that the
synthesis of social and natural sciences is not reduced to a mechanical combination
in some aggregate system or conglomeration of knowledge, or even to the
establishment of some kind of subordination between them, but is based on the
general theory of labour activity.
This task deserves most serious attention and calls for extensive investigations p
(alongside the solution of applied problems) into the general principles of human
activity. Such investigations should be aimed at revealing the laws governing the
perception of data, the shaping of combined pictorial-conceptual models, visual
thinking and decision-making processes. Much has already been done in this
direction, yet the development of a comprehensive theory of labour activity is still a
matter of the future. As a result of the weakness of the general theoretical basis
technical systems are often designed without due regard for the human factor. For
instance, man is viewed merely as an auxiliary technical element, and very
inconvenient at that, of a control system, and the system is understood as some
kind of a computerised complex differing from the conventional one only by the
number of technical means employed and by the method of its operation. Such an
approach is absolutely untenable from the methodological viewpoint and leads in 373
practice to serious technical and economic miscalculations.
Ergonomic investigations are mainly aimed so far at attaining specific aims, rather p
narrow by nature: the improvement of technical means to meet the requirements of
modern production, the optimisation of machine-tool configurations, the rational
arrangement of instruments or control desks and auxiliary equipment, the
improvement of controls, etc. True, the scope of these investigations is gradually
expanding: besides the equipment improvement and layout optimisation problems,
specialists in ergonomics jointly with designers study the possibilities of
domesticating the territory of industrial enterprises so that it may merge naturally
with the city or suburban complex. They concern themselves more and more often
not only with the quality and external appearance of one or another industrial
product, but also with the conditions, both natural and social, under which it is to be
used.
It stands to reason that the scientific solution of the problem of optimal interaction p
between man and machine in the socialist countries is directed not only towards
enhancing the efficiency and economic effect of new technology in connection with
the new role of man in the system of modern production. Even a more important
aim of this investigation consists in creating the best possible conditions for the
development of man and for freeing him from the strain of tedious and monotonous
work. The new technology, the extensive use of electronic computers and the overall
improvement of production conditions testifies, first and foremost, to the
humanitarian mission of science opening up new possibilities for improving mans 374
welfare and ensuring his all-round harmonious development.
An important factor in the strengthening of links between social, natural and p

technical sciences is the tendency towards the integration of their cognitive
potentialities, both theoretical and experimental, as regards the rational use of nature,
environmental protection and the solution of other global problems.
The synthesis of social, natural and technical sciences in the process of the p
comprehensive solution of various problems leads to the emergence of numerous
gravitation centres where specialists in most diverse fields of science join their
efforts to achieve a common goal, and accounts for different levels of analysis,
including the highest level of the integration of social and natural sciences on the
basis of materialist dialectics which becomes in this case the theoretical and
methodological basis for complex scientific investigations. This tendency results in a
considerable enhancement of the role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as the most
general theory of the development of nature, society, thinking and the methodology
of science. Lenins idea of the alliance between Marxist philosophers and
representatives of special sciences is demonstrating its increasing viability. Under the
conditions of socialism, this alliance derives its strength from the principles of
dialectical materialismthe objectivity of knowledge, development, causality,
existence of objective laws, etc.which provide a solid methodological basis for
natural, social and technical sciences. From its inception, Marxist philosophy has
been absorbing the outstanding achievements of natural and social sciences and 375
developing as the methodology of natural knowledge, social knowledge and the
world-transforming revolutionary practice.
At the turn of the 20th century Lenin wrote: It is common knowledge that a p
powerful current flowed from natural to social science not only in Pettys time, but
in Marxs time as well. And this current remains just as powerful, if not more so, in
the twentieth century too.[ 3751 The truth of Lenins words is once again
confirmed by the large-scale penetration of the mathematical methods of analysis into
social sciences which use them as an important instrument of sociological, economic
and psychological investigations, and by the application of computers and data
processing equipment in the sphere of public opinion studies (opinion polls). The
development of science is characterised today by powerful currents of ideas not only
from natural to social sciences but also in the opposite directionthe problems, ideas
and methods of social sciences exercise an ever increasing influence on natural and
technical sciences. An important role in their integration belongs to cybernetics, the
probability theory, the games theory and the theory of information. For instance,
cybernetics has not only made a valuable contribution to the development of the
methodology of some social sciences and to the very style of scientific thinking, but
has itself benefited from the alliance with social sciences. As a matter of fact, its
very first steps could not but be influenced by such general concepts of progressive 376
social and philosophical thought as target setting, control, systems analysis, etc. The
concepts of memory, teaching (in relation to automatons), game, collective behaviour
and others made their way into cybernetics together with the new problems and
specific methods of psychology, sociology and linguistics. The investigation into the
so-called artificial intellect problems also testifies to the influence of humanitarian
sciences on the orientation of cybernetics. The development of data converters and
machine programmes in line with cybernetic concepts emphasises the imperative need
for studying the nature of mans creative activity and heuristic art and highlights the
importance of the knowledge of man and society.
The growing interdependence of social, natural and technical sciences and their p
methods of investigation, the emergence and rapid development of the marginal
branches of knowledge, the tendency towards comprehensive investigations of major
economic and fundamental scientific problems by joint efforts of sociologists and
natural scientistsall this tends to enhance the role of dialectical-materialist
methodology. The new conditions causing social, natural and technical sciences to
draw ever closer together pose a number of complex problems of world outlook and
methodology before Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Most serious attention, for one,
should be given to such problems as the main directions and concrete forms of the
integration and differentiation of sciences, the use of methods employed by natural
science in sociological investigations, the mathematisation of knowledge.
The analysis of dialectical transitions between the abstract and the concrete, the p 377
general and the particular, the empirical and the theoretical, the substantive and the
formal in scientific cognition is a necessary condition for the effective
implementation of the ideas of mathematics, mathematical logic and cybernetics in
other sciences. Of special importance is the dialectics of the abstract and the
concrete, the general and the particular in the analysis of social relations carried out
with the use of abstract mathematical and cybernetic notions. In this field the correct
subordination of notions, methods and techniques plays a decisive role. Any
formalism and eclectic dovetailing of social, natural and technical concepts is
absolutely inadmissible.
All this shows that the increasing differentiation and deepening integration of p
scientific knowledge pose extremely important tasks before dialectical materialism as
the philosophical and methodological foundation of the cooperation of sciences. The
philosophic interpretation of the latest achievements of social, natural and technical
sciences is one of the important prerequisites for the further development of scientific
world outlook and methodology. Yet the task of philosophy cannot be confined
either to the passive registration of these achievements or to their so-called
generalisation consisting essentially in attaching the tags of philosophical categories
to some general concepts worked out by science. The philosophy of dialectical and
historical materialism cannot and must not be just a pedlar of new ideas and data
obtained by other sciences. This philosophy is indeed open for all new and fruitful 378
ideas, yet it does not mean that it is a mere vessel for accumulating general scientific
information. Its function is to give a creative interpretation and a dialectical synthesis
of new data. This, in turn, presupposes the creative development of Marxist-Leninist
philosophy itself, its enrichment with new ideas, the further concretisation of its
categories representing the sum total of the entire history of mans cognition and
transformation of the world.
The complexity of integration processes accounts for considerable difficulties in the p

solution of these problems. The rapprochement and close cooperation of some
sciences, such as psychology and physiology, tend -to gradually obliterate the
borderlines between them and lead some scientists to an erroneous conclusion that
their objects coincide. This view is fraught with the danger of overlooking qualitative
distinctions between the objects of investigation by these sciences and this, in turn,
may result in the absolutisation of certain methods and concepts at the expense of
others. In fact, such sciences as psychology and physiology of higher nervous
activity study different aspects of the activity of the brain and, consequently, the
objects of their interest must not be confused. The psychologists task evidently
consists in studying the socio-historical origin of the most complex forms of
consciousness regarded as an independent object of investigation which cannot
receive an exhaustive explanation in terms of physiological processes alone, though
the latter constitute the basis of the complex forms of mans conscious actions. It is
this task which determines the basic methodological principle of the interaction 379
between psychology and physiology. The identification of the subject-matters of the
physiology of higher nervous activity and psychology bars the way for understanding
the socio-historical laws that govern the formation and development of the higher
forms of psychic activity and is in fact tantamount to denying psychology as a
separate science. Similar difficulties arise in the realisation of comprehensive research
programmes, since their effectiveness largely depends on the assignment of the field
of activity for each specialist and on the understanding of his possibilities and
advantages in a given investigation.
Such synthesis, however, should not be regarded as the simple summation of p

knowledge obtained by individual sciences. The purpose of a comprehensive analysis
is not to obtain data characterising different aspects of an object and to present them
in a summarised form. It consists, first and foremost, in defining the main factor
which constitutes the system under investigation and accounts for its specificity and
integrity. It is therefore very important to assess correctly the significance of the
problems of theory, methodology and world view arising in the process of the
integration and interaction of individual sciences in a complex investigation. The
adequate idea of the basic integrated properties of a complex studied by different
sciences can only be provided by a more general theory. Indeed, the experience
gained in the development of comprehensive programmes of cooperation of natural,
technical and social sciences attests to the fact that such programmes, born out of the 380
needs to solve certain practical, applied problems, tend to advance new theoretical
questions and actualise philosophical problems pertaining to the activity of man in
general, his interaction with machine, the relations between production and the
environment, nature and society, etc.
Complex methodological problems of the interaction of social, natural and technical p

sciences arise not only in connection with the definition of their objects of
investigation, but also as a result of the mutual penetration of their concepts and
methods. Laying aside the question of the possible forms of such interaction, we
shall merely emphasise here that each attempt to apply the methods and concepts of
one science in the field of another science should be preceded by a dialectico-
materialist analysis of the possibilities of such extrapolation and, consequently,
should be viewed as a philosophical problem. Nothing but harm will result from the
oversimplified understanding of this process and from the underestimation of those
philosophical and methodological principles which underlie the development of
social, natural and technical sciences and their creative possibilities. The uncritical,
mechanistic transfer of the concepts and methods of one science, ungrounded
extrapolations and formal generalisations can only mislead a scientist. The borrowing
of the ideas and methods by one science from another presupposes their creative
assimilation and reassessment in accordance with the specific object and tasks of the
former. Under such conditions special importance attaches to the analysis of

dialectical transitions from one field of knowledge to another. Any underestimation 381
of the importance of the methodological, philosophical analysis of the borrowed ideas
and methods leads either to negativism regarding the possibility of the integration of
the methods of social, natural and technical sciences, or to a kind of euphoria,
ungrounded enthusiasm about the cybernetisation, mathematisation, formalisation and
ecologisation of science often prompted by nothing more than the desire to keep up
with vogue.
Though the positivist concepts of the relationship between philosophy and special p
sciences, as well as between social and natural sciences have gone never to return,
the reductionist illusions regarding the relationship between the social and the
biological, the social and the psychological prove to be very tenacious. For instance,
striving to trace the roots of crime, some authors are inclined to see them in genetic,
i.e. essentially molecular-biological mechanisms. Similar tendencies are also in
evidence in the interpretation of the so-called biosocial nature of man. This formula
looks attractive enough due to its laconicism, yet it tends to oversimplify the
mediated relationship between the social and the biological, camouflaging a number
of essential intermediate links between them. It is precisely owing to the complexity
of this relationship, its mediate character, that social phenomena do not yield either
to direct biological explanations or to an interpretation in terms of the so-called
parallelism of social and biological factors. To be sure, the dialectico-materialist
analysis of high-level psychological processes or social phenomena with all their
links and relations of mediation should not ignore the natural determinants of human 382
behaviour. Such determinants, however, must be taken into account in unity with all
other factors revealing the definitive role of social motives in the activity of man.
It stands to reason that the integration and differentiation of science alongside the p
increasing importance of theory tend to complicate the structure of modern scientific
knowledge and its further development. The emergence of such sciences as
cybernetics, the games theory, the information theory, and others which study very
general laws applicable to entirely different objects and phenomena of reality partly
accounts for an illusion that positive sciences no longer need a philosophy and that
philosophical knowledge can be at last replaced by general scientific concepts
capable of providing the necessary methodological and scientific basis for more
concrete sciences. Some contemporary Western philosophers go even as far as
asserting that the prophecy of positivism has at last come true and that science
assumes the methodological prerogatives which hitherto belonged to philosophy.
True, modern science can no longer content itself with the means of the local p
synthesis of knowledge. A need arises to synthesise the knowledge of
interdisciplinary character and to develop additional means for such a synthesis:
special integration theories, new branches of knowledge and new scientific trends,
such as cybernetics, semiotics, system investigations, a general theory of modelling, a
theory of similarity and dimensions, investigation of operations, etc. The additional
means for such a synthesis also include new hardwareautomatic data processors, 383
such as cybernetic modelling machines and computers which essentially enhance the
efficiency of brain work by mechanising and automating mental operations,
particularly in the bibliographic information service, which is thus enabled to solve
new complex problems. This intellectual industry permits improving the accuracy
of weather forecasts, developing many branches of the national economy, accelerating
technical progress, etc. Without its aid it would be impossible to carry out extremely
complex calculations, exercise control over space flights and solve many other
problems.
The peculiar position of general scientific disciplines which serve as intermediaries p

between philosophy and natural sciences results from the two main functions they
perform. First, they provide a theoretical and methodological basis for a number of
positive sciences. Characteristic in this respect is the connection of these sciences
with mathematical methods of investigation which enable them to carry out more
general qualitative and quantitative analyses and to apply the general rules of
calculation in a given concrete field of investigation. Second, they serve as an
intermediate methodological link between certain positive sciences and materialist
dialectics as a whole.
For instance, the specific methodological function of the theory of similarity which p
covers physical and physico-chemical processes manifests itself in processing and
generalising experimental data and in modelling physical processes. The conceptual
body of the theory of investigation of operations is not limited to mathematics. Its 384
categories and the general principle of investigation provide a particular
methodological approach in the investigation of any complex goal-oriented activity,
its elements being individual operations. This theory is used in the investigation of
many different kinds of human activity, as well as in the analysis of man-machine
complexes representing automated control systems. The main principles and
categories of cybernetics provide particular methodological guidelines for sciences
concerned with living nature and social life, as well as for technical sciences
investigating control processes in terms of data-processing operations. These include
the questions of automatic regulation, self-adjustment, instruction and self-instruction,
self-organisation, self-reproduction and the development of natural and artificial
systems. Hence, from the theoretical and methodological viewpoint integrative
sciences provide, as it were, a kind of a bridge to the highest theoretical
generalisations and methodological principles, i.e. to philosophy.
As we see, the growing complexity of scientific knowledge and the emergence of p

general theoretical disciplines make the question of the role, of philosophy even
more topical. Scientific progress in our time leads not to the witheringaway of
philosophical methodology, but to the further enhancement of its role. The
interpenetration of social, natural and technical sciences and their methods, the
appearance and rapid development of boundary scientific disciplines, the trend
towards comprehensive scientific investigations of major socio-economic problems
which call for joint efforts of social and natural scientistsall these processes attest 385
to the growing significance of philosophical methodology. Such is the viewpoint of
materialist dialectics and such is the trend of scientific development.
Within the province of professional philosophers remain, as before, the investigation p

into general trends in the development of science, the study of interaction between
new scientific trends, their relative independence, the applicability of the methods of
certain scientific disciplines in the fields of other disciplines, the extrapolation of
theoretical concepts to new fields of investigation, reduction problems (criticism of
reductionism) in their numerous aspects, the unity of scientific knowledge alongside
the extreme diversity and dissociation of individual scientific schools, etc., not to
speak of the eternal problems arising with new force under the present-day
conditions: the objectivity of scientific knowledge, causality, determinism, the
dialectics of scientific cognition, and others. The solution of these problems not only
calls for excellent knowledge of the latest scientific achievements and of the history
of science in general, but also presupposes profound philosophical background and
good acquaintance with the history of philosophy.
The acquaintance with the basic principles of materialist dialectics is far from p
sufficient to guarantee success in scientific investigationno less important is the

ability to use them. The successful solution of scientific problems under modern
conditions, in the face of highly complex and widely ramified scientific disciplines,
depends on the ability to assess available knowledge in the light of general scientific 386
concepts which is impossible without good knowledge of modern theoretical ideas
and the history of science. Philosophical knowledge, owing to its special relations of
mediation with concrete empirical and applied scientific investigations never reveals
itself in its pure forms. It is represented in current theoretical ideas and concepts, in
the theoretical knowledge related to a given specific field.
The influence of philosophy on the character and results of scientific investigation is p

in fact much more subtle than is purported by some popular scientific and
philosophical publications intended to demonstrate with maximum possible clarity the
role of methodology and world outlook in scientific knowledge. To be really
successful and fruitful, scientific activity must rest on the entire system of dialectical
materialist philosophy understood as a single harmonious, integrated world outlook,
but not on dissociated scraps of philosophical knowledge, interpreted at that in a
very primitive manner.
It would be naive to expect that universal theoretical problems can be solved by a p

specialist in cybernetics, the general systems theory or by a representative of some
other scientific discipline, however broad its field. No less groundless would be a
hope that such a task could be successfully accomplished by a philosopher who
would be capable of digesting the enormous amount of information obtained by
positive sciences. There is no alternative to the alliance between philosophers and
representatives of natural and social sciences. The problem, if there is any, can only 387
be over the selection and development of the most effective and adequate form of
this alliance.
A modern scientist specialising in boundary problems and investigating the p

crossroads of traditional scientific trends can hardly expect to gain any success in his
work even if he is well versed in one of the special fields. It becomes more and
more obvious that the more important discoveries in modern science await not a
narrow specialist, but a scientist of broad theoretical outlook, a thinker, an
intellectual. We may be now returning to the epoch of the Encyclopaedists, but on a
new level of scientific knowledge. At any rate, such a return to the seemingly old
appears to us quite possible and certain symptoms of the advent of a new age of
Leonardo da Vinci and French Enlighteners are already in evidence.
In our time, when much of the tedious work required to accumulate and classify p
facts can be handed over to machines with their constantly expanding possibilities,
the value of experience in some special field of knowledge stands as high as ever,
yet the importance of philosophical, methodological knowledge increases
immeasurably since it is precisely this knowledge that can bridge the age-old gaps
between physics and biology, biology and physiology, psychology and mathematics,
economy and mathematics, etc. The new disciplines emerging on the borderlines
between these sciences are notable for practically direct scientific application of
philosophical knowledge. In contrast to 18th-19th-century natural philosophy, it plays
the role of general theoretical, philosophical principles and concepts and does not 388
claim to provide final solutions to concrete scientific problems.
Present-day scientific knowledge is highly dynamic. The current scientific and p

technological revolution is notable not only for rapid changes in the content of
knowledge itself, but also for abrupt shifts in the value approach to different
branches of knowledge. It was only quite recently that physics was the idol of the
youth. The changing tide then lifted up cybernetics and the representatives of this
promising branch of science enjoyed universal attention. The recent breakthrough in
genetics and the acuteness of the ecological problem have sharply increased the
prestige of biology. The value and prestige of one or another science and,
consequently, its impact on social life and on the style of thinking constantly
fluctuate. It is no secret that the current period is marked by a steadily growing
interest among the youth in social, humanitarian sciences. Yet it is not only the
young that turn up in increasing numbers at these sciences enlistment centres. Far
more significant is the fact that humanitarian problems attract more and more full-
fledged natural scientists engaged in their specific investigations. Understandably, the
natural scientists attention to humanitarian issues results, first and foremost, from
their social, civic interests. A modern scientist cannot conceive of activity removed
from social problems and the tasks of scientific, technical and ethical progress.
Under contemporary conditions philosophy alone can provide scientists with an p

effective means to cope with the increasing flow of information and expand their
theoretical horizon and world outlook. First, it gives them the necessary 389
methodological instruments for safe navigation in the boundless sea of scientific
theories and concepts and guards against unfounded hypotheses and unrestrained
imagination. Second, it provides guidelines for the investigation of social problems
giving the necessary information on their character and disclosing the basic principles
underlying the development of social, humanitarian knowledge. Such information is
essential for scientists in all fields irrespective of the particular questions they are
concerned with. If we view the progress of science from a broad perspective and
take full account of the modern tendencies in its development, we cannot but come
to the conclusion that success in research and the advance of science as a whole
depends as much on the scientists special knowledge, as on their theoretical
background. The latter implies that a scientist should not only be well versed in the
adjacent fields directly related to his sphere of interest, but also be familiar with the
entire complex of social, natural and technical sciences. The development of science
in the 20th century has convincingly shown that the concepts of the flank and
rear in the overall scientific offensive have become completely antiquated, just as
the title of the leading science which now reminds one of a challenge prize kept
by the winner as long as he is in the heyday of popularity. The prize will inevitably
pass on to another science as soon as it draws the publics eye.
The concepts of adjacent fields and boundary problems are becoming

anachronistic, too. The unidimensional structure of scientific knowledge is giving way 390
to a multidimensional one. Not long ago physics or, more accurately, mechanics, was
considered to be the only science adjacent to engineering disciplines. Now they have
got other neighbours as well, such as engineering psychology born of the
engineering and psychology borderline problems. The study of the architecture of
living organisms carried out within the framework of bionics has brought closer
together engineering and biological disciplines. Such examples are numerous. The
shoots of new scientific knowledge, new scientific trends are appearing and will
appear in most unexpected nodal points of this crystal lattice. The boundary
problems holding out the greatest promise for scientists should therefore be visualised
now in terms of solid rather than plane geometry, i.e. as being disposed in some
imaginary multidimensional space where each science can find points of contact with
any of its counterparts.
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 3751] V.I. Lenin, Socialism Demolished Again, Collected Works, Vol.20, 1972,
p.196.
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The above critical analysis of the positivist attitude to the problem of the objectivity p

Contents of scientific knowledge, as well as the comparison of positivist views with some of
the alternative concepts surfacing in the modern philosophy of science was to
highlight, among other things, the inseparable unity of modern materialism and
Index
dialectics. One cannot pursue the principle of objectivity of scientific knowledge
Card
without concessions to idealism and metaphysics if the materialistic approach is not 391
integrated, merged from the outset with the dialectical methodology of science. It is
Formats: highly essential that this integration is not a mechanical combination of dialectical
Text and materialistic concepts which supplement one another but that they are blended in
PS
the analysis of the real problems of scientific cognition.
PDF
The task of blending materialism and dialectics is the more topical at present as not p

many investigations can boast integrated dialectical materialist approach to the
Other
Titles:
analysis of concrete scientific problems. Regrettably, the study of special problems is
TA not infrequently guided by the principles of didactics rather than by the dialectics of
scientific cognition, and the division of scientific material convenient for its
Years: presentation to students often predetermines the principles of scientific analysis.
1984 However, methodical schemes invaluable in the classroom sometimes turn out to be
too rigid to reveal all the aspects of the interdependence of materialism and
dialectics.
###
The importance of this problem is also highlighted by the analysis of the main p
MAP
philosophical trends of our time. As has been shown above, modern bourgeois
philosophy reveals an obvious tendency toward materialism. The crisis of the
positivist methodology of science gives rise to new philosophical schools, such as
critical realism and scientific materialism, which proclaim materialism to be their
credo.
However, this materialistic trend in Western philosophy does not merge with p
materialistic dialectics and remains indifferent to its achievements, Moreover, it is
often openly biased against dialectics. The fact that many representatives of critical 392
realism recognise the objective reality not only of individual physical objects, but
also of general properties and entities, and speak of scientific metaphysics, the
development of scientific knowledge, etc. is very indicative of a profound crisis of
the positivist philosophy of science. Yet it is but the first stage in the search for new
methodological guidelines since the principles of objectivity and testability of
scientific knowledge, correct in general, must be supplemented or, to be more exact,
integrated with the dialectical approach to scientific problems.
The obvious fact that modern materialism is inconceivable without dialectics is again p
and again confirmed by concrete investigations. Take, for instance, the old problem
of consciousness whose different aspects are now highly topical. Sociology,
pedagogics and social psychology view this problem mainly from the social angle,
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/3.6-Dialectics.of.Objective.and.Subjective[2012-12-17 15:16:40]
i.e. in terms of the determining influence of social conditions on the genesis of

consciousness. Cybernetics studies the same problem from the viewpoint of the
possibility of reproducing the functions of consciousness by cybernetic machines,
psychology and neuropsychology, in terms of the relationship between consciousness
and the brain, etc.
One can declare himself a convinced materialist professing the primacy of social p
being in relation to consciousness, indicating that consciousness is a function of the
brain, highly organised matter, or pointing out the possibility of modelling the brain
processes with the help of computers. Yet none of these statements attests to a 393
consistent materialistic stand unless they represent a dialectical approach to the
problem. Once we separate one from the other, which is sometimes the case in
scientific publications, we automatically undermine the very foundation of the
professed materialistic views. It is common knowledge, for instance, that the content
of human consciousness is determined by social factors. One should bear in mind,
however, that the prerequisites for the formation of concepts, mental images reside in
neurodynamic processes. Hence, a consistent materialistic analysis of the nature of
consciousness is only possible if both sides are taken into account in their
interdependence. Should we for a moment lose sight of one of them and rashly state,
for instance, that we owe consciousness to social factors only, the ghost of idealism
will present itself right here and then. Indeed, since individual knowledge is passed
on from generation to generation, our statement would imply the existence of some
kind of primordial knowledge which might well assume the form of absolute or
innate ideas.
Furthermore, this is not the only loophole which would be opened for idealism by p
our unwary statement. If consciousness is determined by social factors only, how
should we account for such phenomena as talent, good inclinations, natural gifts?
How should we explain Mozarts musical endowments and Lenins genius? We
should have either to leave these questions unanswered, or appeal for help to
Providence. In a word, without dialectics we should not make a step toward
materialism.
Materialism has now reached a stage when its further development as the world p 394
view and as the methodology of scientific knowledge is only possible on the
dialectical foundation. Conversely, dialectics cannot be a coherent system of
philosophical views unless it rests on the materialistic foundation.
The merger of materialism and dialectics is embodied in Marxism-Leninism which p

opened a new epoch in the development of philosophy. After the emergence of
Marxism-Leninism any deviation from either dialectics or materialism, any
concession to idealism, eclecticism and metaphysics is bound to undermine the unity
of philosophy and should be regarded as essentially regressive.
The entire history of materialism shows that it could not be consistent unless it was p
interpreted dialectically. This was particularly obvious when materialist principles
were applied to the explanation of social phenomenasuffice it to recall Feuerbach.
In our time, non-dialectical materialism is simply inconceivable; it cannot but
stumble at every step. Modern science and social processes are so complex and
dynamic that any inconsistency in world outlook and in the philosophical
interpretation of one or another phenomenon is fraught with grave ideological
consequences. Each philosophical problem, therefore, should be treated from the
viewpoint of dialectical materialism, i.e. from the materialistic and dialectical angles.
The materialistic principles themselves will turn into an inadmissible philosophical
abstraction if they are divorsed from dialectics. In our time dialectics is opposed not
only to metaphysics, but also to idealism, Conversely, materialism claiming 395
consistency is incompatible with metaphysics and all sorts of eclecticism.
The positivist concept of objectivity, the Popperian interpretation of objective p

knowledge and the stand of scientific realism are notable, first and foremost, for a
narrow understanding of the principle of objectivity. Nevertheless, each of the above
trends has certain rational elements and their comparison will help understand more
clearly the essence of the problem and define the guidelines for its modern solution.
The obvious difficulties encountered by positivism and other trends of the modern
philosophy of science in the interpretation of objectivity show that there are but two
methodological alternatives open before a philosopher: either to give up the search
for objectivity altogether and agree that objective knowledge is unattainable, or to
hold on to the materialistic tradition at the risk of earning the reputation of an
outdated and even retrograde thinker attempting to draw philosophy back to the
ideals .of classical natural science. The first alternative appears to be rather attractive:
it seemingly complies with the spirit of modern science which continues blasting one
bastion of classical science after another, and relieves the scientists of the need to
rack their brains over metaphysical problems enjoying but little popularity with
most of them. At a closer look, however, it does not help to avoid difficulties, since
any attempt to carry on investigations with the legalised handicap of the subjective
brings the investigator back to the problem of distinguishing between the objective
and the subjective which he tried to escape. This was clearly demonstrated by the 396
fate of the hypothesis of latent parameters in quantum mechanics which postulated
the inevitable presence of the observer in the quantum-mechanical theory. As regards
the second alternative, i.e. the adherence to the principle of objectivity, it turns out to
be a thorny path just as well and calls for a serious philosophical analysis of the
concept of objectivity. What is more, this analysis appears to be the more difficult as
it is to provide a basis for mutual understanding between the philosophers and the
representatives of special sciences.
What was the main weakness in the positivist concept of the objective? In one of p
the previous sections devoted to this problem we have shown that positivism
identified the objective with the observable. It was through observation and
combination of various sensations and perceptions that one could form an
intersubjective idea of any object. An individual observation or perception could not,
of course, give knowledge independent of the subject, but a series of observations,
the perception of recurrent processes were evidently sufficient to provide the
necessary material for separating the subjective from the intersubjective.
A similar understanding of the objective underlies also the concept of critical p

rationalism. In his theory, Popper only eliminates the most obvious weaknesses in
the positivist interpretation of the objective, but sides with the concept of
intersubjectivity. According to Popper, the difference between the objective and the
subjective consists only in that the former has passed through the purgatory of
intersubjective criticism which separates the elements of knowledge immune to 397
falsification from those disproved by constantly changing experience. The objective is
thus identified with the conventional, the immutable, with what is not questioned by
experience at a given moment. The narrowness of such criteria of objectivity reveals
itself, in fact, each time science transgresses the bounds of habitual, stereotyped
phenomena and events. As regards unobservable processes, relationships and
properties, the positivist criterion of objectivity proves to be completely
unsatisfactory. Poppers criterion reveals its untenability and inner subjectivism when
one fundamental theory gives place to another, since the breakdown of a theory
signifies the dissolution of the stable nucleus which cannot be falsified and is,
according to Popper, the refuge of objectivity.
In its search for objective knowledge me modern philosophy of biology strives to p

reduce biological knowledge to physical phenomena. Why is it so? Because
phenomenalistic theories proceed from the assumption that the stable nucleus of
knowledge immune against subjective influence or interpretation can only be defined
through the analysis of physical structures on the molecular, atomic or subatomic
levels. This mirage still entices scientists who stake on physicalism and are
fascinated by the seemingly clear and tangible outlines of new theoriesthough this
path, as we have shown, is actually a blind alley, and the scientist who takes it in
quest of objective knowledge is soon bound to discover it. True, the physicalism of
scientific materialism is more constructive if only for the fact that it is oriented on
the recognition of objective reality, creation of scientific ontology and its subsequent 398
verification. In our opinion, it is far less damaging to scientific progress than
positivist physicalism which in fact seeks to pass off the present reduction of
scientific knowledge to physico-chemical concepts as the last word of science.
As we see, the problem of objectivity in the philosophy of science is split, so to p

speak, among the existing levels of scientific knowledge, if not among different
sciences. We shall not attempt here to investigate into the general causes of this
phenomenon in the development of science; we shall merely take it for granted as a
fact. In each doctrine, the concept of objectivity is confined within more or less
narrow bounds which have a more or less definite location in the space of modern
scientific knowledge and conform to its existing structure. The concreteness of
philosophical categories, as we have shown above, has nothing to do with this
location reflecting the limitations of each doctrine and, in the end, its subjectivism.
The dialectico-materialist interpretation of the objective which is inseparably linked
with the definition of matter as a philosophical category denoting objective reality
independent of human consciousness in general, sets but the epistemological
framework for this concept and has no meaning beyond the limits of the basic
question of philosophythe one concerning the relation of matter and consciousness.
It is not connected with the boundaries of individual sciences or fields or levels of
knowledge. It contrasts everything that is subjective to everything that is independent
of consciousness. It points out the asymmetry (in the epistemological sense) of the 399
relationship between them.
The contrast between the objective and the subjective has a purely philosophical p
meaning. Perhaps like no other conceptual distinction, it sets a clear demarcation line
between philosophy and positive sciences which are in fact indifferent to such a
universal division. The independence of philosophical knowledge, its irreducibility to
any special science stands out here with particular clarity, though the specificity of
philosophy can also be demonstrated on the example of a number of other problems.
The philosophical understanding of the objective as essentially independent of p

consciousness in general is evidently much broader than its interpretation in the
positivist, Popperian, physicalist and scientific-realist concepts, which connect
objectivity with observability, intersubjectivity, reducibility to physical notions, etc. It
should be noted, however, that different versions in the interpretation of objectivity
are not always groundless and senseless. The positivist understanding of objectivity,
for one, has a certain value within the framework of empirical investigations,
whereas the Popperian interpretation of objectivity must be given credit for its
attempt to view the positivist solution from a broader socio-cultural perspective and
to emphasise the existing demarcation (tending, however, to absolutise it) between
the individual and general consciousness, etc. It would not be correct to regard them
as completely wrong; rather, they are narrow and deformed.
To view the problem of objectivity from the philosophical angle, one has to p
universalise the methods or ideas of special sciences or branches of knowledge and 400
rise above their level, since this problem assumes one form in physics, another in
biology, still others in history, theoretical sciences, empirical sciences, etc. Each of
these disciplines concentrates on its own specific, topical aspects of the problem and
has its own means and ways for its solution.
Hence, the first aspect of the problem of objectivity, as it is posed in contemporary p

philosophy, calls for a dialectical analysis and consists in distinguishing, first and
foremost, between its empirical and theoretical levels. Obviously, objectivity cannot
be reduced to observability, coherence, one or another degree of the generalisation of
concepts, etc. Any of the above criteria leads to an unwarranted restriction of the
concept of objectivity as it implies independence of the object of investigation from
some special kind, form or level of consciousness, but not from consciousness in
general. Yet the concept of the objectivity of knowledge in its philosophical sense
presupposes the independence of knowledge from consciousness in general, be it
individual or collective. The numerous difficulties involved in the implementation of
this criterion do not by any means attest to its uselessness, they merely confirm the
well-known truth that the path of true science is not a royal road. The theories
asserting the objective character of knowledge but regarding it to be independent of
certain forms of consciousness only imply, willy-nilly, its dependence on other forms
of consciousness, thus leaving a loophole for idealism.
No less untenable are the attempts of some other philosophers proclaiming p

themselves adherents of materialism to identify matter and, consequently, objectivity 401
with one or several properties of material objects except the sole property of
matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound upthe property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside the mind.[ 4011
The history of philosophy shows that the single problem of the objectivity of p
knowledge can and must be solved differently at different levels of scientific
cognition. The recognition of this fact is perhaps the starting point of the process of
fusion of materialism and dialectics which reveals the complex and contradictory
character of scientific cognition and shows that it cannot be confined to the sensuous,
empirical stage. Scientific cognition goes into the depth of processes and phenomena,
penetrates the realm of laws and reveals laws of different orders and different
degrees of generalisation. The criterion of objectivity which may appear simple and
explicit to any investigator in his specialised field is bound to turn into a complex
problem when he enters upon the theoretical level of cognition and finds himself in
the jungle of philosophy after the prairie of the macroworld.
It should be stressed, however, that the observance of the principle of objectivity p

was and remains the primary objective of modern science. Without the elimination of
the subject, however difficult it may be for the investigator, scientific research will
lose all meaning. Therefore recognising distinctions in the approach to the problem
of objectivity at philosophical, theoretical, empirical and other levels is making but 402
one, though important, step forward. The next step, which is, evidently, the most
difficult one, consists in revealing their relationship and defining a method for
changing over from a philosophico-theoretical to philosophico-methodological aspect
and further to the theoretical and empirical levels of the problem of objectivity. In
point of fact, we need some kind of a bridge to pass from the philosophical principle
of objectivity to its concrete embodiment in the context of a scientific theory.
We believe that the function of such a bridge leading from one level of p
knowledge to the other in the formulation and solution-of the problem of objectivity
can be performed primarily (but only partly) by the idea of invariance.
The principle of objectivity implies, in essence, the elimination of the subject p

from the object of investigation. What is the actual meaning of this requirement in
the context of a concrete scientific investigation? Should we understand this phrase
literally?
Significantly, dialectical materialism has never maintained that the requirement of p

the objectivity of knowledge is equivalent to setting up some kind of an
insurmountable barrier between the subject and the object of investigation.
Insurmountable in the sense that it prevents any influence of man on the object of
cognition and only permits the mirror reflection of reality in his consciousness.
Knowledge, wrote Lenin, is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not a
simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of
abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these 403
concepts, laws, etc. (thought, science = the logical Idea) embrace conditionally,
approximately, the universal law-governed character of eternally moving and
developing nature.[ 4031
Thus the dialectics of cognition presupposes mans active penetration, intrusion into p
reality, his, so to speak, aggressive attitude to it. Here one may ask: how can such
an attitude agree with the principle of objectivity?
To eliminate the subject does not mean to fence him off from the object of his p
investigation, though sometimes a specific kind of a barrier, e.g. an aquarium wall,
can indeed make for objectivity, like in the case of an observer studying the
behaviour of fish or sea plants. Nor does it mean to dig a ditch which can
sometimes separate an investigator watching wild life. Eliminating the subject
means creating conditions which would not so much prevent him from interfering
with objective processes as from distorting them and causing to deuiate from their
normal course. In terms of epistemology the subject is a very complex notion
accounting for the possibility of human errors, inaccuracies and prejudices,
inadequacy of technical and natural means at mans disposal, as well as of the store
of knowledge available to him, the specific features of his perceptions, mentality, etc.
It would evidently take several pages to enumerate the elements which make up the
notion subject and should be excluded from the notion scientific knowledge. 404
What really matters, however, is not this enumeration, but the obvious fact that
mans centuries-old experience must have already developed reliable mechanisms
compensating for the subjective aspects of the process of cognition. The elimination
of the subject is always aimed, in one form or another, at this compensation and
correction of the defects which are inevitably introduced by man in his exploration of
the Universe.
Far from denying the subjectification of reality by man, dialectics considers it p

inevitable and shows that man transforms reality through his practical, experimental
and even mental activity, since the world, of course, can never be adequately
represented in mans concepts. Man is unable to embrace the world in all its
inexhaustibility; he is bound to limit the sphere of his investigations to the
phenomena which are within his reach. At present, for instance, man is still unable
to penetrate the structure of micro particles and has to be content to study their
external interaction or to split them in a powerful accelerater.
So, insisting on the objectivity of scientific knowledge, dialectics proceeds from the p
fact that the subject alters the object in the process of its investigation. Yet the
objective can only be revealed in the surrounding world if the investigator
concentrates primarily on the stable, the recurrent. It is this search for immutable,
invariant properties and values that represents the transition from the general idea of
objectivity to the theoretical analysis of objective processes and phenomena. While
revealing the immutable, the stable in the objects and phenomena under investigation, 405
the natural scientist may not even be aware of the fact that he attains objective
knowledge.
The above does not mean, of course, that changing properties cannot be objective. If p
we speak of dynamic processes, the only requirement they should meet from the
viewpoint of the principle of objectivity is the constancy of change. Not the change
of constancy, but vice versa. Just so! The language of objectivity is translated into
the language of invariance. Naturally, a physicist, a biologist or a sociologist cannot
divorce the object of investigation from his consciousness. What he can and what he
really does and must do is to distinguish between the mutable and the immutable
properties of the object during his studies. This bridge from the general philosophical
to a particular scientific idea of objectivity has been operable for centuries though its
strength has been frequently subjected to testing. None of the tests, however,
destroyed it, nor could do so completely. As a result, the bridge had only gained in
strength, simplicity and elegance. Why, for instance, was its usability called in
question at the turn of the 20th century? Because the philosophers erroneously
identified matter with the concrete properties of things, but not with their only
property of being an objective reality, of existing outside the mind, whereas the
physicists were bewildered by the collapse of their habitual concepts: the mass of the
electron turned out to be variable, the stationary and impenetrable ether movable,
the spatial and time intervals changeable. The world, once stable and reliable, was
falling to pieces, matter had disappeared,
How did philosophy and physics overcome this crisis? Lenin formulated a p 406
philosophical definition of matter in which the criterion of objectivity was connected
with the property of existing independently of mans consciousness. Physics found
new invariants giving a new meaning to this philosophical idea. Invariants, wrote
Max Born, are the concepts of which science speaks in the same way as ordinary
language speaks of things, and which it provides with names as if they were
ordinary things.[ 4061
Invariance is the property of immutability in relation to a definite set of physical or p

mathematical conditions, specifically, to a group of transformations. This property is
inherent in individual physical and mathematical values and physical characteristics,
as well as in equations and laws of physics. An invariant value can be exemplified,
for instance, by the distance between two points in geometry, or by value E2 H2 in
regard to Lorentzs transformations in electrodynamics, though the values of the
intensity of electrical fields (E) and magnetic fields (H) prove to be invariant when
changing from one inertial reference system to another. Group invariance (or group
symmetry) is a kind of symmetry which is widely used in modern physics: the
invariance of equations in relation to groups of Galilean, Lorentzs and Poincars
transformations, the symmetry of Schrodingers operator in relation to the rotational
group of three-dimensional space, the symmetry of crystals, the unitary symmetry,
etc.
A more general case of in variance is co-variance, i.e. the property of p 407

transformation of a number of physical and mathematical values in accordance with
a definite linear law when passing from one reference system to another. Co-variance
reveals itself in relation to different groups of transformations. It may be inherent
both in different values, e.g. vectors, tensors of relative rotations, and in different
equations and functions. A co-variant value is a value transforming in relation to one
of the representations of a group of coordinate transformations being studied. Go-
variant equations are those which, on being recorded in a co-variant form, do not
change their appearance in any system of coordinates, though individual physical
values incorporated in such equations may be different in different reference systems.
The wide use of the notion of transformation group is accounted for by the
immutability of a number of physical objects within one or another group, which
circumstance makes it possible to define the law of their change during such
transformations.
A transformation group can be exemplified, for instance, by a finite set of p

projections of a certain object on other objects known sufficiently well by their
properties, e.g. on measuring instruments, experimental facilities, etc. Thus, if we are
interested in a geometrical form, i.e. in the spatial structure of an object, we can
regard its projections on different surfaces arranged at different angles relative to one
another as geometrical transformations of the form of this object. The selection of a
set or series of such projections making up a certain group of transformations in
the mathematical sense depends on the conditions of the existence of a given system, 408
on its limits or measure, as well as on the concrete cognitive situation and the nature
of the task the investigator is confronted with. It is the analysis of invariance and
structure carried out with due regard for the objective and subjective aspects of the
process of cognition (i.e. for its specificity) that makes it possible to use the principle
of invariance in the solution of such a fundamental epistemological problem as the
problem of the objectivity of knowledge.
To be sure, it would not be correct to identify the invariant with the objective. Both p
invariant and variant physical values, as well as their relationships can be objective
in equal measure. Both of them, as has already been emphasised by Einstein, reflect
to a degree objective reality. According to Einstein, the difference between invariants
and variants does not lie in the same plane as the difference between the objective
and the real, on the one hand, and the subjective and the seeming, on the other. If
that were not the case, the concept of objectivity would apparently become
superfluous. The revelation of invariants and variants is not yet equivalent to the
establishment of the epistemological nature of each of these classes of phenomena.
The question of the invariant or variant character of different quantities and of their
relationships can only be solved within the framework of each individual theory and
under the strictly defined conditions of investigation.
Invariant values and relationships are direct characteristics of the laws governing the p
behaviour and properties of the objects of a given theory which are freed (in the 409
obtained knowledge) from the characteristics relating to the specific conditions of
investigation. This also applies to those conditions of investigation which are
connected in one way or another with the subject in a given relationship. Hence, the
conditions to be additionally eliminated are only those characterising the subjective
aspect of the process of cognition. The object under investigation should be
considered theoretically in all possible transformation groups so that its objective
presentation in theory may be as full as possible. For instance, in the classical
method of description the absolute length characterises the property of a body in
absolute space regardless of the selected reference system. Recognition of the
absolute nature of space and time presupposes the indifference of objects to the
subject and to the reference system. Conversely, the relativist description of the
space-time interval characterises the property of a physical object in relation to the
selected system of reference (provided, of course, it is inertial). The theory of
relativity treats simultaneity as a variant (relative) concept. It means that the
simultaneity of two events is not regarded as absolute, since it represents not only
the relation between the events themselves, but also depends to an essential degree
on the selected system of coordinates. It is even more so if the events are separated
spatially. In that case the objectivity of simultaneity (and, to a certain extent, of
space and time themselves) can only be attested to by the invariance of space and
time in one or another relationship.
As we see, variant values characterise relations between the objects of a given p 410
physical theory, on the one hand, and the conditions of investigations (including the
observer himself), on the other. A variant value can have any meaning only within
the framework of a given theory and only in relation to definite conditions of
investigation (cognition). Invariant and variant values represent different aspects of
objective reality. Yet for a concrete physical theory the relationship between them is
of paramount importance, as it determines the concrete measure of objectivity
attained by this theory. It is not fortuitous that the search for invariants constitutes
one of the main tasks of every physical and mathematical theory, and the
replacement of old invariants by new ones is indicative of a transition from the old
theory to a new, more general one. As a matter of fact, a transition from one theory
to another covering essentially the same sphere of phenomena is only possible as a
result of transformations revealing new invariants. This mechanism of transformations
ensuring the birth of objective knowledge has long been one of the chief secrets of
science, the veritable philosophical stone so badly needed by the alchemy of
scientific cognition. It is in the process of search for invariants that the system of
knowledge is purged of subjective elements and old scientific theories are replaced
by new, more objective ones.
The change in the relationship between invariant and variant values in favour of the p
former testifies to the elimination of subjective elements from physical knowledge
and is indicative of a transition to a higher level of objectivity, to the expansion of
the sphere of objectivity of physical knowledge. The preservation of immutability, 411
invariance of certain values against the background of the mutability, variance of
others is a sure sign of the objectivity of immutable values. It appears that invariance
is always connected, in one way or another, with objectivity. It does not mean, of
course, that invariance always represents the objective content of a theory, but the
probability of their coincidence is very high. Being always oriented towards the
future; the process of cognition must of necessity have a considerable margin of
safety, therefore every invariant in a theory must be regarded as potentially variable.
On the other hand, the variable aspects of a theory are to be studied more closely
with a view to determining the degree of objectivity they may represent, for which
purpose attempts should be made to identify a group of transformations under which
certain values in the equation in interest may prove to be invariant. The presence of
invariants and variant relationships in a given theory determines the degree of its
objectivity, i.e. testifies to the presence of structural characteristics and properties
of physical objects whose specific forms of symmetry are disclosed by the given
theory under the specified conditions of investigation.
If some values or their relationships prove to be variable relative to given p

transformations, this cannot yet be regarded as attesting to the non-objectivity of the
corresponding properties or relationships. It simply means that the question remains
open and the investigation should continue. What is variant in relation to one group
of transformations may prove to be invariant in relation to another group. Besides,
account is also taken of the fact that the very process of change can also be 412
expressed in the language of invariants with the help of its isomorphic (or
homomorphic) transformations. For instance, the melody of a song can be
represented by changes in a continuously modulated signal. During the transmission
of the signal from the sensors to the central processing units its form changes with
the change of the physical carriers, methods of modulation and coding. Yet the
content of the signal, the information carried by it, i.e. the orderliness of the pulses
representing the melody of the song remains invariant, independent of these
transformations.
It should be specially noted, even in this cursory survey of the problem, that the p
principle of invariance underlying macroworld theories in a latent form plays even a
more important role in the investigation of the microworld. Though the classical
theories (mechanics and electrodynamics) can be restructured in such a way as to
place this principle in the limelight, they are nevertheless based on dynamic
principles expressed in the equations of motion or field. We may assume, without
going deep into this subject, that the objectivity of knowledge in the investigation of
the macroworld is best represented by the equations of classical mechanics. It is not
accidental, therefore, that the decisive role in ensuring the objectivity of knowledge
at the macrolevel belongs to experiment. By contrast, theoretical science has
developed its own, specific methods and principles of obtaining objective knowledge
attaching, it appears, special importance, to the principle of invariance.
As is known, invariance or group symmetry originally played but a secondary role p 413
in quantum mechanics, making it possible to obtain only auxiliary data on a quantum
system. With the integration of Schrodingers and Diracs dynamic equations,
however, the situation changed. Soviet scholars Yu. B. Rumer and A.I. Fet write:
The development of physics over the past few years has reversed, as it were, the
relationship between the equations of motion and symmetry groups. Now the
symmetry group of a physical system has come to the foreground; the representations
of this group and its subgroups carry the most important data on the system. Hence,
groups turn out to be the primary, the most profound elements in a physical
description of nature. As to the concepts of space and time, they play the role of
material for the construction of the representations of groups and owe the place
they occupy in physics to historical factors only. The equations of motion are
assigned the role of conditions superimposed on the vectors of some functional space
for singling out irreducible representations of a group or equations of the
infinitesimal representation of the same group. This shift of basic concepts does not
seem to encourage the idea that each kind of particles and fields should be
represented by some equation of motion. What is more, the very universality of the
scheme known as the theory of field is called in question.[ 4131
The principle of invariance is also largely accountable for the considerable degree of p
subjectivism in scientific concepts of space and time. 414
The concept of absolute space and time was used by Newton in two different, p
though interrelated, senses. First, by absolute space Newton understood the empty
and motionless (in relation to matter) space of the Universe, and by absolute time,
pure duration corresponding to absolute space. Second, he used the term absolute
to characterise the invariance of lengths and time intervals. It is precisely this latter
aspect of the absolute nature of space and time which we are interested in here,
since it is directly connected with the question of their objectivity.
The development of physics showed that the hypothesis of the absolute nature of p
space and time was narrow and contradicted a number of important scientific facts.
For instance, it was not compatible with the principles of electrodynamics. The
equations of electrodynamics were not invariant in relation to the Galilean
transformations expressing the absoluteness of time and space. When applied to the
electromagnetic field, Galilean transformations led to a conclusion that magnetic
disturbance was transmitted at different velocities in two opposite directions from a
moving source whereas the equations themselves excluded such a possibility.
Subsequently the narrowness of the Galilean principle of relativity as applied to
electromagnetic phenomena was proved experimentally. Michelsons experiments in
determining the velocity of light in different directions relative to the moving Earth
showed that the classical law of the summation of the velocities ensuing from the
Galilean principle of relativity did riot hold true in relation to the velocity of light. 415
The contradiction between electrodynamics and the results of Michelsons experiment,
on the one. hand, and classical mechanics based on the Galilean principle of
relativity, on the other, was resolved by the theory of relativity. Proceeding from the
postulate of the constancy of light velocity and using it as the basis of his theory,
Einstein universalised the principle of relativity calling for the invariance of physical
laws for inertial systems and extended it to all physical processes, including
electromagnetic ones. In classical mechanics the concept of absolute time found its
expression in the recognition of absolute simultaneity: if any two events occurred
simultaneously in one inertial system of reference, they were also bound to occur
simultaneously in another. The conclusion ensuing from the principle of the
constancy of light velocity was entirely different: two events which took place
simultaneously in one system of reference could not be simultaneous in another. In
other words, simultaneity according to this principle was relative. The relativeness,
non-invariance of simultaneity signified the non-invariance of the laws of physics in
relation to Galilean transformations. According to Einsteins principle of relativity,
the laws of physics are invariant not in relation to the Galilean, but to Lorenzs
transformations, these providing direct substantiation for the concept of relativity of
space and time viewed separately. Thus the length of a rod turns out to be different
in the rest system and in the body axes system of coordinates.
Various authors not infrequently see the philosophical significance of the theory of p
relativity in that it showed the variant character of space and time. It is correct in the 416
sense that this theory indeed revealed new links and relations which had not been
taken into account by classical physics and thus gave a broader and more profound
picture of the dialectics of time-space relations. Such a general appraisal, however,
needs to be somewhat specified.
First, it would not be correct to regard the concept of absolute space and time (if p
by the absolute we understand their invariance) as an erroneous, metaphysical
picture of the world. This concept stands in the same relation to the objective world
as do all classical physics and its laws. It is a permissible idealisation of reality, its
approximate reflection in relation to speeds which are practically negligible as
compared with the velocity of light. It is applicable to situations in which the
velocity of light can be regarded as practically infinite.
Second, the significance of the theory of relativity cannot be reduced to establishing p

the relativity of space and time. From it ensues not only the invariance of space and
time separated from each other, but also the existence of a new invariant: the time-
spatial interval. Einstein and Infeld write: The world of events forms a four-
dimensional continuum. There is nothing mysterious about this, and the last sentence
is equally true for classical physics and the relativity theory. Again a difference is
revealed when two CS [coordinate systems] moving relatively to each other are
considered. The room is moving, and the observers inside and outside determine the
time-space coordinates of the same events. Again the classical physicist splits the
four-dimensional continua into the three-dimensional spaces and the one-dimensional 417
time-continuum... The old physicist bothers only about space transformation, as time
is absolute for him. He finds the splitting of the four-dimensional world-continua
into space and time natural and convenient. But from the point of view of the
relativity theory, time as well as space is changed by passing from one CS to
another, and the Lorentz transformation considers the transformation properties of the
four-dimensional time-space continuum of our four-dimensional world of
events.[ 4171
The qualitative distinction between the space-time relationship in classical physics p

and the four-dimensional continuum in the relativity theory is that in the first case
space and time are treated as existing independently of matter and motion and
separately from each other, their connection being entirely external, whereas in the
second case they penetrate each other and make a single whole. On the one hand,
the concept of time is incorporated in the definition of the spatial interval which is
the distance between two points localised simultaneously. The relativity of
simultaneity makes the spatial interval dependent on time. On the other hand, spatial
components are incorporated in the definition of time. The time of two inertial
systems is expressed through an equation incorporating a spatial coordinate. Since
this coordinate is different for different systems of reference, time turns out to be 418
dependent on space. Hence, the space-time continuum in the theory of relativity is
not a mechanical combination of space and time connected with each other through
external links, but an integral whole. Fused in a single continuum, space and time do
not lose all of their independence. However, from absolute this independence turns
into relative. Space and time become, as it were, sections of a four-dimensional
continuum. The exposition of the invariance of the space-time interval was
simultaneously a substantiation of the idea of the objectivity of space and time in the
context of a new physical theory. A similar function was subsequently performed by
the general theory of relativity.
The second aspect of the problem of objectivity, as distinct from the first, p
considered above, calls for special dialectical analysis and pertains to the
development of scientific knowledge.
After the crisis in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the current, scientific and p
technological revolution has once again demonstrated the relativity of scientific
knowledge, its concepts and theories. Centuries-old and seemingly inviolable
fundamental concepts and ideas of physics, chemistry, biology, physiology,
psychology and other sciences are undergoing a process of thorough revision. The
relativity of fundamental concepts testifies to the historical character of the process of
cognition. As we have seen, the present-day breakdown of scientific concepts, like in
Lenins time, arouses the feelings of uncertainty among natural scientists and
philosophers, particularly those under the influence of positivist traditions, and makes
them question the very foundation of science, the objectivity, stability and value of 419
scientific knowledge in general.
In this context the relation of the principle of objectivity of scientific knowledge to p

the principle of its historical development acquires special significance.
Analysing the crisis in natural science at the turn of the 20th century, Lenin showed p
that the relativity of scientific knowledge was a manifestation of its dialectical
development. Yet it is only one aspect of scientific knowledge which must not be
torn out of the broad historical context of the development of science; on the
contrary, it should be considered in connection with other aspects and features,
particularly with relativitys opposite, viz., the absoluteness of scientific knowledge.
Should we assume relativism, an objective and necessary aspect of scientific
development that it is, as a foundation of the theory of knowledge and regard it
outside and independent of absoluteness, we shall arrive, as was pointed out by
Lenin, at absolute relativism which sees in the history of cognition a process of
endless change of concepts none of which can give a true reflection of objective
reality.
In fact, the recognition of the relativity of knowledge is not equivalent to the denial p
of its objectivity. One should not, as Lenin pointed out, confuse the question of the
objectivity of scientific knowledge with the question of its fullness and identify
objective knowledge with exhaustive and absolute knowledge. Absolute and relative
truths do not oppose each other as mutually exclusive, incompatible characteristics,
they mutually complement each other: ... for dialectical materialism there is no
impassable boundary between relative and absolute truth.[ 4201 Any knowledge 420
contains objective truth to the extent to which it gives an adequate reflection of
objective reality, and to acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon
man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth[ 4202 .
From this viewpoint, relative truth is also objective truth and only differs from
absolute truth in that it is but a particle, a grain of the latter in the sense that it
represents the content of absolute truth incompletely, partially. Absolute truth, in
turn, is the sum total of relative truths and each stage in the development of science
adds new grains of knowledge to this sum.
Speaking of the dialectics of the relative and the absolute in cognition, one should p
bear in mind yet another important feature of their relationship, namely, that it
represents continuity in the process of scientific cognition. In the course of its
historical development science forms a more and more complete and adequate picture
of natural and social reality. The growth of scientific knowledge consists therefore in
a steady expansion of the sphere of truth represented by a succession of theories
replacing one another.
Summing up his analysis of the dialectics of the relative and the absolute in the p
process of cognition, Lenin wrote: Dialecticsas Hegel in his time explained
contains an element of relativism... but is not reducible to relativism, that is, it
recognises the relativity of all our knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective
truth, but in the sense that the limits of approximation of our knowledge to this truth 421
are historically conditional.[ 4211
The ideas expounded by Lenin over 70years ago are not less, if not more, topical p
today. Absolute relativism, reanimated in a number of the latest bourgeois concepts
of the philosophy of science, including critical realism and the works of some
representatives of the historical trend, has now acquired some new aspects. As
distinct from the earlier period, when absolute relativism was mainly traceable to
gaps in scientific knowledge (this cause is still operative, though to a lesser degree),
the present-day relativists more and more frequently involve the cultural-historical
determinism of theoretical thinking. Justly emphasising the dependence of scientific
knowledge on universal socio-historical factors, representatives of the above-
mentioned and other postpositivist doctrines seek to prove that theories relating to
one and the same sphere of knowledge but developed in different cultural and
philosophical contexts are incommensurate with one another. In their opinion,
scientific revolutions represent so profound a turn in scientists views that there can
be no question of any continuity of old and new theories.
Yet the history of science points to the opposite and demonstrates various forms of p
such continuity. The methods whereby a new theory assimilates and deepens the
objective content of its predecessor can be roughly classified under two categories.
In the first category, the continuity of the new and old theories is realised through p 422
the transfer of certain elements of the old theory into the structure of the new one.
These elements may include not only empirical data, but also certain theoretical
concepts. For instance, the general theory of relativity borrows the variation
principles, the principle of the equivalence of inert and gravitational masses from the
classical gravitation theory. In the second category, which is of a more fundamental
and general character, the continuity of the laws formulated in the old and new
theories assumes the form of a limit transition, i.e. the laws of the new theory pass
into the laws of the old one regarded at their limiting case. Thus, if we assume
Plancks constant to equal zero, the Schrodinger equation, the basic one in quantum
mechanics, transforms into Hamilton-Jacobis canonical equation of motion.
Scientifically grounded laws and theories have deep roots and exercise lasting p
influences; otherwise theoretical knowledge would be simply inconceivable. In this
connection a question naturally arises: what is the source of the tenacity of a
scientific theory in general, why does it preserve its explanatory and forecasting
powers over a prolonged historical period?
The mechanisms pointed out by the well-known American philosopher and historian p
of science Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions are
psychological, rather than epistemological by nature. Kuhn atributes the stability of a
paradigm as a model for the theoretical explanation of facts to the specific
psychology of the scientific community which shows a guarded attitude to a new
theory and is never too fast to support it, as well as to the unwillingness of some 423
quarters in this community to part with the habitual stereotype of causal explanations
and predictions. Such an explanation appears to have certain grounds, though the
scientists psychological motives need a more careful examination in each particular
case. Yet far more important, in our opinion, is the methodological aspect of this
problem. From the epistemological viewpoint, the stability of theories derives largely
from the fact that each of them participating in causal explanations and predictions
rests on definite premises. Unlike the theory itself which is thoroughly elaborated, its
premises are found with comparative ease and, as a rule, are hypothetical by nature.
Therefore, if the predictions or explanations made on the basis of a given theory
prove to be erroneous, the premises are rejected with comparative ease. Newtons
gravitation theory, for instance, was considered to be irrefutable for over two
centuries. When it sometimes failed to come up to expectations, it was not the theory
itself but its premises that were called to account. Thus the discovery of an error in
the calculations of Uranus orbit based on the theory of gravitation did no harm to
the theory; it was shielded by the premises which performed their function of a
lightning rod. As is known, John Adams and Urbain Leverrier traced the error to the
influence of the hitherto unknown planet (Neptune) which had not been taken into
account by the then existing system of assumptions.
Should a theory happen to lose its ability to predict and explain events, its p
prerogatives can be subsequently restored if a new set of conditions is found (and
corresponding assumptions formulated) under which the theory regains its powers. In 424
many theoretical disciplines scientists prefer to preserve the theorys right to predict
and explain events and put off the question of its incompatibility with certain facts.
Hence, theories retain their explanatory powers (if only potential) even when some
explanations prove to be patently erroneous.
Such theories are later modified in accordance with new data which appeared at first p
discordant, and new assumptions are made to support them. The fruitfulness of the
backing hypothesis method can be exemplified by Pavlovs theory of conditioned
reflexes. The analysis of the structure of this theory shows that it is sufficiently
resistant to some contradicting facts. For instance, an animal trained to respond in a
definite way to a certain stimulant far from always follows the exact pattern of
behaviour required of it. Its response is usually slow or even incorrect. That does not
mean, however, that the very first deviation from the forecast made on the basis of
the theory of conditioned reflexes should be seized upon as a pretext for refuting this
theory. In such cases the usual tactics of a scientist consists in shielding the adopted
theory with an auxiliary hypothesis and alleging interference with the required
conditions of an experiment rather than in discarding the theory itself.
A supposition can be made, for instance, that the animals nervous system fails for p
some reason or other to pass through the excitation caused by a corresponding
stimulant or even exerts upon it a certain suppressing effect. Indeed, numerous
experiments carried out by neurophysiologists showed that excitation can really be
suppressed in the nervous system owing to feedback via various nervous circuits with 425
their numerous bends and loops. The hypothesis of the suppression of excitation in
nervous circuits serves, on the one hand, as an additional assumption backing up the
idea of conditioned reflexes, and, on the other, turns out to be an independent theory
subject to additional testing (like all assumptions ensuing from the principle of
causality). This hypothesis preserves the validity of the conditioned reflex theory,
making it a durable and effective instrument of causal explanations and predictions in
the physiology of higher nervous activity.
Hence, owing to various assumptions, scientific theories provide a high degree of p

stability for explanations and predictions based upon them and cover a broad field of
various phenomena and processes.
As we see, a transition from one scientific theory to another is a much more p

complex process than a simple negation of the old theory by a new one; some
elements of the old theory are revised or even altogether excluded from the content
of a more developed theory, other elements are carried over from the old to the new
theory without any change or in the form of a limit transition, ensuring the
necessary continuity and comparability of different stages in the development of
science.
The third important aspect of the problem of objectivity or, more accurately, of the p
dialectics of the objective and subjective which is ignored both by the critical
rationalists and scientific realists is the relation of the objective content of our
knowledge to the abstractions instrumental |n the development of scientific concepts
and theories, i.e. the dialectics of the objective and the subjective in the very content 426
of scientific knowledge. As we have seen, positivism regarded sensations, sensory
data as the only reality, i.e. identified them with reality independent of our
consciousness and thus discarded altogether the question of the approximateness,
incompleteness of human knowledge. As to critical rationalism, it defends the
thesis of the complete arbitrariness of the abstractions and assumptions needed to
construct a scientific theory. Both these schools, undialectical as they are, proved
unable to solve the problem of objectivity.
The substantiation of the objectivity of scientific knowledge cannot be limited to the p

analysis of the relation of the content of this knowledge to the objective world,
though it is, undoubtedly, the major part of the task. As is known, cognition is not a
mirror image of reality, but, using Lenins words, a process of the formation of
abstractions, laws, etc. In the process of cognition, particularly scientific cognition,
the investigator sets himself an aim, defines the object of investigation, disengages
himself from all that is inessential and likely to hamper his reasoning and
experimenting, etc. Besides these operations, cognition presupposes the breaking away
of thought from reality, the flight of fancy, the image-bearing thinking. It might
seem that all this mental activity is bound to reduce to zero any objectivity of
knowledge since it represents nothing but the subjective factor in the process of
cognition. Moreover, many of the above operations consisting essentially in the
creation of abstractions must lead of necessity to the distortion of reality, to obvious
errors and miscalculations. The objectivity of knowledge might seem incompatible 427
with the constructive activity of thought, with its active interference in the course of
events.
Yet it would be unwarrantable pedantry to disparage scientific knowledge because of p

its subjective component which does involve the possibility of errors and distortion
of reality. In point of fact, scientific knowledge would be simply impossible without
this component. Abstractions which are prerequisites for scientific knowledge deserve
therefore special attention, the more so as many difficulties connected with the
problem of objectivity derive from the incorrect understanding of their character and
role.
Coincidence of a notion and its object, theory and reality is a complex, dialectically p
contradictory process. Between the object and the knowledge of the object lies the
sphere of mans activity, his goal-oriented actions aimed at transforming and
cognising the surrounding world. Lenin wrote: Here there are actually, objectively,
three members: 1) nature; 2) human cognition = the human brain (as the highest
product of this same nature), and 3) the form of reflection of nature in human
cognition, and this form consists precisely of concepts, laws, categories,
etc.[ 4271 Pointing out that the main drawback of the theory of knowledge in
pre-Marxian materialism consisted in its inability to apply dialectics to the theory of
reflection, Lenin specially emphasised in his Philosophical Notebooks the need for
a dialectical approach to the theory of knowledge, to cognition as a historically
developing complex process mediated by the collective material and spiritual activity 428
of mankind and by the existing system of relations between the individual subjects of
cognition.
The elaboration of the concepts of reflection was thus connected with the p
development of much more flexible and profound views on the cognitive activity of
man. Cognition is indeed reflection, yet it is the reflection of a special kind which
could only be explained after a radical revision of the epistemological concepts of
pre-Marxian materialism. The revised concept, far from breaking off with the basic
principles of the materialist approach to the process of cognition, was to make
materialism even more flexible and consistent. The new, more profound
understanding of the process of cognition was to be based on the idea of unity of
reflection and activity which implied the dependence of human knowledge on socio-
historical conditions. This new concept threw entirely new light on many traditional
problems of the theory of knowledge and made it possible to explain the mechanism
of the reflection of objective reality.
Despite the broad variety of views on the origin of scientific knowledge in pre- p
Marxian materialist philosophy, common to all of them was the conviction that the
solution was to be achieved through investigating the direct action of objects on
passive individual consciousness. The formation and growth of knowledge were only
attributed to the operation of those factors which manifested themselves in the
influence of objects on the sensuousness of the individual, and no account was taken
of all other determinants of the process of cognitionthe dependence of the
cognitive image on links with other branches of knowledge, on the existing historical 429
substantive generalisations and schematic ties and relationships revealing themselves
in mans practical experience, on the forms and methods of investigations, etc. In
point of fact, it was not understood that any object could only become a source of
knowledge after being mediated by the practical activity of social man and by the
previous history of cognition with its objectifications, schematisations and
idealisations.
The new ideas constantly emerging in the course of the development of science are p
always conditioned, in one way or another, by the cognitive situation in the entire
system of scientific knowledge. The progress of science is based primarily on the
available knowledge, on the existing collective forms of cognitive activity objectified
in the language, in scientific systems, etc. It is the active character of specifically
human perceptions, their unity with social practice, the need for a dialectical
integration of individual sensory data in a single system of perceptions that was
referred to by Lenin when he characterised sensation as a subjective image of the
objective world.[ 4291
The social norms and prerequisites for cognitive activity play even a more important p
role in the formation of an objective epistemological image at the theoretical level of
investigation. Theoretical thinking is known to be based on a complex system of
idealisations, including a special layer of mental structures, the so-called ideal objects
which have no analogues among empirical objects, properties or relationships and 430
which function and develop in accordance with their own laws operative in the field
of theoretical knowledge only.
As long as a layman inexperienced in philosophical intricacies remains within the p

sphere of conventional ideas, his attempts to see through a tangle of events and find
a clue to his current problems can hardly induce him to take a conscious stand on
either side of the barricade between materialism and idealism. Things begin to clear
up when he passes beyond the limits of his experience and finds himself confronted
with unusual phenomena and processes or encounters violations of habitual causal
relationships. Under such conditions, an individual who is not prone to religious
prejudices begins to realise the complete groundlessness of the illusion that his
consciousness dictates laws to nature or forms a chain of events by determining the
order of causes and consequences at his own will.
It is perhaps after being within a hairbreadth of death in an earthquake or after p

suffering a heavy shock from a flood as a result of an unexpected torrential rain that
an individual keenly realises the objectivity of the surrounding world. A scientist,
however, attaches far greater importance, of course, to those arguments which are
adduced by Nature for or against his ideas and theories. Isnt, for instance, the
refutation of the once popular theory of the existence of water canals on Mars,
maintained till quite recently, yet another argument in support of the objectivity of
our knowledge? Arent the discoveries of quantum mechanics and of the physics of
elementary particles which shattered the foundation of classical science convincing 431
proof of the objective nature of scientific cognition? The very unexpectedness,
bizarreness of the most important discoveries of modern science, as well as the
apparent intangibility of many scientific ideas testify to the fact that our knowledge
of nature does not shut itself up in its own shell, but reflects with an ever increasing
degree of accuracy the real, objective properties of reality. As is known, the graphic
representation of the surrounding world is connected with the specific features and
conditions of mans cognitive process. Yet the phenomena under investigation exist
independently of human consciousness and therefore need not necessarily assume the
graphic, tangible form as understood by man.
The objectivity of the existing connections and relationships in the world is also p
demonstrated by the fact that man often begins to realise their significance for his
life and practical activity too late and, being unaware of the existence of certain
links of extensive causal chains in nature and society, proves incapable of foreseeing
all the consequences of his interference with natural processes. This aspect of the
objectivity problem, for one, gives mankind no little trouble at present on account of
the irrational use of natural resources by previous generations, the upsetting of the
natural balance of water and energy reserves, and environmental pollution. The very
fact 4hat people often find themselves unable even to formulate a problem before it
thrusts itself upon them clearly demonstrates the objective nature of causal relations,
social and natural laws which do not depend on when and how man becomes aware
of their operation.
Scientific knowledge is but a more or less adequate reflection of objective relations p 432
between phenomena which is shaped and mediated by the no less objective needs of
society. Special importance, in our opinion, attaches to the recognition of the
objectivity of links and relations. The existence of objects outside mans mind is
seldom negated even by inveterate agnostics adhering to Humes tradition. Nor is it
denied by positivism and modern philosophical science. What they do not accept is
the objectivity of links and relations, particularly causal relations. This necessitates
considering in somewhat greater detail the objective character of causal explanations,
forecasts and laws in the general context of the problem of objectivity.
The concept of causality represents in the most general form various relations in p
nature and society between phenomena one of which (called cause) determines or
produces the other (called effect). Objective in such relations are not only cause and
effect as definite objects, events or phenomena, but also the relations themselves
which are independent of consciousness whatever their nature: material, energetic,
informative, etc.
It may look strange to the uninitiated that this brief statement could have caused p
and is still causing sharp debates which involve not only the methodology of
scientific cognition, but also extend to the problems of social development and even
ideological struggle. Yet universality is characteristic of all philosophical categories if
they are truly scientific and represent objective reality. Viewed in terms of problem-
intensity, they may be likened to an iceberg with a huge submerged portion: the
problems they contain in embryo reveal ever new facets in each successive historical 433
period.
There is apparently nothing ambiguous about the word produce, particularly when p
we use it in the context of our everyday experience or in relation to macroscopic
processes. In its conventional applications it conveys the ideas of the real direction of
a process as a result of which one phenomenon produces another, of the succession
of cause and effect in time, of their real similarity and unity of their nature. Yet
each of these aspects of a causal relationship turns into a complex and difficult
problem when we turn to objects studied by modern science. How can we single out
cause and effect from a multitude of other objects and phenomena accompanying the
process under investigation, and this in such a way as to express correctly the real
relation between them? What is the meaning of the word to produce in a scientific
context if there is no possibility to trace the entire process from cause to
consequence? Is this process continuous or intermittent, necessary or accidental,
transitive or intransitive, and so on and so forth? Most of these problems do not
even arise in our everyday consciousness, nor are they implicated in the
philosophical investigations of the positivist and realist schools.
For positivism, which regards sensations or complexes of sensations as the only p

reality a scientist is concerned with, causality is a purely psychological problem
limited to the formation of associations in the process of observation of a regular
sequence of events. Hence, from the positivist viewpoint the problem of causality is
devoid of any philosophical meaning and comes within the scope of concrete 434
psychological investigations.
Critical rationalism regards causality in terms of the deduction of explanations and p

predictions from more general knowledge. It therefore does not recognise the
problem of the correctness, accuracy of these causal explanations and predictions of
the effect of one or another cause, since effect is a logical sequence of cause,
provided there is a more general law. The problem of the relationship between
discontinuity and continuity is discarded by this school in a similar manner: the
causal relationship being the result of a logical inference must be continuous and
transitive by virtue of its definition. Popper, for one, rejects also the problem of the
relation of causality to chance and necessity, since the very concept of causality
implies necessity as its logical component.
By contrast, scientific realism recognises the objective existence of causal relations p

supposing them to be directly mirrored in scientific knowledge. The philosophers
task is thus restricted to the generalisation of the available knowledge of the
physical, biological, chemical forms of causal relations and to the classification of
these numerous forms, whereas the establishment and investigation of their specificity
is left to natural scientists themselves. The difference between the philosophical and
natural scientific knowledge of causality thus lies in the degree of its generalisation
only. Paradoxical though it may seem, both scientific realism and positivism
discard the same philosophical problems. This coincidence, as we have shown earlier,
springs from the identification of knowledge and reality which is characteristic of 435
both positivism and scientific realism despite the latters obviously materialistic
platform. The only difference between them consists, perhaps, in that positivism
deduces reality directly from knowledge, whereas realism deduces knowledge from
objective reality.
Both philosophical trends, as we see, arrive at the same conclusion, though their p
paths are different: positivism eliminates materialism as a principle of scientific
investigation, whereas realism eliminates dialectics. One lays the stress on the
subjective, the other denies its role in the process of scientific cognition. Here we
can see once again that materialism and dialectics are inseparable and that one
cannot exist without the other.
To be sure, the physicists or biologists are only interested in the objective content p
of a process and seek to establish causes and effects, pursuing their immediate
practical aims. As to the philosophers, they have a different problem to solve: they
should separate the objective content of knowledge from those subjective elements
which are inevitably introduced by the scientists in causal explanations and
predictions. Assuming the physicists or biologists attitude, the philosopher not only
abandons his field, but attempts to pass for a philosophical truth something which
has absolutely no right to claim this title. Willy-nilly, this stand is tantamount to the
distortion of reality in a philosophical sense.
Of course, in dealing with causality the philosopher should not close his eyes to the p
objective content of the knowledge gained within the framework of special sciences,
such as physics, chemistry and biology, otherwise he would open the door for 436
idealism and subjectivism in science. Yet his real task which has already been
considered earlier (see section 3 of this Chapter) consists in specifying the subjective
aspects of causal explanations and predictions. In the context of the basic question of
philosophy, i.e. the relationship of matter and consciousness, the mind and nature, the
philosopher ought to disclose all subjective prerequisites for scientific investigation,
since this task lies outside the scope of the problems tackled by the scientists
themselves. From the philosophico-theoretical viewpoint, the problem of objectivity
consists in revealing the subjective elements of causal explanations and predictions in
special scientific investigations and in disclosing after that the interdependence of the
objective and the subjective, their dialectics in the process of cognition.
Hence, the development of knowledge is characterised by a trend towards p

comprehending the real object of cognition as a unity of all its aspects and toward
integrating all the cognised fragments of reality (different systems of relations) in a
single objective system revealing its different aspects before the cognising subject.
The realisation of this trend calls for the investigation of the forms of interaction of
each object with other objects (the latter being regarded in this case as the conditions
of the former), as well as with the cognising subject himself. The objectivity of
knowledge is therefore made contingent on the understanding of the role of the
subject in the process of cognition, particularly the role of measuring operations, the
instruments used by the investigator, his system of reference and methods of coding
the attained knowledge.
In his everyday work a physicist, a chemist or a biologist usually encounters this p 437
problem in its philosophico-methodological aspect while seeking for concrete, specific
means to single out the objective content of causal relations in reality itself, in actual
processes taking place under natural conditions. It is the more important as the real
problems and difficulties facing science in the field of methodology often stem not
only from the erroneous understanding of causality, but also from the disregard or
underestimation of the abstractions and assumptions forming the framework of the
concept of causal relations. From the methodological viewpoint, i.e. from the
viewpoint of the effective solution of modern scientific problems pertaining to the
principle of causality, it is important to take account not only of the objective
content of the concept of causality, but also of its subjective aspect or, more
specifically, of all the intricacies in the causal relationship represented by the
dialectics of the objective and the subjective.
Indeed, to establish a causal relationship between events A and B and to explain p

event B by pointing out its cause A or to predict possible consequences B1 , B2 , etc.
of known cause A one must not only indicate the corresponding signs of causality,
but also disengage himself from all other events except A and B in the given space-
time continuum. In order to understand ... details, wrote Engels, we must detach
them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately, its
nature, special causes, effects, etc.[ 4371 An abstraction of this kind resorted to 438
in the establishment of a causal relationship is in fact a routine mental operation
often performed in everyday life. For instance, watching the collision of billiard balls
we have no difficulty in identifying the impact of one ball as the cause of the
movement of another. In doing so, we discard mentally such factors as the friction
of the balls against the surface of the table, the convection airflows, and others,
since we know from experience that they cannot have any essential influence on the
position of massive billiard balls.
Similarly, we say with certainty that on a summer day a stone is heated with p
sunbeams, but not with the light of distant stars, though we know that their light
also reaches the earths surface. Yet its effect is negligible as compared with the
radiant energy of the Sun, therefore we simply disregard it in our explanation.
In dealing with causal relationships such abstractions are used so often that they p
become habitual and seem quite natural. The ease with which they are created and
their practical value produce an illusion that, being quite justifiable in one or several
cases, they must be quite relevant in all other similar situations. It is only after we
are confronted with a complex situation that we begin to realise the full extent of
the difficulties that have to be overcome if we want to establish the cause or effect
of a given event in the tangle of a multitude of other objects and phenomena.
What is the cause, for instance, of the appearance of deserts in the once flourishing p
regions of Central Asia? No doubt the cause does exist, though it is evidently
represented by a complex system of different factors. To answer this question, we 439
must study a tremendous amount of natural-history material and use a great many
different experimental means and methods. We must carry out, for one, a
geomorphological analysis of water reservoirs, register the climatic changes in the
region in interest, study the structure of the topsoil, and so on and so forth. It is
only after we complete such research that we shall be able to discard inessential
factors and construct a more or less adequate explanation. Why should the task be so
complex in this particular case? Is it because the investigator is required to exercise
special care in order to reveal the signs of a causal relationship? Rather on the
contrary, such signs are too numerous and the problem consists in selecting those of
them (after the assessment of their comparative significance) which are characteristic
of the given concrete situation.
The abstractions used in identifying cause and effect play an essential role in the p
explanation and prediction of various phenomena. Should such abstractions prove
impossible for some experimental or theoretical reasons, no correct explanation or
prediction of events on the basis of causal dependence can be provided. In other
words, the establishment of a cause-effect relation is conditional on the
accomplishment of all necessary abstractions.
The abstractions connected with the concept of causality will only be valid if the p
investigator observes certain general rules (rules of abstraction) of which we shall
indicate at least three.
First, invariable conditions should always be fenced off, since cause and effect p
should be variable factors by definition (their emergence or disappearance may be 440
regarded as a special case).
Second, if all or many conditions are variable in one or another respect (which is p
quite probable), the changes regarded as signs of a causal relationship must be
different by their quality from all other changes in the given space-time continuum.
Third, the influence of attending factors must be far less pronounced than the p
influence of the cause on the effect, the difference in their intensity being such that
the attending factors could be disregarded without any appreciable effect on the
results of the investigation.
The above rules of abstraction impose certain limitations on the objective p

(boundary) conditions of the investigation of relationships in interest and, if observed,
warrant the qualification of such relationships as causal. The observance of these
rules takes the form of various assumptions which relate to the conditions of
cognition and are stated in relevant scientific texts.
The strict observance of these rules when identifying cause-effect relations p

guarantees the success of any causal explanation or prediction. A change of B that
follows a change of A cannot yet be regarded as proof of the causal dependence of
B on A unless the above rules are observed.
To be sure, the fulfilment of abstraction rules is often made impossible by objective p

reality itself. In many cases the scientists would probably prefer experiments to the
conditions provided by nature for investigation. What is an advantage in one
cognitive situation may turn into an obstacle in others. Noting this specific feature of
the process of cognition, the Soviet scholar, V.A. Ambartsumyan, writes: A 441
physicist confronted with an unknown phenomenon usually repeats his experiment to
establish the dependence of the phenomena in interest on those conditions under
which the experiment is staged. He has a possibility .not only of studying these
conditions in every detail, but also of changing them. Things are quite different in
astrophysics. Having chanced to observe an unusual phenomenon only once, we .can
neither control the external conditions under which it took place, nor repeat it at will.
Sometimes we do not even have any idea of the condition and circumstances
attending the phenomenon we have observed.[ 4411
In most other fields scientists are usually capable of creating artificial conditions p
which meet the abstraction rules. The aim of an experiment in this case is to show
that a change of one object or phenomenon (which does not affect the natural
processes under the artificial conditions of the experiment) causes a corresponding
change (or emergence) of the other object with other conditions being invariable. It is
precisely the preservation of the constancy of all other conditions that ensures the
observance of the abstraction rules. If the experimental check of a causal dependence
is impossible for some reason or other, the investigator can meet the requirements of
the abstraction rules by resorting, for instance, to appropriate mathematical means.
Suppose, we want to prove a causal relation between the uniform expansion of a p

rubber ball during an increase of its internal pressure and the behaviour of a 442
molecule in a closed vessel. A uniform expansion of the spherical walls testifies to
the equality of gas pressure on the vessel walls. Now, how shall we account for this
equality if it is known that gas consists of individual molecules moving chaotically
within the given volume? In our explanation of the uniform expansion of the vessel
we in fact abstract ourselves from the details of the trajectory of an individual
molecule and from the results of the molecule collisions. Do we have the right to
make such an assumption? It turns out we do. When we deal with a large number of
molecules, we may take it for granted that each molecule stays in any point of the
given volume during equal periods of time, since there are equal probabilities that
any molecule can get to any concrete region irrespective of its location. As a result
of a great number of chaotic collisions not a single molecule can stay next to
another one. Consequently, each molecule acquires a high degree of independence in
its movements relative to other molecules. Since accidental collisions tend towards
complete compensation, conditions are realised for the application of the concept of
causality to the given relationship in full compliance with abstraction rules.
Now, what happens when these rules are not observed? Should the researcher fail to p
take them very seriously, the results of his investigation are bound to be distorted
and he may not even be aware of it. Suppose, we want to apply Hooks law to the
relationship between the strain in a steel bar and the pressure applied to it,
disregarding the fact that this causal relationship obtains within definite pressure
limits only, which are different for different metals. It stands to reason that the 443
explanation itself and the predictions of a concrete strain as a function of the
corresponding pressure value will prove erroneous.
A similar problem arises in defining the wing configuration in an airplane design. p

As long as the airplane speed was not high, the designer was justified in regarding
air as incompressible liquid. Of, course, this assumption was but a crude
approximation to real processes, but it could be tolerated as the resulting error was
practically negligible. However, when it became necessary to define probable airplane
characteristics at high speeds, the hitherto justifiable assumption lost its validity.
Account had also to be taken of many other forces arising due to friction, air
vortices, vibration, etc. The task of accurate prediction and calculation became much
more complex. Consequently, the rules of abstraction (the accuracy of assumptions
given in quantitative terms) have acquired special importance and failure to observe
them is likely to result in serious errors.
The assumptions which relate to the conditions of investigation and are used in the p
analysis of any causal relationship constitute a subjective element in the concept of
causality. The admission of this fact calls for a very thorough philosophical analysis
of the dialectics of the objective and the subjective in causal explanations and
predictions. It is important to understand, first, that the share of subjectivity in such
explanations and predictions is so negligible that it cannot jeopardise their objectivity.
Second, the introduction of certain subjectivity in such cases is quite justifiable, since 444
the use of abstractions in scientific explanations and predictions is necessitated in
each particular case by quite definite objective conditions. It means that the concept
of causality calls for at least a twofold substantiation: first, it is necessary to prove
the validity of the very idea of causal relationship which underlies its definition;
second, it is necessary to prove the soundness of the abstractions and approximations
resorted to. Significantly, from the methodological viewpoint, this latter set of
arguments is not less important than the identification of the causal dependence itself
and should be presented independently of the former set of arguments.
Here the study of causal relationships reveals one of the most curious manifestations p
of the dialectics of the subjective and the objective. On the one hand, the singling
out of the signs of a causal relationship is a subjective act aimed at investigating and
analysing the objective world. Any denial of the subjective character, goal-orientation
and selectivity of the scientific investigation into the cause-effect relationship would
be untenable. On the other hand, this subjective act is by no means arbitrary, it is
prompted by objective conditions. As regards its motives, they are rooted, in the final
analysis, in the practical activity of man.
The active role of the subject in the processes of investigation (the subjective p
aspect) which manifests itself in experiments, hypotheses, suppositions, assumptions,
use of various theoretical and mathematical means is an indispensable condition of
scientific cognition. The tremendous successes achieved by science in the cognition
of the world would have been impossible without mans selective approach to reality, 445
without his conscious use of appropriate means and methods in the process of
cognition. However inaccurate the approximations, it should never be forgotten that

the final result of the investigators activity is the creation of a scientific picture of
the world which helps man to reflect and transform reality through his practical
activity. All this is fully applicable to the investigation of objective causal relations.
At the same time one should bear in mind that the singling out of a causal p
dependence from the entire system of complex objective relations and the disregard
of all other conditions cannot but distort the integral picture of the world, since there
are no absolutely isolated systems implicitly postulated by the concept of causality.
Noting the complex, dialectical character of the cognition of the universal connection
of phenomena, Lenin wrote: The human conception of cause and effect always
somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting
it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of a single world
process.[ 4451
Being an abstraction, every concept, causality including, tends to distort reality. The p
attitude to this indisputable fact is different on the part of pessimists and optimists in
science. The former say that our knowledge is an endless chain of errors and
delusions, whereas the latter (and we include ourselves in their number) do not view
the situation as tragic, though they do recognise it to be contradictory, sometimes 446
even dramatic.
Indeed, there is no ground for mistrusting science only because its results are not p
ideal. The history of science provides numerous examples when such difficulties
were successfully overcome. In view of the extreme epistemological complexity of
the concept of causality we should reconcile ourselves to the inevitable inaccuracies
in any causal explanation and prediction. The scientists task is to reduce such
inaccuracies to a minimum and take full advantage of the effective means (both
technical and conceptual) now available to him in order to neutralise his errors. It
should be noted in this connection that inaccuracies can sometimes be disregarded
altogether without any detriment to the validity of causal explanations. For instance,
in everyday life we readily accept the explanation that water freezes as a result of
the ambient temperature decrease to 4C, though more accurate measurements made
under different conditions will undoubtedly reveal a certain scatter in thermometer
readings even if measurements are made in one and the same place but at different
times, or at one and the same time but with different water samples. Why do we
tolerate such an inaccuracy? Only because all other factors we close our eyes to are
not essential in the given situation. We may disregard, for instance, the influence of
admixtures in water and the probable variation of atmospheric pressure which is also
known to affect liquid freezing processes.
In the example under consideration we only single out what we are interested in at p
the moment, namely, only two most essential events and neglect all other factors and
accompanying conditions. If the quantity of admixtures in water remains within 447
normal limits and the ambient pressure is not very much different from normal, the
error in the explanation of water freezing by a decrease of ambient temperature to
4G will not be essential. Generally speaking, the scientist has every right to change
the conditions of his investigation in accordance with the situation and use to this
end any conceptual or mathematical means at his disposal, provided, of course, that
he strictly observes the rules of abstraction, avoids any arbitrariness in his causal
explanations and predictions and takes care not to distort living reality.
The objectivity of the principle of causality, however, consists not only in that it p
reflects certain aspects of reality and that the selection of certain events as causes
and effects is prompted by the objective conditions of cognition. The very motives of
this selection are always rooted in the material, practical activity of people and, in
the end, in the entire system of social production. Moreover, it is none other than
this practical activity that passes the final judgement on the objectivity of causal
relations.
This idea has been very clearly expressed by Engels. The first thing that strikes us
in considering matter in motion, he wrote, is the interconnection of the individual
motions of separate bodies, their being determined by one another. But not only do
we find that a particular motion is followed by another, we find also that we can
evoke a particular motion by setting up the conditions in which it takes place in
nature... In this way, by the activity of human beings, the idea of causality becomes
established, the idea that one motion is the cause of another.[ 4481 It is 448
precisely the activity of human beings, their social practice, that frees our knowledge
from subjectivity, gives our abstractions flesh and blood and integrates them into its
great concreteness. It is only through practice, by including the cognised link of a
causal relationship, as we understand it, into the objective, universal system of
relations that we test the truth of our knowledge. Should it fit into the system
without disturbing the course of natural processes, we shall have every right to
regard our mental operations and abstractions, even the most daring ones, as
completely justifiable.
***

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Notes
[ 4011] See V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit., pp. 26061.
[ 4031] V.I. Lenin, Conspectus of Hegels Book The Science of Logic, op. cit.,
p.182.
[ 4061] Max Born, Physics in My Generation, Pergamon Press, London, 1956,

p.163.
[ 4131] Yu.B. Rumer, A.I. Fet, Theory of Unitary Symmetry, Moscow, Nauka
Publishers, 1970, p.8 (in Russian), p.424.
[ 4171] Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics, Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1961, pp.219, 208.
[ 4201] V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empiric-Criticism, op. cit., p.136.
[ 4202] Ibid., p.133.
[ 4211] Ibid., p.137.
[ 4271] V.I. Lenin, Conspectus of Hegels Book The Science of Logic, op. cit.,
p.182.
[ 4371] F.Engels, Anti-Dhring, op. cit., p.30.
[ 4411] V.A. Ambartsumyan, Philosophical Questions of the Science of the
Universe, Yerevan, 1973, p.116 (in Russian).
[ 4481] Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, op. cit., 230.
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The scientific and technological revolution has proved to be a serious test not only p
<> for some general and special scientific theories, but also for many philosophical
schools and trends concerned in one way or another with the scientific explanation of
the world. Positivist philosophy which pulled through many difficult periods in the
Contents course of its long history has evidently entered a new critical stage in its evolution.
The general crisis of positivism started, in effect, with the emergence of Marxist
Index philosophy, its first real alternative, and has been aggravating ever since. It became
Card particularly acute at the turn of the 20th century in connection with major discoveries
in physics, mathematics and philosophy, summed up by Lenin. New trials awaited
Formats: positivism in the 1920s as a result of the emergence of quantum mechanics and the
Text theory of relativity. No less troublesome were the subsequent periods of its
PS evolution. All the storms positivism had to weather resulted, as a rule, in partial 450
PDF modifications of its philosophical programme which took into account the criticism of
its opponents, including Marxist philosophy.

Other It is noteworthy that the representatives of positivism attributed all these misfortunes p
Titles: of their philosophy not to its intrinsic weaknesses or to their own fallacies, but
TA regarded them as symptoms of a crisis of science in general. Moreover, all blame for
setbacks and difficulties in scientific cognition they usually laid at the door of either
Years: materialism or dialectics. The strategy and the tactics of positivism fighting for its
1984
prestige in the scientific community evidently deserves special analysis which goes

beyond the scope of our investigation. What we do need to emphasise here is the
### fact that it is not some particulars of the programme of positivism that are called in
question by the current scientific and technological revolution, but the very
MAP foundation of positivist philosophy. In point of fact, the revolution has completely
undermined the scientists confidence in the basic methodological principles of
positivismempiricism, conventionalism, indeterminism, the reduction of philosophy
to the logic of science and to linguistic analysis, etc.
The crisis of positivist philosophy manifests itself not only in the disagreement with p
science and its main tendencies but also in the emergence of new schools and trends
within the philosophy of science coming out with sharp criticism of some positivist
dogmas and proposing methodological alternatives to its traditions.
The Western philosophy of science does not know a more radical critic of p
empiricism than Karl Popper. Critical rationalism as the methodological platform of 451
Popper and his adherents does appear to be rather a formidable opponent of
positivism. Its model of scientific cognition is essentially different from the positivist
model, particularly if we take into account the views expounded in the latest works
of the English philosopher: the recognition of theory as the most essential component
of scientific knowledge, the deductive system of reasoning (from a problem to a
surmise, from the surmise as a tentative solution of the problem to consequences,
from the consequences implied by a hypothesis to their purpose-oriented refutation,
from this to a new formulation of the problem, and so on). Nevertheless, despite the
apparent distinctions from the inductivist model defended by positivism there is
striking resemblance between the two models: both of them postulate direct and
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/4-Conclusion[2012-12-17 15:16:46]
simple connection between empirical knowledge and theory and assert .the
conventional character of basic empirical statements, if not laws themselves.
Another characteristic feature of Poppers stand which seemingly distinguishes it p

from the positivist views is the recognition of the so-called World 3 or the world of
objective knowledge. It is very significant, however, that Popper does not relate this
world to objective reality, relying, like the positivists, on the intersubjective criterion
of scientificity. His idea of objective knowledge borders on the idealism of the
Platonic, if not Berkeleian, type.
Critical rationalism also differs from positivism in that it revives the principle of p
causality and shows special interest in the explanatory role of scientific theories. Yet
even this difference is watered down by interpreting necessity implied by causal 452
explanations in the purely logical sense a la Wittgenstein. The theory of regularity
adhered to by Wittgenstein in relation to the problems of causality and determinism
is obviously rooted in the philosophy of Hume and Kant and shows close affinity to
the Machist concept of causality as probability of the expectation of consequences, as
well as to the interpretation of law as functional dependence expressed by a
mathematical formula.
Besides the highly critical attitude to empiricism in the modern philosophy of p

science, the opposition to positivism also manifests itself in the understanding of the
subject-matter of philosophy. In this field the debates are mainly centred on the
status of the so-called metaphysical problems. Critical rationalism does not go
beyond the general legalisation of such problems though they were implicitly
recognised in positivist dogmata, whereas scientific realism, new ontology and
new metaphysics, which have formed within the framework of the modern
philosophy of science as alternatives to positivism, place special emphasis on the
need for the restoration of metaphysics reduced to ashes during the anti-metaphysical
crusade of positivism and make this issue one of the key points of their programmes.
As a matter of fact, the programme of scientific realism boils down to the p

rebuilding of the scientific structure of the real worldthe task considered to be
worthy of philosophy. Very characteristic in this respect are the general scientific
concepts and metatheoretical problems which receive extensive coverage in the works
of this schools representatives. They indeed regard their task in terms of
resurrection. One gets an impression that scientific realism is completely unaware of 453
the age-old traditions in the investigation of these problems and ignorant of the
dialectics of nature and social development expounded in Marxist-Leninist philosophy
which has never lost interest in such problems as being, the structure of matter, the
interconnection of space and time, the forms of motion, the laws of the development
of material systems, including society, and carried out fruitful investigations into the
philosophical problems of natural science, social progress, etc. The attitude of the
Western philosophy of science to these and many other problems is indicative of its
confinement within the narrow limits of positivist traditions.
Of course, attempts to start from scratch ought to meet with sympathy and it would p
be hardly fair to demand of scientific realism, scientific materialism, new
ontology, etc. that they consider these problems within the framework of more
general philosophical issues and substantiate the new ontology with dialectical and
epistemological analysis. However, any attempt to develop a sound ontology today
without fulfilling this requirement is inevitably doomed to failure. Moreover, an
ontology constructed on a tabula rasa basis tends to reproduce in a crude manner
some ideas and concepts of old natural philosophy gravitating towards mechanicism,
speculativeness, the Laplatian ideal of determinism, etc. It would fail to rise to the
level of universal, truly philosophical generalisations and only strive to replace them
by a more or less coherent system of general scientific statements. Such statements
based either on biological and cybernetic ideas, or on the set theory and the latest
achievements of physics would inevitably lose their concreteness and degenerate into 454
truisms leaving at the same time a lot of loopholes for idealismthe more so as
they are intended to deduce the world from current scientific concepts and tend on
the whole to petrify the present-day knowledge rather than to give a dynamic picture
of living reality on the basis of a truly philosophical approach. Consciousness, too,
with all its specificity and richness of content is deduced from (or reduced to) the
interaction of molecules and atoms, whereas the mechanism of heredity in living
organisms is viewed in terms of quantum transitions. The tabula rasa approach of
new metaphysics to the problem of ontology will hardly enable the philosophy of
science to raise the edifice of new methodology above ground level in the place of
the ruins left by positivism. All attempts to revive ontology as a doctrine of the
objective world and its most general properties and laws will at best remind one of
a recapitulation course of history unless their authors turn in earnest to Marxist-
Leninist philosophy, to the achievements of modern materialism that has assimilated
all that was best and most progressive in the history of science and culture.
It is for this reason that we set ourselves the task of familiarising the reader with p
some principles of Marxist philosophy, showing the essence of dialectical materialism
as an alternative to positivism and considering possible solutions to the present-day
pivotal problems of methodology. It would be presumptuous to claim a more or less
complete exposition of the views of the classics and modern Soviet philosophers in
this book, not to speak of the elucidation of all the problems that have been touched 455
upon in its polemical sections. The author has only singled out a few most acute
problems which have become of late the object of particularly heated controversies
and which have not yet been subjected to a sufficiently detailed analysis in Marxist
literature with due regard for the nuances brought in the limelight.
As regards the positive content of this book, we attach special importance to the p
problems of the scientific value of philosophy and of the concreteness of
philosophical knowledge which are closely connected with each other. In Marxist
philosophy concrete knowledge has always been associated with the completeness of
the reflection of objects and their diverse relations and links with one another.
Conversely, the abstract has been regarded as an equivalent of isolation,
particularisation. Any statement represents a dialectical unity of both opposites,
therefore there are no and cannot be any absolutely abstract or absolutely concrete
scientific statements. Any scientific knowledge can only be more abstract or less
abstract. Regarding scientific cognition as a living process unfolding in time and
space we maintain that this completeness of the reflection of links and relations is
different at different stages of scientific investigation. Hence, we distinguish three
different levels or forms of concreteness: -empirical, representing direct, sensual
perception of objects and phenomena; theoretical, concerned with inner laws,
essential links, relations and necessary features; and philosophical, relating to the
most general properties and phenomena of reality, the contradictoriness of
development, the diversity and the unity of quality and quantity, the material and the 456
ideal, etc., as they are reflected in the human mind.
Real philosophical knowledge reflects certain universal properties of the sensually p

perceived world and is in this sense empirically concrete. It reveals the most general
laws and relationships of the surrounding world and is therefore theoretically
concrete. As distinct from the knowledge provided by special sciences it also defines
the epistemological limits for the solution of one or another problem, i.e. the
concrete form of the relation between the objective and the subjective in scientific
cognition and, consequently, is epistemologically concrete. In point of fact,
philosophical knowledge can only be concrete if it takes into account the place of a
given phenomenon or the property it reflects in the general system of categories and
laws of dialectics and materialism. Concreteness is demanded by Marxist philosophy
of itself in the first place. The concepts of matter and consciousness are only
regarded as concrete (and therefore really scientific) within the framework of the
basic question of philosophy. The category of contradiction can only be concrete if it
is viewed in the context of the unity of the phenomena under consideration.
Dialectics rejects such notions as the opposition in general, quality in general,
essence in general, necessity in general, etc. regarded as absolute entities. It demands
that the opposites be only considered within the framework of unity, quality in
relation to a given quantity, matter in relation to consciousness as its derivative,
necessity in relation to chance, etc. Outside this philosophical concreteness the
categories of dialectics and materialism become nonsensical. The concreteness of
these categories is the main proof of their scientificity. 457
The specific form of concreteness of philosophical knowledge determines also its p

relation to the knowledge provided by special sciences. Philosophy does not stand
aloof from them, it merges with the entire system of human knowledge and actively
penetrates all the cells of this living intellectual organism. Conversely, no special
scientific knowledge could be fully concrete without the support of philosophy, as
positive sciences do not concern themselves with quantity and quality, matter and
consciousness, the opposites in objects and phenomena, etc. It hardly needs
mentioning that no truly scientific analysis would be possible under such conditions.
Possessing its own form of concreteness, philosophical knowledge performs not only p
the methodological, but also the theoretical function in the development of science. It
is not something alien to special scientific knowledge, but makes part and parcel of
its system. It stands to reason that philosophical knowledge integrated in the structure
of human thought usually loses its independent meaning or, at any rate, remains in
the backgroundit serves the purposes of a special scientific investigation or some
practical action and is entirely subordinated to it. This inconspicuousness of
philosophical knowledge sometimes gives grounds for erroneous assertions that a
well-developed theory has no place for philosophy at all.
The history of science shows how philosophical principles and laws rise up in all p
their magnitude and reveal their power and viability in critical periods, at the
crossroads of scientific cognition, when it becomes necessary to solve crucial 458
problems of social and scientific development. Fundamental, theoretical sciences find
themselves much more often confronted with such large-scale problems than do
empirical or applied sciences, and it is usually fundamental theories that throw a new
light on conventional, generally recognised philosophical principles. Hence, the
cooperation between philosophy and special sciences is particularly fruitful in the
sphere of theory. The attitude of theorists to philosophy is reverent and critical at the
same time. T-heir relations based on mutual confidence leave no room for
parochialism and, consequently, for petty squabbles over their share in the success of
a scientific investigation or, conversely, their measure of responsibility in case of its
failure. Here we have a single science whose only aim untarnished by any prestige
considerations is to serve mankind.
The question of the objectivity of knowledge assumes different forms and requires p
different solutions depending on the context. Philosophy provides the most general
solution: everything that exists outside the mind (be it individual or collective) is
objective. Special sciences view the problem from a different angle striving to
eliminate the subject from the results of a scientific investigation. Empirical
investigation does not know a more reliable means for obtaining objective knowledge
than an experiment ensuring the investigators neutrality. Theoretical investigation,
in our opinion, pivots on the principle of invariance. In the theorists language the
objective in the first approximation is equivalent to what is invariant in different
systems of transformation. A natural scientist (a physicist, a chemist, a biologist, etc.) 459
shows but little interest in the problem of objectivity in its pure, philosophical
form, considering it even too trivial (as is evidenced from numerous publications and
verbal statements). His attitude changes when the problem comes to the foreground,
e.g. when the former criteria of invariance fail, generally recognised theories collapse
and the scientists need a reliable bridge to a new theory.
Dialectics does not regard objective knowledge as a challenge prize which passes on p
from one generation to another. Objective knowledge must be gained by and for
each generation of scientists separately and may only come as a result of their own
labour. It should be extracted from the rock of subjective assessments, suppositions
and delusions just like precious metal is extracted from ore. It is procured in arduous
toilonly to be rejected there and then and give way to more profound concepts and
theories.
In its approach to the problem of objective knowledge dialectical methodology is p

characterised, first and foremost, by its constant striving to reflect all the complexity
and dynamism of scientific cognition avoiding any one-sidedness and absolutisation
of some particular methods or levels of cognition. At the same time it firmly adheres
to the principle of objectivity in its most general, philosophical sense, since the
disregard of this principle leads to the erosion and devaluation of the entire system
of scientific knowledge.
To be sure, the concrete embodiment of the principles of dialectics offered by one

or another scientist in his works may lack the necessary flexibility, completeness or
consistency. The blame for subjective weaknesses should not be laid at the door of 460
dialectics itself. It provides a sound basis for the solution of problems facing modern
science, the more so as it calls for creative approach to its own development.
***

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<<< CHAPTER THREE -- NAME INDEX >>>


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461

<div class="alpha_lvl1">
NAME INDEX
</div>
<div class="font-size-tiny"> </div>
<pre>
Adams, J.— 423

Adorno, Th.—292, 320,
321
Agassi, J.—86–93
Ambartsumyan, V. A.—
440, 441
Aristophanes—85
Avenarius, P.—29, 255
Ayala, F.—166
Ayer, A.—29, 30, 37–39,
54, 56, 57, 127, 258
Bauer, E.—198, 199

Bekhterev, V. P.—346
Bergman, G.—49
Bergson, H.—142
Berkeley, J.-53, 55, 58,
154 Bhaskar, R.—198, 199
Blokhintsev, D. I.—346
Bohm, D.—229. 235, 242
Bohr, N.— 42. 43, 142,
150, 151, 239
[col2]
Born, M.—155–59, 406

Braithwaite, R. B.—171
Brecht, B.—85
Bridgeman, P. W.—171,
242 Brodbeck, M.—171
Bunge, M.—108, 115–25,
134, 136, 217, 230–43
Carnap, R.-24, 25, 31–

35, 40, 46, 53, 66,
109, 114, 127, 142,
160–63, 167, 171
Chetverikov, S.—228
Comte, A.—27–29, 44, 49
Copernicus, N.—61, 73
Crick, F.—168–70
Darwin, Ch.—176
Dirac, P.—85
Dubois-Reymond, E.—
165
Dubrpvsky, D.—214

Eccles, J.—218
Einstein, A.—42, 65, 73,
150, 211, 346, 408,
415–17
Engels, F.-62, 221, 222,
251, 252, 255, 270,
271, 280, 285, 333,
334, 342, 349, 437,
447, 448
F
Feigl, H.-108, 130, 131,

208–16, 323, 324
Fet, A. I.—413
Feyerabend, P.—81–87,
93, 94, 109, 113, 206
Fichte, I. G.—142
Finnochiaro, M.—196
Fischer, R.—228
Fock, V. A. —142, 346
Fodor, J.—131, 132
Frank, Ph.—154
Franklin, B.-298
Frolov, I. T.—211, 212
Galilei, G.—85, 406, 414,

415
Goethe, J. W.—248
Habermas, J. — 286–89,

292 Hawking, S. W.—150
Heaviside, 0.—184
Hegel, G.—51, 84, 142,
245, 250, 251, 254,
257,259–65,300,302,
320, 321
Heidegger, M,—143
[col2]
Heisenberg, W.—42, 43,

147, 229, 346
Hempel, C. —128, 171
Herz, H.-184
Hilbert, D.-292
Homer -207
Hull, D.-224–27
Hume, D.-53, 55, 57,
63, 155
Husserl, E.—39
I
Ilyenkov, E. V.—269,
276
Infeld, L.-416, 417
Kant, I.—30, 39, 119,
155, 159, 250, 300,
303, 452
Kepler, I.—79
Kierkegaard, S.— 85
Kuhn, T.—71–84, 195–
97, 309, 422
Lakatos, I.—75–80, 87,

91, 93, 198
Lavoisier, A. L.—73
Lebedev, P. H.— 313,
340
Lenin, V. I.-85, 220–22,
275, 285, 300, 310,
311, 316, 332, 340,
341, 353, 374, 375,
401, 403, 406, 418–
21, 427, 429, 445,
449
Lesevich, V. V.—45
Leverrier, U.—423
Lightfoot, E. N.—168
Locke, J.—57
Lorentz, H.—406, 415,

416
Lorenz, K.-165, 166
Luther, M.-85
Mach, E.-29, 45, 46,

55, 142, 155, 255
Marcuse, H.—292–95
Margolis, J.—217
Marx, K.—85, 221–23,
251, 252, 255, 268–
72, 274, 276, 285–90,
298, 317, 318, 321,
332, 342, 353, 358,
374, 375
Maxwell, J. —184
McKeon, R.—107
Michelson, A.—340
Mill, J. S.—24, 29, 47
Mises, R.-37, 39, 41
Monod, J.—42, 169, 170
N
Nagel, E.-163–65
Narsky, I. S.-321
Neurath, 0.—171
Newton, L—65, 73, 74,
79, 85, 413
Nickols, E. F.—313
Pauli, W.—346
Pavlov, I. P.—346, 424
Plato—39, 189
Poincare, H.—42, 340,
406 Polten, E. —218–21
Popper, K. R.–59–71,
74, 75, 77, 86–104,
109, 116, 117, 119,
123,177–94,196,218,
[col2]
256,257,307–09,450,
451
Ptolemy—194
Quine, W. V. O.—108,
111–14,136,137,205–
07
Reichenbach, H.—109,
142, 143
Robinson, G. S.—194
Rorty, R.—134, 135
Rumer, Yu. B.—413
Ruse, M.—171, 172, 224
Russell, B.—25, 36, 39,
42, 155, 256, 335
Schaffner, K. —170
Schelling, F. W. J.—
142
Schlick, M.—29, 46, 48,
61, 109, 127, 256
Schrodinger, E. —100,
151, 229, 406, 413
Sellars, W.-108, 126,
135 Seve, L.—58
Smart, J. J.—132, 213
Spencer, H.—26, 49
Spinoza, B.—39
Szentgjorgji, A,-228
Trigg, R.—198–205, 217
V
Vavilov, N. I.—346
Volkmann, P.—43
Watson, J.—168, 170

Wetter, H.—326
Wheeler, J. A.-148
[col2]
Whitehead, A. N.—47
Wigner, E.—148–50, 229
Wittgenstein, L.—25, 29,
36, 46, 47, 55, 61,
256, 452
Wright, S.—228
Yudin, B. G.—211, 212
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>>> TITLE: Alternatives to Positivism.
<< >> AUTHOR: Naletov, Igor
SERIES: Criticism of Bourgeois Ideology and Revisionism
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__SERIES__
Criticism
of Bourgeois
Ideology
and
Revisionism
[1]
[2]
__AUTHOR__
Igor Naletov
__TITLE__
Alternatives
to
Positivism
__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2005-07-04T22:02:15-0700
__PUBLISHER_NAME__
Progress
Publishers
__PUBLISHER_ADDRESS__
Moscow
[3]
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1984/AP469/index.txt[2012-12-17 15:17:20]
__TRANSLATED_FROM__
Translated from the Russian by Vladimir Stankevich
И. НАЛЕТОВ
 
АЛЬТерНаТИВЫ

ПОЗИТИВИЗМУ
 
На

анзлийском

языке
 
© ИЗДаТеЛЬСТВО

«Прогресс», 1984
English translation © Progress Publishers 1984
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
~ 0302030900---337
H ----------------
~ ~ 014(01)---84
[4]
CONTENTS
~
Page
~
Introduction ................ 7
~
CHAPTER ONE. BETWEEN SCIENCE AND
METAPHYSICS....... 23
1. Metaphysics and
Anti-Metaphysics of Positivism . . 23
2. Metaphysics of ``Critical
Rationalism''........ 59
3. ``Scientific Realism.''
Metaphysics and Ontology . . 104
~
CHAPTER TWO. SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE ....... 139
1. Positivism: Objectivity as
Observability of Events . . 139
2. Objective Knowledge and
``Critical Rationalism'' . . 177
3. From Physicalism to
``Scientific Materialism''...... 196
~
CHAPTER THREE. DIALECTICAL BEARINGS 245
1. Overcoming Hegel .... 245
2. Marx and the Problem of
Concrete Knowledge . . . 268
3. Concreteness of Materialist
Dialectics........ 301
4. Materialist Dialectics and
Special Sciences..... 327
5. Dialectics and the
Integration of Science ..... 357
6. Dialectics of the Objective
and the Subjective in
Scientific Cognition...... 390
~
Conclusion.................. 449
Name Index ................ 461
Subject Index ................. 465
[5]
[6]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
INTRODUCTION
 The scientific and technological revolution

which started in the mid-20th century has proved
to be a serious test not only for many scientific
theories, but also for a number of philosophical
ideas, concepts and even major trends. It affected,
first and foremost, those philosophical schools
which were, or claimed to be, connected with
natural science. The global nature of many
scientific problems, the high level of theoretical
abstractions, the wide scope of generalisations
and the deep differentiation and integration of
scientific knowledge enhanced by the scientific
and technological revolution have increased the
progressive scientists' concern about the ethical
aspects and humanistic orientation of research
and sharpened their sense of social responsibility
for the destinies of mankind. The acceleration
of scientific and technical progress has intensified
their natural interest in the latest achievements
of philosophical thought and emphasised the
need for a genuinely scientific philosophical

theory that would make it possible to comprehend
concrete scientific problems in a broad theoretical,
methodological and social context and provide a
key to the most crucial issues of our time.
 It is not fortuitous, therefore, that of all the

major philosophical trends and schools those
related more or less closely to science and
representing it in some form or other were the first
to weather the storm. And no wonder that
positivism and dialectical materialism, the two
teachings that have always professed their
adherence to science, recognised its great mission and
expressed their readiness to serve its lofty ideals
turned out, as it were, to be the two poles of
attraction for increasingly theory-minded natural
scientists.
 Which of the two philosophical schools will

be able to pass through the crucible of time and
provide reliable guidance for creative thought
in the epoch of scientific and technological
revolution? The author of this book undertakes to
answer this crucial question and to substantiate
the answer to the extent a task of such
dimensions is accomplishable within the scope of a
single monograph.
 Many Soviet and foreign philosophers believe

that contemporary positivism, despite its
professed adherence to scientific thinking, is
undergoing a deep ideological crisis because of an
obvious and ever growing rift between its
methodological programme and the tasks, tendencies
and principles of modern science. The nature of
this crisis sharpened by the scientific and
technological revolution deserves special attention,
the more so as there is a glaring contradiction
between the actual results of the evolution of

positivism and its professed goals, between
its pretentious claims and the real contribution
to scientific progress.
 Speaking of positivism and its crisis, we shall

mainly concentrate on the third stage of this
philosophy known as logical positivism and often
referred to as logical empiricism or analytical
philosophy, and make occasional digressions to
the previous stages in order to trace certain
current concepts to their sources.
 Positivism as a philosophical trend is known

to derive from radical empiricism which is one
of the pillars of this teaching in all its forms.
According to the programme of logical positivism
elaborated by the Vienna circle science begins;
with the observation of similarities and differences
between phenomena, i.e. with the observation
of -single facts. Established facts provide a basis
for initial empirical generalisations which, after
an additional study of separate phenomena and
events, are transformed into broader
generalisations. Universality of statements can only be
attained at a theoretical level and such universal
truths are regarded as empirical laws
constituting the basis and the core of all theoretical
knowledge. The development of science thus
consists in the progressive expansion of empirical
generalisations, and inductive conclusion turns
out to be the main instrument of such
development. Expressing the concept of empiricism in
a concise logical form, Rudolf Carnap, one of
the leaders of logical positivism, wrote: ``...~science
begins with direct observations of single facts.
Nothing else is observable. Certainly a regularity
is not directly observable. It is only when many
observations are compared with one another that

regularities are =
discovered.''^^1^^
 The rapid development of fundamental research

in the 20th century has clearly shown the
untenability of logical positivism based on radical
empiricism. As a matter of fact, the entire history
of modern science, starting from the development
of the quantum theory and the theory of relativity
and ending with cybernetics, is a repudiation of
the tenet of empiricism. It is not accidental that
most contemporary philosophers of science reject
the reduction of theoretical knowledge to
empirical knowledge. They believe that knowledge
does not begin with observations and sensual
experience, since observation is always preceded
or attended by theoretical concepts. Yet this
general premise is still a long way from regular
criticism of empiricism as the core of positivist
philosophy, as well as from a comprehensive
theory of scientific knowledge and its consistent
substantiation. The actual relationship and unity
of the empirical and the theoretical in scientific
cognition, their concrete interaction in the history
and logic of science, the passage from lower to
higher levels call for a detailed investigation.
Nevertheless, the development of the entire
Western philosophy of science in the 1960s and
1970s is keynoted by a revision of the programme
of radical empiricism found to be untenable
both methodologically and theoretically. And
this is a very grave symptom of an ideological
crisis of this philosophy.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of

Physics, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers New York, 1966, p.~6.
10
 Another sign of the predicament of the

philosophy of science which follows in the wake of
positivist traditions is a drastic change in its
attitude towards ``metaphysics''. The struggle
against ``metaphysics'' and the attempts to oust
it from science and philosophy have had both
positive and negative aspects. The positive effect
of the campaign against metaphysics which was
a characteristic feature of early positivism
consisted in its opposition to the traditional
speculative, particularly religious and idealistic,
philosophy which showed little interest in concrete
problems of scientific cognition and practical
life. On the other hand, positivists rejected
as ``metaphysical'' practically all most general
and, in essence, traditional problems of
philosophy as unrelated to science. These included the
problems of objectivity, necessity, causality,
essence, etc. Such problems, according to
positivists, went beyond the limits of experience, did
not accord with the basic tenets and criteria of
empiricism and were therefore declared
speculative, senseless, non-scientific, etc.
 Unlike most pre-positivist critics of the so-called

metaphysics who were not opposed to a
philosophical theory dealing with traditional problems
in one or another form, positivism rejects
``metaphysics'' in principle both as a method and a
specific field of knowledge and declares all its
problems to be irrational by nature. The negative
attitude towards traditional philosophy is
regarded by positivists themselves as a characteristic
feature of their concept and as one of its
fundamental principles. `Ìf one wishes to characterize
every view which denies the possibility of
metaphysics as positivistic,'' wrote Schlick, ``this is
11
quite unobjectionable, as a mere definition, and

I should in this sense call myself a strict
positivist.''^^1^^
 In order to overcome ``metaphysics'', logical

positivism advanced an extensive programme
providing for a logical restructuring of the whole
edifice of science in order to standardise the
language of science, clear up its logical structure,
identify the basic elements of knowledge and
reduce all the other concepts and propositions of
science to these elements. These tasks, according
to the exponents of the new theory, were to be
accomplished through the agency of mathematical
logic. At this stage the so-called philosophy of
science posed as the logic of science, claiming to
give the anatomy of science with the help of
mathematical logic.
 Yet all attempts by positivism to become a

pure methodology were doomed to failure. In
substantiating the platform of the philosophy of
science positivism could not but proceed from
a set of definite philosophical principles, i.e.
from a new ``metaphysics'' of science. This
``metaphysics'' with its idealistic and anti-democratic
premises gave a distorted picture of the world in.
which the existence of the object was made
conditional on its sensual perception by the subject,
the reality was construed as an aggregate of
elementary facts, etc.
 One of the symptoms of the current crisis of

positivism consists in that the exponents of the
philosophy of science have renounced yet another
tenet of their teaching and are turning their
_-_-_
^^1^^ Moritz Schlick, ``Positivism and Realism'', in:

Logical Positivism, Ed. by A.~J. Ayer, The Free Press,
Glencoe, Ill., 1960, p.~83.
12
eyes to what they call metaphysics. Proposals are

even made to start developing a new metaphysics
on a more or less regular basis. The concept of
metaphysics, however, is extremely broad and
sometimes reflects a stable interest in the problems
of materialism and dialectics. The attempts to
solve such problems, though far from being
consistent, testify to a search for a new
methodological basis and a new system of values.
 Hebert Feigl, for instance, defends the scientific

status of such ``metaphysical'' problems as the
relationship between consciousness and the brain.
Mario Bunge believes that the main task of the
new ``metaphysics'' is the construction of scientific
ontology. Marx Wartofsky writes that
``metaphysics represents the most general method of
articulating, in critical and systematic form,
the alternative conceptual frameworks within
which theoretical understanding becomes
possible. The heuristic force of metaphysics lies
in its closeness to our primary modes of
understanding and explaining (by means of the story,
the re-enactment of nature in dramatic =
form).''^^1^^
Recognising the methodological (and even the
heuristic) role of metaphysics, Wartofsky,
however, fails to give a clear idea of its content.
Despite the obvious tendency towards a more
realistic approach to the structure of scientific
knowledge, to general philosophical principles
and categories and to their role in the
development of science, it is already clear that the
philosophy of science remains and will evidently
_-_-_
^^1^^ M.~Wartofsky, ``Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science'',

in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.~III,
Dordrecht, 1967, p.~123.
13
remain loyal to some basic traditions laid down

by the classics of positivism, focusing on the
problems of the logic of scientific cognition, the
language of science and special problems of the
methodology of science, natural science in the
first place. Deviating from some dogmas of
positivism, it does not relinquish its claim to
the title of the ``philosophy of science'', thus
determining the sphere of its interest. In our
subsequent discourse we shall use this name too,
inasmuch as it is associated with Western,
particularly Anglo-American philosophy.
 It will also be in place here to define our attitude

to the term ``metaphysics'' which will be
frequently used in the subsequent text. Though it
has acquired a positive sense in anti-positivist
literature, being almost synonymous to general
philosophical problems, we shall abstain from
equating these notions and use the term strictly
in the sense it has in the context of the
philosophical doctrines under consideration---negative in
positivist philosophy, positive in the concepts
of ``scientific realism'', etc. Each of these doctrines
will be treated separately and the reader will
have no difficulty in identifying the context in
which the term is used thus making the inverted
commas unnecessary. As regards the
methodological problems discussed in the book, we shall
call them all philosophical, distinguishing each
time between their specific types, such as
theoretical, philosophical-methodological, ontological,
epistemological, logical and others.
 In the already extensive critical literature on

positivism the most controversial problems
appear to be those connected with the relationship
between theory and sensory experience, the
14
attitude to metaphysics, and the objectivity of

knowledge. The concepts of causality and
determinism, by contrast, have been relegated to a
secondary plan and are usually discussed as
separate issues independent of other basic
problems, though the most prominent exponents of
positivism have always, at all the stages of its
evolution, focused their attention on causality,
the nature of scientific laws and scientific
explanation. There is no doubt that their views on these
problems should be critically reappraised.
 Besides, the problems of causality and

determinism are obviously linked with a number of
general epistemological and methodological
issues and influenced by radical empiricism,
reductionism, induction logic, etc. One or another
solution of these general issues---and such
solutions, despite the downright rejection or dodging
of metaphysics, could never be avoided---has had
a direct bearing on the concepts of causality and
scientific law. Conversely, any interpretation of
the concepts of causality and determinism could
not but affect the general conclusions of the
theory of knowledge and the positivist
methodology of science.
 Similarly, the negative attitude towards

``metaphysics'' has predetermined the rejection of
causality and determinism as pseudo-problems.
In turn, the positivist interpretation of causality
was partly accountable for the negative attitude
of positivism in general and logical positivism
in particular to general philosophical
(metaphysical) problems.
 In a lecture delivered at Oxford in 1958,

Friedrich Waismann, one of the pillars of
positivism, referred to 1927 as the year of the funeral
15
of =
causality^^1^^. Explaining the title of his lecture

``The Decline and Fall of Causality'', Waismann
contended that the collapse of the principle of
causality was not unexpected as it had been
prepared by a long period of its general recognition.
According to Waismann, this recognition dated
back to the 18th century, i.e. to the Laplatian
concept of determinism which inspired scientists
with a hope that the location of all possible
systems in space and time, as well as their
physical state could be accurately predicted
given the knowledge of their initial state. Laplace,
in Waismann's opinion, became the exponent of
the principle of causal determinism which had
prevailed for more than a century and a half as
an ideal of scientific explanation. For all the
power of human intellect, however, such an ideal
was unattainable even in the realm of classical
mechanics which was greatly indebted to Laplace.
It was called in question as soon as scientists
found it impossible to measure physical values
with ideal accuracy implicit in the Laplatian
doctrine. The concept of causality was bound to
collapse as was the Laplatian ideal of scientific
knowledge. According to Waismann, causality
was dealt a final blow in 1927 by Heisenberg's
principle of uncertainty as it dismissed
completely the possibility of any prediction of events
on the subatom level.
 Western philosophers were not slow to attack
Waismann's views, yet even in the 1960s most
of his opponents stood but for a limited
_-_-_
^^1^^ See A.~C. Crombie, Turning Points in Physics,

North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1960,
pp. 84--154.
16
rehabilitation of the principle of causality. Of late, the

criticism of positivist views regarding causality
and determinism has become. sharper, broader
and more elaborate. The opposing concepts,
inconsistent as they are, tend to restore causality
to some of its methodological and theoretical
rights. Nevertheless, it is still hard to say which
path the philosophy of science will follow in
treating these issues.
 There is no doubt that logical positivism can

be credited with posing a number of interesting
scientific problems. No less obvious is the
contribution made by its outstanding representatives
to the development of the logic of scientific
cognition, the investigation of some specific
problems of the language of science, etc. There is no
denying the fact that this school has helped
science to get rid of fruitless speculations and
dogmatism. We do not focus on the deserts of
logical positivism deliberately since our interest
lies not so much in positivism per~se as in the
lessons that could be learned from the analysis of
its weaknesses, limitations and errors.
 The sharp criticism of the positivist methodology

is not the only obvious symptom of its
current crisis. Using Thomas Kuhn's terminology
and his approach to the analysis of crisis
situations in sciences, one should attach special
significance to the emergence, within the framework
of the contemporary philosophy of science, of a
multitude of rival concepts which go far beyond
a critical revision of certain aspects of the
positivist methodology of science and lay claim to a
new methodological paradigm. In point of fact,
they strive to develop a more or less complete
methodological alternative to positivism and
__PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__
2-1152
17
work out a philosophical programme defying

positivism on all or nearly all key issues.
 Such alternative programmes are represented

by ``critical rationalism'' (Karl Popper, Imre
Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend), ``scientific (or critical)
realism'' (Wilfrid Sellars, J. Smart, Mario
Bunge), ``historical trend'' (Tomas Kuhn, Joseph
Agassi, Stephen Toulmin) and other, perhaps less
influential, schools of the contemporary
philosophy of science in the West.
 Which course will the philosophy of science

follow, what new theory, if any, is likely to emerge
as a result of the present crisis? To answer
these crucial questions one ought to find out,
first and foremost, the real relationship between
the above-mentioned schools and positivist
philosophy, i.e. the depth of division between them,
the existing traditional and conceptual links, the
ability of these schools to solve the topical
methodological and theoretical problems of
contemporary science and the adequacy of the proposed
solutions from the viewpoint of scientific and
technical progress.
 The crisis of positivism has been brought about

not only by the internal contradictions of its
platform, but also by the inadequacy of its
understanding of the real nature of scientific
investigation, of the laws and history of scientific
knowledge. We shall not concentrate therefore
on the issues that preoccupied positivism at
different stages of its evolution, but give our main
attention to the most general, fundamental
problems connected with the world outlook and
methodology which are in the focus of attention
of scientists, philosophers and practical workers
at the present time. What we mean is the
18
relationship between philosophy and natural science,

the nature of scientific knowledge, the objective
content of notions and theories, i.e. their relation
to the `òutside'' world, the role of the subject in
the construction of scientific theories, the
reliability and verifiability of scientific concepts, the
role of the principles of causality and
determinism in research, etc.
 The fact that throughout its entire history
positivism has either been ignoring some of these
problems altogether or trying to dismiss them as
irrelevant to scientific investigation is, in fact,
of little consequence. Willy-nilly, all
masterminds of positivism, starting with Auguste
Comte and Herbert Spencer and ending with Rudolf
Carnap and Alfred Ayer, were compelled to come
to grips with them. What is more, it is these
fundamental problems and not the specifically
positivist issues such as the logical structure of
statements, the meaning of reduction, the
structure of explanation, etc. that proved to be the
main battlefield where the fate of positivism as a
philosophical teaching was decided.
 It should be noted that the above problems

will be considered in this book not as separate
subjects divorced from one another and from
other problems, but in their logical connection
with other problems and always in the context of
the methodology of scientific knowledge. For
instance, the solution of the problem of the source
of knowledge predetermines, to a certain
extent, the solution of the problem of causality or
the relationship of the philosophy to science.
Conversely, the solution of the problem of
causality will influence the specific form of the
analysis of epistemological problems. Hence, we shall
2*
19
try to deal not with some random distinctions

and features of this or that school or some
peculiarities in the interpretation of a problem by
different thinkers, but with a more or less
connected system of their basic principles. We shall
focus, therefore, either on the essential common
features in the philosophical concepts of different
representatives of one and the same school or,
on the contrary, on the basic differences in the
views of the adherents of different schools.
Understandably, some specific features of different
philosophical trends and some peculiarities in
the views of their representatives will be, of
necessity, left out of account.
 The controversy over the fundamental

problems of philosophical methodology is highly
instructive as it highlights their contemporary
significance. Thus, the attitude to science on the
part of the exponents of positivism is a logical
consequence of their absolutisation of the
empirical methods of cognition, whereas the attitude
to science of ``critical rationalists'' stems from
their interpretation of the verification problems.
``Scientific realism'' as a philosophical trend
regards science as practically the only source of
material for philosophical analysis and for any
concepts of the world. The conflict of opinions
reveals weaknesses in each of the above
philosophical teachings, shows how they distort the
actual process of cognition and exposes their
prognostication errors.
 The present-day significance of the problem of

causality, too, becomes more apparent if we, on
the one hand, find out the reason for the negative
attitude to it on the part of the positivists and,
on the other hand, show its revival in ``critical
20
rationalism'' as expounded by Popper who displays

special interest in the forms of theoretical
explanation and in the deductive models of the process
of cognition. Highly instructive is also the
collision between the concept of causality
rehabilitated and revised by ``scientific realism'' in the
spirit of materialism and the logical concept
characteristic of the positivist approach inasmuch as
this collision highlights the specific demands of
contemporary science on the means of a
theoretical causal explanation and prognostication and
reveals the very essence of the principle of
causality.
 It would be impossible to define the prospects

of the methodology of scientific cognition without
considering the confrontation between positivism
and Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The history of
``critical rationalism'', ``scientific realism'' and other
new trends in the philosophy of science runs
into several decades at most, whereas the
ideological struggle between Marxism and positivism
dates from the mid-19th century and is in fact as
old as Marxist philosophy itself. Important as
they are, the old-time philosophical battles will
not command our attention, since our chief
interest lies, as has already been indicated, in a
comparative analysis of the
dialectical-materialist methodology and =
post-positivism^^1^^.
 As regards the problems which will be
considered in the light of dialectical materialism, the
author has not set himself the task of expounding
in a systematic form the commonly known
_-_-_
^^1^^ We shall sometimes use this term to denote all

modern schools of the philosophy of science merely to save
space, without implying that they form a single
homogeneous whole.
21
Marxist concepts or the views of the classics of

Marxism-Leninism on these issues. Proceeding from
the basic principles of their solution known
from Marxist literature the author has attempted
to reveal their topical aspects and new forms of
interpretation and solution in accordance with
the latest scientific data and new philosophical
tasks posed by the scientific and technological
revolution. The book, therefore, does not pretend
to an exposition of any set of truths, but rather
underscores the need for a further investigation
of the problems of interest from the
methodological positions which the author believes to be
the most fruitful and promising. It is the author's
conviction that the mutual understanding of
philosophers investigating the methodology of
scientific cognition is more and more becoming a
reality.
[22]
__NUMERIC_LVL1__
CHAPTER ONE
__ALPHA_LVL1__
BETWEEN SCIENCE
 AND METAPHYSICS
__ALPHA_LVL2__
1. METAPHYSICS AND
 ANTI-METAPHYSICS OF POSITIVISM
 There is hardly any trend or school in Western

philosophy that could compare with positivism
in the depth and durability of its influence on
society, particularly on intellectuals. Since the
first half of the 19th century positivism has
suffered many ups and downs and the interest in this
teaching has alternately risen and subsided. Its
founders have had the greatest of triumphs a
thinker can dream of and sunk to the depths of
the bitterest humiliation and derision that may
fall to the lot of an unlucky philosopher. The
powerful grip of positivist philosophy on
intellectuals' minds and the periodic tides of its
universal popularity can only be accounted for by its
sincere devotion to, even worship of, science.
 However biting today's remarks about the

destiny of positivism as a philosophical trend, one
can hardly question the sincerity of its intentions
to enter into a firm and durable alliance with
science. Born in the atmosphere of universal
ecstasies over the successes of the natural sciences,
positivism has preserved till nowadays its
23
romantic faith in the power of experimental

investigation, its appeal for realism in cognition and
genuine interest in the scientific analysis of
everyday experience and language. In the light of
contemporary science and philosophy which have
gone far ahead in the understanding of the laws of
scientific cognition and the effectiveness of the
interaction of natural and social sciences a
number of its concepts appear now to be naive and
sometimes even ill-matched, the more so as
positivism, like any other philosophical trend, assumed
different forms in the works of its exponents:
John S. Mill earnestly strove for accurate applied
knowledge without realising the fatal narrowness
of his concept of such knowledge restricted within
the bounds of the bourgeois world outlook and
system of values; Bertrand Russell hoped to find
strict logical rules for solving philosophical
problems, including those in the sphere of ethics;
Rudolf Carnap made persistent attempts to
resolve the growing contradictions inherited from
the previous forms of positivism.
 In positivism, like in many other

philosophical schools, one should always distinguish
between the ideas of the classics and their followers.
The former, representing progressive tendencies
in science, can usually be identified, first and
foremost, by their profound devotion to the
goddess of philosophy and, alas, by sometimes no
less profound delusions. Unlike the wholehearted
founders of positivism, their numerous mediocre
imitators lack the necessary critical spirit of
trailblazers in science and, instead of exploiting the
success of their forerunners and rising to a higher
level, fall to aggravating their shortcomings and
debasing their fruitful ideas.
24
 For all the delusions of the founders of

positivism we cannot but pay tribute to the noble
endeavours of such outstanding scholars of their
time, scientists in the proper sense of the word
as Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap and Ludwig
Wittgenstein who did everything possible to bring
closer together science and philosophy even at
the expense of their personal self-disparagement.
Indeed, there is something unnatural about a
professional philosopher contending for
self-destruction of philosophy, its abrogation and
dissolution in ``positive'' scientific knowledge. People
usually regard this either as cunning, or as
reprehensible folly, and are apt to overlook the
possibility of the scientist's utter selflessness in the
service of his goddess which goes hand in hand
with modesty and complete indifference to
scientific degrees, honorary academic titles, priority
and material benefits. Such selflessness may
induce a true scientist of outstanding erudition
and talent to be content with the role of a
humble clerk in attendance on an endless flow of
scientific papers the meaning of which will
always remain unknown to him. His devotion to
science may even cause him to assume
voluntarily the function of a cleaner of scientific Augean
stables and become, so to speak, a scientific
scavenger.
 In the 1830s, when German classical

philosophy with its pledges to explain nature by
itself, to penetrate the very core of the universe
and establish eternal control over its mechanism
seemed to be at the summit of glory, the challenge
of young positivism and its promise to rid
science of quackery, whoever the genius behind
it, came as a gust of fresh wind and deserved
25
every respect and recognition. Positivism was indeed

a tree planted for the benefit of science and
intended to promote its greatness and glory---
however bitter the fruit that was eventually born
by it.
 The rapid development of experimental science

in the 18th and early 19th centuries, the natural
attraction held out to scientists by the empirical
methods of research gave rise to an illusion that
all problems of natural science and social
development could be solved exclusively by empirical
means and that the techniques used in the
natural sciences should be broadly applied to social
research. Practicism and utilitarianism
characteristic of the way of life in the developing
capitalist countries of Western Europe---Britain,
France, later Germany and still later the USA---
gradually became a standard of scientific
thinking. Referring to this feature in early positivism
in the first half of the 19th century one of its
founders, Herbert Spencer, said that the wish
to possess a ``practical science'' which could serve
the needs of life was so strong that the interest
in scientific investigation not directly applicable
to practical activities seemed ridiculous.
Enthusiasm over the new methods of scientific
investigation, naturally, went side by side with
growing scepticism towards the knowledge which
did not conform to everyday experience, could
not be obtained within the framework of the
empirical approach or had no direct practical
application.
 Nevertheless, the ideology of positivism

contributed to some extent to the development of
natural science, particularly experimental
investigations, and helped science to free itself from
26
the fetters of the religious world outlook and

various speculative doctrines and artificial, not
infrequently mystic, concepts and theories.
Positivism as an embodiment of this tendency has
served as a good purgative. In the 1830s, while
still in its cradle, positivism came out with a
demand to oust idealistic philosophers from science
and subjected idealism and religion to sharp
criticism regarding them both a product of the
mythological stage in the development of human spirit.
According to the positivists, metaphysics had
very much in common with theology and differed
from it in form only. Both of them
represented different systems of world outlook and, as
such, were outside the limits of scientific
knowledge. Auguste Comte, another founder of
positivism, repeatedly stressed the affinity and, in
some important aspects, even the identity of the
theological and metaphysical methods of
thinking. In his opinion, the basic distinction of
metaphysical concepts consisted in regarding
phenomena as being independent of their carriers,
and in attributing independent existence to the
properties of each substance. He considered it
immaterial whether these personified abstractions
were later turned into souls or fluids. They came
from one and the same source and were the
inevitable result of the method of studying the
nature of things which was characteristic in every
respect of the infancy of human mind. This
method, according to Comte, inspired originally the
idea of gods which were transformed later into
souls and finally into imaginary fluids.
 Comte rejects metaphysics, i.e. everything

that goes outside the limits of science (religion,
mysticism, idealism, materialism, dialectics, etc.)
27
and proclaims the ideal of positive knowledge

and, accordingly, a new philosophy. Yet
metaphysics, according to Comte, is not entirely
identical with religious thinking. Moreover, it
prepares mankind for a transition to scientific
thinking. A metaphysical thought is, so to speak, an
intermediary between the theological and the
scientific ways of thinking and performs
simultaneously a critical function in relation to
science. Owing to imagination which prevails in
metaphysical thinking over observation, the
thought becomes broader and is prepared
unostentatiously for truly scientific work. According to
Comte, another contribution of metaphysics to
the emergence of positive science consisted in
that it performed the vitally important function
of theory until the mind was able to develop it
on the basis of observations.
 Philosophy in its traditional guise is identical

with metaphysics. Its existence can only be
justified as long as science is unable to solve
certain general problems. Hence, philosophy is
only destined to pave the way for science and
ceases to exist as soon as science takes over. It is
only within this brief lifespan, measured off by
history, that philosophy contributes to the
emergence of science. Its cognitive value is limited to
the preliminary formulation of problems. The
social task of philosophy consists in attracting
the attention of the broad masses, even amateurs
in different fields, to these problems, but their
solution should be the concern of the positive
sciences and narrow specialists.
 Despite the long evolution of positivist

philosophy, this understanding of science and of the
relationship of science to metaphysics was shared
28
by all exponents of positivism. The problem of

demarcation between science and metaphysics,
in some periods just implied, in others posed
sharply and uncompromisingly, was one of the
key issues in the programme of positivism at all
its stages and even the main driving force of its
development.
 In the 1920s, logical positivism, starting from

the investigations of the Vienna Circle,
continued its struggle against ``metaphysics'' from
the positions of empiricism, though less radical
than that of Auguste Comte, John S. Mill, Ernst
Mach and Richard Avenarius. According to the
principle of verification first defined by Moritz
Schlick^^1^^ and further generalised by Ludwig
Wittgenstein,^^2^^ the truth of every scientific
statement must be ascertained by comparing it
directly with the evidence of the senses.
 In a later version Alfred Ayer described this

principle as follows: ``The criterion which we
use to test the genuineness of apparent
statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability.
We say that a sentence is factually
significant to any given person, if, and only if, he
knows how to verify the proposition which it
purports to express---that is, if he knows what
observations would lead him, under certain
conditions, to accept the proposition as being true,
or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand,
the putative proposition is of such a character
that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is
_-_-_
^^1^^ Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre,

Springer, Berlin, 1925.
^^2^^ See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus

Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1949,
p. 77.
29
consistent with any assumption whatsoever

concerning the nature of his future experience, then,
as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology,
a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence
expressing it may be emotionally significant to him;
but it is not literally significant. And with
regard to questions the procedure is the same. We
enquire in every case what observations would
lead us to answer the question, one way or the
other; and if none can be discovered, we must
conclude that the sentence under consideration
does not, as far as we are concerned, express a
genuine question, however strongly its
grammatical appearance may suggest that it =
does.''^^1^^
 Hence, empirical verification was assigned a

function which went far beyond its
possibilities--- to appraise the truth-value of all
statements without exception. As compared with the
previous forms of positivism, the new element
here (actually borrowed from Kant) was the
division of all statements into two types:
analytical and synthetic. Analytical statements were
regarded as tautological or identical, similar to
those often used in mathematics and
mathematical logic. Synthetic statements were regarded as
object judgements characteristic of empirical,
factual sciences and claimed to be the only
statements which carried any new information.
 Regarding the first two types of statements as

being of some scientific significance, logical
positivism not only denies all other statements any
scientific value, but considers them simply
_-_-_
^^1^^ A.~J. Ayer ``The Elimination of Metaphysics'', in:

Philosophy Matters, Ed. by A.~J. Lisska, Charles E.
Merril Publishing Comp., Columbia, Toronto, London,
Sydney, 1977, p.~236.
30
senseless. If one or another statement does not lend

itself to direct verification, it must at least be
reducible by logical means, as a theoretical,
nonanalytical statement, to a corresponding basic or
protocol statement which can be confirmed by
direct observation. Statements which are neither
analytical nor synthetic are meaningless and
subject to elimination from the language of
science as metaphysical.
 The narrowness of the verification criterion

induced the positivists to make repeated attempts
at its modification. The watered-down (for
instance, Ayer's) version of this criterion admits
of both full and partial verification of statements,
i.e. of their partial confirmation by empirical
data. A theory was needed, however, which being
itself in agreement with this criterion, would
define more accurately the notion of confirmation,
on the one hand, and correspond to the general
programme of positivism (construction of the
logical language of science) and to the traditions
of empiricism, on the other hand.
 A most significant attempt to develop such a

theory was Carnap's inductive logic expounded
by him in Logical Foundations of =
Probability^^1^^
and in The Continuum of Inductive =
Methods,^^2^^ and
then, in an enlarged and elaborated form, in
A Basic System of Inductive =
Logic.^^3^^ A
characteristic feature of both versions of his system
_-_-_
^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability,

Chicago, 1951.
^^2^^ Rudolf Carnap, The Continuum of Inductive Methods,

Chicago, 1952.
^^3^^ Rudolf Carnap, `À Basic System of Inductive Logic'',

in: Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Ed. by
R.~Carnap and R.~Jeffrey, Berkeley, 1971.
31
consisted, first and foremost, in that the logical

probability of the meaningfulness of universal
generalisations was recognised to equal zero and
that there existed a theoretically neutral
language of observations. Out of the three phases
of inductive inference---the selection of the
language, the selection of the statements of this
language and the assessment of the degree of
confirmation of a given statement by other
statements---Carnap focused on none other than the
appraisal of the probability of statements
relative to the results of the observation (empirical
data).
 As we see, in Carnap's inductive logic the
traditional problem of induction undergoes a
considerable transformation. The main task of an
inductive conclusion is regarded to be the
formulation of a probabilistic prognostication of a
particular event rather than of a universal assertion.
Induction for Carnap is practically any
non-deductive conclusion and, primarily, a
metalinguistic statement establishing, on the basis of
experimental data, a definite degree of
confirmability of a hypothesis. Consequently, Carnap
expands the volume of the traditional concept of
induction, on the one hand, and, on the other,
eliminates the problem of confirmation of
universal assertions, i.e. laws, from its content.
 According to Carnap, universal laws appear to

be senseless from the viewpoint of the verification
principle and inconfirmable in inductive logic.
In point of fact, universal statements are useless:
no one, in Carnap's opinion, will make a stand
for the universality of this or that theory in any
part of the universe. All a scientist or a
practical worker may want is a hope that the next test
32
will confirm his hypothesis. The logical

evolution of Carnap's views brought him later to an
admission that a shift in emphasis from
confirmation to decision-making in the analysis of
inductive logic's problems would provide even a
more radical method of ousting universal laws
as the last remnants of metaphysics in science.
Such a shift would indeed free science from
universal laws replacing them with specific
hypotheses. Finally, in the Foreword to the 2nd~edition
of Logical Foundations of Probability (1962),
Carnap altogether avoids mentioning the ``degree
of confirmability'' in connection with the
assessment of inductive probability and prefers to
speak of the significance of inductive logic for the
theory of solutions only (and not for the theory
of confirmation). This looks like the end of the
last hope to construct the methodology of science
on a strictly logical foundation.
 The failure to solve this problem cannot but

tell on the prospects of the programme of
empiricism, since it affects the two most important and
interconnected premises of positivist philosophy.
A question is bound to arise: are the principles
of Carnap's inductive logic purported to be
helpful in the solution of the main task of logical
empiricism compatible with the principles of
empiricism itself?
 It has already been pointed out that Carnap's

inductive logic was focused on the evaluation of
the degree of confirmation of hypotheses. It
proceeded from the assumption that the
statements concerning such confirmations by
empirical data were the result of metalinguistic
analysis and, as such, analytical statements. Carnap
emphasised that his inductive logic excluded any
3-1152
33
a priori synthetic principles and not only

remained loyal to empiricism but even in some
respects corrected its shortcomings, thereby
strengthening its positions.
 The principle of induction, as formulated by

Carnap, was based on the assumption that the
experimental data testified to a very high degree
of probability of the world's uniformity. Since
the probability in the formulation of this
principle was logical by nature, the statement as
such was analytically true. Its truth was not
necessarily conditioned by the truth of the
principle of induction---it was sufficient to know that
this principle was probable. The contradiction
inherent in this proposition consisted in that the
principle of induction itself was assigned a role
of the foundation of logic and, consequently, its
analytical truth value could not be deduced from
the very same logic, but was to be established
within the framework of a more general logical
system.
 All attempts made before Carnap to develop

the logic of inductive conclusion pivoted, as it
were, on the principle of the uniformity of nature
which lay at the root of the principle of
induction. Yet this latter principle is ontological
rather than logical and cannot be obtained through
inductive generalisation. According to Kant, it
could have been classified with good reason as
an a priori synthetic generalisation. Carnap, as
we see, could not avoid this ill-fated dilemma
either and had to make his choice between an a
priori synthetic generalisation and an
ontological statement (in the spirit of materialism). A
detective story writer skilled at stock phrases could
have summed up the situation in these words:
34
``The fateful shadow of metaphysics has again

crossed his path.''
 It was not fortuitous that Carnap, seeking later

to provide a rational substantiation for
induction, pointed out that the axioms of inductive
logic could only rest on a priori statements and
argued that inductive logic as such could be
constructed in a formal way. Yet inductive
probability could only be justified in the context of
the theory of solutions where the concept of
probability is linked with utility and rational
action.^^1^^ The search for a non-inductive foundation
of inductive logic as a form of scientific
cognition brought Carnap in the end to the
understanding of probability as a reasonable degree of
faith. As a result, the theory of induction turned
out to be built on the sand of intuitive and
subjective propositions. Each of the paths tried by
Carnap in his attempts to substantiate induction
on the basis of empiricism led him beyond its
limits right into the arms of metaphysics.
 It is noteworthy that logical positivism seeks

to reinforce empiricism in its drive against
metaphysics by a logical analysis of the structure
of knowledge. For all the internal contradictions
of Carnap's version of logical positivism, it
turned out to be the most successful of all, as it
revealed one of the main trends in the
development of positivism and displayed a characteristic
feature of its understanding of the subject-matter
of philosophy. Significantly, both the adherents
and opponents of Carnap's theory often call it
``logical empiricism''. The search for new ways in
_-_-_
^^1^^ See Rudolf Carnap, `Ìnductive Logic arid Rational

Decisions'', in: Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability,
op. cit., pp. 5--31.
3*
35
the struggle against metaphysics was by no means

accidental. Already in the 19th century the
development of theoretical sciences revealed the
narrowness and inadequacy of the empiricist
programme for the revision and restructuring of
science which had been advanced by early
positivism. It became clear even in that period that
the programme of struggle against metaphysics
ran counter to the interests of science and
hampered the development of theoretical investigation.
The theory of the atomic structure of matter,
quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity
provided ample proof that empiricism as a
philosophical and methodological programme was
useless and even detrimental to scientific
progress.
 The rapid development of logico-mathematical

studies in that period seemed to indicate an
attractive and promising way out of the difficult
situation---to treat a theory as an aggregate of
logically interconnected facts. That
anti-metaphysical line was started by Russell and then
developed by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus into an elaborate theory followed
by their successors.
 Russell did not yet shun many traditional

philosophical problems which he hoped to solve
through the agency of strict rules of
mathematical logic. His failure on this path caused
Wittgenstein to take a more uncompromising position
---not only to divorce science from
metaphysics, but also to throw the latter overboard as
senseless mysticism. The centuries-old
controversy over certain philosophical problems
pertaining to the world outlook was viewed by him
either as a result of violation of the elementary
36
rules of logic, or as a linguistic confusion. Alfred

J. Ayer, one of the contemporary followers of
these ideas, keeping his allegiance to more or
less orthodox logical positivism writes: ``We may
accordingly define a metaphysical sentence as a
sentence which purports to express a genuine
proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a
tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as
tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the
entire class of significant propositions, we are
justified in concluding that all metaphysical
assertions are =
nonsensical.''^^1^^ According to Ayer,

the typical examples of metaphysical assertions
are those underlying the problems of the reality
of experience, the unity of the world, the nature of
``true reality'' as distinct from sensory experience,
etc.
 Richard von Mises who regarded his own

position relative to traditional philosophy as the
most conciliatory among the neo-positivists, was
also of the opinion that metaphysics constituted
the sphere of pre-scientific propositions and was
not entirely devoid of future as people would
always ask questions extending beyond the
limits of scientific knowledge. Even in new fields
of research, while the adequate scientific
language was still nonexistent and the main
linguistic rules and logical forms were not yet
known, new questions going beyond the familiar
ground were bound to be at first non-scientific, i.e.
metaphysical. To become truly scientific, new
concepts must get a footing in their field, merge
with the formal systems adopted earlier and
_-_-_
^^1^^ A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin

Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1978,
p.~56.
37
develop full ability to communicate, so to speak,

with other fields of scientific knowledge.
 Clearly, this contraposition of scientific and

non-scientific or metaphysical knowledge is
rooted in a peculiar understanding of the ideal of
scientific knowledge. This ideal, according to
positivism, is represented by empirical science with
its principle of empirical verification of any
assertion. To become scientific, a proposition must
pass through the purgatory of sense-perceptions
which alone are capable of providing direct,
really verifiable and really objective knowledge.
 Metaphysics as a specific set of traditional

philosophical problems derives, according to
positivism, from the recognition of some unique
reality which does not lend itself to scientific
cognition and can only be apprehended with the
help of the metaphysical, speculative faculties of
the mind. `À more ambitious conception of
metaphysics is one that places it in competition
with the natural sciences,'' says Ayer. ``The
suggestion is that the sciences deal only with
appearances: the metaphysician penetrates to the
underlying =
reality.''^^1^^ All positivists irrespective of
the school to which they belong hold that
traditional philosophy postulates the existence of some
transcendental reality which is different from
and independent of the sensual world, but which
determines its main features.
 The pretension to know something beyond

possible experience presupposes the existence of an
extraempirical source of knowledge. The only
method whereby metaphysical philosophers obtain
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ A. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy,

London, 1973, p.~4.
38
their truths can be the method of a priori

speculative reflection. For instance, Russell
considered that one of the essential features of the
classical tradition in philosophy consisted in a
conviction that a priori reflection alone was
capable of penetrating the mysteries of the
universe. Nothing but an a priori method was
capable of proving that reality was different from
what appeared to direct observation.
Emphasising that the a priori principle was the essence
of traditional philosophy, Mises wrote: `Às soon
as one speaks of reaching beyond experience and
of the disclosure of the true core, one appeals to
the existence of extraempirical sources of
knowledge. In spite of all their many differences, such
theories as Husserl's `Wesensschau' and Plato's
`doctrine of ideas', Spinoza's `knowledge through
apprehending insight', Kant's à priori' and
Schopenhauer's transempirical metaphysics, ...
are things of a similar =
kind.''^^1^^ This stand, despite

certain modifications in different forms of
positivist philosophy has not changed till nowadays.
There is nothing, asserts Ayer, that cannot be
expressed in the language of observations, and
everything beyond these limits is of a mystic
nature. In point of fact, however, along with
mystic entities Ayer throws overboard everything
that cannot be perceived by senses.
 According to positivism, the unscientific

character of metaphysics springs from its
worldview function or, more precisely, from its social
orientation and claim to disclose the essence of
the world, as well as from the fact that its
_-_-_
^^1^^ Richard von Mises, Positivism. A Study in Human

Understanding, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1951, p. 277.
39
propositions are based on convictions. On these grounds

metaphysics is regarded as a false projection
of subjective human qualities and emotions on
knowledge and on the world in general. The
possibility of a scientific world outlook is dismissed
altogether, since scientific theories, according to
positivism, cannot give answers to questions
pertaining to world views.
 The positivists maintain that metaphysics

meets man's psychological need for understanding
the world as a whole and his place in the world,
and is called to life by the fateful questions as to
the meaning of human life, moral responsibility,
and human values. Yet science is unable to
tackle these questions as they cannot be
answered on the grounds of empirico-mathematical
investigation which is regarded by positivism as
the only form of scientific knowledge. These
questions, according to the positivists, will
always remain the objects of unscientific methods
of comprehension. Man is entitled to use any
means to express his world views, including the
least suitable one, i.e. metaphysics, but in that
case he should not claim it to be what it is not
and will never become---a science, a system of
knowledge. Carnap regards metaphysics not as
actual knowledge, but rather as poetry giving but
an illusion of knowledge.
 The world-view character of philosophy is

considered by positivism as the main cause of its
incompatibility with science. Justly
underlining the inseparable ties between the world
view, on the one hand, and ideology and
politics, on the other, the positivists come to the
conclusion that no problems relating to nature,
society and cognition can fee solved by
40
philosophy (metaphysics) on a scientific basis for the

simple reason that these problems are treated in
the broad context of the world outlook and their
solution depends, in the final analysis, on the
views and ideological stand of the philosopher.
``The desire to arrive at practically useful
answers (predictions) in the most difficult and most
general questions of life,'' says Mises, ``leads to
the construction of systems of metaphysical
propositions.''^^1^^
 Ambitious and noble were the aspirations of

positivism which set out to free philosophy from
the fetters of religious and idealistic dogmas. The
20th century seemed to have been destined to
become the age of triumph of positivist
philosophy. Indeed, it has started with fundamental
scientific discoveries and its closing decades are
marked by a profound revolution in the entire
system of scientific knowledge, technology and
social relations which are being successfully
restructured on truly rational and scientific
principles. Ironically, however, this century has also
borne witness to the decline and fall of the
philosophy that has made science its fetish.
 Dramatic as it may be, the situation is not

likely to rouse our emotions unless we perceive a
human drama behind the ideological
vicissitudes. In point of fact, the reverses of fortune in
the realm of ideas are never divorced from the
destinies of human beings and usually entail a
drama of a whole galaxy of outstanding
personalities, who believed in the viability of the
principles they had advanced and did everything
possible to defend and elaborate them. One can
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ Richard von Mises, op. cit., p. 370.
41
hardly blame any one of them personally for the

long and, alas, futile wanderings in the labyrinths
of methodology. If only it were a matter of
personal fallacies, mankind would have long ago
found a way to avoid them.
 Yet the bitterest irony consisted, perhaps, in

that positivism, whose credo was service to
science, failed to find a common language with its
master for any appreciable length of time. True,
there were periods when positivism was in
vogue. Its shares went up at the turn of the 20th
century with the discoveries of the complex
structure of the atom and of the electromagnetic
field. Hopes also soared in the 1920s which were
marked by the successful development of
quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity.
Another spell of good luck came with the intensive
investigations into the problems of linguistics
and psychology in the 1930s and 1940s. Finally,
the last boom was connected with the rapid
development of cybernetics and genetics,
neurophysiology and psycho physiology.
 The philosophy of science has been favourably

commented upon and can even boast of the
homage paid to it by Henri Poincare, Albert
Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Niels Bohr, Werner
Heisenberg and Jacques Monod. Yet it is also
known that the heights of their mutual
sympathies invariably coincided with the periods of
abrupt breakdown of old fundamental theories
rather than with constructive periods in the
history of science. Once a crisis in science comes to an
end and the gulfs are bridged, the philosophy of
science in its logico-empirical version would
inevitably reveal its inability to offer a positive
programme for scientific, technological or social
42
progress. Each new upswing of theoretical thought

was a sure sign of approaching depression
in positivist philosophy. Yesterday's followers
and adherents of positivism would promptly turn
away from the ``friends of science'' and the
short-lived mutual understanding would give place to
even a more profound and lasting mutual distrust
than before. These tides remind one of something
like intermittent fever in Western science, and
the blame for it can hardly be put on any
particular individual. The disease must evidently be
traced to a source other than the human qualities
of each separate thinker---be he great or mediocre,
honest or hypocritical, egoistic or unselfish. It
proved to be contagious for altruist Einstein and
misanthrope Heisenberg, great Bohr and mediocre
Paul =
Volkmann^^1^^. The true cause of the illness

lies not in the merits or demerits of individuals,
outstanding or at least interesting as they are, but
in the conditions of contemporary society.
 The role of social conditions in the emergence

and development of positivism is a separate
subject that lies outside the scope of this work. Here I
shall confine myself to discussing the general
laws and tendencies of scientific cognition which
provide, as it were, an epistemological
background of the developing ideological drama.
Paradoxical as it may seem, this drama is contained
in embryo in the basic tenet of positivism
determining its attitude to science. It is precisely the
glorification of science and the disparagement of
philosophy that did positivism an ill turn
accounting for the scepticism and even for the
_-_-_
^^1^^ Paul Volkmann (1856--1938) was a professor of

theoretical physics in Konigsberg and wrote several
philosophical works.
43
downright denial of the value of scientific cognition

that are characteristic of positivist works. How
did the extremes meet? To answer this question,
let us turn once again to the positive platform of
the philosophy of science.
 Rejecting traditional philosophy as

unscientific and metaphysical and using many other
disparaging epithets to belittle its role, positivism
has never denied the need for philosophy in
general. On the contrary, the exponents of
positivism have underscored the significance of a new,
scientific philosophy which was called a
``philosophy of science'' and given it many other no
less pretentious titles. What was the real
meaning of their contentions?
 Philosophy as a theory of the most general and

essential laws of being was eliminated by Comte
in favour of some universal system of scientific
knowledge. All scientific knowledge, according
to Comte, can only be obtained by special
sciences through observation, experiment, description
and generalisation with the help of broadly used
mathematical means. There can be no specifically
philosophic understanding of nature different
from that ensured by the natural sciences.
Whatever the particular distinctions in the
understanding of the subject matter of positivist
philosophy revealed by different representatives of
the ``first'' form of positivism, there is every reason
to assert that their views are in the main
identical: new philosophy has in fact nothing in
common with old metaphysics and does not basically
differ from other ``positive'' sciences: both the
positive sciences and scientific philosophy are
absolutely neutral in the metaphysical sense, i.e.
in relation to materialism and idealism. The
44
main object of a philosophical investigation is

science, its concepts and method. The methods of
``philosophical'' investigations .are also borrowed
directly from science. In short, science is its own
philosophy. It is these ideas, developed and
elaborated during the evolution of positivism that
underlie its understanding of the subject matter
of philosophy.
 Just like the rapid development of special

sciences and the strengthening of their
experimental base in the 18th century gave the early
positivists occasion to contend that scientific
investigation should substitute for philosophic
cognition of the world, so the development of
biology and psychological sciences was in the late
19th century interpreted by Machism as the
elimination of metaphysics from the studies of
man's cognitive activities in favour of a
scientific theory of knowledge. This idea was clearly
expressed by Mach's follower and commentator
V. V. Lesevich, one of the first Russian
positivists: ``What will remain of philosophy after
the theory of knowledge, too, gains the status of
a separate and independent science?'' he asks
and proceeds as follows: ``When psychology,
thanks to its successes, rose to a truly scientific
level, no fragment was left of the old
all-embracing and undivided science, philosophy, which
could be said to possess the property of universal
and comprehensive knowledge: its place was
taken up by a number of separate independent
sciences, and philosophy in the old sense of the
word =
disappeared.''^^1^^
 The achievements of biology and psychology
_-_-_
^^1^^ V. V. Lesevich, Collected Works, Vol. 2, Moscow,

1915, pp. 7--8 (in Russian).
45
in the study of man, his psychical and cognitive

activity were interpreted by the ``second'' form of
positivism as the emergence of a scientific theory
of knowledge opposing traditional epistemology
as unscientific metaphysics. Machism, like
classical positivism, made the concepts and methods
of special sciences the object of philosophy which,
consequently, was to be metascientific by nature.
According to Mach, a philosopher differs from a
natural scientist in that the former has to deal
with a broader range of facts. Justly stressing
the need for a broad approach to philosophical
matters, Mach maintains, in full agreement with
the positivist principles, that it is achieved not
through the generalisation of the process of
cognition in philosophical categories and its
interpretation on the basis of a definite world view and
methodology, but with the help of some new
specialised science which would study knowledge
with the use of special scientific means of
investigation. Such means, according to Mach, could
best be borrowed from biology and psychology,
since it was precisely these disciplines that
studied man as the subject of cognition and could
provide a reliable basis for the understanding of
his cognitive activity.
 The most explicit presentation of the positivist

concept of the relationship between science and
philosophy can be found in the works of Schlick,
Carnap, Wittgenstein and other members of the
Vienna Circle which is usually associated with
the emergence of logical positivism. The
representatives of the new trend fully agreed with
their predecessors in that scientific philosophy
was an immanent product of the development of
science, that philosophy should give up
46
metaphysical problems if it was to be promoted to a rank

of science and that it should get both its object
of inquiry and its method from science itself.
According to neopositivists, the only reason why
philosophy had been unable to become scientific
for a long period consisted in the insufficient
development of science itself which could not
provide the necessary means for philosophy to fulfil
its metascientific functions. The emergence of
``scientific'' philosophy at the present stage of the
evolution of science was a result of the
development of mathematical logic which devised the
technical means for the analysis of science. The
initial methodological models developed within
the framework of positivism were in fact nothing
but the application of the ready-made body of
mathematical logic borrowed from Principia
Matematica by Russell and Whitehead to the logical
development of some hypothetical system of
`ìdeal scientific knowledge''.
 Logical positivism was a full-scale realisation

of the analytical tendency in the understanding
of ``scientific'' philosophy. Yet unlike Mill and
Mach, who initiated this tendency, logical
positivism did not regard philosophy as a theory
dealing with the principles of the classification
of sciences, the system of laws common to all
sciences and with cognition as such (interpreted
in terms of either inductive logic or the
psychology of cognition), but as an instrument for the
analysis of science. This approach reduced
philosophy to a scientific system of actions, a kind
of analytical activity. Wittgenstein's thesis that
``philosophy is not a theory but an =
activity''^^1^^
_-_-_
^^1^^ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus

Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., p. 77.
47
became the banner of an influential trend in

analytical philosophy. ``The great contemporary
turning point,'' wrote Schlick, `ìs characterised by
the fact that we see in philosophy not a system
of cognitions, but a system of =
acts.''^^1^^ The attempts

of the earlier positivists to construct scientific
philosophy as a theory are regarded by
neopositivists as a relapse of old metaphysics.
 In view of the growing proportion of highly

specific logico-methodological problems in
scientific investigations, logical positivism demanded
that methodology should be completely
independent of philosophy and that a new ``pure''
methodology, free from any presuppositions should be
developed that would banish philosophical
epistemology together with other philosophical
worldview elements from genuine science. According
to the logical positivists, the ``reflection upon
scientific knowledge'', hitherto the domain of
philosophy, turns into a special field of concrete
scientific investigation. In this respect the only
distinction of logical positivism from other forms
of positivist philosophy consists in that it turns
into an absolute the logico-methodological
analysis of knowledge instead of empirical science in
general and psychology and biology in particular.
Logical positivism regards the use of accurate
logico-methodological means in the investigation
of the structure of scientific knowledge as a
``scientific'' method of the formulation and solution of
philosophical problems. The emphasis on logic as
an instrument of philosophical research is the
keynote of the latest stage in the realization of the
_-_-_
^^1^^ M. Schlick, ``The Turning Point in Philosophy'', in:

Logical Positivism, Ed. by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press,
Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, p. 56.
48
principal aim of positivist philosophy, viz.

discarding traditional philosophical problems and
substituting formal-logical and linguistic methods
of analysis for the philosophical approach to
science.
 It should be noted that positivism denouncing

the so-called extrascientific metaphysics is in
effect carrying out a programme based on entirely
`èxtrascientific'' principles. It is wrong to take
for granted the assertions of the positivists that
their philosophy is free from metaphysics as the
premises of positivism, unlike those of other forms
of philosophy, are allegedly self-evident.
Positivism is shy of declaring and exposing to analysis
the postulates underlying the entire system of its
arguments.
 The metaphysical content of the philosophy of

science is admitted retrospectively by the
positivists themselves. It has become a peculiar
tradition with the positivist philosophers to accuse
their predecessors of metaphysicism,
inconsistency in the struggle with metaphysics, various
concessions to metaphysics and deviations from the
principle of ``neutrality'' in philosophy. Spencer
reproached Comte for concessions to metaphysics,
the Machists are advancing similar charges against
both of them. As regards the neo-positivists,
they are laying claims to a final break with
metaphysics which allegedly has never been banished
completely from the writings of all positivist
philosophers. Defending the concept of
phenomenalistic analysis, Gustav Bergman
reproaches physicalists for their inclination to
metaphysics, which term, as it transpires, he applies to
some of their materialistic statements. Even
within logical positivism itself the palm of the
4-1152
49
most consistent fighter against metaphysics is

claimed now by one, now by another of its
representatives.
 It will be shown later that despite all attempts

of positivism to discard such problems as the
relation of man to being, consciousness to matter,
interdependence of space, time and movement,
causality, the nature of contradictions, etc. it is in
fact unable to ignore them altogether and has to
tackle them in one way or another, often in a
disguised form. Moreover, the more persistent the
attempts of each new generation of positivist
philosophers to dismiss the above problems as
metaphysical and nonsensical, the more obvious
their importance for science and philosophy. All
positivist theories invariably started from some
sort of denunciation---be it the denunciation of
metaphysics, idealism, dualism or materialism.
Yet all their criticism designed to clear the way
for the new ``scientific'' methodology always
contains in a hidden form some positive, assertory
elements.
 The metaphysics of positivism is all the more

dangerous as it is concealed behind loud phrases
about the need to fight it and rid science of the
cobweb of the past. The oversimplified idea of
scientific knowledge and the disregard of its
hierarchical multilayer structure, as well as the
primitive understanding of the nature of the
scientific reflection of the world that leaves no
room for the throbbing thought proved
detrimental to positivism even in its self-evaluation
and prevented it from understanding the hidden
purpose of its own dogmas. Not only did
positivism fail to uncover its social face and state
its social aims, it proved unable even to define its
50
place in the general process of cognition. The

hidden part of the positivist programme, its
basic general postulates covered up by loud and
pretentious declarations have never been brought
to light for open examination. Yet for the purpose
of this analysis it is advisable that acquaintance
be made of these ghosts of metaphysics kept
from the public eye in the backyard.
 A curious paradox with the positivist

philosophy, besides its unhappy relations with science,
consists in that in its struggle against
metaphysics (which happened to be now the
speculations of German classical philosophy, now the
philosophical principles of classical science, i.e.
mechanistic materialism, now Freudism, now
dialectical materialism which has synthesised
the most valuable achievements of progressive
philosophical thought), positivism at all the
stages of its evolution has invariably found itself
in a snare of metaphysical concepts, sometimes
not a bit more elaborate than those of the
18th-century materialism or Hegel's idealistic
dialectics.
 Incidentally, the metaphysical fallacies of

German classical philosophy and the Enlighteners'
materialism have at least the justification that
their speculativeness was partly a result of the
immaturity of science and social relations ruling
out the possibility of the profound, truly
scientific understanding of the laws and tendencies of
social development. But can there be any
justification for positivism wallowing in
metaphysics and idealism at our time when philosophy
became a branch of science way back in the
middle of the 19th century, when the problem of the
relationship between philosophy and special
4*
51
sciences has been successfully solved and they

have developed their own powerful means of
theoretical investigation?
 If Minerva's night-flying owl had ventured to

make its appearance in broad daylight, it would
have inevitably struck against various obstacles
and could have hardly become the ancient symbol
of wisdom. Positivism, unlike the mythological
bird, has appeared too late to win the scientists'
faith for long and become the foundation of
scientific knowledge. It has never, even in the days of
its so-called triumphs, been able to overcome the
somewhat ironic attitude of the scientists to most
of its claims.
 Positivism combines in itself the belated faith

in empirical science which was the foundation of
the industrial power of capitalism in the 18th
century with the youthful illusions of its
ideologists that the prosperity of capitalist society was
inseparable from scientific progress. Yet it is
already infected with early scepticism in the
anticipation of its inevitable decline and does not
believe either in science, industry or in human
values. The metaphysical principles making the
foundation of positivist philosophy are similar
to those metaphysical doctrines which were
characteristic- of both the 19th-century's idealistic
philosophy and mechanistic materialism. How
can they tally with the latest versions of
positivism, with its refined ``logic of scientific
discovery'', ``semantic philosophy'', pseudo-scientific
terms such as `èxplication'', ``denotation'',
``verification'' and the like?
 The rejection by positivism of such traditional

philosophical problems as the relationship of
consciousness to being, spirit to nature is by no means
52
tantamount to the rejection of idealistic and

materialistic metaphysics. Just like in the case
of Machism which claimed to rise above the
antithesis between materialism and idealism with
the help of ``neutral world elements'',
`ìntrojection'', ``the principal of coordination'', `èconomy of
thought'', it simply means that the only object of
scientific investigation is, according to
positivism, the scientists' sensory experience, which
allegedly does not represent any metaphysical,
transcendental reality. The true significance of
the empirical theory of verification advanced by
neo-positivism consisted in that its adherents,
despite all their anti-metaphysical declarations,
were forced in the end to revert to the traditional,
essentially metaphysical, problem of philosophy
---that of the basic, ultimate elements of
knowledge. Instead of the objective reality the title
`àbsolute'' was conferred on sensations. According
to the positivists, man's activity proceeds not in
real space and time, but within the narrow
confines of logical formulae binding the sensory
experience. Man is incapable of breaking out of the
jail built by positivist philosophers.
 The mystification of the relation of knowledge
to reality is characteristic of all idealistic
philosophy which regards the world as the
materialisation of an ideal form, as logic incarnate
represented in language. Carnap, like Berkeley, Hume
and any other subjective idealist, puts the true
relation of knowledge to objective reality upside
down. He starts his analysis not from objective
reality, but from the logical structure of the
language as it exists today, i.e. the language
which has already taken a definite shape and is
no longer a living organism, In other words, the
53
accumulated factual material represented in the

modern language is the eternal truth---not
relative, inaccurate, approximate, but Her Majesty
Reality personified. To be intelligible, reality
must have the same parameters as the logical
structure of language. Man cannot go beyond the
facts arranged in accordance with the logical
structure of language. Such transcendence would
call for a truly mystic ability to adandon the
sphere of language and intellect.
 According to Ayer, for instance, the world is

a ``logical structure'' made up of sensations, which,
in his modernised parlance, are called ``sensuous
content''. Since the ``sensuous content'' is
inseparable from the forms in which it is expressed,
we are unable to pass beyond the bounds of even
our statements of sensations. Ayer does not deny
the existence of material objects, yet such
existence, in his opinion, cannot be proved with
the same certainty as the existence of sensuous
images.
 In the positivist picture of the world, like in

a frequently staged play, the action always
follows one and the same pattern set by the producer:
subject to change are only the actors, i.e.
concrete facts. Not only do the present logical schemes
substitute for real relations between objects
which are infinitely richer, more complex and
contradictory than their logical counterparts;
no less important is the fact that such schemes
turn out to be even more speculative than the
natural-philosophical doctrines of the 18th
century, except that they take into account some
results of the scientific progress during the past
two centuries. In other words, the artificial
positivist schemes ignore the crucial fact that the
54
logical links and relations are by no means

identical with the real ones.
 Positivism sees its main task in binding

together the ultimate elements of scientific knowledge
rather than in searching for them.
Nevertheless, such elements do have to be defined, if only
vaguely. The more resolute the opposition of
positivism to objective reality as something that
stands behind the `èlements'' and is different from
them, the more it turns these elements into the
`àbsolute source'' of knowledge. By the ultimate
elements of knowledge logical positivism
understands ``facts''. For all the ambiguity of this term
which can denote both the fragments of objective
reality and events registered by language, the
so-called facts are turned into an absolute
similar to Mach's ``neutral world elements'' or
Berkeley's sensations. The certitude of these
original sources of knowledge does not need any
further confirmation---it is self-evident. All other
structures of knowledge rest on this solid
foundation given directly in experience.
 Wittgenstein's selected propositions such as

``the world is all that has place'', ``the world is an
aggregate of facts, but not things'', the `àtom fact
is the connection of objects (things)'', `òbjects
make the substance of the world and therefore
cannot be composite'', are in fact nothing but
vaguely defined ontology not much different from
that of Hume or Berkeley: it is the ontology of
`àtom events'' given in sensations. The only
difference consists, perhaps, in that in the ontology
of the classics the atoms are connected by
association, through the agency of mental links,
whereas in logical positivism the connection must
be purely logical.
55
 Positivism takes for granted Hume's doctrine

that the laws of science do not moan anything but
habitual concomitance of events (conjunction of
facts) and sets itself the task of showing the
soundness of this. It has also borrowed the empiricist
concept of `òbservation'' as a simple self-evident
act which only calls for distinguishing the
observation of objects from the observation of their
properties. Observation is not only the initial,
but also the final point of cognition, since the
only method of the verification of knowledge is
also observation.
 Hence, it would not be correct to regard the

positivist doctrine as free from any ontology.
Recognising that observation represents
something that exists independent of man and his
consciousness, positivism projects outside the
result of observation. The positivist philosopher's
world appears to be made up of separate,
unconnected objects united only by some kind of
affinity which, incidentally, is taken for granted
and requires no explanation. These logically
independent and empirically indifferent facts are
joined with one another solely through the
relation of similarity, just as distinctions are the
only form of their separation.
 Consequently, each object can change without

affecting the properties of other objects or can
remain immutable despite the existing
alternatives. This, however, is not the premise, but rather
the conclusion following from the logical
independence of statements of facts. In Ayer's
doctrine all facts are particular or represent
conjunctions of separate events so that any
generalisation of such facts can only be purely formal.
Causality has no other empirical basis than
56
permanent conjunction since, according to Ayer, there

can be no obvious links between them. Hence,
relations between facts can only be external. Even
if one speaks of `ìnternal relations'', the phrase
can only mean a combination of simple elements
as component parts of larger objects. Ayer avers
that even if the process of identifying an element
in the system carries some reference to other
elements, there will be no two elements of which it
can be said that they are necessarily related, and
this is as much as Hume's argument requires.
 Hence, the obvious paradox consists in that

positivism, despite its own declarations about
the need to overcome metaphysics and free
philosophy from myths and Utopias remains itself
metaphysical and even a mythological system
substituting speculative logical schemes both for
objective reality and for the real processes of
cognition.
 Advocating a strictly scientific approach to

knowledge and demanding the elimination of
all a priori propositions from scientific analysis,
' the positivists proceed from a very definite system
of values which were established way back in the
ideological battles with scholastic metaphysics.
We shall yet have not one opportunity to see
that positivism, even in its latest forms, has
not been averse to the classical tradition in
philosophy and in science in general. On the contrary,
it has proved its strong affinity, remote in time
but not in spirit, for this tradition, attempting
to reconcile Locke's and Hume's views,
incompatible in many respects as they are.
 The inherent metaphysics of positivist

philosophy, incapable of critical self-analysis,
combines in itself some characteristic features of
57
18th-century natural philosophy and mechanistic

materialism manifesting themselves in the
irresistible urge of positivism towards formal
simplicity, rigidity and completeness of scientific
knowledge, with the principles of Hume's and
Berkeley's subjective-idealistic philosophy
underlying the positivist absolutisation of empirical
facts regarded as the only source of self-evident
certitude and the true foundation of scientific
knowledge. Indeed, beware of metaphysics!
 The widely advertised neutrality of positivist

philosophy is in fact nothing but a philosophical
eclecticism leading inevitably to idealism, just
as the proclaimed freedom from metaphysics is
nothing but a smokescreen for more subtle
metaphysics. Lucien Seve has justly observed that
``positivism is a typical form of the decline of
metaphysics which has not yet managed to find
its way to scientific =
materialism''.^^1^^ It stands to
reason that the inner contradictions of positivism
inherent in its basic dogmas, let alone the
contradictions between the premises and
conclusions, could not but lead positivism from one
crisis to another and stimulated its attempts to
find a way out with the help of one or another
stopgap theory. The philosophy of science was
bound in the end to reject the positivist programme
of struggle against metaphysics and give up
attempts to discard all general problems
pertaining to being, nature, society and thinking. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the tendency
towards the revival of ``metaphysics'' has at last
prevailed in the philosophy of science itself.
_-_-_
^^1^^ L. S\ève, La philosophie française contemporaine,

Editions sociales, Paris, 1962, p. 294.
58
__ALPHA_LVL2__
2. METAPHYSICS
 OF ``CRITICAL RATIONALISM''
 One of the radical attempts to solve the

problem of the relationship between science and
metaphysics on a non-positivist basis has been
undertaken by Karl Popper, a prominent English
philosopher, who proposed a doctrine of the
structure and development of scientific knowledge
and gave it the name of ``critical rationalism''.
It is noteworthy that the main principles of
his doctrine, alternative in a way to logical
positivism, were developed by Popper within the
walls of its citadel---the Vienna Circle. The ideas
of Popper who had been a member of this circle
from its very foundation foreshadowed, as it were,
the inevitable crisis and disintegration of the
new school long before it reached the peak of its
glory when nothing seemed to betoken the
impending end.
 From the very beginning Popper was a severe

critic of the new trend in the philosophy of
science which was budding within the Vienna Circle
among the philosophers and natural scientists
interested in the logic and methodology of
science. However, Popper was no alien in this
circle, though there is an obvious tendency now to
leave this fact out of account in considering his
relation to logical positivism. Popper's
alliance with the new school was by no means
accidental even if we put aside his formal
membership of the Vienna Circle. One could evidently
speak of a certain difference of opinions
concerning the means, yet the aim as such was
undoubtedly common. This is true at least of the early
period of Popper's activity when he advocated
59
the restructuring of scientific knowledge on the

basis of an empiricist interpretation of its laws
and categories and underscored the need for
complete elimination of metaphysics from scientific
studies. Hence, not only did he identify himself
with the tasks set by logical positivism in that
early period of his research, but he strove
wholeheartedly to solve them in a most consistent and
effective manner.
 True, the way which Popper considered to be

the most expedient and logically sound fell off
the tracks chosen by most of the other adherents
of the Vienna Circle. Giving him credit for
scientific intuition one ought to note that he sensed the
inherent weakness of the verification theory when
it was still in the cradle and discerned the seeds
of contradictions bound to undermine this theory
when it was to start revealing its philosophical
content, particularly when the principles
proclaimed by the Vienna Circle were to be applied
to the problems of real scientific cognition.
 In his polemics with logical positivism Popper

stressed, not without reason, that modern
physical theories were too abstract, even
speculative, to meet in any degree the criterion of
verification. This criterion, according to which the
truth of any theoretical statement must be
confirmed by direct experience, could not provide
reliable guidelines even for a most general
appraisal of their scientific value. All attempts to
reduce them to experimental data and to show
that such statements, if only in the field of
classical mechanics, were based on direct
observation have proved to be futile. Even the basic laws
making the backbone of a theory were too
remote from what was called the empirical
60
foundation of science. On the other hand, the treatises

devoted to dreams and spiritualistic seances
appeared at first sight much closer to everyday
experience than theoretical propositions and even
seemed to use something like the induction
method which held undivided sway in empiricist
natural science.
 Popper also noted the fact that many

scientific theories had originated from myths. It was
yet another proof that there existed no sharp
demarcation between science and metaphysics,
particularly in terms of the verification theory.
According to Popper, Copernicus's heliocentric
theory of the Universe was inspired by the
neo-Platonists' worship of the Sun which they placed
in the centre of the Universe. Ancient atomistics
was another example of a myth that played an
extremely important role in the development of
science. As opposed to logical positivism which
reduced the difference between science and
metaphysics to the difference between meaningful
and senseless propositions, Popper underscored
already in his first mature works that the
problem of meaningfulness and senselessness was a
pseudo-problem. Metaphysics, according to
Popper, was neither a science nor a set of nonsensical
assertions. Hence, already in the early period
of his ideological evolution Popper held a
different view of metaphysics than the founders of
the Vienna school influenced to a considerable
extent by Wittgenstein's and Schlick's ideas.
 According to the ``verification version'' of

logical positivism, the criterion of the scientific
value of different forms of human knowledge is
their confirmability by inductive methods: an
assertion can only be regarded scientifically
61
(empirically) valid if it can be confirmed by

inductive methods or an inductive =
inference.^^1^^ As
regards a theoretical proposition, it must permit
logical reduction to a protocol statement
confirmable by an experiment. The basic
distinction of Popper's criterion of scientific knowledge
from the verification principle consisted in that
he regarded refutability (or ``falsifiability'') and
not confirmability as the main characteristic
feature of a scientific statement. Hence, Popper's
solution of the problem of demarcation between
scientific and non-scientific assertions is the
direct logical opposite of the neopositivistic
criterion. The immunity, even if only thinkable, of
a proposed hypothesis against refutation is a
sure sign of its metaphysical nature. A system of
assertions can only be considered scientific if it is
at least capable of being at variance with
observation. From this it follows that the verifiability
of a theory coincides not with its confirmability,
but with its refutability, and this is just what
makes the difference between science and
``nonscience''. For instance, the existence of God,
according to Popper, is asserted in approximately
_-_-_
^^1^^ The weakness of empiricism and inductivism as

methodological concepts was noted long ago. The most
exhaustive assessment of these trends was given by Engels who,
in particular, wrote in his Dialectics of Nature: ``These
people have got into such a dead-lock over the opposition
between induction and deduction that they reduce all
logical forms of conclusion to these two, and in so doing
do not notice that they (1) unconsciously employ quite
different forms of conclusion under those names, (2)
deprive themselves of the whole wealth of forms of conclusion
in so far as it cannot be forced under these two, and (3)
thereby convert both forms, induction and deduction,
into sheer nonsense'' (Frederick Engels, Dialectics of
Nature, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p.~226).
62
this form: God is because he is. Since this

statement is practically tautological, the degree of
its confirmability is very high. Yet it is quite
obvious that a statement, of this kind is
completely immune from refutation and is, therefore,
non-scientific.
 Popper's argument against the verification

principle and in favour of his ``falsification''
criterion are serious enough, though not at all
as original as he claims. Putting aside the
author's pretence, let us take a more close look at
his arguments against the ``verification version''
of anti-metaphysical philosophy.
 First, Popper contends that observation is

always preceded by certain theoretical
assumptions and scientific knowledge, contrary to the
positivist concept, does not start with sensory
experience. Second, the traditional problem of
empiricism, that of the substantiation of the
inductive conclusion, derives, according to
Popper, from Hume's error concerning the nature
of the scientific method. In Popper's opinion,
Hume indeed showed that a theory cannot be
'deduced logically from observation statements,
yet he overlooked a very important circumstance:
his arguments do not prove that a theory cannot
be refuted by observation. Therefore, contrary
to the expectations of the positivists, empirical
generalizations are immaterial for scientific
cognition. A scientist is usually not guided by
generalised observations, but makes a resolute step
and puts forward bold proposals which are
subject to subsequent empirical verification. Popper
maintains that scientists test new theories not
in an attempt to deduce them from a certain
imaginary basis, but by creating experimental
63
situations whereby they try to refute or falsify

them.
 One cannot but admit that Popper did pinpoint

the vulnerable spot of empiricism. Yet the full
significance of his criticism can only be assessed
in the light of the programme which he proposes
as an alternative. It may seem at first sight that
his epistemological principles are radically
different from those of positivism. Indeed,
according to Popper, ``knowledge cannot start from
nothing---from a tabula rasa---nor yet from
observation. The advance of knowledge consists,
mainly, in the modification of earlier knowledge.
Although we may sometimes, for example in
archaeology, advance through a chance observation,
the significance of the discovery will usually
depend upon its power to modify our earlier
theories.''^^1^^
 Refutation in science, according to Popper, is

a motive force of progress---a refuted hypothesis
gives place to another one intended to eliminate
or avoid the error. Some conclusion ensuing from
an adopted theory or from a hypothesis may be
refuted---this will cause the scientists to improve
and transform the theory or the hypothesis. It
may also happen that the very premises of a
theory will prove to be invalid---in that case the
theory should be resolutely rejected. In any case,
a scientist himself must always strive to
subject his hypotheses to severe criticism as it
stimulates continuous progress of science. ``Refute!''
_-_-_
^^1^^ K.~R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth

of Scientific Knowledge, Harper and Row Publishers, New
York and Evanston, 1963, p.~28; see also Karl R. Popper,
The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
London, 1960.
64
---calls Popper on scientists. A refutation, in his

opinion, is a scientist's victory since any act
of rejection represents the essence of sciencof
elimination of errors and perpetual progress e:
knowledge.
 According to Popper, the test of a theory amounts

in fact to an attempt to refute it, and
refutability is the fundamental property of scientific
knowledge, whereas the critical spirit is one of
the basic characteristics of scientific life, the
ethical imperative, so to speak, of a scientist's
behaviour. In assessing a hypothesis a scientist
should first of all decide whether it lends itself
to a critical examination and, if so, whether it
is capable of withstanding a critical charge.
Newton's theory, says Popper, predicted a
deviation of the Sun's planets from Kepler's
orbits owing to their interaction and thereby
exposed itself to a possibility of being refuted by
experience. Einstein's theories were tested in a
similar manner as the conclusions they
suggested did not follow from Newton's theory.
 By contrast with the metaphysicians striving

for an ever broader generalisation and
confirmations of their ideas, the scientists do not
seek a high degree of probability of their
assertions or, to be more precise, it is not their main
aim. The more a statement asserts, the less
probable it is, says Popper. For instance, a theory
giving exact quantitative predictions in
relation to the splitting of lines in the atom emission
spectrum under the influence of magnetic fields of
different intensity is more vulnerable to
experimental refutation than a theory predicting
merely the effect of a magnetic field on such
emission. In that respect, according to Popper, the
5---1152
65
more definite and refutable a theory is the more

verifiable it also is, as it lends itself to more
accurate and exacting tests. In other words, contrary,
for instance, to Carnap, Popper maintains that
a high degree of verifiability cannot represent the
aim of science. If that were so, the scientists would
confine themselves to tautological statements
alone. Actually, however, their task consists in
developing science, i.e. in enriching its content,
and that is bound to lower the probability of its
propositions.
 As we see, Popper presents rather a dramatic

picture of the evolution of science which
consists essentially in a continuous struggle of
theories and in the survival of the fittest. Unlike
Carnap who regarded the victory of a theory to
be in no way damaging to the prestige of its
rivals, Popper maintains that the triumph of one
hypothesis inevitably spells the doom of all
others. With Carnap, scientific theories move in
a respectable and civilised society, whereas
Popper sees them waging relentless struggle for
existence in which the rise of a theory can only be
achieved by ``murdering'' its opponent.
Explaining his understanding of the difference between
science and ``metaphysics'', Popper used to say
that a believer perishes together with his false
convictions, whereas a scientist sacrifices his
creation, a theory, for the sake of the progress of
science.
 As regards each individual scientific theory, it

begins, according to Popper, with a problem.
Then follows a tentative solution, a conjecture,
criticism and correction of errors. The tentative
solution may prove partly or even completely
erroneous. Yet this does not mean, says Popper,
66
that a scientist is entitled to a deliberate error.

To avoid it, he must, first of all, look deeper into
the problem and ``comprehend'' it. And how can
he do this? Popper says: ``To understand a
problem means to understand its difficulties, and to
understand its difficulties means to understand
why it is not easily soluble---why the more
obvious solutions do not =
work.''^^1^^ The step that

follows a tentative solution consists in discussing
and criticising the theory. At this stage
everybody tries to find faults with it, to refute it or
to correct the errors. Popper writes: ``The critical
attitude may be described as the conscious
attempt to make our theories, or conjectures, suffer
in our stead in the struggle for the survival of
the fittest. It gives us a chance to survive the
elimination of an inadequate hypothesis---when
a more dogmatic attitude would eliminate it by
eliminating =
us.''^^2^^
 This attitude, according to Popper, is true of

the animal, pre-scientific and scientific knowledge
and, consequently, characterises the mechanism
of its evolution in general. A specific feature of
scientific knowledge consists in that the struggle
for existence in human society becomes more
difficult because of conscious and systematic
criticism.
 In Popper's opinion, one can only speak of

any progress in science (as well as of the
demarcation line between science and metaphysics)
in connection with the possibility of falsification.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An

Evolutionary Approach, At the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p.~260.
^^2^^ Challenges to Empiricism, Ed. by Harold Morick,

Wadsworth Publishing Company, Ltd., Belmont,
California, 1972, p.~149.
5*
67
Popper's falsification concept is closely linked

with his peculiar notions of the genealogical tree
of knowledge. If we take a tree in its natural
position, i.e. with its crown up, for a model of
the evolutionary process, we shall have,
according to Popper, the picture of the development of
applied sciences, since they are characterised
by the ever increasing diversification and
specialisation. Yet to visualise the development of
pure knowledge, of fundamental sciences, one
should set the tree with the crown down, since
the leading tendency in the sphere of pure
knowledge consists in the growing integration and
unification of theories.
 From the epistemological viewpoint, Popper's

concept is different from the traditional
empiricist stand only in that it dismisses the question
of the source of knowledge, since the logic of a
scientific discovery which is what Popper's
epistemology boils down to, does not concern itself
with questions of this kind. In point of fact, this
question lies on the other side of the demarcation
line which Popper draws between science and
metaphysics. Yet even within the narrow limits
of a purely logical model of the process of
cognition Popper's concept gives rise to serious
contradictions. Indeed, in investigating the
relation between knowledge in general and a concrete
discovery or theory one must answer at least two
questions: (1) which element of knowledge and
at which stage of its maturity is taken as the
basic proposition; (2) which proposition in a
given specific case can be confirmed or refuted
with the help of an experiment. The second
question remains, in fact, unanswered by Popper.
As regards the first one, the answer is as follows:
68
the initial, basic propositions are a product of

arbitrary convention among scientists. Popper
does not deny the connection of basic propositions
with experience. In The Logic of Scientific
Discovery he writes that the decision to adopt a basic
proposition stands in causal relation to our sense
perceptions. Experience, according to Popper,
can only go to the extent of motivating a decision
which is needed for the adoption or rejection of
a proposition. Yet any attempt to trace basic
propositions to perceptions would be entirely
fruitless.
 As we see, despite the ostensible opposition to

empiricism, Popper's concept reveals a curious
similarity to logical positivism in at least two
aspects: (1) in its tendency to limit the
subject-matter of epistemology to purely logical problems
and to reject some general problems (e.g. the
problem of the source of knowledge); (2) Popper,
like the leading theorists of the Vienna school,
is forced to resort to conventionalism when it
comes to explaining the origin of basic
propositions, though he substitutes conventionalism
``from below'' for the traditional conventionalism
``from above'' used by logical positivism in its
attempt to account for scientific laws and
theories. Popper's conventionalism is a result of
his far-reaching logicism, leading to the
dismissal of philosophical and sociological problems
of science as insoluble. The basic propositions
introduced by Popper are intended to replace
the protocol statements of the Vienna school and
differ from them in that they reflect a system of
conventional knowledge rather than the
transient individual experience.
 The rational kernel in Popper's criticism of the
69
verification theory consists in that Popper

considers science as an endless chain of theories that
replace one another. He effects a radical change
in the traditional orientation of the logical
analysis of scientific knowledge. Having started
with the investigation into the rules of
refutation of scientific theories, Popper made the
progress of science the pivotal point of his concept.
The problem of the criterion of scientificity now
organically merges with the concept of the
development of science: crises in science, i.e. the
collapse of traditional theories are declared to
be inherent in the main postulates of the logic
of scientific development. The new logic of
science is a logic of scientific discovery, of the
radical transformation of the existing systems of
knowledge. Popper has shifted the focus of
attention from the formal logical analysis of
systems and propositions to the problem of the
logical reconstruction of historical events in
scientific development.
 In his person the logic of science has made a

step towards the history of science in the hope
of creating a new tradition in the analysis of
scientific knowledge. New horizons have been
opened up before logic both in terms of theory
and heuristics. Popper's logical notions show
a clear tendency towards historicism in the
presentation of scientific progress. Historical
analysis, of course, would have been highly helpful
in the solution of such problems as the criterion
of scientific theories, the role of philosophical
knowledge in the development of science, and
many others. But such analysis proved to be
beyond Popper's possibilities. Logicism has got
the better of his aspirations.
70
 Development, a traditional metaphysical

problem, has also been treated with reference to
scientific knowledge by Thomas S. Kuhn, who gave
it even a more pronounced anti-positivist turn.
 In opposition to Popper, Kuhn put forward a

thesis that scientific development cannot be
explained by means of rational logical notions in
principle. The sharp controversy that was
initiated by his book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions first published in 1972 is still
unabated centering around Kuhn's polemics with
Popper's school. This polemics is playing rather
an important role in weakening the positions of
``critical rationalism''.
 A crucial feature of scientific life which,

according to Kuhn, was ignored by Popper, consists in
the presence of some ``dogmatic'' elements in the
scientists' work which bolster up their faith in
the success of their investigations and help
them to persist in their studies without arguing
with their colleagues. As distinct from Popper
who underscores the significance of criticism in
science, Kuhn emphasises the function of dogma
in scientific investigation. Contrary to Popper,
who avers that bold refutations and tough
competition of theories pave the way for scientific
progress, Kuhn sees the starting point of
progress in a transition from debates and competitive
theories to a common viewpoint shared by all
specialists.
 According to Kuhn, the true creator of science

is the scientific community, a group of
professionals who decide to adopt a certain scientific
achievement or theory as a model and make it a basis
for their investigations. No scientific community
can start investigating natural phenomena
71
without a definite system of generally recognised

notions. Such a system of notions also includes
certain metaphysical propositions or models of the
type: ``heat is kinetic energy of particles making
a body'' or `àll perceptible phenomena are
essentially interaction of qualitatively
homogeneous atoms in free space'', etc. Within the
scientific community a model theory is a paradigm,
whereas the study of nature within the framework of a
paradigm is ``normal science''. If there is a
paradigm, the solution of concrete scientific problems
resembles the solution of puzzles: the scientist
has a model of the solution (the paradigm), the
rules to be followed, and knows that the
problem is soluble. The conditions being set, his
success depends on his personal ingenuity. The
secret of scientific achievements lies largely in
the self-organisation of the scientific community.
No other professional group has succeeded to such
an extent in fencing itself off from everyday life
and laymen's questions as the scientific
community. To be sure, such isolation can never be
complete, yet it is very essential. A scientist
always does his individual research with an eye to
his colleagues in the first place, whereas a poet
or a writer addresses a non-professional audience
and depends to a great extent on its appreciation.
``Just because he is working only for an audience
of colleagues, an audience that shares his own
values and beliefs, the scientist can take a single
set of standards for =
granted,''^^1^^ writes Kuhn.
He does not even have to select his problems---
they themselves are waiting for him.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific

Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962,
p.~164.
72
 However, this is only the first stage of the

scientific process. The next stage consists in a
break-down of old paradigms, a crisis and a
formation of a new paradigm. It is a period of
extraordinary investigations and controversy
leading to the development of the new principles
of investigation and to the creation of a new
picture of the world. The main task of this period
is to select a theory that would play the role of
a paradigm. This selection, according to Kuhn,
is not a logical problem as it appears to logicians.
The criterion for the selection lies in a
socio-psychological sphere: the scientific community
selects for a paradigm the theory which appears
to be best suited to ensure the ``normal''
functioning of the scientific mechanism. Therefore each
critical period gives way to a new upsurge of
creative activity and another step forward in
the onward march of natural science. To an
individual scientist, however, a change of basic
theories (paradigms) is tantamount to conversion
to a new faith: he feels like entering a new world
with entirely different objects, notions, problems
and tasks.
 Hence, a scientific revolution consists

essentially in a change of paradigms. This change does
not yield to rational explanation in terms of
logic as it is rooted in the professional feeling
of the scientific community: either the community
possesses the necessary means for solving
``puzzles'', or, if such means are not available, the
community has to create them.
 The main turning points in the history of

science are associated with the names of
Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein. According
to Kuhn, each of these turning points signified
73
that a group of professional scientists had to
discard one age-old theory in favour of another
incompatible with the former.
 Paradoxical as it may seem, Popper's logical

concept of scientific revolutions and of the
downfall of famous theories has been constructed
on the basis of the same historical material.
In this connection Kuhn justly observed that
Popper had no reason for characterising all
scientific activity in the terms applicable to its
rare revolutionary periods only.
 The severity of the test criteria referred to by

Popper is only one side of the medal, the other
one being the tradition of ``normal'' science, the
solution of ``puzzles''. Subject to testing is not
the basic theory, but the scientist's conjecture,
his ingenuity. An erroneous conjecture is a
setback for the scientist, but not for his paradigm.
 Popper's idea of the `èlimination of errors''

which accompanies a change of theories is yet
another concept which meets Kuhn's resolute
opposition. Popper regarded as erroneous
Ptolemy's geocentric astronomy, the flogiston theory,
Newton's mechanics. Kuhn refuses to accept
this point of view: no `èrror'' has been committed
in the development of these theories and the
notion of error in general is absolutely irrelevant
in the assessment of an obsolete scientific theory.
In his opinion, the most one can say in such
cases is that a theory which had once been correct
later became erroneous, or that a scientist made
a mistake by adhering to a theory too long.
 In the final analysis the basic distinction

between Popper's and Kuhn's concepts lies in their
different understanding of the nature of science
and progress. Popper has repeatedly emphasised
74
the need to cast off ``psychologism'' in the solution

of such problems. He was never tired of repeating
that his concern was the logical rules of scientific
progress rather than the scientists' psychological
incentives; yet he could not but admit that the
rules of logic followed by scientists in their
investigations are something like their professional
imperatives. In contrast to Popper, Kuhn
contends that such imperatives alone can account for
a scientist's selection of one solution instead of
another and that his preference cannot be
explained on purely logical or experimental grounds.
In other words, it is only the analysis of
socio-psychological factors in the development of
science that provides a key to the correct
understanding of the historical aspects of scientific
progress. Popper's science is impersonal whereas
Kuhn strives to introduce a ``human element''
into the logical problems of scientific cognition
and highlights its sociological and psychological
aspects. Both concepts, however, are completely
divorced from the problem of the interaction
between philosophy and particular sciences.
Moreover, Kuhn even makes a special point of
substantiating this indifference. A question,
naturally, arises if such an abstraction in the
investigation of the history of science is justifiable
and if it is not likely to distort the true picture
of scientific progress.
 A serious attempt to save the logical tradition

in the analysis of historical changes in science
was made by Popper's disciple Imre Lakatos,
a prominent representative of critical
rationalism and a talented expounder of his school's
principles.
 Lakatos holds that it is necessary to discard
75
completely the tradition of logical positivism

which focused on formal logical means in the
analysis of scientific =
knowledge.^^1^^ He shares
Popper's opinion that the only way in the
investigation of the logic of science is to turn to the real
practice of scientific thinking. To substantiate
this view he shows that even mathematics which
has long been regarded as the main bastion of
the adherents of formal logical analysis needs the
substantive analysis of its history so as to get a
basis for the development of the logical and
methodological scheme of scientific discovery.
 Each time the historical process of scientific

cognition reveals a need for a change in the
existing system of knowledge there appears a
possibility for different strategies and for different
ways of development. Being always faced with the
necessity of ``casting lots'' in selecting one of the
alternatives that would prove the most
beneficial for further scientific progress, the scientists
never stop seeking for a guideline. This guideline,
according to Lakatos, must be provided by the
modern logic of science. It is precisely for this
reason that it should break off with the tradition
of formalism. Formal logical analysis deals with
deductive, formalised theories which represent
science in the artificially ``frozen'' state, whereas
the real object of logical analysis and
explanation should be the methods and mechanisms of
changes in the structure of knowledge. Criticism
gives scientists a rich ``situation logic'', i.e. opens
up a broad range of possible lines of behaviour in
different situations.
_-_-_
^^1^^ See I.~Lakatos, ``Changes in the Problem of Inductive

Logic'', in: The Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam,
1968, pp. 325--30.
76
 Lakatos points out that Popper's solution of

the ``demarcation'' puzzle and his criterion of
scientific knowledge have brought about a radical
change in the very formulation of the problem.
After Popper, the logical appraisal of a scientific
theory turned in fact into the analysis of
conditions under which a given theory or hypothesis
can be adopted for scientific use. In other words,
Popper's new approach to the traditional
problems of the logic of science brought to the
forefront the question of the acceptability of a
scientific theory or a hypothesis. According to Popper,
a theory can only be accepted as scientific if it is
falsifiable. Lakatos, however, regards this
criterion as only one of the requirements a theory
must meet in order to become acceptable.
 Kuhn's controversy with Popper about

scientific revolutions raised the crucial question of
the possibility of representing the endless change
of fundamental scientific theories as a rational
process interpretable in terms of logic. As for
Lakatos, his main object was to give a logical
explanation of the victory of a new paradigm.
He is firmly convinced that logic is capable of
giving the scientist a rational guideline for his
behaviour during a ``critical'' period in the
development of science. Proceeding from this aim,
Lakatos develops his concept known as the
``methodology of research programmes''.
 Lakatos sides with Kuhn in his criticism of

Popper's rule: ``having falsified---reject!''.
According to Lakatos, the comparison of a theory with
the results of an experiment is a more complex
procedure than Popper originally thought it to
be. This comparison involves, as it were, three
``layers'' of knowledge: (1) the theory under test
77
itself; (2) the sensory data explained by the theory

(for instance, the light images observed with the
help of an optical instrument); (3) the so-called
background knowledge embodied, for instance,
in the instrument design. We cannot know what
the experiment demonstrates and how it can pass
a final judgement on the theory under test.
Rather, says Lakatos, we subject to testing a tangle
of our theories and the experiment's verdict is:
`ìncompatible''. Which of the theories must be
rejected is still a big question. Generally speaking,
there are no absolutely indisputable facts which
would compel an ardent adherent of a theory to
surrender immediately and unconditionally. On
these grounds Lakatos comes to the conclusion
that a theory cannot be invalidated by a single
empirical counter-example. Its rejection can only
come about in the process of adoption of a new,
better theory.
 Broadly speaking, it means that the true object

of a logical evaluation is a series of theories in
their succession rather than an individual theory.
Several series cluster around propositions playing
the role of something like a dogma---here,
according to Lakatos, Kuhn was right. It can
therefore be affirmed with good reason that the
scientists in their investigations of nature translate
into reality some more or less developed
``programmes''.
 Lakatos understands science as activity aimed

at solving concrete problems within the
framework of a certain programme. Each programme
can be viewed as consisting of two components:
a rigid core and a safety zone of ``sacrificial''
theories. The rigid core consists of one or several
propositions which are not subject to refutation.
78
Such are, for instance, the three laws of

thermodynamics and the law of gravitation for the
adherents of Newton's theory. These propositions
must be preserved under any onslaught of
falsifying data. The ``salvation'' of the core is
achieved at the expense of auxiliary hypotheses
which replace one another and are intended to
neutralise counter-examples and preserve the core with
the help of various amendments and modifications.
 By way of illustration Lakatos refers to

Newton's gradual elaboration of his theoretical
models.^^1^^ Having first worked out his programme for
a planetary system with a fixed point---like the
Sun and one single point-like planet, Newton
derived his inverse square law for Kepler's ellipse.
But this model was forbidden by Newton's own
third law of dynamics, therefore the model had
to be replaced by one in which both the Sun and
the planet revolved round their common centre
of gravity. Later he introduced more planets as
if there were only heliocentric but no
interplanetary forces. However, the results obtained at
this stage ran counter to observations, and later
Newton worked out the case where the Sun and
planets were not mass points but mass-balls
and also introduced interplanetary forces. Such
multistage elaboration, according to Lakatos,
reveals the true course of the scientist's thought.
 The history of science, according to Lakatos,

is the history of the birth, life and death of
research programmes. While a programme is being
realised, science runs its normal course---it is
Kuhn's ``normal science''. During a change of
_-_-_
^^1^^ See Imre Lakatos, ``Falsification and the

Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes'', in: Criticism and
the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 143--59.
79
programmes, or a change of paradigms, science

undergoes a revolution. As distinct from Kuhn,
however, Lakatos believes that programmes are
logically commensurable and can be compared
to one another. Their comparative analysis can
provide a scientist with a reasonably reliable
guideline for selecting one programme and
rejecting another.
 According to Lakatos, any theoretical concept

of knowledge provides a framework for the
rational restructuring of the history of scientific
knowledge. Though not every detail in the history
of science fits in with rational explanation,
logico-methodological concepts should provide the
closest possible approximation to real processes
in order to permit their description. For instance,
an inductivist who considers Newton's theory
an `èrror'', and its lasting prevalence a delusion
would find no rational justification for it.
Popper's type of logic would provide a rational
explanation for a scientist's failure to recognize
the collapse of his theory by referring to his
metaphysical views. In Lakatos' opinion,
preference should be given to a concept which
permits the rational restructuring and
interpretation of the largest possible number of facts in the
history of science. Proceeding from this
criterion, Lakatos considers his concepts to be the
most expedient. However that may be, his
ultimate conclusion is this: it is the history of science
which is the touchstone of any logico-methodological
concept, its strict and uncompromising judge.
 The controversy between the ``critical

rationalists'' and the adherents of Kuhn's-concept of the
history of science had greatly affected the
assessment of the very possibility of constructing a
80
purely logical concept of scientific knowledge

and its development. The most sceptical views
in relation to this problem were expressed by
Paul Feyerabend. In one of his works, after
expounding the basic principles of Popper's logic of
scientific investigation, Feyerabend puts two
questions which he considers to be of prime
importance: (1) whether it is desirable to live up
to the rules of ``critical rationalism'' and (2)
whether science can be brought in accord with
these =
rules.^^1^^ Feyerabend gives negative answers

to both questions.
 According to Feyerabend, the highly specialised

thinking characteristic of modern civilisation is
accountable for a corresponding narrow approach
to the study of man's cognitive activity and for
a tendency to rationalise the process of cognition
by simplifying its participants, strictly
delimiting the field under investigation and by
abstracting from historical context. Feyerabend contends
that such abstraction from the external factors
of scientific development becomes fatal for
philosophy, since human inclinations, interests and
ideological influences have a greater effect on the
progress of knowledge than is generally believed.
Despite his general opposition to Kuhn's
understanding of the nature of scientific activity,
Feyerabend, as he himself admitted, had
wholeheartedly accepted his thesis of the incommensurability
of basic scientific theories that succeed one
another in history. Incommensurability was the
point on which the views of both authors
completely coincided when they were discussing the
basic ideas of Kuhn's book. Kuhn was fond of
_-_-_
^^1^^ See Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method. Outline of

an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London, 1975.
6---1152
81
comparing the world as it appeared to Aristotle

with the world depicted by the 17th-century
science. Having taken the cue, Feyerabend carries
out a detailed comparative analysis of classical
celestial mechanics and the special theory of
relativity and strives to show that even the
concepts of length, mass and speed in these theories
were entirely different. According to both Kuhn
and Feyerabend, the meaning of observation
terms is completely determined by the
theoretical context in which they are used. From this it
follows that theories replacing one another are
mutually incompatible and even
incommensurable. They belong to different worlds. The field
of application of a new theory is not necessarily
the extended field of application of the previous
theory, these fields may only overlap each other.
The view according to which a new theory is
bound to be commensurable with the previous one
cannot be accepted as a universal principle.
Incommensurability may be eliminated in one
aspect, but holds good or even becomes more
complete in another.
 The thesis of the incommensurability of

theories succeeding one another is so important for
Feyerabend that he considers it imperative for
the logical analysis of scientific theories to start
with revealing and emphasising the qualitative
distinction of the new theory over the old one.
A new theory must not only explain new facts,
but also show the causes of the failure of the
old theory. It is only on this condition that a new
theory can be admitted to the temple of science.
According to Feyerabend, a scientific theory can
only be identified by its novelty and complete
break from its predecessor. This criterion should
82
also be applied to epistemology and to the logic

of science.
 Feyerabend contends that the history of

science testifies to the absence of any norms and
standards of scientific activity valid for all times.
Proceeding from his own understanding of
Hegelian dialectics, Feyerabend maintains that any
phenomenon can only be investigated in terms
of the dialectics of the subjective and the
objective, chance and necessity. Any absolutisation
of norms and rules tends to bar the way to
cognition. The true task of philosophy is to neutralise
the baneful trends towards the stability and
rigidity of methodological norms. Philosophy
should embody the whole gamut of man's creative
potentialities, all his individual qualities. To
achieve this end, however, it must do away with
the stability of all norms of scientific knowledge.
Consequently, the logic of science should
renounce the very idea of standards which hold
good throughout history. Such standards can at
best be treated as a verbal ornament or, more
accurately, as a remembrance of those happy days
when it was believed possible to gain success in
science just by observing a few simple and
rational rules and when scientific investigation was
not yet known to be a risky and hazardous
venture that it is, with endless upheavals and
cataclysms.
 Feyerabend's methodology calls for rejection

of the theoretical monism characteristic of
positivist and some other philosophical doctrines.
The plurality of theories, in his opinion, must not
be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge
which will be replaced later by a ``single true
theory''. ``Theoretical pluralism is assumed to
6*
83
be an essential feature of all knowledge that claims

to be objective,'' writes Feyerabend. ``Nor can
one rest content with a plurality, that is merely
abstract and created by arbitrarily denying now
this and now that component of the dominant
point of view, as is the plurality created by the
various attempts of modern artists to free
themselves from the conventions of their
predecessors.''^^1^^
 In its methodological orientation the theory

of science should proceed from the idea of
epistemological anarchism. The development of
science, according to Feyerabend, is a process of
the continuous combination of standards and
their violations, dogmas and heresies, norms and
errors. Kuhn's ``normal science'' does exist, but
it has to be opposed in every way as it reflects
the ideology of professional specialist. Kuhn's
concept of paradigm is deficient in that it
``consoles'' the specialists instead of subjecting their
views to criticism. Feyerabend's motto is an
uninterrupted revolution.
 Proceeding from his own interpretation of

Hegel's words about human practice, man's
spiritual and practical activity, Feyerabend avers
that it excludes any regularities. A theory of
science should only provide some general hints,
rules of thumb and heuristic methods, but not
general injunctions. ``Knowledge is ... an
ever-increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and
perhaps even incommensurable) =
alternatives.''^^2^^
_-_-_
^^1^^ Paul K. Feyerabend, ``Problems of Empiricism'', in:

Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contemporary
Science and Philosophy, Vol.~2, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965, p. 149.
 ^^2^^Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit., p.~30.
84
Nor is philosophy itself amenable to rational

analysis in view of the disorderliness,
complexity and wholeness of its structure.
 Feyerabend proposes a broad programme of

struggle to attain the ideal of anarchic
epistemology and overcome the ideas of critical
rationalism which seeks to alienate science and
enslave human spirit. He points out three means
to achieve this goal: (1) scrupulous analysis of
the works of such revolutionaries as Galilei,
Newton, Luther, Marx and Lenin; (2) study of
Hegel's philosophy and its alternative
as.expounded by Kierkegaard; (3) integration of
science and art. According to Feyerabend, their
present separation is not natural and results from
the idea of professionalism which must be
discarded. A poem or a play can be intellectual and
informative in equal degree (Aristophanes,
Brecht), whereas scientific theories are capable of
giving pleasure (Galilei, Dirac). In Feyerabend's
opinion, we can change science and make it
conform to our tastes.
 Being indeed anarchical and wide open to all

winds of theoretical thought, this model of
scientific knowledge nevertheless leaves enough
room for metaphysical ideas. Moreover, their
function, as defined by Feyerabend, makes them
a decisive factor both in the criticism and in the
development of what is generally believed and
``highly confirmed''. Hence, they must be
present at any stage of the development of scientific
knowledge. Feyerabend contends that a science
free from all metaphysics is on the way of
becoming a dogmatic metaphysical system.
Metaphysics performs the role of an instrument of
criticism of existing theories, on the one hand, and,
85
just because of the possibility of such criticism,

is an argument in favour of these theories. The
postulate of Feyerabend's philosophy affirming
the absence of any certainty, stability and
system in methodology assumes itself the
character of a dogma. Its absolutisation results in the
restoration of a new variety of metaphysics which
is anything but refined.
 Joseph Agassi also shares the view that the

claim of logic to the role of the theory of
scientific knowledge can hardly be considered
justifiable. As for himself, he is inspired by the idea
of reproducing the real history of science with
all its wealth of conflicting tendencies, and the
methodology of science has no special appeal for
him. The keynote of his works is the futility
of preconceived viewpoints and the need for a
scrupulous and unbiased reproduction of the
entire history of science with all its real
conflicting tendencies.
 In Agassi's opinion, one ought to start with

asking himself a question: what do we know about
science in general and about its history? The
existing historiography is too raw to provide
a basis even for a most abstract theoretical
discussion of the criterion of scientificity and the
logical principles of cognition.
 Agassi contends that a broad programme of

historiographic investigations of science should
be based on Popper's situation logic which makes
it possible to reveal the historical context of
various scientific theories or hypotheses. He
warns, however, that such investigations should
not be influenced by any preconceived idea of
science, since the present-day task consists in
disclosing and singling out concrete genetic links
86
between scientific theories rather than in their

reduction to some ideal type or logical
model.
 Agassi holds that the core of science reveals

itself in the scientists' ``metaphysical'', i.e.
philosophical, views which should therefore be given
priority attention in historiographic studies.
He shows that philosophical ideas tend to degrade
to current opinions if their authors are shy of
exposing them to criticism. Those and only those
scientists can develop new fruitful theories who
are willing to subject their philosophical
principles to a serious examination. According to
Agassi, the priority objective of a historian of
science is to disclose the nature of the
metaphysical nucleus of scientific theories and doctrines.
He therefore contends that there should be a
radical change in the very orientation of the logical
analysis of knowledge which, in his opinion,
should be focused on historiographic
investigations. The history of science should be written
anew, since the existing historiography of science
is unsatisfactory.
 It is evidently for the accomplishment of

this task that Agassi sets out to revive
metaphysics.
 Significantly, Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos

and some other representatives of the modern
philosophy of science follow different paths and
are interested in different aspects of scientific
cognition. Yet they have one point in common---
all of them stand for the rehabilitation of
metaphysics which has been held in contempt by
positivism for many years. Of course, the difference
in their approach to the process of cognition and
their different aims cannot but tell on their
87
concepts of metaphysics, their understanding of its

role in scientific cognition and their attitude to
traditional philosophical problems. For instance,
unlike Popper who does not go beyond the formal
justification of metaphysics, and unlike Lakatos
who confines himself to asserting the
irreducibility of theory to the empirical basis, Agassi's
doctrine tends to endow metaphysics with
certain substance.
 Accepting in principle the view that

metaphysical proposition can be identified by its
empirical unfalsifiability, Agassi nevertheless brings
his metaphysics closer to the traditional
philosophical problems. It is indicative that his
assessment of the scientificity of one or another
theory depends to a certain extent on its relation
to metaphysics. Thus the selection of scientific
problems which are to be studied should be
governed, according to Agassi, not by the degree
or their verifiability or falsifiability, but by
their importance for arising metaphysical
problems. Metaphysics is regarded by Agassi as a
coordinating factor in the development of
science, since the criterion of the importance of a
scientific problem is its metaphysical significance.
 It is noteworthy that Agassi's understanding

of the concrete historical conditions affecting the
development of science appears to be more
profound than that of Popper, as he takes into
account or, at least, shows interest in the factors
determining the selection of problems to be
tackled and the change of scientific interests
(including the change of ``vogue'' in science). An
important role, in his opinion, belongs not only
to the techniques and equipment used in
experiments, but also to the general socio-economic
88
situation, to society's needs, etc. For all that,

his doctrine assigns the role of the main factor
to none other than metaphysics. ``Some scientific
problems,'' he writes, `àre relevant to
metaphysics; and as a rule it is the class of scientific
problems that exhibit this relevance which is chosen
to be =
studied.''^^1^^
 In his analysis Agassi deals not so much with

a single theory as with a totality of theories,
problems and methods of investigation
characteristic of a given period and viewed by him as a
single whole. It enables him to make
comparisons and deduce general principles governing
scientific progress in different fields, e.g. in
physics, biology, social sciences in a given period.
In Agassi's interpretation, metaphysics is no
longer a specialised theory divorced from science.
Hence, the focus of attention should be shifted
from the problem of demarcation between
science and non-science to that of demarcation
between science, on the one hand, and metaphysics
(bad or good), on the other.
 This leads to a corresponding modification of

the criterion of such demarcation: the aim of
scientific investigation, according to Agassi and
contrary to Popper, is not to find and verify
plausible hypotheses, but to search for and to
test those hypotheses which appear to be
relevant to metaphysics.
 Reasoning in a purely metaphysical manner,

Popper regards the transition from observations
to a good theory not as a result of some
_-_-_
^^1^^ Joseph Agassi, ``The Nature of Scientific Problems

and Their Roots in Metaphysics'', in: The Critical
Approach to Science and Philosophy, Ed. by Mario Bunge,
Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., London, 1964. p.~192.
89
inductive conclusion, but as a tentative solution

subject to testing, as an advancement of any new
theory. The criterion of a theory which is to be
given priority in testing should be, according to
Popper, its falsifiability. Contrary to Popper,
Agassi contends that the choice among rival
theories should be made on an heuristic basis
and governed by metaphysical considerations.
He also contends that metaphysics itself takes
part in the development of theories considered
important in given problem situations.
``Scientific physics,'' he writes, ``belongs to the rational
debate concerning metaphysical ideas. Some of
the greatest single experiments in the history of
modern physics are experiments related to
metaphysics. I suggest that their relevance to
metaphysics contributes to their uncontested high
status. And yet, I contend, the metaphysical
theories related to these experiments were not
parts of =
science.''^^1^^
 Metaphysics for Agassi is not something

homogeneous. As has been indicated above, it can be
``bad'' or ``good''. The former merges with
pseudoscience, the latter, with science. Bad
metaphysics, such as existentialism or Hegel's
philosophy is not capable of exerting serious influence
on the development of science. Good metaphysics,
on the contrary, not only provides something
like a methodological programme for science---
in point of fact, it blends with science and can
hardly be distinguished from it.
 Agassi regards metaphysics as a programme for

future scientific development and stresses that
it cannot be characterised as ``true'' or ``false''---
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~193.
90
it can be either commendable or condemnable.

Here Agassi practically follows in Popper's
footsteps adopting the main principles of his
doctrine. Metaphysical theories themselves may
engender an attractive programme such as that
of Faraday, but the attractiveness or
unattractiveness of a programme is not directly connected
with the truth or falsity of the metaphysical
theory that produced it. According to Agassi,
the significance of a programme is only
determined by the heuristic value of this theory. At this
point, however, we arrive at a contradiction:
if the criterion of demarcation between science
and metaphysics holds good, the truth or
falsity of metaphysical theories will not depend on
their refutability, or else there must exist a
method for establishing the truth or falsity of
theories without resorting to their falsification.
 In his concept Agassi strives to fence off ``bad''

metaphysics which claims to be on an equal
footing with empirical science. He says:
``Metaphysics may be viewed as a research program, and
the false claims of pseudo-science as the result
of confusing a program with the finished
product.''^^1^^ Yet he fails to draw a distinct demarcation
line between true science and the
pseudo-scientific style of thinking characteristic of old natural
philosophy. Unlike Lakatos who either merges
metaphysics with special sciences and practically
makes it their integral part, or altogether
eliminates metaphysics from scientific
investigations regarding it as some obscure source of
inspiration for the scientist, some purely subjective
factor akin to his personal inclinations, aesthetic
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~204.
91
tastes or peculiarities of biography, Agassi strives

to resolve the contradiction by turning this
subjective factor into something immanent in
the very substance of science. A scientific theory
in his doctrine appears as some kind of
interpretation of a metaphysical concept, but not as its
logical consequence.
 It should be rioted, however, that this part of

Agassi's programme of reviving metaphysics is
patently beneath any criticism. What with
metaphysical theories being neither true, nor false,
there remains at best but one way out: to assume
that there are no practical means, or even no
possibility in general to come to a definite
conclusion as regards their status. In that case, however,
one has to give up all attempts at distinguishing
between metaphysics and science and to leave
the reader in the dark regarding the ways whereby
metaphysics becomes immanent in scientific
theories undergoing strict verification procedures.
It proves impossible to reconcile the
understanding of philosophy as an external factor
determining the development of science with its role
of an internal factor determining its content.
The sphere of metaphysics, too, though including
some traditional philosophical problems,
appears to be both too narrow and too vaguely
defined for all Agassi's pretensions to having
developed a highly efficient working model,
something like a matrix for production of new
theories. All that a scientist now needs, according to
Agassi, is but a few comparatively simple
parameters having a purely ``technical'' meaning.
In Agassi's doctrine metaphysical propositions
have no basic distinctions from empirical
generalisations. On the other hand, they must meet
92
the rigid rules of formal logic. This kind of

approach which appears more or less compatible
with Lakatos' concept does not tally with
Agassi's historiographic orientation and runs counter
to his intention of giving a sufficiently accurate,
adequate and broad representation of the
historical process of scientific cognition.
 The history of ``critical rationalism'' shows that

Popper's initial call to.turn to the analysis of
the development of science has proved, as it were,
a Trojan horse for critical rationalism. Having
taken his cue from Popper, Feyerabend comes
to doubt the very possibility of maintaining a
logical, normative stand in the analysis of
scientific knowledge. The criterion and the norms
of scientificity advanced by critical rationalism
prove untenable when applied to the real
practice of scientific thinking, to the study of the
history of science. As a result, Agassi puts
forward a new programme of the investigation of
science focusing not on the logic, but on the
history of its development.
 Would it be correct, then, to draw the

conclusion that the history of science indeed attests
to the fallacy of the existing logical concepts of
scientific knowledge and its development? It
would rather be more correct to say,
paraphrasing Lakatos, that life itself has compared the
logical and historical pictures of science and
showed that these pictures are `ìncompatible''.
Hence, the conclusion of the ``critical
rationalists'' about 'the necessity of radical changes both
in the history and logic of science appears to be
quite sound.
 ``Critical rationalism'' is undoubtedly

one-sided in all its variants of scientific development
93
as it does not strive to present science as an

integral part of the life of society. Yet this school
has succeeded in showing one important thing,
namely, that the progress of science is not a
simple accumulation of knowledge or a gradual
increase of its certainty, but a complex
contradictory process.
 The positivist logic of science was only capable
of reflecting the norms and standards of a certain
``synchronous'' level of science. ``Critical
rationalism'' has made an attempt to construct a
logic of scientific development, i.e. a logic capable
of reflecting ``diachronous'' transformations. This
attempt, however, has called in question the very
idea of such a logic. Indeed, the history of
``critical rationalism'' has vividly demonstrated that
the traditional logical approach with its
orientation on the ``natural'' laws of rational thinking
suffers a complete fiasco whenever it is applied to
the problems of growth and development of
knowledge. The ``critical rationalists'' cannot
accept this fact as all of them, even such a radical
as Feyerabend, have committed themselves to the
logical tradition. Nevertheless, the tendency to
tone down the rigours of the positivist attitude
to ``metaphysics'' and to link
philosophico-methodological analysis (without reducing it to
sensory experience) with the 20th-century
theoretical investigations clearly revealed itself already
in Popper's early fundamental works. This
tendency became even more manifest in his
subsequent studies and particularly in the
investigations of other ``critical rationalists''. Popper's
concept of science as a chain of successive
theories replacing one another accounts to some
extent for an important change in the traditional
94
positivist orientation of logical analysis.

Starting out with the doctrine of falsification, Popper
has come to the problems of the development of
science and reassessed the criterion of
scientificity in terms of historical progress. Crises in
science, i.e. the periods of the collapse of its
traditional theories, are not only explained by his
logic, but ensue from its main postulates. A theory
which is found to be fully confirmable turns,
according to Popper, into technology, know-how or
something of the kind and has no more room in the
temple of science.
 Popper's logic of science is the logic of

scientific discovery, the logic of a radical transformation
of the existing system of knowledge. His
emphasis on the history of science is an important point
of his programme of logical analysis marking a
considerable deviation from the positivist
traditions if only for the fact that he focused his
attention not on the formal logical analysis of
systems of statements, but on the problem of the
logical representation of scientific development.
To be sure, his emphasis on the relative
independence of theoretical knowledge afforded
greater freedom for creative thinking and allowed for
a possibility of generic links between scientific
theories. and ``metaphysics''. Nevertheless,
despite the deductive character of the logical
structure of knowledge, Popper's concept, as has
already been pointed out, did not go beyond the
limits of empiricism since it proceeded from the
direct dependence of a theory on its empirical
verification, post factum though it was. This
dependence on empirical data was perhaps even
more rigid than allowed by the ``verification
version''. On these grounds early Popper's concept
95
should be regarded on the whole as essentially

logico-positivistic. Its assessment by ``critical
realism'' focusing on the formal structure of
Popper's logico-methodological system rather
than on its philosophical orientation need not
be taken into account too seriously.
 Popper's attitude to metaphysics, i.e. to

general ontological problems, as well as his
definition of the falsification principle have been
gradually changing. His later works present a
modified falsification variant watered down in
accordance with his growing interest in metaphysical
problems and in the question of autonomy of the
so-called World 3. To be sure, from the very
beginning Popper's philosophical system as a whole
did not fit the Procrustean bed of the falsification
principle devised by him to eliminate
``metaphysics'' and looked, from the viewpoint of this
principle, quite metaphysical even in its initial
explication. Yet late Popper's blunt turn to
metaphysics was evidently somewhat unexpected and
amusing even for his most ardent adherents
despite the obvious trend towards such a
development traceable already in his early publications.
Popper's new stand was clearly expressed in
his works Objective Knowledge (1972) and The
Self and Its Brain (1977) in which he set out to
construct a cosmic methodological system, though
already in the 1950s and 1960s Popper had
criticised the physicalist and behaviourist theories
of consciousness questioning at the same time
the fruitfulness of the linguistic approach to
the problems of matter, spirit, the brain and
psychological phenomena.
 Popper's recognition of refutability as a
characteristic feature of scientific knowledge and
96
his assessment of metaphysics as a historically

inevitable, though mythological stage of
scientific cognition were in themselves important
steps towards his own ``metaphysics''. No less
important was his idea that the mysterious
process of scientific cognition manifests itself in
the strife of hypotheses and theories, i.e. in the
sphere of rational thinking, but not in the depths
of the scientist's individual consciousness. This
concept was also instrumental in paving the
way for metaphysics and contributed to the
materialisation of consciousness. All these
fragmentary notions developed later into an
evolutionary concept of consciousness and knowledge,
into a metaphysical system of ``three worlds''
which shall be considered in more detail in the
next chapter.
 Popper's main epistemological or

logico-methodological doctrine denies the validity of any
final explanations or final truths. Yet Popper
abandons his principles when it comes to the
primary source of objective knowledge.
Rejecting Plato's metaphysics of ideas, he evolves his
own metaphysics which resembles to some
extent 18th-century natural philosophy and is
supplemented by notions borrowed from
evolutionism and genetics. Popper maintains that
active human consciousness capable of
influencing the environment through the mediation of
culture had its forerunner---the biological
evolution of organisms. The aims and preferences of
the organism influence the environment which,
in turn, affects the evolution of the organism.
According to Popper, this `èmergent'' process is
not only analogous to the consciousness and vital
activity of the organism, but also provides
7---1152
97
a key to the understanding of the origin of

science.
 Already in his Objective Knowledge Popper

makes an attempt to reveal the embryo of science
in its incipiency in the vegitable and animal
kingdoms. `Ì assert,'' he writes, ``that every animal
is born with expectations or anticipations which
could be framed as hypotheses, a kind of
hypothetical =
knowledge.''^^1^^ This, according to Popper,

is the secret of the phylogenesis of scientific
knowledge which provides a clue to its
ontogenesis. In his opinion, ``this inborn knowledge,
these inborn expectations will ... create our first
problems; and the ensuing growth of our
knowledge may therefore be described as consisting
throughout of corrections and modifications of
previous =
knowledge''.^^2^^
 Hence, there is no and cannot be any `èxoteric''

history of science. Its history is the logic of
scientific discoveries which is nothing but a chain
of successive problems or theories.
 The genetic structure of man also contains in

incipiency the faculty of speech which plays an
important part in natural selection and,
according to Popper, participates in some obscure way
in the social process of language study. Thus
Popper comes to the problem of the relationship
between consciousness and the brain, spirit and
matter, not only from the logical, but also from the
historical viewpoint. However, handicapped by
his earlier commitments, Popper in fact
disregards the historical aspect in the development of
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An

Evolutionary Approach, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979,
p.~258.
^^2^Îbid., pp. 258--59.
98
consciousness and ignores the real, social context

of its formation and progress. The emergence of
language, according to Popper, leads to the
formation of the cortex and, consequently, to the
development of consciousness.
 Popper's biological approach to the problem of

the origin and development of knowledge
prompted by his studies of modern evolutionary
biology and genetics must have become yet another
stepping stone towards his concept of `èmergent
realism''. In recent years this concept has been
contrasted not only to positivism with its
physicalist and behaviourist tendencies in the approach
to the problems of the nature of consciousness,
history, etc. but also to the ideas of the so-called
``scientific realism'' and ``scientific materialism''.
Investigating the origin of objective knowledge,
Popper has been engaged of late in a controversy
against idealism, phenomenalism, positivism,
materialism and behaviourism simultaneously
or, using his own words, against all forms of
anti-pluralism^^1^^. Explaining the reason for his critical
attitude towards reductionism, Popper describes
life as an inherent property of all physical bodies.
He declares: `Ìf the situation is such that, on the
one hand, living organisms may originate by a
natural process from non-living systems, and
that, on the other hand, there is no complete
theoretical understanding of life possible in
physical terms, then we might speak of life as an
emergent property of physical bodies, of =
matter.''^^2^^
_-_-_
^^1^^ See K.~R. Popper, `À Realist View of Logic, Physics

and History'', in: Physics, Logic and History, Ed. by
Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck, Plenum Press,
New York, 1970, pp. 6--9.
^^2^Îbid., p.~7.
7*
99
__CHECKS__ '&' checked (2005.07.11)
 Coming out against positivist reductionism,
Popper specially emphasises the uselessness of
purely linguistic solutions whereby the behaviour
of an individual once explained in terms of
postulated psychical states is translated into the
language of physiological states, or an account of
a physiological state is reduced by linguistic
means to the Schr\"odinger equation. Particularly
characteristic in this respect is Popper's
reappraisal of the problems which he recently qualified
as metaphysical: ``We must beware,'' he writes,
`òf solving, or dissolving, factual problems
linguistically, that is, by the all too simple method
of refusing to talk about them. On the contrary,
we must be pluralists, at least to start with: we
should first emphasize the difficulties, even if
they look insoluble, as the body-mind problem
may look to =
some.''^^1^^ According to Popper, the

hopes that the objective meaning of a theory can
be reduced to the states of consciousness of those
who propound it rest on a trivial error---failure
to distinguish between the two meanings of the
word ``thinking''. In the subjective sense
``thinking'' describes perceptions or the processes of
consciousness, but different perceptions or acts
of individual consciousness cannot be logically
related even if they are causally connected to
one another.
 Another problem which has come of late to be

interpreted by Popper in terms of `èmergent
realism'' is the relationship between the self and its
brain. Popper agrees with ``scientific materialism''
in that all spiritual activities of the individual
are accompanied by certain brain processes. Yet
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~9.
100
his concept of the self is entirely different from that

of scientific materialism as he regards it
essentially as a self-contained entity identical with what
was earlier called ``soul'' and what actually
constitutes man's true essence less the religious
envelope. Popper ranks himself among the
interactionists who disagree with the materialists in
the understanding of the relationship between the
consciousness and the brain and regard the
problem basically in terms of the interaction
between two levels of reality---the psychic and the
physical. Moreover, they assign the active role
in this system not to the physical world, i.e. the
brain as a material object, but to what they
consider to be the self. Popper even goes so far as to
assume that the self is a quasi-substantial entity
if substance is understood as a process or as
activity in general.
 Traditional materialism, according to Popper,

usually linked man to machine, modern
materialism identifies him with computer, whereas the
self is in fact the ghost in the machine and at the
.same time the active programmer of the thinking
activity. The self is the embodiment of wishes,
plans, hopes, the determination to act and the
acute awareness of its being the acting centre. The
self is the motive force of activity. What makes
the self is different from the chemical and
biological processes attending the act of thinking and
other kinds of activity by one unique quality---
the integration and coherence of experience.
Expounding his views, Popper writes: ``What
characterizes the self (as opposed to the
electrochemical processes of the brain on which the self
largely depends---a dependence which seems far
from one-sided) is that all our experiences are
101
closely related and integrated; not only with past

experiences but also with our changing programmes
for action, our expectations, and our theories---
with our models of the physical and the cultural
environment, past, present, and future, including
the problems which they raise for our evaluations,
and for our programmes for action. But all these
belong, at least in part, to =
World~3.''^^1^^
 The important conclusion that Popper makes

reflects the socio-ethical and ideological thrust
of his concept: the emergence of the self signifies
the transition of nature to a socio-cultural level
of development and the transformation of the
laws of evolution and natural selection in
accordance with the new environment. ``The main
function of mind and of World 3,'' writes Popper, `ìs
that they make possible the application of the
method of trial and the elimination of error
without the violent elimination of ourselves...
Thus in bringing about the emergence of mind,
and World~3, natural selection transcends itself
and its originally violent character...
Non-violent cultural evolution is not just a Utopian
dream; it is, rather, a possible result of the
emergence of mind through natural =
selection.''^^2^^
 Hence, Popper's scheme of cognition, his

understanding of its sources and trends is falling under
the increasing influence of the concept of natural
selection and biological inheritance. It stands to
reason that this concept can in no way be
subjected to empirical verification. Being a simple
extrapolation of biological laws to the sphere of
scientific cognition it is postulated as premise
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and
Its Brain, Springer International, Berlin, 1977, pp. 146--47
 ^^2^Îbid., p.~210.
102
which does not have to be proved and is in fact

rooted in Popper's interest in biology. The
notions of evolutionary biology are introduced into
the system of epistemological categories by
analogy rather than on the basis of a serious
investigation into the nature of cognitive processes.
Biological laws are declared to be universal,
governing the development of the world in general and
the process of cognition in particular. Popper's
former logicism gives way here to a biologised
concept of scientific development which seems
to contain more of a substance than a purely
formal logical theory. Yet this ostensibly more
profound concept is essentially metaphysical, and
that in the worst sense of the word, because of its
undisguised apriorism, subjectivism and
speculative nature.
 Rejecting the principle of the universality of

physico-mathematical knowledge which underlies
the concept of logical positivism, Popper comes in
the end, as a result of his own evolution, to the
`òntologisation'' of biological knowledge
substituting biological laws and notions for general
philosophical principles and traditional
philosophical problems. Using the falsification theory
as a foundation, and the notions of special
sciences, mainly biology, as building blocks, Popper
erects his own metaphysical building that has no
room for categories and problems with
long-standing historical tradition behind them. Even if
he speaks of the active essence of consciousness
materialising in culture, i.e. in the universal,
and strives to find some culturological approach
to the solution of different problems, this approach
is limited to the self-programmed wholeness''
of ``World~3''. As to social reality, it is reduced by
103
Popper to an indefinite combination of ``physical

reality'' and ``World 3''.
 All in all, Popper's doctrine with all its

weaknesses inherent in any metaphysical system and
often justly criticised by both positivists and
``scientific realists'', and handicapped by its
speculativeness, apriorism, empirical contestability
and dogmatism proves rather a meagre replica
of more profound systems. It offers but very
schematic, embryonic versions of ``new metaphysics''
which is far behind 18th-century materialistic
natural philosophy and Hegel's idealistic
metaphysics in terms of profoundness,
informativeness and wealth of concrete material. It is not
improbable that the further evolution of ``critical
realism'' and the views of its inspirer, who has
evidently embarked on the final stage of his
scientific career, will somewhat enrich and elaborate
the schematic solutions proposed so far. Yet the
very return of positivism to metaphysics, and a
crude one at that which aggravates the old
weaknesses of natural philosophy by new idealistic
fallacies, proves better than anything else that
this philosophical trend has outlived itself and
is now, very much in the manner of a scorpion,
stinging itself to death with its own venom.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
3. ``SCIENTIFIC REALISM''.
 METAPHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY
 The internal contradictions of positivism and

the growing rift between its concepts and the
real scientific development were bound to lead to
a profound crisis which will evidently mark
the end of this school as an independent
104
philosophical trend, though its traditions and certain

achievements in the logic and methodology of
science have been adopted by many schools of
the modern philosophy of science. Equally
inevitable was a more radical, compared with
``critical realism'', revision of the notorious positivist
demand for `èlimination of metaphysics'', i.e.
concepts, theories and problems that failed to
meet the rigid empirical criterion of verification
or falsification. Not only did this demand run
counter to the very essence of positivism which
has always rested on certain non-empirical
postulates. It was also untenable from the viewpoint
of the laws, problems and tendencies of scientific
cognition as it tended to restrict the scientist's
outlook to the mole's horizons and kill the very
spirit of creative scientific endeavour.
 The philosophical platform of positivism

despite the periodic revivals of interest in its
evolution was bound sooner or later to arouse
dissatisfaction among scientists as it deprived them
of the stimulating effect of theoretical and
philosophical knowledge and shut them off from the
wealth of human culture. Discontent with the
isolationist concept alienating science from
humanitarian and social values was also to be
expected and had in fact been predicted, e.g. by the
Marxist philosophers, among the intellectuals,
particularly in the humanitarian circles.
Natural, too, was the antipathy to positivism on the
part of various philosophical schools and trends
which could never stomach some or all of its
tenets.
 The storm which had long been gathering over

positivism was precipitated by the scientific and
technological revolution with its imperative
105
demand for immediate solutions to a number of

fundamental problems of scientific, technical
and cultural progress, and the decrepit vessel of
the philosophy of science was swept over by a
powerful wave of general discontent. The critical
fervour of different schools has been centring
largely around the demand to revive ``metaphysics''.
Naturally enough, such a revival, as well as the
content of metaphysics itself, are receiving widely
varying interpretations ensuing from no less
widely varying intentions. Idealism, for one, resentful
over the hesitating position of positivism between
the objective knowledge of the physical world
and subjective perceptions is insistent on the
unequivocal recognition of the primacy of the mind
and consciousness. The scientific community,
long deprived by positivism of solid grounds in
theoretical investigations is demanding of the
``realists'' a reliable ontology, a materialistic one
at that. The scientists whose interests mainly
lie in the sphere of empirical investigations are
expressing their grave concern over the
theoretical vacuum, partly traceable to the
`àntropogenic'' influence of positivism. All these trends
are unanimous in their demand to concentrate on
the solution of fundamental philosophical
problems and are keenly aware of the inability of
traditional philosophy to meet the challenge of
natural sciences.
 It stands to reason that the concept of

constructive revivified metaphysics advanced by such
heterogeneous opposition to positivism with its
wide diversity of interests and views on the
subject-matter of philosophy cannot but be very
vague or at least extremely polysemantic.
Problems regarded a$ metaphysical include general
106
scientific and metatheoretical doctrines, the

so-called ontology or the general doctrine of being
rejected by.positivism, as well as the traditional
`èternal'' philosophical problems of value, ethical
norms, etc. Such an approach will be quite
understandable if we take into account the fact that
the attempts to revive metaphysics are based on
the specific material of the history of science,
history of philosophy, ethics, psychology,
linguistics, etc. In his Afterword to a collection of
articles entitled The Future of Metaphysics one
of its exponents Richard McKeon writes: ``The
future of metaphysics is determined by the
controversies of philosophers as well as by the ontology
of things or the epistemology of thoughts; and
its course is often marked more clearly by
suggestive paradoxes than by indubitable =
certainties.''^^1^^ We need not characterise all the trends of

metaphysics, the more so as some of them
continuing the line of idealism and religious
philosophy have always fed on such problems and the
crisis of positivism has simply added fuel to their =
fire.^^2^^ Far more important to us is the variety of

new metaphysics, known as ``scientific realism'',
which springs up on the ruins of positivist
philosophy and pretends to the role of its alternative
in the methodology of science.
 The name ``scientific realism'' which is
currently used alongside other names, such as
``scientific materialism'', ``new ontology'', ``critical
realism'' and others is purely conventional, since this
_-_-_
^^1^^ Richard McKeon, ``The Future of Metaphysics'', in:

The Future of Metaphysics, Ed. by E.~Wood, Quadrangle
Books, Chicago, 1970, p.~288.
^^2^^ See, for instance, E.~Sprague, Metaphysical Thinking,

Oxford University Press, New York, 1978, p.~3.
107
school has not yet offered its solutions to the

problems of scientific progress, nor defined its
objectives or methods of analysis. The name
represents what may be termed the nucleus of the
programme---the criticism of positivist views on the
structure, foundation and future development of
scientific knowledge. It is noteworthy, however,
that the so-called materialism of the new school
proves in some respects to be but a new version
of reductionism, whereas its ``criticism'' is
sometimes markedly uncritical and its ``newness''
often goes back to the concepts of the 19th or even
18th centuries. Vague as it is, the new teaching
has evidently revealed so far only one positive
feature---recognition of the objective reality as
the starting point of scientific cognition. To this
can be added its intention to analyse the real
process of scientific development and the real
history of science rather than to indulge in the
invention of speculative schemes based on new
metaphysical concepts. It is undoubtedly a sober
approach which corresponds to the present level and
to the prospects of scientific development.
 To be sure, critical attitude to positivism is an

important asset of the new school. Its criticism
is all the more effective as it exposes the inner
contradictions of the philosophy which has in
fact been source of the youthful inspiration of
practically all modern prominent expounders of
scientific realism. Willard Van Orman Quine,
Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, Mario Bunge and
many other contemporary leaders of this trend
were under a strong influence of positivist
philosophy at least in their early period, even though
they did not completely share its views.
Understandably, the general crisis of positivism which
108
revealed itself not only in the internal

contradictions of the positivist methodological
programme but also in the conflict with the general trend
of scientific cognition marked a turning point in
the attitude towards the ideas of Carnap, Schlick,
Reichenbach, Ayer, and other positivists. No
less significant is the opposition of scientific
realism to critical rationalism which is often
considered to be the direct successor of positivist
philosophy. One cannot deny, however, the mutual
influence of these trends which is manifested, for
instance, in that Popper, Feyerabend and others
not infrequently identify themselves with the
``realists''. True, their statements are not immune
from verification.
 The ``realism'' of the new school implies a

critical reappraisal of the positivist methodological
programme prompted, as has already been
pointed out, by the practical needs of the scientific
and technological revolution in the late 1940s-
early 1950s. This reappraisal has involved almost
all the essential points of this programme: the
problems of the objectivity of knowledge, causality,
determinism, the relationship of matter and
consciousness and, to a lesser extent, the problems of
the development and structure of science. To be
sure, the actual range of problems requiring a
different approach in connection with the
methodological criticism of positivist philosophy is much
broader and extends far beyond the narrow scope
of the positivist programme which, in fact,
determines the horizon of ``scientific realism'' and
prevents it from opening up broader fields of
scientific cognition. We shall consider the
attitude of the new trend to these problems later and
concentrate now on its interpretation of the
109
scientificity of philosophy and the relationship of

philosophy and science, the two main topics of this
chapter. The anti-positivist solution of these
issues by scientific realism has led, first and
foremost, to the revival of ontology.
 It is noteworthy that ``realism'' connects the

revival of ontology as a philosophical doctrine of
being and as a philosophical explication of the
properties, objects and relations of the external
world with the recognition of the external world,
i.e. the reality which existed prior to and
independently of man. Significantly, most of the
followers of scientific realism declare themselves
``modern materialists'', `èxponents of scientific
materialism'', etc. But how true are such
declarations? Do the claims of scientific realists
correspond to the content of their doctrine and its
premises to its conclusions?
 The new school directs its criticism first and

foremost at the extremes of the positivist slogan
of struggle against metaphysics under the cover
of both verificationism and falsificationism.
According to the ``realists'', this slogan is untenable
for several reasons: first, in everyday practice
scientific investigation ignores the facts which
contradict theory; second, facts are not primary in
scientific cognition, they are born, so to speak, in
theoretical diapers; third, theories deal not with
the objects of observation, but only with their
idealised models; fourth, the verification of a
scientific assertion is not, as a rule, a simple
consequence of a theory, but rather follows from a
theory combined with additional assumptions
which must also be tested by experience. Hence,
neither verification nor falsification taken
separately can provide a satisfactory criterion for
110
establishing the truth of a theory and recognising its

scientificity and, consequently, for distinguishing
metaphysical statements from true science.
 Quine, one of the early opponents of positivism

representing the views of the new school, clearly
reveals the unsoundness of the main dogmas of
the traditional philosophy of science: its belief
in the possibility of sharply demarcating the
analytical truths independent of empirical facts
(i.e. deducible from definitions and therefore
tautological by nature) from the synthetic
propositions based on empirical facts, and its reduction
principle whereby each meaningful assertion can
be reduced by purely logical means to basic
empirical facts or propositions of the
protocol-statement type. He points out that the basic concept
of logical positivism which regarded language to
be the starting point of analysis was fallacious,
since the so-called physical-object language
proposed by this school was at variance with its own
demand---to be the language of sensually
perceptible physical phenomena. Including the notions
of a logically developed theory, language
incorporated of necessity certain elements of
mathematical theories related, for instance, to
mathematical logic. The presence of such notions as a
class of objects and a class of classes in the
concept of logical empiricism was in itself a
linguistic indulgence incompatible with the monastic
vows of positivism.
 Quine admits that ontological problems are

unavoidable and emphasises that their
formulation can only be sensible and free from
contradictions if ontological statements meet the demands
of modern logical analysis. The adopted ontology
can only be regarded as unambiguous after the
111
confusion resulting from the use of individual

terms has been eliminated with the help of
Russell's description theory, quantification methods,
etc. According to Quine, the fundamental
ontological question can be put as follows: what kind
of objects can be considered real if we believe in
the truth of a given theory? The criterion of being
which is the subject-matter of ontology is no less
definite: to be is to be the meaning of the variable.
From this it follows that any theory recognises
in fact only those objects which can be classified
as variables connected with one another in such
a way as to confirm the truth of the propositions
of the given theory.
 Quine as a ``realist'' declares in favour not only

of the existence of objective reality, but also of
a possibility to construct scientific ontology,
thus overcoming the general anthropocentrism of
positivist philosophy. In his opinion, no special
philosophical system of knowledge is required
for this purpose, since ontology is entirely a
product of scientific theory.
 Quine contends that our knowledge, on the one

hand, maintains contact with the external world
through sense perception. Yet it also comprises
entities outside sensory experience. Man's
knowledge is predetermined by his sense perception,
but different people need not necessarily get
identical sensory data under identical conditions.
This accounts for a possibility of switching over
from the empirical language to the language of
theory. It is precisely the intersubjective language
which makes it possible, according to Quine, to
perceive different empirical facts, i.e. to agree or
disagree with the observer's propositions. `Ìt
is this,'' writes Quine, ``that enables the child to
112
learn when to assent to the observation sentence.

And it is this also, intersubjective observability
at the time, that qualifies observation sentences
as check points for scientific theory.
Observation sentences state the evidence, to which all
witnesses must =
accede.''^^1^^
 As distinct from Feyerabend, Quine is ready to

go beyond the empirical evidence. Even if two
theories are equivalent in terms of empirical
evidence, they may be very different. This
suggests, according to Quine, that the preference in
selecting a true theory is determined by its
simplicity rather than by a criterion related to
empirical material. Hence, the judgements regarding the
truth of a theory can only be passed after the
theory has been accepted or rejected. It is only within
the framework of the existing conceptual scheme
that one can assess the true content of a theory.
Consequently, reality as the true content of
knowledge is entirely out of the question, except in the
language of the adopted conceptual scheme.
Quine prefers not to speak of
``things-in-themselves'' or of some other special philosophical
interpretation of a scientific theory. ``Reality'',
according to Quine, is in fact what we believe to be
existing. Therefore he regards science as primary,
and epistemology as secondary, or, as he puts it,
as science self-applied. Its task, according to
Quine, is to show how we know what we ought to
know about science.
 Quine does not concern himself about the

metaphysical status of propositions but is rather
interested in what we should do with them.
_-_-_
^^1^^ W. V. O. Quine, ``The Nature of Natural

Knowledge'', in: Mind and Language, Ed. by Samuel Guttenplan,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p.~74.
8-1152
113
Epistemology, according to Quine, is not
something outside science, it is incorporated in our
judgement about it. The decision as regards what
is existent and what is non-existent depends on
the contemporary state of science.
 Quine takes special note of Carnap's well-known

attempt to water-down the rigid dogma of
radical reductionism by conceding that each
proposition taken by itself and isolated from other
propositions can be confirmed or disproved as a whole.
Yet even this thesis does not seem to him quite
satisfactory and he contrasts to it his own
version according to which our statements about the
external world face the tribunal of sense
experience not individually but only as a corporate
body. According to Quine, ``total science is like a
field of force whose boundary conditions are
experience. A conflict with experience at the
periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of
the =
field.''^^1^^ Re-evaluation of some statements

entails re-evaluation of others, because of their
logical interconnections, but the total field is
so undetermined by its boundary conditions,
experience, that there is much latitude of choice. No
particular experiences are linked with any
particular statements in the interior of the field,
except indirectly through considerations of
equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.
 If this view is right, reasons Quine further,

there is no ground for speaking about the
empirical content of an individual statement,
particularly if it be a statement at all remote from the
experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore,
_-_-_
^^1^^ W.~V. Quine, ``Two Dogmas of Empiricism'',

Philosophical Review, Vol.~60, No.~1, 1951, pp. 38--39.
114
it becomes folly to seek a boundary between

synthetic and analytical statements. Any statement
can be held true if the theoretical system is
subjected to drastic enough adjustments.
 Mario Bunge, one of the most influential

adherents of ``scientific realism'' also points out the
sketchy character of the positivist concept of the
relation of theory to experience. He maintains
that the procedure of checking a theory is,
generally speaking, far more complex than is
suggested by those simplified schemes imposed both
by the verification and falsification principles.
The task of the philosophy of science is to bring
the description of this procedure as close as
possible to the scientist's real work. In one of his
articles he writes: ``We must start afresh, keeping
closer to actual scientific research than to the
philosophical [positivist] =
traditions.''^^1^^ The
empirical test alone is far from being sufficient. A
scientific theory must be subjected not only to an
empirical, but also to a non-empirical test which
should have at least three aspects:
metatheoretical, intertheoretical and philosophical. The
object of the metatheoretical checking of a theory
should consist in ascertaining that it is not
inwardly contradictory, that its consequences have
factual content and that there exists a
procedure for a transition from unobservable causes to
observable ones. The intertheoretical checking
consists in ascertaining that the theory in
question is consistent with other theories, already
recognised. The purpose of the philosophical
_-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, ``Theory Meets Experience'', in: Mind,

Science and History, State University of New York Press,
Albany, 1970, p.~164.
8*
115
checking is to establish to what extent the new

theory corresponds to the dominant philosophy.
Bunge has no doubts about the need to bring our
scientific theories in accord with the dominant
philosophical concepts. The world view,
according to Bunge, has a direct bearing on the
selection of research problems, the formation of
hypotheses and the evaluation of ideas and =
procedures.^^1^^ This correspondence has always been

sought for and alleged even if it did not exist, as
was the case with the relativist and atomic
theories in relation to positivism. The latter
circumstance makes it absolutely imperative to check
the soundness of the philosophical principles
themselves.
 According to scientific realism, Popper's
falsification theory is no less contradictory than the
verification theory and both of them are equally
far removed from the real practice of scientific
cognition. Not a single scientist, says Bunge, would
like to see his own creation dead. On the
contrary, he would do everything possible to make it
viable, i.e. to corroborate his theory. A closer
look at the process of consolidation of a scientific
theory reveals in it two more or less distinct
stages. At the first stage, the theory advanced by a
scientist gains ground and his colleagues, no less
than the author himself, are busy searching for
facts to support it. At the second stage, the new
theory struggling for existence and for the right
to develop comes across phenomena which do not
fall within its framework. The theory becomes
the object of criticism and the process of the
revaluation of facts begins.
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~142.
116
 A lot of theories highly beneficial to science

have won the right to existence without
applying to the falsification criterion. There are many
methods whereby a theory can be constructed.
Theories can adapt themselves to new data which
seemed at first `ìnconvenient'', develop
additional and auxiliary hypotheses and, once they
reached the necessary level of corroboration, are
never discarded at once. `À way of building
a scientific theory,'' writes Bunge, `ìs to surround
the central hypotheses with well-meaning
protectors hoping they will eventually turn out to be =
true.''^^1^^ There is nothing wrong about protecting

a hypothesis by ad hoc hypotheses as long as the
latter are in principle independently testable.
This method permits building quite a viable
hypothetico-deductive system and may ensue in a
new crop of experiments, whereas a strict
application of Popper's criterion would nip the whole
development in the bud.
 After a detailed analysis of the applicability

of Popper's falsification criterion to some
important scientific theories Bunge comes to the
conclusion that it is useless in the assessment of
many general theories such as, for instance, the
concept of continuum mechanics, the evolution
theory, etc. They can only be tested in combination
with additional (ad hoc) hypotheses or specific
data pertaining to the components of the systems,
their interaction or spatial configuration, etc.
 Unlike the lever, simple pendulum and other

specific theories which lend themselves to
fullscale testing (i.e. to verification and falsification),
_-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Method, Model and Matter, D.~Reidel

Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1973, p.~28.
117
the field theory or, for instance, the concept of

quantum mechanics cannot be subjected to
exhaustive testing. In this connection Bunge singles
out three types of scientific theories: (1) specific
theories, such as particle mechanics or the
quantum theory of the Helium atom; (2) generic
fully-interpreted theories, such as classical
mechanics, quantum mechanics, general relativity, the
evolution theory; (3) generic semi-interpreted
theories, such as games theory, information theory,
field theory, etc. Characterising the third-type
theories most of the symbols of which are
assigned no factual interpretation, Bunge points out
that such theories are particularly valuable in
case of insufficient, incomplete knowledge of
facts. Emphasising also their extremely general
character and empirical untestability, Bunge
points out that many such theories seem in fact
to qualify as metaphysical ones. From this he
makes the conclusion that there is no sharp line of
demarcation between science and metaphysics.
``Surely,'' contends Bunge, ``there is a line
between wild metaphysics and science---as well as a
boundary between exact metaphysics and
pseudoscience---but there seems to be no frontier
between exact metaphysics and the set of most
general (type~III) scientific theories: in fact, there
is a good deal of =
overlap.''^^1^^
 Bunge further points out that the term

``metaphysics'' had different shades of meaning in the
history of philosophy and concentrates on two of
them. Plain metaphysics, according to Bunge,
``ranges from elaborate nonsense through archaic
common sense to deep and sophisticated yet
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., pp. 39--40.
118
outdated good =
sense.''^^1^^ It is removed too far from

modern knowledge. ``Kant,'' says Bunge, ``was
certainly right in his day in stressing the difference
between science and metaphysics and in
claiming that it was impossible to conceive of
metaphysics as a science. So were probably the
Vienna Circle and Popper---in their own time, that =
is.''^^2^^ Now, according to Bunge, the situation has

radically changed with the appearance of exact
ontological theories relevant to science.
Conditions are now ripe for the emergence of exact
metaphysics which seeks to solve some problems put
off by plain metaphysics and strives to keep tune
both with formal and factual sciences.
 Bunge's requirements to scientific

metaphysics on which he dwells at length deserve special
attention. In his opinion, scientific metaphysics
should (1) concern itself primarily with the most
general properties of reality and real objects,
rather than with spiritual objects; (2) it should
be a systematic theory or a part thereof rather
than expound somebody's views; (3) it should make
use of logic and mathematics; (4) it should
expound key philosophical concepts and
fundamentals of science; (5) it should contain elements
which can be found among the postulates of
scientific theories. Scientific metaphysics can
itself become a scientific theory as a result of
specification or additional conditions for its
application. Metatheories, according to Bunge, can
also be constructed with the use of elements
borrowed from other fields of knowledge, as well as
with the help of analogy and extrapolation.
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~145.
^^2^Îbid., p.~41.
119
In Bunge's opinion, all means are good for this

purpose. He considers in detail the analysis and
synthesis theory as an example of metaphysical
theories and maintains that it is growing beyond
the bounds of chemistry where it originated.
Among metaphysical he also rates the automata
theory on the grounds that it can be referred to
the `òbject-medium'' system of any type:
mechanical, electrical, biological or behavioural.
 The author classifies the problems pertaining

to the methodological analysis of scientific
metaphysics under three categories. The first relates
to the form of metaphysical theories, which,
in the author's view, must have a mathematical
structure to qualify as exact theories. This
structure must be at least algebraic or logical, if not
quantitative. The second category of problems
is pertinent to the content of metaphysical
theories. Here the author points out that scientific
metaphysics, unlike factual sciences, is concerned
primarily with the world at large.
Consequently, the logically possible models of natural
processes lie outside its sphere (in Bunge's opinion,
scientific metaphysics includes two systems of
theories: universal or multilevel theories and
regional theories limited to one integration level.
Yet even the most special of metaphysical
theories are not specific enough to cover in detail
individual objects). Finally, the third category of
problems is connected with the testing of
metaphysical theories.
 Rejecting both the empirical-positivist and

Popper's concepts of the testability of scientific
knowledge, Bunge proposes a special criterion of
scientificity---the conceptual testability of
theories understood as their compatibility with the
120
fundamentals of our prior knowledge. What is

more, conceptual testability is but the
indispensable condition of scientificity. To qualify as
scientific, theories of any type must also meet
additional requirements which depend on the
nature of the problem being considered. These
additional requirements, according to Bunge, are
as follows: (1) a hypothesis should be at least
indirectly confirmable; (2) a specific theory should
include components which are both empirically
confirmable and refutable when enriched with
empirical data; (3) a generic interpreted theory
should be susceptible of becoming a specific theory
upon the adjunction of subsidiary assumptions
and their interpretation; (4) a generic
semi-interpreted theory should be capable of turning
into a generic interpreted theory. Bunge avers
that conceptual testability jointly with any of
the above four conditions constitute necessary
and sufficient conditions for a hypothesis or a
theory to be called scientific. Hence, testability
in the broad sense is in fact the equivalent of
scientificity: testable knowledge is scientific and
vice versa.
 As regards the testability of metaphysical

theories the author does not go beyond generalities.
A metaphysical theory should be enlightening,
as well as capable of being inserted in the
nonformal axiomatic background of some
scientific theory, i.e. it should be susceptible of
becoming a presupposition of theoretical science. To
be scientifically valid, metaphysical theories,
according to Bunge, should be exact, consistent
with scientific knowledge, and capable of
clarifying and systematising philosophical concepts
(such as event and chance) or principles (such
121
as law and interdependence of integration

levels).
 As we see, Bunge's testability concept is

patently contradictory. Denying a sharp line of
demarcation between metaphysical and generic
scientific theories, he nevertheless does not admit that
metaphysical theories, unlike scientific ones, do
not lend themselves even to a conceptual
verification. They cannot be true or false, they can
be applicable or non-applicable. They are useful
in the sense that they are always motivated and
constitute sweeping generalisations of actual or
possible specific theories. The theories of this
kind are corrigible, but not refutable: they can
be improved upon formally (logically or
mathematically) or they can be made more complex.
In short, theories in scientific metaphysics
cannot be refuted, but, on the other hand, they can
be confirmed---if not through prediction but at
least by showing that they are compatible with a
whole family of specific theories or that they take
part in the design of viable systems. ``Strangely
enough,'' writes Bunge, ``such theories can be
adequate and convenient without being true and
they can never be falsified: at most they can be
shown to be irrelevant or pointless or =
useless.''^^1^^
 According to Bunge, the theories of the second
and third types can raise the level of
generalisations and serve as a basis for predictions owing
to the introduction of additional specific premises.
If that is so, there seems to be no reason why the
theories called by him metaphysical cannot be
specified in a similar manner. Sure enough, the
general systems theory or the theory of
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~37.
122
integration levels classed by the author as

metaphysical cannot give concrete predictions in such fields
as, for instance, economics, biology, cybernetics
where they have set up, so to speak, their
specialised divisions. Yet it is obvious that these
theories can provide a basis for some general
conclusions which, in turn, enable scientists to make
forecasts and inferences of a less general level,
and so on. Hence, there is no sharp line of
demarcation between metaphysical theories and the
theories of the second and third type from the
viewpoint of their testability either.
 Bunge writes: ``While the Vienna Circle

rejected metaphysics as the enemy of science (which
it was in most cases), and Popper tolerated it
for its heuristic value (which it often has), we
have come to regard metaphysics as capable of
becoming scientific and moreover as constituting,
together with logic and semantics, the common
part of philosophy and =
science.''^^1^^ However,
contrasting his viewpoint to the positivist concept,
Bunge fails to take into account that positivism
has qualified as metaphysical not only and even
not so much the general theories of science as the
most general philosophical principles of
materialism and dialectics. That is why any consistent
criticism of positivist philosophy must of
necessity show the real methodological and
worldview significance of these principles for special
sciences. Critical as he is of positivism, Bunge
undoubtedly makes here an important concession:
bridging the gap between science and
metaphysics, he disregards the difference between
_-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Method, Model and Matter, op. cit.,
pp. 42--43.
123
philosophical concepts and the general theories of

modern science reducing the former to the latter.
 Among the important components of scientific

metaphysics Bunge ranks, for instance, the
concept of the structural levels of matter. Giving
this concept the conventional interpretation
reflected in relevant scientific literature Bunge,
however, treats it not only as a metaphysical
theory, but also as a set of definite epistemological
principles. Moreover, he also presents it in a
methodological form as a set of conditions which
scientific investigation must comply with.
 One may ask here if other metaphysical

theories too must have both the epistemological and
general methodological form. The answer to this
question should evidently be in the negative,
since the level of generalisation in the concept of
the structural levels of matter is much higher than
in such ``metaphysical theories'' as the automata
theory or the theory of games. The automata
theory cannot provide a basis for the general
methodology of science and epistemology. Here Bunge,
evidently, eliminates the line of demarcation which
does exist---that between special scientific
theories and philosophical concepts. However broad
the generalisations in such theories as the theory
of games, the automata theory and the general
theory of systems, all of them remain within the
sphere of special sciences, whereas the concept
of structural levels has long since become the
object of philosophical investigations. Such
vagueness in demarcating special sciences and
philosophy is by no means accidental. In the context of
Bunge's concept it attests to a tendency to reduce
philosophy to the level of metaphysical
principles and theories rather than to include
124
metaphysical theories into the system of

philosophical knowledge. This becomes even more
evident when we acquaint ourselves with
Bunge's attitude towards materialism and dialectics.
Substantiating his views on the scientific value
of metaphysical theories, Bunge evidently intends
to dispel in this way the prejudices of positivism
against the so-called metaphysical problems.
His efforts, however, go wide of the mark since
he deprives materialism and dialectics of
their methodological and world-view role in science
without any reason whatsoever and ascribes
all methodological functions to general
theories, such as the automata theory, the general
systems theory, etc.
 This trend towards the identification of

ontology with science is characteristic, with some
variations, of many other representatives of
``scientific realism'', though some of them attempt
to distinguish between philosophical and
scientific =
ontology.^^1^^ ``The task of the philosopher,''

writes Errol Harris, `ìs thus two-fold. He must
use the evidence provided by the sciences to
construct a comprehensive and coherent
conception of the universe, and he must examine the
methods of scientific investigation and discovery
and the process by which the science advances,
in order to discern the insignia of reliability that
entitle any discipline to be called by the name of
knowledge---that is, =
science.''^^2^^ As a rule, the

defence of a scientific theory by ``realism'' is not based
on ontological convictions---rather on the
_-_-_
^^1^^ See, for example, Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of

Science, Hassocks, New Jersey, 1978, pp. 29--30.
^^2^^ Errol E. Harris, The Foundations of Metaphysics in

Science, Humanities Press, New York, 1965, p.~30.
125
contrary, the reliability of a theory guaranteed by

the use of adopted means and methods of
scientific investigation can serve as a basis for ascribing
ontological existence to its postulates, motions
and concepts. Of course, besides the scientific
perception of reality by man, there also exists
the conventional everyday perception. Wilfrid
Sellars, for instance, even writes about a ``tragic
dualism'' of the two antagonistic ways of thinking:
the scientific and the manifest. The first makes
use of the techniques, methods and language of
natural sciences. The second is guided by the
common sense and traditional thinking adopted in
everyday life. In Sellars' opinion, the task of
philosophy consists in a harmonious integration of
these two ways of thinking. Yet in his ontology
he shows obvious preference for the paradigms of
scientific thinking. For him, the world's
ultimate constituents are primarily the theoretical
postulates and principles of science. ``Speaking as a
philosopher,'' he notes, `Ì am quite prepared to
say that the common sense world of physical
object in Space and Time is unreal---that is, that
there are no such things. Or, to put it less
paradoxically, that in the dimension of describing and
explaining the world, science is the measure of
all things, of what is that it is, and of what is
not that it is =
not.''^^1^^
 As we see, ``scientific realism'', gradually

detaching itself from positivism, step by step shapes
its anti-positivist programme aimed at reviving
metaphysics. The central point of this programme
_-_-_
^^1^^ Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality,

Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p.~173.
126
is the relation of consciousness to the brain---

the problem which was completely ignored by
the former philosophy of science. Indeed, the
development of scientific ontology is impossible
without its solution. Positivism has eliminated
the consciousness-brain (or psychophysical)
problem as patently metaphysical. Thus Carnap
wrote: `Àre the so-called mental processes really
physical processes or not? Are the so-called
physical processes really spiritual or not? It seems
doubtful whether we can find any theoretical
content in such philosophical questions as
discussed by monism, dualism and =
pluralism.''^^1^^
 The attempt to get rid of the psychophysical

problem, like of other so-called metaphysical
problems, was not and could not be successful ---
it proved to be yet another delusion of positivism.
In point of fact, positivist literature itself gives
quite a definite solution to this problem in the
monistic spirit of subjective idealism. This
solution which has nothing in common with
materialist views is plainly stated by Moritz Schlick
who writes that ``the adjectives `physical' and
`mental' formulate only two different
representational =
models''^^2^^, or by Alfred Ayer who tries

to substantiate the thesis that statements of
mental phenomena and statements of bodily
phenomena are two different methods of the
_-_-_
^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, ``Logical Foundations of the Unity

of Science'', in: Readings in Philosophical Analysis,
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1949, p.~413;
see also K.~G. Hempel, ``The Logical Analysis of
Psychology'', in: Readings in Philosophical Analysis, op. cit.,
p.~380.
^^2^^ Moritz Schlick, `Òn the Relation Between

Psychological and Physical Concepts'', in: Readings in
Philosophical Analysis, op cit., p.~403.
127
classification and interpretation of our experience. The

authors of these views are far from asserting the
primacy of electromagnetic, thermal, mechanical
or other physical processes which underlie
psychic phenomena. They do not deal with the
phenomena of objective reality---their main intent
is to emphasise the unity of science or sciences
which study sensory experience or facts entirely
different by nature. All they are aiming at is to
provide a single description of sense data on
psychical processes, on the one hand, and of sense
data on the outer world, on the other. They seek
reduction within the framework of a theory only
and do not turn to the actual processes taking
place in the physical world. Consequently,
sensory experience remains the origin of all origins,
the cause of all causes and the task only consists
in harmonising the languages of physics and
psychology within the present framework. The sum
total of this reduction is bluntly stated by Carl
Hempel who contends that psychology is an
integral part of physics and even asserts that all
sciences have in principle one and the same
nature and belong to physics as its =
branches.^^1^^
 Searching for the ontology of knowledge,

``scientific realism'', naturally, could not
sidestep the problem of the relation of consciousness
and the brain not only as a specific issue directly
involved in all the problems being raised by the
new trend, but as an independent problem of
crucial importance for the very status of scientific
ontology. It is not accidental that the branch of
``scientific realism'' directly concerned with the
_-_-_
^^1^^ See Carl G. Hempel, ``The Logical Analysis of

Psychology'', in: Readings in Philosophical Analysis, op. cit.,
pp. 378, 382.
128
investigation of this problem has actually turned

into a more or less independent school of
``scientific materialism'', the name suggesting a
definite anti-positivist and anti-idealistic
orientation of the new teaching.
 Nevertheless, the difference between

positivism and ``scientific realism'' is not infrequently
hard to determine, mainly owing to the fact that
both schools bear a distinct mark of
reductionism. Logical positivism coming out against
dualism strives to overcome it by reducing
psychic to physical phenomena within the framework
of scientific descriptions. The followers of
``scientific materialism'' are also engaged in reductions
with practically the same aim as the positivists---
to eliminate dualism. The difference between
these two schools consists in that ``scientific
materialism'', in contrast to positivism, is concerned
not with theoretical reductions, but with
ontological ones, i.e. it strives to reduce psychic
phenomena as such to physical phenomena. It is,
in fact, the confusion of these two types of
reduction that underlies endless debates in the
literature on psychophysical problems.
 Positivistic reductionism tends to treat the

psychophysical problem within the narrow
confines of the concept of unity of scientific
knowledge casting aside all its so-called metaphysical
aspects. The possibility of reducing the psychic to
the physical is based here, and by no means
accidentally, on the theory of meaning alone: the
description of an object in psychical terms must
have the same meaning as its description in
physical terms. The proof of the unity, naturally,
boils down to the logico-semantic analysis of
statements. Logical positivism maintains that
9-1152
129
psychological statements cannot be directly

translated into physical ones. Yet one can speak of
them as being identical if they are considered to
be just different methods of describing one and
the same object. The direct experience of human
beings, as well as the experience we sometimes
ascribe to some higher animals is identical with
certain aspects of nervous processes in the
organism. ``What is had-in-experience, and (in the
case of human beings) knowable by acquaintance,
is identical with the object of knowledge by
description provided first by moral behavior theory
and this is in turn identical with what the science
of neuro-physiology =
describes.''^^1^^ The author of

this statement, as we see, does not accentuate
physical identity---he emphasises the fact that
in the two kinds of knowledge, the knowledge
through the realisation of one's own ``raw
sensations'' and the knowledge by description differing
from each other both in the source of information
or language and in the method of verification we
in fact deal with one and the same object which
gives us the right to speak of their identity.
 Very characteristic is also Feigl's pronounced

positivistic approach to the problem: he sincerely
believes that the identity thesis eliminates any
ontological interpretation of the psychophysical
problem and thereby abolishes psychophysical
dualism.
 According to Feigl, the ``mental'' and the

``physical'' are identical in that the mental terms, on
the one hand, and some neuro-physiological terms,
_-_-_
^^1^^ Herbert Feigl, ``The `Mental' and the `Physical'\thinspace'', in:

Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.~II,
Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem,
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958, p.~446.
130
on the other, have similar meanings and, as

scientific progress goes on, tend to converge so that
their correlation gradually turns into actual
identity. Feigl distinguishes between direct sense
experience ``(raw sensations'') which carries direct
knowledge of our mental states, and the
experience expressed in some very personal language.
All empirical concepts are based entirely on this
personal language, since they form `à higher
degree of =
certainty''.^^1^^
 Despite a certain deviation from the positivist

paradigm noted by numerous authors, Feigl
nevertheless does not desert it completely. The
physicalism of his position is, on the whole, far
removed from consistent, i.e. dialectical,
materialism, though Feigl sometimes notes (hat the
term ``physical'' in the ``personal language''
denotes an aggregate of molecules whose action
produces a sensory impression.
 In its solution of the mind-body problem

``scientific materialism'' (``realism'') seeks to overcome
the barrier set up by positivism and find a way
to objective reality which is pictured as having
its own existence independent of the process of
cognition, yet being knowable only through the
medium of science. Here the function of
reduction is different---it consists in creating a
scientific image of the world, ontology, representing
the real processes as they actually happen.
``Determining whether or not materialism can be
true,'' writes Jerry Fodor, `ìs part of
understanding the relation between theories in psychology
and theories in neurology---a relation that many
philosophers believe poses a stumbling block for
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~392.
9*
131
the doctrine of the unity of science. In

particular, it is sometimes maintained that the unity of
science requires that it prove possible to
`reduce' psychological theories to neurological
theories, the model of reduction being provided by the
relation between constructs in chemistry and
those in =
physics''^^1^^.
 The treatment of the mind-body problem by

positivism is also criticised by Australian
philosopher J.J. Smart who unequivocally dissociates
himself from its dualism. He writes: `Ìn so far
as 'after-image' or 'ache' is report of a process,
it is report of a process that happens to be a brain
process. It follows that the thesis does not claim
that sensation statements can be translated
into statements about brain processes. Nor does it
claim that the logic of a sensation statement is
the same as that of a brain-process statement.
All it claims is that in so far as a sensation
statement is a report of something, that something is
in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing
over and above brain =
processes.''^^2^^ Criticising
dualism, Smart counterposes to it what he styles as
his ``materialistic metaphysics''.
 According to Smart, every year science

provides more and more convincing proof that man is
nothing but a psychophysical mechanism. Sooner
or later his behaviour will be exhaustively
characterised in the corresponding terms. In point of
fact, there is nothing in the world besides a
complex aggregate of physical particles, protons and
_-_-_
^^1^^ J.~A. Fodor, ``Materialism'', in: Materialism and the

Mind-Body Problem, Ed. by D.~M. Rosenthal,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.~J., 1971, p.~128.
^^2^^ J. J. Smart, ``Sensations and Brain Processes'', in:

Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, op. cit., p.~56.
132
electrons, and their interaction, and the only

real laws of science are the laws of physics and
chemistry.
 As we see, unlike former materialism which

gravitated towards ontological reductionism, i.e.
tended to reduce real psychic and mental
processes to physical phenomena, modern ``scientific
materialism'' strives to substitute the knowledge
of physical objects for the objects themselves
thereby identifying reality with its linguistic
image. The difference of the approaches to the
mental-physical or mind-body problem on the
part of Feigl, on the one hand, and Smart or
Sellars, on the other, consists in that the
neopositivist faction focuses on this problem in order to
discard it as metaphysical by reducing the
mental to the physical, whereas ``scientific
materialism'' as a form of ``scientific realism'' pursues quite
a different aim---to translate the descriptive
language used to characterise mental processes
into the language of science in order to be able
to construct a scientific ontology of mental
processes. The reductionist approach to the
consciousness-brain problem characteristic of ``scientific
realism'' and positivism, the attempts of both
schools to reduce all spiritual phenomena
exclusively to neuro-physiological processes are
largely traceable to their common traditions. The
similarity of the ``realistic'' and positivist views
also shows up in their exaggerated emphasis on
the analysis of the language used to describe
processes in interest. For all that, one ought to
distinguish between positivist reductions and
the reductions proposed by the ``scientific
materialists'' who sincerely strive for a materialistic
solution of the above problem.
133
 It should be noted that in its approach to the

mind-body problem aimed at creating a new
scientific ontology of mental processes ``scientific
materialism'', like ``scientific realism'' in general,
makes certain concessions to idealism and cannot
be credited with consistency. ``scientific realism''
as a whole regards the ontology of mental
processes and, for that matter, ontology at large as a
peculiar projection of scientific knowledge on
the outer world, as a certain theoretical
assumption which follows of necessity from the adopted
system of scientific knowledge. Hence, reality as
understood by ``realism'' is identified with the
current scientific picture of the world and even
with the language whereby the present or
eventually possible reality is described. ``The specific
input to NPP [new philosophy of physics] should
be the whole of physics, past and present,
classical and quantal,'' writes Bunge. ``The
corresponding output should be a realistic account
(analysis and theory) of actual and optimal research
procedures, of conceived and conceivable ideas,
of currently pursued and possible goals both in
theoretical and experimental =
physics.''^^1^^
 As we see, ``realism'' offers no criterion for
distinguishing between the really existing objects
of science and purely mental, theoretical ones
which, consequently, need not necessarily have
their analogues in the material world. It proceeds
from the conviction that reality outside the
language of science, i.e. reality as such, is
nonsensical since all true judgements of reality can only
be expressed in scientific notions.
 According to R.~Rorty, the traditional
_-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Philosophy of Physics, D.~Reidel

134
description of psychic and spiritual phenomena in

modern culture must also be replaced by scientific
description which is to be given priority. All other
languages are not only inadequate, they are
simply anachronistic, akin to demons and evil =
spirits.^^1^^ On the face of it, this thesis is directed

against phenomenalism and the later views of
Wittgenstein who underscored the decisive
significance of the analysis of everyday language as a
panacea for all unpleasant dilemmas of modern
science and advocated the concept of the
plurality of languages. Yet it is quite obvious that the
language of science reflects primarily the most
general or universal properties and links of being
and is incapable of conveying the boundless
richness of relations in the real world. The
deficiencies of scientific knowledge are to be made up for
by literature, painting, music, sculpture and other
forms of human culture. The underestimation of
the humanitarian forms of culture by all
``scientific realism'' is yet another feature which draws
it closer to positivist philosophy. It is not
fortuitous that both positivism and ``realism'' seek to
' reduce the broad diversity of individual traits
to a few rather lean abstractions and show
undisguised scepticism regarding the possibility of
penetrating the inmost recesses of human heart.
``The conceptual framework of persons,'' writes
Sellars, `ìs not something that needs to be
reconciled with the scientific image, but rather
something to be joined to =
it.''^^2^^
_-_-_
^^1^^ See R.~Rorty, ``Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and

Categories'', in: Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem,
op. cit., p.~179.
^^2^^ Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality,

op. cit. p.~40.
135
 It should be noted that distinguishing between

ontology and objective reality as such calls for
analysis of scientific knowledge from the angle of
the relation of the objective to the subjective in
its content. The accomplishment of this task, in
turn, presupposes a comprehensive study of the
subject's role in scientific cognition, of his
intellectual possibilities and limitations, merits and
demerits, the theoretical heritage and the new
concepts and hypotheses, abstractions and
assumptions, philosophical and theoretical premises,
etc. It is only through such a comprehensive study
that one can reveal the objective component of
theoretical knowledge and regard it as truly
scientific ontology. As to the ontology which is
being constructed by scientific realism outside
the crucible of philosophical examination,
it does not go beyond the generalisation of
special knowledge and the extrapolation or even
direct ontologisation of current scientific
theories.
 The example of Bunge, Quine and other

representatives of ``scientific realism'' shows that this
school, having made some obvious concessions
to idealism, has also failed so far to dissociate
itself completely from the idealistic
understanding of metaphysics as such. Scientific
metaphysics which is identified with ontology by most of
the ``scientific realists'' should in fact be regarded
as a sphere of general scientific or
metatheoretical research. It lies beyond the limits of
theoretical knowledge proper, though its
generalisation level is below the level of philosophical laws
and principles as understood by dialectical
materialism. From the viewpoint of ``scientific
realism'', the analysis of problems belonging to this
136
sphere does not call for their serious examination

either in terms of materialism or dialectics, the
latter being in special disfavour with this
philosophical school.
 It is only natural, therefore, that the ontology

thus constructed turns out to be indeed
metaphysical, and sometimes in the worst sense of the
word at that, as it is not amenable to any critical
analysis in terms of either philosophical
(dialectical and materialist) or special scientific
concepts.
 ``Scientific realism'' makes a very vague

distinction between ontological and scientific
theoretical problems and this in fact amounts to
postulating a new philosophical discipline.
``Philosophy, or what appeals to me under that head,''
writes Quine, `ìs continuous with science. It is
a wing of science in which aspects of method
are examined more deeply, or in a wider
perspective than elsewhere. It is also a wing in which
the objectives of a science receive more than
average scrutiny, and the significance of the results
receives special =
appreciation.''^^1^^
 To sum up, the characteristic features of

``scientific realism'' are its anti-positivist
orientation and persistent search for non-traditional
ways in the development of the methodology of
science. Life shows, however, that this school has
no future as an independent philosophical trend
and as a serious alternative to positivism because
it proceeds from the incompatibility of
_-_-_
^^1^^ W.~V. Quine, ``Philosophical Progress in Language

Theory'', in: Language, Belief, and Metaphysics, State
University of New York Press, Albany, 1970. p.~3.
137
materialism and dialectics within a single

philosophical doctrine. Assessed in general terms, ``scientific
realism'' represents a certain tendency of the
bourgeois philosophy of science to turn from
positivism to the objective analysis of scientific
knowledge.
[138]
__NUMERIC_LVL1__
CHAPTER TWO
__ALPHA_LVL1__
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVE
 KNOWLEDGE
__ALPHA_LVL2__
1. POSITIVISM: OBJECTIVITY
 AS OBSERVABILITY OF EVENTS
 Objectivity of knowledge has been a key issue

in the course of the entire history of philosophical
thought. In our time, too, it remains a touchstone
of the true attitude of one or another philosophical
school to science revealing the extent of its
influence on social and practical life. Those philosophers
who show interest in this problem have always
been aware, vaguely or keenly, that knowledge
which cannot be regarded as objective is
powerless or useless, and that the practices relying on
such pseudo-knowledge are adventurist and even
harmful. Failing to meet the requirements of
objectivity, they are bound to become arbitrary.
 Philosophical schools do not always focus their

attention on the problem of objectivity, let alone
placing it in the foreground. Wittingly or
unwittingly, it is often overshadowed by other issues,
seemingly more concrete and, at first sight, more
pressing. Yet it always underlies all controversies
over the place and role of metaphysics, i.e. over
139
the subject-matter of philosophy, and has a

direct bearing on such problems as the relation of
sensory experience to theory, induction to
deduction, truth to error, etc. Therefore the problem
of the objectivity of knowledge sometimes
becomes, as it were, a concentrate of many issues
pertaining to different aspects of the theory of
knowledge.
 It would not be correct to say that this problem

has been treated separately from all other
problems of the methodology of science, such as
causality, determinism, laws of development,
etc. Yet its solution has always been determined
primarily by the answer to the question if
reality exists outside and independently of man. Any
answer to this, be it positive, negative or
fifty-fifty, and even abstention from any answer at
all, is in itself a sufficiently clear indication of
the philosopher's views on the content and
nature of knowledge. Attempts to elude the issue
have never helped to make the philosophers' and
scientists' life easier---on the contrary, the
muddle has always grown worse.
 In its attempts to reject all unscientific,

metaphysical problems, including the problem of
the independent existence of objective reality
and such `àbsolutes'' as matter, substance, space,
causality and others, positivism has proved
to be no more fortunate than other philosophical
schools. However, it would be interesting and
instructive to trace the impact of the objectivity
problem on positivist philosophy in general, and
on its specific concepts and notions in particular.
This question deserves special attention if only
for the fact that numerous gullible authors take
in all good faith the rejection by positivism of
140
the problem of the existence of objective reality

as metaphysical, whereas others, aware of the
latent contradiction in the views of the positivist
writers, suspect them of a crafty intention to
conceal the true meaning of their philosophy and its
subjectivism. As a matter of fact, neither of these
views can be accepted without serious
reservations. The issue is much more complicated
than is implied by the proposed explanations.
 There is yet another aspect to the problem of

the objectivity of knowledge in positivist
philosophy---the understanding of its true attitude to
this problem provides a key to understanding
the modern criticism of the positivist programme
by ``critical rationalism'', ``scientific realism'',
``scientific materialism'', etc.
 Being always opposed, as it was, to the

discussion of the so-called metaphysical problems and,
in particular, refusing to investigate the relation
of knowledge to the objective world and bother
about the origin of scientific knowledge and what
lies behind this knowledge, positivism could not
afford to discard completely the principle of the
objectivity of knowledge. Declaring against this
principle would be tantamount to opposing the
fundamental scientific tradition, in fact, the
entire history of science which has always held that
objectivity was its chief goal and basic trait
distinguishing it from other forms of knowledge and
intellectual culture.
 Positivism has regarded traditional philosophy

to be metaphysical first and foremost because it
postulates the existence of transcendental reality
different from and independent of the sensuous
world. The question of the existence of the
physical world independent of sensory experience has
141
always been viewed by positivism from Comte to

Reichenbach as a pseudo-problem at best.
Refusing to discuss the origin of scientific knowledge,
positivism has also regarded as metaphysical
the question of its development not only from the
historical, but also from the logical angle. Both
these negative premises of positivist philosophy
have led to a number of dramatic conclusions.
For instance, Mach not only discards the
`àbsolutes'' of Newton's mechanics, for which he had good
reason, but also declares himself against the
atomic theory. Accepting the theory of relativity
and quantum mechanics, Carnap and
Reichenbach interpret them merely as logical devices to
systematise and harmonise sensory experience.
 In the notes to his article ``The Elimination of

Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of
Language'' (1957) Carnap comes out against idealism
as a metaphysical tendency. At the same time,
expressing his attitude to metaphysics he writes:
``This term is used for the field of alleged
knowledge of the essence of things which transcends the
realm of empirically founded, inductive science.
Metaphysics in this sense includes systems like
those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson, =
Heidegger.''^^1^^ Carnap is evidently not aware of the

fact that this criticism reaches far beyond his
target and hits the theoretical pillars of all
modern science, as well as its material foundation.
Reichenbach, on his part, ignores the real
dialectical unity of the corpuscular and wave
properties of matter which was not known to classical
physics and which is considered in Bohr's concept
_-_-_
^^1^^ Rudolf Carnap, ``The Elimination of Metaphysics

through Logical Analysis of Language'', in: Logical
Positivism, op. cit., p.~80.
142
of complementarity developed and elaborated,

among others, by Vladimir Fock and his
disciples. In his philosophical discourse on quantum
mechanics Reichenbach makes certain
assumptions regarding the terms ``particle'' and ``wave''
which, in his opinion, are ``neither true nor false''
and proposes a theory of equivalent
descriptions according to which both the corpuscular
and wave interpretations are admissible under
certain conditions as ``they say the same thing,
merely using different =
languages''.^^1^^
 The independent existence of objects made

no serious problem for the researchers in classical
science. First, their attention was mainly focused
on the external side of the physical world and
science was only building up strength to
penetrate the hidden mechanisms of phenomena and
processes, the structure of physical bodies, the
earth's bowels, the intricate heredity carriers
and the laws of cosmic processes. Second, the
notions expressing the properties of objects and
phenomena under observation differed but little
. from current everyday concepts. Third, the
distorting influence of the researcher on objects
and phenomena under investigation was
incommensurate, even in terms of energy alone, with
real processes in nature and could not therefore
affect to any appreciable degree the course or
direction of these processes. Finally, progress
in scientific cognition was very slow and
scientific concepts and theories were not subject to
rapid change, at least on a historical scale.
Knowledge accumulated and grew in scope
without any serious breakdowns.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time,

University of California Press, Berkeley, 1956, p.~218.
143
Revolutionary changes in science were regarded by scientists

themselves as something quite out of the
ordinary.
 Positivism as a philosophical teaching was

a typical product of its time, though it was
not destined to have a long life. As physics and
other sciences were passing on from macroscopic
objects familiar to man from his everyday
experience to the inner structure of matter, the
problem of objectivity was acquiring essentially
new scope and dimensions. Scientific notions
were more departing from the ideal of sensual
certitude, observability. Particularly heavy was
the blow delivered on the principle of sensual
certitude by the discovery of electron and other
microparticles at the end of the 19th century.
 The crisis in physics at the turn of the century

was regarded as crisis of all former scientific
ideals, including the ideal of objective
knowledge and, consequently, as a crisis of
materialism. The fact that objects under investigation
could be observed no longer was used by
positivist philosophy not for revising its mistaken
views, but for confusing the issue, namely, for
rejecting the idea of any reality beyond the
limits of sensory experience. Incidentally, it is
precisely this philosophy clinging to the obsolete
ideals of empirical science that bears
responsibility for the survival of the dogmas of
metaphysical materialism in natural sciences till the end
of the 19th century---the dogmas which had
been discredited and buried by dialectical
materialism half a century earlier.
 If objective reality is only what is observable,

the task and the function of theory consist
merely in finding as yet unknown observable
144
and measurable objects proceeding from the

available sensory experience and taking into
account the body of mathematics. In this case
theory does not play any independent role and
its function is confined to purely logical analysis
leading a scientist from one sensory experience
to another.
 The obvious implication of this approach is

that a non-classical theory should be free from
any new notions, i.e. notions having any new
physical meaning, new objective content. A
physical theory is merely a new logical means to
systematise the observable.
 Quantum mechanics, however, proved to be

not only far removed from the ideals of
positivism---it was a direct challenge to it, despite
some temporary rapprochement between them
regarding the principles of causality and
objectivity which ended in a complete alienation,
evidently final. The positivists regarded
quantum mechanics as an expression of experience
or its elements connected by formal logical
means. By contrast, Bohr's aim was rather to
find out the conditions making experience
possible, i.e. its necessary premises. The so-called
Copenhagen interpretation is often associated
with the assertion that ``the non-existent cannot
be observable''. Its essence, however, will be
more accurately summed up in this statement:
the observable is definitely existent, the
nonobservable allows of certain suppositions.
 The purpose of research in classical physics

was to establish definite phenomena taking
place in space and time and to investigate laws
determining the course of processes. A problem
was considered solved if the researcher succeeded
10--1152
145
in proving that a process did take place in space

and time. The method whereby the process had
been cognised, the observations which had made
it possible to ascertain its existence
experimentally were absolutely immaterial. In the
quantum theory the physicist is faced with an
entirely different situation. The very fact that the
mathematical scheme of quantum mechanics
is not a graphic representation of processes
taking place in space and time shows that it can
only permit calculating the probability of one
or another result of an experiment based on the
experimental knowledge of the previous state
of the atom system, in so far as the latter has
not been subjected to any other disturbances
except those needed by the experimentalists
themselves. Even a most complete set of experimental
conditions cannot give more than a mere
probability of the result expected in the next
experiment on the system. To the positivists it was
a sure sign that any objectivity of the processes
in interest was entirely out of the question. Each
observation led to a certain discrete change of
the mathematical values characterising the
atomic process and, consequently, to a discrete
change of the physical phenomenon itself. In
contrast to the classical theory, where the method
of observation was immaterial for the process
under investigation, in the quantum theory the
disturbance produced by each observation of
atom phenomena plays a decisive role. Further,
since any observation can only be summed up
in probability statements as regards the results
of later observations, the account of the
essentially uncontrollable disturbance component must
become, according to Bohr, a decisive factor
146
in constructing a quantum theory free from

contradictions.
 As distinct from positivism in general or, at

least, from its most radical (or most naive)
versions, Bohr did not consider sensory data
to be elementary entities. What he called
phenomena could only be defined within a broader
context of ``reality''. This reality as the context
of experience could be set by concepts performing
the role of definite conditions or premises of
classical physics. Bohr usually meant two such
conditions: spatial-time description and
causality which were only compatible within the
classical model of events. In his opinion, the
discovery of the quantum of action had led to a break
between them and to the adoption of the
principle of complementarity of descriptions.
 Things being as they were, Bohr and a number

of his followers made an attempt to combine
the object of observations, the measuring
apparatus and the observer into a single
quantum-mechanical system and thus to eliminate
uncertainty. In his speech on receiving a Nobel prize,
Werner Heisenberg said that classical physics
was the kind of aspiration for the knowledge
of nature in which scientists strove to make
conclusions on objective processes proceeding in
fact from their sensations and refusing to take
into account the influences of all observations
on the object being observed. Quantum
mechanics, on the contrary, obtained the possibility
of considering atomic processes by partly refusing
to objectivise them and describe in terms of
space and time.
 Despite the controversies lasting many years

this interpretation known as the ``Copenhagen
10*
147
approach'' has not yet completely lost its grip

on the minds of philosophers and physicists
many of whom are still inclined to think that
by breaking with the traditions of classical
science quantum mechanics has opened up a new
epoch. ``Quantum mechanics,'' writes, for instance,
J.~A. Wheeler, ``has led us to take seriously and
explore the ... view that the observer is as
essential to the creation of the universe as the
universe is to the creation of the observer...
Unless the blind dice of mutation and natural
selection lead to life and consciousness and
observership at some point down the road, the
universe could not have come into being in the
first place; ... there would be nothing rather
than =
something.''^^1^^ Hence, quantum mechanics

provides a new point of reference for
understanding all events in the universe, including its
emergence in the form which engendered our
life itself. Reality, according to Wheeler, can
no longer be regarded as independent of the
observer.
 Eugene Wigner, too, is inclined to share the

opinion that quantum mechanics deals with
nothing else but ``measurements'' or
`òbservations''. He maintains that the equations of
movement both in classical and quantum
mechanics do not describe reality but are merely
instruments to calculate the probability of
certain results of observations. His opinion is in
full conformity with the positivist views that
the observation becomes fulfilled when the
_-_-_
^^1^^ J.~A. Wheeler, ``Genesis and Observership'', in:

Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Ed. by
R.~E. Butts and J.~Hintikka, Dordrecht, 1977, p.~27 ff.
148
observer's consciousness is brought into play and

that not a single system has any definite
measurement attributes of its own---they appear only
as a result of the very process of measurement
or simultaneously with it. In this connection
Wigner writes: `Ìt is the entering of an
impression into our consciousness which alters the
wave function because it modifies our appraisal
of the probabilities for different impressions
which we expect to receive in the future. It is
at this point that the consciousness enters the
theory unavoidably and unalterably. If one
speaks in terms of the wave function, its changes
are coupled with the entering of impressions
into our =
consciousness.''^^1^^ There is nothing

surprising, according to Wigner, in that idealism
provides the most relevant representation of the
world. Even if it were possible to exclude the
observer (or sensations) from the analysis of
a quantum-mechanical situation, it would be
necessary, in Wigner's opinion, to project him
mentally.
 Indeed, observation and measurement are

important requisites for the construction of
quantum mechanics. The admission of this fact,
however, leaves open the question of the
relations between the components of this unity---
the system, the instrument and the observer.
Wigner's method reduces the first two to the
last one. The independent existence of physical
objects is called in question. To be sure, Wigner
does not aver that consciousness creates its
images in absolute vacuum or that physical
_-_-_
^^1^^ E.~P. Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections,

Bloomington, Indiana, 1967, p.~175.
149
theories are products of immaterial elements.

His viewpoint, rather, consists in that scientific
research is limited to the sphere of actually
existing, i.e. observable, events. Wigner does
not simply repeat the arguments of Machist
philosophy but goes further making the object
more and more dependent on observation. This
view leads, in fact, to the elimination of the
positivist concept of system-instrument unity
in favour of the logical primacy of the observer.
 As a result, reality becomes the world of

experience or the `èmpirical world''. Modern
physicist S.~W. Hawking goes even as far as
asserting the existence of some impenetrable
``curtain'' which completely shuts out everything
that lies behind it. In his opinion, gravitational
collapse sets an obvious barrier to scientific
cognition which can hardly be expected to be
overcome even in the distant future. The thing
is that the inner state of the ``black hole'' is,
according to theoretical calculation,
unobservable in principle. Hence, gravitation provides
an example of uncertainty regarding the
existence of real objects, which is even of a higher
order than the uncertainty in quantum
mechanics. Recalling Einstein's winged words ``God
does not play dice'' in his well-known
controversy with Bohr, the author even attempts to
strengthen Bohr's arguments. In his opinion,
``God not only plays dice, he sometimes throws
the dice where they cannot be =
seen.''^^1^^
 Another threat to the objectivity of scientific

knowledge comes from the probability
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ S.~W. Hawking, ``Breakdown of Predictability in

Gravitational Collapse'', Physical Review, Vol.~14, No.~10,
1976, p.~2464.
150
interpretation of the so-called Ψ-function. According to

Bohr, the wave and corpuscular theories of
microparticles need not necessarily be
contradictory in reality despite their conceptual
incompatibility. Both theories are equally important
for the physical reality, each covering a definite
type of situations, and consequently, are
complementary. Proceeding from this viewpoint, some
physicists and philosophers came to the
conclusion that the Ψ-function is a wave function
representing the density of probability and,
consequently, is merely a mental projection of
theory on a physical situation.
 In point of fact, nothing but the form of

mathematical equations makes it possible to
treat a particle as a certain ``density of
probability'' which can represent it in an experiment.
The Ψfunction provides but a partial
description of physical reality and, besides, merges
the object and the subject into a single whole.
Though, according to Heisenberg, we can
separate them temporarily in different specific
situations, they can never be completely detached
from each =
other.^^1^^
 Erwin Schrodinger contends that one can

hardly assert the existence of waves in nature
if probability is their characteristic feature.
In his opinion, one can only speak of the
probability of an event if one believes that it does
occur now and then. If the probability function
does not describe any physical reality in an
experiment it definitely does not give any
_-_-_
^^1^^ See W.~Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conception of

Nature, London, 1958, pp.~22, 28--29; see also Physics and
Philosophy, London, 1959, Ch.~III.
151
information on what takes place ``between two

experiments''.
 As we see, some of the above arguments boil

down to the assertion that what is not observable
cannot be accepted by science. Others emphasise
the fact that wave is the only form of quantum
movement in space, which is attested to by such
physical phenomena as interference, diffraction
and others. Since waves represent nothing but
probability, doubt is cast on the existence of
particles in the period between the experiments
ascertaining their presence.
 It should be noted that the above viewpoint

leaves out of account two important circumstances.
First, any experimental set is a macrosystem.
Analysing the results of experiments, a
physicist cannot but proceed from certain laws
governing physical phenomena. As a rule, he does not
have to resort to probability functions. Second,
the idea of the inseparable unity of the subject
and the object reflects the simple fact that
dynamic and spatial parameters cannot be defined
simultaneously in a single experiment. Indeed,
certainty can only be attained within definite
limits. This fact, however, gives no grounds
at all for a conclusion that the unity of the
object and the subject is inseparable in general.
Besides, even if particles do appear in the course
of an experiment only, as is the case with excited
vacuum (virtual particles), probability as a state
is no less objective than actuality. From the
viewpoint of the positivist interpretation of physical
reality the very idea of such objectivity is bound
to look preposterous indeed.
 The real obstacle confronting the

experimentalist and preventing him from accurately
152
defining the parameters of a moving particle consists

at present in the objective and glaring
contradiction between the absense of any system
capable of emanating or absorbing less than one
quantum of energy, on the one hand, and the
inevitability of the exchange of energy, however
negligible, between the instrument and the
object in any measurement or experiment, on
the other. As regards the microworld, where one
quantum of action and the object under
measurement are commensurate, any process of
measurement will cause a substantial change in the
state of the object. All that does not prove,
however, that the existence of the object in
microphysics is completely dependent on the
subject.
 It stands to reason that the observability of

an object as such does not provide a solid ground
for scientific cognition. The progress of
theoretical research and particularly quantum mechanics
and the theory of relativity, have revealed the
inadequacy and limitations of observation as
a method of cognition to the positivists
themselves. The development of theoretical science
has enhanced the danger of solipsism which was
evident even to the Machists way back in the
late 19th century. The very fact that quantum
mechanics and the theory of relativity appear
to be equally meaningful to different people
irrespective of their nationality and ideological
affiliation has called for a considerable extension
of the notion of objectivity. From the
methodological viewpoint, the philosophers of science
have begun to attach ever growing significance
to Hume's old idea that the focus of attention
should be shifted from the observation of
153
individual phenomena to the regular repetition of

events, their regular concomitance or sequence.
A separate experiment can neither confirm, nor
refute a hypothesis---it takes a whole series or
succession of observations. Philipp Frank, a
representative of late logical positivism, wrote:
`À single experiment can only refute a `theory'
if we mean by `theory' a system of specific
statements with no allowance for modification.
But what is actually called a 'theory' in science
is never such a system... Therefore, no crucial
experiment can refute any such =
theories.''^^1^^ From
this it follows that one of the main requirements
to an experiment is its reproducibility at
different times and in different parts of the universe.
 What is the purpose of this methodological

principle leading to the denial of the decisive
role of experiments in science? Its aim is to
replace the criterion of observability by the
criterion of inter subjective verification of
knowledge. As a result, objectivity becomes equivalent
to intersubjectivity. Solipsism can be avoided
(without resorting, like Berkeley, to God) by
recognising at least the existence of other people.
But this is not all, of course. It must also be
postulated that people are alike everywhere,
consequently, the reality constructed by them
will also be similar everywhere. Contrary to
common sense which accepts only one physical
world, the emphasis on the subject who is the
architect of reality leads to a tempting idea that
different scientific theories and, consequently,
their authors represent different worlds which
_-_-_
^^1^^ Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science, Prentice-Hall,

Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.~J., 1957, p.~31.
154
they themselves construct. To avoid absolute

relativism ensuing from this concept, it is
necessary to show additionally how one
experience can be compared with another, i.e. to
solve the problem of their mutual correction.
Naturally enough, subjective experience may fail
to tally with what is regarded true by common
consent. Let us consider at least one of the
answers to this question proposed by Max Born
which is sufficiently typical of all attempts of
the positivists to find a way out of a difficult
situation without forfeiting their main dogmas.
 Expounding his views, Born describes a

conversation with his cousin who asked him a
puzzling question way back in his school years:
``What do you mean exactly when you call this
leaf, here, green or the sky, there, blue?''
Dissatisfied with Born's reference to the impressions
of other people who all saw green and blue like
he did, the cousin said: ``There are colourblind
people who see the colours differently; some of
them, for example, cannot distinguish red and =
green.''^^1^^
 The answer to this question appeared to be

far from simple and the question itself was
evidently not at all as superfluous as it had seemed
at first to Born, if he deemed it necessary to
return to it time and again in his declining
years. Moreover, Born admitted that he had
found the meaning of this question even more
profound after he had got acquainted with the
classical answers to it given by Kant, Russell,
Mach, and Hume. Assessing the positivist doctrine
_-_-_
^^1^^ Max Born, My Life and My Views, Charles Scribner's

Sons, New York, 1968, pp. 161--62.
155
alongside those of other philosophical schools he

was to some degree familiar with, Born wrote:
`Ìn the most radical interpretation this theory
means a denial of the existence of an external
world, or at least the negation of its knowability.
In practical life a follower of this doctrine would
hardly behave as if there were no external =
world.''^^1^^
 Born, however, does not accept the materialist

view either. In his opinion, dialectical
materialism has so broadened the concept of matter
that its initial meaning has been completely lost
and the concept itself has become too far removed
from concrete problems of physics. The existence
of the real, objective, knowable world, according
to Born, has turned into a sanctified creed.
 Born offers his own solution to the problem

of objectivity of knowledge. In his opinion, the
impossibility to prove the objective existence
of green leaves and the blue sky is rooted in
the attempt to reach an agreement on a single
sensory impression. Such a task, according to
Born, is nonsensical. Objective knowledge can
only be reached by obtaining the perceptions of
two communicable impressions which lend
themselves to intersubjective verification. The
equality or inequality of such impressions can already
be ascertained quite definitely. Born lays special
emphasis on the communicability of
impressions. One person cannot give an adequate
description of his sensations which he experiences when
looking at a green leaf, but two persons together
can come to an agreement regarding the colour
of the leaf they observe.
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~166.
156
 Objectivity is thus reduced to the equality

of impressions. An important means of comparing
impressions is a symbol, i.e. a visual or a sound
signal the exact form of which is not important---
what matters is the information conveyed by
this symbol. One and the same set of data can
be represented by different signals. Symbols
performing the function of data carriers during
intercourse between individuals are of decisive
importance in attaining objective knowledge.
 The process of cognition is visualised by Born

as follows. A child assimilates language as the
totality of symbols and learns to correlate them
with one another. It is worth noting that Born
does not speak of the correlation between
symbols and the objective world, but of the
correlation between different symbols with definite
meanings. Hence, given the ability to
manipulate symbols, the measurement of heat intensity
can be presented as the process of correlation of
the sensation of heat with a geometrical value
(the height of the mercury column in a
thermometer). Learning provides man with a dictionary
and enables him to correlate sensations through
the agency of thermometer readings, i.e. to
correlate his sensations with other people's
sensations. Similarly, chemistry teaches people to
correlate different substances with a combination
of symbols denoting elementary basic
components (atoms). By correlating atomic weights
with the symbols of elements one can learn the
corresponding molecular weights, whereas the
correlation of valency with the symbols of atoms
makes it possible to forecast the results of
chemical reactions.
 Such correspondence of sense data
157
(perceptions and the corresponding symbols) is
established, according to Born, in all spheres of
experience. Born notes the existence and coincidence
of structures which are identified with the help
of the sense organs and indicates that the
corresponding impressions can be passed from one
individual to another. He is even inclined to call
these structures after Kant ``things-in-themselves''.
Physical formulae and systems of equations
need not necessarily symbolise what is known
from experience and what can be visualised. Yet
Born is convinced that all these formulae are
deduced from experience through abstraction and
a continuous process of experimental test.
 For the sake of objectivity, the scientists

should describe the essence of their abstract
formulae in the plain language, using
self-evident notions. Yet modern science, according to
Born, cannot avoid subjectivity, no matter how
hard the scientists may try to do so. On the
whole, Born's interpretation of the
complementarity principle falls in line with the principles
of the Copenhagen school: a scientist is free to
choose the experimental apparatus which is to
be used in his experiment. However, the
selection of the apparatus determines the picture of
reality. ``Thus a subjective trend,'' writes Born, `ìs
reintroduced into physics and cannot be
eliminated. Another loss of objectivity is due to the
fact that the theory makes only probability
predictions, which produce graded =
expectations.''^^1^^
 As we see, Born in fact substitutes the process

of tuition and learning for the cognition of
reality. He proceeds from an already existing
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~187.
158
system of knowledge which enables the

individual experience of every man to be harmonised.
This approach implies that individual
experiences are identical and therefore do not need any
comparison, elaboration and correction of their
content. It is quite sufficient to correlate the
symbols denoting one or another totality of
impressions. Such a model has in fact nothing
in common with the real process of scientific
cognition which aims first and foremost at
investigating new, unknown phenomena, but not
at harmonising and systematising individual
experiences with the help of an arbitrarily
selected aggregate of symbols described by Born.
 Of course, the communicative aspect of

scientific cognition is in itself an interesting
philosophical problem, but it should not overshadow
the essence of scientific cognition. Criticising
Mach for his attempts to reduce the world to
sense perceptions and the scientific theory to
a means for establishing logical links between
sense perceptions, Born is in fact very close to
positivism in his understanding of the process
of cognition. The world lying ``beyond
phenomena'' indeed remains for Born something like
the Kantian ``thing-in-itself'' which is not
amenable to any determination. As a result, the
problems of truth, of the certitude of knowledge
and of the means for improving incomplete and
inaccurate knowledge become superfluous. No
reason whatsoever is given for the identity of
our perceptions of reality, except for the
reference to the selected system of symbols and to an
agreement on their meanings---such identity is
the more strange as the subjective perceptions
of different people vary to a considerable extent
159
and as there are no similar people with equal

abilities for perception, equal personal experiences,
equal interests and equal stocks of knowledge,
let alone many important personal qualities.
 The investigation of these problems has long

since transcended the bounds of physical science,
though the problems themselves have not become
any easier for that reason. On the contrary in
such fields as chemistry, biology, the psychology
of public opinion, and others where the
possibilities for observation are limited, it has proved
even more difficult to explain how subjective
knowledge can be turned into objective
knowledge, verifiable and applicable for practical
purposes as it is. To save the principle of
objectivity in these fields on the basis of empiricism,
the philosophy of science had but one way out
only---to sacrifice its traditional phenomenalist
approach in favour of physicalism. This did not
mean, however, a complete break with
traditions, since the philosophical thinking of the
positivists has always been characteristic of
a peculiar symbiosis of both the phenomenalist
and the physicalist approaches. Whereas the
philosophers advocating phenomenalist analysis
contended that sensory experience was the basis
of knowledge from the epistemological viewpoint
and that the statements expressing such
experience formed the language of all meaningful
propositions, the physicalists believed that the
foundation of all knowledge was the observation
of material things and that the statements of
observation made the core of the language which
was used for expressing the meaningful
propositions of cognitive value. Carnap, for one,
represented both these tendencies in different periods
160
of his life. Siding up first with the

phenomenological branch of positivism, he became later
one of the most persistent and, perhaps, most
profound expounders of the second branch too.
As a result of the evolution of his views, Carnap
became, willy-nilly, an instrument for a
considerable deflation of the initial claims of
physicalism, though the latter has not lost its ground
completely till nowadays.
 For later-time Carnap, the foundation of

knowledge is not irrefutable statements, as he believed
earlier, but statements which underlie any
scientific investigation and provide a psychological
basis of cognition not only for a scientist, but
also for any individual in general. It is these
initial statements that can be connected
intersubjectively with other statements and therefore
make the objective foundation of knowledge.
Carnap's radical physicalism boils down to the
assertion that all meaningful statements can be
connected in one way or another with a
statement of the type: ``the temperature in this place
varies within 5 to 10° C.'' According to Carnap,
the statements of such sciences as biology,
chemistry, geology, etc. can be reduced to physical
notions because the type of determinism
prevailing in these sciences can be reduced to physical
determinism. `Àll laws of nature,'' he writes,
`ìncluding those which hold for organisms,
human beings, and human societies, are logical
consequences of the physical laws, i.e. of those
laws, which are needed for the explanation of
inorganic =
processes.''^^1^^ For instance, the notion
_-_-_
^^1^^ The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Ed. by
P.~A. Schillp, Open Court, London, 1963, p.~883.
11--1152
161
of impregnation can be interpreted in terms of

merger of sperm and ovum accompanied by
some redistribution of elements. Similarly,
psychological knowledge, in Carnap's opinion, can
be reduced to physical knowledge. Thus, a
statement to the effect that somebody has been
very angry at 10 a.m. today can be translated
without any detriment to the scientific value
of this statement into the language of physics
by stating that the person's breathing and pulse
have quickened, the muscles have strained, etc.
True, Carnap concedes that this reduction may
perhaps fail to provide a clear idea of the laws
underlying impregnation in the first case, and
the emotional process, in the second. Making
this concession, Carnap does not concern
himself about the nature of the impregnation process
or the individual's inner world. He views the
problem from the angle of verbal descriptions
only. If such descriptions prove to be impossible
for some reason or other, there can be no question
of attaining intersubjectivity, i.e. the objectivity
of biological and psychological phenomena as
they are understood by different scientists.
 In turn, the correctness of the initial

statements of observation is made by Carnap
contingent on the extent of agreement between the
sense data of different observers. If the sense
data of each of the observers are consistent with
the interpretation of the indications of a certain
apparatus designed to fulfil a given task, it
means that the initial statements required to
form a scientific proposition have passed the
test for viability.
 True, intersubjective observability has certain

advantages over the phenomenologic language
162
from the standpoint of the development of

scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, one can
hardly take seriously the attempt, to construct all
sciences, psychology and social disciplines
including, on the basis of physics, arid expect all
theoretical concepts and laws to be derived from
physical concepts and laws. Being aware of the
weakness of his position, Carnap later proposed
several modified variants of the physicalist
programme limiting it, for instance, to the
reduction of all descriptive terms in the
languages of different sciences to terms denoting
sensuously perceived properties of things. In his
opinion, the class of observable material
predicates can provide a reliable basis for the
reduction of all statements and for language integrity.
For instance, the ability ``to be dissolved in
water'' is revealed and confirmed by the
observation of the fact of dissolution. It was a
significant moderation of Carnap's initial stand, as
the sphere of observable empirical and
dispositional predicates is markedly broader than the
.sphere of terms expressing our sense data in
purely physical parameters. Finally, in one of
his latest works entitled Philosophical
Foundations of Physics Carnap beats a further retreat
and confines himself to a mere recommendation
of a very general character, an admonition
rather than an injunction, advising the scientists
to base their language on the language of physics
wherever possible. This is all that remained
of his formerly uncompromising
physicalism.
 Of certain interest in this context is also the

position of Ernst Nagel, one of the latest and
sufficiently radical adherents of the physicalist
11*
163
principle of reductibility. Like all other

philosophers siding with the modern philosophy of
science and upholding some essential traditions
of positivism, Nagel sees the meaningfulness
of empirical statements in their connection with
direct observation, considering logical links
between them chiefly formal or linguistic. In his
opinion, a theory can only be meaningful if its
statements relate to potentially observable things
and do not run counter to its principles. He
denies meaningfulness to those statements which
have no empirical confirmation. According to
Nagel, the data of experience, observation
statements and logical links play each their special
role in the process of cognition.
 Nagel maintains that any attempt to base the
knowledge of physical facts on sensory data is
doomed to failure. If the whole edifice of science
were built on direct sensory experience,
knowledge would never go beyond its limits.
 Nagel contends that our knowledge includes

objective facts, but not simple sensory data or
some of their complexes localised in the sphere
of sensory experience. It is only after
investigation and by no means before it that we can claim
the possession of sensory data. Investigation
alone enables us to assert that the earth is round
and that President Roosevelt remained in office
longer than his predecessors.
 In Nagel's opinion, the objectivity of our

knowledge does not lead to metaphysical
realism. He supports the view of some other
physicalists that the doctrine whereby all statements
on directly observable objects can be translated
into the so-called physicalist language should be
replaced by semantic realism in which
164
non-observable objects are represented by a system of

nomological statements.
 According to Nagel, in proposing the

reduction of one theory to another we implicitly
proceed from the assumption that there exist
some methods to demonstrate the deducibility
of one theory from another. `Ìn reductions of
the sort so far mentioned,'' Nagel writes, ``the
laws of the secondary science employ no
descriptive terms that are not also used with
approximately the same meanings in the primary
science. Reductions of this type can therefore be
regarded as establishing deductive relations
between two sets of statements that employ a
homogeneous =
vocabulary.''^^1^^ Nagel admits that the

secondary science sometimes includes notions
which are absent from the primary science.
 Understandably, positivist physicalism is

directed against openly idealistic concepts which
not only fail to provide adequate answers to
acute theoretical questions, but in every way
hamper the development of modern science. The
biologists, for instance, can hardly be encouraged
in their investigations by philosophical doctrines
explaining all the processes in living organisms
by the operation of mysterious immaterial agents
such as entelechy or the vital force which do not
yield to any rational determination or even
description. Central to all these doctrines from
Emil Dubois-Reymond's time till nowadays has
been the idea of blessed ignorance---ignoramus
et ignorabimus. A prominent biologist Konrad
Lorenz says in his book The Reverse of the Mirror
_-_-_
^^1^^ E.~Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York, 1961,

p.~339.
165
that this view not only acts as a brake on

scientific progress, but is also one of the gravest errors
having a dire consequence---a doubt about the
reality of the external =
world.^^1^^ Lorenz deplores

the belatedness of his enlightenment and notes
that the practical problems of medicine and
natural science have made him an opponent of
idealism. This materialist tendency of modern
science causes many biologists to turn their eyes
to philosophical materialism.
 Confessions of this kind are not exceptions

with prominent representatives of modern
biology. Another well-known biologist, Francisco
Ayala, makes this significant statement: ``The
goal of science is the systematic organization of
knowledge about the universe on the basis of
explanatory principles that are genuinely =
testable.''^^2^^ The reappraisal of values is characteristic

not only of modern biology. Idealism is being
subjected to devastating criticism in many works
on the physiology of higher nervous activity,
on neuropsychology, neurophysiology, etc.
 Contrary to idealistic theories of knowledge

the latest investigations in biology and
psychology provide convincing evidence that human
thinking is not entirely autonomous. Viewed from
both the psychological and epistemological angles,
it represents the ability of highly organised
living systems to reflect, i.e. to cognise, the
external world and themselves.
_-_-_
^^1^^ See K.~Lorenz, Die R\"uckseite des Spiegels. Versuch

einer Naturgeschichte menschlicher Erkennens, R.~Piper &
Co. Verlag, M\"unchen, 1975, S.~27.
^^2^^ F.~J. Ayala, ``Biology as an Autonomous Science'',

in: Topics in the Philosophy of Biology, M.~Grene and
E.~Mendelsohn (eds.), Reidel Publishing Company,
Dordrecht, 1976, p.~312.
166
 How does this materialistic tendency reveal

itself in the modern ``philosophy of science''?
 Several trends are in evidence here. The beaten

track for the adherents of this philosophy is to
restrict the problem of objectivity to the problem
of observation and accumulation of empirical
data. Since the observation of intimate biological
processes is identified by many scientists with
the analysis of their physical manifestations,
their materialism not infrequently borders on
physicalism. When it comes to the analysis of
new phenomena, particularly in biology,
psychology and sociology, the researchers seek in the
first place to trace them to the operation of
physical or chemical mechanisms. Naturally enough,
it is the only way to ``transfer'' many biological,
psychological, social, demographic and other
processes to the sphere of the observable. Carnap
writes that the physical language is universal.
This is the thesis of physicalism. If the physical
language on the grounds of its universality were
adopted as the system language of science, all
science would become physics. The various
domains of science would become parts of unified
science. According to Carnap, the laws of
psychology are special cases of physical laws holding
in inorganic physics as well. Identifying all
materialism with its mechanistic trend, Carnap
believes that the materialist system corresponds
to the viewpoint of the empirical sciences, since
in this system all concepts are reduced to the =
physical.^^1^^
 It is common knowledge that molecular

genetics and molecular biology owe their
_-_-_
 ^^1^^See Logical Positivism, op. cit., pp. 166--67, 144. 
167
achievements to modern physics and chemistry.

Physico-chemical investigations have enabled
scientists to make the greatest discoveries in modern
genetics---to reveal the molecular structure of
DNA (desoxyribonucleic acid) as the carrier of
genetic information and to define the role of
nucleic acids, their molecular and sub-molecular
structures, in heredity. These epoch-making
achievements of molecular genetics and molecular
biology have given a new impetus to the
mechanistic doctrine and mechanistic reductionism
according to which all life processes and
properties of living organisms, as well as the origin
and evolution of living matter can be explained
with the help of physico-chemical investigations
of microstructures and microprocesses in living
organisms.
 The history of science shows that the ideas

stimulating scientific investigations in their
initial stage do not always prove beneficial for the
subsequent progress of science. The inception of
molecular biology was indeed marked by the
influence of the physicalist paradigm. Noting
this fact, E.~N. Lightfoot, however, seeks to
perpetuate it: in his opinion, the investigations
in molecular biology have been based on the
view that living organisms are subjected to the
same laws as inanimate objects and can be
denoted by terms corresponding to these laws.
Now, says Ayer, he holds the same view, though
on a higher level of complexity and
comprehension.
 This mechanistic approach has been expressed

in a most uncompromising form by the
discoverers of the molecular structure of DNA, John
Watson and Francis Crick. In one of his lectures
168
in 1966, Crick declared that the ultimate goal

of the modern development of biology was
explanation of all biological phenomena on the basis
of achievements in physical and chemical
sciences. In his opinion, there were very good reasons
for that. The revolution in physics in the
mid-1920s provided a solid theoretical basis for
chemistry and for the corresponding departments
of physics. According to Crick, it would not be
presumptuous to assert that the quantum theory
and the available empirical knowledge in
chemistry provide at present a no less reliable
foundation for the construction of biological science.
 Crick's reference to quantum rather than to

classical mechanics is indicative of a new trend
in the modern doctrine of physicalism.
Nevertheless, the essence of this doctrine does not change---
as before, it represents a tendency to express
biological phenomena, processes and laws in the
physico-chemical language.
 Taking exception to `òrganicism'' and ``holism''

one of the representatives of this trend Jacques
Monod writes: ``Some philosophical schools (all
of them being consciously or unconsciously
under Hegel's influence) are known to contest
the significance of analytical approach to such
complex systems as living beings. According to
these schools (organicists or holists) which rise
from ashes like Phoenix with every new
generation, the analytical approach qualified as
reductionist has always been sterile since it
tends to reduce, purely and simply, the
properties of extremely complex organisations to a
mechanical aggregate of the properties of their
parts. Harmful and useless is any argument with
holists which testifies to nothing but their utter
169
ignorance regarding the scientific method and

the essential part played in it by =
analysis.''^^1^^
 Monod also rejects the general theory of =
systems^^2^^ and any ``dialectical =
description''^^3^^ of
living organisms. According to Monod, the cell
is indeed a machine which defies any ``dialectical''
description. In its essence it is not Hegelian,
but Cartesian. According to Kenneth Schaffner,
regarded to be a typical representative of modern
mechanistic reductionism and physicalism, the
discovery of Watson and Crick also contributes
to a general development towards a complete
chemical explanation of biological organisms and
processes and substantiates the view that
``genetics, and other biological sciences, are reduced
to physics and =
chemistry''.^^4^^
 It is noteworthy, however, that while

repeating the familiar propositions of radical
mechanistic reductionism in relation to living
organisms and biological science, Schaffner is forced
to make reservations after each of his statements
thereby confirming the irreducibility of
biological phenomena to physico-chemical ones.
Schaffner's views are apparently anti-vitalistic and
anti-idealistic. He cannot but admit qualitative
distinctions between the living organisms and
the dead nature, yet he persists in his mechanistic
reductionism as he sees no alternative to it except
_-_-_
__ERROR_P_170_COMMENT__ Missing footnote number before 3rd footnote.
^^1^^ Jacques Monod, Le hasard et la n\'ecessit\'e. Essai sur la

philosophic naturelle de la biologie moderne, Editions du
Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 92--93.
^^2^Îbid., p.~94.
^^3^Îbid., pp.~47, 50.
^^4^^ K.~F. Schaffner, ``The Watson-Crick Model and

Reductionism'', The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, Vol.~20, No.~4, December 1969, p.~338.
170
for the idealistic doctrine which he does not

accept.
 The crisis of biological chemism and

mechanistic reductionism in modern biology is at the
same time the crisis of neopositivistic
physicalism, the ``logico-empirical analysis of science'',
whose representatives from Otto Neurath, Rudolf
Carnap and Percy W. Bridgeman to Rudolf
B. Braithwaite, M. Brodbeck and Carl G.
Hempel have invariably pursued one and the same
aim, viz. to reduce the biological to the physical.
 Until recently the neopositivistic ``philosophy

of science'' was predominantly the ``philosophy
of physics'' and made no serious attempts to apply
its logico-empirical analysis to biology.
However, the gap has started filling up. The most
important ``contribution'' in this direction
appears to be Michael Ruse's book The Philosophy
of Biology, which is remarkable, for one, in that
it convincingly shows the difficulties facing the
positivists in their attempts to apply the
logicoempirical analysis of science, i.e. physical
reductionism, to biology. Ruse is out to prove that
such application is possible. He stresses, for
instance, that ``there are now no theoretical
barriers in the way of a Nagelian-type reduction
and that there are obvious signposts about how
this should be done, as that such a reduction has
been rigorously accomplished... It is only after
this development that the physico-chemical and
the biological came into harmony, opening the
way for a reduction, or at least, for a possible =
reduction.''^^1^^
_-_-_
^^1^^ M.~Ruse, The Philosophy of Biology, Hutchinson

& Co. Publishers, Ltd., London, 1973, p.~207.
171
 Ruse obviously strives for a consistent

implementation of the logico-empiricist, i.e.
positivist, approach to the present problems of biology
and to the future of biological science. At the
same time he is aware of the appeal of organicism
to the biologists and admits that many branches
of biological science, such as systematics and
palaeontology seek to develop their own theories,
genuinely biological, without resorting to
molecular-biological, i.e. essentially physical,
explanations. He regards such trends as transient
phenomena and expresses a hope that biology
would ultimately take the course of reductionism
and translate its theories into the language of
physics and chemistry. In his opinion, the
existing state of affairs can only be explained
by the stubborn reluctance of prominent modern
biologists to join the new school of
molecularbiological reductionism.
 In positivist philosophy empiricism as the

criterion of the objectivity of knowledge is
inseparably linked with reductionism.
Epistemological reductionism tending to reduce all
scientific knowledge to its empirical basis was
supplemented by theoretical reductionism which
revealed itself in persistent attempts to translate
all the wealth of accumulated knowledge together
with its theoretical explanations in the language
of physics. From the viewpoint of logic, this
transition is understandable: the laws of physics
permit experimental checks of theoretical
propositions making them testable. Hence,
theoretical reductionism leads to and finds its logical
expression in physicalism. The language used
in the description of physical objects appears to
be natural, too, since it is the first language of
172
man starting to master the external world.

The type of experience expressed in this language
precedes chronologically, psychologically and
even logically other types expressed in other
languages, the phenomenological one inclusive.
 The fallacy of this stand is not hard to expose.

The perception of physical objects by man at an
early stage of his development is indeed natural
and goes side by side with the mastery of the
physical world. Yet this experience in the child's
development is preceded by more primitive
forms of perception, such as the perceptions of
colours, smells and tastes which are very different
with the infant from modern physical notions.
Besides, the development of man does not stop
at perceptions and his growing knowledge of the
external world extending to the animal kingdom,
thinking and psychological processes, the sphere
of social phenomena such as the relations of
production, freedom, solidarity, etc. can by no
means be squeezed into the physicalist paradigm.
 Seeking to substantiate their doctrine, the

adepts of physicalism also refer to the
intersubjectivity of the language of observable physical
phenomena as its characteristic feature. In their
opinion, this feature accounts for the fact that
it is much easier to ascertain the objectivity of
one or another scientific proposition through
physical reduction than through phenomenalistic
analysis. Hence, they make the objectivity of
knowledge contingent on the possibility of its
intersubjective expression, i.e. on the community
of notions and their usability with different
people and different scientific quarters. In turn,
intersubjectivity is made contingent on the
possibility of reducing this knowledge to
173
physical terms. Such a concept of the objectivity of

knowledge is far removed from the materialistic
concept identifying objectivity with
independence from man and his consciousness in general,
particularly if we take into account that most
physical terms except those testable by direct
sensory experience are considered
conventional.
 True, the language of physics provides a basis

for intersubjective certainty in the sense that
it does not deal with abstract sensory data or
even perceptions, but reflects universal or general,
recurrent, stable and therefore regularly
observable phenomena, which is in full accord with
the requirements of scientific cognition. Yet the
requirements of universality and recurrence, being
important as they are, do not yet ensure the
objectivity of knowledge. Such physicalist views
suggest the idea that intersubjectivity is
characteristic not only of objects under observation, but
of the observations themselves. Hence, they
may be considered final in the analysis of
epistemological problems. Here is, so to speak, a
feedback link---from theoretical reductionism back
to epistemological reductionism. One strengthens
the other. Yet all observations, no matter
how complete they may be and whatever their
objects, remain, from the standpoint of the
theory of knowledge, the perceptions of
individuals.
 The language of physics is incapable of

providing the intersubjective basis for science in general
and for scientific epistemology, in particular,
if only for the fact that it constitutes a smaller
part of our language and that the perceptions
of physical facts are not more important---
174
indeed, they can sometimes be even less

important---than the perceptions of biological or
psychological phenomena, since the perception
of the physical world is inconceivable outside
the human brain. Another weakness of the
physicalist programme which becomes ever more
obvious with the advance of science ensues from
the growing differentiation of physical science
itself. A question, naturally, arises: where is
the limit of the reduction process? Do we have
to reduce biological, psychical and social
phenomena to the physics of the macroworld? Or to
molecular physics-chemistry? Or to the atomic
level? Suppose, we adopt the physicalist doctrine
and stop at the atomic level. But what about
the future? What if the world of the electron or
some other elementary particle indeed opens into
infinity? One can only be sorry for a philosophy
which will attempt to shut the door in the face
of a new generation of scientists.
 Expounding some of the weaknesses of the

physicalist doctrine mentioned above, many
philosophers propose, in fact, to go back where
positivism has started. All their ardent criticism
thus turns out to be merely aimed at reinstating
the phenomenologic approach (we leave aside
here the numerous pluralistic versions of the
combination of the empirical and the theoretical,
the physical and the mental, etc.). Yet the
unsuccessful attempts to reduce the mental to
the physical, the biological to the chemical, the
theoretical to the empirical, etc. do not mean
that biology is doomed to stay forever in the
cradle and content itself with exclusively
empirical approach. Nor does it mean that the
`ìrreducible residue'' of biology which could not
175
be rationalised by physics and made part of

``respectable'' science should always remain purely
empirical.
 The dialectical synthesis of the achievements

of phenomenological analysis, be it in biology,
psychology, social sciences or elsewhere, with
the results of consistent and rational reduction
is the only path to a new theory, a new
theoretical fundamental discipline destined to turn
biology, sociology, etc. into independent sciences
which will not confine themselves, on the one
hand, to the superficial description of phenomena,
too specific in their external manifestation's to be
reduced to coarse physical terms, and will not
dissolve, on the other hand, in physical notions
degrading to a commonplace.
 There has been growing evidence of late that

biology, psychology, sociology and other specific
sciences are beginning to turn onto this path and
gain independence not as primitive
phenomenological schools, but as full-fledged scientific
disciplines. Darwin's phenomenological theory
synthesised with the achievements of molecular biology
and genetics exemplifies a solution to the dilemma
of reductionism or organicism. The same path is
evidently being taken now by the modern theory
of knowledge despite the predictions of
epistemological reductionism. It is emerging as a
product of integration of general epistemological
concepts with the results of specific investigations
into the nature of consciousness as such
(including the social and historical factors of its
development), on the one hand, and into the
neurophysiological mechanisms of conscious and unconscious
activity, on the other. In its advancement new
scientific epistemology is casting off both the
176
phenomenological fetters and the physicalist

dogmas.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
2. OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE
 AND ``CRITICAL RATIONALISM''
 Since the 1920s, when Karl Popper proclaimed

his principle of falsification as the basis for the
testability of knowledge and for distinguishing
between scientific propositions and pseudo-science,
he has invariably criticised positivist
philosophy and its understanding of objectivity as
the observability of events. His arguments against
empiricism are serious enough. Popper
maintains, first, that observation is always based on
some theoretical premises and that scientific
knowledge, contrary to the positivists, does not
start with sensory data. Hence, the objectivity
of knowledge cannot be identified with the
observability of events. Second, the traditional
problem of inductive conclusion regarded by
empiricism as the principal argument in favour
of the objectivity of a theory is rooted in Hume's
error regarding the nature of the scientific method.
 However, the true significance of this

criticism can only be assessed in the light of Popper's
positive programme. It may appear at first
sight that the principles of his epistemology are
indeed radically different from those of
positivism. Knowledge, according to Popper, cannot
start from nothing---from a tabula rasa---not yet
from observation. Science, philosophy, rational
thought, must all start from common =
sense.^^1^^
_-_-_
^^1^^ See K.~R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An

Evolutionary Approach, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979,
p.~33.
12--1152
177
Yet the main principle of common sense is the

faith in the existence of the real world. Realism
which asserts the existence of the world outside
and independent of its perception cannot, in
Popper's opinion, be proved or disproved. In
other words, it belongs to the sphere of
``metaphysics''. Realism should be accepted `às the only
sensible hypothesis---as a conjecture to which
no sensible alternative has ever been =
offered''.^^1^^
Popper's realism, however, has little in common
with ``scientific realism'' or ``scientific
materialism'', particularly in the understanding of
objectivity. In Popper's opinion, shared also by
enlightened common sense, ``realism should be
at least tentatively =
pluralistic.''^^2^^ A rationalist
seeks to reduce all the diversity of the world to
several fundamental entities or processes. In
Popper's words, Ockham's razor can only be
applied after recognising the plurality of what
there is in the =
world.^^3^^
 As has been indicated earlier, Popper

distinguishes three autonomous and relatively
independent worlds noting that the term ``world''
is conventional and that there may be different
criteria for their classification. The ``first world''
is physical reality, the ``second world'' the
subjective knowledge of an individual, and the
``third world'', objective knowledge as
understood by Popper. ``My first thesis,'' Popper writes,
`ìnvolves the existence of two different senses of
knowledge or of thought: (1) knowledge or thought
in the subjective sense, consisting of a state of
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~42.
^^2^Îbid., p.~294.
^^3^Îbid., p.~301.
178
consciousness or a disposition to behave or to
react, and (2) knowledge or thought in an objective
sense, consisting of problems, theories, and
arguments as such. Knowledge in this objective
sense is totally independent of anybody's claim
to know; it is also independent of anybody's
belief, or disposition to assent; or to assert, or
to act. Knowledge in the objective sense is
knowledge without a knower: it is knowledge
without a knowing =
subject.''^^1^^ The elements of the

``third world'' comprise, according to Popper, not
only theories and ideas, but also problems or
problem situations. By analogy with physical
states he also qualifies as the ``third world's''
elements the states of discussion or the states
of critical arguments, as well as information
carriers, i.e. books, magazines, libraries, etc.
 It is indicative in itself that Popper's evolution

has brought him to the recognition of the
existence of the ``physical world''. Yet the sequence
of the worlds as listed above by Popper does not
correspond to their significance in Popper's logic
of science. It is not at all the physical world
occupying the first place on Popper's list that
constitutes the essence of scientific knowledge.
Nor is the ``second world'', i.e. the world of
emotions, sensations and individual knowledge,
of any great significance. In Popper's opinion,
it is just because of its exclusive interest in the
subjective knowledge as expressed in everyday
phrases `Ì know'' or `Ì am thinking'' that
traditional epistemology has lost its influence. It was
concerned with what was not, in fact, scientific
knowledge. Popper writes: ``For scientific
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., pp. 108--09.
12*
179
knowledge simply is not knowledge in the sense of the

ordinary usage of the words 'I know'. While
knowledge in the sense of 'I know' belongs to
what I call the 'second world', the world of
subjects, scientific knowledge belongs to the third
world, to the world of objective theories,
objective problems, and objective =
arguments.''^^1^^ Hence,
the ``third world'' or ``world~3'' alone is truly
autonomous and objective.
 From the epistemological viewpoint this thesis

does not offer any new solutions. It only counters
empiricism in that it eliminates the question of
the source of knowledge, as the logic of scientific
discovery which is the core of Popper's entire
epistemology has no place for such question.
It lies on the other side of the ``line of
demarcation'' drawn by Popper between science and
metaphysics. Yet even within the narrow limits of
the logico-theoretical model of knowledge the
concept of the ``third world'' gives rise to serious
contradictions. If we analyse the relation of the
``third world'' to a concrete discovery or theory,
we are bound to answer at least two questions:
first, which element of our knowledge and at
what stage of its maturity is regarded as the
initial one? Second, which elements in a given
discovery or theory can be confirmed or disproved
by an experiment? Popper gives in fact no answer
to the second question. As regards the first one,
the answer is as follows: the selection of the
initial, basic propositions is a conventional one.
Popper does not deny the connection of basic
propositions with experience. In The Logic of
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~108.
180
Scientific Discovery he writes that a decision to

adopt a basic proposition is not prompted by
our sense-perceptions. According to Popper,
experience can only motivate a decision to adopt
a proposition or reject it, but any attempt to
trace basic propositions to perceptions will prove
completely futile.
 Hence, despite Popper's resolute opposition to

empiricism, his concept reveals curious likeness
to logical positivism in at least two respects.
First, Popper strives to confine the
subjectmatter of epistemology to purely logical
problems and to dismiss some problems of general
significance (e.g. the problem of the source of
knowledge). Second, like the representatives of
the Vienna school Popper is forced to resort to
conventionalism as regards the origin of basic
propositions. In point of fact, he replaces the
conventionalism ``from above'' (in relation to
laws and theories) characteristic of logical
positivism by conventionalism ``from below'' (in
relation to basic propositions). His
conventionalism stems from deeply rooted logicism which
manifested itself already in his early works by
the rejection of philosophical and sociological
problems of science. Understandably, Popper's
basic propositions do not relate to current
individual experience, but reflect the system of
established knowledge. His concept has not gone
beyond a slight displacement of the border
between our knowledge and the material world.
All we know from Popper about our relation to
this world is that our knowledge exerts active
influence upon it. He sidesteps the question of
the primacy in this interaction which is
embarrassing to both the positivist and Popperian
181
epistemology and constitutes the key issue of the theory

of knowledge.
 According to Popper, the ``third world'' emerged

as a result of the spontaneous activity of man and
this is just what accounts for its objectivity.
The unpremeditated build-up of knowledge by
man is akin to the spinning of a web by a spider
or to the making of honey by a bee. `Ànd I
assert,'' writes Popper, ``that even though this
third world is a human product, there are many
theories in themselves and arguments in
themselves and problem situations in themselves
which have never been produced or understood
and may never be produced or understood by =
men.''^^1^^ Such theories and problem situations,

according to Popper, do not appear according
to plan, they are not even needed before their
emergence. Once they have made their
appearance, however, they may create new problems or
a new system of ideas. The objectivity of a theory
is understood by Popper as its independence
from individual consciousness. In order to
substantiate his viewpoint, he concentrates, first
and foremost, on the problem of the acceptance
and understanding of scientific discoveries.
 It should be noted that this problem is not

alien to Marxist philosophy either. It has long
since been the object of serious discussions in
Soviet literature relative to concrete dialectical
issues. The true meaning of ideas, theories and
projects is indeed often realised by scientists
long after the corresponding discovery or
invention is made. This fact, characteristic of one
of the aspects of objectivity, is not regarded by
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~116.
182
Popper as something requiring any special

attention. Actually, however, the gradual realisation
and acceptance of a discovery is nothing but
the result of the objectivity of knowledge
understood as the reflection of objective processes,
i.e. as a fact which can only be explained through
the analysis of social factors influencing the
development of science and its relation to the
material world.
 Ideas, theories and other components of social

consciousness are indeed relatively autonomous
and independent of individual consciousness.
The existence of the theory of relativity or
Darwin's theory of evolution does not depend
on anyone's consciousness. Moreover, we can go
even so far as to assert that it was not Einstein
or Darwin who had to decide on whether their
theories were ``to be or not to be''. These theories
were bound to appear, and not at the scientists'
wish or by force of coincidence, but mainly
because they reflected the objective processes
of reality. Besides, to understand the
inevitability of these discoveries, one ought to take into
account the general laws of scientific development
determined in the end by practical needs. Hence,
the correct statement of the problem of
objectivity is the following: what is the objective content
of scientific theories and what are their subjective
elements?
 Frankly speaking, Popper's analysis of a

scientific theory cannot boast of subtlety. Knowledge
is construed as both a process of cognition and
a result thereof, embodied in various theories,
ideas and problems. In Popper's opinion,
however, the process of thinking lies outside the
concept of scientific knowledge which should be
183
mainly understood as the product of this process,
i.e. as theories and their logical relations. The
process of thinking is always individual and
subjective, whereas its general results, i.e.
problems, ideas and theories are objective. In
Popper's opinion, the incompatibility of certain
theories is a logical fact which is absolutely
irrelevant to whether somebody is aware of it
or not. These purely objective logical relations
are the characteristic features of entities which
are called by Popper theories or knowledge in
the objective sense of the word.
 Should we defy Popper's scheme, overstep the

boundary set by him and consider the connection
between scientific knowledge (the ``third world'')
and material reality in all details, i.e. in the
process, sum, tendency, origin, we shall find
out that there is no sharp line of demarcation
between the knowledge of an individual and the
system of scientific knowledge developed by
mankind. They differ, as it were, by the
objective/subjective ratios. Hence, both the thinking
processes and their results deserve special
philosophical analysis. The electromagnetic theory
as developed by James Maxwell was evidently
just as much indicative of its author's subjective
demerits (and, for that matter, his subjective
merits), as were his mental processes, notions
and ideas. To be sure, science cannot be too
tolerant. The amendments made by Heinrich
Hertz and Oliver Heaviside, as well as the
subsequent elaboration of the electromagnetic theory
in the light of the theory of relativity and
quantum mechanics have corrected a number of
Maxwell's errors. Yet it is not criticism or mutual
rational verification which guarantees, according
184
to Popper, the objectivity of the electromagnetic

theory. Such criticism can at best eliminate
some subjective imperfections thereby helping
to reveal the objective content of the theory.
It does not mean at all that a scientific theory
owes its objectivity exclusively to criticism and
falsification of erroneous conclusions.
 Despite the proclaimed objectivity of the

``third world'', Popper fails to provide an
appropriate substantiation for this thesis. His
objectivity can only be defined by comparison with
individual experience, and the criterion of the
testability of theories is, in fact, intersubjective
by nature. Popper himself makes no bones about
his stand when he writes: ``Now I hold that
scientific theories are never fully justifiable or
verifiable, but that they are nevertheless testable.
I shall therefore say that the objectivity of
scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be
inter subjectively =
tested.''^^1^^ Intersubjective testing

need not go beyond a mutual rational control
which is the common objective of critical
discussions. Such rational control, according to Popper,
'is only possible through multiple checks and
repeated comparisons with the obvious. No
observations should be taken into account if they
cannot be repeated and checked. Such repetitions
alone can provide sufficient evidence that we deal
not with accidental coincidences, but with events
which are intersubjectively testable owing to
their recurrence. In other words the objective
world as defined in Popper's epistemological
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery,

Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1959, p.~44.
185
scheme is mainly referred to by scientists for

falsification of one or another theory.
 According to Popper, the essence of scientific

activity, its distinguishing feature consists in
systematic attempts to refute ideas, hypotheses
and theories which are being advanced, and in
eliminating errors. The tests should result in the
selection of a hypothesis which is more resistant
to criticism than other hypotheses. In other
words, all tests should aim at finding weak
points and eliminating untenable theories by
their falsification. ``But just because it is our
aim to establish theories as well as we can,''
writes Popper, ``we must test them as severely
as we can... This is the reason why the discovery
of instances which confirm a theory means very
little if we have not tried, and failed, to discover =
refutations.''^^1^^ Yet Popper overlooks the fact that

every experiment tests not only a theory as
such, but also a host of its logical and
non-logical premises. All of them participate in the
interpretation of an experiment in one way or
another. Therefore, if an experiment testifies
against a theory, we can never be sure whether
the falsification applies to the theory itself, or
to the attending premises. The conclusion that
an experiment falsifies a theory is purely
conventional. Any theory can be saved by introducing
additional premises or by modifying the basic
ones. Realising the contradictory nature of the
situation, Popper offers, on purely conventional
grounds, to adopt a postulate prohibiting the
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, London,

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 133--34.
186
introduction of hypotheses intended to protect

a theory against a ``death sentence''.
 Consequently, in Popper's opinion, theories

and ideas must become the objects of merciless
falsification. The refutation of theories becomes
for scientific cognition the end in itself.
 In accordance with his model of scientific

cognition Popper contends that not a single
scientist can claim the truth of his ideas and
theories. ``Scientists act,'' he writes, `òn the basis
of a guess or, if you like, of a subjective belief
(for we may so call the subjective basis of an
action) concerning what is promising of
impending growth in the third world of objective =
knowledge.''^^1^^ In developing their research programmes

scientists, according to Popper, are guided by
their conjectures as regards which trend is likely
to be the most fruitful in the ``third world''.
A scientist therefore must once and for all discard
the self-confident `Ì know'' or `Ì suppose''. Since
his individual notions are inevitably subjective,
he has but very modest rights which only entitle
him to say: `Ì am trying to understand a
problem'', `Ì am trying to think of alternatives to this
problem'', `Ì am thinking of an experimental
check for the given theory'', `Ì am trying to
axiomise the theory'', and the like.
 According to Popper, the worlds are real if

they can interact with the physical world, and
they are autonomous if their irreducibility to
one another is postulated. The main problem of
his pluralistic philosophy hinges upon the
relations between the worlds. Of the three worlds,
the two first and the two last ones can directly
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge, op. cit., p.~111.
187
interact. The second world, the world of

individual experience, subjective knowledge, can
interact with the two other worlds, but the physical
world and the world of knowledge cannot directly
contact each other in a similar manner, they
have to use the mediation of the second world.
In principle, it is possible to assume the
reducibility of the mental world to the physical world,
but the existence of objective knowledge, its
obvious influence on the physical world, on the
one hand, and the no less obvious impossibility
of the direct causal effect of abstract entities
on physical processes, on the other, force the
inevitable conclusion about the plurality of the
worlds and the autonomy of the mental as the
necessary mediator between the physical and the
ideal.
 One of the important functions of the ``second

world'' is to comprehend the objects of the ``third
world'', i.e. the objective content of thinking.
Almost all subjective knowledge depends on
objective knowledge. The ``third world'' is
autonomous, though we constantly act upon it and
are subjected to its influence. Cognition is
traditionally defined as the activity of a
cognising subject. Popper holds that this definition
is only applicable to subjective cognition which
should better be called organic cognition as it
``consists of certain inborn dispositions to act,
and of their acquired =
modifications''.^^1^^
 Objective cognition does not depend on the

cognitive aims, opinions and actions of the
cognising individual. Cognition in the objective
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, op.

cit., p.~121.
188
sense is cognition without the cognising
individual. Objective knowledge consists of the logical
content of scientific theories, conjectures,
suppositions and logical content of their genetic
code. Objective knowledge can be exemplified
by scientific theories expounded in journals and
books, discussions of these theories, as well as
by problems, problem situations, etc.
 From the viewpoint of traditional subjectivist

epistemology, the ``third world'' can only exist
as the content of some consciousness. For
instance, a book only exists as a factor of culture if
somebody reads it. A book remains a book even
if it is a table of logarithms composed by a
computer and not written by any man. A book
belongs to the ``third world'' provided it can be
understood and deciphered---even if such a
possibility is never translated into reality. In
Popper's opinion, Plato was the first philosopher
who discovered the existence of the ``third world'',
its influence upon us and began to use the ideas
of the ``third world'' to explain the phenomena
of the ``first'' and ``second'' worlds.
 The history of epistemology knows a far more

influential tradition than the one Popper claims
to represent. Epistemological subjectivism, like
its antagonist, ontological realism, are both
rooted in common sense. The everyday concept
of knowledge rests on the conviction that sensory
data are the source of knowledge. In philosophy
this concept is known as the theory of tabula
rasa. It underlies Locke's, Berkeley's and Hume's
empiricism, as well as many theories of modern
positivists and empiricists. Traditional
non-critical rationalism contrasting itself to
empiricism and subjectivism has also, proved unable
189
to overstep the bounds of common sense.
 The subjectivist theory of knowledge is

incapable of distinguishing between subjective and
objective knowledge. In its attempts to disclose
the process of scientific cognition traditional
(positivist) epistemology proceeded either from
sense data, or from the self-consciousness of
a cognising individual ``(I know'', `Ì think''),
remaining in both cases within the narrow
confines of subjective knowledge. Naturally
enough, it could not understand it either, since
the comprehension of the ``second world'' is only
possible from the positions of the ``third world''.
 According to Popper, the theory of knowledge
of common sense is almost entirely false, yet its
main error consists in the search for a self-evident
starting point of the process of cognition.
Classical epistemology was incapable of understanding
that sensory data were nothing but adaptive
reactions of an organism. The organs of sense,
such as the eyes, are not indiscriminate in their
perception of the surrounding world; they take
in only those events which are being `èxpected'',
and no others. Like theories (and prejudices),
they must be `ìndifferent'' to other events which
they do not perceive and cannot interpret. Any
sensuously perceived material, according to
Popper, is already an interpretation based on a
theory or on prejudice. There can be no ``pure''
sensory experience, just as there can be no ``pure''
language of observation: all languages are full
of myths and theories.
 Rejecting epistemological reductionism, Popper

also comes out against ontological reductionism
(physicalism). Criticising physicalism as a
variety of radical materialism, Popper alleges that
190
the latter is incapable of explaining the

qualitative diversity of reality. In his opinion,
materialism could have had some sense before the
appearance of life on the earth. After that, owing
to the development of human culture and
self-reflection of man, physicalist explanations lost
their universality. As man has created a new
objective world, the world of the products of
the human mind, a world of myths, of fairy
tales and scientific theories, of poetry and art
and music, the emergent, creative nature of the
universe becomes, in his opinion, quite =
obvious.^^1^^
 All the three worlds, according to Popper, are

real. Speaking of the reality of ``world~1'', Popper
agrees with the physicalist materialists that
notions used by a physicist, such as fields, forces,
quanta, etc., refer to real entities. Yet, in his
opinion, traditional materialism with its
paradigm of reality in the form of solid material
bodies is closer to the truth. He shares the
viewpoint of common sense that physical entities
are just as real as consciousness understood as
subjective mental process, as well as the content
of consciousness embodied in culture. The
central point of Popper's concept is his assertion of
reality and the relative independence of ``world~3'',
the world of the products of human spirit such
as legends, explanatory myths, instruments of
knowledge, scientific theories (both true and
false), scientific problems, social institutions and
works of art.
 It is noteworthy that Popper links the

existence of the objects of ``world~3'' with the
_-_-_
^^1^^ See Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and
Its Brain, Springer International, Berlin, 1977, pp. 15--16.
191
embodiment of the products of human intellect in books,

sculptures, etc. However, the mere
`òbjectification'' of these phenomena in material culture and
in the systems of signs does not yet testify
to their independence. Popper's crucial argument
in favour of the autonomy of ``world~3'' consists
in that the development of theories and ideas
follows their own laws and they produce
consequences which cannot be foreseen by their
creators. Being ideal as they are, they can also
give rise to material effects: for instance, they
can induce people to produce their own kind
and other ideal objects thereby exercising
influence on ``world~1''. All civilisation, according
to Popper, can be regarded as the realisation of
man's aims, ideals and plans, i.e. the objects
of ``world~3''.
 The distinction of Popper's concept from

physicalist theories stands out quite clearly here: he
refuses to substitute the epistemological
problems of the correlation of the ``mentalist'' and
``physicalist'' languages for ontological problems,
seeks to deduce the qualitative diversity of the
external world from reality and posits the problem
of consciousness in the context of cosmic and
cultural evolution. On the other hand, Popper
reveals no less clearly the inadequacy of his
understanding of the interdependence of the
subjective and the objective consciousness. The
concept of autonomous ``world~3'' gives grounds
for a supposition that the emergence of new
ideas is determined by logical possibilities which
have already materialised in the objects of this
world, i.e. in theories, problem situations, etc.
In that case ideas and theories must have ideal
existence even before they enter individual
192
consciousness and the task of the subjective

spirit must consist in provoking the realisation
of ideal possibilities lying dormant in human
culture, i.e. in translating possibility into
reality. More, if we assume that the activity of the
subjective spirit is confined merely to ``grasping''
and manipulating the objects of ``world~3'', we
are bound to deny the spontaneous creative
activity of human consciousness and to admit
that individual consciousness and new ideas are
products of culture, but not of concrete
individuals. Popper is evidently not completely unaware
of this Platonic tendency in his concept and
therefore lays special emphasis on the
genetic-biological foundation of consciousness and
knowledge.
 Denouncing the philosophy of neopositivism,

particularly its claim to the role of the
methodology of modern scientific cognition, Popper in fact
offers an idealistic epistemological alternative.
 To substantiate his understanding of the

progress of scientific cognition, Popper introduces
a concept of ``verisimilitude''. In his opinion,
the verisimilitude of a theory consists in the
superiority of a multitude of true logical
consequences of this theory over a multitude of false
logical consequences. From this viewpoint, of
crucial importance is the content of a theory. It
includes a class of all logical consequences, both
true and false. Popper intends to divide this
system, evidently infinite, into two
subclasses---the true and the false consequences of the
given theory, and to discard successively those
which themselves ensue from false consequences.
 It should be noted that the very notion of

logical consequence is not used by Popper with
13--1152
193
due accuracy. Individual statements, some of

which are based on or expressed in theories,
evidently have no consequences at all (true or
false). A consequence is only possible in
situations where certain initial conditions are
indicated. In that case, however, the number of
consequences will be equal to the number of statements
contained in the description of initial conditions.
Most of them will probably turn out to be false
in the strictly logical sense of the word, since
the accuracy possible under experimental
conditions can hardly compare with the accuracy of
mathematical operations associated by Popper
with the notions of truth and objectivity.
 Besides, in a situation with the infinite number

of consequences there will be only two degrees
of verisimilitude, the maximum and the zero
one, depending on whether the true content
is infinite and the false content is finite, or both
of them are infinite. The vulnerability of Popper's
concept of verisimilitude is noted, for instance,
by American philosopher G.~S. Robinson, who
writes: `Ìf scientists were to take Popper's
conception of verisimilitude and progress seriously
it would have the effect of stultifying growth
and progress because what he calls
`verisimilitude' and 'progress' could be increased or even
maximized by a policy of incurious repetition
of safe =
experiments.''^^1^^
 Contrary to Popper, scientists do distinguish

between theories and predictions ensuing from
them considering some of them truer than others.
For instance, planning a flight to Venus, they
_-_-_
^^1^^ G.~S. Robinson, ``Popper's Verisimilitude'', Analysis

(Oxford), Vol.~31, No.~6, June 1971, p.~195.
194
are sure that the theory of relativity is more

reliable than the theory of Newton, Ptolemy or
Aristotle and that the predictions based on the
former must be more accurate than those based
on the latter. Of course, scientists may err in
their judgements of relative probability. Their
inductive criterion of truth may sometimes fail
them. Yet they do use it and rely on one theory
more than upon another. If Popper refuses to
admit that we can and must express judgements
on comparative probability based on an
inductive conclusion, his theory of verisimilitude and
progress proves untenable. If the predictions of
an old theory (except a small number of tested
ones) have turned out false and the predictions
of a new theory (except a small number of
rejected ones) have turned out true, it is obvious
that the new theory is closer to the truth than
the old one. It stands to reason that a scientific
theory owes its reputation for dependability to
a successful experimental or practical test. Why,
then, is its rational confirmation not possible?
`Ìf any and every failure to fit were ground for
theory rejection,'' Thomas Kuhn justly
observes, `àll theories ought to be rejected at all
times. On the other hand, if only severe failure
to fit justifies theory rejection, then the
Popperians will require some criterion of ìmprobability'
or of `degree of falsification'. In developing one
they will almost certainly encounter the same
network of difficulties that has haunted the
advocates of the various probabilistic
verification =
theories.''^^1^^
_-_-_
^^1^^ Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific

Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962,
pp. 146--47.
13*
195
 Popper's concept of the development of

scientific knowledge is in fact the opposite of Kuhn's
concept. It leaves no room for the ``normal''
activity of scientists aimed at the consolidation
and development of a newly created theory.
On the other hand, Popper does not single out
a revolution in science as a specific stage of its
development. In point of fact, he regards every
new theory, every new discovery as a
revolutionary step in science.
 Hence, the evolution of scientific knowledge is

represented in Popper's concept as an endless
chain of revolutions and can, therefore, be
regarded with good reason as a concept of
``permanent revolution in science''.
 This model of scientific development does not

reproduce the true course of science. The lack of
historicism in Popper's analysis has been noted
by numerous philosophers and historians of
science. For instance, according to Maurice
Finnochiaro, Popper's principle is not sound.
All Popper can say on the basis of historical
evidence sums up in that the play of science is
endless. In Finnochiaro's opinion the one who
may once decide that his scientific assertions
need no subsequent test and should be regarded
as ultimately correct may be quite right, from
his own viewpoint, that is. Yet it is likely that
sooner or later a different viewpoint will prevail
in science and his own one will be refuted.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
3. FROM PHYSICALISM
 TO ``SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM''
 The turn from positivism to ``scientific

realism'' is very characteristic of the modern
196
philosophy of science. This trend, which is only two

decades old, has already managed to define its
stand with sufficient clarity despite all the
diversity of the individual approaches and opinions
of its adherents. However, none of the current
views of ``scientific realism'' as a methodological
alternative to positivist philosophy is ripe enough
to claim authority. Representing the
materialistic viewpoint, ``scientific realism'' somehow
falls out of line with the general historical trend
of philosophical development and seems rather
odd because of its apparent spontaneity. Indeed,
in its attempt to evolve a new philosophical
doctrine ``scientific realism'' has started from scratch
and is denying or passing over in silence any
affinity with traditional philosophical trends.
This is partly attributable to the fact that many
of the newly converted active exponents of
materialistic ideas reflect the direct needs of science
rather than some purely philosophical
tradition.
 It cannot be said, however, that new

materialism is completely free from any philosophical
links in general. The new school, for one, admits
in some form or other to its inheritance of certain
aspects, problems and principles from positivist
philosophy. ``scientific realism'' represents an
obvious attempt to smooth over the contradictions
which have led to a complete break of science
with positivist philosophy. This feature also
accounts for the attitude of ``scientific realism'' to
the problem of the objectivity of knowledge. On
the one hand, the new trend discards the
positivist interpretation of objective knowledge,
including its latest versions; on the other, it shows an
obvious influence of many positivist dogmas.
197
 Coming out against the concept of

intersubjectivity, most of the ``realists'' oppose both the
positivist and Popper's doctrines. Neither do they
accept the Kuhn-Lakatos concept as manifestly
relativistic. Yet they do not go beyond
postulating reality independent of man and sidestep the
main issue---the concrete solution of the question
of the nature of objectivity and relationship
between the objective and the subjective in scientific
knowledge. This circumstance essentially weakens
the position of ``scientific realism'' exposing it to
criticism on the part of its opponents. ``The
realist,'' writes, for instance, Roger Trigg, ``starting
from objective reality rather than man's
knowledge of it, will not be surprised if some portions
of it elude man's grasp for ever. He will insist
that though this limits man's knowledge, it
cannot affect the nature of what exists, since reality
is =
self-subsistent.''^^1^^
 As regards the problem of intersubjectivity,

the ``realists'' maintain that the presence of some
common elements in different theories is
accounted for by none other than reality, whether
perceptible or not. Some ``realists'' go even as far as
distinguishing between the ontological and the
epistemological aspects of the problem, i.e.
between reality as such and the reality that we
know. According to Roy Bhaskar, for instance,
the positivists make a typical epistemological
error considering that ``statements about being
can be reduced to or analysed in terms of
statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological
_-_-_
^^1^^ Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk: A Defence of Realism in

Philosophy and the Sciences, The Harvester Press, Ltd.,
Barnes & Noble Books, Sussex, N.~J., 1980, p.~IX.
198
questions can always be transposed into

epistemological =
terms''.^^1^^
 Many adherents of the ``realistic'' trend,

however, believe that ontological realism should be
supplemented with `èpistemological relativism''.
This opinion is based on the well-known thesis
according to which we are incapable of going
beyond the limits of the particular, the concrete,
i.e. the knowledge available at a given moment
though we are aware of the existence of being.
In Bhaskar's opinion, ``whenever we speak of
things or of events etc. in science we must always
speak of them and know them under particular
descriptions, descriptions which will always be
to a greater or lesser extent theoretically
determined, which are not neutral reflections of a
given world. Epistemological relativism, in this
sense, is the handmaiden of ontological realism
and must be =
accepted.''^^2^^
 The confusion regarding the relationship

between ontology and epistemology, the objective
and the subjective sometimes leads the ``realists''
to counterposing realistic and materialistic
viewpoints. A distinction between them does exist, of
course, but its actual significance, in the
``realists'\thinspace'' opinion, evidently lies elsewhere. Trigg
contends that realism represents a broader
viewpoint than materialism, as it permits accepting
the reality of what is not material. `Èven a
theist,'' he writes, ``can assert a realist notion of
God existing independently of men's conceptions
of Him, and not espouse idealism, because he
_-_-_
^^1^^ Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, The

Harvester Press, Ltd., Hassocks, N.~J., 1978, p.~36.
^^2^Îbid., p.~249.
199
__CHECKS__ '&' checked (2005.07.11)
also accepts the independent reality of the

material =
world.''^^1^^
 Realism and materialism, according to Trigg,

are different in the sense that realism pretends to
be a neutral doctrine taking no interest in the
content of reality. In Trigg's opinion, many
idealistic trends insist only on the independence
of reality from human consciousness or sensations
and do not accept the existence of God, whereas
numerous forms of empiricism could be
anti-realistic and atheistic at the same time.
 According to Trigg, the controversy between

realists and anti-realists was of crucial
importance for philosophy. Realism opposes the doctrine
which accepts the dependence of the `èxternal
world'' on man and restricts the world to what
man knows about it. Is the world indeed what
we take it for? asks Trigg, and answers
emphatically: ``No!'' There may exist galaxies we cannot
even conceive of. Besides, many of our scientific
beliefs are probably wrong. `Ìt is exceedingly
rash,'' he says, ``to equate reality with the views
we happen to have at the =
moment.''^^2^^ In a sense,
reality is considered to be mental rather than
material, as the reason which comprehends it
simultaneously creates it in one way or
another.
 Whereas ``realism'' underscores the existence of

reality independent of our notions of it, idealism
considers everything to be a function of reason
and regards being in terms of man's mental images
or perceptions. Hence, subjective experience
may be in contradiction with what is considered
_-_-_
 ^^1^^Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk..., op. cit., p.~XIX.
^^2^Îbid., p.~2.
200
true by general consent. According to Trigg,

``\thinspace`subjective' can be the opposite of ìntersubjective'
rather than òbjective'. To put it another way,
the word òbjective' can refer in a weak sense to
what is agreed on, rather than in a strong sense
to what is `really' the =
case.''^^1^^
 In Trigg's opinion, the anti-realist will prefer

to emphasise the necessity for intersubjective
agreement. Anti-realists are inevitably forced, if
they conceive the problem in terms of the
opposition of mind and matter, to admit the
independent reality of other minds. Idealism inevitably
becomes objectivist even when `òbjectivist'' is
understood in its strong sense.
 Epistemological realism, according to Trigg, is

sometimes distinguished from the ontological
sort, so that one can be an epistemological realist
and an ontological idealist. `Ìn that case,'' he
writes, `ònly minds would exist, but there would
be an external world beyond our judgements.
What we know would be in no way dependent on
our knowing it, but the reality which is the
source of knowledge would be ultimately mental.
This means that reality is not ultimately
independent of judgement as such. It may be
unconnected with what you think or what I think, but
it is not unconnected with all =
minds.''^^2^^ Trigg
asserts that the only alternative to
`èpistemological realism'' is solipsism. Epistemological
realism is the inevitable consequence of accepting
that the world is not one's own creation, and
that as a result one may be mistaken about its
nature.
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~22.
^^2^Îbid., p.~23.
201
 According to Trigg, the principal disagreement

between the realists and their opponents springs
not so much from the difference in their
understanding of the relationship between reality and
man in general, as from the distinction between
the weak and strong objectivity, between
intersubjectivity and objectivity. In Trigg's opinion,
one should not identify objectivity with what
one believes in here and now. The history of
science shows that even the most firmly
established theories can be modified or even refuted.
 ``Scientific realists'' generally avoid identifying

their stand, even on special issues, such as the
mind-body problem, with the concepts of
dialectical materialism.
 Expounding his views, Trigg definitely

dissociates himself from materialism considering its
approach too narrow. He strives to justify his
prejudice against materialism by alleging that it
disregards subjective reality and grants the
status of being to matter only. The origin of this
prejudice is not far to seek: Trigg, like many
Western philosophers who cannot boast of too
close an acquaintance with the materialist
tradition in philosophy, particularly with the essence
of dialectical materialism, equates materialism
with physicalism.
 As a result, Trigg identifies Lenin's views with

physicalist concepts widely spread in Western
literature, overlooking the fact that it is just
against physicalism and its understanding of
matter, space, time and causality that Lenin has
directed its main philosophical work Materialism
and Empiric-Criticism. The irony of the situation
consists in that Trigg, coming out in defence of
realism, opens a wide door for fideism and
202
actually sets it on an equal footing with science. As

we see, the response of scientists to the
disintegration of positivism does not always accord with
the needs of scientific cognition. Despite the
repeated assurances that he is opposed to
idealism and anti-realism, Trigg, in fact, sees no
possibility of passing beyond the bounds of
experience and language.
 ``We cannot,'' he writes, ``talk or think about

reality without talking or thinking about it...
We cannot have a conception of something
without employing the conceptual scheme we have
at our disposal... We cannot conceptualize reality
and then check the concepts we have produced
against reality. It is self-defeating to attempt to
think of reality as it exists beyond our thoughts.
There is no way that we can somehow hold our
concepts in suspense, while we compare them
with =
reality.''^^1^^
 Trigg's realism consists in that he accepts the

existence of real~ty beyond the limits of man's
present knowledge, this reality including not only
what is not yet known, but also, it appears, what
is unknowable in principle. He writes: ``Realists
leave open what is to be meant by 'the world'.
We have used the term rather broadly to mean
`what there is'. The realist can accept that mind,
matter and even other kinds of entities might
exist. His argument with the idealist is not
concerned with the reality of mind. He is merely
concerned to hold that the mental does not
exhaust =
reality.''^^2^^ Trigg draws a purely external line

of demarcation between what appears to be two
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~1.
^^2^Îbid., p.~28.
203
different worlds---the reality which is independent

of man and has not yet become the object of his
knowledge and the reality which has already been
drawn into the sphere of man's cognitive activity
and is no longer independent of his thoughts.
Such an external border does not seem to be a
good solution, as it makes it impossible to
correlate more accurately the objective and subjective
realities and investigate their relationship in the
second world. As a matter of fact, the same
applies to Trigg's first, `ùnattainable'', world,
since it exists beyond our thoughts and cannot,
according to his logic, be extracted from our
conceptual scheme by any means. The concept
of God, for that matter, can also be regarded as
one of the versions of conceptualising the
uncognisable.
 Dialectical materialism is far from ignoring

the reality of the concept of God as an element
of religious systems. Moreover, it regards this
false concept as a reality which should be
eliminated by practical means. Marxism not only
admits the reality of religious rites but also
takes it in all seriousness. It is obvious to any
Marxist that religion (but not God) is only one
of the elements of a highly complex and
heterogeneous subjective reality which includes man's
entire spiritual world with all its diversity and
contradictions. Trigg and other realist authors
may rest assured that their intellectual stand as
well as the books they publish are real to us in a
no lesser degree.
 Trigg's realism is a graphic illustration of the

confusion resulting from the application of loose
criteria of objectivity and lack of dialectical
flexibility in the philosophical analysis of
204
scientific development. What is more, after such a

``cultivation'' vast areas of terra ignorationis are
allowed to lie fallow, grow thick with weeds and
spread pseudo-scientific seeds all over the
adjacent areas of science and philosophy. These weeds
often infect the still healthy field of ``scientific
realism'' which, according to Trigg, is called upon
to give an accurate theoretical description of
reality. In Trigg's opinion, a scientist will always
aspire for the true knowledge of the world though
not all reality can be accessible for observation.
Some theories may be true at all times, others
may need modification, yet they all reflect reality
to some extent, though we do not know how
profoundly. ``The realist in science,'' writes Trigg,
``does not merely oppose the empiricist's view
about the pivotal role of observations. He also
emphasizes that science is about something and
that theories attempt to capture reality as it is.
It follows that only one completely correct
account of the world is forthcoming. Different,
competing theories will each view the world
differently, but the realist will not be as content with
that situation as Feyerabend seems to be and
will want to ask which is the right =
one.''^^1^^
 Contrary to Trigg, Quine contends that

competing theories of reality do not give a unique
and simple picture of the world. Defending all
the basic propositions of ``realism'' he writes:
``We have no reason to suppose that man's surface
irritations even unto eternity admit of any one
systematization that is scientifically better or
simpler than all possible others... Scientific
method is the way to truth, but it affords even in
_-_-_
^^1^^ Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk..., op. cit., p.~66.
205
principle no unique definition of =
truth.''^^1^^ Quine
also appears to be appreciably closer to
positivism in his attachment to the concept of
intersubjective test. In his opinion, intersubjective
contact assures a single dimension deriving from
the similarity of sensuous stimuli. This
intersubjective contact provides a basis both for the
language of learning and for the construction of
a scientific theory. The relevant circumstances
attending the utterance of statements are
combined by Quine in the notion of `ìntersubjective
observability''. Intersubjective contact `ènables
the child to learn when to assent to the
observation sentence. And it is this also, intersubjective
observability at the time, that qualifies
observation sentences as check points for scientific
theory. Observation sentences state the evidence, to
which all witnesses must =
accede.''^^2^^ According to
Quine, this rules out solipsism, since the general
accessibility of circumstances attending the
utterance of observation statements ensures that we
learn one and the same language and that a
scientific theory may have a solid foundation.
 The leaning towards realism gets the better of

Quine in his concept of self-sufficient reality,
though he underscores that true judgements can
only be made after the adoption of a theory. It
causes him, like Feyerabend, to regard theories
as being relatively true, but here Quine escapes
relativism characteristic of Feyerabend. Any
statements, in his opinion, can only be made
_-_-_
^^1^^ Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, John

Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1960, p.~23.
^^2^^ Willard Van Orman Quine, ``The Nature of Natural

Knowledge'', in: Mind and Language, Ed. by S.
Guttenplan, Oxford, 1975, p.~74.
206
within the framework of a conceptual scheme and

serve as its expression. As a result, no ``reality'' is
conceivable except ``through'' a conceptual
scheme which we ourselves adopt. Hence, the real
world which does exist must be described in terms
of our conceptual scheme. Quine avoids speaking
of ``things-in-themselves'' or of any philosophical
interpretation of scientific propositions. In his
understanding, a scientific theory is something
taken at its face value.
 `Às an empiricist,'' Quine says, `Ì continue to

think of the conceptual scheme of science as a
tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience
in the light of past experience. Physical objects
are conceptually imported into the situation as
convenient intermediaries---not by definition in
terms of experience, but simply as irreducible
posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods
of Homer. For my part I do, qua lay physicist,
believe in physical objects and not in Homer's
gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe
otherwise. But in point of epistemological
footing the physical objects and the gods differ only
in degree and not in =
kind.''^^1^^
 Quine, thus, refuses to admit that there is

any difference between the ``posits'' of a theory
and reality. In his opinion, reality is what we
believe to be existing.
 It is significant, however, that physicalism

remains a characteristic feature of ``scientific
realism'' and its understanding of the problem of
objectivity. This circumstance complicates the
_-_-_
^^1^^ Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of

View. Logico-Philosophical Essays, Harper & Row
Publishers, New York, 1963, p.~44.
207
task of distinguishing between the positivist and

``realist'' ideas of objectivity. The distinction,
rather a subtle one, consists in that for ``scientific
realism'' the programme of the physicalist
reduction of scientific knowledge combines with the
programme of constructing a scientific ontology.
``scientific realism'' not only strives to reduce the
language of any science to the physical language
and theoretical propositions to observation
statements based, in the final analysis, on physical
experience, but is bent on reducing chemical,
biological, geographical, psychological and other
processes as such to physical processes. In other
words, it seeks to explain all objects and
phenomena of reality through their physical
properties and mechanisms. What is more, it regards
such reductionism not as a purely scientific
procedure intended for a physical explanation---
that would be quite justifiable---but defends it
as a universal all-embracing scheme thus giving
it a status of a philosophical or, in relation to the
problem of objectivity, an ontological,
principle.
 Understandably, the true significance of this

feature can only be assessed in the context of the
entire philosophical programme of ``scientific
realism''. The emphasis on the objectivity of
biological, physiological and other processes and the
attempts to explain them on the basis of the
laws of physics represent a manifestly ``realistic''
or even materialistic trend, requiring, however,
further methodological development. On the
other hand, the epistemological reductionism,
consisting in attempts to interpret biological,
physiological or mental phenomena in terms of
physical notions with a view to overcoming
208
``metaphysics'' identifies ``scientific realism'' with

one or another variety of positivist physicalism.
The distinction between them is often quite
impalpable and reveals itself in the general tendency
and orientation rather than in some tangibles.
But then certain atavistic features of the new
school are not to be wondered at if we bear in
mind that the realistic methodology of science is
still in its infancy.
 The subtle difference between the positivist

and realistic programmes can already be discerned
in the philosophical concept of Herbert Feigl,
formerly a member of the Vienna Circle, whose
evolution has reflected numerous contradictions
and vicissitudes of the transition from the
positivist paradigm to the scientific-realist world view.
The watered-down variants of the main dogmas
of the logico-empiricist doctrine, the doubts
regarding the distinction between the analytical
and synthetic statements, the greater flexibility
in the interpretation of the empirical criteria of
scientific value characteristic of Feigl's early
works gradually gave way to a more radical
departure from the positivist tradition. Physicalism
which still holds in Feigl's concept as the
hangover of the early period is evidently regarded by
him as the foundation of the new system.
 Having outlined his general methodological

views mainly with reference to physics, Feigl
later devoted much attention to the mind-body
problem, i.e. to the relationship between the brain
and consciousness. He was at first inclined to
regard statements on mental and physical
phenomena as two different languages referring to the
same facts, but later gave preference to the
monistic theory or the ``theory of identity'' in which
14--1152
209
the data of experience and certain deduced

notions of neurophysiological structures have one
and the same reference object and are regarded as
two different ways of cognising one and the same
thing. Such an identity of the mental and the
physical is not yet tantamount to the logical
identity of mind and body. Parallelism between
them should be established by science, but not
by philosophy. Feigl believes that such
parallelism is already in evidence and the further drawing
together of the two systems is inevitable. From
the standpoint of common sense this eliminates
any basis for the hypothesis of the existence of
two different entities. This line of reasoning
brings Feigl to the conclusion that the referents
of mental terms are identical with those of
physical terms.
 Feigl's evolution from positivism to ``realism''

vividly illustrates all the most essential stages or
steps of this transition: passage beyond the
bounds of a purely linguistic approach to the
problem, extension of the scope of semantic analysis,
emphasis on objective neurophysiological
processes as referents of the corresponding
theoretical terms.
 Feigl distinguishes two different meanings of
the term ``physical'', the broader and the narrower
ones. He writes: ``By `physical1 terms' I mean
all (empirical) terms whose specification of
meaning essentially involves logical (necessary or,
more usually, probabilistic) connections with the
intersubjective observation languages... By
`physical2' I mean the kind of theoretical concepts
(and statements) which are sufficient for the
explanation, i.e. the deductive or probabilistic
derivation, of the observation statements
210
regarding the inorganic (lifeless) domain of =
nature.''^^1^^
According to Feigl, the ``mental'' or the so-called
raw sensations are identifiable with ``physical2''.
 Feigl regards the volumes of these terms to be

equal if the theory of identity is true. However,
in case of emergence, i.e. logical non-deducibility
of organic, mental and social phenomena from
physical phenomena, the sphere of ``physical2''
is obviously narrower than that of =
``physical1''.
 As we see, Feigl's programme implies the

reduction of all sciences to physics. One cannot but
admit, however, that it is not entirely divorced
from the existing practice of theoretical
investigations. The peculiarity of this practice was aptly
expressed by Einstein who once said that
``reason'' was commonly believed to be an unseemly
word that ought to be avoided in a society of
wellbred scientists. Reductionism, as we have already
pointed out, is a kind of a semi-official ideology
of the modern biological establishment. The
practical significance of this tradition, however, is
not very large as it reflects a transitory stage in
the development of biological, as well as
psychological sciences. As Soviet scientists I.~Frolov
and B.~Yudin have justly observed, ``reductionism
is evidently the natural consequence of every
situation in which investigation methods and
experimental facilities come to the foreground in
scientific research and dictate the selection of
problems. Under such conditions the issues
prompted by the inner logic of scientific development
are relegated to a secondary plan and preference
is given to problems whose solution is made
_-_-_
^^1^^ Herbert Feigl, The ``Mental'' and the ``Physical'',
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1967, p.~57.
14*
211
possible owing to the application of specific research

techniques or experimental =
facilities.''^^1^^
 Feigl's concept reveals strong links not only

with physicalism, but also with empiricism.
According to Feigl, knowledge starts with direct
sensory experience, sensory acquaintance, as it
were. He notes that the meaning of scientific
statements actually consists in that they state
the conditions of truth. These conditions, in
turn, are evidently represented in the factual
content of the relation of the stated knowledge
which is represented by sensations. Hence, Feigl
understands the theory of truth as a ``theory of
correspondence''. The meaning of a statement, in
his opinion, should be identified in its factual
relation, whereas the meaning of scientific terms
should be adapted to the set reality. As distinct
from the positivist concept of the Vienna Circle,
according to which the meaning of a statement
determines the method of verification, Feigl lays
special emphasis on a different aspect: `Àfter the
recovery from radical behaviorism and
operationism, we need no longer hesitate to distinguish
between evidence and reference, i.e., between
manifestations or symptoms on the one hand, and
central states on the =
other.''^^2^^
 As has already been noted in the first chapter,

``scientific realism'' is characterised in most cases
by very arbitrary attempts to join or separate
various empirical and theoretical premises of
_-_-_
^^1^^ I.~T. Frolov, B.~G. Yudin, Preface to the Russian

translation of M.~Ruse's book Philosophy of Biology,
Moscow, 1977, p.~18.
^^2^^ Herbert Feigl, The ``Mental'' and the ``Physical'',

op. cit., p.~28.
212
general philosophical nature. A similar tendency

manifests itself in the solution of the mind-body
problem. Underscoring the empirical status of the
identity of mind and body, Feigl, Smart and
other ``realists'' often resort to metaphysical
principles in order to substantiate the ``theory of
identity''. Moreover, the problem itself is regarded
by them as metaphysical. Sometimes the
metaphysical nature of the terms ``mental'' and
``physical'', as well as of the problem of their
relationship is emphasised deliberately in defiance of the
positivist doctrine. The term ``physical'' in this
sense apparently acquires a new shade of
meaning which does not fall within the framework of
``physical1'' or ``physical2''. It approximates the
concept of the world as a whole and can be
regarded as ``physical3'' gravitating to, though not
coinciding with, the materialist concept of
``matter''.
 The presence of two or even three levels in the

understanding of the ``physical'' complicates the
mind-body problem, difficult as it is, the more so
as the above ``levels'' are not defined accurately
enough. As a matter of fact, the description of
the ``physical'' in terms of space-time and causal
relations is characteristic of any theoretical
science. ``Physical1'' related by Feigl to this
description can be related to any other scientific
description. ``From my realistic point of view,''
writes Feigl, `ìt makes perfectly good sense to
explain in terms of physical, psychophysical,
and psychophysiological theories how e.g. a bell
by reflecting light, producing sound waves and
being a solid, hard body affects our retina,
cochlea, and our tactile nerve endings (under
specifiable perceptual conditions) and thus produces
213
the visual, tactual, and auditory data in our

direct experience. This is indeed the `causal theory
of perception' so much maligned by =
phenomenalists.''^^1^^
 The excessively broad definition of the

``physical'' is in fact at variance with the real meaning
of this term in physical science which alone gives
it quite definite methodological significance.
The extension of its limits leads to undesirable.
methodological paradoxes. Such an expansion, as
is justly noted by Soviet scientist D. Dubrovsky,
is tantamount to the absolutisation of the
``physical''---either by postulating a single
all-embracing ``physical substance'', or, given the
epistemological emphasis, by implying the unavoidable
absorption by physics of all other scientific
disciplines. Physicalism is thus linked with the
extension of the concept of the ``physical'' and
this alone is bound to have an adverse effect on
the development of physics condemning it to
endless and futile wanderings. If unduly
extended, the concept of the ``physical'' loses its concrete
meaning and turns into an empty abstraction.
 Feigl's doctrine leads to the identification of

any objective reality with physical reality. The
world is nothing but physical reality painted in
different colours. All phenomena are essentially
physical processes. This applies also to mental
phenomena which are but a subclass of physical
phenomena. The mental is identified with the
physiological, i.e. with the processes which take
place in the human brain. In turn,
neurophysiological or biological processes are
explained in terms of physical phenomena. This double
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., pp. 84--85.
214
reduction, given the extension of the chain, must be

applied to developing neurophysiology,
biochemistry, biophysics, etc. The tendencies in modern
natural science are alleged to hold out much
promise for such development. According to the new
doctrine, materialist philosophy loses its status
of a theoretical premise and turns into just another
ontological hypothesis which is yet to be proved.
 This pretentious claim, by the way, underlies

the title of ``scientific materialism'' assumed by
the new school in an attempt to define its own
place among the numerous trends representing
the modern philosophy of science. True,
physicalism has also sprouted in biology and cybernetics,
but its models in these fields add but little to
the basic physicalist concepts from the
methodological angle. Feigl singles out a theoretical level
represented by ``physical1'' or the physical in the
broader sense of the word, linking it with the
categories of causality, space, time, etc. As a
result, one may get an impression that this level
is identical with the general philosophical
concept of matter. Feigl also links this level with
the intersubjective perception of language,
though he gives no clear indication regarding the
scope of such `ìntersubjectivity''. For Feigl, it is,
evidently, confined within the limits of the
physicalist theory. As regards his interpretation of
the category of causality, it is based, as one can
gather, not on a philosophical, e.g.
dialectical-materialist concept of cause, but on the so-called
causal theory of perception. This theory,
instructive as it is and containing not a few interesting
ideas (which have not received, by the way, due
Coverage in Marxist literature on causality), has
not yet been properly elaborated from the
215
philosophical standpoint. Thus the identity of the

mental and the physical in Feigl's concept rests
on the identification of cause and consequence as
it is assumed that both the causes and their
consequences must of necessity, possess all
characteristics of matter.
 Hence, Feigl's crucial concept of ``physical1'' is

also implicitly based on empirical observations.
This concept is unacceptable, for instance, to a
theoretical physicist investigating the problems
of quantum mechanics as it is quite obvious to
him that a physical theory at its present level
cannot be adequately translated into the language
of sensory experience even if it is the
intersubjective language of observations, as conceded
by Feigl and other advocates of the identity of
the mental and the physical. The qualitative
difference between the theoretical and empirical
levels in the reflection of objective reality has
made it clear to many theoretical physicists
that one cannot be reduced to the other in
principle. The illusions that such a reduction is
possible have already revealed their groundlessness
in physical science. The more groundless are such
illusions with regard to the reducibility of, say,
the physiological to the physical.
 The exponents of the identity of the mental and

the physical often refer to their empirical
identity, and that in spite of the fact that the
empirical language proves inadequate to express the
theoretical content of unobservable phenomena
even in physics itself. It holds even more true of
mental phenomena characterised by a higher
level and greater complexity.
 The vulnerability of Feigl's concept lies

already in his assumption of the mental identity of
216
``physical1'' and ``physical2'', since the former as

the theoretical level in the investigation of
phenomena and processes is restricted, on the strength
of its definition, to the limits of
intersubjectivity, i.e. the empirical level of cognition.
Consequently, this assumption is untenable even from
the viewpoint of physical science itself which
has developed a keen insight into these problems.
The controversies in quantum mechanics are in
fact much more instructive in this respect than
some authors are inclined to think. These
questions will be discussed later when characterising
the dialectical-materialist methodology of
science. Of course, the problem of causality has its
own gradations, and qualitative at that, in
different fields of modern science. The analysis of the
specificity of this problem in physics, biology,
chemistry, physiology, psychology and other
fields could be helpful in preparing scientists for
the acceptance of perhaps even a greater
specificity of mental processes and causal relations in
the boundary area of psychic and
neuro-physiological phenomena. Yet the works published by
``scientific materialists'' have not revealed, so
far, any evidence of such a tendency, nor any
sufficiently differentiated approach to processes
which could be regarded as psychological,
psychophysiological, neuro-psychological,
neuro-physiological, biopsychological and
biochemicalpsychological.
 It stands to reason that the oversimplified idea

of the relationship between different levels of
reality falls an easy prey to all critics of
``scientific materialism'' ranging from the less orthodox
adherents of physicalism (such as Mario Bunge,
Roger Trigg, Joseph Margolis) to the supporters
217
of psycho physical dualism and interactionism

(such as John Eccles, Erik Polten, and Karl
Popper). In the context of such criticism their stand
is presented as purely positivistic. In point of
fact, this accusation is not entirely groundless,
particularly in the case of Feigl. His present
viewpoint differs from the empiricist programme
of positivist philosophy by its general
orientation, promises and expectations rather than by
the actual content. Indeed, Feigl does not go
beyond proclaiming the need for an ontology and
accepting, together with the entire school of
``scientific realism'', the ontological existence of
physical reality independent of man and his
consciousness though he restricts their
relationship to the extent of identifying the mental with
the physical.
 Feigl's special emphasis on the ontological

aspect of the causality problem must serve as
a warning against equating his stand with the
paradigm of logical empiricism, i.e. positivism
in its latest variants. Polten, like other Feigl's
critics, disregards this warning and confuses
Feigl's viewpoint now with the positivist stand,
now with the dialectical materialist concept,
thereby revealing a not too profound knowledge
of the Marxist views. Nevertheless, he does find
the weak spots in the theory of identity. ``Now,''
he writes, ``scientific materialises are committed
to hold that all causes and effects have all
characteristics of matter. Yet I maintain that the
causes of what I distinguish as outer sense are
indeed always physical, but the ultimate
phenomenal effects---the data which are directly
experienced---are mental without exception. I go onto
claim that the pauses or grounds of what I
218
distinguish as inner sense cannot be exclusively

physical, and that the ultimate effects are also mental
in =
nature.''^^1^^
 In substantiating his viewpoint Polten reasons

as follows. Some material [i.e. physical] cause
Z, which is lake Ontario, produces probably
identical consequences: similar perceptions on a
sensory, empirical level of two different observers
A and B. This does not mean at all that the same
lake will be the cause of similar perceptions
of lake Ontario with other observers. Should we
consider not external, but internal perceptions
we shall have to admit that not only the
consequence, but the cause itself cannot be subjected
to a material test. When our imagination is
building up ``castles in the air'', they have nothing in
common with material objects. They are purely
mental attributes of one man and nobody else
is capable of seeing these ``castles'' in his brain.
 The causal theory of perception is based on

the principle `ìdentical causes---identical
consequences'' and does not identify causes if they do
not produce identical consequences. Proceeding
from this principle, Polten infers that physical
and mental processes are independent of one
another and that mind is not identical with the
central nervous system. But he goes further.
Without any profound and concrete analysis he
postulates parallel existence and mutual
independence of physical and mental processes,
asserting, on the one hand, the presence of the world
_-_-_
^^1^^ E.~P. Polten, Critique of the Psycho-Physical Identity

Theory. A Refutation of Scientific Materialism and an
Establishment of Mind-Matter Dualism by Means of
Philosophy and Scientific Method, Mouton, The Hague, Paris,
1973, p.~19.
219
of ``things-in-themselves'' as the external cause

of material phenomena belonging to the sphere
of perceptions of the external world and, on the
other, the presence of the world of mental events
as ``things-in-themselves'' or the world of pure
``Myself'' as the cause of mental phenomena
belonging to the sphere of perceptions of man's
internal state.
 Having thus defined his concept, Polten, as is

often the case, begins to doubt the soundness
of the dualistic viewpoint, since he proposes in
the end to deduce the existence of the physical
world from mind: `Ànd it ought not to be
supposed that mind is anything derivative in this
relationship. On the contrary, mind matters in
perhaps every relevant sense: psychologically,
chronologically, epistemologically, logically,
normatively, and =
ontologically.''^^1^^ True, he hastens to

specify that this assertion is not substantiated in
his work which means that he adheres for the
present to a more moderate opinion seeking to
prove that mind does exist and that it is
different from matter. It goes without saying that
matter is understood by Polten in the purely
physicalist sense: `Ìt is perhaps of some interest
to note,'' he writes, ``that Feigl's physicalist
definition of existence is quite like the
Marxist-Leninist account of matter. Any Marxist text
will repeat the definition of Lenin that the sole
property of matter is the property of being
objective reality, existing outside consciousness, given
to us in sensation. Of course, even consciousness
is material for Marxists, as for =
Feigl.''^^2^^
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., pp. 21--22.
^^2^Îbid., p.~113.
220
 We do not mean to say that Polten deliberately

distorts the Marxist viewpoint. We are rather
inclined to think that Polten has rather a vague
idea of it and very scanty knowledge of the
corresponding works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin.
In any case, his views on the ``Marxist-Leninist
account of matter'' are very far from the truth.
First, the dialectical materialist concept of
matter does not coincide with the notion of the
physical as understood by Feigl, even if we compare
it with his more general interpretation of the
physical as ``physical1''. Besides objective reality,
Marxism recognises subjective reality, the reality
of senses, emotions, thoughts, ideas, etc.
Moreover, Marxism not only recognises these realities,
but demands that they be considered in their
interaction. In this context it would be in place
to recall Lenin's well known words: `Òf course,
even the antithesis of matter and mind has
absolute significance only within the bounds of a very
limited field---in this case exclusively within the
bounds of the fundamental epistemological
problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what
as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative
character of this antithesis is =
indubitable.''^^1^^
Second, Lenin's stand has very little in common
with positivist empiricism which is characteristic
of Feigl's views, since sensations to Lenin are by
no means the only source of knowledge and the
only means for the cognition of reality, but they
are indeed the only form of man's connection
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empiric-Criticism'',
Collected Works, Vol.~14, 1977, p.~147 (here and hereafter
Progress Publishers, Moscow).
221
with the surroundings and even with his own

inner world.
 Every philosopher more or less familiar with

Lenin's works knows perfectly well that Lenin
made a clear distinction between the physical
concept of matter subject to elaboration with
every new significant discovery in physics and the
philosophical or epistemological concept
representing the sole property of the infinitely diverse
objects and phenomena of the world---the
property of being an objective reality. None other
than Lenin, developing the ideas of Marx and
Engels, came out against the identification of these
different levels in the cognition of reality.
Later on we shall dwell on this aspect of the
problem at greater length but at present our point is
to emphasise that Polten's criticism of
``scientific materialism'' in the person of Feigl, Smart,
Armstrong and others distorts their viewpoints
in at least three aspects: in their attitude to
positivism, i.e. logical empiricism, in their attitude
to dialectical materialism and in the confusion
of the methodological and ontological treatment
of the mind-body problem.
 As we see, the viability of the programme of

``scientific realism'' depends primarily on its
ability to overcome the physicalist viewpoint. It is
all the more important as physicalism is in
fact entirely alien to true philosophical
materialism and seriously limits its theoretical and
methodological possibilities. Physicalism, as well
as reductionism in general, restricts the scope of
scientific investigations and tends to turn them
onto a beaten track paved with elaborate
physical theories. Everyone knows how easy it is to
tread along such tracks, yet every true scientist
222
is equally aware that the easiest way is not the

shortest one. Science which represents the
forefront of human thought has always followed and
will follow untrodden paths. Widely known are
Marx's winged words: ``There is no royal road to
science, and only those who do not dread the
fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance
of gaining its luminous =
summits.''^^1^^
 Of course, physicalism and reductionism are

not a transient phenomenon. They are not brought
about by some specific concurrence of
circumstances in scientific development, but make
themselves manifest each time the philosophers,
natural scientists or sociologists attempt to apply
certain general principles and methods of
scientific explanation beyond the sphere where
they hold good. Reductionism can be likened to
intermittent fever of scientific cognition which
seizes now this, now that field of science. It is
essentially connected with the passage from one
level of knowledge to another and plays an
important part in a scientific explanation, though it
is evidently not confined to the limits of this
cognitive pattern alone.
 Physicalism is but one of the forms of

reductionism which seeks to translate specific
phenomena and processes into the language of physical
mechanisms and laws. It should be noted that
we do not apply the terms ``physicalism'' and
``reductionism'' to scientific explanations which
reflect the laws of objective processes and fall in
line with the trends of scientific cognition. With
us, these terms always carry a negative meaning
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.~I, Progress Publishers,

Moscow, 1974, p.~30.
223
denoting an attempt to squeeze certain

phenomena into the Procrustean bed of known laws
relating to different systems and phenomena.
 The modern philosophy of science is

characterised by complex internal processes and sweeping
reappraisal of values. No sooner had Michael
Ruse published his Philosophy of Biology,
advocating reductionist and patently
logico-empiricist views, than the scientific community produced
other works, such as David Hull's Philosophy
of Biological Science which treats practically the
same range of problems, but from an entirely
new position claiming to represent the ``realistic''
approach. Contrary to Ruse who denies
theoretical biology the status of a science, Hull
proceeds from the actual status of biology in a
typically ``scientific realist'' manner. For him, the
existence of a highly ramified and systematised
biological science featuring a high level of
theoretical development needs no proof---it is
selfevident. Understandably, this initial premise lays
a foundation for an entirely different system of
reasoning.
 Defining his attitude to positivism and its

methodological programme, Hull declares that
the logico-empiricist analysis of reduction is at
best inadequate, and at worst utterly wrong. The
paradigm of physicalism proceeds from the
possibility of solving all problems at the lowest
level of analysis, i.e. at the level of quantum
mechanics, whereas biologists use not only
analysis, but also synthesis to investigate the
phenomena in interest since they deal with highly
organised living systems.
 Between the living and the dead Hull sees

not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative
224
difference. This is particularly true of man as a

living being. `Ìt is certainly true,'' he writes,
``that nothing is more obvious in the study of
nature than the existence of complexity and
levels of organisation. Now here are the levels
of organisation more stratified and the
complexity more complex than in the organic world.
But ontological levels, individuals, parts, wholes,
and so forth are hardly the 'givens' of
experience---rather these notions emerge as
phenomena are investigated and need not coincide with
common sense notions... Man is qualitatively
different from other =
species.''^^1^^ It is also indicative

that Hull stands for the independence of biology
as a science not only on the empirical, but also
on the theoretical levels recognising the right of
biology to have its own laws and theories which
have not been formulated by physics and are not
reducible to physical laws and theories. Biology,
in his opinion, provides convincing evidence that
the concept of life leaves no room for any
metaphysical entity. The ability to create and
reproduce ever more complex structures is inherent
in the elements themselves which constitute
living matter. The ascent from elementary
particles to man includes a series of different
integration levels and `ìnterruptions in development''.
Yet it is a continuous process, both in time and
space, with no ``vacuum'' to be filled with
immaterial entities. The transition from inanimate
nature to the world of living beings is so
continuous that the analysis of molecules and organels
of the cell has already got into the hands of
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ D.~Hull, Philosophy of Biological Science, Englewood

Cliffs, N.~J., 1974, p.~131.
15--1152
225
physicists. This does not mean, however, that biology

is turning into an appendage to physics and that
its field of investigations is becoming, so to
speak, a subsidiary to a more complex system.
Each level of organisation features new
properties and new laws. Not a single separate molecule
can reproduce itself. This ability is only
inherent in such a formation as cell. Yet the
emergence of life changes the rules of the game.
Natural selection makes a greater demand on a higher
level system, such as a population of cells, yet
simultaneously offers it new forming
possibilities. Living organisms remaining subject to the
laws that govern inert systems acquire new
properties which do not play any part at a lower
level. Biology calls for a new theory.
 Of certain interest is also Hull's criticism of

vitalism. In his opinion, the vitalist doctrine
results from the failure to understand the
connection between such key categories as things and
substances, on the one hand, and properties, on
the other. Life, according to Hull, is nothing but
time, space, gravitation and magnetism. To this
must be added the `òrganisational property'' of
living systems. The materialistic approach to the
problem of life is quite obvious here, at least
within the limits typical of ``scientific realism'':
Hull offers to explain life by the specific features
of the organisation of living matter itself, but
not by postulating some spirit or vital force.
Hull agrees with some anti-reductionists in that
the successful development of biology calls for
the ontology of many levels, stressing at the
same time that it is far from sufficient to divide
all reality into several layers and levels---the
main thing is to determine the specific
226
properties and laws characteristic of each of them.
 Hull's recognition of the existence of specific,

qualitatively different levels, important as it is,
cannot yet ensure the solution of the problems
facing modern biology. His approach, though
essentially materialistic, is still limited. Hull
has inherited from positivism its special accent on
cognitive structures and carries it onto static
organic structures. Yet one of the fundamental
properties of living matter at all levels consists
in its ability for development and
self-reproduction. Hence, one can hardly expect any
essential progress in the creation of theoretical biology
without a general theory of development, i.e.
dialectics. Moreover, such progress cannot be
ensured by mechanically `àpplying'' dialectics to
the analysis of living systems---it calls for a new
approach which is to be worked out by biological
science itself. It means that the processes of
differentiation should be considered in unity with
those of integration, synthesis, and that the
structural approach should be combined with the
historical one.
 In order to study differentiation phenomena,

the scientist must possess some kind of an
analytical instrument. Good headway has already been
made towards this goal in the field of
investigation of molecular-biological mechanisms. More
difficult appears to be the development of a
comprehensive approach to such regulating and
controlling systems as the endocrine or nervous
system, as it must take into account the
specificity of each system and each level of living matter.
Biology could evidently greatly benefit from the
principle of historicism which would help it to
explain the reactions of a developing organism to
15*
227
changing external conditions in terms of

adaptability, i.e. to regard the interaction of the
organism and the environment as a unity resulting
from a prolonged adaptive evolution. Without a
historical approach all reactions of an organism
may look like a heap of absurdities determined
exclusively by the.internal factors of development,
quite fortuitous at that and in no way connected
with external condition. In order to use to
advantage all available analytical means of
investigation, the biologists must first of all overcome their
prejudice against dialectics and get down in
earnest to studying its real theoretical and
methodological content from classical works permeated
with truly creative spirit.
 The results achieved in molecular biology could

not have been duly appreciated if it had not been
for the intensive development of the idea of
selfdevelopment and for the turn to Darwin's theory
of evolution. The synthesis of genetics and the
evolution theory carried out in the 1930s and
expounded by S. Chetverikov, R. Fischer,
S. Wright, and other scientists undoubtedly
played an important part in paving the way for
the ideas and methods of molecular biology. The
concept of microevolution, disputable as it is,
has had a beneficial influence on the development
of biology if only for its role in preparing
appropriate coordination between structure analysis
and evolutionary research, i.e. in the integration
of experimental biology and theoretical
investigations. It should be remembered that though
the elimination of the principles of integrity
and historism in favour of analytical methods
and means does produce an immediate effect and
gives tangible and demonstrable results, it can
228
never be anything more than just the first, though

sufficiently flexible, approximation to the truth
in the process of cognition of living organisms.
As A. Szentgj\"orgji has figuratively put it, with
reductionism employed as a universal method,
life passes, as it were, between one's fingers.
The significance of each of the above methods in
the development of modern biology can only be
assessed from the standpoint of dialectics as a
science concerned with the most general laws of
development.
 Numerous philosophers and biologists showing

interest in the above problems note the
paradoxical fact that such outstanding physicists as
Schrodinger, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Wigner have
sided of late with the most resolute opponents
of reductionism in many fields, including
biology which is far removed from their special
interests and which is regarded by some physicists
as a kind of their private domain. In making
such observations they overlook the fact that
physics has already recovered, in the main if not
completely, from this intermittent fever. There
are few physicists now who still hope to reduce
the theory of relativity in its present ``dominion''
to the principles of classical mechanics or to
translate quantum phenomena into the language
of classical Laplatian =
determinism^^1^^. It becomes
increasingly clear to scientists that reality cannot
be reduced to the totality of observable facts
and that epistemological reduction as one of the
_-_-_
^^1^^ Hopes for such a reduction were once expressed by

Einstein, and later by David Bohm and other scientists
in the hypothesis of latent parameters. Now these hopes are
considered groundless.
229
dogmas of positivism is untenable. It should be

noted in this context that physics with its
philosophical theories appears to be again far more
instructive to biology than vice versa. As regards
the approach to the problem of objectivity, the
solutions offered by physics and its philosophers
feature a notably higher standard of both
empirical and theoretical investigations.
 It looks as if experimental biology were only

approaching the stage at which it will be
confronted with the problems of the inseparable
connection between the object, subject and
instrument, and the relations between the object and
the means of measurement. So far, we have not
yet come across a philosophical work discussing
these problems in the light of experimental
investigations in biology. The theoretical level of
biological science is evidently not yet high
enough to permit a serious philosophical analysis
of the means of the objective cognition of
biological phenomena. By contrast, all these problems
are not only given extensive coverage, but are
also treated at a high theoretical level in the
literature on physical problems, e.g. in the works
by ``scientific realist'' Bunge. This philosophical
trend occupies far more advanced positions in
physics than in other fields of science.
 One of the important aspects of Bunge's
concept appears to be his analysis of the problem
of the conceptual representation of facts in
theory. In his opinion, theory can hardly be
regarded as simply an image of reality, something
like a picture. It is rather a conceptual
reconstruction of reality. Yet conceptual
representations of facts are no less objective, though
they are only partial and provide at best but an
230
approximation to the truth. Not every

theoretical construct represents something. For instance,
logical notions are not representative at all,
even if they have their referents. According to
Bunge, reference and presentation are
independent of each other, since non-referential
constructs, such as multitudes, can be used for
representation whereas non-referential constructs,
e.g. a tautology, may be completely
unrepresentative. The truth is that scientific theories
can be both referential and representative.
 The difference between the referent and the

representation is of no small significance for
philosophy. According to Bunge, biologists are more
and more frequently engaged in controversies over
which of the three biological systems is the true
referent of the synthetic theory of evolution---the
individual organism, the population or the
species. No convincing argument has been
presented so far in favour of any of the contending
theses. The difference between the referents and
the representations becomes clear in developed
sciences, such as theoretical physics. Here a
certain function probability will refer to some
system or state, whereas the values of this
function may represent certain dispositions of this
system, like, for instance, the function of mass
refers to bodies in general, whereas its
particular value will represent the mass of a given body.
In quantum mechanics each dynamic property
of a system, such as a pulse, is represented by a
certain operator in the Guilbertian space, i.e. a
given operator represents a certain property of its
referent. If the relationship of reference in factual
sciences compares constructs with things or with
aggregates of things, the relationship of
231
representation compares a construct with a certain

aspect or property of a given thing or an
aggregate of things. Hence, the purpose and the result
of a theory is not the representation of selected
aspects of alleged things. Theoretical notions are
nothing but developed mathematical structures
which cannot be defined in terms of empirical
operations or constructed as logical functions on
the basis of given observations. Empirical
checks consist of operations planned in the light
of subsequent theories. Besides the experience
bridging the gap between theory and reality, there
also exists a semantic bridge constructed with
the help of the semantic propositions of the
given theory.
 According to Bunge, the ideal of objectivity

characteristic of factual theory is preserved in
quantum mechanics to no lesser degree than in
classical mechanics. The object neither
disappears nor merges with the subject. The only change
consists in that our modern notions of
microobjects are incorporated in a whole chain of
connecting (mediating) links. ``The subject,'' notes
Bunge, ``does not occur among the basic
predicates of our version of QM [quantum mechanics].
Neither does he occur in the theory of
measurement: indeed, physical theory is unconcerned
with the psychical events going on inside the
observer's skull: a physical theory of measurement
is concerned only with the physical intersection
between two or more physical entities, at least
one of which must be a =
macrosystem.''^^1^^
_-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Philosophy of Physics, D.~Reidel

232
 From Bunge's viewpoint, the standard

formalism of quantum mechanics can be adequately
expressed in terms of physics without any
reference to the subject, i.e. psychology. In other
words, quantum mechanics can be interpreted in
the same way as classical mechanics on the
assumption that the entities referred to by theory,
such as electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. have an
independent status. That does not mean, of
course, that the experimentalist cannot modify
them, for instance, by filtering out certain states
or by providing evidence that some microsystems
are purely imaginary. Yet to achieve this aim
the experimentalist must use physical means
without summoning the ghost of the Copenhagen
school. Bunge views the observer as an entity
capable of influencing physical events with the
help of physical means either directly, through
the agency of his body, or indirectly, through the
mediation of automated devices. The physicist's
mind invents formulae used for prediction of
physical events and for interpretation of
physical phenomena under investigation and
therefore has no direct bearing on theory itself.
 For objective interpretation of quantum

mechanics Bunge proposes to free it, first, from the
notion of observable value and, second, from
subjective probability. In his opinion, it is irrelevant
to speak of an `òbservable value'', of the observer
changing it, of obtaining the true knowledge of
the observable value, etc. All of these notions
relate to the subject, as well as to some of his
actions and mental states. Typical quantum
properties are not observable (in the epistemological
sense of the word), and changeable values are
nothing but approximations to values calculated
233
theoretically. The notion of certainty is no less

alien to physical theory. The latter must contain
the objective interpretation of probability as an
ordinary physical property, but not as a degree
of faith or a measure of certainty.
 According to Bunge, the axiomatisation of the

existing quantum theory is the radical means of
its restructuring. Axiomatic substantiation should
rest on such notions as the ``microsystem'' (or
quanton), the ``surroundings'' (macro- or
microphysical systems), the ``conventional
(configurational) space'' or the ``space of states'', the ``property
of the microsystem'', the `òperator representing
it'' (the `òbservable'' in the Copenhagen version),
etc. These notions will give the quantum theory
a kind of an initial basis subject to no further
determination. The postulates of this ``realistic''
version of quantum mechanics determining each
of the initial notions must be justified by their
ability to give successful theoretical explanations
of experimental facts. Hence, axioms are
determined both formally and semantically.
Measurements only come into play at the checking stage.
As regards the properties of the microsystem
and their conceptual representation, Bunge always
strives to avoid the term `òbservable''. He
contends that, first, they cannot be perceived, though
they are amenable to indirect investigation;
second, there is no complete clarity about the
specific methods of their measurement. In Bunge's
opinion, the subject should be barred from
theoretical physics if we do not wish to confuse
it with psychology or epistemology. The subject's
role consists in constructing and checking a
theory, but not in posing as its referent. It is for
these reasons, according to Bunge, that we should
234
not use the word `òbservable'' with dynamic

variables in quantum mechanics.
 Specific parameters inherent in

quantum-mechanical systems are chance variables in the
sense that they are associated with a definite
distribution of probabilities. It is true, in
particular, of the position and momentum of a
microsystem which should rather be called a
quantum position (quosition) and a quantum
momentum (quomentum), to emphasise their
non-classical nature. Bunge points out that the function
representing the quantum state meets the axioms
of the calculation of probabilities. It means that
quantum mechanics today contains no latent
variables. According to Bunge, Bohm's
prohibition of latent variables directly ensues from the
conventional approach to the notions of the
axiomatic system and from the proof of the
chance character of all dynamic variables.
 In Bunge's opinion, the fundamentalism of

quantum mechanics can be understood in two
different ways. One way is to assume that it refers
not to an individual quanton, but to a statistical
ensemble. From this assumption it logically
follows that different components of a certain
ensemble in a given quantum state have different
values of the coordinates and of the momentum.
Yet quantum mechanics is also applicable to an
individual microsystem (e.g. to an electron
passing through a crystal grid and getting onto a
screen). The theory is not checked by means of
large quantum ensembles. Thus, a calculated
distribution of positions is compared with a
``diffraction'' pattern on the screen when the number
of collisions increases. In other words, the
function of the state (like any other chance
235
variable) refers to an individual quanton and its exact
form is checked with the help of the quanton
statistical totalities.
 The other way referred to by Bunge consists

in regarding quantum-mechanical properties as
latent or potential rather than actual, i.e. as
properties which reveal themselves in the
interaction of the system with the measuring
instrument. During this interaction the properties
become dependent on the observer, since it is in
his power to conduct or suspend the experiment.
Yet here, too, Bunge strives to free
quantummechanical properties from the subject's
influence. As a rule, a quanton has neither an
accurately defined position, nor a definite momentum,
possessing only point distributions. These
distributions change with time under the influence of
the environment irrespective of whether this
environment is included in the experiment or not.
Specifically, a quanton can be fairly well
localised in space, for which purpose it is necessary to
fulfil appropriate operations in order to prepare
a localised state. Such operations quite often take
place under natural conditions. According to
Bunge, we only repeat the experiments staged by
nature itself by fixing, for instance, the position
of the atoms or by producing a monochromatic
electron beam.
 From Bunge's viewpoint, the quantum theory

does not lend itself to an empirical interpretation
since none of its basic symbols has any
empirical content. Moreover not a single basic symbol
of quantum mechanics can be explained in
empirical terms whence it follows that the quantum
theory has no empirical content whatsoever. It
does not mean, however, that it is not testable---
236
it simply means, in Bunge's opinion, that its

facts are quantum transitions lying above the level
of sensory experience. Here Bunge somewhat
exaggerates the existing gap between classical
and quantum mechanics, sensory experience and
theory, observability and non-observability.
Though not directly observable, many
quantummechanical formalisms and symbols can at any rate
be visualised and therefore lend themselves, at
least partially, to empirical interpretation.
Besides, an empirical test involves the use of
additional theories connecting microprocesses with
macroprocesses, as well as theories explaining the
behaviour of the macrosystems included in the
process of measurement. The semantic content of
the quantum theory is thus determined not only
by the factual level reflected in theoretical
concepts, but also by concepts which can be
translated, at least partially, into the empirical
language. To be sure, this circumstance makes the
test of the quantum theory much more difficult
and is accountable for the controversies (still
going on) over the possibility of the interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Bunge strives for the
simplest and most radical solution of the problem
of objectivity in quantum mechanics proposing
complete separation of the empirical and
theoretical levels and banishment of all observable and
measurable values from theory. In point of
fact, it is the reverse of `òusting metaphysics''.
This way can hardly lead to a satisfactory result.
Just like an experiment cannot be freed from
its theoretical canvas, so the quantum theory
cannot and evidently need not be ``relieved'' of
all the observables. If compared with the stand
of the Copenhagen school, it is just the other
237
extreme, prompted by the desire to solve the problem

of objectivity in quantum mechanics by surgical
means.
 One will hardly take exception to Bunge's

contention that a notion cannot be defined as primary
or secondary outside a definite theoretical
context, that the axiomatisation of the theories of
relativity and quantum mechanics has made it
clear that they deal with objects rather than
measurements and that these theories are not
directly related to the observer and his mental
states. It is not quite clear, however, in which
way the axiomatisation of the above theories
helps to reveal their objective content or, the
more so, serves as a means for making knowledge
more objective. Nevertheless, Bunge's idea
appears to be constructive enough, particularly if the
proposed axiomatisation could be supplemented
with other methods of the objective
interpretation of the quantum theory. As we shall try to
show later, such possibilities should evidently
not be discarded.
 Besides the weaknesses noted above, Bunge's

concept is depreciated by the mutual isolation of
classical and quantum mechanics. He draws a
sharp line of demarcation between the two
theories leaving just one connecting link---the
instrument whose indications are described in
terms of classical physics but at the same time
do not yield to empirical interpretation. Here
Bunge appears to be unable to fit things to one
another and shape them into a streamlined
philosophical-methodological system. He stops in
hesitation when confronted with the need for a more
flexible, i.e. dialectical, approach to the
relationship of theories. What is needed, however, is
238
not only a more flexible apparatus to investigate

the relations and links between theories, as well
as between a theory and its empirical basis. Of
crucial importance, alongside a greater
determination to delimit theory and sensory experience,
is an effective methodological concept of
development. A concept of this kind is necessary not
only for understanding the interdependence of
the classical and quantum theories, but also for
defining the future trends of the development of
modern physics. It is very important, for
instance, to envisage the prospects of the modern
non-relativistic quantum theory and the theory
of relativity, as well as the effect of their possible
integration on the theory of elementary
particles. It is quite obvious that the solution of these
problems calls for a dialectical approach to the
analysis of modern scientific knowledge and for
abandoning the view that the quantum theory
revised in accordance with Bunge's requirements
is the ideal for all sciences. The materialistic
substantiation of the latest physical theories
cannot be complete without dialectical analysis.
It is not fortuitous that the weakness of this
link in the system of Bunge's views leads him to a
number of idealistic conclusions. As has been
shown above, Bunge's approach to the
interpretation of quantum mechanics, the general
problems of the relationship of philosophy and science,
as well as to the mind-body problem cannot
but suffer from certain eclecticism due to his
prejudice against dialectics.
 Bunge's concept features rather a contradictory

and even odd combination of the objective
understanding of probability in quantum mechanics
with the mechanistic interpretation of causality.
239
Bunge's mechanicism in this field is traceable to

his earlier works and, as his latest ideas show,
has not been completely cured. It must be
admitted that Bunge has come out with
argumentative criticism against the Machist concept of
causality and opposed the attempts of Schlick, Frank
and Mach himself to substitute functional
dependence or the connection of states for causal
relations. He repeatedly disclosed the futility of all
attempts of positivism to contrast causality and
quantum mechanics and to undermine the idea of
causality by counterposing it to Heisenberg's
correlation of uncertainties. His efforts, given a
most serious attitude to dialectics, could be very
fruitful in achieving a common goal---to give an
objective substantiation to the microworld
theory. However, Bunge has always refused to avail
himself of this methodological support.
 Bunge's stand is largely attributable to the

fact that his concept of causality is based on the
simplest form of causal relations lying on the
surface in everyday experience: the action of one
object on another. Expressing the principle of
causality in a more strict logical form, Bunge
presents it as follows: `Ìf C happens under the
same conditions, then (and only then) E is always
produced by =
it.''^^1^^ According to the author, this

formula includes all the obligatory components
of causality, namely, the conditionality of the
consequence upon the cause, the uniqueness of
the connection, the unilateral dependence of
the consequence on the cause, the constancy of
_-_-_
^^1^^ Mario Bunge, Causality. The Place of the Causal

Principle in Modern Science, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge (Mass.), 1959, pp. 48--49.
240
the connection and its genetic nature (or

productivity).
 Ascribing such features as uniqueness and

necessity to causal relations, Bunge discards by his
formula the possibility of one and the same
consequence being brought about by different causes.
In his analysis of different definitions of causality
Bunge gives preference to the one identifying the
cause with the necessary and sufficient condition.
He includes all the accompanying conditions in
the concept of the efficient cause. In his opinion,
if the accompanying conditions were contingent
upon the cause, the formula of causality would
express more than a simple, direct causal bond
and the cause would then be regarded as the
unchainer or triggerer of a =
process^^1^^. Bunge's
formula, however, complicates the problem of the
relationship of the internal and external
conditions in the analysis of some complex process,
particularly in a living organism or any developing
system. No less difficult becomes also the analysis
of the behaviour of a quantum-mechanical system
which figures prominently in Bunge's works.
 The solution to the internal-external dilemma

in the causality problem proposed by Bunge is
very, if not too, simple: he identifies both the
internal and external conditions either with
the necessary or with the sufficient conditions
required to ensure the causal process. This brings
him in obvious contradiction with his own
concept of determinism. It should be noted that
Bunge distinguishes between the principle of causality
and the principle of determinism. The latter
rests on a broader notion of ``determination''
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid.
16--1152
241
which includes the processes of simple causality.

One might infer from this stand that causality
in its simplest and clearest form must underlie
any kind of determination, including the
statistical one. Yet Bunge, though never giving
a clear-cut definition of necessity and chance,
makes it quite plain that the changes contingent
on the very nature of phenomena and resulting
from the operation of internal factors should
be regarded as the necessary ones. Chance,
according to Bunge, is what results from external
circumstances. Now let us see if this approach will
help in any way to understand the nature of
quanum-mechanical processes or throw additional
light on the problem of completeness of the
quantum theory.
 In his book on causality Bunge still regards
with favour Bohm's hypothesis of the existence of
``latent parameters'' determining the statistical
behaviour of microparticles and contends that,
once defined, they would enable the scientists
to abandon the probability interpretation of
quantum mechanics and of the behaviour of
microparticles. Yet in his Philosophy of Physics,
written later, he changes his views and offers a
different programme: to eliminate completely
the subject (psychological determinations,
measurements, observable values) from the quantum
theory. In this way he evidently seeks to
eliminate the subjective interpretation of probability
as well. To this end Bunge uses the expression
``mean value'' instead of the psychological
`èxpectation value'' and prefers the terminology of
probability of quanton's presence in a given volume
to the vocabulary of the Copenhagen school and
Percy Bridgeman's operationalist concept
242
``(presence is a given volume when the measurement

is practically completed''). Bunge goes even as
far as substituting the terms ``scatter'' and
``spread'' for `ùncertainty'' and `ìndeterminacy''.
 Here, however, a tricky question suggests

itself: is it to be inferred that a statistical process
proceeding at a certain level of the organisation
of matter is a direct effect of the cause operating
at a deeper level? Schrodinger's equation is
known to be in some sense mechanistic, just like
Newton's. Both equations describe the changes
caused by external effects, yet the latter, unlike
the former, represents a simple causal
relationship. The quantisation of states brings in a new
qualitative element which distinguishes modern
from classical mechanics. The essential difference
consists in that the former equation regards
matter as a wave process, whereas the latter one
treats it as the totality of particles. The difference
here is brought about by the inner quality and
not by external forces. Yet in both situations the
principle of causality is used to explain motion
in terms of mechanics (wave mechanics and
classical mechanics respectively). Should it be
assumed, then, that simple causality rejected at
one level owing to statistical interpretation must
be restored at the next basic level as being better
suited for the explanation and prediction of
processes?
 When we pass on to microprocesses, we
encounter a relative increase in the role of internal
factors and a corresponding decrease in the role
of external factors in determining the properties
of physical systems. Here again, how are we to
tally necessity resulting, according to Bunge,
from the operation of internal factors of physical
16*
243
and all other phenomena, and chance regarded

by him as a totality of external conditions with
the view that any future theory explaining the
mechanical displacement of microparticles in
space and time will be a statistical theory?
 Suppose now we still hope that one fine day

it will prove possible to describe the behaviour
of microparticles in terms of simple causal
relations. All the same, the lessons taught by
quantum mechanics have not been lost on us
and we now understand that causality need not
at all be rigidly and for ever linked with
necessity and that necessity, for that matter, cannot
be divorced from chance, except by the sheer
force of abstraction from concrete conditions.
Hence, any causal connection includes both
necessity and chance. If that is so, as surely
it is, causality can never be separated from
probability unless it is viewed as a fixed
relationship, something in the nature of a bronze casting,
which cannot be different from what it is.
 So, we are again bound to come to the

conclusion that disregard for dialectics and the inapt
use of its instruments let down even the most
talented representatives of ``scientific realism''
and account, directly or indirectly, for their
inconsistencies and concessions to idealism despite
the ostensibly materialistic premises of their
concepts.
[244]
__NUMERIC_LVL1__
CHAPTER THREE
__ALPHA_LVL1__
DIALECTICAL BEARINGS
__ALPHA_LVL2__
1. OVERCOMING HEGEL
 While assessing the significance of various
schools of the modern philosophy of science and
comparing their programmes and views on
fundamental methodological problems, we have
never missed an opportunity to outline, if only
schematically, the attitude of dialectical
materialism (or materialistic dialectics) to each issue
under consideration. Now, in order to characterise
materialistic dialectics as an alternative to
positivism, we ought to take a somewhat closer
look at its basic concepts and present them in
a broader perspective.
 Of course, it would be presumptuous even to

attempt to give an exhaustive account of Marxist
philosophy within the scope of this publication.
We shall therefore confine ourselves to the
relationship of philosophy and special sciences, the
objectivity of scientific knowledge and causality,
i.e. to the main problems which we have already
discussed in connection with the crisis of
245
positivism and with the programmes of alternative

doctrines within the framework of the modern
philosophy of science and which constitute, as
we have shown, the core of any methodological
programme.
 From its very first steps Marxist philosophy,

continuing the materialistic and dialectical
traditions of all previous philosophy has been the
antipode of positivism. There is no need to
reproduce here the history of their struggle, the
more so as its outcome is well known. The prestige
of materialistic dialectics as the methodology of
cognition and as the world view is steadily
growing, winning over to its side the most
prominent representatives of modern science.
Marxist philosophy, assimilating every new
achievement of social and scientific progress and
constantly enriching itself, is extending its influence
to ever new regions of the world, the only means
of its `èxpansion'' being, as before, the logic of
truth. It is precisely this logic, confirmed by life
itself, that underlies its high scientific repute.
By contrast, positivist philosophy, represented
now by a dozen or so of its champions, the living
relics of the past, is undergoing a profound
ideological crisis evidently marking the closing stage
of its history.
 The dramatic story of the struggle between
Marxist philosophy and various trends of
positivism suggests certain conclusions which appear
to be particularly instructive in the light of the
present-day debate on the methodology of
scientific cognition, as they are directly related to the
main controversial issues. In this connection
special importance attaches to the difference
between the Marxist and positivist views on the
246
relation of philosophy to special sciences, as

well as on the relation of science in general to
the unscientific forms of consciousness.
 As we have earlier indicated, one of the key

points in the programmes of all positivist schools
without exception has always been the opposition
to metaphysics, i.e. to everything that passes
beyond the limits of scientific knowledge. Indeed,
the only difference between the successive stages
or phases of the evolution of positivism consisted,
perhaps, in the difference of the concepts of
scientificity and, consequently, in different lines
of demarcation between science and ``non-science''.
 This circumstance, however, has nothing to

do with the ill luck of positivist philosophy,
since the delimitation of these two spheres of
human and social consciousness is indeed
absolutely necessary. No one in our time, except,
perhaps, theologists (who are not averse to
partaking in the fruit of science either), would raise
any objections to the separation of science and
religion if only for the simple reason that they
represent entirely different forms of social
consciousness with their own traditions, specific
features and functions in society, not to speak
of the religious prejudices that have always been
a formidable obstacle in the way of scientific
progress.
 Besides religion, there exist other forms of

nonscientific consciousness, such as, for instance,
aesthetic consciousness and ``common sense''.
They should also be distinguished from science
as such, though there is no sharp line of
demarcation between them. Indeed, scientific knowledge
grows on the rich soil of man's everyday
experience, and the artistic perception of the world
247
inspires creative scientific endeavour. It would
be impossible to understand science, its origin,
motive forces and the nature of scientific
thinking itself if we left out of account the blood
vessels connecting science with living humanity,
its everyday needs and aspirations, as well as
the enormous wealth of labour experience
accumulated by mankind. Said Goethe: `Àll theory,
dear friend, is grey, but the golden tree of actual
life springs ever green.''
 The fact that the links between science and the
arts have not yet been properly explored gives no
grounds for ignoring their obvious mutually
beneficial influence. On the contrary, the more
complex and uncommon their relations, the greater
should be the philosophers' desire to get at the
root of their extraordinary alliance, since they
may find there a clue to the mystery of human
thinking. The discoveries that may await them
on this path are being eagerly looked forward
to by science, as they will essentially affect the
further course of scientific and technological
progress, rationalise the development of
technology and raise the intellectual standards of
human life.
 There is no need to discuss these problems in

detail, since our purpose at present is to
underscore the importance of demarcating science and
non-scientific knowledge. However, such a
demarcation cannot be an aim in itself. The close
links existing between science and everyday
life, science and the arts, common sense and true
knowledge, as well as between science and other
fields of social life indicate that it should be
but a preliminary stage for further investigations.
When social life and social consciousness are
248
divided respectively into more or less

independent spheres and forms, the next step will be to
focus our attention on their interconnection.
This stage, however, will hardly be the final
one either, since the investigation of their links
will lead to a more profound and concrete
understanding of differences between them. This
process, alas, has no end, just like the process of
cognition in general.
 We may sound not very optimistic, but one

of the tasks of science, as distinct from religion
and other forms of myths consists in giving man
correct ideas of himself and of the surrounding
world, the ideas that would be concrete,
connected with reality and therefore testable, rather
than in his illusory consolation. As to the arts
and common sense, science differs from them
by the precision of its statements, accuracy of
calculations and forecasts, as well as by the
reliability of its conclusions.
 As is seen from these considerations, very

general and sketchy as they are, the nature of
scientific knowledge can only be understood after
it is singled out of other forms of human
consciousness and presented as- a historical process,
i.e. with its essential links, both logical and
historical. It should be noted that the rapid
scientific development over the past decades
and the crucial changes of many fundamental
concepts of the world have exposed the links
between science and other social activities and
made their interdependence common knowledge.
The immaturity of these links in the period of
the inception of positivism, however, cannot
justify this philosophy for their methodological
distortion, particularly at the later stages of
249
its evolution when these links became more

apparent.
 As early as the beginning of the 19th century

Hegel defined the basic principles underlying
the approach to this question. These principles,
though in idealistic attire, carried profound
dialectical meaning which ensured their viability
till our time. All that was needed (in Hegel's
time at any rate) in order to solve in principle
the problem of the relationship of science to
the non-scientific forms of human consciousness
was dialectics. It was to show the complexity and
the contradictory nature of this relationship: on
the one hand, the opposition of science and
religion, of scientific and pictorial thinking, intuition
and logic, practice and theory; on the other, the
diversity of bonds, mediating and intermediate
links, as well as the transitions from one form
of consciousness to another.
 The question of the scientific value of

philosophy aroused Hegel's special interest. In 1802,
he emphasised the importance of this question
in the Critical Philosophical Journal and
discussed the attitude to it on the part of Kant and
Fichte. ``Philosophy,'' wrote Hegel, ``since it is
to be Ordered Knowledge, cannot borrow its
Method from a subordinate science, such as =
Mathematics.''^^1^^ In his opinion, philosophy was

capable of being an objective, conclusive science
based on the immanent development of the
notion and the absolute method of =
knowledge.^^2^^
The content of logic as the highest type of
philosophical science is its scientific method, the
_-_-_
^^1^^ Hegel's Science of Logic, Vol.~1, George Allen &

Unwin, Ltd., London, 1929, p.~36.
^^2^Îbid., pp. 36--37.
250
notion of science itself which is its ultimate

result, as well as the concept of its
subject-matter, thinking in concepts which `ìs engendered
in the course of development of the Science, and
therefore cannot precede =
it''.^^1^^ According to Hegel,

the one and only thing for securing scientific
progress is understanding that the method of
logic is spontaneous development of its content
and that its essence is a dialectical, i.e. definite =
negation.^^2^^
 Having mastered Hegel's dialectics, Marx and

Engels gave a profound comparative analysis of
their own and Hegel's views proceeding from the
materialistic idea of the primacy of social being
over social consciousness, of the determination
of consciousness, its content and structure by
the content and structure of the social, practical
activity of man. Reuniting dialectics and
materialism, Marx and Engels turned dialectics into
a real science, and this in the terms that have
preserved their validity till nowadays:
objectivity, connection with reality and testability of
its propositions in practice. Having retained
the universality of logical categories and
principles, materialist dialectics at the same time
got rid of the speculativeness, scholasticism and
abstractness which were characteristic of German
classical philosophy.
 Disclosing the mystified form of Hegelian
dialectics in his Economic Manuscripts of 1857--1859,
Marx described his own method as being the
direct opposite of the Hegelian method. One
of the features of Marx's method, also contrasting
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~53.
^^2^Îbid., pp. 64--65.
251
with Hegel's idealistic dialectics, consisted,

according to Marx, in that it ``leads from abstract
definitions by way of reasoning to the
reproduction of the concrete situation,~... as a summing-up,
a result, and not as the starting =
point.''^^1^^
 The categories and laws of materialistic

dialectics are indeed universal and in this sense
irrefutable. Yet their status is entirely different from
the status of a priori, absolute Hegelian ideas.
The universality of the categories and laws of
dialectics interpreted materialistically does not
mean that they can be used everywhere, at all
times, in all cases and under any circumstances.
They are only universal in the sense that they
apply to all fields of reality, namely, to nature,
society and thinking. When we say that they are
universally confirmable, we mean that they are
confirmed in all fields of reality. This, and only
this is the meaning of `ùniversality''
characterising dialectical laws and categories. Of course,
such an understanding of universality limits
the competence of philosophy which claimed
to be the science of sciences by denying it the
right to explain or analyse every individual
object or phenomena, every relationship or
dependence. One can speak of dialectics as the science of
sciences in a figurative sense only, meaning that
it rises above particulars, trivial problems and
petty everyday situations. If Marx and Engels
had not risen above their surroundings, they
would hardly have managed to discern the essence
of capitalism, its basic laws and working of
hidden mechanisms behind the Mont Blanc of
_-_-_
^^1^^ K.~Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. ~206.
252
individual facts. Moreover, had they not risen above

reality, they would not have been able to see
the outlines of future human society.
 This ``looking from above'' has nothing in

common with ``looking down'' upon something and
does not by any means imply a derogatory
attitude to specialised sciences, everyday human life
and their specific reflection in human
consciousness. It is rather an epistemological position
indicative of the relative independence of
philosophical knowledge and of the specific character
of the subject-matter of dialectics as a science.
Philosophy and dialectics should be concerned
with more general problems than those which
come within the scope of special sciences.
 It stands to reason that the links and

relationships connecting the most general properties of
objects and phenomena of reality are different
from those connecting specific objects and
phenomena. They constitute a specific field of
knowledge which cannot be covered in full measure
by physics, chemistry, biology, history or any
other particular sciences. On the other hand, the
tree of science would hardly be able to flourish
without its crown transforming the power and
tenacity of philosophical ideas into the energy
of scientific cognition.
 Having preserved the universality of dialectical

categories which reflect eternal human problems
and link the wonderings of man's spirit in the
depths of outer space, atom or living cell with
his earthly existence, Marxism has shown at
the same time the real connection of most general
philosophical problems with man's social life,
practical activity and problems of special
sciences. In that sense Marxism revealed the specific
253
nature of philosophical categories and,

consequently, showed the way to test them, i.e. to
confirm true ideas and views and to refute false
ones. This idea of the unity of the universality
(abstractness) of philosophical knowledge and its
concreteness was beyond Hegel's understanding
owing to the speculativeness of his philosophy,
its detachment from real (material) being rooted
in the conception of the identity of being and
thinking. This idea, however, is also beyond the
comprehension of modern positivism with its
fixation on the direct empirical testing of any
scientific knowledge and obsession with the
struggle against ``metaphysics'' condemned
together with dialectics by the positivist court of
``verification'' or ``falsification''.
 The irony consists in that dialectics which had

provided the real basis for alliance between
philosophy and science way back by the middle
of the 19th century has become one of the main
objects of positivist attacks against metaphysics
and speculativeness. One of the greatest
achievements of human mind was treated by the
``philosophy of science'' equally with religion and
other distorted forms of social consciousness.
Fighting against dialectics and striving to tear it
away from science, positivism was at the same
time pretending to give a correct explanation of
the nature and essence of scientific cognition,
distinguish science from other forms of human
activity and delimit religion and mythology.
It is this paradox that lies at the root of all the
misfortunes of positivism.
 The evolution of positivism, which is now

almost one and a half century old, has not brought
about any appreciable change in its attitude to
254
dialectics. Spencer and Comte underscored the

empirical untestability of the categories and
laws of dialectics. Mach and Avenarius opposed
the dialectics of Marx and Engels even more
uncompromisingly. Attempting to disprove
dialectics, the logical positivists have seized upon
the criterion of verification, and their arguments,
if only slightly modified, are now currently used
by all modern representatives of the philosophy
of science. They allege, for instance, that
dialectics is being substantiated by non-scientific
methods and that its propositions are just
illustrated by examples instead of being
mathematically correlated with experience. In support of
their charges they usually refer to textbooks on
philosophy which sometimes do expound
dialectics in an oversimplified didactic manner. Such
accusations, however, cannot be taken seriously.
Criticism of dialectics requires a far more
profound knowledge of the subject than just
superficial acquaintance with students' aids.
 The real thrust of positivist criticism consists

in the contention that dialectics is nothing but
natural philosophy, since it concerns itself with
the most general laws of being. A philosopher,
according to positivism, has no right to express
his views not only on reality as a whole, but
even on any of its components. One of the most
serious positivist arguments against dialectics
is the assertion that it has no empirical content
and that its propositions are nonsensical in
cognitive terms. According to the positivist
critics, this conclusion is borne out by the
impossibility of any empirical verification of
dialectical statements.
 It is commonly argued in present-day positivist
255
literature that dialectics does not disprove

anything and that its propositions are universally
confirmable, i.e. not falsifiable. In contrast to
Russell, Schlickand Wittgenstein who underscored
the empirical non-testability, non-verifiability
of dialectics and therefore qualified it as
metaphysics, Popper and his numerous followers apply
a different criterion in the assessment of
dialectics. Yet one would vainly expect them to
recognise it as the methodology of scientific cognition.
Significantly, in Popper's system which is based
on an entirely different and even, in a sense, the
opposite approach to the problem of testability
of scientific knowledge dialectics, nevertheless,
is again classified as ``metaphysics'', this time,
however, on different grounds: since the `Òccam
razor'' for Popper is falsifiability, he condemns
dialectics for universal confirmability or
nonfalsifiability of its propositions and principles.
 In Popper's opinion, no facts can be cited

which would run counter to the, principles of
dialectics, if only potentially. At the same time,
dialectical statements are not analytical like
those of logic or mathematics. Their fallacy
therefore is inherent and can be neither circumvented,
nor neutralised. That, according to ``critical
rationalism'', means that dialectics is just another
kind of metaphysics and its statements have but
a semblance of empirical content. However,
Popper's prolonged debate with the Vienna school
was bound to effect a serious change in his views
and to make him reproduce increasingly, though
unconsciously, the ideas of German classical
and, in particular, Hegelian dialectics. The
more anti-positivistic he became, the louder
sounded the Hegelian notes in his concept of
256
objective knowledge, `ìnherent'' knowledge,

cosmic, physical, biological and cultural evolution.
Popper's militant anti-historicism was giving way
to evolutionism, etc. Seeking a clue to Popper's
spontaneous gravitation to Hegelian
metaphysics, one should take into account the similarity
of the situations in European bourgeois
philosophy in the middle of the 20th and the early
19th centuries. Like Hegel's dialectics born in
the midst of the struggle against the
mechanical-naturalistic and empirical-phenomenological
forms of philosophy, as well as against the
reductionist concepts of consciousness, Popper's
evolution towards the dialectical forms of thought takes
place in the atmosphere of criticism of the
mechanistic dogmas of neopositivism: the
static-cumulativistic concept of science, the empirical
and inductivist methodology, the physicalist
theory of cognition, etc.
 Referring to the universality of dialectical

categories and laws, representatives of the
modern ``philosophy of science'' speak of the
triviality of its conclusions. In their opinion, dialectics
applicable to all cognitive situations without
exception is nothing but a set of tautological
assertions which give no grounds for any
differentiations and, consequently, are devoid of
analytical possibilities.
 They further argue that a philosopher does not

base his conclusions on sensory data and does
not resort to an experiment. He can only reason
within the limits of his professional capability.
Hence the conclusion: philosophy must not claim
to be anything more than logic. Since formal logic
is the development of its own postulates and not
related in any way to the outer world, it must not
17--1152
257
be regarded as knowledge of anything. The

logician and, consequently, the philosopher must
look after the scientist ensuring that his formal
calculations are not nonsensical, but the
calculations themselves should be based on linguistic
agreements. ``For the philosopher, as an analyst,''
writes Ayer, `ìs not directly concerned with
the physical properties of things. He is concerned
only with the way in which we speak about them...
Philosophy is a department of logic. For we shall
see that the characteristic mark of a purely
logical inquiry is that it is concerned with the
formal consequences of our definitions and not
with questions of empirical =
fact.''^^1^^
 Whatever the viewpoints as to the scientific

value of various propositions (verification or
falsification), the difference between them
consists in the adherence to a definite method of
comparing such propositions with sensory
experience. Laying aside the details, i.e. the question
of the methods of checking which are in fact
diametrically opposite in each of the concepts
and equally one-sided, each concept centres
around the problem of testability, at least in
principle, of various statements and refutability
of false ideas.
 It stands to reason that Marxist philosophy

also regards the testability of any assertion,
i.e. its confirmability or refutability, as the main
criterion of scientific knowledge. Marxism holds
that the testability of propositions presupposes
their concreteness and meaningfulness, and this
is just the crux of the matter.
_-_-_
^^1^^ A.~J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, op. tit.,

p.~76.
258
 If philosophy is a system of abstract knowledge,

the testability of its propositions, in contrast to
specialised or positive sciences, is entirely out
of the question. Since the categories, laws and
principles of dialectics and materialism are
indeed expressed in abstract terms, positivism
may seem to be justified in asserting that
dialectical propositions are nonsensical, unscientific
and metaphysical.
 True, the categories of materialistic dialectics

are the most abstract, i.e. the most general
concepts which constitute the initial postulates
not only in the system of special knowledge, but
also in philosophy itself. ``These are the ultimate,
most comprehensive concepts,'' Lenin wrote,
``which epistemology has in point of fact so far
not surpassed (apart from changes in nomenclature,
which are always =
possible).''^^1^^ These Lenin's words

characterising the concepts of matter and
consciousness are fully applicable to many other
categories of dialectics. They cannot be deduced in
a purely logical way, \à~la Hegel, from other
concepts---they are abstracted from reality itself
and raised to a level of universal philosophical
generalisations on the basis of centuries-old
human experience and scientific knowledge.
 Indeed, if we identify the concrete with sensory

experience and regard as concrete an individual
object or a phenomenon given us in direct sense
perceptions dialectics will inevitably appear as
an abstract science, a field of abstract knowledge
free from any sensory experience and concreteness
since it is far removed from the sensuous world and
_-_-_

Collected Works, Vol.~14, 1977, p.~146.
17*
259
is least of all concerned with individual

phenomena and objects concentrating primarily on their
general properties and relations. It is just this
understanding of the abstract and the concrete
in which the former represents the universal
properties and relations, and the latter, the
sensually perceived individual objects, that is
prevalent in literature and underlies the attempts
to counterpose philosophy and special sciences.
 Before we proceed to philosophical categories,

let us have a closer look at the most concrete,
at first sight, knowledge, the knowledge of what
is given us in everyday sensory experience, and
see how concrete and, consequently, testable it is.
 What can be said about sensory experience

as the primary source of our knowledge? If we
are to rely upon it for its critical and informative
values as proposed by positivism, it must be
the real standard of clarity and we should have
no doubt as regards its content or possible limits.
Yet the very first pages of Hegel's Phenomenology
of Spirit show that there is nothing more obscure
than sensory experience. If we want to get pure
sensory experience and abstract from all rational
elements, all ``structures'' of the mind, we shall
find ourselves in possession not of the richest, but
of the poorest content conceivable. We shall
have to throw away all universal or rational
forms, all categories such as ``quality'',
``contradiction'', ``necessity'', ``matter'', etc. in order to
find absolutely possible pure ``this'', ``here'', ``now''.
 Having arrived at this point, we shall realise

that instead of a well of knowledge we have got
an iridescent soap bubble ready to burst under
the slightest whiff of scientific air and absolutely
empty at that. What we find, writes Hegel, is in
260
itself unstable and indefinite, since even with

a minor change of our view or attention we find
a different ``this---here---now.'' However, even
these categories must preserve some remnant
of the abstract, if they are to have any sense at
all. ``This'', ``here'' and ``now'' turn out to be the
least definite of all categories when we attempt
to define or fix them with the help of experience.
They acquire their stable meaning due to the
work of mind only.
 Hegel's concepts of the abstract and the

concrete are much more refined and promising, if
only for the fact that he does not necessarily
connect the concrete with sensual perception.
A ``murderer'' is an abstract definition for a crowd
of idlers not because it is a legal notion abstracted
from man's other definitions (though it is also
true), but mainly because he ceases to be anything
else but a murderer for an onlooker watching the
execution. `À handsome murderer? Can one think
so badly, can one call a murderer =
handsome?''^^1^^
His personality with all the richness of his life,
his appearance, upbringing, etc. are all squeezed
into a single definition severing all other ties
and relations with the world. The abstract for
Hegel is the separate, isolated, alienated from
the multitude of ties and relations of an object.
By contrast, the concrete is the richness of the
fully reproduced properties and qualities in
their totality. According to Hegel, a wise judge
of human heart thinking in concrete terms will
consider the entire course of events shaping the
criminal's character, trace the influence of bad
_-_-_
^^1^^ G. W. F. Hegel, S\"amtliche Werke, Band 20,

Stuttgart, 1930, S.~447--48.
261
relations between his father and mother on his

life and his upbringing, reveal, perhaps, the
injustice or cruelty to which he was exposed, etc.
 Hegel evidently intended to reconcile society

with itself, the society ``which, on the one hand,
disregards abstract thinking without suffering
the pangs of remorse, and, on the other, feels
at heart certain respect for it as for something
elevated, and avoids it not because of contempt
for it but because of glorification, not because
it seems something commonplace but because
it is taken for something notable or, on the
contrary, for something =
special''.^^1^^
 Yet Hegel's irony which, for that matter,

permeates his entire article, is too obvious to
make the opponents of the abstract more tolerant.
The examples of the average man's concrete
thinking displayed by Hegel are too unattractive
to make his eulogy of concrete thinking flattering
for the champions of empirical concreteness. Here
Hegel hasn't got the slightest chance to win their
sympathy. It is the more regrettable as even this
publicistic article is, in fact, very instructive.
Hegel convincingly shows that what appears at
first sight very concrete knowledge with lots of
down-to-earth and juicy details turns out to be
extremely incomplete, i.e. abstract.
 True, Hegel hardly shows here the depth of

the abstract, the concreteness of general
determinations. The abstract and the concrete do not
yet merge in organic synthesis. They are still held
apart by the idea that knowledge can be concrete
and abstract and that abstract knowledge can
pass into concrete knowledge through ever more
substantive determinations. We should not,
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., S.~447.
262
however, demand too much from Hegel. What he

said gives grounds for further inferences and
suggests, if only implicitly, new ideas. Hegel
is known to be helpful in overcoming Hegel and
in enabling his successors to open up new
horizons, standing on his own shoulders.
 Hence, none other than Hegel enables us to

make the first critical remark about positivism:
the highest positivist criterion of meaningfulness
^nd scientificity proves itself to be extremely
indefinite and badly needing clarification. Yet
neither definiteness, nor clarity can be borrowed
from the formal logic which is nothing but a set
of conventional rules for formulating statements.
Of course, sensory experience can play the part
of a cognitive method, but it can only be defined
and harmonised within a broader rational system,
such as the one conceived by Hegel, but not within
sensory experience itself or the logical syntax.
Positivism strives, so to speak, to freeze
arbitrarily the cognitive method at one of the levels,
important though it may be.
 Since the criterion of sensory experience is itself

uncertain, one should not be surprised at the
controversies flaring up now and again within
positivist philosophy over the nature of experience.
Experience was first believed to consist of
fragmentary sensory data. Later it became clear that
such fragments were themselves abstractions
singled out by the mind from more concrete and
continuous whole. What were then the pure sense
data? Were they to include relations having
different abstract components?
 Nor was it clear which categories expected

to be discovered within the sphere of pure
experience were genuine, and which were purely
263
logical, i.e. verbal structures. More, was sensory

experience to be regarded as the manifestation of
something called ``qualities'' (if this term had
any meaning at all at the given level) and wasn't
even the most primitive experience mingled
with our conviction surfacing, for instance, in the
vagueness of assertions and statements on facts
and situations? Finally, whence the assurance
that sensory experience was to be placed in the
foreground?
 It is again Hegel who helps us reveal this

important omission of positivist philosophy. The
mind is denied the ability to comprehend reality,
since every statement about reality must, by
force of its synthetic nature, express pure chance,
and the mind does not produce anything but only
elaborates the conclusions obtained from clear
verbal statements. For Hegel, statements of
chance represent but a moment which is barren
of any thought and signifies that mind has already
completed its work.
 Positivism, on the contrary, regards as

meaningful only those statements which relate to
accidental (or probable) facts. Yet to point out
a fact does not mean to comprehend it. A
synthetic statement a posteriori is nothing but a
record of what has occurred, but it has no
explaining force. Such statements cannot become
explanatory through generalisation processes. They
remain synthetic irrespective of whether they
refer to one, some, most or all objects. A statement
which is now called law remains a simple
assertion that something is accidental and gives no
understanding of the causes of the given
occurrence.
 It is obvious that the process of generalisation
264
enhances the ``force of prediction''. To speak of

the object as a whole is to give a more reliable
prediction of the future state of affairs. Yet the
ability for prediction is something different
from comprehension. Even if we eventually
succeeded, through hard work, in obtaining
generalisations covering the broadest possible field of
events and were able to predict the course of
every experiment, we would not take a single
step towards understanding any of them.
 The function of the mind, according to Hegel,

is neither the singling out of tautological
statements, nor the generalisation of synthetic
statements of facts. Its function is comprehension.
Rational comprehension for Hegel results from at
least two factors: the ontological status of the
mind and the impossibility to find something
which can be completely determinable or
completely comprehensible. The first factor prevents
logic from being conventional and purely verbal,
the second factor does not allow it to bog down
at the very beginning.
 One of the obvious meanings of the concept

``concreteness'' is that our knowledge reflects
empirical objective reality and that every notion,
judgement or scientific theory has quite definite
objective content which we call empirical. The
empirical concreteness of our knowledge is its
conformity with sensory experience. Our
everyday experience, practical activity, the
experimental side of scientific cognition evidently
possess the highest degree of empirical
concreteness. But does it mean that empirical concreteness
is not inherent in the theoretical knowledge of
special sciences? Besides, can we make a
categorical assertion that the knowledge resulting
265
from empirical investigation is really the most

concrete knowledge? It is indeed concrete in the
sense that it is close to reality and rich in detail
and colour. Yet one cannot help feeling that such
knowledge of details can very easily turn into
a useless toy if it fails to distinguish the main,
the significant, the essential, the necessary.
 The empirical knowledge of separate isolated

facts permits tearing out individual parts or
features of a whole and turning them into an
absolute, a senseless abstraction. If the concrete
is understood as the direct connection with the
objective world, as the exact reproduction of
sensually perceived properties and sides of an
object, such knowledge will be the most concrete.
On the other hand, if concreteness is understood
as the fullness of all determinations of an object
or a phenomenon, as a unity in the diversity or
a diversity in the unity, such knowledge should
be regarded with good reason as abstract.
Conversely, if abstract knowledge is characterised
by the separation, isolation of one or another
element from the totality of other determinations,
empirical knowledge which does not reveal all
links and relations of a given object with the
multitude of other objects can also be called
abstract, sometimes even in the worst sense of
this word.
 A purely empirical idea of a tree growing under
my window and having, for instance, slightly
drooping branches, a trunk reaching the height
of the first floor and covered with grey-green bark,
with light-green buds on its branches the size of
a wheat grain, etc. will be an abstract description
despite the fact that I could add to it lots of such
details which are known to no one but myself,
266
since this tree was and will hardly be interesting

for anyone as a possible object of an empirical
description.
 Hence, the concepts of the concrete and the

abstract themselves need a serious analysis.
A detailed description of a tree growing in front
of my window and presented to me in all its
sensual concreteness turns out to be quite abstract
since my detailed description based entirely on
the sense-perceptions of the colour of the bark,
buds, the shape of the crown, the size of the
trunk, etc. will hardly be helpful in determining
its species. Any student of biology will find my
description non-scientific and abstract as it
covers millions of trees in the middle part of
Russia. Hence, an empirical description can be
justly regarded as abstract, arbitrarily
subjective, non-scientific etc. since it does not permit
distinguishing with certainty one object from
a multitude of others.
 As we see, even a very detailed description

of the external side of objects and phenomena can
.far from always be regarded as concrete knowledge
without any reservations. It moans that the
direct relationship between knowledge and
reality, i.e. the sensual basis of knowledge, is not
yet sufficient to make it concrete. Such
knowledge is still incomplete and inaccurate since
it reflects but partially the real links and relations
between a given object and a multitude of others.
As to the reflection of the internal properties,;
bonds, contradictions and laws governing the
development of this object, such knowledge is
even less satisfactory. Consequently, the
knowledge of separate observable objects and
phenomena, their properties and sides can be regarded
267
both as concrete, in the sense that it is directly

related to reality, and as abstract (theoretically
abstract), in the sense that it does not reveal
the latent processes and internal laws and does
not single out the main, the essential.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
2. MARX AND THE PROBLEM
 OF CONCRETE KNOWLEDGE
 Now we come to the problem of concreteness

in theoretical knowledge. If the scientific value
of knowledge, the possibility of its verification
and practical use derives from its concreteness,
direct relation to objective reality, then the
striving of scientists for ever broader
generalisations, for universal statements and conclusions
must seem strange indeed, since the more general
a statement, the farther it is removed from
individual (empirically concrete) objects and
phenomena. Again, it is evidently not without
reason that theoretical notions and ideas are
commonly believed to be abstract. And this would
indeed be so if we identified concreteness with
just one kind of it---empirical concreteness.
 Of course, it would not be correct to deny

concreteness to sensual perceptions. Yet in dialectical
logic the concrete is by no means tantamount
to the ``sensually perceptible''. The concrete in
dialectics is regarded as a unity in diversity, as
a full representation of different aspects and
relations of objects and phenomena and, understood like
this, is one of the central categories of logic, an
expression of the real general, multidimensional
which is inherent both in reality and in our
knowledge. Another aspect of the concrete is
that it represents the objective diversity of a
268
whole object, the totality of all its relations, both

internal and external.
 As regards the abstract as a logical or

epistemological category, it expresses not only the specific
distinction of thinking from reality and its
sensual perception, but also represents a form of
development common to both reality and
cognition. In Marx, the problem of the relation of the
abstract to the concrete includes not only the
.relation of thought to the sensually perceptible
but also the problem of the internal division of
any object and its theoretical reproduction in
the movement of notions. The question of the
relation of the abstract to the concrete presents
itself in two aspects: first, as the relation between
partial and limited knowledge to fuller
knowledge and, second, as the relation of the whole
to its own moments standing out objectively in
its =
content.^^1^^
 For Marx, the abstract and the concrete express

internal contradictions, the movement of which
is the life of the object of investigation. It is
. not a pure epistemological definition of the
methods of work of the human brain in which one
element (the concrete) can be identified with a sense
perception, and the other element (the abstract),
with the theoretical generalisation of the data
of sensual experience. It is not a simple definition
of the different poles of cognitive activity, even
if they are regarded as connected with each other,
but also an expression of the internal separation
of objects and links between separate sides and
phenomena existing objectively outside and *
_-_-_
^^1^^ For detailed analysis of this question see E.~V.

Ilyenkov, The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in
Marx's ``Capital'', Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982.
269
independently of human consciousness. Hence, the

abstract, according to Marx, can express both
the particular and the general to the extent
to which these sides stand out objectively in the
whole and represent internally dependent, but
externally isolated formations.
 Engels shows the same understanding of the

categories of the abstract and the concrete. For
him, the formation of general concepts is the
process of abstraction from the multitude of
inessential properties, features, objects and
phenomena and of the retention of their common,
stable, essential properties and features. On the
other hand, the formation of theoretical concepts
is at the same time a process of concretisation,
integration, enrichment and retention in thought
of the real content of all relations and links
embraced by the given concept. It was Engels who
defined exhaustive knowledge as the
transformation of the single (concrete) into the universal
(abstraction, law) and maintained that the ``general
law'' of change of the form of motion is much more
concrete than any single ``concrete'' example of it.
 According to Marx, the coordination and

combination of abstractions, the ascent from
the simple to the complex is not the mental
reproduction of the concrete. ``... The method of
advancing from the abstract to the concrete,'' he
wrote, `ìs simply the way in which thinking
assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a
concrete mental category. This is, however, by no
means the process of evolution of the concrete
world =
itself.''^^1^^ Hence, Marx regards the concrete
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political

Economy, op. cit., p.~206.
270
as the unity of diverse aspects and as diverse

aspects of the unity both in reality itself and
in cognition. It is true of dialectically
interpreted laws and abstractions, as well as of the
particular phenomena they reflect. If an investigator
proceeding from a general abstract law does
not lose sight of the actual circumstances
conditioning the operation of this law, if he takes
into account the interdependence of this law and
other laws and the numerous links connecting
them, his thinking is concrete. ``The concrete
concept,'' wrote Marx, `ìs concrete because it is
a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing
the unity of diverse aspects. It appears therefore
in reasoning as a summing-up, a result, and not
as the starting point, although it is the real point
of origin, and thus also the point of origin of
perception and =
imagination.''^^1^^
 The interpretation of the concrete and the

abstract by Marx and Engels was by no means
playing up to the Hegelian manner of reasoning.
It was a conscious and deliberate use of Hegel's
language, transformed and amended, which
conveyed profound dialectical ideas.
 Proceeding from his concepts of the abstract

and the concrete, Marx, naturally, regards the
ascent from the abstract to the concrete as the
only possible and therefore correct scientific
method whereby the concrete can be assimilated
and mentally reproduced in theoretical analysis.
 It should be noted, however, that some

philosophers' enthusiasm about the method of Marx's
analysis carries them sometimes too far and they
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid.
271
begin to absolutise it and even counterpose the

abstract and the concrete which is entirely alien
to Marx's analysis. In our opinion, such
absolutisation is traceable to two inaccuracies in the
interpretation of Marx. First, the abstract and
the concrete as such are ascribed to reality itself
as is evidenced, for instance, from the commonly
used and nonetheless confusing expression ``this
concrete (i.e. sensually perceived) object''. Second,
the abstract and the concrete as the starting and
the final points of theoretical analysis are regarded
as two poles in the development of scientific
knowledge without taking into account their
dialectical unity, mutual penetration similar to
that of the magnet poles which can only exist as
a single whole.
 It is assumed, for instance, that the abstract

and the concrete exist in reality as separate,
isolated objects and phenomena. Marx's `àbstract
labour'', `àbstract man'', `àbstract wealth'' are
sometimes regarded as objective: entities
existing, so to speak, in a pure form. The analysis
of these concepts, objective as they are, calls
for a more subtle approach which would better
accord with Marx's conception. The acceptance
of the reality of such things as `àbstract labour'',
`àbstract man'', etc. would be tantamount to
recognising the actual existence of matter, space
and other special entities alongside definite
objects and phenomena of the objective world.
 Speaking of such things as `àbstract labour''

and `àbstract individual'', Marx regarded them
as clear-cut abstractions in a definite conceptual
context and never treated them as actually
existing independent separate entities.
 Some literary critic may seize upon these words
272
in an attempt to substantiate his own opinion
that it is only concrete things which exist in
objective reality. To forestall his argument, we shall
state at once that this current view which is
often expressed in literature and has many
persistent advocates seems to us one-sided if only
for the fact that the concepts of the abstract and
the concrete are correlative and, as such, are
only meaningful in inseparable unity with each
other. The elimination of one concept makes its
counterpart nonsensical. Understandably, this
only holds true if the problem is treated from
the same epistemological angle and within the
framework of one and the same subject.
 It stands to reason that the isolation and

relative independence of objects and phenomena
makes it in principle impossible to form an
absolutely concrete notion of an object, whereas
the objectification of the concrete tends in fact
to absolutising it. A given object can never
possess at a given moment all the possible properties
and features which may reveal themselves in
a different place and at a different time. One and
the same man turns out to be different or, at
least, not quite the same among his friends, in
the office and at home. In which surroundings,
then, are we to consider him concrete? Evidently,
in all, but each time differently. Concreteness is
relative, but not absolute.
 Now, are all these subtleties really so

important that we have to accentuate them? May be
it is simply a question of terminology, and the
`òbjectivity of concrete objects and phenomena''
is identical with the `òbjective foundation of
concrete analysis?''
 We suppose that some philosophers accepting
18--1152
273
so far our reasoning might just intervene at this

point and add that objective reality has neither
abstract nor concrete objects and, consequently,
the concepts of the abstract and the concrete are
nothing but the product of our exalted
materialistic imagination inventing the absolutes of the
abstract and the concrete and striving to impose
them on the virgin scientific mind with its natural
aversion to metaphysical concoctions. So, they
may conclude, we come in the end to what they
have been trying to prove all along.
 As regards the real existence of abstract and

concrete objects, we might perhaps accept this
view, characteristic of positivist philosophy,
even at the risk of being censured by those who
reject any shades and halftones in a philosophical
controversy and recognise but one rigid scheme.
We feel obliged, however, to make one important
reservation and are ready to hold on to it as a
matter of principle: we are convinced that objects
in reality itself stand in different relations to
one another and we can speak of some objects and
phenomena as being relatively abstract (or, to
be more precise, isolated, limited, specific), and
of others as being relatively concrete
(interconnected, united, integrated). When considering
the relations of the first kind we form abstract
notions, categories and ideas and then set about
concretising them. The unity of the abstract
and the concrete, i.e. the unity in diversity,
gives a complete idea of an object, an idea which
Marx calls concrete-universal as distinct from
just concrete.
 The real links between the concrete and the

abstract being established, they become
correlated concepts, and not metaphysical absolutes.
274
It is through the interaction with each other

that they get the measure of their truth, as well
as the measure of their concreteness. Each
concept turns out to be abstract to the extent to which
it reflects the separateness, isolation and specificity
which are objectively inherent in things. Similarly,
category becomes concrete to the extent to which
it reflects the integration, unity and mutual
complementarity of things. ``Logical concepts,'' wrote
Lenin, `àre subjective so long as they remain
àbstract', in their abstract form, but at the
same time they express also the
Things-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract,
[italics supplied], both phenomenon and essence,
both moment and relation. Human concepts are
subjective in their abstractness, separateness,
but objective as a whole, in the process, in the
sum-total, in the =
tendency...''^^1^^
 The objective interpretation of the categories
of the concrete and the abstract not only makes
the presentation of material more difficult and
the language more cumbersome. It brings in new
entities which do not exist as independent objects
of reality, tends to absolutise them breaking
the inseparable bonds, the unity of mutually
penetrating sides of the material world and is, in
fact, incompatible with the dialectics of the
abstract and the concrete.
 This interpretation can at best postulate the

transition from one isolated concept to another,
e.g. from the abstract to the concrete. Important
as it is, such transition is but one of the aspects
of the dialectical relationship between these
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book The

Science of Logic'', Collected Works, Vol.~38, 1972, p.~208.
18*
275
categories. However, to understand their relationship

in a stronger, more profound sense as a a
inseparable connection of two different aspects of scientific
cognition, as a correlation, it is necessary to
investigate the relation of these categories to
objective reality and to define their counterparts
in the objective world.
 Analysing the transition from the abstract to

the concrete, Soviet scholar E.~V. Ilyenkov
writes: `Ùnderstandably, concrete knowledge (or,
more precisely, the knowledge of concreteness)
can only appear as a result, a sum-total, a product
of special work, and the abstract, as its starting
point and material.'' This is undoubtedly true
in relation to some definite level of knowledge,
theoretical knowledge in this particular case.
In his analysis of the system of capitalist
production Marx strictly adheres to the principle
of ascent from the abstract to the concrete. Yet
in presenting the dialectical relationship between
these two categories one should also take into
account the titanic work carried out by Marx
in order to accumulate and screen the ``Mont
Blanc of facts''.
 The concreteness in the implementation of the
principle of concreteness itself calls also for
differentiation between different levels of
scientific cognition: empirical, theoretical, applied,
philosophical, etc. At each of these levels the
dialectical relationship between the abstract and
the concrete inevitably acquires specific features.
In this relationship one thing only remains
constant, invariable, something like the space-time
interval in Einstein's theory of relativity: the
inseparable unity of the abstract and the concrete
in the process of cognition.
276
 There can be no absolutely abstract or

absolutely concrete knowledge, just as there are no
absolutely abstract and absolutely concrete notions---
certain knowledge and certain notions can be more
abstract (less concrete) and more concrete (less
abstract) than others. Since all our knowledge
at any stage is realised through the interaction
(collision) of the abstract and the concrete (more
abstract and more concrete), it can be viewed as
a constant process of transition from one level
of concreteness to another and from one level of
abstractness to another. For instance, from the
sensual form of concreteness and its specific
form of abstractness we pass to the empirical
form of their interaction at the lower ``floor''
of scientific cognition. Science ascends from the
empirical forms of the concrete and the abstract
to the theoretical level of their relationship and
further rises to the philosophical level. It is
evidently within the limits of one level of
cognition only that we can speak of the method of
ascent from the abstract to the concrete, meaning
a strictly definite form of either category.
 The formation of abstractions, the deduction

of the general, similar, identical has never been
and will evidently never be a special aim of
science. As a matter of fact, it takes no great
effort to find similarity even between most
different objects, such as, for instance, a shoe brush
and a mammal. Science, for that matter, is
notable for just the opposite tendency---the
striving for mental reproduction, restoration of the
concrete whole which is split in the process of
abstraction.
 Sensual cognition also reproduces an object

in its wholeness, joining, however, only its
277
external aspects and properties in a single sensual
perceptible image. Each level of cognition, be
it empirical or theoretical, has its own forms of
concreteness and abstractness and the knowledge
at each of these levels develops from the abstract
to the concrete. On the whole, however, it passes
on from one form of abstractness to another, and
from one form of concreteness to another.
 Generally speaking, the concreteness of a notion

or any other form of knowledge should be linked,
in our opinion, not only with the sense
perceptions of the object under investigation, but also
with the degree of reflection of all its bonds and
relations of mediation with other objects and
phenomena, with other aspects, tendencies and
changes. Knowledge is concrete not only when
it gives a detailed reflection of the properties
and aspects of the object or phenomena under
investigation, but also when it is capable of
reproducing all its links and relations with other
objects and phenomena, including their internal
aspects and elements. Conversely, a notion, an
idea or any other element of knowledge are
abstract to a degree to which they are isolated
from other objects and phenomena connected
with them. An abstraction is concrete if it
mentally reproduces the unity, diversity and
manysidedness of real objects, if it singles out and
indicates those aspects of the object or objects
of interest which appear to be topical or
important for human activity at a given moment.
 An analyst can evidently always find at least

one common objective feature of any two objects
or phenomena whereby they can be placed into
a single category. Such generalisations have no
methodological value until they acquire
278
theoretical concreteness. They are also very abstract

in the sense that they do not indicate any
concrete conditions under which the generalisation
is of any scientific significance.
 Scientific abstractions are a powerful means

of cognition but they remain useless without
close ties with the concrete, without practice.
If an abstraction (a law, a principle) is combined
with the diversity of the objective content of
phenomena, and thinking concentrates on those
elements of this diversity which have been placed
in the foreground by life itself, such thinking
is concrete, scientific and true. If scientific
analysis proceeding from facts reveals underlying
regularities and makes it possible to draw
theoretical conclusions, we have the unity of the
abstract and the concrete. Should thinking prove
unable to find the unity, the order in a system,
should it fail to single out the prevailing
tendency in the actual diversity of phenomena, in
that case a concrete approach to the problem
gives way to empirical vacillations between the
.concrete and the abstract and the investigator
cannot see the wood for the trees.
 Consequently, knowledge remains abstract,

though not in the empirical sense of the word,
as long as it does not distinguish between the
essential, necessary and the inessential,
accidental features and tendencies and does not reveal
the law governing a given process. Abstract also
will be the knowledge which does not show the
opposite aspects and tendencies inherent in
every phenomenon or process.
 The number of such abstract, in the

methodological sense, generalisations can be increased
indefinitely, yet they would hardly add to the
279
potential of science. Generalisations of this kind

do not carry any new information, they are
methodologically barren. Indeed, as Engels has
wittily remarked in Anti-D\"uhring, a shoe brush
grouped with mammals will not grow mammary
glands and, consequently, such a generalisation
will hardly do any good to humanity.
 True, a lot of pseudo-scientific investigations

are in fact concerned with inventing ever new
abstract generalisations claiming to contribute
to science. Paradoxical as it is, the empirical
soundness of such investigations is usually
unquestionable: most of the generalisations of this
kind are indeed based on the common features
of real things. It should be noted that such
tendencies are particularly characteristic of
philosophical investigations aimed exclusively at
generalising the material of special sciences. The
authors of such investigations can at best claim
the invention of new terms of doubtful scientific
value. It hardly needs mentioning that the
growing number of abstract generalisations tend to
clutter up knowledge with all kinds of
pseudoscientific nonsense and turn science into a depot
of useless ideas that will never be applied to real
scientific and life problems.
 Every generalisation which is to qualify as

scientific (philosophical inclusive) should be
concrete not only in the empirical, but also in the
theoretical sense. Giving new information, it
should also have a theoretical value, i.e. indicate
ways for the further progress of scientific
knowledge and disclose new links and relations of
a given object with other objects and phenomena.
 As long as a concept has a heuristic value and

opens up new ways for scientific cognition, it
280
remains scientifically valid, and not only

historically significant. It should be noted, however,
that the actual validity of a scientific concept,
a theory or even a law is not an honorary title
conferred on them in perpetuity, since
methodological or heuristic value may not only be
acquired, but also lost. Filling up a gap in our
knowledge, scientific concepts give a fresh impetus
to thought, but subsequent events may prove
their empirical untenability. This problem, by
the way, has given rise to continuous debates
among the historians of science as to whether
the concepts of ether, thermogen, phlogiston,
vital force and the like should be regarded
scientific. The answer to this question can never be
a blunt ``yes'' or ``no''.
 In order to qualify as scientific, a concept

must possess at least one of the above forms of
concreteness and, besides, must help towards
further progress of scientific knowledge. An
abstract generalisation of empirical data is at
best a prerequisite for scientificity. It is
concerned with the knowledge already available and
gives no new information, thus providing no
basis for the analysis of reality, for distinguishing
between separate properties and aspects of the
world. Such concepts and statements result, as
a rule, from the striving for unduly broad
generalisations. The concept-of control relating, for
instance, to social phenomena will be quite
concrete if used in the analysis of social
development. It will evidently be also concrete when
applied to animate nature, since here, too, it can
be connected with the ideas of feedback, data
transmission, etc. In this field, like in the field
of social phenomena, a comparatively weak
281
information signal can actuate the feedback

mechanism and bring about considerable changes,
and not only in terms of power. Suppose now we
comply with the insistent demands of some
authors and extend the concept of control to the
phenomena of inanimate nature. Of course, given
the will, we should also discover here certain
analogies with the feedback mechanism. Yet the
character of interaction in inanimate nature
(viewed independently from man's activity) is
different from that in living organisms,
particularly in what concerns power relationships.
Hence, we cannot speak of anything more than
just a formal similarity between physical
interaction in inorganic nature and feedback
mechanisms in the organic world and in society. Any
attempt to extend the concept of control to
natural physical, geological or geographical
processes will result in an untenable generalisation
yielding no scientific results.
 Take another example. The scientific value

of the concept 01 information is common
knowledge. This concept which is now widely used
in different branches of knowledge has played an
important role in the successful development of
cybernetics and in the solution of numerous
problems in genetics, neuropsychology and other
sciences. It has also proved very helpful in
defining the essence of consciousness and in studying
the nature of the `ìdeal'' as opposed to the
``material'' since it provided a link between the
processes of man's conscious activity and its
neurophysiological mechanism. On these grounds some
philosophers propose to regard the concept of
information as a universal one and classify it as
philosophical. Here, however, they transgress
282
the demarcation line beyond which the concept

of information loses its scientific concreteness
without becoming concrete in the philosophical
sense. A simple generalisation on the basis of
empirical analogies deprives it of the necessary
heuristic value. Hooker, for instance, identifies
information with consciousness, on the one hand,
and with brain processes, on the other, calling
both `ìnformation concepts''. He in fact discards
the problem of the relationship between
consciousness and the brain by simply identifying them
as equivalent `ìnformation-processing =
structures''.^^1^^
 This solution, purely phenomenalistic as it

is, is nevertheless regarded as sufficient grounds
for proclaiming a ``new systematic ontology''
since the proposed concept endows consciousness
with time-spatial and even causal characteristics
without depriving it at the same time of some
properties of mental activity. It is not hard to
see that Hooker's way leads to an ontology in
the spirit of Plato.
 The current attempts to identify the concepts

of consciousness, the brain and information
often go even further and tend to universalise
the concept of information which is alleged to
characterise any existing system in general. To
substantiate this viewpoint, references are made
to cybernetics which has purportedly provided
conclusive evidence to the effect that the concept
of information expresses the property of any
moving matter. Such a broad interpretation of
_-_-_
^^1^^ See C.~A. Hooker, ``The Information-Processing

Approach to the Brain-Mind and Its Philosophical
Ramifications'', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
Vol.~XXXVI, No.~1, September 1975, p.~1.
283
the concept of information, however, deprives

it of its analytical possibilities and obliterates
the border between inorganic processes in nature
and the processes of control which are
distinguished by the transmission, reception and coding
of signals rather than by a specific power
relationship.
 As is evidenced from the above, the scientific

value of a concept or other form of knowledge is
directly connected with its concreteness and
depends on whether it gives new information
in the field where it is introduced. In modern
science fruitless abstractions are still very
numerous and constitute what may be called
pseudoscience or metaphysics in the bad sense of the
word. They are a useless ballast and science
should get rid of them. In its struggle against
the anti-metaphysical positivist programme
dialectics definitely dissociates itself from fruitless
abstractions. It should always be borne in mind,
however, that the weak sprouts of new knowledge
are sometimes not easy to distinguish from
stunted and useless metaphysical concepts and that
they can only turn into full-fledged concrete
concepts of great scientific value as a result of
subsequent development.
 Abstract generalisations and metaphysical

conclusions should by no means be regarded as just
a nuisance having no serious effect on scientific
cognition. In social sciences such abstractions are
not infrequently connected with quite definite
ideological aims. In view of their
pseudo-scientific form and apparent empirical certainty they
are taken for a solution to one or another
problem, whereas they in fact detract science-from
the true course. The seeming concreteness of
284
a proposed concept is but empirical concreteness

which levels up all facts and features relevant to
this concept and equates the main and the
secondary, the necessary and the accidental, the external
and the internal traits. Such a concept, of course,
is a platitude in the first place as it gives no
grounds for some differentiation and analysis
in a given field of knowledge. Yet it becomes
something more than just a truism, a meaningless
phrase---it turns into an instrument for
deliberately juggling with facts instead of conducting
a concrete scientific investigation. With
positivism, by the way, it was a common and rather well
elaborated trick which was time and again
exposed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin.
 Formally imitating the external features of

the specialised language used in mathematics,
linguistics, physics and biology, the positivist
philosophers create an illusion that the
representatives of these sciences understand the language
of their philosophy. It sometimes escapes the
natural scientists that the terms borrowed from
their language lose their concreteness and turn
into verbal dummies preserving, however, the
form and the reputation of scientific certitude
and clarity. It is not fortuitous that Lenin has
always been intransigent to ``play with words''.
The application of various terms borrowed from
biology and energy physics, such as `èxchange
of substances'', `àssimilation and dissimilation'',
``power balance'', `ènthropy'' and the like to such
socio-economic phenomena as crises, class
struggle, competition, capital, etc. is in a sense a
verbal ornament which adds nothing to the
understanding of these phenomena for all its seeming
newness. Yet it is not a harmless play,
285
particularly when it comes to analysing the trends of

social development. Such a terminological
confusion tends to mislead a biologist or a physicist
just as much as a sociologist or a political
economist. With an indiscriminate approach to
philosophical generalisations it becomes, in fact,
inessential whether new scientific data are
translated into the language of some special science
or are given a philosophical interpretation: in
both these ``metaphysical'' variants the concrete
meaning of the scientific data is reduced to
naught.
 Modern bourgeois philosophy also abounds in

the substitutions of special scientific terms for
concrete concepts in sociology or political
economy. It is true not only of positivism, but also
of other philosophical trends which claim to
offer alternative solutions.
 For instance, according to Jurgen Habermas,

historical materialism is a one-sided, excessively
concrete doctrine badly in need of a
generalisation i.e. of a broader, more general, outlook. This
``generalisation'', as proposed by Habermas, boils
down to replacing Marx's concept of productive
forces by a concept of labour or purpose-oriented
rational actions covering both the selection of
means for given purposes and the selection of
purposes themselves out of a multitude of possible
variants. The concept of the relations of
production is to be eliminated in favour of such
concepts as interaction, communicative activity,
institutional framework, organisational
principle, etc.
 In Habermas's opinion, labour is the sphere of

learning and assimilation of useful technical
information, whereas interaction is characterised
286
by the processes of socialisation and moulding of

personality on the basis of the generally
recognised system of social norms. Hence, the first
sphere corresponds to technical interest, and the
second, to practical interest. The Marxist
concept of superstructure becomes irrelevant. Some
phenomena classified as superstructural, such as
culture, social norms, and educational
establishments, are to be transferred to the sphere of
interaction. Other components of the
superstructure, such as power and ideology are
interpreted either as a deviation or a distortion and,
consequently, as some secondary phenomenon in
the sphere of communicative relations.
 This kind of interpretation of history, its inner

content cannot be accepted, first of all, from the
methodological viewpoint, the more so as it
claims to ``restructure'' the Marxist concept.
Habermas seeks to consider classes, power and
ideology from the theoretical-informative aspect,
qualifying them at that as a distortion of the normal
process of human relations. Being restricted to
.the appearance of things, such an approach is at
best superficial. But it is not so harmless as it
may seem: speaking of the ``distortion'' in the
communicative systems, Habermas completely
ignores the real, essential differences between
communicative processes in the opposite social systems---
capitalism and socialism.
 Starting with a seemingly modest proposal to

amend Marx's concept of the determining role of
the mode of production in the historical process
and to supplement it with a ``second dimension'',
the communicative one, Habermas actually seeks
to turn Marx's concrete definition into an
empty abstraction and thus deprive it of its scientific
287
value. The interpersonal communicative factor

introduced by him by way of supplementing the
dialectical understanding of the nature of man
immediately calls for a new sacrifice: the
``generalisation'' of the Marxist understanding of
man's nature. The new way of thinking advocated
by the Frankfurt School is obviously constrained
by the concepts of the mode of production, social
relations and the socio-economic formation,
particularly when it comes to the analysis of such
concepts as capitalism and socialism, the
bourgeoisie and the working class. The concept of
``communicative processes'' is more congenial to this
``way of thinking'' if only for the fact that it is
abstract.
 Habermas goes even as far as claiming certain
affinity between Marxism and positivism,
alleging that they both reduce, ``restrict'' history to
its one dimension---labour and production
activity. According to Habermas, the dimension of
communication, intersubjectivity and
interpersonal relations obvious in Marx's concrete
analysis completely disappears in his philosophical
and historical generalisations resolving in the
concept of practical actions aimed at nature.
 This model, according to Habermas, had an

adverse effect on Marx's understanding of
anthropogenesis. The process of labour and production
activity regarded by Marx as the determining
factor in the evolution of man from the animal world
is confined exclusively to the sphere of
instrumental activity characteristic of the animal world.
Contrary to Marx, Habermas maintains that the
determining factor in the process of
anthropogenesis was the emergence of the communicative
dimension (language), i.e. the replacement of
288
the institutional control by the behavioural

control effected with the help of norms and linguistic
incentives. Thus mankind regarded by Marx as
the object of evolution becomes, according to
Habermas, its subject.
 There are absolutely no grounds for regarding

Marx's view on anthropogenesis as limited or
lopsided. He has developed a consistent theory of
man's practical activity directed to the external
world as the motive force of anthropogenesis.
This activity contributed to the formation of erect
gait, the appearance of the first signs of the
community of interests and joint labour, as well as
to a considerable weakening of the instincts that
determined primitive man's behaviour. It also
accounted for such new phenomena as the
deepening process of socialisation, the development
of consciousness and language, the emergence of a
new type of behavioural control, etc. The factors
singled out by Habermas were operative either in
the first, or in the second group of changes
accompanying the process of man's evolution. Neither
of them would anyway be regarded by Marx as
having an independent value. Habermas's views
do not supplement, but distort Marxism.
 Habermas and other philosophers make a

serious error believing that Marx's concept of the
essence of man can be supplemented by
introducing at least one more feature---the factor of
personal intercourse. This insignificant, at first
sight, addition turns the Marxist conception of
man into an empty abstraction which gives no
methodological guidelines for understanding
man's nature as the concrete expression of social
relations. Yet it would be even more naive to
think that the introduction of this abstraction
19--1152
289
does not do any harm to social sciences. The new

concept of man shifts the emphasis and
substitutes a secondary feature for an essential one. It
can hardly be expected to provide a solid basis
for a more profound understanding of social
development.
 What complicates the matter is that such an

approach seems to be quite relevant and even
necessary from the empirical viewpoint: it
ostensibly concentrates on those aspects of the concepts
of man and society which have not received
sufficient attention and appears therefore
scientifically valid. However, for all the seeming
empirical soundness and even appropriateness of the
proposed amendments they are basically
fallacious: the fault lies with the methodology itself
which presents the empirical material in an
entirely wrong light.
 It would probably be unnecessary to focus

attention on such attempts to ``complement'' Marx
if they were merely aimed at filling up gaps in
our concepts of society and man and did not
represent a methodology incompatible with Marxism.
In point of fact, they remind one of the behaviour
of a cuckoo trying to lay an egg into another bird's
nest. The eggs do look very similar, yet the
nestlings are quite different. Since the
methodological principles of Marx (and Habermas, too) do
not always lie on the surface, one might get an
impression that the point at issue is a purely
factual one. Let us see if it is really so.
 Suppose, you allow your mind's eye to dwell

on an array of well-known personalities: Pushkin
and Dantes, Gandhi and Goebbels, Raskolnikov
and Pyotr Zalomov, Mozart and Salieri...
Nothing seems to be simpler than to define the
290
essence of man by passing from one personality to

another. Similarities and differences, differences and
similarities, the twists of characters, the
vicissitudes of life... It may be that we shall succeed
in determining the general traits and the specific
features of each man's character. Having thus
defined man's essence, we may turn our attention
to his surroundings and project his behaviour in
different circumstances in order to reproduce the
make-up of every single individual and thus to
understand the relations between people. After
that we may go even further and try to
understand the nature of society as a whole, proceeding
again from the obtained definition of man.
 Such an approach appears to be quite relevant

by virtue of its empirical concreteness. Indeed,
we are seemingly concerned with concrete
individuals, concrete biographies reproducing each
man's life story with all its details, both
significant and otherwise. One would naturally expect
it to be the only correct path that would lead us
to the comprehension of a concrete living being...
Yet it is precisely this path that leads nowhere.
True, the real scientific value of empirical
concreteness is not quick to reveal itself. We only
find it out after discovering that the single
standard needed for comparing the heroes of our
scientific drama turns out to be nothing better than
just their general biological characteristic. The
only catch that the empirical net thus brings us
is a lean and meagre abstraction indicating that
each of our heroes belongs to the species of
Homo sapiens. And that is all that remains of the
living, thinking, feeling and acting individual.
 After the empiricist has thus stripped his Man

of every possible garment, he desperately starts
19*
291
covering him up with interpersonal intercourse,

thinking ability, and what not...
 Then comes the turn of logic. Following its

strict rules and proceeding from the obtained
definition of Man, the empiricist sets about
reconstructing society at large.
 David Hilbert once noted that every man has
a definite horizon and when it narrows down to a
point, the man starts talking about his viewpoint.
We do not think Hilbert's statement is
applicable to the whole of mankind, but in the situation
we are dealing with his joke evidently hits the
nail on the head. What can the empiricist see
from his viewpoint? Evidently, what appears
to Marcuse (or Adorno, or Habermas) and what
he is horrified by.
 The biological nature of man---once we decide

to start with it in accordance with Marcuse's
logic---is, first and foremost, the sphere of instincts
and attractions which have always been kept in
check, at least till nowadays. Repression, in
Marcuse's opinion, marks the entire history of man.
Speaking of repression, Marcuse distinguishes
``basic repression'' connected with the general
conditions of human existence, i.e. with the
environmental influences, and the `àdditional
repression'', resulting from the system of class
domination and state power. According to Marcuse, it was
the mind .or human intellect alone that succeeded
in escaping the effect of this omnipotent press.
However, representing a pure cognitive ability
and being free from the bodily functions of
physical enjoyment and satisfaction of natural needs,
intellect can be put to the task of practical and
technical conquest of the world. The mind,
alas, betrayed the pleasure-oriented body.
292
Human sensuality was also seriously affected, though

the senses are suppression-resistant too. Their
power of resistance derives from the dual nature
of the senses: they are the source of knowledge,
on the one hand, and the instrument of pleasure
and physical satisfaction, on the other. The
system of suppression is therefore unable to cope
with the senses and keep them in check by
restricting their sphere to investigation activities
only. As a result of the general distortion of
man's sensuality, the cognitive function of the
organs of perception was separated from the
pleasure-seeking function. The senses were generally
distrusted as a source of information, the data
provided by them had a limited cognitive value,
and they were suppressed by the mind. Above all,
the senses could not serve as a basis for technical
activity.
 This withering influence was exercised by
civilisation on practically all sides of the individual.
Suppression was in fact the only, or at least the
main feature of ``socialisation''.
 Labour is treated by Marcuse in a similar vein.

One of the results of the total suppression of
the individual in all extant `ìndustrial''
civilisations was the transformation of man from an
`ìnstrument of pleasure'' into an `ìnstrument of
labour''. It was just to prepare man for
productive activity that history remoulded both his
biology and his psyche. The concept of production
is brought in by Marcuse for the sole purpose of
putting a finishing touch to the sombre picture
of the suppression of the individual by industrial
civilisation which adds yet another set of
restrictions to the natural repressive forces. Marcuse's
Conclusions are based on a conviction that
293
man as a biopsychical system is predestined to

live exclusively for pleasure. Later, however,
the author has substantially modified this view.
Pleasure as understood by Marcuse cannot be
derived from productive labour, nor from the
extension of man's domination over matter. It
must be, first and foremost, a result of the
complete satisfaction of man's natural needs and of
the free play of the natural forces inherent in
the human body.
 In Marcuse's opinion, dialectics must free

itself from the abstract universal forms of
objectivity, as well as from the abstract universal
forms of thinking. To this end, it should
``conceive its world as a definite historical whole in
which present reality is a result of the historical
practice of =
man''.^^1^^ Yet practice is understood by

Marcuse in accordance with his productivity
principle, i.e. as activity detrimental to man.
History thus turns into a continuous process of
man's own enslavement, the restructuring of his
whole organism aimed at suppressing to a
maximum his biological pleasure centres. This
process goes side by side with the expansion of the
possibilities of using man as an instrument of
labour, a working machine and a means for
conquering nature.
 Marcuse comes out with great fervour against

industrial civilisation, the technological mode of
thinking, scientism, etc., and also criticises
positivism, linking it with modern trends toward
rationalisation. Yet it needs no special insight to
perceive that Marcuse's own methodology
_-_-_
^^1^^ Herbert Marcuse, Der eindimensionale Mensch.

Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft,
Luchterhand, Neuwied, 1967, S.~156.
294
underlying his criticism is a typical expression of the

very rationalisation he speaks about with such
disfavour. Indeed, his empirical approach, the
denial of objective laws in nature and society, the
atomised picture of social life (cf. the atomisation
of the world by Hume, Ayer and the Vienna
Circle), etc. are nothing but the characteristic
features of the positivist method. Ironically, despite
the premises which are not typically positivist,
Marcuse's methodology reflecting the standard
patterns of the ``technical'' style of thinking, is
indeed eloquent proof of the existence of a
powerful ideological press acting on such different
people as Ayer and himself.
 Marcuse's reasoning, like that of all positivists,

is traceable to the old empiricist tradition.
Roughly speaking, its logic boils down to the
following. To form a concept of society, a
philosopher takes the features common to every
individual and supplements them with other features
conditioned by the environment, thus obtaining
``human nature''. Proceeding from this basis, he
constructs the `ìdeal'' model of relations among
people fitting it as close as possible to his abstract
concept of man. Then he compares this ideal
model with the actual relations interpreted in the
light of his theoretical premises and proposes to
restructure the actual relations, i.e. society,
bringing it in conformity with ``human nature''.
The starting point in such ``concrete'' analysis is
nothing but the abstract inherent in each single
individual, i.e. the features common to all
people. This approach, seemingly very ``concrete'',
is in fact extremely abstract if only for the fact
that the analysis concentrates on the personal
qualities of a single individual taken at that
295
outside the process of their formation and
development and regarded as something static,
immutable, accomplished.
 If the abstraction of man is to be scientifically

valid, it must represent him not as an `àtom'',
but as a social being, and take into account both
his place in society and the system of social
relations. Another essential, though subordinate,
characteristic of this abstraction is that it must
reflect man's relation to nature. Speaking of man
as an individual, we have no right to ignore the
general factors determining his personal qualities.
This is just a paraphrase in terms of
methodology of what Marx wrote almost a century and
a half ago: ``... the essence of man is no
abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its
reality it is the ensemble of the social =
relations.''^^1^^
 Taking typical `àtomised'' individuals,

outstanding or otherwise, for the starting point in
the analysis of man's essence is attempting to
revive obsolete methodological standards, long
since discredited. To be sure, it is not easy to
carry out the investigation in such a way as to start
from the concept of the system of social
relations and, using it then as a premise, proceed to
the analysis of man's essence, nor is it easier to
start analysing social relations abstracting them
from an individual. To arrive at this starting
point in theoretical analysis, this elementary cell
of the ``socium'', Marx and Engels had to study all
the history and prehistory of human society. It
was titanic work indeed.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl Marx, ``Theses on Feuerbach'', in: Karl Marx,

Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol.~5, Progress
Publishers. Moscow, 1976. p.~4.
296
 The essential characteristic of Marx's

analysis is that it permits revealing not only the
general qualities inherent in every individual, but
also the necessary features and relationships
reflecting the laws of man's historical development.
It is the analysis of the sum total, the ensemble of
the socio-historical forms of social relations which
reveals the real trend of this development in its
concreteness from the theoretical, and not
empirical point of view. The universal is not
equivalent to the similar represented in each
individual object and regarded as their common feature.
It is, first and foremost, a law-governed
relationship of two or more individuals in which they
pose as the moments of one and the same concrete
and real, and not only formal, unity. According
to Hegel, whose view was also shared by Marx,
the form of universality as a law or the principle
of connection of details within a whole which is
totality. The universal can only be obtained
through analysis, and not through abstraction.
 A single individual is essentially a ``man''

only because his unique make-up embodies
historical necessity, and not because he possesses
certain features, sometimes of secondary importance,
common to other individuals. This viewpoint
makes it possible to regard an individual as a
personality not in the abstract sense, but as an
embodiment (more or less adequate) of the
entire history of mankind, of human civilisation as
a whole. This viewpoint alone provides a basis
for understanding every single individual as a
human being since it reveals a core in the
totality of his personal traits. This viewpoint, too,
will undoubtedly prevent us from placing in the
same category Mozart and Salieri, Gandhi and
297
Goebbels who may appear to be absolutely

similar from the viewpoint of abstract logic.
 The concreteness understood dialectically has

nothing to do with the establishment of such
``similarity'' of individuals. It represents the
unity of all features and qualities of a man in their
real connection with one another, in their
dependence both on the biological nature of man and
on the totality of all social conditions which play
the dominant role. This approach alone can give
us a theoretically concrete, and not an abstract
concept of man. In other words, the theoretical
definition of the `ùniversal in man'' is called upon
to correct all the fallacies, contradictions and
errors of empirical analysis without denying its
role in principle. Attempting in our times to
construct a philosophical system or even a concept
of man on an empirical basis is very much like
starting to advocate the idea of the earth's
flatness. The concrete concept of man can only be
developed if we proceed from the dialectical
unity and interaction of the diverse forms, of
specifically human activity, man's social abilities
and social needs.
 According to the materialistic concept of the

essense of man, the universal form of man's
existence is represented in labour, in social man's
direct transformation of nature (his own nature
inclusive) with the help of instruments which he
himself makes. It is not accidental that Marx
was of such a high opinion of Benjamin
Franklin's famous definition: ``Man is a tool-making
animal.'' In making tools man does not simply
accept nature's demands, but creates a new system
of relations; however, these relations on which he
depends are out of his control. Such is Marx's
298
viewpoint. The definition of man as a

tool-making animal is a characteristic example providing
a vivid illustration to the Marxist understanding
of the universal as concrete and as related to
necessity.
 The universal understood as concrete is

opposed to the multitude of individuals not as an
abstraction, but as their own substance, as a
concrete form of their interaction. It is only in this
capacity that the universal as concrete
determination embodies all the richness of the
particular and the individual, and this not only as
possibility, but also as necessity. The universal
therefore cannot be understood as the abstract
identity of a multitude of events which serves as
a basis for their classification under a single
category. It implies additionally the singling out
of essential links and relations and becomes, as
it were, the ``substance of law''. The universal
is thus conceived as divided internally, as the
identity of contradictions, i.e. as a living,
concrete unity.
 The universal, as we see, turns out to be

concrete only if it reflects the essential features of
the objects and phenomena of reality and does
not take into account the inessential, accidental
features and properties. Thus, we can speak of
theoretical concreteness which consists not in
direct connection with objective reality, not in
the detailed representation of individual aspects
and properties, not in direct sensual perception,
but in the singling out of the main, the essential,
the necessary, the regular. From the empirical
viewpoint, theoretical knowledge is indeed
abstract in the sense that it is removed from
sensual perceptions and its links with the external
299
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world are mediated. Yet it is concrete in the sense

that it reveals those links and relations which
are outside the sphere of empirical knowledge.
In point of fact, theoretical concreteness includes
empirical concreteness which is preserved in the
body of a deeper and more concrete conception---
not in the sense that theory is specific and
demonstrative in accordance with the requirement of
empirical concreteness, but only in the sense that
it preserves in most cases more or less direct links
with experience, experiment, practice. Without
revealing the main, the essential, the necessary,
i.e. the substance of scientific law, knowledge
would remain quite abstract from the theoretical
viewpoint.
 Lenin wrote: `Èssentially, Hegel is completely

right as opposed to Kant. Thought proceeding
from the concrete to the abstract---provided it is
correct (NB) (and Kant, like all philosophers,
speaks of correct thought)---does not get away
<emmm>from</emmm> the truth but comes closer to it. The
abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the
abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct,
serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature
more deeply, truly and =
<emmm>completely</emmm>.''^^1^^
 Indeed, without the knowledge of law

individual facts, even a multitude of them, remain
abstract. They may be snatched out of the context
and their significance may be arbitrarily
overemphasised, they may be opposed to all other facts
and events. It stands to reason that such
knowledge would not be truly scientific. Moreover, one
and the same fact or a totality of facts may be
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science

of Logic'', Collected Works, Vol.~38, p.~171.
300
interpreted in entirely different ways in the

context of different theories. Hence, one and the same
empirical basis may be used to construct very
different scientific (not to speak of speculative
and pseudo-scientific) theories. It should also be
borne in mind that the significance of various
facts, their real scientific value cannot be
established if we ignore laws.
 The thing is that facts characterising one or

another object or event prove, as a rule,
contradictory. If we see an apple falling and trust our own
eyes, we should expect it to fly upward or
sideways on the other side of the planet. Standing on
the shore, we can see the ocean retreating and
then advancing again, we can observe a bird
soaring up or falling or evenly descending.
Examples of this kind can be cited ad infinitum, and
in any of them the correctness of our observation,
the scientific value of our knowledge can only be
proved if we reveal the operation of laws behind
them: the law of gravitation in the first example,
the law of tidal motion in the second, the
aerostation law in the third, etc. In other words, in
each of the phenomena we observe we must define
the internal links which do not lie on the surface.
The knowledge of laws, undoubtedly, makes our
cognition more concrete, though it is quite
obvious that laws are abstract statements.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
3. CONCRETENESS
 OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS
 We have been concerned so far with special

sciences or, more precisely, with those forms of
concreteness which are characteristic of empirical
301
and theoretical investigations in physics,

biology, psychology, etc. What about the
concreteness of philosophical categories themselves? This
is, in fact, the essence of the matter, the more so
as the very idea of concreteness of such laws and
categories of dialectics as the transformation of
quantitative into qualitative changes, the unity
and struggle of opposites, the negation of
negation, necessity and chance, cause and effect seem
to be quite paradoxical at first sight.
 The question of the concreteness of

philosophical knowledge (laws, categories, principles)
evidently calls for special investigation which goes
beyond the scope of this work. Since our object
is to compare the basic principles of the
philosophy of science and dialectical materialism, we
feel justified in confining our analysis to just a
few laws and categories.
 It is not at all accidental that Lenin has taken

special note of this idea in Hegel's Lectures on the
History of Philosophy: `Ìf the truth is abstract
it must be untrue. Healthy human reason goes
out towards what is concrete... Philosophy is
what is most antagonistic to abstraction, it leads
back to the =
concrete...''^^1^^ To Lenin, this

statement has evidently carried profound meaning,
as is evidenced not only from his philosophical
ideas, but also from numerous economic and
political works. As regards Lenin's philosophical
works proper, he has always placed special
emphasis on the principle of concreteness and pursued
it with remarkable consistency. This particular
aspect of his philosophical heritage deserves
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book Lectures on

the History of Philosophy'', op. cit., p.~245.
302
special attention. Do we always realise, for instance,

the profoundness of his well-known statement that
the contrast between matter and mind is
meaningful within the framework of the fundamental
question of philosophy only?
 The assertion of positivist philosophy that the

concepts of matter and consciousness are
metaphysical and can be replaced by more ``concrete''
notions of special sciences, such as physics,
mechanics, biology, psychophysiology,
neuropsychology and others results, in the final analysis,
from its inability to understand the
philosophical concreteness of the concepts of matter and
consciousness. At all stages of the evolution of
positivism its adherents have persisted in declaring
the concept of matter to be a fruitless
abstraction, an absolute and useless symbol, on the
grounds that all materials needed for scientific
investigation are given to man in the senses, in
individual experience. Hence, there is no need,
according to positivism, to project something
transcendental, something that extends beyond
the limits of sensual perceptions. It is significant
that the concept of matter or of the physical world
proves to be a useless abstraction within the
framework of positivist philosophy only.
Recognising formally the existence of this world, none of
the adherents of this philosophy goes beyond the
abstract, metaphysical understanding of matter.
Setting up an impassable barrier between matter
and the cognising subject, positivism, naturally, is
unable to provide a concrete solution to the
problem of the relationship between the material
world and the world of human consciousness.
In this field positivism did not go beyond Kant,
and Hegel's assessment of Kant's philosophy
303
is fully applicable to positivist views: "The

essential inadequacy of the standpoint at which
philosophy halts consists in this, that it clings to the
abstract Thing-in-itself as an ultimate
determination; it opposes Reflection, or the determinateness
and multiplicity of the Properties, to the
Thingin-itself; while in fact the Thing-in-itself
essentially has this External Reflection in itself, and
determines itself as an entity endowed with its
proper determinations, or Properties; whence it is
seen that the abstraction of the Thing, which
makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is an untrue
determination.''^^1^^
 No one denies that matter is given man in his

sensations and that we should resort to a very
high degree of abstraction in order to oppose
mentally matter to consciousness, sensations,
perception. Yet such abstraction is inevitable if
we want to have a more concrete understanding
of their relationship. Positivism makes a stand
for the inseparable connection between matter
and consciousness knowing, in fact, nothing about
what is connected with what. By contrast,
Marxist scientific analysis is aimed at creating
abstractions in order to obtain a concrete
understanding of the real, specific forms of the
interconnection of matter, the objective world, with
consciousness.
 As is evidenced from the above, the concepts

of matter and consciousness are only valid within
the framework of the fundamental question of
philosophy. In order to get a profound
understanding of the relationship between matter and
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ Hegel's Science of Logic, Vol. II, London, George

Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1929, p. 118.
304
consciousness, it is necessary to reveal all the

forms of their interaction which is not confined
to the reflection of objective reality in our
consciousness, but also includes the influence of
consciousness on the outer world (to the extent
to which the reflection of reality is correct).
"Of course,'' Lenin writes, "even the antithesis
of matter and mind has absolute significance
only within the bounds of a very limited field—
in this case exclusively within the bounds of
the fundamental epistemological problem of
what is to be regarded as primary and what as
secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative
character of this antithesis is =
indubitable."^^1^^
 The concept of matter is not correlated with the

individual forms of the cognition of reality, nor
with the concepts of information, code or something
else of this kind. It is correlated with the concept
of consciousness only. What is more, this
correlation has any sense in connection with the
problem of the dependence of consciousness on matter
and the historical formation of matter and
consciousness. The concept of matter which is
seemingly extremely abstract as it takes no account
of all aspects and properties of things except just
one—their existence outside and independent of
our mind—is in fact epistemologically concrete
as it is meaningful in the context of the
fundamental question of philosophy only. Outside these
bounds the concept of matter has no independent
philosophical meaning though it can be iused as
a stylistic substitude for some other, special
terms (for instance, physicists speak of the
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empiric-Criticism'',

Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 147.
20--1152
305
density of matter in the Universe). At the same time,

no knowledge in general can be concrete without
the abstractions of matter and consciousness as
the opposite sides of reality if only for the fact
that without the solution of this fundamental
problem it would be impossible to decide which
elements of our knowledge can be regarded as
true, objective and independent of man no
matter how far our science may advance, and which
elements are connected with consciousness in
one way or another, and, hence, are subject to
testing and verification in the general context
of human experience and available scientific
data. As we shall try to show later,
distinguishing between the objective and the subjective
in our knowledge is absolutely essential for
making our knowledge concrete.
 Consequently, no particular experiment aimed

at testing the materialist solution of the
fundamental question of philosophy will be of any
use if it fails to take into account the
epistemological concreteness of the concepts of matter and
consciousness. This question can only be solved
if we abstract from the interconnection of
matter and consciousness. Not many experiments
can meet this requirement. Yet if science can
provide evidence that consciousness appears as a
result of the activity of the brain, that certain
functions of consciousness can be exercised by a
computer and that nature existed prior to man, this
scientific evidence is sufficient to confirm the
soundness of the materialist viewpoint. Conversely,
should the reasonable beings who assumed the title
of Homo sapience choose to destroy the abode of
their reason, this act, alas, will evidently be the
last argument for materialism.
306
 Throughout its entire history positivism has

been denouncing, in one or another form and more
or less resolutely, the principle of causality as
typically metaphysical. Significantly, Machism and
logical positivism rejected this principle and the
meaningfulness of the categories ``cause'' and
`èffect'' on the grounds that they could not be
tested empirically, i.e. verified or confirmed.
The new generation of positivist philosophers
armed with Popper's principle of falsification
hold the same view yet on different grounds,
namely, that this principle cannot be falsified.
Since, they reason, it is confirmed by all human
experience, without any exception, the
categories of causality are applicable always and
everywhere and therefore turn into commonplace
devoid of any analytical, i.e. scientific
significance.
 Popper does not deny the real scientific value

of causal explanations, but presents their
logical schema as follows: there is some universal
judgement, i.e. a law, and a proposition
characterising the `ìnitial conditions'' in terms of
individual events. From these two premises we
infer a supposition regarding another individual
event. The concepts of cause and effect are
eliminated as unnecessary. Popper rejects
completely the ``principle of causality'' in the general,
philosophical sense. For him causality rather has an
instrumental meaning as an assertion that any
event can be explained in terms of causality, i.e.
predicted through deduction, which is the same
thing.
 Depending on the interpretation of the words

``can be'' in this assertion, it may prove either an
analytical statement (tautology) or a synthetic
20*
307
statement (a statement of reality). If we

interpret these words as a logical possibility to
construct a causal explanation, this statement is
tautological, since for any prediction we can
always find a universal proposition and initial
conditions so. that it can be easily deduced from them.
In some situations, however, the words ``can be''
are regarded as an indication that the world is
governed by strict laws and that every
phenomenon is an example of universal regularity or law.,
In that case the above statement should be
regarded as a synthetic one, which is not, however,
verifiable. Proceeding from this consideration,
Popper concludes: `Ì shall, therefore, neither
adopt nor reject the `principle of causality';
I shall be content simply to exclude it, as
`metaphysical', from the sphere of science. I shall,
however, propose a methodological rule which
corresponds so closely to the 'principle of
causality' that the latter might be regarded as its
metaphysical version. It is the simple rule that
we are not to abandon the search for universal laws
and for a coherent theoretical system, nor ever
give up our attempts to explain causally any kind
of event we can =
describe.''^^1^^
 Thus causality as something elusive is

metaphysically identified with the concept of universal
law. The principle of causality is understood in
a very trivial manner: it is quite sufficient to
know that the phenomenon in interest belongs to
a certain class of phenomena in order to draw a
conclusion that the effect or, more precisely, the
predictable event belongs to just another definite
_-_-_
^^1^^ Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery,

Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1959, p.~61.
308
class. Any violation of this necessary

relationship indicates that one of the classes has been
determined incorrectly and should be either
broadened or narrowed. Such a concept of causality
is indeed trivial from the methodological
viewpoint as it is aimed primarily at bringing every
phenomenon in accord with the universal law
or, more precisely, with a universal empirical
generalisation. As to its objective content, this
concept does not postulate anything but the
regular sequence or regular concomitance of events
belonging to different classes. Oddly enough,
such an understanding of causality underlies the
entire ``logic of scientific discovery'', though it
is quite obvious that this methodological
scheme rules out in principle the possibility
of any discovery of new phenomena which go
beyond the limits of the universal law or, at
any rate, sets them in opposition to it. The
universal law understood as regularity of events
is incompatible with any new phenomenon in
principle. Inversely, any new phenomenon, i.e.
what Kuhn calls an `ànomaly'' in relation to the
existing theory is incompatible with the
universal law. Consequently, it is not the principle of
causality as such which is metaphysical, but its
narrow, instrumentalist interpretation by Popper.
His interpretation in fact eliminates causality
from real science and reflects the ideal of
Laplatian determinism, since Popper identifies
causality with logical dependence, logical necessity.
It is only natural, therefore, that such a
canonised concept of causality and law has practically
no appeal to science, particularly modern
science. As we see, Popper's own errors lead him
to the conclusion that the principle of causality
309
is trivial, unscientific and metaphysical. The

truth is that his interpretation of the concepts
of cause and effect are indeed alien to the spirit
of real science.
 The scientists, particularly the natural

scientists, never understand causality in such a narrow
way as to throw doubt upon it each time an exact
prediction proves impossible. Such a prediction
requires the knowledge not only of the causal
dependence, but also of the specific conditions of
cognition. The strictly Laplatian ideal of
prediction identified by positivists with causality is
generally attainable in such sciences as the
mechanics of macroscopic objects, astronomy, and
loses its sense when we pass to such fields as
hydrodynamics and the theory of elasticity.
 Despite the universality of the principle of

causality, it is by no means simple to establish
the true, objective causal relationship separating
it from a multitude of intertwined and
overlapping events and phenomena. The singling out
of causal dependence from other kinds of relations
is in itself a difficult problem from the
methodological viewpoint. Even if an observer or an
experimentalist have good reasons to expect a
causal relationship, they have to display sometimes
a high degree of ingenuity in order to create
appropriate conditions for the identification of
causal dependence. Even in those cases when the
signs of causality seem to lie on the surface, it
proves to be extremely important
methodologically to define those abstractions and assumptions
which have to be adopted each time the concept
of causality is used in scientific cognition. The
need for abstractions in cognising causal
relationships has been stressed by Lenin: ``Hence, the
310
human conception of cause and effect always

somewhat simplifies the objective connection of
the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only
approximately, artificially isolating one or another
aspect of a single world =
process.''^^1^^
 For instance, the kinetic theory of gases

explained the chaotic motion of molecules, the
distribution of the concentration of molecules in the
field of terrestrial attraction, the emission of
electrons from heated metal, the viscosity and heat
conductivity of gases and other phenomena on the
basis of the principle of causality. All these
explanations proceeded from the assumption that
gas consists of absolutely resilient minute
spherical particles, that these particles possess kinetic
energy only, that the magnitude of this
kinetic energy depends on the absolute temperature
of gas only and that such molecules do not
collide with one another.
 Though such assumptions somewhat distort

the objective processes as there are no gases in
nature with the above ideal properties, they
nevertheless reflect the conditions under which
these processes actually take place. Indeed, under
the conditions of moderate temperatures and
relatively low pressures the distortions allowed for
numerous gases do not have any appreciable
effect either on their qualitative or quantitative
characteristics.
 Hence, the explanations and predictions are

based not only on the recognition of causal
relations, but also on certain assumptions
presupposing the exact knowledge of conditions under
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', op.

cit., p.~156.
311
which the process in interest takes place. These

aspects of scientific investigation are closely
connected with one another: explanations and
predictions are impossible without objectively
grounded assumptions, whereas the assumptions
themselves have any sense only in the context of
the above explanations or predictions. Yet in the
philosophical analysis of the principle of causality
it is advisable to distinguish these aspects as
more or less independent objects of investigation
which could be called an explanation, a
prediction and a substantiation of assumptions.
 The problem of the subtantiation of assumptions

in the context of an explanation or a prediction
is not infrequently left out of account in
philosophical investigations so that the analysis is
often confined to the concept of causality and
to the solution of various methodological
problems arising in natural sciences in connection with
explanation and prediction. The study of initial
conditions seems a secondary task which is
always subordinated to explanation and prediction
proper. Yet it is not difficult to show that the
exact knowledge of these conditions sometimes
turns out to be problem No.~1 which has to be
solved before any explanation or prediction is
ever attempted. Besides, if an existing law or
theory suggests the existence of a certain causal
relationship, the search for conditions under which
this relationship can materialise becomes quite
an independent research problem and calls for
serious creative efforts which may lead to
important scientific discoveries. Such investigations
often give a powerful impetus to the development
of experimental facilities, computers, conceptual
and mathematical bodies.
312
 An experiment staged by the outstanding

Russian physicist, Pyotr Lebedev, was intended,
for instance, to prove the existence of light
pressure by demonstrating the effect of a light beam
on a metal blade, and also to compare the
obtained value of this pressure with the value
predicted on the basis of Maxwell's theory. The most
difficult part of the experiment (like of the
experiment staged later by E.F. Nickols and Philip
Hall) consisted in creating the necessary conditions
to ensure the fulfilment of the rules of
abstraction. There was no special difficulty in observing
the rotation of the experimental blade after
switching on the source of light. Yet it was just here
that an error might slip in, since the blade could
be caused to rotate by other factors as well, such
as radiometric forces, the forces of gas
convection, etc., the more so as they exceeded many
times the weak force of light pressure. It took not
only the experimentalist's resourcefulness in
developing the appropriate apparatus, but also
called for a profound analysis of the nature
of convection and radiometric forces. Hence,
attempts to prove the existence of causal relations
may lead to the discovery of new phenomena, to
new interesting and unexpected explanations
pertaining to the conditions under which the main
investigation is carried out, and, finally, to the
improvement of experimental equipment, as the
scientist always tries to envisage its response to
various side effects.
 It may so happen that the forecast of a causal

relationship does not come true under the given
set of circumstances. Does it mean that we
should question the principle of causality in
general? Of course, not. In that case we are faced with
313
this alternative: either our prediction of a causal

relationship is not correct and the existing
correlation is the result of other indirect links (and
we must study them), or the causal relationship
does exist, but the experiment or the
observations give wrong results due to the presence of
unknown interfering factors. In both cases the
principle of causality leads to new problem and
stimulates new discoveries, often quite unexpected.
 Hence, the principle of causality not only

fulfils the functions of explanation and prediction,
but is also of great heuristic importance. To assess
correctly the heuristic role of the principle of
causality, one should take into account the fact
that the scientific discoveries resulting from the
evaluation of specific conditions, the revelation
of hitherto unheeded factors, the rejection of
ungrounded assumptions, etc. are of ten more
important than those sought by scientists in their
attempts to explain or predict one or another event.
It may seem all the more paradoxical as
conditions, according to our own assertion, are
inessential for the causal dependence to the extent
making it possible to disregard them altogether.
Yet the dialectics of these two aspects of
objective reality consists in that the conditions
inessential for a given causal relationship may prove
highly essential for another relationship.
 One of the main objects of criticism levelled

against dialectics by its present-day opponents
is the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
According to an ancient and at the same time the
latest argument against dialectics, an objective
contradiction is incompatible with the logical
principle or law of contradiction whereby two
opposite statements cannot be true if they relate
314
to the same time and to the same content.

Accordingly, an object of reality cannot possess two
mutually excluding properties or be in two
mutually excluding states in one and the same
respect.
 It should be noted first of all that the term

``dialectical'' is by no means applicable to any
opposites or any contradictions. We can only speak
of contradictions within the framework of a concrete
relationship in which two phenomena, two
aspects of one and the same object can be regarded
as opposite and mutually contradictory.
Accusing dialectics of speculativeness, scholasticism
and absence of any scientific value, positivist
philosophers and other modern opponents and
interpreters of dialectics refer to a vice which is
absolutely alien to Marxist dialectics.
 The concreteness of the law of the unity and

struggle of opposites is violated each time its
critics tear apart the two inseparable aspects:
the unity and the mutual exclusion of opposites.
One cannot speak of the opposition of certain
aspects of an object or a phenomenon until after
their unity has been established, the degree of
their opposition corresponding to the degree of
their unity. It was senseless, for instance, to speak
of the opposition of the Sun and the Earth
before it was found out that both of them are two
celestial bodies belonging to one and the same
planetary system. Likewise, it is senseless to speak
of the opposition of science and, for instance,
art till we establish that both of them have the
same nature as two forms of social consciousness.
Hence, there are no and cannot be any objects
or phenomena which are absolute opposites,
opposites `ìn general'', in the abstract sense.
315
Conversely, there are no and cannot be any two

absolutely identical phenomena---such identity from
the dialectical viewpoint is also abstract.
 Any knowledge will be abstract, partial,
incomplete, if it does not properly reflect the
contradictions inherent in the object under
investigation, if it is presented as something immutable,
frozen, lifeless. Lenin has closely linked the
question of the concreteness of knowledge with the
question of the mutability and contradictoriness
of the objects and phenomena of reality as is seen
from his following emphatic remark: ``Cognition
is the eternal, endless approximation of thought
to the object. The reflection of nature in man's
thought must be understood not `lifelessly', not
àbstractly', <emmm>not devoid of
movement, not without
contradictions</emmm>, but in the eternal <emmm>process</emmm> of
movement, the arising of contradictions and their =
solution.''^^1^^
 From the positivist viewpoint this statement

is nonsensical. Limiting the subject-matter of
philosophy to the analysis of existing scientific
knowledge, and this mainly in terms of its
correspondence with the standards of formal logic,
positivism has once and for all defined its stand
in relation to contradictions. Contradictions are
only possible in thinking and therefore must be
removed from our knowledge as their very
presence testifies, according to formal logic, to the
falsity of at least one of the opposing statements.
 Dialectical contradictions in nature and

society differ from the so-called logical contradictions.
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science

of Logic'', op, cit., p.~195.
316
In contrast to formal logic, which understands

contradiction as incompatibility of statements,
dialectics regards it as conflict of opposing forces
or tendencies. Such dialectical contradictions can
be exemplified by the phenomenon of class
struggle, the relationship between nature and
society, etc.
 In thinking and cognition, the concepts of

dialectical and logical contradictions coincide, i.e.
the dialectical contradiction assumes the form of
the logical one. It is important, however, that
one should distinguish between the role of
contradiction in the development of cognition as
empirical phenomenon, on the one hand, and the
consequences of contradiction for concrete
knowledge, i.e. for cognition in the logical sense, on
the other. As regards the former, the revelation
and resolution of contradictions is the motive force
of cognition (this applies, of course, to essential
contradictions inherent in the very nature of
cognition, but not to the ones resulting from the
subjective inability to think correctly). As to
the latter, a contradiction in the logical structure
of knowledge is always objectionable as either
one of the two contradicting propositions within
a given system can be used for deducing logically
correct statements. Hence, it is not logical
contradiction, but the search for the ways to eliminate
it that constitutes the source of the
development of scientific knowledge.
 The logical principle of concrete identity, the

identity of opposites was for Marx (and Hegel)
the main logical criterion of concreteness in the
approach to the objects and phenomena of the
objective world. It was this approach, according
to Marx, that made the difference between the
317
trivial, uncritical description of phenomena as

they appeared to everyone and their theoretical
comprehension.
 The dual nature of the commodity was by no

means Marx's discovery. Even before Ricardo
and Smith, any man in the street knew quite well
that a commodity had use value and exchange
value or, in other words, that it could satisfy some
human need, or be exchanged for another
commodity, more necessary at the moment for a
given owner (though both commodities were
equivalent in terms of money, i.e. their prices were
equal). The assertion that the commodity is a
carrier of use and exchange values has nothing in
common with the theoretical proposition
disclosing the nature of value in general. The former is
a mere statement of two isolated abstractions in
no way connected with each other, whereas the
latter proceeds from the understanding of the
use value of a commodity as a method or form of
the manifestation of its own opposite---the
exchange value or, more precisely, simply ``value''.
This concept represents a transition from the
abstract (from two equally abstract notions) to the
concrete (the unity of the notions of use value and
exchange value).
 Consequently, knowledge cannot be
sufficiently concrete unless it reveals some general aspects
and properties of the objects and phenomena
of the objective world: their essence, main
contradictions, content, necessity, etc. Yet it is
precisely these aspects and properties which constitute
the subject-matter of philosophical
investigation proper. Therefore, philosophical concreteness
is not a contradictio in adjecto, but a profound
theoretical concept. As it turns out, the knowledge
318
given us by physics, chemistry, biology,

geography and other special sciences should also be
concrete from the philosophical viewpoint. Without
such `àbstract'' (in the traditional sense)
categories as quantity and quality, chance and
necessity, essence and appearance, etc. the concepts of
atom and elementary particle, organism and
living cell, man and society turn out to be
insufficiently concrete.
 There is yet another important side to this

problem. If we leave out of account the above
categories, any scientific knowledge will only be
testable within the scope of the links and relations
that have already been revealed. In other words,
the test will be confined to examining the
empirical content of our knowledge, the object or
phenomenon in interest being isolated from other
objects and phenomena, and to establishing
logical links between this empirical content and the
theoretical knowledge already available. Hence,
the possibility of a comprehensive test of any
knowledge for scientific value and authenticity will
be ruled out altogether and, consciously or
unconsciously, new concepts or theories will be left
exposed to eventual criticism. Knowledge which
has not passed through the crucible of a
philosophical trial is not only vulnerable to critical
attacks, but also liable to various distortions and
misinterpretations.
 Here is an example. Before the establishment

of the contradictory nature of light, its complex
quantum-mechanical properties, it would have
been impossible, as we are fully aware now, to
adopt either the wave or the corpuscular theory.
Each of these theories could have been tested by
corresponding experiments, yet these
319
experiments contradicting one another would only have
been regarded by the adherents of the rival theory
as a temporary misunderstanding.
 The way of abstract identities leads away from,

but not towards dialectics. Dialectics unfolds the
analysis of concrete, living objective
contradictions, whereas eclecticism, being in fact a
counterfeit of dialectics, is engaged in the arbitrary
combination of any opposites and identities.
 No better appears to be the alternative

solution to the problem of contradiction offered by
the representatives of the Frankfurt School. This
solution, in contrast to the one proposed by
positivism, is based on the absolutisation of
contradiction and negation and on the rejection of any
identity whatsoever. The approach of the
Frankfurt School which is distinguished by utter
disregard for the concreteness of the categories of
identity and opposition can be well illustrated by
Theodor Adorno's proposition concerning
``non-identity''. According to him, identity is the
enemy of all that is factual, single, particular
and, strange as it may seem, concrete.
Concreteness, as it turns out, can only be saved through =
``non-identity''^^1^^. The trouble, however, is that

identity itself in Adorno's interpretation loses
concreteness and turns into something lifeless,
static and absolute. Yet the identical, as has been
pointed out by Hegel, includes the necessary seed
of distinction, discord (Unterschied). Already in
his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel came out
_-_-_
^^1^^ See Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik,

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1966, S.~138.
320
against the understanding of negation as activity

consisting only in refuting, nullifying the attained
result. In the preface to that book Hegel calls
true that thinking which emerges in the process of
development as a definite negative and therefore
as some positive content. Adorno's ``negative'',
by contrast, remains abstract and lopsided,
pathetically inferior to Hegel's profound concept---
though, according to good Adorno, Hegel has
failed to rise to the required level of thinking.
Adorno interprets Marx in a similar manner, making
special effort to find in his works everything
related to the ``negative'' or ``negation'' and counterpose
it to the ``positive'' or ``negation of the negation''.
In point of fact, the only difference between
Marx and Hegel in the interpretation of `ìdentity''
and ``distinction'', ``positive'' and ``negative'',
`àssertion'' and ``negation'' is that Marx had placed
all these categories on a materialistic basis. Freed
from speculativeness and abstractness, they
have acquired new forms of concreteness and
preserved at the same time their interdependence
disclosed by Hegel who has correlated each pair
and regarded it as an indissoluble unity. ``The
creator of negativist logic which is full of
contradictions,'' writes Soviet scientist I.S. Narsky
about Adorno, ``manipulates, like Proudhon,
static antitheses, such as society and nature,
democracy and technocracy, history and theory,
criticism and apology, process and system, action
and cognition, practice and reflection, humanism
and scientism, discarding, though, almost any
one of these alternatives just as easily or turning
them into arbitrarily interpreted symbols... His
method is anti-dialectical, dialectics with Adorno
ceases to be dialectics and turns into the
21--1152
321
metaphysics of the rigid models of =
non-identity.''^^1^^
 It stands to reason that the exposure of trivial

contradictions can little contribute to scientific
investigation except by bringing in a few odd
empirical details. Yet even these meagre scraps of
knowledge reveal their utter uselessness when it
comes to moulding them into a single concept.
Just imagine for a moment a toy factory run by an
eclectic in accordance with his theoretical
notions. The toyshops would be cram-full of little
monsters having an ear instead of an eye and an
eye instead of an ear, a kneecap on the shoulder,
a frying-pan instead of a hat, gloves instead of
shoes, trousers instead of a shirt, etc. This
comparison, though, perhaps, a little too blunt, is
by no means far-fetched.
 Of course, from the viewpoint of logic an ear

and an eye, a shoulder and a knee-cap are opposites
in a way, just like the right and the left eye,
the right and the left foot, hand, etc. Each object
is the opposite of another object in some abstract
sense. It would be absurd to engage in studying
such contradictions without specifying the
concrete relationship within which such contradictions
are considered.
 In his critical analysis of D\"uhring's book,

Engels wrote that his opponent's views on the
question of contradiction ``can be summed up in the
statement that contradiction=absurdity, and
therefore cannot occur in the real world. People who
_-_-_
^^1^^ I.~S. Narsky, ``The Problem of Negation and the

Negative Dialectics of T. Adorno'', Filosofskiye nauki,
No.~3, 1973, p.~77.
322
in other respects show a fair degree of common

sense may regard this statement as having the
same self-evident validity as the statement that
a straight line cannot be a curve and a curve
cannot be straight. But, regardless of all protests
made by common sense, the differential calculus
under certain circumstances [italics supplied]
nevertheless equates straight lines and curves, and
thus obtains results which common sense,
insisting on the absurdity of straight lines being
identical with curves, can never =
attain.''^^1^^
 Referring to the universality of the laws of

dialectics, its opponents allege that dialectics
can prove or confirm anything in the world, it
can be used to justify any political act. Since the
laws of dialectics are applicable everywhere and
at all times, they cannot be of any help in
discovering something new.
 Herbert Feigl who honestly confesses to having

not read a single Soviet publication in
philosophy over the past few years, regards the laws of
dialectics as hackneyed banalities. ``The vague
.principles of dialectics'', according to Feigl,
are handicapped by Hegelian logic consisting,
in fact, of illogicalities. They are scientifically
useless both in terms of ontology and
methodology. Dialectics, in Feigl's opinion, adds nothing
new to the special solution of the mind-body
problem or the problem of the corpuscular-wave
dualism. All that is needed to solve such problems is
``the good old two-valued logic'' plus the required
natural scientific data. ``The slogan about the
transition of quantity into quality,'' writes Feigl,
_-_-_
^^1^^ Frederick Engels, Anti-D\"uhring, Progress Publishers,

Moscow, 1975, p.~144.
21*
323
`ìs just as vague as the triad, or the `negation of

the =
negation'.''^^1^^
 No Marxist philosopher would deny the

universality of the categories of dialectics. The crucial
point is the understanding of this universality.
From the Marxist viewpoint, the universality of
categories and laws consists in that they reflect
the processes and phenomena in nature, society
and cognition. It does not mean, however, that
the laws of dialectics are applicable to any
situation regardless of conditions and that they exist
outside and independent of the corresponding
phenomena and processes to which they relate. The
law of the interdependence of quantitative and
qualitative changes is very concrete for all its
universality and abstractness (in the empirical
sense). It does not apply to any quantity or
quality, but only to the quantity of a given quality.
 It means that not any, but only strictly definite

quantitative and qualitative changes can be
linked in a scientific context.
 The concrete unity of the quantity and quality

of a given object is known to be reflected in the
dialectical category of measure which lays special
emphasis on the concreteness of this unity. The
quantitative changes of a given quality are
restricted within the limits of a given measure
beyond which the unity under consideration breaks
up and is replaced by another unity having its
own measure.
 The concreteness of quantity and quality

accounts for the relativeness of the distinction
_-_-_
^^1^^ Herbert Feigl, ``Critique of Dialectical Materialism'',

in: Dialogues on the Philosophy of Marxism, Ed. by J.
Somerville and H. L. Parsons, Greenwood Press, Westport,
Connecticut, 1974, p.~114.
324
between quantitative and qualitative changes.

It is only in relation to a given quality that one
can speak of certain quantitative changes.
Outside the bounds of the measure such a
counterposition becomes senseless. The number of the
electrons on the outermost shell of the atom is
directly related to its qualitative characteristics, to
the quality as a whole. Yet this number does not
affect the aggregate state of the matter which
includes the electrons under consideration. We do
not mention here the trivial approach to this
dialectical category exemplified, for instance, by
an attempt to link daylight illumination with
the number of stars in the sky.
 Proceeding from the abstract logical pattern

advocated by the opponents of dialectics, we
might say that any quantitative change in general
involves one or another qualitative alteration.
Take, for instance, the budding of leaves on a tree.
The appearance of a new leaf on a branch is in
itself a qualitative change---it involves the
emergence of a bud, the concentration of chlorophyll,
the absorption of light, etc. One might even speak
of many qualitative changes. Similarly, the
evaporation of several molecules of water from
its surface which brings about but a minor
quantitative change in the volume of liquid in a vessel
is connected with such a qualitative change as
the process of evaporation. The same quantity of
molecules could have been removed from the
same volume by means of, for instance, a sprayer.
 Can we indeed speak of quantitative and

qualitative changes in this latter case? If we do, we
shall make a common, even a typical mistake
which leads sometimes to serious
misunderstandings. Of course, if we speak in an abstract
325
manner, the elimination of a certain amount of

molecules is a quantitative process. But in relation to
what? This is just the point, since the principle
of concreteness calls for a very definite ``reference
system'' without which any scientific analysis
turns into nonsense. Whereas the aggregate state
of liquid in a vessel does not change (the
qualitative state of water remains invariable),
molecules pass into a new state, acquire a new quality,
the humidity of ambient air increases, etc., i.e.
qualitative changes do take place ---but in a
different system of relations. The law of the
interdependence of quantitative and qualitative changes
would indeed turn into commonplace if we did
not define in each particular case the relationship
between a certain quantity and a certain quality,
i.e. did not determine the system the
development of which is the object of our analysis.
 Taking exception to the law of the

transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes,
Herman Wetter writes that if the new quality
were of a higher order, it would be bound to have
something which cannot be explained in terms
of the laws of the lower order. That means that
the effect would be bigger in some respect than
the cause or, to put it another way, it would have
no corresponding cause, at least with regard to
the increment. Consequently, according to
Wetter, the law of the transformation of quantitative
into qualitative changes does not explain
anything, it merely describes the transition from the
old quality to a new one.
 As has been pointed out above, the laws of

dialectics, though universal by nature, are not
confirmable under any arbitrary set of conditions.
They are operative within quite definite
326
epistemological limits and become senseless beyond

them. In other words, they can be falsified in
principle, if we come across a sufficiently large body
of contradicting facts. The absurd contentions
that the categories and laws of materialist
dialectics are trivial and unscientific derive from sheer
ignorance. Such contentions are based on the
subjective interpretation of dialectics and have
nothing to do with its true nature. In most
contemporary concepts of Western philosophers
claiming to carry on the dialectical tradition,
dialectics is replaced by eclecticism, the semblance of
dialectics.
 To sum up. Philosophical knowledge

represents all forms of scientific concreteness:
empirical, theoretical and epistemological. It can be
confirmed experimentally, given conditions for
appropriate abstraction, and it can be falsified
outside the limits of the objective field. Philosophical
knowledge is theoretically concrete in the sense
that it rests on the theoretical foundation of
modern science, formulates its laws and provides
answers to philosophical questions prompted by the
development of science itself. Finally,
philosophical knowledge is concrete from the
epistemological viewpoint in the sense that each
dialectical category and law is based on and relevant to
the entire system of philosophical knowledge in
terms of its logic and history.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
4. MATERIALISTIC DIALECTICS
 AND SPECIAL SCIENCES
 The nihilistic attitude towards philosophy and

towards broad theoretical concepts in the
327
period of the inception of positivism is closely

connected with (though cannot be fully excused
by) the stormy growth of empirical sciences in
the late 18th and the early 19th centuries. The
universal enthusiasm about their remarkable
successes created an illusion that all mankind's
problems without exception could and ought to
be solved exclusively by the methods of natural
sciences which not only provided the exhaustive
explanation of phenomena, but also predicted
the existence of unknown phenomena and thus
opened the way for new discoveries. Of special
interest to us, however, is the connection between
this philosophical nihilism and the boom of
empirical investigations. This question is the more
topical as in our time, too, the extensive
development of empirical methods of investigation
in one or another scientific field brings about a
very similar phenomenon---a certain
estrangement, if not downright victimisation of
philosophy.
 As is commonly known, empirical

investigations usually aim at studying individual, sensually
perceptible objects and phenomena of reality.
Besides, the sphere of empirical investigation
includes inductive generalisations and even the
formulation of empirical laws. Most researchers
associate theoretical knowledge with a higher
level of abstraction, with the explanation of
empirical laws, revelation of their links with other
laws and existing theories, i.e. with their
theoretical substantiation, as well as with the discovery
of new laws which do not always lend themselves
to empirical interpretation.
 The very nature of empirical knowledge, like

that of applied knowledge in general, accounts
328
for the fact that the scientist engaged in concrete

empirical investigations is seldom forced by the
specific problems he studies to concern himself
with philosophical generalisations. At any rate,
the logic of his research does not lead him to
philosophical concepts of universal significance.
 It does not mean, however, that a natural

scientist does not concern himself with
philosophical problems and is in general far removed
from philosophy. Even in a purely empirical
investigation a scientist cannot make a step
without adhering, for instance, to the principle
of objectivity. His task consists in excluding
the effect of the subjective factor, i.e. the
influence of his own manipulations, particularly
of his personal perception and his individual
experience from the conditions of his experiment
or observation. Every experimentalist knows
only too well the difficulties involved in the
fulfilment of this task, as well as the severity of
the requirement for the ``purity of the
experiment''. Not every scientist, however, is fully
aware of the fact that this requirement does not
stem from the nature of his specific
investigation but is of general methodological significance,
i.e. that it is a philosophical principle.
Similarly, a scientist cannot disregard the principle of
causality or determinism from the viewpoint
of methodology. The experimentalist's work
largely consists in a search for the causes of the
event or phenomenon under observation, or in
defining its possible effects. Here, too, the
patterns of his thinking and experimental
activities are predetermined methodologically so that
he proceeds from events to their causes, then to
their consequences, conditions, etc, In such
329
standard situations a scientist relies on the available

philosophical knowledge and seldom questions
its validity. Moreover, not infrequently he is
not even aware of the philosophical basis which
provides, as it were, the methodological
framework for his research. The problems he is
concerned with cannot be qualified either as purely
philosophical or as specifically scientific. The
solution of his problems calls for bridging the
gap between philosophical and specialised
knowledge so as to permit philosophical ideas to
fertilise his practical work and give it a new meaning
and new dimensions. Such problems can be called
philosophico-methodological since they are
philosophically oriented and their solution is guided
by general philosophical principles. Yet they are
not regarded as philosophical, since their
emergence does not cast doubt on the content of
philosophical categories, nor does it question the
role of philosophical laws. It is not surprising
therefore that a scientist may delude himself into
thinking that he is completely free of any
philosophical propositions or principles.
 It should be noted that empirical

investigations in one or another specific field are not likely
to add much to the arguments for or against some
philosophical trend, even if the facts the scientist
deals with are quite extraordinary. Numerous
evidences regarding flying saucers and the
abundance of documentary reports about catastrophes
in the area of the Bermuda triangle give rather
impressive data and stir up imagination. On
the basis of such information a layman may
come to most fantastic conclusions. Generally
speaking, the thinking of a man in the street is
apt to overcome very easily the compatibility
330
barriers which often make a tremendous

problem for a serious scientist.
 A layman's imagination can easily carry him

from the rumours of flying saucers to a very
plausible image of a visitor from outer space described
sometimes in great detail (down to the number of
fingers on his hand) and further to fantastic
pictures of the arrival of reasonable beings on
the Earth. Then he may plunge into speculations
on the nature of reason, on the origin of the solar
system, etc. Strange as it may seem, what is
easily accessible to the layman's fanciful
imagination proves to be beyond the power of
thinking of a scientist who cannot resort either
to Pegasus' wings or to Hermes' sandals but has
to follow his thorny path with a heavy tread of
an experimentalist. His every step must be thought
out and well measured. To be sure, science
has also learned to build ``castles in the air''
now called orbital stations... Yet how very
careful and arduous its every step forward,
how modest its achievements in comparison
with the ages of hard work and relentless struggle
against the unknown and therefore terrifying
forces of nature---and how very different the sober
and restrained approach of true scientists from
the unfounded conceit of dilettantes relishing
man's would-be power over nature! Alas, the
position of an empirically-minded natural
scientist differs but little from the thinking of a
dilettante venturing to expound his views on the
philosophical doctrines he knows only by
hearsay... He is doomed to vacillate from the extreme
exaggeration of the significance of his own
achievements and the derogation of the role of theory,
particularly philosophy, to the concoction of
331
astounding theories and `òriginal'' philosophical

doctrines...
 It is the empiricist style of scientific thinking

and investigation, the empiricist standard of
scientific progress that lies at the root of
metaphysical ideas and speculative propositions which
fill in the gaps between individual isolated facts
torn out of the context and viewed outside and
independent of their links and relationships. It
is narrow empiricism in science that often takes
a disdainful and intransigent stand against
consistent materialist approach to reality and
tends to replace serious scientific investigation
by pretentious, extravagant ideas without
bothering to trace them to the corresponding
historical or historical-scientific anticedents in
the age-old history of science and philosophy.
This unwillingness to study philosophical
traditions and historical links accounts, above all,
for uncritical attitude toward general theoretical
and philosophical ideas which are unavoidable
in any scientific investigation.
 Every researcher seeks to transgress the bounds

of his immediate investigation and take a
broader view of the problem he is concerned with.
Yet such transgressions need not necessarily
testify to the expansion of his scientific horizons
and broadening of his interests---they may also
result from scientific adventurism which goes
hand in hand with the condemnation of
``primitive materialism'', ``theoretical dogmatism'', etc.
This militant empiricism which has always
chafed under the so-called harshness of
dialectics and complained about the pedestrian style
of Marx's thinking and the intransigence of
Leninist materialism proves to be capable of
332
getting on quite well with those theories and

philosophical concepts which suit it in one way
or another in a given situation, gratify its
weaknesses. This attitude is usually expressed in
overall hostility to any methodology, in
anarchical opposition to any world outlook and results
from the absence of a solid theoretical foundation.
 The uncritical attitude to the philosophical

environment leads to a paradoxical situation:
on the one hand, ostensible independence, the
absence of any philosophical commitments and
freedom to choose any philosophical concept
that is suitable from the practical, utilitarian
viewpoint and justifies all sorts of wild
digressions into the history of science or depth of the
Universe; on the other hand, actual bondage to
current philosophical tastes and intellectual
fashion. The illusion of freedom from
philosophical systems turns out to be overall dependence
on obsolete philosophical theories. The champions
of the ``freedom of intellect'' find themselves in
the position of those natural scientists who were
so aptly ridiculed by Engels: ``Natural scientists
believe that they free themselves from philosophy
by ignoring it or abusing it. They cannot,
however, make any headway without thought, and for
thought they need thought determinations. But
they take these categories unreflectingly from
the common consciousness of so-called educated
persons, which is dominated by the relics of
long obsolete philosophies, or from the little
bit of philosophy compulsorily listened to at
the University (which is not only fragmentary,
but also a medley of views of people belonging
to the most varied and usually the worst schools),
or from uncritical and unsystematic reading of
333
philosophical writings of all kinds. Hence they

are no less in bondage to philosophy, but
unfortunately in most cases to the worst philosophy,
and those who abuse philosophy most are slaves
to precisely the worst vulgarised relics of the
worst =
philosophies.''^^1^^
 Among such slaves found itself not only

positivism, but also other philosophical schools which
undertook to express the empiricist's curtailed
world view and carried to excess all the demerits
(and merits, for that matter) of empirical
investigation. The empiricist's stand is in fact
hypocritical in that his abuse of philosophy and
``metaphysics'' often serves as a smokescreen for his
own philosophical system intended to espouse
his views.
 It would be wrong to think that the tendency

to exaggerate the role of sensory experience
characteristic of earlier empirical science will die
away by itself in the age of the maturity of
science with its high level of abstractions and
complex mathematical formalisation of whole
branches. The empirical investigation of
individual objects and phenomena will always
remain an important task of science however
attractive and promising theoretical research may
be. It is essential, therefore, that alongside the
encouragement of young scientists in fundamental
investigations due attention be paid to
experimental work and that appropriate incentives be
constantly sought to improve and stimulate it.
Sometimes an individual fact discovered by mere
chance may lead to the emergence of a new
_-_-_
^^1^^ Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Progress

Publishers, Moscow, 1974, pp. 209--10.
334
scientific trend or to the reappraisal of current

scientific theories.
 On the other hand, as long as scientific

investigations in certain fields are based on empirical
data, there exists a nutrient medium for
empiricism as a philosophical trend.
 There is yet another paradoxical aspect of

the evolution of positivism. The dominance of
empirical methods in natural science and the
universal enthusiasm about its achievements
had come to an end or at least considerably
subsided by the mid-19th century. At the turn of
the 20th century the prestige of empiricism was
completely undermined by the rapid development
of physics, chemistry, biology and psychology.
Yet it is precisely this period that reanimated the
influence of positivist philosophy.
 The development of theoretical natural science

and elaboration of fundamental theories did not
change the attitude of positivism to general
philosophical problems. Logical positivism that
came to the foreground in that period with renewed
determination to eliminate ``metaphysics''
from science was nurtured by the hopes that all
theoretical propositions could be reduced to
empirical knowledge. This stand was well
illustrated by Russell's attitude to the principle of
causality in scientific cognition. Characterising
this principle as purely metaphysical, as a relic
of the pre-scientific stage of knowledge, he
pointed out that theoretically developed sciences
had already got rid of all remnants of causality.
Alongside the principle of causality, positivism
threw overboard all other philosophical
principles and laws, first and foremost those of
dialectics and materialism, on the grounds that the
335
categories of quality, matter, necessity, essence

and the like are alien to theoretical knowledge.
 Modern philosophers of science in their works

devoted to the concept of law and to the
principle of determinism in fact identify law with
universal assertions on the grounds that the
language of science does not express any
necessity except the logical one. Necessity itself is
identified with universality which, in their
opinion, is all that is demanded of scientific
statements, theoretical generalisations and even the
most advanced modern theories. Similar is their
attitude to the categories of contradiction,
essence and practically all other main categories
and laws of dialectics.
 Such oversimplified understanding of the

structure of scientific knowledge revealing itself
in present-day positivist literature is a natural
consequence of the main premises of the
philosophy of science limiting the philosophy and
methodology of science exclusively to the logic
and language of scientific cognition. Regarding
the available knowledge as reality itself
embodied in language, the positivists cannot but
overlook the infrastructure of science, i.e. its
abstractions, premises and assumptions.
 True, the latest variants of positivist

philosophy, e.g. critical rationalism and other
``postpositivist'' trends, go as far as recognising the
methodological, instrumental role of some
principles of dialectics, such as causality and
determinism. Yet they also stop short of recognising
the theoretical significance of philosophical
categories and laws pointing out that they do not
reveal themselves openly either in theoretical
or in empirical knowledge.
336
 The view that philosophical substratum does

not lie on the surface of scientific theories and
empirical investigations is on the whole not
objectionable. The question, however, consists
in whether the principles and laws of dialectics
are indeed devoid of any scientific significance
and play no part in theoretical investigations.
 To answer this question, it is necessary first

of all to take into account some specific features
of theoretical knowledge. Understandably, the
formulation of philosophical propositions and
principles goes beyond the limits of a special
scientific investigation. Philosophical principles
seldom come to the forefront in a scientific
system and their cognitive value is seldom
conspicuous. As long as any philosophical principle or,
for that matter, any theoretical premise in
general serves the purposes of scientific
investigation the scientist is not confronted with the task
of its further elaboration or improvement. And
it is quite natural. His immediate aim is to solve
a specific problem within a more or less narrow
field of his interests. He achieves this aim
directly, using the means of his particular science---
physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.
Philosophical principles for the scientist are
something like air which he does not think of as
long as his breathing is not difficult.
 What is more, this approach is evidently

suggested by the very object under
investigation since it appears to be the most promising
and likely to yield the best results. As a matter
of fact, the object of investigation often proves,
so to speak, more dialectical and more
materialistic than the theoretical views of the
investigator himself, particularly if his philosophical
22--1152
337
baggage consists of meagre positivist abstractions.
 In any case, the scientist does not pose any

philosophical problems in his field of
investigations as long as the concepts he relies upon in his
practical work perform the function of the
foundation of science. The theoretical significance
of philosophical principles and laws would,
perhaps, never come to light if they always remained
but implicit. Yet sooner or later the time
comes when philosophical concepts do reveal
themselves to celebrate their victory and claim
universal recognition. Unlike experimental data
and theoretical principles which lie at the root
of specific theories, philosophical principles and
laws should be regarded as their premises since
it is impossible to deduce from them any
particular scientific doctrine. At the same time, no
scientific theory is conceivable without the
corresponding philosophical basis. Hence, philosophical
premises are essential, but not sufficient
conditions for theoretical and empirical cognition.
 As distinct from theoretical concepts which

serve as a basis for a nascent theory so that it is
largely deducible from them, philosophical
concepts constituting its foundation cannot be used
for deducing one or another variant of this
theory. As a matter of fact, there may be several ways
of solving a problem which would meet the
requirements of materialism and dialectics, i.e.
scientific philosophy, under given conditions.
 Speaking, for instance, of the philosophical

foundation of classical physics, we can single
out at least four philosophical ideas deeply
rooted in all the theories of 19th-century natural
scientists. They are: (1) the idea of materiality
of the world, the identity of matter and substance,
338
impenetrability of matter, etc.; (2) the idea

of the absoluteness of space and time regarded as
receptacles of matter and as having properties
not connected with one another' and independent
of the movement of material bodies; (3) the idea
of absolute determinateness of all changes and
events in nature owing to universal interaction
governed by the dynamic laws of mechanics and
expressed in the concept of Laplatian
determinism; (4) the idea of the independence of the
object from the subject of investigation, i.e.
the concept of the objectivity of knowledge.
 Since these ideas were linked with the

theoretical foundation of contemporary science, they
assumed even more concrete forms. For instance,
materiality was identified with several material
properties such as constant mass, atomic
structure, impenetrability, etc.; space was assumed to
be filled up with hypothetical material medium
called ether (hence the corpuscular and wave
theories of light); interaction was believed to
spread instantaneously (hence the idea of remote
action); matter and motion were regarded to be
indestructible (hence the law of conservation
of energy).
 The existing philosophical premises allowed

of several alternative solutions to theoretical
problems making equally plausible the
corpuscular and the wave theories, the theory of ether
and the theory denying the existence of any
mechanical elastic medium, Laplatian determinism
and statistical physics, etc. Metaphysical
materialism with its one-sided mechanistic
conceptions of motion and matter brought natural science
to a crisis which was not confined to just one or
several fields but affected the very foundation
22*
339
of science---its instinctively materialistic world

view. ``Radium, the great revolutionary'',
according to Henri Poincare, cast doubt on the law of
conservation of energy and, consequently, on
the idea of the indestructibility of matter. The
electron shook the concepts of the indivisibility
of atoms and the immutability of the mass of a
body thus undermining the idea of materiality.
Albert Michelson's experiments (1881) called
in question the existence of ether and absolute
space in which the velocity of light should have
been higher in the direction of the movement of
the source of light, but proved to be variable
and independent of the speed of the source of
light. In 1901, Pyotr Lebedev's experiments
revealed the pressure of light. The discovery
of X-rays in 1895 followed by the discovery of
the electron as the atom's main component (in
1897) and of radioactivity refuted the idea of the
indivisibility of atoms. Other philosophical
foundations of classical physics were undermined
too: the concept of the immutability of nature's
primary substances and attributes, of the
universality and absolute identity of the operation
of mechanical laws both on the infinite and
infinitesimal scales.
 It became obvious that the philosophical

doctrines inherited from the mechanistic
materialism of the 17th-18th centuries could not provide
a reliable theoretical foundation for the
solution of the pressing problems of physics and
natural science in general. ``The essence of the crisis
in modern physics'', wrote Lenin, ``consists in
the break-down of the old laws and basic
principles, in the rejection of an objective reality
existing outside the mind, that is, in the
340
replacement of materialism by idealism and

agnosticism. `Matter has disappeared'---one may thus
express the fundamental and characteristic
difficulty in relation to many particular questions
which has created this =
crisis.''^^1^^
 Turning to the philosophical premises of

19th-century physics, the physicists unfamiliar
with dialectics could not but identify
metaphysical materialism with materialism in general.
We need not enlarge on this subject, as it has
received extensive coverage in relevant Marxist
literature and is not, in fact, directly connected
with the main point we want to make here,
namely, that the philosophical premises of science
have no independent significance as long as they
do not come in a more or less sharp conflict with
the results of scientific investigations and the
latest theoretical views.
 However, an impending crisis in science causes

scientists to start revising its theoretical and
experimental principles.
 Yet a crisis may sometimes go deeper and

involve also the philosophical foundation of
science if it fails to meet the latest requirements.
Hence, crises in the development of science can
only be avoided if scientists are fully aware of
the philosophical principles which underlie the
fundamental theories in their fields of
investigation. Of special importance here is not only a
profound theoretical background of scientific
personnel and a thorough knowledge of the
history of science, but also sufficient philosophical
culture and good acquaintance with the historical
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'',

op. cit., p.~258.
341
sources of philosophical problems. Most serious

attitude to the philosophical foundation of a
given science is extremely important.
 It is no secret that the philosophical principles

of modern physics were formulated in a general
form by Marx and Engels way back in the middle
of the 19th century. The definition of matter as
a philosophical category denoting the objective
reality which exists independently of
consciousness provided the necessary guideline for
scientific investigations in the late 19th and the early
20th centuries. Progress in physics could only be
attained if the electron was regarded not as a
purely theoretical construct, not as an object
with ``free will'', but as a component part of the
atom with a complex structure of its own. The
dialectical solution of the problem of the
relationship between necessity and chance
constituting a single whole laid or was to lay the
foundation for the probability approach to the
interpretation of quantum-mechanical processes, for
the correct understanding of probability and the
relationship between indeterminacies, i.e. the
discoveries made in the first half of the 20th
century. The concept of the unity of space, time
and motion advanced by Marx and Engels also
gave a clue to the special and general theories
of relativity.
 It stands to reason that the implementation

of these philosophical concepts required of
natural scientists conscious assimilation and
further development of the philosophical ideas of
Marx and Engels providing a theoretical basis for
dialectical interpretation of concrete physical,
biological, chemical and other data. Of great
importance for the accomplishment of this task
342
was close cooperation between philosophers and

natural scientists. However, conditions at that
time were not yet ripe for such cooperation.
 Even this short historical survey shows that

philosophical knowledge is not doomed to
remain forever behind the scenes. Sooner or later
it is bound to come to the forefront of scientific
progress.
 An essential distinction of fundamental

theoretical investigations from empirical cognition
consists in that theory is capable of setting and
solving a number of philosophical, tasks on its
own. This feature, naturally, is largely
accountable for the difference in the attitude of
scientists representing the two tendencies in the
development of science to the significance and value
of philosophical problems and to philosophy in
general. The task of fundamental investigations
consists in explaining the established laws,
revealing the links between them, predicting and
foreseeing new facts and new trends in the
development of science. Theoretical laws and concepts
.therefore express necessity and are of a general
nature. Theory no less than empirical sciences
rests on a philosophical basis in the form of
adopted and tested philosophical doctrines and
principles, instrumental methodologically in the
formulation and explanation of new laws and
relationships.
 Hence, theoretical investigations also involve

problems which we call
philosophico-methodological and which are mainly connected with the
use of the available philosophical propositions,
principles and laws in the solution of
methodological problems and in the fulfilment of concrete
theoretical tasks. To be sure, the
343
philosophico-methodological approach to the problems dealt

with in a theoretical investigation is essentially
different from the approach to the same problems
in an empirical investigation aimed at
revealing and explaining individual facts of scientific
importance. For instance, the problem of the
objectivity of knowledge viewed from the
philosophico-methodological angle at the theoretical
level of cognition may boil down to deciding
on whether the theoretical analysis of a
quantummechanical ensemble should be carried out with
the help of a certain apparatus or whether a
basically new means of investigation should be
sought in order to make the process under
observation independent of the observer. Of course,
the effect of an apparatus on the micro-object
is an objective phenomenon, but the nature of
the apparatus and the form of its influence
cannot but tell, in one way or another, on the
subjective perception of the processes in interest. It
would be wrong, therefore, to deny the fact that
object-subject problems do arise in such
investigations. Moreover, it can be asserted that no
effective solution has been found to this problem
so far. The problem of causality regarded from
the philosophico-methodological viewpoint at
the level of theoretical cognition may consist, for
instance, in the theoretical explanation of
discovered laws, in the logical deduction of a certain
proposition from several premises, in the
forecasting scientific and technological progress, etc. Here,
too, the content of the principle of causality,
the meaning of the categories are not subject to
any special analysis.
 Hence, the problems which we call

philosophico-methodological have to be solved both by a
344
theorist and an empirical scientist. Just like in

the case of empirical investigations, they are
not regarded as philosophical problems mainly
due to the fact that the solutions sought are
expected to help in the fulfilment of a specific
scientific task rather than in the formulation of
a philosophical conclusion. The solution of the
specific problem in question is subordinated to
the- principal aim---the solution of a definite
puzzle, a special theoretical problem.
 Similarly to empirical knowledge, theoretical

knowledge also has its limits. A theorist takes
over where the empiricist leaves off. He
formulates empirical laws, explains them, links to
other laws having the same degree of
universality or to even more general laws, gives them a
theoretical substantiation. Scientific conclusions
have different degrees of universality
expressing the necessary links and relationships at
different levels of generalisation. Some
theories, e.g. the lever theory, differ but little
from empirical generalisations as they describe
the properties of concrete objects and phenomena.
Other theories, such as the general systems
theory, the set theory, the games theory, the modern
cosmological theories, and others come very close
to philosophical concepts and conclusions.
 As is known, a scientific principle can only be

refuted by another one if they represent similar
or at least comparable degrees of generalisation.
Consequently, critical attitude to existing
philosophical concepts, as well as real interest in
the development of philosophical knowledge
which is indicative of the growing understanding
of its role and significance in modern science can
only appear at the theoretical level of scientific
345
cognition. It does not mean, of course, that the

responsibility for developing philosophical
knowledge rests exclusively with the natural scientists.
The point is that the revision of philosophical
principles, however partial, calls for their
reassessment and creative development, since the
problem is not confined to the concrete expression
or application of current philosophical laws. It
is laws themselves, their content, that become
the object of scrutiny. The problems which arise
in such situations can be called
theoretico-philosophical or world-view problems.
 The very nature of these problems makes it

impossible for the natural scientists to tackle
them on their own, though their solution may
predetermine the results of investigations in
the specific fields they are concerned with. The
professional philosophers, for their part, need
profound theoretical knowledge in highly
specialised fields of positive science in order to
undertake this task. They must have a clear
understanding of the conflicting theoretical views in the
given branch, know its history and traditions.
History knows many examples when the natural
scientists set themselves the task of solving
philosophico-theoretical problems arising in their
fields in order to help overcome the crisis. Among
prominent natural scientists who made invaluable
contribution to the theory and philosophy of
science are such famous names as Albert Einstein,
Wolfgang Pauli, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg,
Vladimir Bekhterev, Ivan Pavlov, Nikolai
Vavilov, Ernst Bauer, Vladimir Fock, Dmitri
Blokhintsev, and others.
 In this context utterly absurd appear to be
the repealed attempts of the positivists to lay
346
the blame for unsolved philosophico-theoretical

problems and deadlocks in science on none other
than philosophy, Marxist philosophy in the
first place. Positivism has always been trying to
make Marxist philosophy the scapegoat for the
difficulties encountered in the process of scientific
cognition. Be it the comprehension of the
philosophical problems of the theory of relativity or
the painful process of consolidation of the
quantum theory, the guilt for the protracted debates
and controversies was invariably laid at the
door of materialist dialectics and the Marxist
philosophers who were allegedly opposed to the
adoption of new ideas in physics. The
development of genetics, too, purports to have been
hampered by ill-intentioned dialectics which,
according to the positivist ``historians'' of science did
not serve as a guide for scientific thought but
acted as a brake on its progress.
 The history of science shows that

theoretico-philosophical problems emerge as an expression
of contradictions between the available
theoretical basis of science and its philosophical
foundation. Philosophical arguments are only resorted
to when a theoretical problem cannot be solved
by purely theoretical means and when it becomes
necessary, on the one hand, to analyse its
scientific roots and, on the other, to formulate
its essence in philosophical terms and to indicate
the possible ways for its solution. This, in turn,
calls for a sufficiently high philosophical culture.
The history of science knows a great many
examples when the natural scientists proved incapable
of solving important philosophical problems only
because they allowed themselves to be enslaved
by obsolete or basically false philosophical
347
doctrines. On the other hand, cases are on record

when even prominent philosophers adhering to
an advanced philosophical teaching were unable
to understand the significance of pressing
theoretico-philosophical problems as they lacked
sufficient scientific background or specific knowledge
in the particular field of science.
 Neither physics, biology, nor any other
special science can be blamed for the inability of
individual scientists to provide correct answers
to topical problems of world-view significance.
Physics cannot be held responsible for the
inability of such scientists as Mach and Poincar\'e
to interpret materialistically the results of their
own scientific investigations. Similarly, it is
not the fault of Marxist philosophy that some
of its ill-starred representatives abused and
denounced cybernetics as a bourgeois pseudo-science
because they were unable to distinguish
between its real scientific content and the
misrepresentation of its discoveries in Western
philosophical literature.
 Hence, neither side alone can be held

responsible for inability to understand and overcome one
or another crisis in the theoretico-philosophical
field: the fault lies both with natural scientists
and philosophers. Once physicists misjudge a
certain discovery, their error is seized upon by
philosophers and becomes a source of groundless
philosophical illusions and absolutisations
leading, as a rule, to idealism and priestcraft. Should
a slip be made by philosophers, their delusion
will immediately tell on the relations between
the rival schools in the corresponding field of
positive science. Any controversy over
methodological or philosophico-theoretical problems is
348
equally sensitive to both philosophical and

specifically scientific arguments.
 Of course, it always takes scientists some time

to realise that they are faced with a
theoretico-philosophical problem. If any symptom of an
impending crisis in science becomes evident,
philosophical concepts and principles are always
the last to be called in question. A wrong
prediction or explanation in some specific field of
science leads first of all to the revision of
theoretical principles and corresponding scientific
theories. Such a revision takes several years of
scrupulous and wearisome work even in our age of the
scientific and technological revolution. The turn
of the philosophical concepts constituting the
foundation of a given theory comes only after
scientists complete a most exacting test of the
empirical basis and axiomatic premises of the
theory in question. There are many hot areas in
modern science where philosophical concepts
and ideas are tested for strength by new scientific
discoveries. As in Engels's time, nature remains
the touchstone of dialectics and gives ever new
evidence that it is governed by the laws of
dialectics, and not metaphysics.
 The intensive development of modern science

characterised by the ever increasing complexity
of its structure and growing sophistication of
its theoretical framework expands further the
sphere of man's knowledge. Scientific
investigations extend to ever new fields, new objects,
phenomena and properties of the material world.
This statement may seem quite trivial, yet it
is not always realised that the expansion of
scientific horizons is a transgression not only of the
bounds of available knowledge, but also of the
349
bounds of the current theories and adopted

paradigms. This latter circumstance is of special
significance since the current view tending
towards some kind of pantheorism maintains that
practically all new facts discovered by modern
science do not go outside the framework of
commonly professed theories, at least the
fundamental ones, such as the theory of relativity,
the quantum theory, the theory of the atomic
structure of matter, and the Darwin theory.
 True, so far as the modern means of scientific

investigation are concerned, there are no grounds
to question the validity of at least one of the
above fundamental theories both in the macro-
and microworlds. Nonetheless, it is rather a
weak argument in favour of pantheorism. First
of all, science has already received certain
empirical data and theoretical conclusions which
are not quite compatible with current theories,
even with such a comprehensive one as the
general theory of relativity. The explanation of these
facts calls for a special scientific investigation.
It is quite likely that a more thorough analysis
will bring these facts in full conformity with
the theory in question. Yet a possibility cannot
be excluded altogether that it will have to be
modified, generalised or even replaced by a basically
new theory.
 Besides, it is never to be forgotten that all

current theories, however broad they may be,
cannot claim to account for all the properties and
aspects of the objective world. In other words,
science can still reveal vast areas, explored but
partially or unexplored at all, even in those
fields where one or another fundamental theory
appears to be indisputable. Take, for instance,
350
the complex ecological processes or

meteorological phenomena we are still trying to find a
clue to and sometimes get the badly needed
answers when they are already useless. The earth's
bowels, too, are full of mysteries, not to speak
of our nearest neighbours, the Moon and Mars,
which are to be explored in the near future---
here we have no proven theoretical concepts
whatsoever to rely upon.
 One can hardly expect to get the right

perspective of the relationship between philosophy and
science if he ignores the present trends of
scientific development, however inconspicuous and
insignificant they may seem. One should take into
account the fact that the relations between
philosophy and some natural sciences or their
departments concerned with these latest trends
tend to become ever more direct and
unmediated.
 The point is that, in the absence of a developed

theory providing a direct and specific
explanation of a given phenomenon and predicting its
consequences, the functions of such a theory
largely pass to general philosophical concepts and
principles. To be sure, an essential role in the
development of specific scientific theories giving
an exhaustive and concrete interpretation of
facts belongs also to theoretical or general
scientific categories and principles. Yet philosophy
plays an independent theoretical part, too, and
advances problems which may be called
philosophico-theoretical.
 What are, for instance, those basic scientific

principles which constitute now the theoretical
core of ecological knowledge, the embryo of
the future special theory? They are nothing but
351
a set of philosophical categories concretised to

meet specific conditions.
 In geography, these basic categories represent

the concepts of structure, dynamics, development
and others. Thus, the landscape axiom is
formulated as follows: `Ìn each point of the earth's
surface individual elements, components and
factors of geographic substance are interconnected
within a system of diverse and law-regulated
orderly ties.'' The chorological axiom
postulating spatial interdependence reads thus: `Àll
geographical phenomena are related to some
geographical places which are identified by their
location and particularly by the connection of
this location with neighbouring places and areas.''
Here is the distinguishing feature of
geographical objects: `Ìn geographic reality there are no
objects which do not possess such geographical
properties as location and spatial ties.''
 As one can see, all these initial theoretical

propositions are essentially concretised basic
methodological and world-view principles.
Alongside the world view and methodological functions
dialectico-materialist philosophy performs an
important theoretical role.
 Such an understanding of the functions of

philosophical knowledge may at first seem to be a
revival of the concept of natural philosophy
discarded by Marxism way back in the 19th
century. Yet the emphasis on the theoretical
significance of philosophy has nothing in common
with old natural philosophy if only for the fact
that materialist dialectics providing the initial
theoretical basis for natural science does not by
any means claim to substitute philosophical
principles and speculative hypotheses for the
352
subsequent detailed investigation of the object and

for the specific laws governing its functioning
and development. The absolutisation of
philosophical knowledge, the speculativeness
characterristic of the natural philosophy of the 17th and
18th centuries are ruled out by dialectical
materialist methodology itself. Marxist-Leninist
philosophy points the way for science to a more
profound knowledge of the world, stressing the
need to pass from general philosophical
principles to concrete objects, and proves the necessity
of discovering ever new aspects and empirical
laws of reality. According to dialectical
materialism, philosophy should not keep aloof from
this process letting science stew in its own juice
and expecting it to ripen all by itself, evolve
true philosophical principles or provide yet
another proof of dialectics.
 ``Bad'' natural philosophy cannot spring from
the methodology of dialectical materialism. It
flourishes where the theoretical progress of
science is made contingent on pseudo-philosophical
generalisations and ontological interpretations
of physical, chemical, biological and other
specific data. Such generalisations and
interpretations claiming the role of philosophical
categories actually tend to replace true philosophical
knowledge by speculative, natural-philosophical
concepts.
 It would be a mistake to presume that the

appearance of natural-philosophical concepts can
be effectively prevented in our time by the
spontaneous development of science and by Marxist
criticism. That is not so. When propounding
the Marxist-Leninist understanding of philosophy,
it is necessary to analyse not only the positivist
23--01152
353
views, but also the natural philosophical

concepts, e.g. within the framework of so-called
scientific realism, even if they spring up from
a seemingly materialistic soil. This circumstance
deserves special attention, since the present
crisis of positivist philosophy tends to stimulate
the ``revival of metaphysics'' as one of the
alternatives to the positivist methodological
programme. It is precisely this alternative offered
by Western specialists in the methodology of
science that leads to the reanimation of natural
philosophy in its modern form. Numerous
publications by American and British authors
confirm it with utmost clarity.
 It has already been pointed out in

philosophical literature that the mere process of the
generalisation of scientific data resulting in the
creation of universal theories and concepts does not
yet produce any `ìncrement in philosophical
knowledge''. In point of fact, such an `ìncrement''
gives grounds for various speculative, scholastic
concepts and hypotheses.
 This approach is untenable for several reasons.

First, the conclusions based on the simple
generalisation of concrete scientific data cannot but
be trivial as they do not solve any real
philosophical or special scientific problems. In fact, any
generalisation can only be regarded as
scientifically valid if it ensues from the solution of a
real philosophical problem. Hence, to qualify
as philosophical categories or principles, any
notions and generalisations should be
interpreted in the light of the basic principles of
dialectical materialism, tested for relevance and
consistence with other philosophical categories and
laws.
354
 Second, such conclusions are scientifically

barren as they do not lead to any new problems.
 Third, such conclusions tend to distort the

philosophical picture of reality, and this is
perhaps the most serious defect of the method
under consideration. Not a single notion can gain
circulation and be used in a philosophical
context, in debates or discussions, unless it is assessed
from the viewpoint of the main question of
philosophy. Why is it so important? First and
foremost, because philosophical analysis is based, at
least in relation to the world view and
methodology, on the already existing concepts and theories
which, understandably, possess both the
objective content and subjective elements. One should
clearly understand the dialectics of these two
aspects of scientific knowledge and distinguish
one from the other in order to avoid errors in
manipulating the new notion and trying to solve
philosophical problems.
 Suppose, we discuss the cause-effect problem

in the light of the feedback concept. Its solution
can only be obtained if we present the above
categories as abstractions. For a physicist,
biologist, a specialist in cybernetics or, for that
matter, in any other field of natural science this
problem simply does not exist. Specialists do
not deal with the categories of ``causality'' and
``feedback'', but with objective processes
themselves. In this context the above categories are
not regarded as abstractions with corresponding
approximations, assumptions, etc. In objective
reality feedback links are inseparable from
causal links. Besides, analysing the processes of
control in terms of feedback relations, a
scientist practically does not resort to the concept of
23*
355
causality. It means that these concepts have

quite definite epistemological limits which also
determine the sphere of their application. Hence,
the applicability of one or another concept---and
we are speaking here about scientific concepts of
a very general nature---depends not only on the
specific field of objective reality, but also on
the epistemological bounds. The transgression
of such bounds, as well as the use of theoretical
categories in an alien field renders them
nonsensical.
 The solution of one or another question from

the philosophical angle requires special
attention to the epistemological bounds of notions and
concepts. In this respect the philosophical
approach making a sharp distinction between the
objective and subjective aspects of scientific
facts and ideas is essentially different from the
approach of the natural scientists, just like
philosophy in general is different from the
knowledge accumulated in physics, biology, chemistry
and other particular sciences.
 Of course, the basic question of philosophy is

not the only ``filter'' for scientific generalisations
which are to qualify as truly philosophical
categories of world-view significance. No less
important in this respect are the fundamental laws and
categories of materialistic dialectics.
 It should never be forgotten that the

transition from the special knowledge obtained within
the framework of some positive science to the
philosophical level of thinking, like the process
of scientific cognition in general, has very little
in common with a linear and unidimensional
process of successive generalisations, something
in the nature of epigenesis. This transition is
356
a qualitative change, a swing to a different level

of universality and, accordingly, to a different
level of comprehension of the necessary links and
relations of the objective world.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
5. DIALECTICS AND
 THE INTEGRATION OF SCIENCE
 The contemporary development of scientific
knowledge is characterised by certain peculiar
trends very important for understanding the
relationship between philosophy and science.
These trends testify to the fact that dialectics is
a replica of objective reality and therefore
provides the best method for its cognition. For one,
dialectics highlights the objective character of
such a profound intrinsic contradiction of
scientific and technical progress as the unity of
integration and differentiation of science. These two
processes account to a considerable extent for
the growing complexity of the structure of
scientific knowledge and cannot but affect the progress
of philosophy itself. Their objective and veracious
presentation and assessment can only be
undertaken by a philosophy which is fully cognizant
of its own dependence on the general trend of
scientific development yet is not susceptible to
particular influences within each special science.
It is only this kind of philosophy that is capable
of viewing the development of science ``from the
inside'' by virtue of its being its integral part
and, as it were, its ``spokesman'', and ``from the
outside'', as the exponent of its most general
laws, principles and categories.
 From the viewpoint of dialectical materialism
357
which is the only philosophy capable of the

above approach, the main and most essential
trend in the development of modern science
consists in the growing interdependence of natural,
social and technical sciences. This trend does
not fall in with either positivist or any of the
``post-positivist'' models of the development of
science. It is highly significant that this
fruitful cooperation is based on modern production
and its achievements, on the one hand, and
unsolved problems, on the other. Marx's prediction
that science will eventually turn into a direct
productive force of society is coming true and
this fact is gaining ever wider recognition.
Understandably, this applies primarily to natural
and technical sciences. Their increasingly close
interaction stems not only from the needs of
production and from social tasks, but also from
the inner logic of scientific development, from
the vital tasks of fundamental and applied
research. The very links between science and
production, the effectiveness of scientific
investigations and fundamental research depend to a
considerable extent on the depth of integration of
scientific knowledge.
 An important feature of scientific progress

in our time which is overlooked or deliberately
ignored by all modern ``philosophy of science''
is the rapidly increasing significance and
theoretical independence of social sciences. Their
growing prestige is connected with spectacular
achievements of Marxist thought in transforming social
relations and in the successful management of
society in the socialist countries, with the
consolidation of the principles of socialist ethics
and social humanism. Yet the immediate
358
objective cause of this process is the increasing role of

social sciences in the sphere of social production.
 Under the conditions of modern scientific and

technical progress profound knowledge of the
achievements and problems of social sciences
becomes a prerequisite for the successful
development of natural science and should be regarded
as an important element in the general scientific
and cultural background of a modern scientist.
The role of social sciences should not be confined
to giving a specialist in natural or technical
sciences a certain minimum of knowledge just
to broaden his outlook. They should also
provide him with relevant social information to
permit solving complex problems he may
encounter in his more or less narrow field of activity,
let alone the tasks of preparing him for socially
useful activity, solving organisational problems,
broadening his philosophical horizon and
improving ideological education. The very logic of
scientific progress, the law of the development
of modern science calls for a broad humanitarian
education of the so-called narrow specialists.
 Under the impact of the current scientific and

technological revolution social sciences,
particularly some of their applied disciplines,
penetrate into the very core of production processes
revealing new possibilities for the solution of
important theoretical and practical problems and
for enhancing the efficiency of production. The
revolution gives a powerful impetus to the
development of new forms of interaction between
theoretical and experimental investigations
within the framework of natural, social and
technical sciences.
 The current scientific and technological
359
revolution is connected primarily with the discovery

and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
with the development of automation and
computers, breathtaking achievements of chemistry,
rapid progress of biology and space flights.
Natural science plays today a crucial role in
developing qualitatively new instruments of labour and
new materials, in introducing basically new
technological systems, designing automatic machine
lines, introducing on a wide scale automated
control systems and in solving many other
important problems. Tremendous achievements of
modern science and technology have made it
possible to start fundamental investigations of
the structure of matter in micro- and macrocosm,
to design and develop complex technical
systems, investigate and reproduce the most
intricate systems of living nature, including the
human organism.
 The current scientific and technological

revolution is also characterised by the essential
enhancement of the human factor in production,
i.e. of the role of man as the subject of the
production process, by a radical change in the
man-science-technology system and by the growing
complexity of organisation and management.
A crucial role in the investigation of all these
phenomena belongs to social sciences whose
representatives take an active part in the
development of the theoretical principles of scientific
control over socio-economic processes, in the study
of numerous factors stimulating creative
activity and in improving industrial engineering and
production schemes. The influence of social
sciences in the sphere of production is constantly
growing and its cooperation with natural and
360
technical sciences is becoming ever closer and

more fruitful.
 The penetration of social sciences into the

sphere of production affects not only the systems
of control and organisation. Changes in the
man-science-technology complex go side by side with
the revolution in the very foundation of
production processes. The growing complexity of the
design and operation of modern machines, their
increasing role in the automation and
management of production make ever more exacting
demands not only on natural, but also on social
sciences which have to supply the necessary data
for engineering solutions. The present level of
integration of social, natural and technical
sciences makes it incumbent on engineers, designers
and specialists in cybernetics to take accurate
account of social, psychological and other
``human factors'' in production, in the service
industry and in other fields.
 The development of new technology and the

extensive use of automation, data-processing
equipment and computers are primarily the
result of the labour of mathematicians and
specialists in cybernetics and electronics, yet the
achievements in these fields are also creditable to the
creative endeavour of logicians, linguists,
psychologists, specialists in mathematical economy
and economic cybernetics. It is common
knowledge that computers which are indispensable in
modern production systems cannot be
constructed and operated without the solution of economic,
psychological, logical and linguistic problems.
As a result, new sciences come into being, such
as applied linguistics, human engineering, and
economic cybernetics, The computerisation of
361
industrial processes is impossible without the

modelling of numerous thinking operations, so
far comparatively simple, and without solving
the problems connected with translation from
human language into machine language. The
highly accurate operation of automatons is known
to be controlled by algorithm-base programmes
representing the models of production and social
processes. The creation of artificial languages,
the systematisation of terms and symbols, the
development of modelling systems have
expanded the scope of application of linguistics which
was originally confined to the problems of
teaching the native or foreign languages and
translating from one language into another, and had very
little to do with direct production processes.
 The extreme complexity of systems which

include man as their component, calls for new
research methods essentially different from the
traditional physico-mathematical analysis.
Linguistics, for instance, holds out much promise in
the field of modelling such systems as it permits
using not only digits, but also words and even
whole sentences of the natural language. Profound
investigations into the structure of the natural
language, the analysis of the laws governing its
formation and functioning are also helpful in
the solution of certain technical problems, such
as the improvement of the quality standards
and responsiveness of the press, automation of
some editing and publishing processes, etc.
 The acceleration of scientific and technical

progress, the development of effective control
systems result in the rapid increase of
information flows which have to be processed at an ever
growing rate. The participation of linguists in
362
the improvement of production and social

processes with the use of computers finds its
expression today in a new linguistic method of
investigation---the modelling of the linguistic system
and speech processes. The results of this
modelling are materialised in special artificial languages
and various linguistic algorithms. Particularly
accurate should be the modelling of speech
processes when developing dialogue-type systems
and other advanced methods of man-machine
interaction.
 Applied linguistics is called upon to make its

contribution to the essential improvement of all
systems using the natural language and to the
enhancement of their effectiveness. Specifically,
it should enable computers to receive
information in its natural forms, without any preliminary
preparation by man. Computers should
manipulate semantic units instead of textual elements,
sharply expand the volume of information
required for the automatic solution of intellectual
problems and open up new possibilities for its complex
logical processing. To achieve these aims, it
is necessary to develop machine languages
approximating to the natural one, create
identification devices capable of recognising human voice
or its optical images, and improve the general
standard of self-control and self-perfection of
machines within the man-machine system. The
solution of this latter task is now becoming
quite feasible owing to the fact that the substance
of man's creative activity yields ever more
readily to mathematical description. An important
role in this process belongs, for one, to human
engineering which describes man's mental
characteristics and functions in terms of
363
mathematical language. This can be easily translated into

a machine language to fit in human and machine
characteristics. A similar function is performed
by bionics, particularly psychological bionics.
 The investigation into the role of the human

factor in modern technology throws a new light
on such philosophical problems as the
man-machine relationship, the specific features of
man-machine languages, substantive and formal
moments in reproductive and creative thinking,
artificial intellect and self-organisation, the
unity of the algorithmic and heuristic principles
of thinking.
 Social sciences play an increasingly important

role in the solution of questions pertaining to
the development of a single classification
system for various items and terms, to the
unification and standardisation of documents with
a view to producing uniform information for
various control systems in production and other
fields of social life. In this connection a need
arises to start a more profound investigation into
the theoretical problems of terminology, the
language of science, and to join the efforts of
scientists studying these problems. The
creation of such classifiers, as well as the development
and introduction of uniform documents, single
systems of technical, economic, financial and
other indices should not only reflect the growing
information unity of social, natural and
technical sciences, but also take into account new trends
in the improvement of the organisational
structure of the economy, the new level of the
development of democratic centralism in the sphere of
management and control. Classifiers not only
record essential balance links between the
364
economy and control systems, but also serve as the

source material for economic and
mathematical modelling in all spheres of the national
economy.
 Automation of production and many other

problems of social, scientific and technical
progress provide yet another channel for the
penetration of social sciences into the sphere of
production and for their drawing closer to natural
sciences. The more difficult the tasks and the
more complex the processes subject to
automation, the more imperative the need for studying
man and the full diversity of his individual
qualities, the social ones inclusive. The focus of
attention is shifted on man's activity, and the results
achieved in these studies determine to a
considerable extent the solution of many crucial
problems, both practical and theoretical.
 From the viewpoint of theory, the

investigation of human activity acquires special importance
in modelling man's actions and thinking processes.
Computers can only simulate the operational
and technical functions of human thinking. The
procedures characteristic of the actions of
machine and man are entirely different, let alone
the difference of the mechanisms themselves.
The extremely complex nature of human
activity cannot be reduced to logico-mathematical
algorithms. Attempts at formalising certain
elements of thinking processes, extremely useful
as they are, do not yet give grounds for excessive
optimism about the possibility of all-round
modelling of man's mental activities, developing
a full-scale artificial or hybrid intellect, etc.
Computers can essentially facilitate, speed up
and improve the accuracy of the decision-making
365
process, yet they can also accelerate the

implementation of an incorrect decision.
 The experience gained in the operation of

computers has provided convincing evidence that, in
contrast to the solution of simple and
similar type problems when man's role in automated
control systems is limited to setting a task,
inserting initial data into the computer and
interpreting the formal decision, the attainment of
substantive solutions is only possible on the
condition that man intervenes in the
decision-making process at each stage of the machine
operation. It has turned out that the elements of
creative approach to the solution of complex
problems, particularly in unforeseen circumstances
and in cases when logical and mathematical
formalisation proves difficult, are needed much
more often than in the case of simpler problems.
Such operations as the identification of new
targets in research, the breaking up of the general
task into subtasks, the development of new
criteria for a new situation, the selection of the
classification base and methods of equivalent
transformations and many others include
numerous elements which do not yet lend themselves
to formal and algorithmic presentation.
Therefore the need for direct interaction between man
and machine, i.e. for the man-machine dialogue
becomes more and more imperative.
 As a result, social and technical sciences find

themselves confronted with the extremely
interesting problems of the organisation and design
of human activity in its unity with automation
facilities ranging from elementary means to most
complex and sophisticated equipment.
 The difficulties and miscalculations in the
366
development of automatic control systems and

automatic devices are not infrequently traceable
to the underestimation of the data provided by
social sciences. The specificity of economic
processes characteristic of a given industry, industrial
amalgamation or enterprise is not always taken
into account by automation development
engineers who tend to concentrate on secondary
problems, mainly related to accounting, rather than
to tackle the key issues of control such as
scientific prognostication, scientific and technical
progress, etc.
 New technical means not only make work

easier, they change essentially the very nature of
labour and shift the emphasis onto man's
intellectual abilities by complicating the process
of data apprehension and analysis and increasing
demands on his ingenuity, creative powers and
ability to make quick decisions in a changing
situation. These features of modern production
account for the need to extend scientific
investigations beyond the traditional field of
physical and chemical characteristics of the
instruments of labour, quality of materials and energy
problems, and to enlist the services of social
sciences. Scientific investigations in the field of
labour activity should not be confined to
technical facilities as such and to man as the subject
of production. They should concentrate more
and more on the correspondence between man's
physical and mental possibilities, aesthetic
tastes and other social qualities, on the one hand,
and the properties of modern technical systems,
on the other.
 The problem of man, his concrete role in the

transformation of nature and society is becoming
367
one of the key issues stimulating the most

profound integration of social, natural and technical
sciences. Therefore, in considering the task of
optimising human activity as part of the general
problem of the rationalisation of labour,
philosophers jointly with sociologists, psychologists
and engineers ought to think of how to avoid
the restriction of man's creative activity by the
further automation of production.
Non-automated and semi-automated production processes not
only limit the worker's freedom of action, but
also make it difficult to change from one
occupation to another. While projecting new trades and
professions in connection with the deepening
processes of automation, special measures should
be taken to neutralise these negative trends.
Seeking to make work easier and more interesting,
the development engineers engaged in the
rationalisation of production processes and technical
means and in the improvement of environmental
conditions at industrial enterprises are already
confronted with the need for designing specific
labour operations. These should relate both to
individual elements of production (a concrete
working place, a specific man-machine system),
and to technical complexes (a production line,
a shop, etc). The designing of new kinds of
labour activity, of more rational forms of
interaction between man and nature, man and machine,
etc. is still behind practical needs. However,
this trend represents yet another important field
where natural, social and technical sciences join
their efforts to achieve a common goal.
 Modern science regards man, machine and the

production environment as a complex dynamic
system, with man playing the leading part. A
368
comparatively new branch of science known as

ergonomics or human engineering studies the
role of human factors in modern production and
other spheres of activity and analyses the
integral characteristics of the man-machine system.
Investigations in this field cannot be reduced to
the analysis of the characteristic features of
man, machine and production environment
separately from one another, even if they are viewed
in the aggregate. Ergonomics as a science is
evidently confronted with the task of developing
its own theory and devising its specific methods
of investigation into the
man-technology-production environment system.
 A comprehensive approach to the problem of

man's labour activity based on the achievements
of social, natural and technical sciences throws
a new light on many theoretical and practical
problems. It makes it possible to correctly
assess not only the role of the instruments of
labour, technical means and the real significance
of the factors of production environment, but
also the place of man in modern social
production. Such an important category as the quality
of labour, for instance, acquires a new meaning.
Economists are at present mainly concerned with
such characteristics of labour as its complexity
(calling for the workers' appropriate
qualification), intensity, physical hardness, importance
for society, etc. All these characteristics are
taken into account in wage rating practices at
state enterprises. However, they cannot reveal
in full scope the social effectiveness of labour.
The analysis of its quality only from the
viewpoint of narrow practical criteria does not fully
reflect the specificity of labour under the
24--01152
369
conditions of developed socialism. Yet the quality

of labour is an integral characteristic which
represents the product quality and quantity
indicators referred to the indicators of man's health
and intellectual level.
 At the present stage of industrial development

it becomes technically possible to realise
projects on the basis of a comprehensive approach to
man's activity. Under the conventional pattern,
design work on a system generally starts from
its estimated technical characteristics which
determine the place and the functions of the
man-operator, the latter's role being mainly
assessed in terms of limitations (a relatively small
amount of information the operator is capable
of processing within a unit of time, a relatively
slow response, a comparatively weak resistance
to noise, etc.).
 Time has evidently come to reverse this order

and try the alternative method. Specifically, in
developing a technical assignment the designers
should proceed from the idea of the secondary,
auxiliary function of machines and, consequently,
take into account, first and foremost, the
positive qualities of man as the real subject of labour,
i.e. his advantages over the machine, but not
his demerits. This approach opens up basically
new possibilities for enhancing the efficiency of
labour and will eventually make it possible to
shift the focus of attention from the solution of
the pressing problems of industrial engineering,
the improvement of available technical means
and the adaptation of man to the existing
technological norms onto the design of new forms of
human activity based on comprehensive
theoretical investigations into man's physical, mental
370
and intellectual potentialities now being studied

by ergonomics. As has been pointed out in the
recommendations of the Second International
Conference of Scientists and Specialists of CMEA
Countries and Yugoslavia on Ergonomics
(Bulgaria, 1975), the trends in the development of
modern production will evidently bring about
a situation in which the main design problems
will .be connected not with the investigation of
equipment characteristics, but with the search for
ways and means ensuring optimal interaction
between man and technical means. The main
criteria for such optimisation must be the
provision of the most rational equipment (depending
on the concrete achievements of scientific and
technical progress) and the maximum
satisfaction of man's need for creative work.
 Besides the mutual influence of their ideas

and methods, the growing interdependence of
social, natural and technical sciences finds its
expression in the emergence of new branches
of knowledge on the borderlines between them.
Ergonomics, engineering aesthetics, applied
linguistics, economic cybernetics, etc. can hardly
be classified among purely natural or purely
social sciences. They do not study man as such
or objective relations between people, or the
technical aspect of production. The
subjectmatter of these disciplines which constitutes the
basis for the synthesis of social and natural
sciences is the interaction of man and technical
systems, production and natural environments,
etc.
 In this context special importance attaches to

the analysis of complex methodological
problems underlying the synthesis of social, natural
24*
371
and technical knowledge. It is the diversity of

possible approaches to man's labour activity in
modern production that presents the main
difficulty in developing a single language for
different specialists concerned with ergonomical
problems. Understanding among economists,
designers and psychologists can only be achieved on
condition that the synthesis of social and
natural sciences is not reduced to a mechanical
combination in some aggregate system or
conglomeration of knowledge, or even to the
establishment of some kind of ``subordination'' between
them, but is based on the general theory of
labour activity.
 This task deserves most serious attention and

calls for extensive investigations (alongside the
solution of applied problems) into the general
principles of human activity. Such
investigations should be aimed at revealing the laws
governing the perception of data, the shaping of
combined pictorial-conceptual models, visual thinking
and decision-making processes. Much has
already been done in this direction, yet the
development of a comprehensive theory of labour
activity is still a matter of the future. As a
result of the weakness of the general theoretical
basis technical systems are often designed without
due regard for the human factor. For instance,
man is viewed merely as an auxiliary technical
element, and very `ìnconvenient'' at that, of a
control system, and the system is understood
as some kind of a computerised complex
differing from the conventional one only by the
number of technical means employed and by the
method of its operation. Such an approach is
absolutely untenable from the methodological viewpoint
372
and leads in practice to serious technical and
economic miscalculations.
 Ergonomic investigations are mainly aimed

so far at attaining specific aims, rather narrow
by nature: the improvement of technical means
to meet the requirements of modern production,
the optimisation of machine-tool configurations,
the rational arrangement of instruments or
control desks and auxiliary equipment, the
improvement of controls, etc. True, the scope of these
investigations is gradually expanding: besides
the equipment improvement and layout
optimisation problems, specialists in ergonomics jointly
with designers study the possibilities of
``domesticating'' the territory of industrial
enterprises so that it may merge naturally with the city or
suburban complex. They concern themselves
more and more often not only with the quality
and external appearance of one or another
industrial product, but also with the conditions, both
natural and social, under which it is to be used.
 It stands to reason that the scientific solution

of the problem of optimal interaction between
man and machine in the socialist countries is
directed not only towards enhancing the
efficiency and economic effect of new technology in
connection with the new role of man in the
system of modern production. Even a more
important aim of this investigation consists in
creating the best possible conditions for the
development of man and for freeing him from the strain
of tedious and monotonous work. The new
technology, the extensive use of electronic computers
and the overall improvement of production
conditions testifies, first and foremost, to the
humanitarian mission of science opening up new
373
possibilities for improving man's welfare and

ensuring his all-round harmonious development.
 An important factor in the strengthening of

links between social, natural and technical
sciences is the tendency towards the integration
of their cognitive potentialities, both
theoretical and experimental, as regards the rational
use of nature, environmental protection and the
solution of other global problems.
 The synthesis of social, natural and technical

sciences in the process of the comprehensive
solution of various problems leads to the
emergence of numerous ``gravitation centres'' where
specialists in most diverse fields of science join
their efforts to achieve a common goal, and
accounts for different levels of analysis,
including the highest level of the integration of social
and natural sciences on the basis of materialist
dialectics which becomes in this case the
theoretical and methodological basis for complex
scientific investigations. This tendency results
in a considerable enhancement of the role of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy as the most general
theory of the development of nature, society,
thinking and the methodology of science. Lenin's
idea of the alliance between Marxist philosophers
and representatives of special sciences is
demonstrating its increasing viability. Under the
conditions of socialism, this alliance derives its
strength from the principles of dialectical
materialism---the objectivity of knowledge,
development, causality, existence of objective laws,
etc.---which provide a solid methodological basis
for natural, social and technical sciences. From
its inception, Marxist philosophy has been
absorbing the outstanding achievements of
374
natural and social sciences and developing as the

methodology of natural knowledge, social
knowledge and the world-transforming revolutionary
practice.
 At the turn of the 20th century Lenin wrote:

`Ìt is common knowledge that a powerful current
flowed from natural to social science not only
in Petty's time, but in Marx's time as well. And
this current remains just as powerful, if not
more so, in the twentieth century =
too.''^^1^^ The
truth of Lenin's words is once again confirmed
by the large-scale penetration of the
mathematical methods of analysis into social sciences
which use them as an important instrument of
sociological, economic and psychological
investigations, and by the application of computers
and data processing equipment in the sphere
of public opinion studies (opinion polls). The
development of science is characterised today
by powerful currents of ideas not only from
natural to social sciences but also in the opposite
direction---the problems, ideas and methods of
social sciences exercise an ever increasing
influence on natural and technical sciences. An
important role in their integration belongs to
cybernetics, the probability theory, the games
theory and the theory of information. For
instance, cybernetics has not only made a valuable
contribution to the development of the
methodology of some social sciences and to the very style
of scientific thinking, but has itself benefited
from the alliance with social sciences. As a
matter of fact, its very first steps could not but be
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~I. Lenin, ``Socialism Demolished Again'',

Collected Works, Vol.~20, 1972, p.~196.
375
influenced by such general concepts of

progressive social and philosophical thought as target
setting, control, systems analysis, etc. The
concepts of memory, teaching (in relation to
automatons), game, collective behaviour and others
made their way into cybernetics together with
the new problems and specific methods of
psychology, sociology and linguistics. The investigation
into the so-called artificial intellect problems
also testifies to the influence of humanitarian
sciences on the orientation of cybernetics. The
development of data converters and machine
programmes in line with cybernetic concepts
emphasises the imperative need for studying the
nature of man's creative activity and heuristic
art and highlights the importance of the
knowledge of man and society.
 The growing interdependence of social,

natural and technical sciences and their methods of
investigation, the emergence and rapid
development of the marginal branches of knowledge,
the tendency towards comprehensive
investigations of major economic and fundamental
scientific problems by joint efforts of sociologists and
natural scientists---all this tends to enhance the
role of dialectical-materialist methodology. The
new conditions causing social, natural and
technical sciences to draw ever closer together pose
a number of complex problems of world outlook
and methodology before Marxist-Leninist
philosophy. Most serious attention, for one, should
be given to such problems as the main directions
and concrete forms of the integration and
differentiation of sciences, the use of methods
employed by natural science in sociological
investigations, the mathematisation of knowledge.
376
 The analysis of dialectical transitions between

the abstract and the concrete, the general and
the particular, the empirical and the theoretical,
the substantive and the formal in scientific
cognition is a necessary condition for the
effective implementation of the ideas of
mathematics, mathematical logic and cybernetics in
other sciences. Of special importance is the
dialectics of the abstract and the concrete, the
general and the particular in the analysis of
social relations carried out with the use of
abstract mathematical and cybernetic notions.
In this field the correct ``subordination'' of
notions, methods and techniques plays a
decisive role. Any formalism and eclectic
``dovetailing'' of social, natural and technical concepts
is absolutely inadmissible.
 All this shows that the increasing

differentiation and deepening integration of scientific
knowledge pose extremely important tasks before
dialectical materialism as the philosophical and
methodological foundation of the cooperation of
sciences. The philosophic interpretation of the
latest achievements of social, natural and
technical sciences is one of the important
prerequisites for the further development of scientific
world outlook and methodology. Yet the task
of philosophy cannot be confined either to the
passive registration of these achievements or to
their so-called generalisation consisting
essentially in attaching the tags of philosophical
categories to some general concepts worked out
by science. The philosophy of dialectical and
historical materialism cannot and must not be
just a ``pedlar'' of new ideas and data obtained
by other sciences. This philosophy is indeed
377
`òpen'' for all new and fruitful ideas, yet it

does not mean that it is a mere vessel for
accumulating general scientific information. Its
function is to give a creative interpretation and
a dialectical synthesis of new data. This, in
turn, presupposes the creative development of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy itself, its
enrichment with new ideas, the further concretisation
of its categories representing the sum total of
the entire history of man's cognition and
transformation of the world.
 The complexity of integration processes

accounts for considerable difficulties in the
solution of these problems. The rapprochement and
close cooperation of some sciences, such as
psychology and physiology, tend -to gradually
obliterate the borderlines between them and lead
some scientists to an erroneous conclusion that
their objects coincide. This view is fraught with
the danger of overlooking qualitative
distinctions between the objects of investigation by
these sciences and this, in turn, may result in
the absolutisation of certain methods and
concepts at the expense of others. In fact, such
sciences as psychology and physiology of higher
nervous activity study different aspects of the
activity of the brain and, consequently, the
objects of their interest must not be confused.
The psychologists' task evidently consists in
studying the socio-historical origin of the most
complex forms of consciousness regarded as an
independent object of investigation which cannot
receive an exhaustive explanation in terms of
physiological processes alone, though the latter
constitute the basis of the complex forms of
man's conscious actions. It is this task which
378
determines the basic methodological principle of

the interaction between psychology and
physiology. The identification of the subject-matters
of the physiology of higher nervous activity and
psychology bars the way for understanding the
socio-historical laws that govern the formation
and development of the higher forms of psychic
activity and is in fact tantamount to denying
psychology as a separate science. Similar
difficulties arise in the realisation of comprehensive
research programmes, since their effectiveness
largely depends on the assignment of the field
of activity for each specialist and on the
understanding of his possibilities and advantages in
a given investigation.
 Such synthesis, however, should not be

regarded as the simple summation of knowledge
obtained by individual sciences. The purpose of
a comprehensive analysis is not to obtain data
characterising different aspects of an object and
to present them in a summarised form. It consists,
first and foremost, in defining the main factor
which constitutes the system under investigation
and accounts for its specificity and integrity.
It is therefore very important to assess correctly
the significance of the problems of theory,
methodology and world view arising in the
process of the integration and interaction of
individual sciences in a complex investigation.
The adequate idea of the basic integrated
properties of a complex studied by different sciences
can only be provided by a more general theory.
Indeed, the experience gained in the
development of comprehensive programmes of
cooperation of natural, technical and social sciences
attests to the fact that such programmes, born
379
out of the needs to solve certain practical,

applied problems, tend to advance new
theoretical questions and actualise philosophical
problems pertaining to the activity of man in
general, his interaction with machine, the relations
between production and the environment, nature
and society, etc.
 Complex methodological problems of the

interaction of social, natural and technical sciences
arise not only in connection with the definition
of their objects of investigation, but also as
a result of the mutual penetration of their
concepts and methods. Laying aside the question of
the possible forms of such interaction, we shall
merely emphasise here that each attempt to apply
the methods and concepts of one science in the
field of another science should be preceded by
a dialectico-materialist analysis of the
possibilities of such extrapolation and, consequently,
should be viewed as a philosophical problem.
Nothing but harm will result from the
oversimplified understanding of this process and from the
underestimation of those philosophical and
methodological principles which underlie the
development of social, natural and technical sciences
and their creative possibilities. The uncritical,
mechanistic transfer of the concepts and methods
of one science, ungrounded extrapolations and
formal generalisations can only mislead a
scientist. The borrowing of the ideas and methods by
one science from another presupposes their
creative assimilation and reassessment in accordance
with the specific object and tasks of the former.
Under such conditions special importance
attaches to the analysis of dialectical ``transitions''
from one field of knowledge to another. Any
380
underestimation of the importance of the

methodological, philosophical analysis of the borrowed
ideas and methods leads either to negativism
regarding the possibility of the integration of
the methods of social, natural and technical
sciences, or to a kind of euphoria, ungrounded
enthusiasm about the cybernetisation,
mathematisation, formalisation and ecologisation of
science often prompted by nothing more than the
desire to keep up with vogue.
 Though the positivist concepts of the

relationship between philosophy and special sciences,
as well as between social and natural sciences
have gone never to return, the reductionist
illusions regarding the relationship between the
social and the biological, the social and the
psychological prove to be very tenacious. For
instance, striving to trace the roots of crime, some
authors are inclined to see them in genetic,
i.e. essentially molecular-biological mechanisms.
Similar tendencies are also in evidence in the
interpretation of the so-called biosocial nature
of man. This formula looks attractive enough
due to its laconicism, yet it tends to oversimplify
the mediated relationship between the social and
the biological, camouflaging a number of
essential intermediate links between them. It is
precisely owing to the complexity of this
relationship, its mediate character, that social
phenomena do not yield either to direct biological
explanations or to an interpretation in terms
of the so-called parallelism of social and
biological factors. To be sure, the dialectico-materialist
analysis of high-level psychological processes or
social phenomena with all their links and
relations of mediation should not ignore the
381
natural determinants of human behaviour. Such

determinants, however, must be taken into
account in unity with all other factors revealing
the definitive role of social motives in the
activity of man.
 It stands to reason that the integration and

differentiation of science alongside the
increasing importance of theory tend to complicate the
structure of modern scientific knowledge and its
further development. The emergence of such
sciences as cybernetics, the games theory, the
information theory, and others which study very
general laws applicable to entirely different
objects and phenomena of reality partly accounts
for an illusion that positive sciences no longer
need a philosophy and that philosophical
knowledge can be at last replaced by general scientific
concepts capable of providing the necessary
methodological and scientific basis for more
concrete sciences. Some contemporary Western
philosophers go even as far as asserting that the
prophecy of positivism has at last come true
and that science assumes the methodological
prerogatives which hitherto belonged to
philosophy.
 True, modern science can no longer content

itself with the means of the ``local'' synthesis of
knowledge. A need arises to synthesise the
knowledge of interdisciplinary character and to
develop additional means for such a synthesis:
special integration theories, new branches of
knowledge and new scientific trends, such as
cybernetics, semiotics, system investigations,
a general theory of modelling, a theory of
similarity and dimensions, investigation of
operations, etc. The additional means for such a
382
synthesis also include new hardware---automatic data

processors, such as cybernetic modelling
machines and computers which essentially enhance the
efficiency of brain work by mechanising and
automating mental operations, particularly in the
bibliographic information service, which is thus
enabled to solve new complex problems. This
`ìntellectual industry'' permits improving the
accuracy of weather forecasts, developing many
branches of the national economy, accelerating
technical progress, etc. Without its aid it would
be impossible to carry out extremely complex
calculations, exercise control over space flights
and solve many other problems.
 The peculiar position of general scientific

disciplines which serve as intermediaries between
philosophy and natural sciences results from
the two main functions they perform. First, they
provide a theoretical and methodological basis
for a number of positive sciences. Characteristic
in this respect is the connection of these sciences
with mathematical methods of investigation
which enable them to carry out more general
qualitative and quantitative analyses and to
apply the general rules of calculation in a given
concrete field of investigation. Second, they
serve as an intermediate methodological link
between certain positive sciences and materialist
dialectics as a whole.
 For instance, the specific methodological

function of the theory of similarity which covers
physical and physico-chemical processes
manifests itself in processing and generalising
experimental data and in modelling physical processes.
The conceptual body of the theory of
investigation of operations is not limited to
383
mathematics. Its categories and the general principle of

investigation provide a particular
methodological approach in the investigation of any complex
goal-oriented activity, its elements being
individual operations. This theory is used in the
investigation of many different kinds of human
activity, as well as in the analysis of
man-machine complexes representing automated control
systems. The main principles and categories of
cybernetics provide particular methodological
guidelines for sciences concerned with living
nature and social life, as well as for technical
sciences investigating control processes in terms
of data-processing operations. These include the
questions of automatic regulation,
self-adjustment, instruction and self-instruction,
self-organisation, self-reproduction and the development
of natural and artificial systems. Hence, from
the theoretical and methodological viewpoint
integrative sciences provide, as it were, a kind
of a bridge to the highest theoretical
generalisations and methodological principles, i.e. to
philosophy.
 As we see, the growing complexity of scientific

knowledge and the emergence of general
theoretical disciplines make the question of the role,
of philosophy even more topical. Scientific
progress in our time leads not to the
``witheringaway'' of philosophical methodology, but to the
further enhancement of its role. The
interpenetration of social, natural and technical sciences
and their methods, the appearance and rapid
development of boundary scientific disciplines,
the trend towards comprehensive scientific
investigations of major socio-economic problems which
call for joint efforts of social and natural
384
scientists---all these processes attest to the growing

significance of philosophical methodology. Such
is the viewpoint of materialist dialectics
and such is the trend of scientific
development.
 Within the province of professional

philosophers remain, as before, the investigation into
general trends in the development of science,
the study of interaction between new scientific
trends, their relative independence, the
applicability of the methods of certain scientific
disciplines in the fields of other disciplines, the
extrapolation of theoretical concepts to new
fields of investigation, reduction problems
(criticism of reductionism) in their numerous aspects,
the unity of scientific knowledge alongside the
extreme diversity and dissociation of individual
scientific schools, etc., not to speak of the
`èternal'' problems arising with new force under the
present-day conditions: the objectivity of
scientific knowledge, causality, determinism, the
dialectics of scientific cognition, and others.
The solution of these problems not only calls
for excellent knowledge of the latest scientific
achievements and of the history of science in
general, but also presupposes profound
philosophical background and good acquaintance with
the history of philosophy.
 The acquaintance with the basic principles of

materialist dialectics is far from sufficient to
guarantee success in scientific investigation---no
less important is the ability to use them. The
successful solution of scientific problems under
modern conditions, in the face of highly complex
and widely ramified scientific disciplines, depends
on the ability to assess available knowledge in
25--1152
385
the light of general scientific concepts which is

impossible without good knowledge of modern
theoretical ideas and the history of science.
Philosophical knowledge, owing to its special
relations of mediation with concrete empirical
and applied scientific investigations never reveals
itself in its pure forms. It is represented in
current theoretical ideas and concepts, in the
theoretical knowledge related to a given specific
field.
 The influence of philosophy on the character

and results of scientific investigation is in fact
much more subtle than is purported by some
popular scientific and philosophical publications
intended to demonstrate with maximum possible
clarity the role of methodology and world
outlook in scientific knowledge. To be really
successful and fruitful, scientific activity must
rest on the entire system of dialectical
materialist philosophy understood as a single
harmonious, integrated world outlook, but not on
dissociated scraps of philosophical knowledge,
interpreted at that in a very primitive
manner.
 It would be naive to expect that universal

theoretical problems can be solved by a
specialist in cybernetics, the general systems theory
or by a representative of some other scientific
discipline, however broad its field. No less
groundless would be a hope that such a task
could be successfully accomplished by a
philosopher who would be capable of digesting the
enormous amount of information obtained by
positive sciences. There is no alternative to the
alliance between philosophers and
representatives of natural and social sciences. The problem,
386
if there is any, can only be over the selection

and development of the most effective and
adequate form of this alliance.
 A modern scientist specialising in boundary

problems and investigating the crossroads of
traditional scientific trends can hardly expect
to gain any success in his work even if he is well
versed in one of the special fields. It becomes more
and more obvious that the more important
discoveries in modern science await not a narrow
specialist, but a scientist of broad theoretical
outlook, a thinker, an intellectual. We may be
now returning to the epoch of the
Encyclopaedists, but on a new level of scientific knowledge.
At any rate, such a return to the seemingly old
appears to us quite possible and certain
symptoms of the advent of a new age of Leonardo da
Vinci and French Enlighteners are already in
evidence.
 In our time, when much of the tedious work
required to accumulate and classify facts can
be handed over to machines with their constantly
expanding possibilities, the value of experience
in some special field of knowledge stands as high
as ever, yet the importance of philosophical,
methodological knowledge increases
immeasurably since it is precisely this knowledge that
can bridge the age-old gaps between physics and
biology, biology and physiology, psychology and
mathematics, economy and mathematics, etc.
The new disciplines emerging on the borderlines
between these sciences are notable for practically
direct scientific application of philosophical
knowledge. In contrast to 18th-19th-century natural
philosophy, it plays the role of general
theoretical, philosophical principles and concepts and
25*
387
does not claim to provide final solutions to

concrete scientific problems.
 Present-day scientific knowledge is highly

dynamic. The current scientific and technological
revolution is notable not only for rapid changes
in the content of knowledge itself, but also for
abrupt shifts in the value approach to different
branches of knowledge. It was only quite recently
that physics was the idol of the youth. The
changing tide then lifted up cybernetics and the
representatives of this promising branch of science
enjoyed universal attention. The recent
breakthrough in genetics and the acuteness of the
ecological problem have sharply increased the
prestige of biology. The value and prestige of
one or another science and, consequently, its
impact on social life and on the style of thinking
constantly fluctuate. It is no secret that the
current period is marked by a steadily growing
interest among the youth in social, humanitarian
sciences. Yet it is not only the young that turn
up in increasing numbers at these sciences'
`ènlistment centres''. Far more significant is the
fact that humanitarian problems attract more
and more full-fledged natural scientists engaged
in their specific investigations. Understandably,
the natural scientists' attention to humanitarian
issues results, first and foremost, from their
social, civic interests. A modern scientist cannot
conceive of activity removed from social problems
and the tasks of scientific, technical and ethical
progress.
 Under contemporary conditions philosophy

alone can provide scientists with an effective
means to cope with the increasing flow of
information and expand their theoretical horizon and
388
world outlook. First, it gives them the necessary

methodological instruments for safe navigation
in the boundless sea of scientific theories and
concepts and guards against unfounded
hypotheses and unrestrained imagination. Second, it
provides guidelines for the investigation of social
problems giving the necessary information on
their character and disclosing the basic
principles underlying the development of social,
humanitarian knowledge. Such information is
essential for scientists in all fields irrespective of the
particular questions they are concerned with.
If we view the progress of science from a broad
perspective and take full account of the modern
tendencies in its development, we cannot but
come to the conclusion that success in research
and the advance of science as a whole depends
as much on the scientists' special knowledge,
as on their theoretical background. The latter
implies that a scientist should not only be well
versed in the adjacent fields directly related to
his sphere of interest, but also be familiar with
the entire complex of social, natural and technical
sciences. The development of science in the 20th
century has convincingly shown that the concepts
of the ``flank'' and ``rear'' in the overall scientific
offensive have become completely antiquated,
just as the title of the ``leading science'' which
now reminds one of a challenge prize kept by
the winner as long as he is in the heyday of
popularity. The prize will inevitably pass on to
another science as soon as it draws the public's
eye.
 The concepts of `àdjacent fields'' and

``boundary problems'' are becoming anachronistic, too.
The unidimensional structure of scientific
389
knowledge is giving way to a multidimensional one.

Not long ago physics or, more accurately,
mechanics, was considered to be the only science
adjacent to engineering disciplines. Now they have
got other ``neighbours'' as well, such as
engineering psychology born of the engineering and
psychology borderline problems. The study of the
`àrchitecture'' of living organisms carried out
within the framework of bionics has brought
closer together engineering and biological
disciplines. Such examples are numerous. The
shoots of new scientific knowledge, new scientific
trends are appearing and will appear in most
unexpected nodal points of this crystal lattice.
The boundary problems holding out the greatest
promise for scientists should therefore be
visualised now in terms of solid rather than plane
geometry, i.e. as being disposed in some
imaginary multidimensional space where each science
can find points of contact with any of its
counterparts.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
6. DIALECTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE
 AND THE SUBJECTIVE
 IN SCIENTIFIC COGNITION
 The above critical analysis of the positivist

attitude to the problem of the objectivity of
scientific knowledge, as well as the comparison
of positivist views with some of the alternative
concepts surfacing in the modern philosophy of
science was to highlight, among other things,
the inseparable unity of modern materialism and
dialectics. One cannot pursue the principle of
objectivity of scientific knowledge without
390
concessions to idealism and metaphysics if the

materialistic approach is not integrated, merged
from the outset with the dialectical methodology
of science. It is highly essential that this
integration is not a mechanical combination of
dialectical and materialistic concepts which
supplement one another but that they are blended
in the analysis of the real problems of scientific
cognition.
 The task of blending materialism and dialectics

is the more topical at present as not many
investigations can boast integrated dialectical
materialist approach to the analysis of concrete
scientific problems. Regrettably, the study of special
problems is not infrequently guided by the
principles of didactics rather than by the dialectics
of scientific cognition, and the division of
scientific material convenient for its presentation to
students often predetermines the principles of
scientific analysis. However, methodical schemes
invaluable in the classroom sometimes turn out
to be too rigid to reveal all the aspects of the
interdependence of materialism and dialectics.
 The importance of this problem is also

highlighted by the analysis of the main
philosophical trends of our time. As has been shown above,
modern bourgeois philosophy reveals an obvious
tendency toward materialism. The crisis of the
positivist methodology of science gives rise to
new philosophical schools, such as critical
realism and scientific materialism, which proclaim
materialism to be their credo.
 However, this materialistic trend in Western

philosophy does not merge with materialistic
dialectics and remains indifferent to its
achievements, Moreover, it is often openly biased against
391
dialectics. The fact that many representatives

of critical realism recognise the objective reality
not only of individual physical objects, but
also of general properties and entities, and speak
of scientific metaphysics, the development of
scientific knowledge, etc. is very indicative of
a profound crisis of the positivist philosophy of
science. Yet it is but the first stage in the search
for new methodological guidelines since the
principles of objectivity and testability of
scientific knowledge, correct in general, must be
supplemented or, to be more exact, integrated
with the dialectical approach to scientific
problems.
 The obvious fact that modern materialism is

inconceivable without dialectics is again and
again confirmed by concrete investigations. Take,
for instance, the old problem of consciousness
whose different aspects are now highly topical.
Sociology, pedagogics and social psychology
view this problem mainly from the social angle,
i.e. in terms of the determining influence of
social conditions on the genesis of consciousness.
Cybernetics studies the same problem from the
viewpoint of the possibility of reproducing the
functions of consciousness by cybernetic
machines, psychology and neuropsychology, in terms
of the relationship between consciousness and
the brain, etc.
 One can declare himself a convinced
materialist professing the primacy of social being in
relation to consciousness, indicating that
consciousness is a function of the brain, highly
organised matter, or pointing out the possibility
of modelling the brain processes with the help
of computers. Yet none of these statements
392
attests to a consistent materialistic stand unless

they represent a dialectical approach to the
problem. Once we separate one from the other,
which is sometimes the case in scientific
publications, we automatically undermine the very
foundation of the professed materialistic views.
It is common knowledge, for instance, that the
content of human consciousness is determined
by social factors. One should bear in mind,
however, that the prerequisites for the formation
of concepts, mental images reside in
neurodynamic processes. Hence, a consistent materialistic
analysis of the nature of consciousness is only
possible if both sides are taken into account in
their interdependence. Should we for a moment
lose sight of one of them and rashly state, for
instance, that we owe consciousness to social
factors only, the ghost of idealism will present
itself right here and then. Indeed, since
individual knowledge is passed on from generation to
generation, our statement would imply the
existence of some kind of primordial knowledge
which might well assume the form of `àbsolute''
or `ìnnate'' ideas.
 Furthermore, this is not the only loophole

which would be opened for idealism by our
unwary statement. If consciousness is determined
by social factors only, how should we account
for such phenomena as talent, good inclinations,
natural gifts? How should we explain Mozart's
musical endowments and Lenin's genius? We
should have either to leave these questions
unanswered, or appeal for help to Providence.
In a word, without dialectics we should not make
a step toward materialism.
 Materialism has now reached a stage when its
393
further development as the world view and as

the methodology of scientific knowledge is only
possible on the dialectical foundation.
Conversely, dialectics cannot be a coherent system of
philosophical views unless it rests on the
materialistic foundation.
 The merger of materialism and dialectics is

embodied in Marxism-Leninism which opened
a new epoch in the development of philosophy.
After the emergence of Marxism-Leninism any
deviation from either dialectics or materialism,
any concession to idealism, eclecticism and
metaphysics is bound to undermine the unity
of philosophy and should be regarded as
essentially regressive.
 The entire history of materialism shows that

it could not be consistent unless it was
interpreted dialectically. This was particularly obvious
when materialist principles were applied to the
explanation of social phenomena---suffice it to
recall Feuerbach. In our time, non-dialectical
materialism is simply inconceivable; it cannot
but stumble at every step. Modern science and
social processes are so complex and dynamic
that any inconsistency in world outlook and
in the philosophical interpretation of one or
another phenomenon is fraught with grave
ideological consequences. Each philosophical
problem, therefore, should be treated from the
viewpoint of dialectical materialism, i.e. from the
materialistic and dialectical angles. The
materialistic principles themselves will turn into an
inadmissible philosophical abstraction if they
are divorsed from dialectics. In our time
dialectics is opposed not only to metaphysics, but
also to idealism, Conversely, materialism
394
claiming consistency is incompatible with

metaphysics and all sorts of eclecticism.
 The positivist concept of objectivity, the

Popperian interpretation of `òbjective
knowledge'' and the stand of ``scientific realism'' are
notable, first and foremost, for a narrow
understanding of the principle of objectivity.
Nevertheless, each of the above trends has certain
rational elements and their comparison will help
understand more clearly the essence of the
problem and define the guidelines for its modern
solution. The obvious difficulties encountered
by positivism and other trends of the modern
philosophy of science in the interpretation of
objectivity show that there are but two
methodological alternatives open before a philosopher:
either to give up the search for objectivity
altogether and agree that objective knowledge is
unattainable, or to hold on to the materialistic
tradition at the risk of earning the reputation
of an outdated and even retrograde thinker
attempting to draw philosophy back to the ideals
.of classical natural science. The first alternative
appears to be rather attractive: it seemingly
complies with the spirit of modern science which
continues blasting one bastion of classical science
after another, and relieves the scientists of the
need to rack their brains over ``metaphysical''
problems enjoying but little popularity with
most of them. At a closer look, however, it
does not help to avoid difficulties, since any
attempt to carry on investigations with the
legalised handicap of the ``subjective'' brings the
investigator back to the problem of distinguishing
between the objective and the subjective which
he tried to escape. This was clearly demonstrated
395
by the fate of the hypothesis of ``latent

parameters'' in quantum mechanics which postulated
the inevitable presence of the observer in the
quantum-mechanical theory. As regards the
second alternative, i.e. the adherence to the
principle of objectivity, it turns out to be a thorny
path just as well and calls for a serious
philosophical analysis of the concept of objectivity.
What is more, this analysis appears to be the
more difficult as it is to provide a basis for mutual
understanding between the philosophers and the
representatives of special sciences.
 What was the main weakness in the positivist

concept of the objective? In one of the previous
sections devoted to this problem we have shown
that positivism identified the objective with the
observable. It was through observation and
combination of various sensations and
perceptions that one could form an intersubjective idea
of any object. An individual observation or
perception could not, of course, give knowledge
independent of the subject, but a series of
observations, the perception of recurrent processes
were evidently sufficient to provide the necessary
material for separating the subjective from the
intersubjective.
 A similar understanding of the objective

underlies also the concept of ``critical
rationalism''. In his theory, Popper only eliminates the
most obvious weaknesses in the positivist
interpretation of the objective, but sides with the
concept of intersubjectivity. According to
Popper, the difference between the objective and the
subjective consists only in that the former has
passed through the purgatory of intersubjective
criticism which separates the elements of
396
knowledge immune to falsification from those disproved

by constantly changing experience. The
objective is thus identified with the conventional, the
immutable, with what is not questioned by
experience at a given moment. The narrowness
of such criteria of objectivity reveals itself, in
fact, each time science transgresses the bounds
of habitual, stereotyped phenomena and events.
As regards unobservable processes, relationships
and properties, the positivist criterion of
objectivity proves to be completely unsatisfactory.
Popper's criterion reveals its untenability and
inner subjectivism when one fundamental theory
gives place to another, since the breakdown
of a theory signifies the dissolution of the
stable nucleus which cannot be falsified and is,
according to Popper, the refuge of
objectivity.
 In its search for objective knowledge me

modern ``philosophy of biology'' strives to reduce
biological knowledge to physical phenomena.
Why is it so? Because phenomenalistic theories
proceed from the assumption that the stable
nucleus of knowledge immune against subjective
influence or interpretation can only be defined
through the analysis of physical structures on
the molecular, atomic or subatomic levels. This
mirage still entices scientists who stake on
physicalism and are fascinated by the seemingly clear
and tangible outlines of new theories---though
this path, as we have shown, is actually a blind
alley, and the scientist who takes it in quest
of objective knowledge is soon bound to
discover it. True, the physicalism of ``scientific
materialism'' is more constructive if only for the
fact that it is oriented on the recognition of
397
objective reality, creation of scientific ontology

and its subsequent verification. In our opinion,
it is far less damaging to scientific progress than
positivist physicalism which in fact seeks to
pass off the present reduction of scientific
knowledge to physico-chemical concepts as the last
word of science.
 As we see, the problem of objectivity in the

philosophy of science is split, so to speak, among
the existing levels of scientific knowledge, if
not among different sciences. We shall not
attempt here to investigate into the general causes
of this phenomenon in the development of
science; we shall merely take it for granted as
a fact. In each doctrine, the concept of
objectivity is confined within more or less narrow bounds
which have a more or less definite location in
the ``space'' of modern scientific knowledge and
conform to its existing structure. The concreteness
of philosophical categories, as we have shown
above, has nothing to do with this location
reflecting the limitations of each doctrine and,
in the end, its subjectivism. The
dialectico-materialist interpretation of the objective which
is inseparably linked with the definition of
matter as a philosophical category denoting
objective reality independent of human
consciousness in general, sets but the epistemological
framework for this concept and has no meaning
beyond the limits of the basic question of
philosophy---the one concerning the relation of matter
and consciousness. It is not connected with the
boundaries of individual sciences or fields or
levels of knowledge. It contrasts everything that
is subjective to everything that is independent
of consciousness. It points out the asymmetry
398
(in the epistemological sense) of the relationship

between them.
 The contrast between the objective and the

subjective has a purely philosophical meaning.
Perhaps like no other conceptual distinction, it
sets a clear demarcation line between philosophy
and positive sciences which are in fact indifferent
to such a universal division. The independence
of philosophical knowledge, its irreducibility
to any special science stands out here with
particular clarity, though the specificity of
philosophy can also be demonstrated on the
example of a number of other problems.
 The philosophical understanding of the

objective as essentially independent of consciousness
in general is evidently much broader than its
interpretation in the positivist, Popperian,
physicalist and scientific-realist concepts, which
connect objectivity with observability,
intersubjectivity, reducibility to physical notions, etc.
It should be noted, however, that different
versions in the interpretation of objectivity
are not always groundless and senseless. The
positivist understanding of objectivity, for one,
has a certain value within the framework of
empirical investigations, whereas the Popperian
interpretation of objectivity must be given credit
for its attempt to view the positivist solution
from a broader socio-cultural perspective and
to emphasise the existing demarcation (tending,
however, to absolutise it) between the individual
and general consciousness, etc. It would not be
correct to regard them as completely wrong;
rather, they are narrow and deformed.
 To view the problem of objectivity from the

philosophical angle, one has to universalise the
399
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methods or ideas of special sciences or branches

of knowledge and rise above their level, since
this problem assumes one form in physics,
another in biology, still others in history,
theoretical sciences, empirical sciences, etc. Each
of these disciplines concentrates on its own
specific, topical aspects of the problem and has its
own means and ways for its solution.
 Hence, the first aspect of the problem of

objectivity, as it is posed in contemporary philosophy,
calls for a dialectical analysis and consists in
distinguishing, first and foremost, between its
empirical and theoretical levels. Obviously,
objectivity cannot be reduced to observability,
coherence, one or another degree of the
generalisation of concepts, etc. Any of the above criteria
leads to an unwarranted restriction of the concept
of objectivity as it implies independence of the
object of investigation from some special kind,
form or level of consciousness, but not from
consciousness in general. Yet the concept of the
objectivity of knowledge in its philosophical
sense presupposes the independence of knowledge
from consciousness in general, be it individual or
collective. The numerous difficulties involved in
the implementation of this criterion do not by
any means attest to its uselessness, they merely
confirm the well-known truth that the path of
true science is not a royal road. The theories
asserting the objective character of knowledge
but regarding it to be independent of certain
forms of consciousness only imply, willy-nilly,
its dependence on other forms of consciousness,
thus leaving a loophole for idealism.
 No less untenable are the attempts of some

other philosophers proclaiming themselves
400
adherents of materialism to identify matter and,

consequently, objectivity with one or several
properties of material objects except the sole
``property'' of matter with whose recognition
philosophical materialism is bound up---the
property of being an objective reality, of existing
outside the =
mind.^^1^^
 The history of philosophy shows that the

single problem of the objectivity of knowledge
can and must be solved differently at different
levels of scientific cognition. The recognition
of this fact is perhaps the starting point of the
process of fusion of materialism and dialectics
which reveals the complex and contradictory
character of scientific cognition and shows that
it cannot be confined to the sensuous, empirical
stage. Scientific cognition goes into the depth
of processes and phenomena, penetrates the realm
of laws and reveals laws of different orders and
different degrees of generalisation. The criterion
of objectivity which may appear simple and
explicit to any investigator in his specialised
field is bound to turn into a complex problem
when he enters upon the theoretical level of
cognition and finds himself in the jungle of
philosophy after the prairie of the macroworld.
 It should be stressed, however, that the

observance of the principle of objectivity was and
remains the primary objective of modern science.
Without the elimination of the subject, however
difficult it may be for the investigator, scientific
research will lose all meaning. Therefore
recognising distinctions in the approach to the problem
_-_-_
^^1^^ See V.~I. Lenin, ``Materialism and

Empirio-Criticism'', op. cit., pp. 260--61.
26--1152
401
of objectivity at philosophical, theoretical,

empirical and other levels is making but one, though
important, step forward. The next step, which
is, evidently, the most difficult one, consists
in revealing their relationship and defining
a method for changing over from a
philosophico-theoretical to philosophico-methodological aspect
and further to the theoretical and empirical
levels of the problem of objectivity. In point
of fact, we need some kind of a bridge to pass
from the philosophical principle of objectivity
to its concrete embodiment in the context of
a scientific theory.
 We believe that the function of such a ``bridge''

leading from one level of knowledge to the other
in the formulation and solution-of the problem
of objectivity can be performed primarily (but
only partly) by the idea of invariance.
 The principle of objectivity implies, in

essence, the `èlimination of the subject'' from the
object of investigation. What is the actual
meaning of this requirement in the context of a concrete
scientific investigation? Should we understand
this phrase literally?
 Significantly, dialectical materialism has never

maintained that the requirement of the
objectivity of knowledge is equivalent to setting up
some kind of an insurmountable barrier between
the subject and the object of investigation.
Insurmountable in the sense that it prevents any
influence of man on the object of cognition and
only permits the ``mirror'' reflection of reality
in his consciousness. ``Knowledge,'' wrote Lenin,
`ìs the reflection of nature by man. But this
is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete
reflection, but the process of a series of
402
abstractions, the formation and development of

concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws, etc.
(thought, science = ``the logical Idea'') embrace
conditionally, approximately, the universal
law-governed character of eternally moving and
developing =
nature.''^^1^^
 Thus the dialectics of cognition presupposes

man's active penetration, intrusion into reality,
his, so to speak, aggressive attitude to it. Here
one may ask: how can such an attitude agree
with the principle of objectivity?
 To `èliminate the subject'' does not mean to

fence him off from the object of his investigation,
though sometimes a specific kind of a barrier,
e.g. an aquarium wall, can indeed make for
objectivity, like in the case of an observer
studying the behaviour of fish or sea plants. Nor does
it mean to dig a ditch which can sometimes
separate an investigator watching wild life.
`Èliminating the subject'' means creating
conditions which would not so much prevent him from
interfering with objective processes as from
distorting them and causing to deuiate from their
normal course. In terms of epistemology the
subject is a very complex notion accounting for
the possibility of human errors, inaccuracies and
prejudices, inadequacy of technical and natural
means at man's disposal, as well as of the store
of knowledge available to him, the specific
features of his perceptions, mentality, etc. It
would evidently take several pages to enumerate
the elements which make up the notion ``subject''
and should be excluded from the notion
_-_-_

Science of Logic'', op. cit., p.~182.
26*
403
``scientific knowledge''. What really matters, however,

is not this enumeration, but the obvious fact
that man's centuries-old experience must have
already developed reliable mechanisms
compensating for the subjective aspects of the process
of cognition. The `èlimination of the subject''
is always aimed, in one form or another, at
this compensation and correction of the defects
which are inevitably introduced by man in his
exploration of the Universe.
 Far from denying the ``subjectification'' of

reality by man, dialectics considers it inevitable
and shows that man transforms reality through
his practical, experimental and even mental
activity, since the world, of course, can never
be adequately represented in man's concepts.
Man is unable to embrace the world in all its
inexhaustibility; he is bound to limit the sphere
of his investigations to the phenomena which
are within his reach. At present, for instance,
man is still unable to penetrate the structure of
micro particles and has to be content to study
their `èxternal'' interaction or to split them in
a powerful accelerater.
 So, insisting on the objectivity of scientific

knowledge, dialectics proceeds from the fact
that the subject alters the object in the process
of its investigation. Yet the objective can only
be revealed in the surrounding world if the
investigator concentrates primarily on the stable,
the recurrent. It is this search for immutable,
invariant properties and values that represents
the transition from the general idea of objectivity
to the theoretical analysis of objective processes
and phenomena. While revealing the immutable,
the stable in the objects and phenomena under
404
investigation, the natural scientist may not

even be aware of the fact that he attains
objective knowledge.
 The above does not mean, of course, that

changing properties cannot be objective. If we speak
of dynamic processes, the only requirement they
should meet from the viewpoint of the principle
of objectivity is the constancy of change. Not
the change of constancy, but vice versa. Just so!
The language of objectivity is translated into
the language of invariance. Naturally, a
physicist, a biologist or a sociologist cannot divorce
the object of investigation from his
consciousness. What he can and what he really does and
must do is to distinguish between the mutable
and the immutable properties of the object
during his studies. This bridge from the general
philosophical to a particular scientific idea of
objectivity has been operable for centuries
though its strength has been frequently subjected
to testing. None of the tests, however, destroyed
it, nor could do so completely. As a result, the
bridge had only gained in strength, simplicity
and elegance. Why, for instance, was its
usability called in question at the turn of the 20th
century? Because the philosophers erroneously
identified matter with the concrete properties
of things, but not with their only ``property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside
the mind'', whereas the physicists were bewildered
by the collapse of their habitual concepts: the
mass of the electron turned out to be variable,
the stationary and impenetrable `èther'' movable,
the spatial and time intervals changeable. The
world, once stable and reliable, was falling to
pieces, matter ``had disappeared'',
405
 How did philosophy and physics overcome

this crisis? Lenin formulated a philosophical
definition of matter in which the criterion of
objectivity was connected with the property of
existing independently of man's consciousness.
Physics found new invariants giving a new
meaning to this philosophical idea. `Ìnvariants,''
wrote Max Born, `àre the concepts of which
science speaks in the same way as ordinary
language speaks of `things', and which it provides
with names as if they were ordinary =
things.''^^1^^
 Invariance is the property of immutability in

relation to a definite set of physical or
mathematical conditions, specifically, to a group of
transformations. This property is inherent in
individual physical and mathematical values and
physical characteristics, as well as in equations
and laws of physics. An invariant value can be
exemplified, for instance, by the distance between
two points in geometry, or by value =
E2---H2
in regard to Lorentz's transformations in
electrodynamics, though the values of the intensity
of electrical fields (E) and magnetic fields (H)
prove to be invariant when changing from one
inertial reference system to another. Group
invariance (or group symmetry) is a kind of
symmetry which is widely used in modern
physics: the invariance of equations in relation to
groups of Galilean, Lorentz's and Poincar\'e's
transformations, the symmetry of Schrodinger's
operator in relation to the rotational group of
three-dimensional space, the symmetry of
crystals, the unitary symmetry, etc.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Max Born, Physics in My Generation, Pergamon

Press, London, 1956, p.~163.
406
 A more general case of in variance is co-variance,

i.e. the property of transformation of a number
of physical and mathematical values in
accordance with a definite linear law when passing
from one reference system to another. Co-variance
reveals itself in relation to different groups of
transformations. It may be inherent both in
different values, e.g. vectors, tensors of relative
rotations, and in different equations and
functions. A co-variant value is a value transforming
in relation to one of the representations of a group
of coordinate transformations being studied.
Go-variant equations are those which, on being
recorded in a co-variant form, do not change
their appearance in any system of coordinates,
though individual physical values incorporated
in such equations may be different in different
reference systems. The wide use of the notion of
transformation group is accounted for by the
immutability of a number of physical objects
within one or another group, which circumstance
makes it possible to define the law of their change
during such transformations.
 A transformation group can be exemplified,

for instance, by a finite set of projections of
a certain object on other objects known
sufficiently well by their properties, e.g. on measuring
instruments, experimental facilities, etc. Thus,
if we are interested in a geometrical form, i.e.
in the spatial structure of an object, we can
regard its projections on different surfaces
arranged at different angles relative to one another
as geometrical transformations of the form of
this object. The selection of a set or series of
such ``projections'' making up a certain group of
transformations in the mathematical sense
407
depends on the conditions of the existence of

a given system, on its limits or measure, as well
as on the concrete cognitive situation and the
nature of the task the investigator is confronted
with. It is the analysis of invariance and
structure carried out with due regard for the objective
and subjective aspects of the process of
cognition (i.e. for its specificity) that makes it
possible to use the principle of invariance in the
solution of such a fundamental epistemological
problem as the problem of the objectivity of
knowledge.
 To be sure, it would not be correct to identify

the invariant with the objective. Both invariant
and variant physical values, as well as their
relationships can be objective in equal measure.
Both of them, as has already been emphasised
by Einstein, reflect to a degree objective reality.
According to Einstein, the difference between
invariants and variants does not lie in the same
plane as the difference between the objective
and the real, on the one hand, and the subjective
and the seeming, on the other. If that were not
the case, the concept of objectivity would
apparently become superfluous. The revelation of
invariants and variants is not yet equivalent to
the establishment of the epistemological nature
of each of these classes of phenomena. The question
of the invariant or variant character of different
quantities and of their relationships can only
be solved within the framework of each
individual theory and under the strictly defined
conditions of investigation.
 Invariant values and relationships are direct

characteristics of the laws governing the
behaviour and properties of the objects of a given
408
theory which are freed (in the obtained

knowledge) from the characteristics relating to the
specific conditions of investigation. This also applies
to those conditions of investigation which are
connected in one way or another with the subject
in a given relationship. Hence, the conditions
to be additionally eliminated are only those
characterising the subjective aspect of the process
of cognition. The object under investigation
should be considered theoretically in all possible
transformation groups so that its objective
presentation in theory may be as full as possible.
For instance, in the classical method of
description the absolute length characterises the property
of a body in absolute space regardless of the
selected reference system. Recognition of the
absolute nature of space and time presupposes
the indifference of objects to the subject and to
the reference system. Conversely, the relativist
description of the space-time interval
characterises the property of a physical object in relation
to the selected system of reference (provided,
of course, it is inertial). The theory of relativity
treats simultaneity as a variant (relative)
concept. It means that the simultaneity of two
events is not regarded as absolute, since it
represents not only the relation between the
events themselves, but also depends to an
essential degree on the selected system of
coordinates. It is even more so if the events are
separated spatially. In that case the objectivity of
simultaneity (and, to a certain extent, of space
and time themselves) can only be attested to by
the invariance of space and time in one or another
relationship.
 As we see, variant values characterise relations
409
between the objects of a given physical theory,

on the one hand, and the conditions of
investigations (including the observer himself), on the
other. A variant value can have any meaning
only within the framework of a given theory and
only in relation to definite conditions of
investigation (cognition). Invariant and variant values
represent different aspects of objective reality.
Yet for a concrete physical theory the
relationship between them is of paramount importance,
as it determines the concrete measure of
objectivity attained by this theory. It is not fortuitous
that the search for invariants constitutes one of
the main tasks of every physical and
mathematical theory, and the replacement of old
invariants by new ones is indicative of a transition
from the old theory to a new, more general one.
As a matter of fact, a transition from one theory
to another covering essentially the same sphere
of phenomena is only possible as a result of
transformations revealing new invariants. This
mechanism of transformations ensuring the birth
of objective knowledge has long been one of the
chief secrets of science, the veritable
philosophical stone so badly needed by the `àlchemy''
of scientific cognition. It is in the process of
search for invariants that the system of knowledge
is purged of subjective elements and old
scientific theories are replaced by new, more objective
ones.
 The change in the relationship between

invariant and variant values in favour of the former
testifies to the elimination of subjective elements
from physical knowledge and is indicative of
a transition to a higher level of objectivity, to
the expansion of the sphere of objectivity of
410
physical knowledge. The preservation of

immutability, invariance of certain values against the
background of the mutability, variance of others
is a sure sign of the objectivity of immutable
values. It appears that invariance is always
connected, in one way or another, with objectivity.
It does not mean, of course, that invariance
always represents the objective content of a
theory, but the probability of their coincidence is
very high. Being always oriented towards the
future; the process of cognition must of necessity
have a considerable ``margin of safety'', therefore
every invariant in a theory must be regarded as
potentially variable. On the other hand, the
variable aspects of a theory are to be studied more
closely with a view to determining the degree of
objectivity they may represent, for which
purpose attempts should be made to identify a group
of transformations under which certain values
in the equation in interest may prove to be
invariant. The presence of invariants and variant
relationships in a given theory determines the
degree of its `òbjectivity'', i.e. testifies to the
presence of structural characteristics and
properties of physical objects whose specific forms of
symmetry are disclosed by the given theory
under the specified conditions of investigation.
 If some values or their relationships prove

to be variable relative to given transformations,
this cannot yet be regarded as attesting to the
non-objectivity of the corresponding properties
or relationships. It simply means that the
question remains open and the investigation should
continue. What is variant in relation to one
group of transformations may prove to be
invariant in relation to another group. Besides,
411
account is also taken of the fact that the very

process of change can also be expressed in the
language of invariants with the help of its
isomorphic (or homomorphic) transformations. For
instance, the melody of a song can be represented
by changes in a continuously modulated signal.
During the transmission of the signal from the
sensors to the central processing units its form
changes with the change of the physical carriers,
methods of modulation and coding. Yet the
content of the signal, the information carried by
it, i.e. the orderliness of the pulses representing
the melody of the song remains invariant,
independent of these transformations.
 It should be specially noted, even in this

cursory survey of the problem, that the principle
of invariance underlying macroworld theories in
a latent form plays even a more important role
in the investigation of the microworld. Though
the classical theories (mechanics and
electrodynamics) can be restructured in such a way as to
place this principle in the limelight, they are
nevertheless based on dynamic principles expressed
in the equations of motion or field. We may
assume, without going deep into this subject,
that the objectivity of knowledge in the
investigation of the macroworld is best represented by
the equations of classical mechanics. It is not
accidental, therefore, that the decisive role in
ensuring the objectivity of knowledge at the
macrolevel belongs to experiment. By contrast,
theoretical science has developed its own, specific
methods and principles of obtaining objective
knowledge attaching, it appears, special
importance, to the principle of invariance.
 As is known, invariance or group symmetry
412
originally played but a secondary role in

quantum mechanics, making it possible to obtain
only auxiliary data on a quantum system. With
the integration of Schrodinger's and Dirac's
``dynamic'' equations, however, the situation
changed. Soviet scholars Yu. B. Rumer and
A.~I. Fet write: ``The development of physics
over the past few years has reversed, as it were,
the relationship between the equations of motion
and symmetry groups. Now the symmetry group
of a physical system has come to the foreground;
the representations of this group and its
subgroups carry the most important data on the
system. Hence, groups turn out to be the
primary, the most profound elements in a physical
description of nature. As to the concepts of
space and time, they play the role of 'material'
for the construction of the representations of
groups and owe the place they occupy in physics
to historical factors only. The 'equations of
motion' are assigned the role of conditions
superimposed on the vectors of some functional space
for singling out irreducible representations of
a group or equations of the infinitesimal
representation of the same group. This shift of basic
concepts does not seem to encourage the idea
that each kind of particles and fields should be
represented by some equation of motion. What
is more, the very universality of the scheme
known as the 'theory of field' is called in =
question.''^^1^^
 The principle of invariance is also largely

accountable for the considerable degree of
_-_-_
^^1^^ Yu.~B. Rumer, A.~I. Fet, Theory of Unitary

Symmetry, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1970, p.~8 (in
Russian), p.~424.
413
subjectivism in scientific concepts of space and

time.
 The concept of absolute space and time was

used by Newton in two different, though
interrelated, senses. First, by absolute space Newton
understood the empty and motionless (in
relation to matter) space of the Universe, and by
absolute time, pure duration corresponding to
absolute space. Second, he used the term
`àbsolute'' to characterise the invariance of lengths and
time intervals. It is precisely this latter aspect
of the absolute nature of space and time which
we are interested in here, since it is directly
connected with the question of their objectivity.
 The development of physics showed that the
hypothesis of the absolute nature of space and
time was narrow and contradicted a number of
important scientific facts. For instance, it was
not compatible with the principles of
electrodynamics. The equations of electrodynamics were
not invariant in relation to the Galilean
transformations expressing the absoluteness of time
and space. When applied to the electromagnetic
field, Galilean transformations led to a
conclusion that magnetic disturbance was transmitted
at different velocities in two opposite directions
from a moving source whereas the equations
themselves excluded such a possibility.
Subsequently the narrowness of the Galilean principle
of relativity as applied to electromagnetic
phenomena was proved experimentally. Michelson's
experiments in determining the velocity of light
in different directions relative to the moving
Earth showed that the classical law of the
summation of the velocities ensuing from the Galilean
principle of relativity did riot hold true in
414
relation to the velocity of light. The contradiction

between electrodynamics and the results of
Michelson's experiment, on the one. hand, and
classical mechanics based on the Galilean principle
of relativity, on the other, was resolved by the
theory of relativity. Proceeding from the
postulate of the constancy of light velocity and using
it as the basis of his theory, Einstein
universalised the principle of relativity calling for the
invariance of physical laws for inertial systems
and extended it to all physical processes,
including electromagnetic ones. In classical mechanics
the concept of absolute time found its expression
in the recognition of absolute simultaneity: if
any two events occurred simultaneously in one
inertial system of reference, they were also
bound to occur simultaneously in another. The
conclusion ensuing from the principle of the
constancy of light velocity was entirely different:
two events which took place simultaneously in
one system of reference could not be
simultaneous in another. In other words, simultaneity
according to this principle was relative. The
relativeness, non-invariance of simultaneity
signified the non-invariance of the laws of physics
in relation to Galilean transformations.
According to Einstein's principle of relativity, the
laws of physics are invariant not in relation to
the Galilean, but to Lorenz's transformations,
these providing direct substantiation for the
concept of relativity of space and time viewed
separately. Thus the length of a rod turns out
to be different in the rest system and in the
body axes system of coordinates.
 Various authors not infrequently see the

philosophical significance of the theory of relativity
415
in that it showed the variant character of space

and time. It is correct in the sense that this
theory indeed revealed new links and relations
which had not been taken into account by
classical physics and thus gave a broader and more
profound picture of the dialectics of time-space
relations. Such a general appraisal, however,
needs to be somewhat specified.
 First, it would not be correct to regard the

concept of absolute space and time (if by the
`àbsolute'' we understand their invariance) as an
erroneous, metaphysical picture of the world.
This concept stands in the same relation to the
objective world as do all classical physics and
its laws. It is a permissible idealisation of
reality, its approximate reflection in relation to
speeds which are practically negligible as
compared with the velocity of light. It is applicable
to situations in which the velocity of light can
be regarded as practically infinite.
 Second, the significance of the theory of

relativity cannot be reduced to establishing the
relativity of space and time. From it ensues not
only the invariance of space and time separated
from each other, but also the existence of a new
invariant: the time-spatial interval. Einstein and
Infeld write: ``The world of events forms a
four-dimensional continuum. There is nothing
mysterious about this, and the last sentence is equally
true for classical physics and the relativity theory.
Again a difference is revealed when two CS
[coordinate systems] moving relatively to each
other are considered. The room is moving, and
the observers inside and outside determine the
time-space coordinates of the same events.
Again the classical physicist splits the
416
four-dimensional continua into the three-dimensional
spaces and the one-dimensional time-continuum...
The old physicist bothers only about space
transformation, as time is absolute for him.
He finds the splitting of the four-dimensional
world-continua into space and time natural and
convenient. But from the point of view of the
relativity theory, time as well as space is changed
by passing from one CS to another, and the
Lorentz transformation considers the
transformation properties of the four-dimensional
time-space continuum of our four-dimensional world
of =
events.''^^1^^
 The qualitative distinction between the

space-time relationship in classical physics and the
four-dimensional continuum in the relativity
theory is that in the first case space and time
are treated as existing independently of matter
and motion and separately from each other, their
connection being entirely external, whereas in
the second case they penetrate each other and
make a single whole. On the one hand, the
concept of time is incorporated in the definition of
the spatial interval which is the distance between
two points localised simultaneously. The
relativity of simultaneity makes the spatial interval
dependent on time. On the other hand, spatial
components are incorporated in the definition
of time. The time of two inertial systems is
expressed through an equation incorporating
a spatial coordinate. Since this coordinate is
different for different systems of reference, time
_-_-_
^^1^^ Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution

of Physics, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1961, pp.~219,
208.
27--1152
417
turns out to be dependent on space. Hence, the

space-time continuum in the theory of relativity
is not a mechanical combination of space and
time connected with each other through external
links, but an integral whole. Fused in a single
continuum, space and time do not lose all of
their independence. However, from absolute this
independence turns into relative. Space and time
become, as it were, sections of a four-dimensional
continuum. The exposition of the invariance of
the space-time interval was simultaneously a
substantiation of the idea of the objectivity of space
and time in the context of a new physical theory.
A similar function was subsequently performed
by the general theory of relativity.
 The second aspect of the problem of

objectivity, as distinct from the first, considered above,
calls for special dialectical analysis and
pertains to the development of scientific
knowledge.
 After the crisis in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries the current, scientific and technological
revolution has once again demonstrated the
relativity of scientific knowledge, its concepts and
theories. Centuries-old and seemingly inviolable
fundamental concepts and ideas of physics,
chemistry, biology, physiology, psychology and
other sciences are undergoing a process of
thorough revision. The relativity of fundamental
concepts testifies to the historical character of the
process of cognition. As we have seen, the
present-day breakdown of scientific concepts, like in
Lenin's time, arouses the feelings of uncertainty
among natural scientists and philosophers,
particularly those under the influence of positivist
traditions, and makes them question the very
418
foundation of science, the objectivity, stability

and value of scientific knowledge in general.
 In this context the relation of the principle of

objectivity of scientific knowledge to the
principle of its historical development acquires special
significance.
 Analysing the crisis in natural science at the

turn of the 20th century, Lenin showed that the
relativity of scientific knowledge was a
manifestation of its dialectical development. Yet it is
only one aspect of scientific knowledge which must
not be torn out of the broad historical context of
the development of science; on the contrary, it
should be considered in connection with other
aspects and features, particularly with
relativity's opposite, viz., the absoluteness of scientific
knowledge. Should we assume relativism, an
objective and necessary aspect of scientific
development that it is, as a foundation of the theory of
knowledge and regard it outside and independent
of absoluteness, we shall arrive, as was pointed
out by Lenin, at absolute relativism which sees
in the history of cognition a process of endless
change of concepts none of which can give a true
reflection of objective reality.
 In fact, the recognition of the relativity of

knowledge is not equivalent to the denial of its
objectivity. One should not, as Lenin pointed
out, confuse the question of the objectivity of
scientific knowledge with the question of its
fullness and identify objective knowledge with
exhaustive and absolute knowledge. Absolute
and relative truths do not oppose each other as
mutually exclusive, incompatible characteristics,
they mutually complement each other: ``... for
dialectical materialism there is no impassable
27*
419
boundary between relative and absolute =
truth''.^^1^^
Any knowledge contains objective truth to the
extent to which it gives an adequate reflection of
objective reality, and ``to acknowledge objective
truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and
mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise
absolute =
truth''^^2^^. From this viewpoint, relative

truth is also objective truth and only differs from
absolute truth in that it is but a particle, a ``grain''
of the latter in the sense that it represents the
content of absolute truth incompletely, partially.
Absolute truth, in turn, is the sum total of
relative truths and each stage in the development of
science `àdds'' new grains of knowledge to this
sum.
 Speaking of the dialectics of the relative and

the absolute in cognition, one should bear in
mind yet another important feature of their
relationship, namely, that it represents
continuity in the process of scientific cognition. In the
course of its historical development science forms
a more and more complete and adequate picture
of natural and social reality. The growth of
scientific knowledge consists therefore in a steady
expansion of the sphere of truth represented by
a succession of theories replacing one another.
 Summing up his analysis of the dialectics of

the relative and the absolute in the process of
cognition, Lenin wrote: ``Dialectics---as Hegel in
his time explained---contains an element of
relativism~... but is not reducible to relativism,
that is, it recognises the relativity of all our
knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective
_-_-_

op. cit., p.~136.
^^2^Îbid., p.~133.
420
truth, but in the sense that the limits of

approximation of our knowledge to this truth are
historically =
conditional.''^^1^^
 The ideas expounded by Lenin over 70~years

ago are not less, if not more, topical today.
Absolute relativism, reanimated in a number of the
latest bourgeois concepts of the philosophy of
science, including critical realism and the works
of some representatives of the ``historical trend'',
has now acquired some new aspects. As distinct
from the earlier period, when absolute relativism
was mainly traceable to gaps in scientific
knowledge (this cause is still operative, though to
a lesser degree), the present-day relativists more
and more frequently involve the
cultural-historical determinism of theoretical thinking. Justly
emphasising the dependence of scientific
knowledge on universal socio-historical factors,
representatives of the above-mentioned and other
``postpositivist'' doctrines seek to prove that theories
relating to one and the same sphere of knowledge
but developed in different cultural and
philosophical contexts are incommensurate with one
another. In their opinion, scientific revolutions
represent so profound a turn in scientists' views
that there can be no question of any continuity
of old and new theories.
 Yet the history of science points to the opposite

and demonstrates various forms of such
continuity. The methods whereby a new theory
assimilates and deepens the objective content of its
predecessor can be roughly classified under two
categories.
 In the first category, the continuity of the new
_-_-_
^^1^Îbid., p.~137.
421
and old theories is realised through the transfer

of certain elements of the old theory into the
structure of the new one. These elements may
include not only empirical data, but also certain
theoretical concepts. For instance, the general
theory of relativity borrows the variation
principles, the principle of the equivalence of inert
and gravitational masses from the classical
gravitation theory. In the second category, which
is of a more fundamental and general character,
the continuity of the laws formulated in the old
and new theories assumes the form of a limit
transition, i.e. the laws of the new theory pass
into the laws of the old one regarded at their
limiting case. Thus, if we assume Planck's
constant to equal zero, the Schrodinger equation, the
basic one in quantum mechanics, transforms into
Hamilton-Jacobi's canonical equation of motion.
 Scientifically grounded laws and theories have

deep roots and exercise lasting influences;
otherwise theoretical knowledge would be simply
inconceivable. In this connection a question naturally
arises: what is the source of the tenacity of
a scientific theory in general, why does it preserve
its explanatory and forecasting powers over a
prolonged historical period?
 The mechanisms pointed out by the

well-known American philosopher and historian of
science Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions are psychological,
rather than epistemological by nature. Kuhn
atributes the stability of a paradigm as a model for
the theoretical explanation of facts to the specific
psychology of the scientific community which
shows a guarded attitude to a new theory and is
never too fast to support it, as well as to the
422
unwillingness of some quarters in this community

to part with the habitual stereotype of causal
explanations and predictions. Such an
explanation appears to have certain grounds, though the
scientists' psychological motives need a more
careful examination in each particular case. Yet
far more important, in our opinion, is the
methodological aspect of this problem. From the
epistemological viewpoint, the stability of theories
derives largely from the fact that each of them
participating in causal explanations and
predictions rests on definite premises. Unlike the theory
itself which is thoroughly elaborated, its
premises are found with comparative ease and, as
a rule, are hypothetical by nature. Therefore, if
the predictions or explanations made on the basis
of a given theory prove to be erroneous, the
premises are rejected with comparative ease.
Newton's gravitation theory, for instance, was
considered to be irrefutable for over two centuries.
When it sometimes failed to come up to
expectations, it was not the theory itself but its premises
that were called to account. Thus the discovery
of an error in the calculations of Uranus' orbit
based on the theory of gravitation did no harm to
the theory; it was shielded by the premises which
performed their function of a lightning rod. As
is known, John Adams and Urbain Leverrier traced
the error to the influence of the hitherto
unknown planet (Neptune) which had not been
taken into account by the then existing system of
assumptions.
 Should a theory happen to lose its ability to

predict and explain events, its prerogatives can
be subsequently restored if a new set of conditions
is found (and corresponding assumptions
423
formulated) under which the theory regains its

powers. In many theoretical disciplines scientists
prefer to preserve the theory's right to predict
and explain events and put off the question of its
incompatibility with certain facts. Hence, theories
retain their explanatory powers (if only
potential) even when some explanations prove to be
patently erroneous.
 Such theories are later modified in accordance

with new data which appeared at first discordant,
and new assumptions are made to support them.
The fruitfulness of the ``backing hypothesis''
method can be exemplified by Pavlov's theory of
conditioned reflexes. The analysis of the structure
of this theory shows that it is sufficiently
resistant to some contradicting facts. For instance,
an animal trained to respond in a definite way to
a certain stimulant far from always follows the
exact pattern of behaviour required of it. Its
response is usually slow or even incorrect. That
does not mean, however, that the very first
deviation from the forecast made on the basis of the
theory of conditioned reflexes should be seized
upon as a pretext for refuting this theory. In such
cases the usual tactics of a scientist consists in
shielding the adopted theory with an auxiliary
hypothesis and alleging interference with the
required conditions of an experiment rather than
in discarding the theory itself.
 A supposition can be made, for instance, that

the animal's nervous system fails for some reason
or other to pass through the excitation caused by
a corresponding stimulant or even exerts upon
it a certain suppressing effect. Indeed, numerous
experiments carried out by neurophysiologists
showed that excitation can really be suppressed
424
in the nervous system owing to feedback via

various nervous circuits with their numerous
bends and loops. The hypothesis of the suppression
of excitation in nervous circuits serves, on the
one hand, as an additional assumption backing up
the idea of conditioned reflexes, and, on the
other, turns out to be an independent theory subject
to additional testing (like all assumptions ensuing
from the principle of causality). This hypothesis
preserves the validity of the conditioned reflex
theory, making it a durable and effective
instrument of causal explanations and predictions in
the physiology of higher nervous activity.
 Hence, owing to various assumptions, scientific

theories provide a high degree of stability for
explanations and predictions based upon them
and cover a broad field of various phenomena and
processes.
 As we see, a transition from one scientific

theory to another is a much more complex process
than a simple negation of the old theory by a new
one; some elements of the old theory are revised
or even altogether excluded from the content of
a more developed theory, other elements are
carried over from the old to the new theory
without any change or in the form of a limit
transition, ensuring the necessary continuity
and comparability of different stages in the
development of science.
 The third important aspect of the problem of

objectivity or, more accurately, of the dialectics
of the objective and subjective which is ignored
both by the ``critical rationalists'' and ``scientific
realists'' is the relation of the objective content of
our knowledge to the abstractions instrumental
|n the development of scientific concepts and
425
theories, i.e. the dialectics of the objective and

the subjective in the very content of scientific
knowledge. As we have seen, positivism regarded
sensations, sensory data as the only reality, i.e.
identified them with reality independent of our
consciousness and thus discarded altogether the
question of the approximateness, incompleteness
of human knowledge. As to ``critical rationalism'',
it defends the thesis of the complete arbitrariness
of the abstractions and assumptions needed to
construct a scientific theory. Both these schools,
undialectical as they are, proved unable to solve
the problem of objectivity.
 The substantiation of the objectivity of

scientific knowledge cannot be limited to the analysis
of the relation of the content of this knowledge
to the objective world, though it is,
undoubtedly, the major part of the task. As is known,
cognition is not a mirror image of reality, but, using
Lenin's words, a process of the formation of
abstractions, laws, etc. In the process of
cognition, particularly scientific cognition, the
investigator sets himself an aim, defines the object of
investigation, disengages himself from all that is
inessential and likely to hamper his reasoning
and experimenting, etc. Besides these operations,
cognition presupposes the breaking away of
thought from reality, the flight of fancy, the
image-bearing thinking. It might seem that all this
mental activity is bound to reduce to zero any
objectivity of knowledge since it represents
nothing but the subjective factor in the process of
cognition. Moreover, many of the above
operations consisting essentially in the creation of
abstractions must lead of necessity to the distortion
of reality, to obvious errors and miscalculations.
426
The objectivity of knowledge might seem
incompatible with the constructive activity of thought,
with its active interference in the course of events.
 Yet it would be unwarrantable pedantry to

disparage scientific knowledge because of its
subjective component which does involve the
possibility of errors and distortion of reality. In point
of fact, scientific knowledge would be simply
impossible without this component. Abstractions
which are prerequisites for scientific knowledge
deserve therefore special attention, the more so as
many difficulties connected with the problem of
objectivity derive from the incorrect
understanding of their character and role.
 Coincidence of a notion and its object, theory

and reality is a complex, dialectically
contradictory process. Between the object and the
knowledge of the object lies the sphere of man's
activity, his goal-oriented actions aimed at
transforming and cognising the surrounding world.
Lenin wrote: ``Here there are actually, objectively,
three members: 1) nature; 2) human cognition =
the human <emmm>brain</emmm> (as the highest product of
this same nature), and 3) the form of reflection of
nature in human cognition, and this form consists
precisely of concepts, laws, categories, =
etc.''^^1^^
Pointing out that the main drawback of the
theory of knowledge in pre-Marxian materialism
consisted in its inability to apply dialectics
to the theory of reflection, Lenin specially
emphasised in his ``Philosophical Notebooks'' the need
for a dialectical approach to the theory of
knowledge, to cognition as a historically developing
_-_-_

Science of Logic'', op. cit., p.~182.
427
complex process mediated by the collective

material and spiritual activity of mankind and
by the existing system of relations between the
individual subjects of cognition.
 The elaboration of the concepts of reflection was

thus connected with the development of much
more flexible and profound views on the cognitive
activity of man. Cognition is indeed reflection,
yet it is the reflection of a special kind which
could only be explained after a radical revision of
the epistemological concepts of pre-Marxian
materialism. The revised concept, far from breaking
off with the basic principles of the materialist
approach to the process of cognition, was to make
materialism even more flexible and consistent.
The new, more profound understanding of the
process of cognition was to be based on the idea
of unity of reflection and activity which implied
the dependence of human knowledge on
socio-historical conditions. This new concept threw
entirely new light on many traditional problems
of the theory of knowledge and made it possible
to explain the mechanism of the reflection of
objective reality.
 Despite the broad variety of views on the

origin of scientific knowledge in pre-Marxian
materialist philosophy, common to all of them was the
conviction that the solution was to be achieved
through investigating the direct action of objects
on passive individual consciousness. The
formation and growth of knowledge were only
attributed to the operation of those factors which
manifested themselves in the influence of objects on
the sensuousness of the individual, and no
account was taken of all other determinants of the
process of cognition---the dependence of the
428
cognitive image on links with other branches of

knowledge, on the existing historical substantive
generalisations and schematic ties and
relationships revealing themselves in man's practical
experience, on the forms and methods of
investigations, etc. In point of fact, it was not understood
that any object could only become a source of
knowledge after being mediated by the practical
activity of social man and by the previous
history of cognition with its objectifications,
schematisations and idealisations.
 The new ideas constantly emerging in the course

of the development of science are always
conditioned, in one way or another, by the cognitive
situation in the entire system of scientific
knowledge. The progress of science is based primarily
on the available knowledge, on the existing
collective forms of cognitive activity objectified in
the language, in scientific systems, etc. It is the
active character of specifically human
perceptions, their unity with social practice, the need
for a dialectical integration of individual sensory
data in a single system of perceptions that was
referred to by Lenin when he characterised
sensation as `à subjective image of the objective =
world''.^^1^^
 The social norms and prerequisites for cognitive

activity play even a more important role in the
formation of an objective epistemological image
at the theoretical level of investigation.
Theoretical thinking is known to be based on a complex
system of idealisations, including a special layer
of mental structures, the so-called ideal objects
_-_-_

op. cit., p.~119.
429
which have no analogues among empirical objects,

properties or relationships and which function
and develop in accordance with their own laws
operative in the field of theoretical knowledge
only.
 As long as a layman inexperienced in

philosophical intricacies remains within the sphere of
conventional ideas, his attempts to see through
a tangle of events and find a clue to his current
problems can hardly induce him to take a conscious
stand on either side of the barricade between
materialism and idealism. Things begin to clear
up when he passes beyond the limits of his
experience and finds himself confronted with unusual
phenomena and processes or encounters violations
of habitual causal relationships. Under such
conditions, an individual who is not prone to
religious prejudices begins to realise the complete
groundlessness of the illusion that his
consciousness dictates laws to nature or forms a chain of
events by determining the order of causes and
consequences at his own will.
 It is perhaps after being within a hairbreadth of

death in an earthquake or after suffering a heavy
shock from a flood as a result of an unexpected
torrential rain that an individual keenly realises
the objectivity of the surrounding world. A
scientist, however, attaches far greater importance,
of course, to those `àrguments'' which are adduced
by Nature for or against his ideas and theories.
Isn't, for instance, the refutation of the once
popular theory of the existence of water canals on
Mars, maintained till quite recently, yet another
argument in support of the objectivity of our
knowledge? Aren't the discoveries of quantum
mechanics and of the physics of elementary
430
particles which shattered the foundation of classical

science convincing proof of the objective nature
of scientific cognition? The very unexpectedness,
``bizarreness'' of the most important discoveries
of modern science, as well as the apparent
intangibility of many scientific ideas testify to the fact
that our knowledge of nature does not shut itself
up in its own shell, but reflects with an ever
increasing degree of accuracy the real, objective
properties of reality. As is known, the graphic
representation of the surrounding world is
connected with the specific features and conditions of
man's cognitive process. Yet the phenomena under
investigation exist independently of human
consciousness and therefore need not necessarily
assume the graphic, tangible form as understood by man.
 The objectivity of the existing connections and

relationships in the world is also demonstrated
by the fact that man often begins to realise their
significance for his life and practical activity too
late and, being unaware of the existence of
certain links of extensive causal chains in nature and
society, proves incapable of foreseeing all the
consequences of his interference with natural
processes. This aspect of the objectivity problem,
for one, gives mankind no little trouble at
present on account of the irrational use of natural
resources by previous generations, the upsetting
of the natural balance of water and energy
reserves, and environmental pollution. The very fact
4hat people often find themselves unable even to
formulate a problem before it thrusts itself upon
them clearly demonstrates the objective nature
of causal relations, social and natural laws which
do not depend on when and how man becomes
aware of their operation.
431
 Scientific knowledge is but a more or less

adequate reflection of objective relations between
phenomena which is shaped and mediated by the
no less objective needs of society. Special
importance, in our opinion, attaches to the recognition
of the objectivity of links and relations. The
existence of objects outside man's mind is seldom
negated even by inveterate agnostics adhering to
Hume's tradition. Nor is it denied by positivism
and modern ``philosophical science''. What they
do not accept is the objectivity of links and
relations, particularly causal relations. This
necessitates considering in somewhat greater detail the
objective character of causal explanations,
forecasts and laws in the general context of the
problem of objectivity.
 The concept of causality represents in the most

general form various relations in nature and
society between phenomena one of which (called cause)
determines or produces the other (called effect).
Objective in such relations are not only cause and
effect as definite objects, events or phenomena,
but also the relations themselves which are
independent of consciousness whatever their nature:
material, energetic, informative, etc.
 It may look strange to the uninitiated that this

brief statement could have caused and is still
causing sharp debates which involve not only
the methodology of scientific cognition, but also
extend to the problems of social development and
even ideological struggle. Yet universality is
characteristic of all philosophical categories if
they are truly scientific and represent objective
reality. Viewed in terms of ``problem-intensity'',
they may be likened to an iceberg with a huge
submerged portion: the problems they contain in
432
embryo reveal ever new facets in each successive

historical period.
 There is apparently nothing ambiguous about

the word ``produce'', particularly when we use it
in the context of our everyday experience or in
relation to macroscopic processes. In its
conventional applications it conveys the ideas of the real
direction of a process as a result of which one
phenomenon produces another, of the succession
of cause and effect in time, of their real similarity
and unity of their nature. Yet each of these
aspects of a causal relationship turns into a
complex and difficult problem when we turn to objects
studied by modern science. How can we single
out cause and effect from a multitude of other
objects and phenomena accompanying the process
under investigation, and this in such a way as to
express correctly the real relation between them?
What is the meaning of the word ``to produce'' in
a scientific context if there is no possibility to trace
the entire process from cause to consequence?
Is this process continuous or intermittent,
necessary or accidental, transitive or intransitive, and
so on and so forth? Most of these problems do
not even arise in our everyday consciousness,
nor are they implicated in the philosophical
investigations of the positivist and realist
schools.
 For positivism, which regards sensations or

complexes of sensations as the only reality a
scientist is concerned with, causality is a purely
psychological problem limited to the formation
of associations in the process of observation of
a regular sequence of events. Hence, from the
positivist viewpoint the problem of causality is
devoid of any philosophical meaning and comes
38--1152
433
within the scope of concrete psychological

investigations.
 ``Critical rationalism'' regards causality in terms

of the deduction of explanations and predictions
from more general knowledge. It therefore
does not recognise the problem of the correctness,
accuracy of these causal explanations and
predictions of the effect of one or another cause, since
effect is a logical sequence of cause, provided
there is a more general law. The problem of the
relationship between discontinuity and
continuity is discarded by this school in a similar manner:
the causal relationship being the result of a
logical inference must be continuous and transitive
by virtue of its definition. Popper, for one, rejects
also the problem of the relation of causality to
chance and necessity, since the very concept of
causality implies necessity as its logical
component.
 By contrast, ``scientific realism'' recognises the

objective existence of causal relations supposing
them to be directly mirrored in scientific
knowledge. The philosopher's task is thus restricted to the
generalisation of the available knowledge of the
physical, biological, chemical forms of causal
relations and to the classification of these numerous
forms, whereas the establishment and
investigation of their specificity is left to natural scientists
themselves. The difference between the
philosophical and natural scientific knowledge of
causality thus lies in the degree of its generalisation
only. Paradoxical though it may seem, both
``scientific realism'' and positivism discard the
same philosophical problems. This coincidence, as
we have shown earlier, springs from the
identification of knowledge and reality which is
434
characteristic of both positivism and ``scientific

realism'' despite the latter's obviously
materialistic platform. The only difference between them
consists, perhaps, in that positivism deduces
reality directly from knowledge, whereas ``realism''
deduces knowledge from objective reality.
 Both philosophical trends, as we see, arrive at

the same conclusion, though their paths are
different: positivism `èliminates'' materialism as a
principle of scientific investigation, whereas realism
`èliminates'' dialectics. One lays the stress on
the subjective, the other denies its role in the
process of scientific cognition. Here we can see
once again that materialism and dialectics are
inseparable and that one cannot exist without
the other.
 To be sure, the physicists or biologists are only

interested in the objective content of a process
and seek to establish causes and effects, pursuing
their immediate practical aims. As to the
philosophers, they have a different problem to solve:
they should separate the objective content of
knowledge from those subjective elements which
are inevitably introduced by the scientists in
causal explanations and predictions. Assuming the
physicist's or biologist's attitude, the
philosopher not only abandons his field, but attempts to
pass for a philosophical truth something which
has absolutely no right to claim this title.
Willy-nilly, this stand is tantamount to the distortion
of reality in a philosophical sense.
 Of course, in dealing with causality the

philosopher should not close his eyes to the objective
content of the knowledge gained within the
framework of special sciences, such as physics,
chemistry and biology, otherwise he would open
28*
435
the door for idealism and subjectivism in science.

Yet his real task which has already been
considered earlier (see section 3 of this Chapter) consists
in specifying the subjective aspects of causal
explanations and predictions. In the context of
the basic question of philosophy, i.e. the
relationship of matter and consciousness, the mind and
nature, the philosopher ought to disclose all
subjective prerequisites for scientific
investigation, since this task lies outside the scope of the
problems tackled by the scientists themselves.
From the philosophico-theoretical viewpoint, the
problem of objectivity consists in revealing the
subjective elements of causal explanations and
predictions in special scientific investigations and
in disclosing after that the interdependence of the
objective and the subjective, their dialectics in
the process of cognition.
 Hence, the development of knowledge is

characterised by a trend towards comprehending the
real object of cognition as a unity of all its
aspects and toward integrating all the cognised
fragments of reality (different systems of
relations) in a single objective system revealing its
different aspects before the cognising subject.
The realisation of this trend calls for the
investigation of the forms of interaction of each object
with other objects (the latter being regarded in
this case as the conditions of the former), as well
as with the cognising subject himself. The
objectivity of knowledge is therefore made contingent
on the understanding of the role of the subject in
the process of cognition, particularly the role of
measuring operations, the instruments used by
the investigator, his system of reference and
methods of coding the attained knowledge.
436
 In his everyday work a physicist, a chemist or

a biologist usually encounters this problem in its
philosophico-methodological aspect while seeking
for concrete, specific means to single out the
objective content of causal relations in reality
itself, in actual processes taking place under
natural conditions. It is the more important as the
real problems and difficulties facing science in
the field of methodology often stem not only
from the erroneous understanding of causality,
but also from the disregard or underestimation of
the abstractions and assumptions forming the
framework of the concept of causal relations.
From the methodological viewpoint, i.e. from the
viewpoint of the effective solution of modern
scientific problems pertaining to the principle of
causality, it is important to take account not
only of the objective content of the concept of
causality, but also of its subjective aspect or,
more specifically, of all the intricacies in the
causal relationship represented by the dialectics of
the objective and the subjective.
 Indeed, to establish a causal relationship

between events A and B =
and to explain event B by

pointing out its cause A or to predict possible
consequences =
B1, B2, etc. =
of known cause A one

must not only indicate the corresponding signs of
causality, but also disengage himself from all
other events except A and B in the given
space-time continuum. `Ìn order to understand ...
details,'' wrote Engels, ``we must detach them from
their natural or historical connection and
examine each one separately, its nature, special
causes, effects, =
etc.''^^1^^ An abstraction of this kind
_-_-_
^^1^^ F.~Engels, Anti-D\"uhring, op. cit., p.~30.
437
resorted to in the establishment of a causal

relationship is in fact a routine mental operation often
performed in everyday life. For instance, watching
the collision of billiard balls we have no difficulty
in identifying the impact of one ball as the cause
of the movement of another. In doing so, we
discard mentally such factors as the friction of
the balls against the surface of the table, the
convection airflows, and others, since we know
from experience that they cannot have any
essential influence on the position of massive billiard
balls.
 Similarly, we say with certainty that on a

summer day a stone is heated with sunbeams, but not
with the light of distant stars, though we know
that their light also reaches the earth's surface.
Yet its effect is negligible as compared with the
radiant energy of the Sun, therefore we simply
disregard it in our explanation.
 In dealing with causal relationships such

abstractions are used so often that they become
habitual and seem quite natural. The ease with which
they are created and their practical value produce
an illusion that, being quite justifiable in one or
several cases, they must be quite relevant in all
other similar situations. It is only after we are
confronted with a complex situation that we
begin to realise the full extent of the difficulties that
have to be overcome if we want to establish the
cause or effect of a given event in the tangle of
a multitude of other objects and phenomena.
 What is the cause, for instance, of the

appearance of deserts in the once flourishing regions of
Central Asia? No doubt the cause does exist,
though it is evidently represented by a complex
system of different factors. To answer this
438
question, we must study a tremendous amount of

natural-history material and use a great many
different experimental means and methods. We
must carry out, for one, a geomorphological
analysis of water reservoirs, register the climatic
changes in the region in interest, study the
structure of the topsoil, and so on and so forth. It is
only after we complete such research that we shall
be able to discard inessential factors and
construct a more or less adequate explanation. Why
should the task be so complex in this particular
case? Is it because the investigator is required to
exercise special care in order to reveal the signs of
a causal relationship? Rather on the contrary,
such signs are too numerous and the problem
consists in selecting' those of them (after the
assessment of their comparative significance) which are
characteristic of the given concrete situation.
 The abstractions used in identifying cause and

effect play an essential role in the explanation and
prediction of various phenomena. Should such
abstractions prove impossible for some
experimental or theoretical reasons, no correct
explanation or prediction of events on the basis of
causal dependence can be provided. In other words,
the establishment of a cause-effect relation is
conditional on the accomplishment of all
necessary abstractions.
 The abstractions connected with the concept of

causality will only be valid if the investigator
observes certain general rules (rules of
abstraction) of which we shall indicate at least
three.
 First, invariable conditions should always be

fenced off, since cause and effect should be
variable factors by definition (their emergence or
439
disappearance may be regarded as a special

case).
 Second, if all or many conditions are variable

in one or another respect (which is quite
probable), the changes regarded as signs of a causal
relationship must be different by their quality
from all other changes in the given space-time
continuum.
 Third, the influence of attending factors must

be far less pronounced than the influence of the
cause on the effect, the difference in their
intensity being such that the attending factors could be
disregarded without any appreciable effect on the
results of the investigation.
 The above rules of abstraction impose certain

limitations on the objective (boundary)
conditions of the investigation of relationships in
interest and, if observed, warrant the qualification
of such relationships as ``causal''. The observance
of these rules takes the form of various
assumptions which relate to the conditions of cognition
and are stated in relevant scientific texts.
 The strict observance of these rules when

identifying cause-effect relations guarantees the
success of any causal explanation or prediction.
A change of B that follows a change of A cannot
yet be regarded as proof of the causal dependence
of B on A unless the above rules are observed.
 To be sure, the fulfilment of abstraction rules is

often made impossible by objective reality itself.
In many cases the scientists would probably
prefer experiments to the conditions provided
by nature for investigation. What is an advantage
in one cognitive situation may turn into an
obstacle in others. Noting this specific feature of the
process of cognition, the Soviet scholar, V.~A.
440
Ambartsumyan, writes: `À physicist confronted with

an unknown phenomenon usually repeats his
experiment to establish the dependence of the
phenomena in interest on those conditions under
which the experiment is staged. He has a
possibility .not only of studying these conditions in
every detail, but also of changing them. Things
are quite different in astrophysics. Having chanced
to observe an unusual phenomenon only once,
we .can neither control the external conditions
under which it took place, nor repeat it at will.
Sometimes we do not even have any idea of the
condition and circumstances attending the
phenomenon we have =
observed.''^^1^^
 In most other fields scientists are usually

capable of creating artificial conditions which meet the
abstraction rules. The aim of an experiment in
this case is to show that a change of one object or
phenomenon (which does not affect the natural
processes under the artificial conditions of the
experiment) causes a corresponding change (or
emergence) of the other object with other
conditions being invariable. It is precisely the
preservation of the constancy of all other conditions
that ensures the observance of the abstraction
rules. If the experimental check of a causal
dependence is impossible for some reason or other, the
investigator can meet the requirements of the
abstraction rules by resorting, for instance, to
appropriate mathematical means.
 Suppose, we want to prove a causal relation

between the uniform expansion of a rubber ball
during an increase of its internal pressure and
_-_-_
^^1^^ V.~A. Ambartsumyan, Philosophical Questions of the

Science of the Universe, Yerevan, 1973, p.~116 (in Russian).
441
the behaviour of a molecule in a closed vessel.

A uniform expansion of the spherical walls
testifies to the equality of gas pressure on the vessel
walls. Now, how shall we account for this
equality if it is known that gas consists of individual
molecules moving chaotically within the given
volume? In our explanation of the uniform
expansion of the vessel we in fact abstract ourselves
from the details of the trajectory of an individual
molecule and from the results of the molecule
collisions. Do we have the right to make such an
assumption? It turns out we do. When we deal
with a large number of molecules, we may take it
for granted that each molecule stays in any point
of the given volume during equal periods of
time, since there are equal probabilities that any
molecule can get to any concrete region
irrespective of its location. As a result of a great number of
chaotic collisions not a single molecule can stay
next to another one. Consequently, each molecule
acquires a high degree of independence in its
movements relative to other molecules. Since
accidental collisions tend towards complete
compensation, conditions are realised for the
application of the concept of causality to the given
relationship in full compliance with abstraction
rules.
 Now, what happens when these rules are not

observed? Should the researcher fail to take them
very seriously, the results of his investigation are
bound to be distorted and he may not even be
aware of it. Suppose, we want to apply Hook's
law to the relationship between the strain in
a steel bar and the pressure applied to it,
disregarding the fact that this causal relationship
obtains within definite pressure limits only, which
442
are different for different metals. It stands to

reason that the explanation itself and the
predictions of a concrete strain as a function of the
corresponding pressure value will prove
erroneous.
 A similar problem arises in defining the wing

configuration in an airplane design. As long as
the airplane speed was not high, the designer was
justified in regarding air as incompressible liquid.
Of, course, this assumption was but a crude
approximation to real processes, but it could be
tolerated as the resulting error was practically
negligible. However, when it became necessary
to define probable airplane characteristics at
high speeds, the hitherto justifiable assumption
lost its validity. Account had also to be taken
of many other forces arising due to friction, air
vortices, vibration, etc. The task of accurate
prediction and calculation became much more
complex. Consequently, the rules of abstraction (the
accuracy of assumptions given in quantitative
terms) have acquired special importance and
failure to observe them is likely to result in
serious errors.
 The assumptions which relate to the conditions

of investigation and are used in the analysis of
any causal relationship constitute a subjective
element in the concept of causality. The admission
of this fact calls for a very thorough philosophical
analysis of the dialectics of the objective and the
subjective in causal explanations and
predictions. It is important to understand, first, that
the share of subjectivity in such explanations
and predictions is so negligible that it cannot
jeopardise their objectivity. Second, the
introduction of certain subjectivity in such cases is
443
quite justifiable, since the use of abstractions in

scientific explanations and predictions is
necessitated in each particular case by quite definite
objective conditions. It means that the concept
of causality calls for at least a twofold
substantiation: first, it is necessary to prove the validity
of the very idea of causal relationship which
underlies its definition; second, it is necessary to
prove the soundness of the abstractions and
approximations resorted to. Significantly, from the
methodological viewpoint, this latter set of
arguments is not less important than the
identification of the causal dependence itself and should
be presented independently of the former set of
arguments.
 Here the study of causal relationships reveals

one of the most curious manifestations of the
dialectics of the subjective and the objective. On the
one hand, the singling out of the signs of a
causal relationship is a subjective act aimed at
investigating and analysing the objective world.
Any denial of the subjective character,
goal-orientation and selectivity of the scientific
investigation into the cause-effect relationship would
be untenable. On the other hand, this subjective
act is by no means arbitrary, it is prompted by
objective conditions. As regards its motives, they
are rooted, in the final analysis, in the practical
activity of man.
 The active role of the subject in the processes
of investigation (the subjective aspect) which
manifests itself in experiments, hypotheses,
suppositions, assumptions, use of various theoretical
and mathematical means is an indispensable
condition of scientific cognition. The tremendous
successes achieved by science in the cognition of
444
the world would have been impossible without

man's selective approach to reality, without
his conscious use of appropriate means and
methods in the process of cognition. However
inaccurate the approximations, it should never be
forgotten that the final result of the investigator's
activity is the creation of a scientific picture of the
world which helps man to reflect and transform
reality through his practical activity. All this is
fully applicable to the investigation of objective
causal relations.
 At the same time one should bear in mind that

the singling out of a causal dependence from the
entire system of complex objective relations and
the disregard of all other conditions cannot but
distort the integral picture of the world, since
there are no absolutely isolated systems implicitly
postulated by the concept of causality. Noting the
complex, dialectical character of the cognition
of the universal connection of phenomena, Lenin
wrote: ``The human conception of cause and effect
always somewhat simplifies the objective
connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting it
only approximately, artificially isolating one or
another aspect of a single world =
process.''^^1^^
 Being an abstraction, every concept, causality

including, tends to distort reality. The attitude
to this indisputable fact is different on the part
of pessimists and optimists in science. The
former say that our knowledge is an endless chain of
errors and delusions, whereas the latter (and we
include ourselves in their number) do not view
the situation as tragic, though they do recognise
_-_-_

op. cit., p.~156.
445
it to be contradictory, sometimes even dramatic.
 Indeed, there is no ground for mistrusting

science only because its results are not ideal. The
history of science provides numerous examples
when such difficulties were successfully overcome.
In view of the extreme epistemological
complexity of the concept of causality we should
reconcile ourselves to the inevitable inaccuracies in
any causal explanation and prediction. The
scientist's task is to reduce such inaccuracies to
a minimum and take full advantage of the
effective means (both technical and conceptual)
now available to him in order to ``neutralise''
his errors. It should be noted in this connection
that inaccuracies can sometimes be disregarded
altogether without any detriment to the validity
of causal explanations. For instance, in everyday
life we readily accept the explanation that water
freezes as a result of the ambient temperature
decrease to --4°C, though more accurate
measurements made under different conditions will
undoubtedly reveal a certain scatter in thermometer
readings even if measurements are made in one
and the same place but at different times, or at
one and the same time but with different water
samples. Why do we tolerate such an
inaccuracy? Only because all other factors we close our
eyes to are not essential in the given situation.
We may disregard, for instance, the influence of
admixtures in water and the probable variation
of atmospheric pressure which is also known to
affect liquid freezing processes.
 In the example under consideration we only

single out what we are interested in at the
moment, namely, only two most essential events and
neglect all other factors and accompanying
446
conditions. If the quantity of admixtures in

water remains within normal limits and the
ambient pressure is not very much different from
normal, the error in the explanation of water
freezing by a decrease of ambient temperature
to --4°G will not be essential. Generally speaking,
the scientist has every right to change the
conditions of his investigation in accordance with
the situation and use to this end any conceptual
or mathematical means at his disposal, provided,
of course, that he strictly observes the rules of
abstraction, avoids any arbitrariness in his
causal explanations and predictions and takes
care not to distort living reality.
 The objectivity of the principle of causality,

however, consists not only in that it reflects
certain aspects of reality and that the selection of
certain events as causes and effects is prompted
by the objective conditions of cognition. The
very motives of this selection are always rooted in
the material, practical activity of people and, in
the end, in the entire system of social production.
Moreover, it is none other than this practical
activity that passes the final judgement on the
objectivity of causal relations.
 This idea has been very clearly expressed by

Engels. ``The first thing that strikes us in
considering matter in motion,'' he wrote, `ìs the
interconnection of the individual motions of separate
bodies, their being determined by one another.
But not only do we find that a particular motion
is followed by another, we find also that we can
evoke a particular motion by setting up the
conditions in which it takes place in nature... In
this way, by the activity of human beings, the
idea of causality becomes established, the idea
447
that one motion is the cause of =
another.''^^1^^ It is
precisely the activity of human beings, their
social practice, that frees our knowledge from
subjectivity, gives our abstractions flesh and
blood and integrates them into its great
concreteness. It is only through practice, by including
the cognised link of a causal relationship, as we
understand it, into the objective, universal
system of relations that we test the truth of our
knowledge. Should it fit into the system without
disturbing the course of natural processes, we
shall have every right to regard our mental
operations and abstractions, even the most daring
ones, as completely justifiable.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, op. cit.,

230.
[448]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
CONCLUSION
 The scientific and technological revolution has

proved to be a serious test not only for some
general and special scientific theories, but also for
many philosophical schools and trends concerned
in one way or another with the scientific
explanation of the world. Positivist philosophy which
pulled through many difficult periods in the
course of its long history has evidently entered
a new critical stage in its evolution. The general
crisis of positivism started, in effect, with the
emergence of Marxist philosophy, its first real
alternative, and has been aggravating ever since.
It became particularly acute at the turn of the
20th century in connection with major discoveries
in physics, mathematics and philosophy, summed
up by Lenin. New trials awaited positivism in the
1920s as a result of the emergence of quantum
mechanics and the theory of relativity. No less
troublesome were the subsequent periods of its
evolution. All the storms positivism had to
1/2 29-1152
449
weather resulted, as a rule, in partial

modifications of its philosophical programme which took
into account the criticism of its opponents,
including Marxist philosophy.
 It is noteworthy that the representatives of

positivism attributed all these misfortunes of their
philosophy not to its intrinsic weaknesses or to
their own fallacies, but regarded them as
symptoms of a crisis of science in general. Moreover, all
blame for setbacks and difficulties in scientific
cognition they usually laid at the door of either
materialism or dialectics. The strategy and the
tactics of positivism fighting for its prestige in
the scientific community evidently deserves
special analysis which goes beyond the scope of our
investigation. What we do need to emphasise
here is the fact that it is not some particulars of
the programme of positivism that are called in
question by the current scientific and
technological revolution, but the very foundation of
positivist philosophy. In point of fact, the
revolution has completely undermined the scientists'
confidence in the basic methodological principles
of positivism---empiricism, conventionalism,
indeterminism, the reduction of philosophy to the
logic of science and to linguistic analysis, etc.
 The crisis of positivist philosophy manifests

itself not only in the disagreement with science
and its main tendencies but also in the emergence
of new schools and trends within the philosophy
of science coming out with sharp criticism of some
positivist dogmas and proposing methodological
alternatives to its traditions.
 The Western philosophy of science does not

know a more radical critic of empiricism than
Karl Popper. ``Critical rationalism'' as the
450
methodological platform of Popper and his adherents

does appear to be rather a formidable opponent of
positivism. Its model of scientific cognition is
essentially different from the positivist model,
particularly if we take into account the views
expounded in the latest works of the English
philosopher: the recognition of theory as the most
essential component of scientific knowledge, the
deductive system of reasoning (from a problem to
a surmise, from the surmise as a tentative solution
of the problem to consequences, from the
consequences implied by a hypothesis to their
purpose-oriented refutation, from this to a new
formulation of the problem, and so on). Nevertheless,
despite the apparent distinctions from the
inductivist model defended by positivism there is
striking resemblance between the two models:
both of them postulate direct and simple
connection between empirical knowledge and theory
and assert .the conventional character of basic
empirical statements, if not laws themselves.
 Another characteristic feature of Popper's stand

which seemingly distinguishes it from the
positivist views is the recognition of the so-called
World 3 or the world of objective knowledge.
It is very significant, however, that Popper does
not relate this world to objective reality, relying,
like the positivists, on the intersubjective
criterion of scientificity. His idea of `òbjective
knowledge'' borders on the idealism of the Platonic, if
not Berkeleian, type.
 ``Critical rationalism'' also differs from

positivism in that it revives the principle of causality
and shows special interest in the explanatory
role of scientific theories. Yet even this
difference is watered down by interpreting necessity
29*
451
implied by causal explanations in the purely

logical sense a la Wittgenstein. The ``theory of
regularity'' adhered to by Wittgenstein in
relation to the problems of causality and determinism
is obviously rooted in the philosophy of Hume
and Kant and shows close affinity to the Machist
concept of causality as probability of the
expectation of consequences, as well as to the
interpretation of law as functional dependence
expressed by a mathematical formula.
 Besides the highly critical attitude to

empiricism in the modern philosophy of science, the
opposition to positivism also manifests itself in the
understanding of the subject-matter of
philosophy. In this field the debates are mainly centred
on the status of the so-called metaphysical
problems. ``Critical rationalism'' does not go beyond
the general legalisation of such problems though
they were implicitly recognised in positivist
dogmata, whereas ``scientific realism'', ``new
ontology'' and ``new metaphysics'', which have formed
within the framework of the modern philosophy of
science as alternatives to positivism, place special
emphasis on the need for the restoration of
metaphysics reduced to ashes during the
anti-metaphysical crusade of positivism and make this
issue one of the key points of their programmes.
 As a matter of fact, the programme of

``scientific realism'' boils down to the rebuilding of the
scientific structure of the real world---the task
considered to be worthy of philosophy. Very
characteristic in this respect are the general
scientific concepts and metatheoretical problems which
receive extensive coverage in the works of this
school's representatives. They indeed regard their
task in terms of resurrection. One gets an
452
impression that scientific realism is completely unaware

of the age-old traditions in the investigation of
these problems and ignorant of the dialectics of
nature and social development expounded in
Marxist-Leninist philosophy which has never
lost interest in such problems as being, the
structure of matter, the interconnection of space and
time, the forms of motion, the laws of the
development of material systems, including society, and
carried out fruitful investigations into the
philosophical problems of natural science, social
progress, etc. The attitude of the Western
philosophy of science to these and many other problems
is indicative of its confinement within the narrow
limits of positivist traditions.
 Of course, attempts to start from scratch ought

to meet with sympathy and it would be hardly
fair to demand of ``scientific realism'', ``scientific
materialism'', ``new ontology'', etc. that they
consider these problems within the framework of
more general philosophical issues and substantiate
the new ontology with dialectical and
epistemological analysis. However, any attempt to
develop a sound ontology today without fulfilling
this requirement is inevitably doomed to failure.
Moreover, an ontology constructed on a tabula
rasa basis tends to reproduce in a crude manner
some ideas and concepts of old natural philosophy
gravitating towards mechanicism, speculativeness,
the Laplatian ideal of determinism, etc. It would
fail to rise to the level of universal, truly
philosophical generalisations and only strive to replace
them by a more or less coherent system of
general scientific statements. Such statements based
either on biological and cybernetic ideas, or on
the set theory and the latest achievements of
453
physics would inevitably lose their

concreteness and degenerate into truisms leaving at the
same time a lot of loopholes for idealism---the
more so as they are intended to deduce the world
from current scientific concepts and tend on the
whole to petrify the present-day knowledge rather
than to give a dynamic picture of living reality
on the basis of a truly philosophical approach.
Consciousness, too, with all its specificity and
richness of content is deduced from (or reduced to)
the interaction of molecules and atoms, whereas
the mechanism of heredity in living organisms
is viewed in terms of quantum transitions. The
tabula rasa approach of new metaphysics to the
problem of ontology will hardly enable the
philosophy of science to raise the edifice of new
methodology above ground level in the place of the
ruins left by positivism. All attempts to revive
ontology as a doctrine of the objective world and
its most general properties and laws will at best
remind one of a recapitulation course of history
unless their authors turn in earnest to
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, to the achievements of
modern materialism that has assimilated all that
was best and most progressive in the history of
science and culture.
 It is for this reason that we set ourselves the

task of familiarising the reader with some
principles of Marxist philosophy, showing the essence
of dialectical materialism as an alternative to
positivism and considering possible solutions to
the present-day pivotal problems of methodology.
It would be presumptuous to claim a more or
less complete exposition of the views of the
classics and modern Soviet philosophers in this book,
not to speak of the elucidation of all the problems
454
that have been touched upon in its polemical

sections. The author has only singled out a few
most acute problems which have become of late
the object of particularly heated controversies
and which have not yet been subjected to a
sufficiently detailed analysis in Marxist literature
with due regard for the nuances brought in the
limelight.
 As regards the positive content of this book, we

attach special importance to the problems of the
scientific value of philosophy and of the
concreteness of philosophical knowledge which are closely
connected with each other. In Marxist philosophy
concrete knowledge has always been associated
with the completeness of the reflection of objects
and their diverse relations and links with one
another. Conversely, the abstract has been
regarded as an equivalent of isolation, particularisation.
Any statement represents a dialectical unity
of both opposites, therefore there are no and
cannot be any absolutely abstract or absolutely
concrete scientific statements. Any scientific
knowledge can only be more abstract or less
abstract. Regarding scientific cognition as a living
process unfolding in time and space we maintain
that this completeness of the reflection of links
and relations is different at different stages of
scientific investigation. Hence, we distinguish
three different levels or forms of concreteness:
-empirical, representing direct, sensual perception
of objects and phenomena; theoretical, concerned
with inner laws, essential links, relations and
necessary features; and philosophical, relating to
the most general properties and phenomena of
reality, the contradictoriness of development, the
diversity and the unity of quality and quantity,
455
the material and the ideal, etc., as they are

reflected in the human mind.
 Real philosophical knowledge reflects certain

universal properties of the sensually perceived
world and is in this sense empirically concrete.
It reveals the most general laws and relationships
of the surrounding world and is therefore
theoretically concrete. As distinct from the knowledge
provided by special sciences it also defines the
epistemological limits for the solution of one or
another problem, i.e. the concrete form of the
relation between the objective and the subjective
in scientific cognition and, consequently, is
epistemologically concrete. In point of fact,
philosophical knowledge can only be concrete if it takes
into account the place of a given phenomenon or
the property it reflects in the general system of
categories and laws of dialectics and materialism.
Concreteness is demanded by Marxist philosophy
of itself in the first place. The concepts of matter
and consciousness are only regarded as concrete
(and therefore really scientific) within the
framework of the basic question of philosophy. The
category of contradiction can only be concrete if
it is viewed in the context of the unity of the
phenomena under consideration. Dialectics rejects
such notions as the opposition in general, quality
in general, essence in general, necessity in
general, etc. regarded as absolute entities. It demands
that the opposites be only considered within the
framework of unity, quality in relation to a
given quantity, matter in relation to consciousness
as its derivative, necessity in relation to chance,
etc. Outside this philosophical concreteness the
categories of dialectics and materialism
become nonsensical. The concreteness of these
456
categories is the main proof of their

scientificity.
 The specific form of concreteness of

philosophical knowledge determines also its relation to the
knowledge provided by special sciences.
Philosophy does not stand aloof from them, it merges
with the entire system of human knowledge and
actively penetrates all the cells of this living
intellectual organism. Conversely, no special
scientific knowledge could be fully concrete
without the support of philosophy, as positive
sciences do not concern themselves with quantity and
quality, matter and consciousness, the opposites
in objects and phenomena, etc. It hardly needs
mentioning that no truly scientific analysis
would be possible under such conditions.
 Possessing its own form of concreteness,

philosophical knowledge performs not only the
methodological, but also the theoretical function in
the development of science. It is not something
alien to special scientific knowledge, but makes
part and parcel of its system. It stands to reason
that philosophical knowledge integrated in the
structure of human thought usually loses its
independent meaning or, at any rate, remains in
the background---it serves the purposes of a special
scientific investigation or some practical action
and is entirely subordinated to it. This
inconspicuousness of philosophical knowledge sometimes
gives grounds for erroneous assertions that a
well-developed theory has no place for philosophy at
all.
 The history of science shows how philosophical

principles and laws rise up in all their magnitude
and reveal their power and viability in critical
periods, at the crossroads of scientific cognition,
30 -- 1152
457
when it becomes necessary to solve crucial

problems of social and scientific development.
Fundamental, theoretical sciences find themselves
much more often confronted with such
large-scale problems than do empirical or applied
sciences, and it is usually fundamental theories
that throw a new light on conventional, generally
recognised philosophical principles. Hence, the
cooperation between philosophy and special
sciences is particularly fruitful in the sphere of
theory. The attitude of theorists to philosophy is
reverent and critical at the same time. T-heir
relations based on mutual confidence leave no
room for parochialism and, consequently, for
petty squabbles over their share in the success
of a scientific investigation or, conversely, their
measure of responsibility in case of its failure.
Here we have a single science whose only aim
untarnished by any prestige considerations is to
serve mankind.
 The question of the objectivity of knowledge

assumes different forms and requires different
solutions depending on the context. Philosophy
provides the most general solution: everything
that exists outside the mind (be it individual or
collective) is objective. Special sciences view the
problem from a different angle striving to
`èliminate the subject'' from the results of a scientific
investigation. Empirical investigation does not
know a more reliable means for obtaining
objective knowledge than an experiment ensuring the
investigator's ``neutrality''. Theoretical
investigation, in our opinion, pivots on the principle of
invariance. In the theorist's language the
objective `ìn the first approximation'' is equivalent to
what is invariant in different systems of
458
transformation. A natural scientist (a physicist, a

chemist, a biologist, etc.) shows but little interest in
the problem of objectivity in its ``pure'',
philosophical form, considering it even too trivial (as is
evidenced from numerous publications and verbal
statements). His attitude changes when the
problem comes to the foreground, e.g. when the
former criteria of invariance fail, generally
recognised theories collapse and the scientists need a
reliable bridge to a new theory.
 Dialectics does not regard objective knowledge

as a challenge prize which passes on from one
generation to another. Objective knowledge must
be gained by and for each generation of
scientists separately and may only come as a result of
their own labour. It should be extracted from the
rock of subjective assessments, suppositions and
delusions just like precious metal is extracted
from ore. It is procured in arduous toil---only to
be rejected there and then and give way to more
profound concepts and theories.
 In its approach to the problem of objective

knowledge dialectical methodology is
characterised, first and foremost, by its constant striving to
reflect all the complexity and dynamism of
scientific cognition avoiding any one-sidedness and
absolutisation of some particular methods or
levels of cognition. At the same time it firmly
adheres to the principle of objectivity in its most
general, philosophical sense, since the disregard
of this principle leads to the erosion and
devaluation of the entire system of scientific knowledge.
 To be sure, the concrete embodiment of the

principles of dialectics offered by one or another
scientist in his works may lack the necessary
flexibility, completeness or consistency. The
30*
459
blame for subjective weaknesses should not be

laid at the door of dialectics itself. It provides
a sound basis for the solution of problems facing
modern science, the more so as it calls for creative
approach to its own development.
[460]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
NAME INDEX
<pre>
Adams, J.--- 423

Adorno, Th.---292, 320,
321
Agassi, J.---86--93
Ambartsumyan, V. A.---
440, 441
Aristophanes---85
Avenarius, P.---29, 255
Ayala, F.---166
Ayer, A.---29, 30, 37--39,
54, 56, 57, 127, 258
Bauer, E.---198, 199

Bekhterev, V. P.---346
Bergman, G.---49
Bergson, H.---142
Berkeley, J.-53, 55, 58,
154 Bhaskar, R.---198, 199
Blokhintsev, D. I.---346
Bohm, D.---229. 235, 242
Bohr, N.--- 42. 43, 142,
150, 151, 239
[col2]
Born, M.---155--59, 406
Braithwaite, R. B.---171
Brecht, B.---85
Bridgeman, P. W.---171,
242 Brodbeck, M.---171
Bunge, M.---108, 115--25,
134, 136, 217, 230--43
Carnap, R.-24, 25, 31--

35, 40, 46, 53, 66,
109, 114, 127, 142,
160--63, 167, 171
Chetverikov, S.---228
Comte, A.---27--29, 44, 49
Copernicus, N.---61, 73
Crick, F.---168--70
Darwin, Ch.---176
Dirac, P.---85
Dubois-Reymond, E.---
165
Dubrpvsky, D.---214
461
Eccles, J.---218
Einstein, A.---42, 65, 73,
150, 211, 346, 408,
415--17
Engels, F.-62, 221, 222,
251, 252, 255, 270,
271, 280, 285, 333,
334, 342, 349, 437,
447, 448
Feigl, H.-108, 130, 131,

208--16, 323, 324
Fet, A. I.---413
Feyerabend, P.---81--87,
93, 94, 109, 113, 206
Fichte, I. G.---142
Finnochiaro, M.---196
Fischer, R.---228
Fock, V. A. ---142, 346
Fodor, J.---131, 132
Frank, Ph.---154
Franklin, B.-298
Frolov, I. T.---211, 212
Galilei, G.---85, 406, 414,

415
Goethe, J. W.---248
Habermas, J. --- 286--89,

292 Hawking, S. W.---150
Heaviside, 0.---184
Hegel, G.---51, 84, 142,
245, 250, 251, 254,
257,259--65,300,302,
320, 321
Heidegger, M,---143
[col2]
Heisenberg, W.---42, 43,

147, 229, 346
Hempel, C. ---128, 171
Herz, H.-184
Hilbert, D.-292
Homer -207
Hull, D.-224--27
Hume, D.-53, 55, 57,
63, 155
Husserl, E.---39
I
Ilyenkov, E. V.---269,
276
Infeld, L.-416, 417
Kant, I.---30, 39, 119,

155, 159, 250, 300,
303, 452
Kepler, I.---79
Kierkegaard, S.--- 85
Kuhn, T.---71--84, 195--
97, 309, 422
Lakatos, I.---75--80, 87,

91, 93, 198
Lavoisier, A. L.---73
Lebedev, P. H.--- 313,
340
Lenin, V. I.-85, 220--22,
275, 285, 300, 310,
311, 316, 332, 340,
341, 353, 374, 375,
401, 403, 406, 418--
21, 427, 429, 445,
449
Lesevich, V. V.---45
Leverrier, U.---423
Lightfoot, E. N.---168
Locke, J.---57
462
Lorentz, H.---406, 415,

416
Lorenz, K.-165, 166
Luther, M.-85
Mach, E.-29, 45, 46,

55, 142, 155, 255
Marcuse, H.---292--95
Margolis, J.---217
Marx, K.---85, 221--23,
251, 252, 255, 268--
72, 274, 276, 285--90,
298, 317, 318, 321,
332, 342, 353, 358,
374, 375
Maxwell, J. ---184
McKeon, R.---107
Michelson, A.---340
Mill, J. S.---24, 29, 47
Mises, R.-37, 39, 41
Monod, J.---42, 169, 170
Nagel, E.-163--65
Narsky, I. S.-321
Neurath, 0.---171
Newton, L---65, 73, 74,
79, 85, 413
Nickols, E. F.---313
Pauli, W.---346
Pavlov, I. P.---346, 424
Plato---39, 189
Poincare, H.---42, 340,
406 Polten, E. ---218--21
Popper, K. R.--59--71,
74, 75, 77, 86--104,
109, 116, 117, 119,
123,177--94,196,218,
[col2]
256,257,307--09,450,
451
Ptolemy---194
Quine, W. V. O.---108,
111--14,136,137,205--
07
Reichenbach, H.---109,
142, 143
Robinson, G. S.---194
Rorty, R.---134, 135
Rumer, Yu. B.---413
Ruse, M.---171, 172, 224
Russell, B.---25, 36, 39,
42, 155, 256, 335
Schaffner, K. ---170
Schelling, F. W. J.---
142
Schlick, M.---29, 46, 48,
61, 109, 127, 256
Schrodinger, E. ---100,
151, 229, 406, 413
Sellars, W.-108, 126,
135 Seve, L.---58
Smart, J. J.---132, 213
Spencer, H.---26, 49
Spinoza, B.---39
Szentgjorgji, A,-228
Trigg, R.---198--205, 217
463
V
Vavilov, N. I.---346
Volkmann, P.---43
Watson, J.---168, 170

Wetter, H.---326
Wheeler, J. A.-148
[col2]
Whitehead, A. N.---47
Wigner, E.---148--50, 229
Wittgenstein, L.---25, 29,
36, 46, 47, 55, 61,
256, 452
Wright, S.---228
Yudin, B. G.---211, 212
</pre>
[464]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
SUBJECT INDEX
<pre>
Abstraction, abstract---
136,261--63, 266--327,
425,426,437--41,443,
447, 448, 455
Analytical statement---30,
31, 34
Anomaly in cognition---
309
Apriorism---39, 103
Assumption, premise---
30, 63, 110, 121,
122, 134, 136, 142,
186, 232, 310--13, 338,
341,393,423--26,442--
44
Axiomatisation---234/238,
349
Basic propositions---69,
180
Biology---45, 46, 89, 99,
123, 160, 166--69, 176,
214, 225--28, 253, 292,
294, 302, 303, 335,
[col2]
337, 342, 348, 360,

397
Causality, cause---50, 56,

57, 100, 140, 215,
218, 219, 239--44, 307--
14, 329, 335, 344,
355, 374, 423--48, 452
Chemistry---120,160, 215,
253, 337, 342, 356,
359
Classical science---51,118,
142, 229, 233, 338--
40, 412--15, 422
Common sense notions,
everyday
experiences --- 26, 126, 225,
248, 249,
Communicative process---
38, 156, 286--88
Conception of ``Third
World''-96, 102--04,
180, 182, 185, 187--
94, 451
Concrete--261--63, 265--
465
327, 455, 456

Confirmation---31, 32, 61,
62, 66, 68, 121, 164,
195, 307
Contradiction---318--20,
347
Convention,
conventionism---69, 107, 126,
181, 186, 234, 450,
451
Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum
mechanics, Copenhagen
school of physicists---
145, 147, 148, 158,
237, 242
Crises in science---42, 70,
77, 144, 340, 341
Criterion of genuineness of
knowledge---29, 120,
185, 195, 317, 319
``Critical rationalism''---
59,71, 75,81,93,94,
104, 177, 256, 426,
434, 450--52
Cumulative growth of
knowledge---173, 257
Cybernetics---42, 348, 355,
361, 375, 376, 382
Deduction, deductionism
---117, 277, 317, 338,
344
Delusions, errors in
cognition---66, 67, 90,
91, 100, 185, 191,
193, 195, 258, 355,
437
Demarcation between
science and
metaphysics-68, 77, 89, 118,
209, 247, 399
Determinism---J40, J6|,
[col2]
229, 239--44, 329, 336,

339, 450, 452
Development of science---
70, 71, 81, 85, 94,
187, 335, 339--41, 357--
90, 418--27
Dialectical categories and
laws---257, 318, 326,
327, 337, 349, 356,
456
Dialectical materialism ---
51, 136, 137, 144,
204, 218, 245--448,
454
Dialectics---27, 125, 137,
138, 176, 228, 238,
245, 252, 254, 256,
259, 449--53
Dogmas, dogmatism---50,
67, 71, 85, 86, 114,
177, 209, 332
Dualism-50, 127, 129.
132
E
Eclecticism---58,288, 292,
296, 327
Elimination of errors --- 67
---of metaphysics---67, 142
---of problem---127
---of subject--184, 401,
403
Empirical data---31, 57,
95, 164, 265, 266,
334
Empiricism---31, 34, 36,
56, 57, 63, 64, 95,
164, 189, 291, 334,
335, 450
Epistemology---43, 46, 69
97, 103, 113--14, 124,
176, 181, 189, 199,
201, 221, 222, 234,
259, 398, 399, 453
Evolutionary theory of
466
cognition---67, 97,
109
Experience---37, 39, 101,
113, 114, 130, 131
Experiment---78, 152--54,
180, 194, 236, 300,
306, 313, 319--20, 327,
340, 359, 440, 441
Explanation---77, 78, 82,
91, 100, 141, 161,
170, 172, 210, 254,
264, 307, 308, 311--
14, 342, 378, 422--48,
451
Fact---54--57, 116, 164,

253, 258, 276, 300,
334, 337
Falsification,
falsificationism---63, 64, 67, 68,
77, 88, 90, 91, 110,
116, 117, 177, 186,
187, 195, 254
Frankfurt School---288--96,
320
G
Generalisation---34, 56,
122, 124, 264, 278--
80, 284, 288, 309,
355, 356, 378, 401
Genetics---42, 97, 99, 168,
176, 228
German classical
philosophy---25, 51, 245--
65
Heuristics, heuristic
value---70, 84, 91, 123,
280, 314
Historical materialism---
286, 287, 29Q
[col2]
History of science---66,
79, 80, 86, 87, 347,
457
Human values---41, 135,
191
Hypothesis---33, 67, 86,
117, 154, 186
I
Idealism---27, 44, 50, 51,

58, 99, 127, 166,
193, 348, 394, 400,
451
Idealistic dialectics---5l,
104, 251, 256, 271
Identity and
contradiction---260, 302, 316--
19, 336, 455
Inborn knowledge --- 98,
257
Incommensurability of
theories---81, 82, 84,
93
Information --- 30, 281,
283, 284, 286, 287,
330, 359, 375, 389
Integration of knowledge
---68, 85, 357--90
Interactionism---286
Intersubjective
knowledge---112, 113, 154--
62, 173, 185, 198,
201, 206, 215, 288,
396, 397
Intuition---35, 250
Invariance---405--18
Knowledge, cognition---
39, 53, 56, 67, 75,
76, 81, 135, 139, 159,
179, 180, 250, 265,
278, 317, 397, 398,
467
402, 403, 418, 419,

431, 432
Language,linguistics---37,
42, 49, 111, 112, 133,
158, 160, 162, 163,
167, 169, 174, 206,
210, 258, 285, 288,
289, 336, 361--64, 372,
405, 406
Laws of science, laws of
nature, laws of
society---32, 56, 57, 79,
84, 103, 161, 163,
167, 255, 270, 297,
300, 301, 308, 309,
324, 326, 328, 336,
339, 342, 374, 379,
401, 431, 456
Logical empiricism---35,
42, 209
Logicism---70, 71, 74, 95,
96, 103, 105
Machism,
empirio-criticism---45, 46, 53, 142,
202, 240, 307, 452
Man-53, 272, 289--99,306,
361--74,381,384,428.
429
Materialism, matter---27,
50, 51, 96, 99, 101,
108, 125, 137--38, 140,
199, 200, 213, 220,
221, 258, 259, 290,
303--05,332,338,341,
391--448, 450, 454
Mathematical logic---30,
47, 122, 377
Matter and consciousness
---50, 96, 98, 176,
201, 304, 305, 406,
[col2]
436, 457
Mechanistic
materialism-51, 52, 58, 167
Mental and physical
processes---96, 127, 128,
175, 192, 209, 213,
219, 220
Metaphysics---27, 29, 31,
32, 35--38, 41, 44,
67, 71, 85, 87, 88,
90, 92, 95, 104--08,
142, 256, 257, 274,
284, 310, 335, 394,
395, 452
Methodological anarchism
---81--85
``Methodology of research
programmes''---76--80
Methodology of science---
33, 59, 94, 209, 246,
312
Mind and brain---98, 100,
130--35, 306
Natural philosophy---58,
104, 387
Natural sciences---26, 36,
38, 44, 328, 338, 339,
351,357--90, 395, 453
Natural selection---102,
226
Necessity and chance---
260, 297, 300, 301,
318, 320, 434, 450
Neurophysiology---42,
130, 133, 176, 215,
217
Object---54,101,115,144,
151, 265, 266, 315,
468
328, 345, 356, 396,

409, 410
Objectivity, objective
knowledge --- 96--104,
106, 112, 139--94, 197,
201, 270, 338, 340,
342, 374, 390--448,
451, 458
Observation,
observability---28, 30, 39, 56,
63, 112, 139, 144,
146, 153, 177, 205,
233--35
Ontology---56, 57, 104--
38, 198, 199, 201,
218, 220, 283, 323,
328, 353, 453
Paradigm---72, 73, 80,

350
Phenomenalism,
phenomenology---135, 160,
214, 283
Pluralism---83, 84, 127,
175
Prediction---65, 123, 265,
307, 310, 313, 314,
358, 422--48
Probability---31--33, 150--
52, 195, 210, 234,
235, 342, 375
Protocol statements---31,
62, 69
Psychology---43, 45, 46,
160, 167, 214, 302,
335, 337, 378, 379
Psychophysiology --- 42,
130, 217
Quality and quantity---

260, 319, 323--26, 369,
[col2]
370, 455--57
Quantum mechanics---36.
42, 118, 142, 145--
53, 216, 217, 232--40.
396, 449
Reality---37, 39, 53, 54,

113, 128, 134, 154,
166, 200, 220--22, 230,
340, 342, 355, 419,
420
Reduction, reductionism
---99, 110, 114, 128,
129, 160--64, 170--72,
174, 385
Refutation---64, 68, 70,
96, 121
Scepticism---26, 43, 87,

135
Science and practice---26,
183, 300
Science and theology---
27, 63, 154, 204,
247, 254
Scientific and
technological revolution---357--
90
Scientific community---
71--73, 106
Scientific criticism---67,
116
``Scientific materialism''
---99, 131--34,178, 196,
197, 397
Scientific problem ---70,
88, 89, 102, 120, 183,
191, 344, 346--48, 350
-57
Scientific progress---48,
70, 75, 94, 247, 281,
469
358--90
``Scientific realism''---99,
104--38, 178, 196--244,
353, 391, 395, 434,
435, 452
Scientific revolution---74,
80, 84, 143--44, 169,
196, 360, 361, 422--48
Selection
---of fact-159, 232
---of hypothesis---72,
73, 80
---of problem---88,
211--12
---of theory---113
Sensual perception,
sensory experience---37,
141, 144, 156, 2C9,
272
``Situation logic,'' --- 76
Social progress---43, 98,
281, 388
Social sciences---89, 123,
167,285--88,290,291,
297--99, 357--90, 392
Solipsism---154, 201
Space-50, 126, 140, 339,
342, 414--18
Subject, subjective---35,
91, 92, 101, 141, 151,
179, 180, 184, 185,
282, 303, 355, 390--
448, 458, 459
Synthetic statement---30,
31, 34, 264
System investigations---
382, 453
Tacit knowledge---338,
423--26, 442--44
Tautology---30, 37, 66,
231, 265
Theory---38, 64--67, 81,
82, 85, 86, 92, 102,
[col2]
112, 116, 120, 136,

183, 184, 191, 192,
265, 299, 322, 334,
338, 350, 449
---of atom-molecular
structure of matter---36,
61, 157, 233, 350
---of identity of the
mental and the
physical---130, 209, 210,
216, 217
---`òf regularity''---
161, 302, 452
---of relativity---36,
42, 45, 118, 142,
183, 195, 276, 408,
415--17, 449
---tentative---66, 67
Time---50, 126, 339, 342,
413--18
Trade---288, 289, 293, 360--
74
Transcendental reality---
38 39 53
Truth---39,' 90, 91, 97,
191,193--95,212,224,
280, 419, 420
Universality---32, 252,
297--99, 324, 329, 345
V
Verification,
verificationism---29--31, 56, 61,
63, 66, 67, 88, 95,
102, 110, 195, 254,
307
Vienna Circle---46, 59--61,
69, 119, 123, 209, 212
World view---39, 40
</pre>
470
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SUBJECT INDEX
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<pre>
Abstraction, abstract—
136,261–63, 266–327,
425,426,437–41,443,
447, 448, 455
Analytical statement—30,
31, 34
Anomaly in cognition—
309
Apriorism—39, 103
Assumption, premise—
30, 63, 110, 121,
122, 134, 136, 142,
186, 232, 310–13, 338,
341,393,423–26,442–
44
Axiomatisation—234/238,
349
Basic propositions—69,
180
Biology—45, 46, 89, 99,
123, 160, 166–69, 176,
214, 225–28, 253, 292,
294, 302, 303, 335,
[col2]
337, 342, 348, 360,

397
Causality, cause—50, 56,

57, 100, 140, 215,
218, 219, 239–44, 307–
14, 329, 335, 344,
355, 374, 423–48, 452
Chemistry—120,160, 215,
253, 337, 342, 356,
359
Classical science—51,118,
142, 229, 233, 338–
40, 412–15, 422
Common sense notions,
everyday
experiences — 26, 126, 225,
248, 249,
Communicative process—
38, 156, 286–88
Conception of “Third
World”-96, 102–04,
180, 182, 185, 187–
94, 451
Concrete–261–63, 265–

327, 455, 456

Confirmation—31, 32, 61,
62, 66, 68, 121, 164,
195, 307
Contradiction—318–20,
347
Convention,
conventionism—69, 107, 126,
181, 186, 234, 450,
451
Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum
mechanics, Copenhagen
school of physicists—
145, 147, 148, 158,
237, 242
Crises in science—42, 70,
77, 144, 340, 341
Criterion of genuineness of
knowledge—29, 120,
185, 195, 317, 319
“Critical rationalism”—
59,71, 75,81,93,94,
104, 177, 256, 426,
434, 450–52
Cumulative growth of
knowledge—173, 257
Cybernetics—42, 348, 355,
361, 375, 376, 382
Deduction, deductionism
—117, 277, 317, 338,
344
Delusions, errors in
cognition—66, 67, 90,
91, 100, 185, 191,
193, 195, 258, 355,
437
Demarcation between
science and
metaphysics-68, 77, 89, 118,
209, 247, 399
Determinism—J40, J6|,
[col2]
229, 239–44, 329, 336,

339, 450, 452
Development of science—
70, 71, 81, 85, 94,
187, 335, 339–41, 357–
90, 418–27
Dialectical categories and
laws—257, 318, 326,
327, 337, 349, 356,
456
Dialectical materialism —
51, 136, 137, 144,
204, 218, 245–448,
454
Dialectics—27, 125, 137,
138, 176, 228, 238,
245, 252, 254, 256,
259, 449–53
Dogmas, dogmatism—50,
67, 71, 85, 86, 114,
177, 209, 332
Dualism-50, 127, 129.
132
Eclecticism—58,288, 292,
296, 327
Elimination of errors — 67
—of metaphysics—67, 142
—of problem—127
—of subject–184, 401,
403
Empirical data—31, 57,
95, 164, 265, 266,
334
Empiricism—31, 34, 36,
56, 57, 63, 64, 95,
164, 189, 291, 334,
335, 450
Epistemology—43, 46, 69
97, 103, 113–14, 124,
176, 181, 189, 199,
201, 221, 222, 234,
259, 398, 399, 453
Evolutionary theory of
cognition—67, 97,
109
Experience—37, 39, 101,
113, 114, 130, 131
Experiment—78, 152–54,
180, 194, 236, 300,
306, 313, 319–20, 327,
340, 359, 440, 441
Explanation—77, 78, 82,
91, 100, 141, 161,
170, 172, 210, 254,
264, 307, 308, 311–
14, 342, 378, 422–48,
451
Fact—54–57, 116, 164,
253, 258, 276, 300,
334, 337
Falsification,
falsificationism—63, 64, 67, 68,
77, 88, 90, 91, 110,
116, 117, 177, 186,
187, 195, 254
Frankfurt School—288–96,
320
Generalisation—34, 56,
122, 124, 264, 278–
80, 284, 288, 309,
355, 356, 378, 401
Genetics—42, 97, 99, 168,
176, 228
German classical
philosophy—25, 51, 245–
65
Heuristics, heuristic
value—70, 84, 91, 123,
280, 314
Historical materialism—
286, 287, 29Q
[col2]
History of science—66,
79, 80, 86, 87, 347,
457
Human values—41, 135,
191
Hypothesis—33, 67, 86,
117, 154, 186
I
Idealism—27, 44, 50, 51,

58, 99, 127, 166,
193, 348, 394, 400,
451
Idealistic dialectics—5l,
104, 251, 256, 271
Identity and
contradiction—260, 302, 316–
19, 336, 455
Inborn knowledge — 98,
257
Incommensurability of
theories—81, 82, 84,
93
Information — 30, 281,
283, 284, 286, 287,
330, 359, 375, 389
Integration of knowledge
—68, 85, 357–90
Interactionism—286
Intersubjective
knowledge—112, 113, 154–
62, 173, 185, 198,
201, 206, 215, 288,
396, 397
Intuition—35, 250
Invariance—405–18
Knowledge, cognition—
39, 53, 56, 67, 75,
76, 81, 135, 139, 159,
179, 180, 250, 265,
278, 317, 397, 398,
402, 403, 418, 419,

431, 432
Language,linguistics—37,
42, 49, 111, 112, 133,
158, 160, 162, 163,
167, 169, 174, 206,
210, 258, 285, 288,
289, 336, 361–64, 372,
405, 406
Laws of science, laws of
nature, laws of
society—32, 56, 57, 79,
84, 103, 161, 163,
167, 255, 270, 297,
300, 301, 308, 309,
324, 326, 328, 336,
339, 342, 374, 379,
401, 431, 456
Logical empiricism—35,
42, 209
Logicism—70, 71, 74, 95,
96, 103, 105
Machism,
empirio-criticism—45, 46, 53, 142,
202, 240, 307, 452
Man-53, 272, 289–99,306,
361–74,381,384,428.
429
Materialism, matter—27,
50, 51, 96, 99, 101,
108, 125, 137–38, 140,
199, 200, 213, 220,
221, 258, 259, 290,
303–05,332,338,341,
391–448, 450, 454
Mathematical logic—30,
47, 122, 377
Matter and consciousness
—50, 96, 98, 176,
201, 304, 305, 406,
[col2]
436, 457
Mechanistic
materialism-51, 52, 58, 167
Mental and physical
processes—96, 127, 128,
175, 192, 209, 213,
219, 220
Metaphysics—27, 29, 31,
32, 35–38, 41, 44,
67, 71, 85, 87, 88,
90, 92, 95, 104–08,
142, 256, 257, 274,
284, 310, 335, 394,
395, 452
Methodological anarchism
—81–85
“Methodology of research
programmes”—76–80
Methodology of science—
33, 59, 94, 209, 246,
312
Mind and brain—98, 100,
130–35, 306
Natural philosophy—58,
104, 387
Natural sciences—26, 36,
38, 44, 328, 338, 339,
351,357–90, 395, 453
Natural selection—102,
226
Necessity and chance—
260, 297, 300, 301,
318, 320, 434, 450
Neurophysiology—42,
130, 133, 176, 215,
217
Object—54,101,115,144,
151, 265, 266, 315,
328, 345, 356, 396,

409, 410
Objectivity, objective
knowledge — 96–104,
106, 112, 139–94, 197,
201, 270, 338, 340,
342, 374, 390–448,
451, 458
Observation,
observability—28, 30, 39, 56,
63, 112, 139, 144,
146, 153, 177, 205,
233–35
Ontology—56, 57, 104–
38, 198, 199, 201,
218, 220, 283, 323,
328, 353, 453
Paradigm—72, 73, 80,

350
Phenomenalism,
phenomenology—135, 160,
214, 283
Pluralism—83, 84, 127,
175
Prediction—65, 123, 265,
307, 310, 313, 314,
358, 422–48
Probability—31–33, 150–
52, 195, 210, 234,
235, 342, 375
Protocol statements—31,
62, 69
Psychology—43, 45, 46,
160, 167, 214, 302,
335, 337, 378, 379
Psychophysiology — 42,
130, 217
Quality and quantity—

260, 319, 323–26, 369,
[col2]
370, 455–57
Quantum mechanics—36.
42, 118, 142, 145–
53, 216, 217, 232–40.
396, 449
Reality—37, 39, 53, 54,

113, 128, 134, 154,
166, 200, 220–22, 230,
340, 342, 355, 419,
420
Reduction, reductionism
—99, 110, 114, 128,
129, 160–64, 170–72,
174, 385
Refutation—64, 68, 70,
96, 121
Scepticism—26, 43, 87,

135
Science and practice—26,
183, 300
Science and theology—
27, 63, 154, 204,
247, 254
Scientific and
technological revolution—357–
90
Scientific community—
71–73, 106
Scientific criticism—67,
116
“Scientific materialism”
—99, 131–34,178, 196,
197, 397
Scientific problem —70,
88, 89, 102, 120, 183,
191, 344, 346–48, 350
-57
Scientific progress—48,
70, 75, 94, 247, 281,
358–90
“Scientific realism”—99,
104–38, 178, 196–244,
353, 391, 395, 434,
435, 452
Scientific revolution—74,
80, 84, 143–44, 169,
196, 360, 361, 422–48
Selection
—of fact-159, 232
—of hypothesis—72,
73, 80
—of problem—88,
211–12
—of theory—113
Sensual perception,
sensory experience—37,
141, 144, 156, 2C9,
272
“Situation logic,” — 76
Social progress—43, 98,
281, 388
Social sciences—89, 123,
167,285–88,290,291,
297–99, 357–90, 392
Solipsism—154, 201
Space-50, 126, 140, 339,
342, 414–18
Subject, subjective—35,
91, 92, 101, 141, 151,
179, 180, 184, 185,
282, 303, 355, 390–
448, 458, 459
Synthetic statement—30,
31, 34, 264
System investigations—
382, 453
Tacit knowledge—338,
423–26, 442–44
Tautology—30, 37, 66,
231, 265
Theory—38, 64–67, 81,
82, 85, 86, 92, 102,
[col2]
112, 116, 120, 136,

183, 184, 191, 192,
265, 299, 322, 334,
338, 350, 449
—of atom-molecular
structure of matter—36,
61, 157, 233, 350
—of identity of the
mental and the
physical—130, 209, 210,
216, 217
—“of regularity”—
161, 302, 452
—of relativity—36,
42, 45, 118, 142,
183, 195, 276, 408,
415–17, 449
—tentative—66, 67
Time—50, 126, 339, 342,
413–18
Trade—288, 289, 293, 360–
74
Transcendental reality—
38 39 53
Truth—39,’ 90, 91, 97,
191,193–95,212,224,
280, 419, 420
Universality—32, 252,
297–99, 324, 329, 345
V
Verification,
verificationism—29–31, 56, 61,
63, 66, 67, 88, 95,
102, 110, 195, 254,
307
Vienna Circle—46, 59–61,
69, 119, 123, 209, 212
World view—39, 40
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A Against Liquidationism
A Against Right-Wing and Left-Wing Opportunism, Against Trotskyism
A Against Trotskyism: The struggle of Lenin and the CPSU against Trotskyism
A Against U.S. Aggression for National Salvation
A Against the Threat of Another World War
A Age-Group and Pedagogical Psychology
A Aggressive Broadcasting, Evidence Facts Documents: Psychological Warfare
A Agony of a Dictatorship: Nicaraguan Chronicle, The
A Agostinho Neto
A Agrarian India Betwen the World Wars
A Agrarian Reforms and Hired Labour in Africa
A Agrarian Relations in the USSR
A Agricultural Co-operatives: Their role in the development of socialist agriculture in the Soviet Union
A Agriculture in the U.S.S.R
A Aim of A Lifetime:, The
A Albert Einsteins Philosophical Views and the Theory of Relativity
A Albert Einstein: Creator and rebel
A Alexei Tolstoy Collected Works In Six Volumes:
A All About The Telescope
A Along the Path Blazed in Helsinki
A Alternatives to Positivism.
A Always a Journalist
A Ambient Conflicts: Chapters from the history of relations between countries with different social system
A American Age of Reason: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, The
A American Literary Criticism: An anthology
A American Model on the Scales of History, The
A American Utopia, The
A American Youth Today
A Americans: As seen by a Soviet writer, The
A Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism
A Anatomy of Lies [Amnesty International], The
A Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict
A Ancient Civilisations of East and West
A Andromeda: A Space Age Tale
A Anglo-Bulgarian Relations During the Second World War
A Anthology of Soviet Short Stories: In Two Volumes: Volume One.
A Anthology of Soviet Short Stories: In Two Volumes: Volume Two.
http://www.leninist.biz/en/TAZ[2012-12-17 15:18:12]
A Anthony Eden
A Anti-Communism Today
A Anti- Communism, the Main Line of Zionism
A Anti-Hitler Coalition:, The
A Antitank Warfare
A Anton Chekhov and His Times
A Anton Makarenko: His life and his work in education
A Arab Struggle For Economic Independence
A Arduous Beginning, The
A Are Our Moscow Reporters Giving Us the Facts About the USSR?
A Aristotle
A Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, The
A Arms Trade: A new level of danger, The
A Arms and Dollars: Roots of U.S. foreign policy
A Army and Social Progress, The
A Army and the Revolutionary Transformation of Society, The
A Art Festivals, USSR
A Art and Social Life
A Art and Society: Collection of articles
A Artistic Creativity, Reality and Man.
A Artistic Truth and Dialectics of Creative Work
A As Military Adviser in China
A As the People Willed: A documented account of how the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was founded (19171922)
A Ascent: Careers in the USSR, The
A Asian Dilemma: A Soviet view and Myrdals concept
A Asian Dilemma: The essence of social progress in the transitional period
A Astronomy for Entertainment
A At the Bidding of the Heart:
A At the Centr\ve of Political Storms: The memoirs of a Soviet diplomat
A At the Turning Points of History: Some lessons of the struggle against revisionism within the Marxist-Leninist movement
A Atlantis
A Atomic Nucleus
A Authoritarianism and Democracy
A Avengers:
A Awakening to Life: Forming behaviour and the mind in deaf-blind children
A Azerbaijanian Poetry, Classic Modern, Traditional:
B Badges and Trophies in Soviet Sports
B Basic Economic Law of Modern Capitalism, The
B Basic Principles of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, The
B Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics: A Soviet view, The
B Basic Principles of the Organisation of Soviet Agriculture, The
B Basic Problems of the Marxist-Leninst Theory: Symposium of Lectures
B Basics of Marxist-Leninist Theory
B Battle for the Caucasus
B Battle of Ideas in the Modern World., The
B Battle of Kursk, The
B Before the Nazi Invasion: Soviet Diplomacy in September 1939June 1941
B Beginning: Lenins Childhood and Youth, The
B Behind the Facade of the Masonic Temple:
B Behind the Scenes of Third Reich Diplomacy.
B Benefactors of Peace
B Big Business and the Economic Cycle:
B Big Changes in the USSR: Leafing through the Soviet Journal Kommunist
B Biosphere and Politics, The
B Birth of Nations, The
B Birth of a Genius: The Development of the Personality and World Outlook of Karl Marx
B Black Book and Schwambrania:, The
B Blacks in United States History
B Bolshevik Partys Struggle Against Trotskyism (1903February 1917), The
B Bolshevik Partys Struggle Against Trotskyism in the Post-October Period., The
B Bolshevik-led Socialist Revolution, MarchOctober 1917, The
B Bolsheviks and the Armed Forces in Three Revolutions:, The
B Book About Artists
B Book About Bringing Up Children, A
B Book About Russia: In the union of equals:, A
B Books in the Service of Peace, Humanism, and Progress
B Books in the USSR
B Boris Kustodiev: The Artist and His Work
B Boris Pasternak: Selected writings and letters.
B Bourgeois Economic Thought 1930s1970s
B Bourgeois Nations and Socialist Nations
B Breadwinners, The
B Brief Course of Dialectical Materialism: Popular outline, A
B British Foreign Policy During World War II 19391945
B Broad-Casting Pirates or Abuse of the Microphone:
B Builder of Socialism and Figher Against Fascism, The
B Bureaucracy in India
B Bureaucracy, Triumph and Crisis: New thinking
B Bureaucrats in PowerEcological Collapse
B By: ANNA LOUISE STRONG
B By: JASON W. SMITH
C Camp of Socialism and the Camp of Capitalism, The
C Can Man Change the Climate?
C Can Socialists & Communists Co-Operate?
C CanadaUSA: Problems and contradictions in North American economic integration
C Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth in Developing Africa
C Capitalism and the Ecological Crisis
C Capitalism at the End of the Century
C Capitalism, Socialism and Scientific and Technical Revolution
C Capitalism, the Technological Revolution, and the Working Class
C Capitalist Economy
C Case for Perestroika: Articles from the monthly Kommunist, The
C Categories and Laws of the Political Economy of Communism
C Caught in the Act
C Causality and the Relation of States in Physics
C Cause of My Life., The
C Caution: Zionism!:
C Cecil Rhodes and His Time
C Central Asia and Kazakhstan Before and After the October Revolution
C Central Asia and Kazakstan[d] Before and After the October Revolution: Reply to falsifiers of history
C Central Asia in Modern Times:
C Central V.I. Lenin Museum
C Centralised Planning of the Economy
C Ching Empire and the Russian State in the 17th Century, The
C Challenges of Our Time: Disarmament and social progress, The
C Champions of Peace
C Changing Face of the Earth:, The
C Chapters from the History of Russo-Chinese Relations 17th19th Centuries
C Child Development and Education
C Child, Adults, Peers: Patterns of communication
C Children and Sport in the USSR
C Children and Sport in the USSR
C Chile, Corvalan, Struggle.
C Chile: CIA Big Business
C China Theatre in World War II: 19391945., The
C China and Her Neighbours from Ancient Times to the Middle Ages:
C Choice Facing Europe, The
C Choice for Children, A
C ChristMyth or Reality?
C Christian Ecumenism
C Christianity and Marxism
C Cia Target: The USSR
C Cia in Asia: Covert operations against India and Afghanistan., The
C Cia in Latin America, The
C Cia in the Dock., The
C Citizenship of the USSR: A legal study.
C City Invincible
C City of the Yellow Devil: Pamphlets, articles and letters about America, The
C Civil Codes of the Soviet Republics., The
C Civil Law and the Protection of Personal Rights in the USSR
C Civil War in Russia: Its causes and significance, The
C Civil War in the United States, The
C Civilisation and Global Problems
C Civilisation and the Historical Process
C Civilisation, Science, Philosophy:
C Civilisation, science, philosophy : theme of the 17th World Congress of Philosophy
C Classes and Nations
C Classes and the Class Struggle in the USSR, 1920s1930s
C Classic Soviet Plays
C Classical Islamic Philosophy
C Cmea Countries and Developing States: Economic cooperation
C Cmea Today: From economic co-operation to economic integration
C Cmea and Third Countries: Legal aspects of co-operation

C Cmea and the Strategy of Acceleration
C Cmea: International Significance of Socialist Integration
C Co-operative Movement in Asia and Africa:, The
C Collapse of the Russian Empire 1917, The
C Comet in the Night: The story of Alexander Ulyanovs heroic life and tragic death as told by his contemporaries
C Coming World Order, The
C Comintern and the East: A critique of the critique, The
C Comintern and the East: The struggle for the Leninist strategy and tactics in national liberation movements, The
C Comintern and the East: strategy and tactics in national liberation movements, The
C Communism IN THE UNITED STATES A BIBLIOGRAPHY
C Communism and Cultural Heritage
C Communism and Freedom
C Communism as a Social Formation
C Communism: Questions and Answers: 1
C Communism: Questions and Answers: 7
C Communism: Questions and answers: 4
C Communist :: 1938 (VOL. XVII), The
C Communist Morality
C Communist Party (Cuba): (Collection of documents)
C Communist Party in Socialist Society: A critique of bourgeois concepts, The
C Communist Response to the Challenge of Our Time, The
C Communists and the Youth: Study of revolutionary education
C Comprehensive Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Co-Operation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration by the CMEA Member Countries
C Comprehensive Science of Man: Studies and solutions, A
C Comrade Stalinthe Continuer of Lenins Great Work
C Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind: From new thinking to new practice.
C Concepts of Regional Development
C Concise Psychological Dictionary, A
C Confrontation or Compromise?: The meaning of worker participation in the management of capitalist enterprises
C Conjugation of Russian Verbs
C Conservation of Nature
C Conservatism in U.S. Ideology and Politics
C Consolidation of the Socialist Countries Unity
C Conspiracy Against Delgado: A History of One Operation by the CIA and the PIDE
C Conspiracy Against the Tsar: A Portrait of the Decembrists
C Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
C Constitutional Law and Political Institutions.
C Contemporary Anti-Communism: Policy and ideology.
C Contemporary Bourgeois Legal Thought: A Marxist evaluation of the basic concepts
C Contemporary Capitalism and the Middle Classes
C Contemporary Capitalism: New developments and contradictions
C Contemporary International Law: Collection of articles.
C Contemporary Political Science in the USA and Western Europe
C Contemporary Revolutionary Process: Theoretical Essays, The
C Contemporary Trotskyism: Its anti-revolutionary nature
C Contemporary World History 19171945, A
C Contemporary World Situation and Validity of Marxism
C Contradictions of Agrarian Integration in the Common Market
C Correction of the Convicted: Law, theory, practice
C Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 19411945:
VOLUME 1:
C Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 19411945:
VOLUME 2:
C Cpsu and the Soviet State in Developed Socialist Society, The
C Cpsu in the Struggle for Unity of All Revolutionary and Peace Forces, The
C Cpsus Nationalities Policy: Truth and lies, The
C Cpsu: Ideological, political and organisational principles., The
C Cpsu: Party of Proletarian Internationalism
C Cpsu: Topical Aspects of History and Policy, The
C Criminalistics
C Crisis of Capitalism and the Conditions of the Working People., The
C Crisis of World Capitalism
C Critique of Anti-Marxist Theories
C Critique of Mao Tse-Tungs Theoretical Conceptions., A
C Critique of Masarykism, A
C Cultural Changes in Developing Countries
C Cultural Exchange: 10 years after Helsinki
C Cultural Life of the Soviet Worker: A Sociological Study, The
C Culture and Perestroika
C Culture for the Millions
C Current Problems of Contemporary Capitalism

D Danger: NATO
D De Gaulle: His Life and Work
D Death Can Wait
D Decisions of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.) on Literature and Art (1946-1948)
D Dedication: Stories about Soviet men and women
D Definition (Logico-Methodological Problems)
D Demography in the Mirror of History
D Denis Diderot
D Destiny of Capitalism in the Orient
D Destiny of the World: The socialist shape of things to come, The
D Destruction of Reason, The
D Destructive POLICY [Policy of Chinese leadership], A
D Destructive Policy, A
D Detente and Anti-communism
D Detente and the World Today: 26th CPSU Congress:
D Developed Socialism: Theory and practice
D Developed Socialist Society: Basic features and place in history.
D Developing Countries from the Standpoint of Marxist Political Economy
D Developing Countries Social Structure, The
D Developing Nations At the Turn of Millennium.
D Development by J.V. Stalin of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of the National Question, The
D Development of Revolutionary Theory by the CPSU.
D Development of Rights and Freedoms in the Soviet State, The
D Development of Soviet Law and Jurisprudence:, The
D Development of the Monist View of History., The
D Dialectical Logic: Essays on its history and theory
D Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy
D Dialectical Materialism.
D Dialectical Materialism: Popular lectures
D Dialectics in Modern Physics
D Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marxs Capital, The
D Dialogue For Peace
D Dialogue of Cultures or Cultural Expansion?
D Dictionary for Believers and Nonbelievers., A
D Dictionary of Ethics., A
D Dictionary of International Law, A
D Dictionary of Philosophy (1967)
D Dictionary of Philosophy (1984)
D Dictionary of Political Economy., A
D Dictionary of Scientific Communism., A
D Difficult Mission: War Memoirs: Soviet Admiral in Great Britain during the Second World War.
D Dilemma of Balanced Regional Development in India
D Diplomacy of Aggression: BerlinRomeTokyo Axis, its rise and fall.
D Diplomatic Battles Before World War II
D Disarmament and the Economy
D Disarmament: the Command of the Times
D Discovering the Soviet Union
D Discovery of the Century
D Distribution of the Productive Forces: General schemes, theory and practice
D Dmitry Shostakovich: About himself and his times
D Do The Russians Want War?
D Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War:
D Documents and Resolutions: the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, February 23March 3, 1981
D Domination in 2,545 Endgame Studies.
D Dramas of the Revolution.
D Drawings by Soviet Children
D Dynamic Stability: The Soviet economy today
D Dynamic Twentieth Century, The
E Early Centuries of Russian History
E Early Russian Architecture
E Early Stories
E East After the Collapse of the Colonial System, The
E Eastern Societies: Revolution, Power, Progress:
E Echoes of the A-Blast
E Ecology and Development
E Ecology: Political Institutions and Legislation: environmental law in the USSR
E Economic Theories of Maoism., The
E Economic Aspects of Capitalist Integration
E Economic Aspects of Social Security in the USSR, The
E Economic Cycle: Postwar Development, The
E Economic Development and Perspective Planning

E Economic Geography of the Ocean
E Economic Geography of the Socialist Countries of Europe:
E Economic Geography of the World
E Economic Geography of the World
E Economic Geography: Theory and methods
E Economic Growth and the Market in the Developing Countries
E Economic History: The Age of Imperialism (18701917), An
E Economic Inequality of Nations
E Economic Integration: Two approaches
E Economic Law
E Economic Neocolonialism: Problems of South-East Asian Countries Struggle for Economic Independence
E Economic Policy During the Construction of Socialism in the USSR
E Economic Substantiation of the Theory of Socialism, The
E Economic System of Socialism, The
E Economic Theories and Reality
E Economic Zone: An International Legal Aspect, The
E Economics, Politics, the Class Struggle, International Relations
E Economies of Rich and Poor Countries, The
E Economies of the Countries of Latin America
E Economy of the Soviet Union Today: Socialism Today, The
E Education in the U.S.S.R.
E Education of the Soviet Soldier: Party-political work in the Soviet armed forces.
E Einstein and the Philosophical Problems of 20th-Century Physics
E Einstein
E Elements of Political Knowledge.
E Elitist Revolution or Revolution of the Masses?
E Elyuchin
E Emotions, Myths and Theories.
E End of Ideology Theory: Illusions and reality:, The
E End of the Third Reich., The
E Engels: A short biography
E English Revolution of the 17th Century through Portraits of Its Leading Figures, The
E Enigma of Capital: A Marxist viewpoint., The
E Environment: International Aspects
E Envoy of the Stars: Academician Victor Ambartsumyan
E Epoch of the Collapse of Capitalism and the Development of Socialism
E Era of Man or Robot?
E Ernesto Che Guevara
E Essays in Contemporary History, 19171945
E Essays in Contemporary History, 19461990
E Essays in Political Economy: Imperialism and the developing countries
E Essays in Political Economy: Socialism and the socialist orientation
E Essays on Linguistics: Language systems and structures
E Estonia, One of the United Family.
E Eternal Man: Reflections, dialogues, portraits
E Ethics of Science: Issues and controversies, The
E Ethics.
E Ethiopia: Population, resources, economy
E Ethnic Problems of the Tropical Africa: Can they be solved?
E Ethnocultural Development of African Countries
E Ethnocultural Processes and National Problems in the Modern World.
E Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere
E Europe 1939:
E Europe and Detente
E Europe and the Communists
E European Security and Co-Operation:
E European Security: Social aspects
E Evgeny Vakhtangov
E Exercises in Russian syntax with explanatory notes: [no date [ca. 1960]].
E Experience of Industrial Management in the Soviet Union, The
E Experience of the CPSU: Its World Significance.
E Export of Counter-Revolution: Past and present, The
F Face to Face With America: The story of N.S. Khrushchovs [Khrushchevs] visit to U.S.A., September 1527, 1959
F Facts About the USSR
F Failure of Three Missions: British diplomacy and intelligence in the efforts to overthrow Soviet government in Central Asia and Transcaucasia...
F Fate of Man, The
F Faust versus Mephistopheles?
F Felix Dzerzhinsky: A biography.
F Female Labour Under Socialism: The Socio-Economic Aspects
F Feudal Society and Its Culture
F Few Salient Points or Things That Agitate Us: A collection of articles, A

F Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa, 19211971
F Fifty Soviet Poets
F Fifty Years of a New Era:
F Fighters for National Liberation: Political profiles
F Fighting Red Tape in the USSR
F Figures for Fun:
F Film Trilogy About Lenin, A
F Final Reckoning, Nuremburg Diaries, The
F Finale: A Retrospective Review of Imperialist Japans Defeat in 1945
F Finance and Credit in the USSR
F First Breath of Freedom, The
F First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba:
F First Days of the October [sic. ABEBOOKS], The
F First Man in Space:
F Firsthand News
F Five Years Progress in Agricultural Production and the Tasks for the Future: Report
F Following Lenins Course: Speeches and articles
F Following the Course of All-round Perfection of Socialism
F For All Time and All Men [Karl Marx]
F For Mans Happiness: The forum of Soviet Communists
F For a Nuclear-Free World
F For a Restructuring of International Economic Relations: 20th anniversary of UNCTAD
F Foreign Comrades in the October Revolution: Reminiscences
F Formation of the Socialist Economic System
F Foundations of Marxist Aesthetics
F Founding Fathers of the United States: Historical portraits
F Fourth Congress of the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party:, The
F Fraternal Family of Nations:, A
F Frederick Engels: A Biography
F Frederick Engels: His Life and Work
F Freedom and the Artist
F Freedom of Conscience in the USSR
F From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism: The evolution of Pekings foreign policy
F From Childhood to Centenarian
F From Geneva to Reykjavik
F From Helsinki to Belgrade:
F From Keynes to Neoclassical Synthesis:
F From Literacy Classes to Higher Education
F From Madrid to Vienna: Follow-up report of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation on the Helsinki Final Act
F From Revisionism to Betrayal: A criticism of Ota Siks economic views
F From Socialism to Communism
F From Tsarist General to Red Army Commander
F From Wooden Plough to Atomic Power: The Story of Soviet Industrialisation.
F From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1950s: Concerning the discussion of Mao Zedongs role
F From the Missionary Days to Reagan: US China Policy
F Fundamental Law of the U.S.S.R., The
F Fundamental Problems of Marxism
F Fundamentals of Corrective Labour Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics: Statute on remand in custody
F Fundamentals of Criminalistics
F Fundamentals of Dialectical Materialism
F Fundamentals of Dialectics
F Fundamentals of Ergonomics
F Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics
F Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism Manual
F Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism Manual
F Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1974), The
F Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1982), The
F Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Theory and Tactics of Revolutionary Parties
F Fundamentals of Philosophy
F Fundamentals of Political Economy (1980)
F Fundamentals of Political Economy (1983), The
F Fundamentals of Political Economy: Popular course
F Fundamentals of Political Science: Textbook for primary political education.
F Fundamentals of Scientific Communism
F Fundamentals of Scientific Management of Socialist Economy
F Fundamentals of Scientific Socialism
F Fundamentals of Soviet State Law
F Fundamentals of Sports Training
F Fundamentals of the Socialist Theory of the State and Law
F Future of Society:, The
F Future of the USSRs Economic Regions, The

F Futurology Fiasco: A Critical Study of non-Marxist Concepts of How Society Develops
G General Chernyakhovsky
G General Council of The First International 18641866: The London conference 1865 minutes
G General Crisis of Capitalism
G General Theory of Law: Social and philosophical problems, The
G Generalisation and Cognition
G Genesis of the Soviet Federative State (19171925)
G Genocide
G Geographical Prognostication: Problems and prospects
G Geography and Ecology: A collection of articles, 19711981
G Geography of the Soviet Union: Physical background, population, economy
G Georgi Dimitrov Selected Works (Volume 1):
G Georgi Dimitrov Selected Works (Volume 2):
G Georgi Dimitrov Selected Works (Volume 3)
G Georgi Dimitrov: An eminent theoretician and revolutionary
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume I):
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume II):
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume III):
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume IV):
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume V):
G German Imperialism: Its past and present
G Germany:
G Glance at Historical Materialism, A
G Global engineering.
G Global Ecology
G Global Problems and the Future of Mankind
G Global Problems of Our Age
G Global Problems of Our Age
G Glory Eternal: Defence of Odessa 1941
G Going Beyond the Square: Notes by an economist
G Gorky Collected Works in Ten Volumes:
G Gorky and His Contemporaries:
G Government Regulation of the Private Sector in the USSR
G Great Baikal Amur Railway, The
G Great Construction Works of Communism and the Remaking of Nature
G Great Heritage: The classical literature of Old Rus, The
G Great March of Liberation, The
G Great Mission of Literature and Art, The
G Great October Revolution and World Social Progress, The
G Great October Revolution and the Intelligentsia:, The
G Great October Revolution and the Working Class, National Liberation and General Democratic Movements, The
G Great October Socialist Revolution, The
G Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 19411945:
G Grounds for Optimism
G Growing Up Human
G Growing Up in the Soviet Union from the Cradle to Coming of Age
G Guarantee of Peace
H Hague Congress of the First International, September 27, 1872:, The
H Handbook of Philosophy, A
H Hands Up! Or Public Enemy No.1
H Hans Kohn Analyses the Russian Mind
H Hashar
H Hatredmongers: Anti-Soviet activity of the Lithuanian Clerical Emigrs
H Health Protection in the USSR.
H Heartbeat of Reform: Soviet jurists and political scientists discuss the progress of Perestroika:, The
H Henry Thoreau
H Henry Winston: Profile of a U.S. communist
H Higher Education and Computerisation
H Highlights of a Fighting History: 60 Years of the Communist Party, USA
H Historical Experience of the CPSU in Carrying Out Lenins Co-operative Plan
H Historical Knowledge: A Systems-Epistemological Approach.
H Historical Materialism ( by Cornforth )
H Historical Materialism (1969)
H Historical Materialism: An outline of Marxist theory of society.
H Historical Materialism: Basic problems.
H Historical Materialism: Theory, methodology, problems.
H Historical Science in Socialist Countries:
H Historical Science in the USSR: New research:
H History OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION / BOLSHEVIKS / SHORT COURSE
H History OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
H History Versus Anti-History: A critique of the bourgeois falsification of the postwar history of the CPSU.
H History and Politics: American historiography on Soviet society
H History in the Making: Memoirs of World War II Diplomacy
H History of Afganistan
H History of Ancient Philosophy: Greece and Rome
H History of Classical Sociology, A
H History of India (2 v.), A
H History of Old Russian Literature, A
H History of Psychology, A
H History of Realism, A
H History of Religion
H History of Science: Soviet research, The
H History of Soviet Foreign Policy 19451970
H History of the Ancient World.
H History of the Middle Ages
H History of the October Revolution
H History of the Three Internationals
H History of the USA Since World War I
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART I:
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART II:
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART III:
H History of the USSR: An outline of socialist construction
H History of the USSR: Elementary course
H History of the USSR: The era of socialism
H Ho Chi Minh Selected Writings, 19201969:
H Ho Chi Minh.
H Honour Eternal: Second World War Memorials
H How Many Will the Earth Feed?
H How Socialism Began: Russia Under Lenins Leadership 19171923
H How Soviet Economy Won Technical Independence
H How Wars End: Eye-witness accounts of the fall of Berlin
H How the National Question Was Solved in Soviet Central Asia
H How the Revolution Was Won:
H How the Soviet Economy Is Run:
H How to Study Historical Materialism
H How to Study the Theory of Scientific Communism:
H Human Relations Doctrine: Ideological weapon of the monopolies.
H Human Rights and Freedoms in the USSR
H Human Rights and International Relations
H Human Rights, What We Argue About
H Human Rights: Continuing the discussion
H Humanism of Art., The
H Humanism, Atheism: Principles and Practice
H Humanism: Its Philosophical, Ethical and Sociological Aspects.
I I Hereby Apply for an Apartment
I I Saw the New World Born: John Reed
I Icon Painting: State Museum of Palekh Art.
I Ideals and Spiritual Values of Socialist Society, The
I Ideological Struggle Today
I Ideological Struggle and Literature:, The
I Ideology and Social Progress
I Ideology and Tactics of Anti-Communism: Myths and Reality, The
I Illusion of Equal Rights: Legal Inequality in the Capitalist World, An
I Image of India: The Study of Ancient Indian Civilisation in the USSR, The
I Immortality: Verse By Soviet Poets Who Laid Down Their Lives in the Great Patriotic War of 19411945
I Imperial China: Foreign-policy conceptions and methods
I Imperialism and the Developing Countries
I Improvement of Soviet Economic Planning
I In Disregard of the Law
I In Pursuit of Social Justice
I In Search of Harmony
I In Search of Holy Mother Russia
I In Southern Africa
I In the Forecasters Maze
I In the Grip of Terror
I In the Name of Life: Reflections of a Soviet Surgeon
I In the Name of Peace
I In the World of Music
I India: Independence and oil
I India: Social and Economic Development (18th20th Century)
I India: Spotlight on Population
I Indian Economy, The

I Indian Philosophy in Modern Times
I Individual and Society, The
I Individual and the Microenvironment, The
I Individual in Socialist Society, The
I Industrial Revolution in the East, The
I Industrialisation of Developing Countries
I Industrialisation of India
I Inflation Under Capitalism Today
I Information Abused: Critical essays
I Insane Squandering: The Social and Economic Consequences of the Arms Race
I Integration of Science., The
I Intensifying Production: Acceleration factors
I Inter-American Relations from Bolivar to the Present
I Interaction of Sciences in the Study of the Earth, The
I International Covenants on Human Rights and Soviet Legislation
I International Humanitarian Law
I International Law of the Sea, The
I International Law: A textbook
I International Law
I International MEETING OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES MOSCOW 1969
I International Monetary Law
I International Monopolies and Developing Countries
I International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic 19361939:
I International Space Law.
I International Terrorism and the CIA: Documents, Eyewitness Reports, Facts
I International Trade and the Improvement of the Standard of Living in the West
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 1: The Origins of the Proletariat and Its Evolution as a Revolutionary Class, The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 2: The Working-Class Movement in the Period of Transition to Imperialism (18711904), The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 3: Revolutionary battles of the early 20th Century, The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 4: The Socialist Revolution in Russia and the International Working Class (19171923), The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 5: The Builder of Socialism and Fighter Against Fascism, The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 6: The Working-Class Movement in the Developed Capitalist Countries After the Second World War (19451979), The
I International Working-Class and Communist Movement: Historical Record (1830s to mid-1940s)
I Interpreting America: Russian and Soviet Studies of the History of American Thought
I Introduction to Physics
I Invitation to a Dialogue
I Islam and Muslims in the Land of the Soviets
J Jawaharlal Nehru and His Political Views
J Jawaharlal Nehru
J Joint Jubilee Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Moscow November 3, 1967
J Jonestown Carnage: A CIA crime, The
K Kampuchea: From Tragedy to Rebirth
K Karl Marx and Modern Philosophy: Collection of Articles
K Karl Marx and Our Time: Articles and speeches
K Karl Marx and Our Time: The struggle for peace and social progress
K Karl Marxs Great Discovery: The dual-nature-of-labour doctrine:
K Karl Marx: A Biography
K Karl Marx: Short biography.
K Keynesianism Today:
K Klement Gottwald Selected Writings 19441949
K Komsomol: Questions and Answers, The
K Konstantin Stanislavsky, 18631963: Man and Actor:
K Kwame Nkrumah
L Labour Protection at Soviet Industrial Enterprises
L Labour in the USSR: Problems and solutions
L Land of Soviets, The
L Landmarks in History: The Marxist Doctrine of Socio-Economic Formations
L Landmarks of Marxist Socio-Economic Foundations
L Last Nuclear Explosion: Forty years of struggle against nuclear tests, The
L Last of the Romans and European Culture, The
L Law and Force in the International System
L Law and Legal Culture in Soviet Society
L Law, Morality and Man:
L Law, Progress, and Peace: A journalists observations on the influence of Soviet law on the progressive development of international law
L Leap Through the Centuries, A
L Leftist Terrorism: Are the Leftist Terrorists Really Left?
L Legal Regulation of Soviet Foreign Economic Relations, The
L Legislation in the USSR
L Legislative Acts of the USSR: Book 3
L Lenin About the Press
L Lenin COLLECTED WORKS (International), V.I.

L Lenin Collected Works
L Lenin In Our Life.
L Lenin In Profile: World writers and artists on Lenin
L Lenin On Participation of the People in Government
L Lenin Prize Winners: Soviet stars theatre, music, art
L Lenin Selected Works
L Lenin Talks to America.
L Lenin Through the Eyes of Lunacharsky
L Lenin Through the Eyes of the World:
L Lenin and Books
L Lenin and Gorky: Letters, reminiscences, articles.
L Lenin and Library Organisation.
L Lenin and Modern Natural Science.
L Lenin and National Liberation in the East
L Lenin and Problems of Literature.
L Lenin and USSR Foreign Politics
L Lenin and the Bourgeois Press
L Lenin and the Leagues of Struggle
L Lenin and the Soviet Peace Policy: Articles and Speeches 194480.
L Lenin and the World Revolutionary Process
L Lenin in London: Memorial places
L Lenin in Soviet Literature; A Remarkable Year, etc.
L Lenin in Soviet Poetry
L Lenin on Labour Under Socialism: The Great Legacy of Marxism-Leninism
L Lenin on Language
L Lenin on religion, V.I.
L Lenin on the Intelligentsia
L Lenin on the Unity of the International Communist Movement
L Lenins "What the Friends of the People Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats"
L Lenins Materialism and Empirio-Criticism
L Lenins The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky
L Lenins Behests and the Making of Soviet Latvia
L Lenins Comrades-In-Arms:
L Lenins Doctrine of National Liberation Revolutions and Modern World
L Lenins Geneva Addresses
L Lenins Ideas and Modern International Relations
L Lenins Plan of Building Socialism in the USSR
L Lenins Political Testament
L Lenins Teaching on the World Economy and Its Relevance to Our Times
L Lenins Theory of Non-capitalist Development and the Experience of Mongolia:
L Lenins Theory of Revolution
L Lenin: A Biography
L Lenin: A Short Biography., V.I.
L Lenin: Comrade and man
L Lenin: Great and Human
L Lenin: His life and work: Documents and photographs, V.I.
L Lenin: Revolution and the World Today
L Lenin: The Founder of the Soviet Armed Forces
L Lenin: The Great Theoretician.
L Lenin: The Revolutionary.
L Lenin: The Story of His Life, V.I.
L Lenin: Youth and The Future
L Lenin: a Biography
L Leningrad Does Not Surrender
L Leninism and Contemporary Problems of the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism.
L Leninism and Modern Chinas Problems
L Leninism and Revolution: Reply to Critics
L Leninism and Todays Problems of the Transition to Socialism
L Leninism and the Agrarian Peasant Question in Two Volumes: Volume One:
L Leninism and the Agrarian Peasant Question in Two Volumes: Volume Two:
L Leninism and the Battle of Ideas.
L Leninism and the National Question
L Leninism and the Revolutionary Process
L Leninism and the World Revolutionary Working-Class Movement (1971):
L Leninism and the World Revolutionary Working-Class Movement (1976):
L Leninism: The Banner of Liberation and Progress of Nations
L Leninist Standards of Party Life.
L Leninist Theory of Reflection and the Present Day, The
L Leninist Theory of Revolution and Social Psychology
L Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Contemporary World.
L Let Us Live in Peace and Friendship

L Let the Blood of Man Not Flow
L Let the Living Remember: Soviet War Poetry
L Letters From the Dead:
L Lev Vygotsky.
L Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War
L Liberation of Europe, The
L Liberation
L Lie of a Soviet War Threat, The
L Life and Activities of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: A lofty example of serving mankind, The
L Life and Death of Martin Luther King, The
L Life and Work of Walt Whitman: A Soviet view
L Life of Lenin
L Life, Art and America: Narratives and stories, articles
L Life, Were All in It Together
L Lifelong Cause, A
L Literature and the New Thinking
L Living Ocean, The
L Living and Effective Teaching of Marxism-Leninism:, The
L Logic Made Simple: A dictionary
L Logic
L Lomonosovs Philosophy
L Long Road: Sino-Russian economic contacts from ancient times to 1917, The
L Looking Into the Future
M Macro-Economic Models
M Mad Love
M Made in USSR
M Mahitahi = Work Together: Some peoples of the Soviet Union
M Main Trends in Philosophy: A theoretical analysis of the history of philosophy., The
M Major Ethnosocial Trends in the USSR
M Making of the Marxist Philosophy from Idealism and Revolutionary Democracy to Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Communism, The
M Man After Work: Social problems of daily life and leisure time.
M Man At Work: The Scientific and Technological Revolution, the Soviet Working Class and Intelligentsia
M Man and His Stages of Life
M Man and Mans World: the categories of man and world in the system of scientific world outlooks
M Man and Nature: The ecological crisis and social progress
M Man and Sea Warfare
M Man and Society
M Man and the Scientific and Technological Revolution
M Man as the Object of Education: An Essay in Pedagogical Anthropology (Selected extracts)
M Man at the Limit: Eye-witness reports
M Mans Dreams are Coming True.
M Mans Potential: Sketches
M Mans Road to Progress: Talks on political topics
M Man, Science and Society
M Man, Science, Humanism: A New Synthesis
M Man, Society and the Environment:
M Man: His Behaviour and Social Relations
M Management of Socialist Production
M Mankind and the Year 2000: Current problems
M Manoeuvre in Modern Land Wafare
M Manpower Resources and Population Under Socialism
M Manzhou Rule in China
M Mao Tse-Tung: A political portrait
M Mao Tse-Tung: An ideological and psychological portrait
M Maos Betrayal
M Maoism As It Really Is:
M Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists
M Maoism Unmasked: Collection of Soviet Press Articles
M Maoism and Its Policy of Splitting the National Liberation Movement
M Maoism and Maos Heirs
M Maoism: The Curse of China
M Market of Socialist Economic Integration: Selected conference papers, The
M Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov (Volume 2):
M Marx & Engles Collected Works
M Marx Engels Marxism [Lenin]
M Marx Engels On Religion
M Marx and Engels Through the Eyes of Their Contemporaries
M Marxs Critique of the Gotha Programme
M Marxs Theory of Commodity and Surplus-Value: Formalised exposition
M Marxism and the Renegade Garaudy
M Marxism-Leninism on Proletarian Internationalism

M Marxism-Leninism on War and Army
M Marxism-Leninism on War and Peace
M Marxism-Leninism on the Non-Capitalist Way
M Marxism-Leninism: A Flourishing Science
M Marxism-Leninism: The International teaching of the working class
M Marxist Conception of Law, The
M Marxist Philosophy at the Leninist Stage
M Marxist Philosophy: A Popular Outline.
M Marxist Philosophy
M Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics and Life:
M Marxist- Leninist Aesthetics and the Arts
M Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1978)
M Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1980)
M Marxist- Leninist Philosophy: Diagrams, tables, illustrations for students of Marxist-Leninist theory.
M Marxist- Leninist Teaching of Socialism and the World Today, The
M Marxist-Leninist Theory of Society:, The
M Mass Information in the Service of Peace and Progress
M Mass Media in the USSR
M Mass Organisations in the U.S.S.R.
M Materialism and the Dialectical Method ( by Cornforth 1971)
M Materialismus Militans: Reply to Mr. Bogdanov
M Maxim Gorky Letters
M Maxim Litvinov
M May Day Traditions
M Meaning and Conceptual Systems.
M Meaning of Life, The
M Mechanisation of Soviet Agriculture: The economic effect, The
M Meeting of European Communist and Workers Parties for Peace and Disarmament, Paris, 2829 April, 1980
M Meeting of Representatives of the Parties and Movements participating in the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution
M Meeting the Challenge: Soviet youth in the Great Patriotic War 19411945
M Meetings with Sholokhov
M Memoirs of Wartime Minister of Navy
M Men at War
M Methodology of History
M Methodology of Law
M Middle East: Oil and Policy, The
M Mikhail Bulgakov and His Times: Memoirs, Letters
M Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy 19171967.
M Militant Solidarity, Fraternal Assistance:
M Militarism and Science
M Militarism in Pekings Policies
M Military-Industrial Complex of the USA, The
M Millionaires and Managers
M Miracle of the Age
M Moby Dick, or the Whale
M Modern History of China., The
M Modern History of the Arab Countries
M Modern History, 16401870
M Modern State and Politics, The
M Modern Theories of International Economic Relations
M Moiseyevs Dance Company
M Monetary Crisis Of Capitalism: Origin, Development
M Monism and Pluralism in Ideology and in Politics (Abridged).
M Monopoly Press: Or, How American journalism found itself in the vicious circle of the crisis of credibility, The
M Morality and Politics: Critical essays on contemporary views about the relationship between morality and politics in bourgeois sociology
M Moscow Diary, A
M Moscow Soviet, The
M Moscow, Stalingrad, 19411942: Recollections, stories, reports.
M Multilateral Economic Co-Operation of Socialist States:, The
M Music Education in the Modern World:
M Musical Journey Through the Soviet Union, A
M My Day and Age: selected poems
M Mysteries of the Deeps [i.E. Deep]:
M Mystery of Pearl Harbor: Facts and Theories, The
M Myth About Soviet Threat: cui bono?
M Myth, Philosophy, Avant-Gardism:
N N. Lobachevsky and His Contribution to Science
N Namibia, A Struggle for Independence:
N National Economic Planning
N National Folk Sports in the USSR
N National Languages in the USSR: Problems and Solutions

N National Liberation Movement in West Africa
N National Liberation Revolutions Today: Part I:
N National Liberation Revolutions Today: Part II
N National Liberation: Essays on Theory and Practice
N National Sovereignty and the Soviet State
N Nationalities Question: Lenins Approach:, The
N Nations and Internationalism
N Nations and Social Progress
N Nato: A Bleak Picture
N Nato: Threat to World Peace
N Nature Reserves in the USSR
N Nature of Science: An epistemological analysis., The
N Nearest Neighbour is 170 KM Away: A journey into the Soviet Union, The
N Neo-Colonialism on the Warpath
N Neo-Freudians In Search of Truth.
N Neocolonialism and Africa in the 1970s
N Neocolonialism: Methods and manoeuvres.
N Nep, a Modern View
N Never Say Die
N New Approach to Economic Integration, A
N New Constitution of the USSR, The
N New Information Order or Psychological Warfare?, A
N New International Economic Order
N New Life Begun: Prose, poetry and essays of the 1920s1930s, A
N New Realities and the Struggle of Ideas
N New Scramble for Africa, The
N New Soviet Legislation on Marriage and the Family
N Newly Free Countries in the Seventies, The
N Nihilism Today.
N Nikolai Miklouho-Maclay: Traveller, scientist and humanist
N Nikolai Vavilov: The Great Sower:
N Nine Modern Soviet Plays
N Nineteenth Century American Short Stories
N Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline
N Non-aligned Movement, The
N Noncapitalist Way: Soviet Experience and the Liberated Countries, The
N Normalization of World Trade and the Monetary Problem
N North Russian Architecture
N Not For War We Raise Our Sons: A collection of letters to the Soviet Peace Fund and the Soviet Womens Committee
N Notes on Indian History (6641858)
N Nuclear Disarmament
N Nuclear Engineering Before and After Chernobyl:
N Nuclear Space Age: The Soviet viewpoint, The
N Nuclear Strategy and Common Sense
N Nuclear WAR: THE MEDICAL AND BIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
N Nuremberg Epilogue, The
O Ocean and Its Resources
O October Revolution and Africa, The
O October Revolution and the Arts:, The
O October Revolution and the Working-Class, National Liberal, and General Democratic Movements, The
O October Storm and After:, The
O October Storm and After:, The
O Of Human Values: Soviet literature today
O Old, the New, the Eternal: Reflections on art, The
O On Communist Education
O On Education: Selected articles and speeches
O On Historical Materialism A Collection [Marx-Engels-Lenin]
O On Just and Unjust Wars
O On Labour-Oriented Education and Instruction
O On Literature and Art
O On Proletarian Internationalism
O On Relations Between Socialist and Developing Countries
O On The Art and Craft of Writing
O On The Principle Of Mutual Advantage:
O On a Military Mission to Great Britain and the USA
O On the Manifesto of the Communisty Party of Marx and Engels
O On the Communist Programme
O On the Edge of an Abyss: From Truman to Reagan, the doctrines and realitites of the Nuclear Age
O On the Eve of World War II: A foreign policy study
O On the Intelligentsia
O On the International Working-Class and Communist Movement

O On the Paris Commune
O On the Path of Cultural Progress: Culture of the socialist world
O On the Side of a Just Cause: Soviet assistance to the heroic Vietnamese people
O On the Soviet State Apparatus
O On the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century: The technological revolution and literature
O On the Track of Discovery. [Series 1] [n.d. [1960s]]:
O On the Unity of the International Communist Movement
O On the Upgrade: Living standards in the Soviet Union
O On the Way to Knowledge: Man, the Earth, outer space, acceleration
O One Is Not Born a Personality.
O One True Luxury: Research into communication pattern of Soviet schoolchildren, The
O One Way Ticket to Democracy:
O Optimal Functioning System for a Socialist Economy
O Orbits of the Global Economy, The
O Organisation and Management: A sociological analysis of Western theories
O Organisation of Domestic Trade in the USSR
O Organisation of Industry and Construction in the USSR
O Organisation of Statistics in the U.S.S.R.
O Organisation of Statistics in the USSR
O Organization of African Unity: 25 years of struggle
O Organizations: Communist Party, USA
O Origin and Principles of Scientific Socialism
O Origin of Man, The
O Origin of the Human Race., The
O Origins of the Proletariat and Its Evolution as a Revolutionary Class, The
O Our Course: Peace and Socialism
O Our Course: Peace and Socialism
O Our Lives, Our Dreams: Soviet women speak:
O Our Rights: Political and economic guarantees:
O Outer Space: Politics and law
O Outline History of Africa, An
O Outline History of the Communist International (1971)
O Outline History of the Soviet Working Class
O Outline Political History of the Americas
O Outline Theory of Population, An
O Outline of Soviet Labour Law, An
O Overseas Chinese Bourgeoisie: A Peking tool in southeast Asia.
O Overseas Expansion of Capital:, The
P Pacific Community: An Outlook, The
P Palekh: Village of Artists
P Palestine Problem: Aggression, resistance, ways of settlement, The
P Palestine Question: Document adopted by the United Nations and other international organisations and conferences, The
P Panorama of the Soviet Union
P Part Played By Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man, The
P Passing Age: The ideology and culture of the late bourgeois epoch, The
P Path of Valour., The
P Path to Peace: A view from Moscow, The
P Patrice Lumumba: Fighter for Africas freedom
P Peace Prospects From Three Worlds
P Peace Strategy in the Nuclear Age
P Peace and Disarmament. Academic Studies. 1980
P Peace and Disarmament: Academic Studies, special issue 1987:
P Peace and Disarmament
P Peaceful Coexistence: Contemporary international law of peaceful coexistence
P Peking Reaches Out: A Study of Chinese Expansionism
P Peoples Army, The
P Peoples Control in Socialist Society
P Peoples Democracy, A New Form of Political Organization of Society
P Peoples Theater: From the Box Office to the Stage
P Peoples of the North and Their Road to Socialism, The
P Perestroika In Action:
P Perestroika: The Crunch is Now
P Permanent Blush of Shame: A Trip to the East and West, A
P Personal Property in the USSR
P Personal Subsidiary Farming Under Socialism
P Petty-Bourgeois Revolutionism (Anarchism, Trotskyism and Maoism)
P Phenomenon of the Soviet Cinema
P Philosophical Conception of Man:, The
P Philosophical Concepts in Natural Science.

P Philosophical Foundations of Scientific Socialism
P Philosophical Problems of Elementary Particle Physics
P Philosophical Traditions Today.
P Philosophical Views of Mao Tse-Tung: A Critical Analysis, The
P Philosophy and Scientific Cognition
P Philosophy and Social Theory: An Introduction to Historical Materialism
P Philosophy and Sociology.
P Philosophy and the Ecological Problems of Civilisation
P Philosophy and the World-Views of Modern Sciences
P Philosophy in the USSR: Problems of dialectical materialism.
P Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism., The
P Philosophy of Optimism: Current problems
P Philosophy of Revolt: Criticism of left radical ideology., The
P Philosophy of Survival, The
P Philososphy in the USSR: Problems of historical materialism
P Physics of Interstellar Space: A popular-science outline
P Pioneers of Space
P Plain-Spoken Facts, The
P Planet of Reason: A Sociological Study of Man-Nature Relationship, The
P Planning a Socialist Economy
P Planning in Developing Countries: Theory and methodology
P Planning in the USSR: Problems of theory and organisation
P Planning of Manpower in the Soviet Union
P Plato
P Please Accept my Donation: Collection of Letters to the Soviet Peace Fund
P Plutos Chain: Explorations of the Kamchatka-Kuril volcanic belt
P Polar Diaries
P Policy Keeping the World on Edge, A
P Policy of Peaceful Coexistence in Action, The
P Policy of Provocation and Expansion: A collection of documents and articles, published in the Soviet press, dealing with Chinas policy of annexation and its territorial claims to other countries, A
P Policy of the Soviet Union in the Arab World:, The
P Politcal Economy (1983)
P Political Consciousness in the U.S.A.: Traditions and evolutions.
P Political Economy (1989)
P Political Economy of Capitalism (1974), The
P Political Economy of Capitalism (1985)
P Political Economy of Revolution:, The
P Political Economy of Socialism (1967)
P Political Economy of Socialism (1985)
P Political Economy: A Condensed Course
P Political Economy: A beginners course
P Political Economy: A study aid
P Political Economy: Capitalism
P Political Economy: Socialism.
P Political Map of the World, The
P Political Reality and Political Consciousness.
P Political Systems, Development Trends: Theme of the 11th World Congress of political sciences
P Political Terms: A short guide
P Political Terrorism: An Indictment of Imperialism.
P Political Thought of Ancient Greece
P Political Work in the Soviet Army
P Politico-Economic Problems of Capitalism.
P Population Biology: Progress and problems of studies on natural populations
P Population and Socio-Economic Development
P Population of the USSR: A socio-economic survey, The
P Population, Economics, and Politics: The socio-economic development of the European members of the CMEA
P Populism: Its past, present and future.
P Present-Day China: Socio-economic problems, collected articles.
P Present- Day Ethnic Processes in the USSR
P Present- Day Problems in Asia and Africa: Theory - Politics - Personalities
P Present- day Non-Marxist Political Economy:
P Press Is a Great Force, The
P Prevent War, Safeguard Peace. [ca. 1962]
P Prevention of War: Doctrines, concepts, prospects
P Principles of Criminology, The
P Principles of Philosophy, The
P Principles of the Theory of Historical Process in Philosophy.
P Priorities of Soviet Foreign Policy Today, The
P Privileged Generation: Children in the Soviet Union, The

P Problem of the Ideal: The nature of mind and its relationship to the brain and social medium, The
P Problems of Africa Today
P Problems of Common Security
P Problems of Contemporary Aesthetics: A collection of articles
P Problems of Leninism
P Problems of Modern Aesthetics:
P Problems of Socialist Theory
P Problems of Soviet School Education
P Problems of War and Peace: A critical analysis of bourgeois theories.
P Problems of the Communist Movement: Some Questions of Theory and Method.
P Problems of the Development of Mind.
P Problems of the History of Philosophy.
P Proceedings of the First Congress of the Yemeni Socialist Party:
P Profession of the Stage-Director, The
P Profiles in Labour: Essays about heroes of socialist labour
P Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:, The
P Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and Other Writings, The
P Psychiatry
P Psychological Research in USSR: Volume 1
P Psychological War, The
P Psychology (1989)
P Psychology As You May Like It
P Psychology in the Soviet Union: A Historical Outline.
P Psychology of Experiencing: An analysis of how critical situations are dealt with, The
P Psychology of Learning: Theories of learning and programmed instruction, The
P Psychology of Management of Labour Collectives, The
P Psychology of Phantasy:, The
P Psychology of Thinking, The
P Public Education in Soviet Azerbaijan: Appraisal of an achievement
P Public Education in the U.S.S.R.
P Public Enterprises in Developing Countries: Legal status
P Public Sector in Developing Countries:, The
P Publishing in the Soviet Union
P Pulse of Time, The
Q Questions of the Methodology of History:
R R&D in Social Reproduction.
R Races and Peoples: Contemporary ethnic and racial problems.
R Races of Mankind, The
R Racism: An ideological weapon of imperialism.
R Rational Utilization of Natural Resources and the Protection of the Environment, The
R Re-reading Dostoyevsky
R Reader on Social Sciences (ABC #1), A
R Reader on the History of the USSR (19171937)., A
R Real Socialism and Ideological Struggle
R Real Truth: Profiles of Soviet Jews, The
R Recent History of the Labor Movement in the United States 19181939
R Recreational Geography in the USSR
R Red Carnation., The
R Red Star and Green Crescent
R Reflections on Security in the Nuclear Age: A Dialogue Between Generals East and West
R Relativity and Man
R Religion and Social Conflicts in the U.S.A.
R Religion in the World Today
R Remarkable Year: The Blue Notebook: Retracing Lenins Steps., A
R Reminiscences of a Kremlin Commandant. [no date, ca. 1965.]
R Rendezvous in Space: Soyuz Apollo
R Renovation of Traditions: (traditions and innovations of Socialist realism in Ukrainian prose)
R Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy
R Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)
R Requirements of Developed Socialist Society
R Responsiblity for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity:
R Resumption and Development of International Economic Relations, The
R Retracing Lenins Steps
R Revolution in Laos: Practice and Prospects
R Revolutionaries of India in Soviet Russia: Mainspring of the Communist movement in the East
R Revolutionary Battles of the Early 20th Century
R Revolutionary COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
R Revolutionary Democracy and Communists in the East
R Revolutionary Democracy in Africa

R Revolutionary Movement of Our Time and Nationalism., The
R Revolutionary Process in the East:, The
R Revolutionary Vanguard:, The
R Riddle of the Origin of Consciousness., The
R Riddle of the Self, The
R Riddles of Three Oceans, The
R Right of the Accused to Defence in the USSR, The
R Right-Wing Revisionism Today
R Rights Accruing From Loss of Health
R Rights of Soviet Citizens: Collected normative acts
R Rights of the Individual in Socialist Society, The
R Rise and Fall of the Gunbatsu: A Study in Military History, The
R Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, The
R Rise of Socialist Economy: The experience of the USSR, other socialist, and socialist-oriented developing countries, The
R Road to Communism:, The
R Road to Great Victory: Soviet Diplomacy 19411945
R Road to Nirvana, The
R Road to Stable Peace in Asia, The
R Road to Victory: The Struggle For National Independence, Unity, Peace and Socialism in Vietnam, The
R Role of Advanced Ideas in Development of Society
R Role of Socialist Consciousness in the Development of Soviet Society, The
R Role of the State in Socio-Economic Reforms in Developing Countries, The
R Role of the State in the Socialist Transformation of the Economy of the U.S.S.R., The
R Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
R Russia and Her People: Recollections in Tranquillity
R Russia and the West: 19th Century
R Russian Discovery of America, A
R Russian History in Tales
R Russian Museum: A Guide, The
R Russian Orthodox Church (1982), The
R Russian Orthodox Church 10th to 20th Centuries, The
R Russian Revolution: The Comic Book Version, The
R Russian Revolution: What actually happened?, The
R Russian Revolutionary Tradition, The
R Russian Thinkers: Essays on SocioEconomic Thought in the 18th and 19th Centuries
R Russians Abroad
S Sacred Lyre: Essays on the life and work of Alexander Pushkin
S Safeguard of Peace: Soviet armed forces:, A
S Salyut Project, The
S Saturn Is Almost Invisible
S Scandinavian Social Democracy Today
S School of Classical Dance
S Science AT THE CROSS ROADS
S Science Fiction and Adventure Stories by Soviet Writers
S Science Fiction: English and American Short Stories
S Science In Its Youth: Pre-Marxian political economy, A
S Science Policy: Problems and trends
S Science Serves the Nation:
S Science and Morality
S Science and Philosophy
S Science and Society.
S Science and Soviet Peoples Education
S Science and Technology, Humanism and Progress:
S Science in the USSR:
S Science, Technology and the Economy
S Scientific Communism (1986)
S Scientific Communism (A Popular Outline)
S Scientific Communism and Its Falsification by the Renegades
S Scientific Communism: A textbook
S Scientific Intelligentsia in the USSR: (structure and dynamics of personnel), The
S Scientific Management of Society (1971), The
S Scientific Management of Society
S Scientific and Technical Progress and Socialist Society
S Scientific and Technical Progress in the USA:
S Scientific and Technical Revolution: Economic aspects
S Scientific and Technological Progress and Social Advance
S Scientific and Technological Revolution and the Revolution in Education, The
S Scientific and Technological Revolution: Its impact on management and education, The
S Scientific and Technological Revolution: Its role in todays world, The
S Scientific and Technological Revolution: Social Effects and Prospects, The
S Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Contradictions of Capitalism., The

S Sdi: Key to security or disaster
S Search in Pedagogics: Discussions of the 1920s and Early 1930s, A
S Second International, 18891914: The History and heritage, The
S Second Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.:
S Second World War: A Politico-Military Survey, The
S Secret War Against Cuba
S Secret War Against Soviet Russia, The
S Secret Weapon in Africa
S Secrets from Whitehall and Downing Street
S Secrets of the Second World War.
S Seeking Rational Solutions: Discussions old and new
S Selected Pedagogical Works
S Selected Philosophical Works
S Selected Speeches and Articles
S Selected Works in Geography
S Selected Writings: Linguistics, poetics
S Selections from Shaw: A fearless champion of truth.
S Selections from Shaw: A fearless champion of truth
S Semantic Philosophy of Art
S Sentinels of Peace
S Sergei Prokofiev: Materials, Articles, Interviews
S Serving the People.
S Seven Days in May
S Seven Essays on Life and Literature
S Shakespeare in the Soviet Union: A collection of articles.
S Sholokhov: A critical appreciation
S Short Course on Political Economy, A
S Short Economic History of the USSR, A
S Short History of Geographical Science in the Soviet Union, A
S Short History of Soviet Society, A
S Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union., A
S Short History of the National-Liberation Movement in East Africa, A
S Short History of the USSR (1987), A
S Short History of the USSR: A popular outline, A
S Short History of the USSR: Part I., A
S Short History of the USSR: Part II., A
S Short History of the World in Two Volumes, A
S Short History of the World in Two Volumes, A
S Siberia, 60 Degrees East of Greenwich: Oil and people
S Siberia: Achievements, Problems, Solutions
S Siberia: Epic of the Century
S Silent Death (Chemical weapons/warfare), The
S Simon Bolivar
S Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1973:
S Sketches of the Soviet Union
S Social Democracy and Southern Africa, 1960s1980s
S Social Informaton and the Regulation of Social Development
S Social Insurance in the U.S.S.R.
S Social Organisations in the Soviet Union: Political and legal organisational aspects
S Social Partnership or Class Struggle?: Theory, Legislation & Practice
S Social Problems of Mans Environment: Where We Live and Work
S Social Programme of the Ninth Five-Year Plan
S Social Psychology and History
S Social Psychology and Propaganda
S Social Psychology
S Social Science
S Social Sciences: Information system., The
S Social Security in the USSR
S Social Structure of Soviet Society, The
S Social and Economic Geography: An essay in conceptual terminological systematisation
S Social and State Structure of the U.S.S.R., The
S Socialism As a Social System
S Socialism Theory and Practice:
S Socialism and Capitalism: Score and Prospects
S Socialism and Communism: Selected passages, 195663
S Socialism and Communism
S Socialism and Culture: A collection of articles
S Socialism and Democracy: A Reply to opportunists
S Socialism and Energy Resources
S Socialism and Humanism
S Socialism and Law: Law in society

S Socialism and Optimism
S Socialism and State Administration
S Socialism and Wealth
S Socialism and the Individual
S Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations
S Socialism and the Rational Needs of the Individual
S Socialism and the State
S Socialism in the USSR: How it was built
S Socialisms Historic Mission and the World Today
S Socialism: A new theoretical vision
S Socialism: Crisis or renewal?
S Socialism: Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice
S Socialism: Its Role in History.
S Socialism: One-party and multi-party system
S Socialism: Questions of Theory
S Socialist Community at a New Stage, The
S Socialist Community: A new type of relations among nations, The
S Socialist Countries Economy in the 1970s, The
S Socialist Countries: Important Changes, The
S Socialist Culture and Man
S Socialist Democracy: Aspects of theory
S Socialist Humanism, Culture, Personality:
S Socialist Ideal and Real Socialism, The
S Socialist Ideology
S Socialist Integration
S Socialist International, The
S Socialist Internationalism (1978)
S Socialist Internationalism: Theory and practice of international relations of a new type
S Socialist Life Style and the Family
S Socialist Literatures, Problems of Development
S Socialist Long-Term Economic Planning.
S Socialist Management: The Leninist concept.
S Socialist Nationalisation of Industry.
S Socialist Organisation of Labour
S Socialist Policy of Peace: Theory and practice
S Socialist Realism and the Modern Literary Process
S Socialist Realism in Literature and Art:
S Socialist Revolution [MarxEngels], The
S Socialist Revolution and Its Defense, The
S Socialist Revolution in Russia and the Intelligentsia, The
S Socialist Revolution in Russia and the International Working Class (19171923), The
S Socialist Self-Government
S Socialist Society In the Present Stage: Proceedings of a section meeting
S Socialist Society: Its social justice
S Socialist Society: Scientific principles of development
S Socialist Way of Development in Agriculture, The
S Socialist Way of Life: Problems and perspectives
S Socialist World System, The
S Socialist- Oriented State: Instrument of Revolutionary Change, A
S Society and Economic Relations
S Society and Individual: Give and take
S Society and Nature: Socio-ecological problems
S Society and Youth
S Society and the Environment: A Soviet view
S Society of the Future
S Sociological Theory and Social Practice:
S Sociology of Culture, The
S Sociology of Revolution: A Marxist view
S Sociology: Problems of theory and method.
S Soldiers Duty, A
S Soldiers Memoirs:, A
S Solving the National Question in the USSR
S Some Aspects of Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces
S Some Basic Rights of Soviet Citizens
S Some Questions Concerning the Struggle of Counter-Revolutionary Trotskyism Against Revolutionary Leninism
S South Africa Against Africa, 19661986
S Southeast Asia: History, economy, policy.
S Southern Africa: Apartheid, Colonialism, Aggression.
S Soviet Agriculture
S Soviet Ambassador Reports Back, The
S Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today, The

S Soviet Army, The
S Soviet Bankers Notes, A
S Soviet Circus: A Collection of articles, The
S Soviet Collective Farm (a sociological study), The
S Soviet Communist Forum: (World response to the 25th CPSU congress)
S Soviet Constitution and the Myths of Sovietologists, The
S Soviet Constitution: A dictionary, The
S Soviet Court, The
S Soviet Democracy and Bourgeois Sovietology
S Soviet Democracy in the Period of Developed Socialism
S Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and problems.
S Soviet Economy Forges Ahead: Ninth five-year plan 19711975.
S Soviet Economy: Results and prospects
S Soviet Employees Rights in Law
S Soviet Family Budgets
S Soviet Finance: Principles, Operation
S Soviet Financial System
S Soviet Fine Arts
S Soviet Foreign Policy Volume I:
S Soviet Foreign Policy Volume II:
S Soviet Foreign Policy: A brief review 195565.
S Soviet Foreign Policy: Objectives and principles
S Soviet Foreign Trade: Today and tomorrow
S Soviet Form of Popular Government, The
S Soviet Frontiers of Tomorrow
S Soviet General Staff at War 19411945: Book 1, The
S Soviet General Staff at War 19411945: Book 2, The
S Soviet Geographical Explorations and Discoveries
S Soviet Geography Today: Aspects of theory
S Soviet Geography Today: Physical Geography
S Soviet Historical Science: New research
S Soviet Industry
S Soviet Land Legislation.
S Soviet Legislation on Childrens Rights.
S Soviet Legislation on Womens Rights:
S Soviet LiteratureYesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
S Soviet Literature: Problems and People
S Soviet Lithuania on the Road to Prosperity
S Soviet Man: The making of a socialist type of personality
S Soviet Nationalities and Policy and Bourgeois Historians: The formation of the Soviet multinational state (19171922) in contemporary American historiography
S Soviet Navy in War and Peace, The
S Soviet North: In the Land of the Midnight Sun; the Arctic; News from High Latitudes
S Soviet North: Present Development and Prospects, The
S Soviet Officers
S Soviet Parliament: A reference book, The
S Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II
S Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II
S Soviet Peace Policy, 19171939
S Soviet Peasantry: An outline history (19171970), The
S Soviet People as I Knew Them
S Soviet People: A new historical community, The
S Soviet Planned Economy, The
S Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security
S Soviet Political System Under Developed Socialism, The
S Soviet Political System: Perceptions and perspectives
S Soviet Psychology
S Soviet Reality in the Seventies
S Soviet Rock: 25 Years in the Underground + 5 Years of Freedom
S Soviet Russia Opts for Peace
S Soviet Russian Literature 19171977: Poetry and Prose - Selected Reading
S Soviet Russian Stories of the 1960s and 1970s
S Soviet Scene 1987: A collection of press articles and interviews
S Soviet School of Courage and Warcraft, The
S Soviet Science and Technique in the Service of Building Communism in the U.S.S.R.
S Soviet Socialist Democracy
S Soviet Society: Philosophy of Development
S Soviet Stars in the World of Music
S Soviet State and Law., The
S Soviet State as a Subject of Civil Law, The
S Soviet State, The
S Soviet Trade Unions: A collection of background materials, The

S Soviet Trade Unions: Yesterday Today Tomorrow
S Soviet Ukraine
S Soviet Union 50 Years Statistical Returns
S Soviet Union Today, The
S Soviet Union and Africa, The
S Soviet Union and European Security, The
S Soviet Union and International Economic Cooperation, The
S Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base (19451949), The
S Soviet Union as Americans See It 19171977, The
S Soviet Union: Political and Economic Reference Book.
S Soviet Volunteers in China 19251945
S Soviet Way of Life, The
S Soviet Women (Some aspects of the status of women in the USSR)
S Soviet Women: A portrait.
S Soviet Worker, The
S Soviet Writers Look At America
S Soviet Youth and Socialism.
S Soviet Youth: A socio-political outline.
S SovietU.S. Relations, 19331942
S Soviets of Peoples Deputies: Democracy and administration
S Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies on the Eve of the October Revolution, MarchOctober 1917
S Soweto: Life and Struggles of a South African Township
S Space Age, The
S Space Flights Serve Life on Earth
S Specialisation and Co-Operation of the Socialist Economies
S Sport and Society
S Stanislavsky
S State Law of the Socialist Countries: Socialism Today, The
S State Monopoly Capitalism and Labour Law
S State Monopoly Incomes Policy: Conception and Practice (In the Context of Great Britain)
S State Property in the USSR: Legal aspects
S State Structure of the USSR
S State and Communism, The
S State and Nations in the USSR, The
S State of Israel: A Historical, Economic and Political Study, The
S State, Democracy and Legality in the USSR: Lenins ideas today, The
S State-Monopoly Capitalism and the Labour Theory of Value.
S Steeled in the Storm: Essays on the history of the Komsomol
S Steep Steps: A Journalists Notes, The
S Stories About Lenin and the Revolution
S Stories About the Party of Communists Under Whose Leadership the Peoples of Russia Overthrew...
S Straight from the Heart: The writer and the time series
S Strategy of Economic Development in the USSR, The
S Strategy of Transnational Corporations, The
S Stride Across a Thousand Years:, A
S Strong in Spirit, The
S Struggle for Socialism in the World
S Studies in Psychology: The collective and the individual.
S Study of Soviet Foreign Policy, A
S Subject, Object, Cognition.
S Submarines in Arctic Waters
S Sukhomlinsky on Education, V.
S Surrealism
S System of Physical Education in the USSR, The
S Systems Theory: Philosophical and Methodological Problems
C Cp of China :: THE POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
T Tales of the Ancient World:
T Talking About the Future: Can We Develop Without Disaster
T Talking About the Future: Is Mankind Heading for a Raw Materials Crisis?
T Talks on Soviet Democracy.
T Teachers Experience: Stanislav Shatsky: A collection, A
T Teaching of Political Economy: A critique of non-Marxian theories, The
T Teaching: Calling and skills.
T Teaching
T Technological Neo-colonialism
T Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences., The
T Television In the West and Its Doctrines.
T Ten Years of the Ethiopian Revolution
T Territorial Industrial Complexes: Optimisation models and general aspects
T Territorial Organisation of Soviet Economy, The
T Terrorism and International Law

T That Curious World of Nature: Geography for entertainment
T The LAND OF SOCIALISM TODAY TOMORROW
T The POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT
T Theatre, Music, Art (19671970)
T Their Point of View: Young Americans in the USSR
T Theoretical Aspects of Linguistics
T Theoretical Physics
T Theories of Surplus Value:
T Theory and Practice of Proletarian Internationalism, The
T Theory and Tactics of the International Communist Movement
T Theory of Earths Origin: Four lectures
T Theory of Growth of a Socialist Economy, The
T Theory of Knowledge ( by Cornforth ), The
T Theory of Population: Essays in Marxist research., The
T Theory of the State and Law
T There Shall be Retribution: Nazi war criminals and their protectors
T They Came to Stay: North Americans in the USSR
T They Found Their Voice: Stories from Soviet Nationalities with No Written Language Before the 1917 October Revolution
T They Knew Lenin: Reminiscenses of Foreign Contemporaries
T They Sealed Their Own Doom
T Third Soviet Generation
T Third World War? Threats, real, and imaginary, A
T Third World: Problems and Prospects, current stage of the national-liberation struggle, The
T Thirty Years of Victory
T This Amazing Amazing Amazing But Knowable Universe
T This NATION AND SOCIALISM ARE ONE
T This Nation and Socialism Are One
T This Whole Human Rights Business
T This is My Native Land: A Soviet journalists travels
T Three Centuries of Russian Poetry
T Three Leaders: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi
T Three Men in a Boat to Say Nothing of the Dog
T Through the Russian Revolution
T Time For a New Way of Thinking
T Time to Speak Out, The
T To Be an IndividualIs It the Lot of Only a Chosen Few?
T To Children I Give My Heart
T Tomorrow Will Be Too Late: Dialogue on the threshold of the third millennium
T Topsy-Turvy Planet, or, Paramons Incredible Tale of Travel and Adventure, A
T Towards Freedom and Progress: The triumph of Soviet power in Central Asia
T Towards Social Homogeneity
T Towards Technologies of the Future
T Towns for People
T Tracing Martin Bormann
T Trade Among Capitalist Countries
T Trade Unions in Socialist Society
T Trade Unions, Disarmament, Conversion
T Trade and Coexistence
T Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, The
T Transnational Corporations And Militarism
T Travel to Distant Worlds
T Travels to New Guinea: Diaries Letters Documents.
T Tretyakov Art Gallery: A Guide
T Triumph of Lenins Ideas: Proceedings of Plenary Session
T Triumph of the Leninist Ideas of Proletarian Internationalism:
T Truth About Afghanistan:, The
T Truth About Cultural Exchange: 10 Years After Helsinki, The
T Turning-Point of World War II:, The
T Twentieth Century Capitalism
T Two Directions of Socio-economic Development in Africa
T Two Hundred Days of Fire: Accounts by participants and witnesses of the battle of Stalingrad
T Two WorldsTwo Monetary Systems
U U.S. Budget and Economic Policy.
U U.S. Labour Unions Today: Basic problems and trends.
U U.S. Military Doctrine, The
U U.S. Monopolies and Developing Countries
U U.S. Negroes in Battle: From Little Rock to Watts
U U.S. Neocolonialism in Africa
U U.S. Policies in the Indian Ocean
U U.S. Policy in Latin America: Postwar to present.
U U.S. Two-Party System: Past and present:, The

U U.S. War Machine and Politics, The
U Ultras in the USA., The
U Ulyanov Family, The
U Unbreakable Union of Soviet Republics, The
U Undaunted Heroes: A Vietnam diary, The
U Undeclared War: Imperialism vs. Afghanistan:, The
U Union of Soviet Writers: Aims, Organisation, Activities, The
U United Soviet People, The
U Unity, Solidarity, Internationalism: International Communist Unity:
U Universe and Civilisation, The
U Universe, The
U Us Monopolies and Developing Countries
U Usa and Western Europe: Economic Relations After World War II, The
U Usa versus Western Europe: New Trends
U Usa, Western Europe, Japan: a triangle of rivalry, The
U Usa: Anatomy of the Arms Race
U Usa: Imperialists and Anti-Imperialists: The great foreign policy debate at the turn of the Century
U Usa: Militarism and the Economy
U Ussr - USA - Sports Encounters
U Ussr Builds for the Future, The
U Ussr Economy in 19761980, The
U Ussr Proposes Disarmament (1920s1980s), The
U Ussr State Industry During the Transition Period
U Ussr Tenth Five-Year Plan Building Projects
U Ussr Through Indian Eyes
U Ussr and Countries of Africa
U Ussr and Developing Countries: Economic Cooperation, The
U Ussr and International Copyright Protection, The
U Ussr and International Economic Relations:, The
U Ussr in World Politics., The
U UssrFRG Relations: A new stage
U UssrUSA Trade Unions Compared
U Ussrs Activities in the UN for Peace, Security and Co-Operation, 19451985, The
U Ussr, Reorganisation and Renewal
U Ussr, the USA, and the Peoples Revolution in China, The
U Ussr: A Dictatorship or a Democracy?, The
U Ussr: A Short History., The
U Ussr: A Time of Change: Scholars, Writers and Artists Speak
U Ussr: A genuine united nations, The
U Ussr: A guide for businessmen
U Ussr: Education, Science and Culture., The
U Ussr: For Peace Against Aggression:
U Ussr: Geography of the eleventh five-year plan period
U Ussr: Public Health and Social Security., The
U Ussr: Questions and Answers
U Ussr: Sixty Years of the Union: 19221982
U Ussr: Youth of the Eighties
V Vietnam Story, The
V Village Children: A Soviet experience
V Vladimir Favorsky
V Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: A biography
V Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: Life and works
V Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: Pages from his life with reminiscences of his associates
V Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
V Vladimir Mayakovsky: Innovator
V Vladimir Vysotsky: Hamlet with a guitar
W Wanted...
W War Is Their Business: The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex:
W War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations:, The
W Wars Unwomanly Face
W Wars and Population
W Washington Crusaders On the March
W Washington Silhouettes: A political round-up
W Washington Versus Havana
W Way Society Develops, The
W We Are From Friendship University [nd (mid 1960s)]
W We Choose Peace
W Weaponry in Space: The dilemma of security
W Welfare the Basic Task: Five Year Plan, 19711975
W West Berlin: In memory of those Soviet officers and men who fell in the battle to liberate Berlin
W West Berlin: Yesterday and Today

W West European Integration: Its policies and international relations
W Western Aid: Myth and Reality
W Western Europe Today: Economics, politics, the class struggle, international relations
W What Are Classes and the Class Struggle? (ABC #14)
W What Are They After in Peking?
W What Are Trade Unions? (ABC #21)
W What If Everything You Thought You Knew About AIDS Was Wrong?
W What Is Capitalism? (ABC #8)
W What Is Communism? (ABC #10)
W What Is Democratic Centralism?
W What Is Democratic Socialism?
W What Is Dialectical Materialism? (ABC #6)
W What Is Good and What is Bad
W What Is Historical Materialism? (ABC #7)
W What Is Labour? (ABC #11)
W What Is Marxism-Leninism? (ABC #2)
W What Is Personality? (ABC #23)
W What Is Philosophy? (ABC #4)
W What Is Political Economy? (ABC #3)
W What Is Property? (ABC #13)
W What Is Revolution? (ABC #17)
W What Is Scientific Communism? (ABC #5)
W What Is Socialism? (ABC #9)
W What Is Surplus Value? (ABC #12)
W What Is The Party? (ABC #15)
W What Is The Scientific and Technological Revolution? (ABC #22)
W What Is The State? (ABC #16)
W What Is The Transition Period? (ABC #18)
W What Is The Working Peoples Power? (ABC #19)
W What Is The World Socialist System? (ABC #20)
W What Is What? (ABC #24)
W What Maoism is Really Like
W What Real Socialism Means to the People:
W Whats What in World Politics: A reference book
W Where All Roads Into Space Begin:
W Where Are Trotskyites Leading the Youth?
W Where Human Rights Are Real.
W Where Its Coldest
W Where the Old Are Young: Long life in the Soviet Caucasus
W White Book:, The
W White House and the Black Continent, The
W Whither and With Whom? Essays from the ideological front
W Whos Who in the Soviet Cinema: Seventy Different Portraits
W Why We Returned to the Soviet Union: Testimonies from Russian emigrs
W Wilfred Grenfell: His life and work
W Will We Survive?
W Winning for Peace: The great victoryits world impact
W Winston Churchill
W Witness to War:
W Women Today
W Women in Science
W Women in the USSR: On the UN Decade for Women
W Women of a New World
W Words of Friends: Greetings extended to the XXVIth Congress of the CPSU, The
W Work and Love
W Workers in Society: Polemical essays
W Workers Control Over Production: Past and present.
W Working Class Movement in the Period of Transition to Imperialism (18711904), The
W Working Class and Social Progress:, The
W Working Class and its Allies, The
W Working Class and the Contemporary World:, The
W Working Class and the Trade Unions in the USSR:, The
W Working Class in Socialist Society:, The
W Working ClassThe Leading Force of the World Revolutionary Process:, The
W Working-Class Movement in the Developmed Capitalist Countries After the Second World War (19451979), The
W Working-Class Struggle for Peace and Social Progress:, The
W Working-Class and National-Liberation Movements:
W World Capitalist Economy: Structural changes:, The
W World Communist Movement: An outline of strategy and tactics, The
W World Energy Problem, The
W World MARXIST REVIEW

W World Market Today, The
W World Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class
W World Revolutionary Process, The
W World Socialist Movement & Anti-Communism., The
W World Socialist System and Anti-Communism, The
W World Socialist System:, The
W World War II: Myths and the Realities.
W World War II: The Decisive Battles of the Soviet Army
W World Without Arms?, A
W World of Man In the World of Nature, The
W Wormwood [Hitler-era anti-semitism & postwar Zionism]
W Writers Creative Individuality and the Development of Literature, The
Y Yakov Sverdlov
Y Year 2000: End of the human race?, The
Y Year of Victory
Y Yellow Devil: Gold and capitalism., The
Y Young Communist International and Its Origins, The
Y Young Teens Blaze Paths to Peace: The story of the first global childrens festival for peace, friendship co-operation
Y Young in the Revolution:, The
Y Your First Move: Chess for beginners.
Y Youth and Politics
Y Youth and the Party: Documents
Z Zionism Stands Accused
Z Zionism: Enemy of peace and social progress

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BETWEEN SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS

Formats: 104 3. SCIENTIFIC REALISM. METAPHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY

245 1. OVERCOMING HEGEL

268 2. MARX AND THE PROBLEM OF CONCRETE KNOWLEDGE

301 3. CONCRETENESS OF MATERIALIST DIALECTICS

327 4. MATERIALISTIC DIALECTICS AND SPECIAL SCIENCES

357 5. DIALECTICS AND THE INTEGRATION OF SCIENCE

6. DIALECTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE

461 NAME INDEX

465 SUBJECT INDEX

Lenin Obras Completas, Akal Editor (Mexico).

Positivism as a philosophical trend is known to derive from radical empiricism p

In order to overcome metaphysics, logical positivism advanced an extensive p

Yet all attempts by positivism to become a pure methodology were doomed to p

In the already extensive critical literature on positivism the most controversial p

Similarly, the negative attitude towards metaphysics has predetermined the p

In a lecture delivered at Oxford in 1958, Friedrich Waismann, one of the pillars of p

Such alternative programmes are represented by critical rationalism (Karl Popper, p

The controversy over the fundamental problems of philosophical methodology is p

The present-day significance of the problem of causality, too, becomes more p

It would be impossible to define the prospects of the methodology of scientific p

As regards the problems which will be considered in the light of dialectical

[ 101 ] Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Basic Books, Inc.,

[ 131 ] M.Wartofsky, Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science, in: Boston Studies in

[ 161 ] See A. C. Crombie, Turning Points in Physics, North-Holland Publishing

<<< CHAPTER ONE -- BETWEEN >>>

In positivism, like in many other philosophical schools, one should always p

Nevertheless, the ideology of positivism contributed to some extent to the p

their carriers, and in attributing independent existence to the properties of each

Despite the long evolution of positivist philosophy, this understanding of science p

future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere

As we see, in Carnaps inductive logic the traditional problem of induction p

Consequently, Carnap expands the volume of the traditional concept of induction, on

According to Carnap, universal laws appear to be senseless from the viewpoint of p

The principle of induction, as formulated by Carnap, was based on the assumption p

It is noteworthy that logical positivism seeks to reinforce empiricism in its drive p

The rapid development of logico-mathematical studies in that period seemed to p

Clearly, this contraposition of scientific and non-scientific or metaphysical p

Metaphysics as a specific set of traditional philosophical problems derives, according p

The pretension to know something beyond possible experience presupposes the p

According to positivism, the unscientific character of metaphysics springs from its p

of subjective human qualities and emotions on knowledge and on the world in

The world-view character of philosophy is considered by positivism as the main p

The role of social conditions in the emergence and development of positivism is a p

Rejecting traditional philosophy as unscientific and metaphysical and using many p

Logical positivism was a full-scale realisation of the analytical tendency in the p

In view of the growing proportion of highly specific logico-methodological problems p

It should be noted that positivism denouncing the so-called extrascientific p

The metaphysical content of the philosophy of science is admitted retrospectively by p

The metaphysics of positivism is all the more dangerous as it is concealed behind p

Incidentally, the metaphysical fallacies of German classical philosophy and the p

If Minervas night-flying owl had ventured to make its appearance in broad p

The rejection by positivism of such traditional philosophical problems as the p

The mystification of the relation of knowledge to reality is characteristic of all p

According to Ayer, for instance, the world is a logical structure made up of p

be proved with the same certainty as the existence of sensuous images.

Advocating a strictly scientific approach to knowledge and demanding the p

The inherent metaphysics of positivist philosophy, incapable of critical self-analysis, p

The widely advertised neutrality of positivist philosophy is in fact nothing but a

[ 291 ] Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Springer, Berlin, 1925.

[ 292 ] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge &

[ 311 ] Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago, 1951.