1

CONSTI I READ ON SECTIONS 7 TO 12, ARTICLE III

CASES FOR DIGEST:

SECTION 7

1. VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE, JR., GR 74930, 2/13/89

2. CHAVEZ VS. PEA AND AMARI, GR 133250, JULY 9, 2002

SECTION 8

3. GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, GR 170132, December 6, 2006

4. BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION VS. DIONISIO, 174 SCRA 589 (1989)

SECTION 10

5. PNB VS. REMIGIO, GR 78505, MARCH 21, 1994

SECTION 12 RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

6. MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 346 (1966)

7. PEOPLE VS. MAHINAY, GR 122485, FEBRUARY 1, 1999

8. PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO, 251 SCRA 293

9. PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, GR 128551, JULY 31, 200

10. PEOPLE VS. ABULENCIA, GR 138403, AUGUST 22, 2001

 2

VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE, JR., GR 74930, 2/13/89

FACTS:

Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting to
befurnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa including the ten (10)
oppositionmembers who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is
notpossible, an access to those said documents. Apart from Valmontes letter, he is stressing the premise of the request onthe
present provision of the Freedom constitution at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of thepeople to
information on matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware that such request contains serious legalimplications seek the
help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In Mr. Tiros reply letter, a confidentialrelationship exists between the
GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty toits customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentialityunless so ordered by the courts.On
June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General Counsel, Petitioner Valmontewrote
another letter saying that for failure to receive a reply, they are now considering themselves free to do whateveraction
necessary within the premises to pursue their desired objective in pursuance of public interest.Separate comments were filed
by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidatedreply, the petition was given due
course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties havingcomplied, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.In his comment, respondent raise procedural objection to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is
thatpetitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Managerare
reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is
therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no causeof action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their
constitutional right to information.

RULING:

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the state.Governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Yet, like allconstitutional
guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. Peoples right to information is limited to matters of public concern and
is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government
and its employees and the administrator of various insuranceprograms for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service
Insurance act of 1977 provide for annual appropriations

for to pay for contributions, premiums , interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, aswell as
the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of itsfunds, the GSIS
is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinentrules and regulations. It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managedproperly with end in view of maximizing
the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, thesupposed borrowers were members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSISand were therefore expected to be the first to see
to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were above board.

2.Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and
Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed
lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation
 3

Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and
owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three
Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public
domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the
sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI
and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly
disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can
these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila
Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006

3. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & General
Manager, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.

FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among them
members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG or the Union), a public sector union of
GSIS rank-and-file employees.
 4

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-
union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction,
KMGs counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject
employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for
reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some
110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the petition and enjoined the GSIS from
implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts and events.

CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available to workers in the
private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming,
joining or assisting employees organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging
or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action.

ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid

HELD: NO

The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-organization to
complement the provision according workers the right to engage in peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law.. It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage
strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to
the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals
Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for
allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national
security.

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision in accordance with law. This is a
clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive
Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly
endorsed an earlier CSC circular which enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes
in government service shall be observed.

Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondents members launched or
participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted
activity. The phrase prohibited concerted activity refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by
themselves or through their employees organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order
to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of
similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and
waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The record
of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of
the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving
the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the
second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A
smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact remains that the
erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain
whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during
office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage
 5

and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government
personnel.

To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility, under Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom
then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October
4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia
was in when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction.

4.Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio

G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989

Facts:

The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the petitioner
contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air Village Association, the
respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation,
security and the general welfare of the community.

The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a property tax
outside the corporate power of the association; the association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment
for lack of privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive,
confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.

Issue:

Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered land are bound by the
annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The petitioners contention that he
has no privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of
land it was understood that he took the same free of all ecumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title,
among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to
pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association.

The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the dues are not in the
concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A
property tax is assessed according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The
dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining
streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are
necessary, valid and reasonable for the particular community involved.

The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. The constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his
will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like the one in question.

The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will because the
limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question,
he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a
member of the association.
 6

5. PNB VS. REMIGIO, GR 78505, MARCH 21, 1994

6. Facts and Case Summary - Miranda v. Arizona

Facts
 7

The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial interrogations. In each of
these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was
cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the
outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed
statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he was
identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted
in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was
found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession.
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a dress shop that
had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the
66th Detective Squad, where he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken
to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a
hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were
presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment.
The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City
robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a
felony charge in California. Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and the next morning by local police.
Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half hours of interrogation by the FBI,
Westover signed separate confessions, which had been prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation, to
each of the two robberies in California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the
California robberies and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on each count. The conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims died
of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies.
Steward was arrested at his home. Police also arrested Stewarts wife and three other people who were visiting him.
Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was interrogated on nine different occasions. During the
ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that
time, police released the four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any of
them with the crime. At trial, Stewarts statements were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first-
degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have
been advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Issues

Whether statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation are admissible against
him in a criminal trial and whether procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself are necessary.

Supreme Court holding

The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves. As such, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.

The Court further held that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused
of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would otherwise do so freely. Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
 8

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New
York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed
the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.

PEOPLE VS. MAHINAY, GR 122485, FEBRUARY 1, 1999

Facts

Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to take care of Isips house which was
under construction adjacent to the latters residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence of
Isip.On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother. The following morning, the Appellant
boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared.The victims body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was
found in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed that the victim was raped and was
strangled to death.

Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon
which was identified by the victims mother to belong to her daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip
identified as that of the appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a
leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellants belongings.

The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated how the crime was committed.
The trial ensued and the lower court convicted him of the crime of Rape and was sentenced to death.

The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issues

1.WON the appellants extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill
of Rights; and

2.WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling

The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court ruled that the appellants extrajudicial confession was taken within the ambit of the law as evinced by the records
and testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and
custodial rights.

As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to
warrant a conviction of his guilt. However, the Court ruled otherwise.

The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled jurisprudence. Absence of direct proof does not absolve the appellant
because conviction may be had with the concurrence of the following requisites as stated in the Rules of Court:

1. there is more than one circumstance;

 9

2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335, that facts and circumstances consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.

The Court agreed with the trial courts decision in giving credence to several circumstantial evidence, which is more than
enough to prove appellants guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.

The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that provided the rights of suspects under custodial
investigation in detail.

A person under custodial investigation should be informed:

1. In a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if
any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;

2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;

3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably
of his own choice;

4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his
behalf;

5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver
has been made;

6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or
messenger with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest
or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this
is accomplished;

7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that
he understood the same;

8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is
void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;

9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning
that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;

10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it
at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
 10

11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence

People v Alicando GR No. 117487 (December 2, 1995)

Facts: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and during the
interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his uncounseled confession
the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting of the victims personal things like clothes stained with blood
which was admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with the death
penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.

Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not informed of his right
to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was written in a language he could not
understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The lower court also
violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the
voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the
court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not
provide the accused with due process of the law. Thus the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and
remanded the case back to the lower for further proceeding.

9. PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, GR 128551, JULY 31, 200

Facts:

Accused-appellant Ramil Samolde was charged, together with Armando Andres, with the crime of murder. However, when
arraigned both accused pleaded not guilty. Accused-appellant Samolde claimed that he was beaten up by the police. He
testified that during his detention, he was not allowed to be seen, lest visitors notice his swollen face. As regards his counsel,
accused-appellant stated that, contrary to what was stated in his extrajudicial confession, his lawyer did not really assist him.
He was not informed of his constitutional rights when he executed his extrajudicial confession, and he did so only after he had
been subjected to some brutality by the police.

Issue:

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant admissible in evidence.

Held:

No. The extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is not admissible in evidence, he was not informed of his constitutional
rights before his statement was taken.

Clearly, accused-appellant was not properly apprised of his constitutional rights. Under Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution, a
suspect in custodial investigation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent;
(2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to
counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. As the above quoted portion of the extrajudicial
confession shows, accused-appellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of his rights, signifying nothing more than
a feigned compliance with the constitutional requirements. This manner of giving warnings has been held to be merely
 11

ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. For this reason, we hold accused-appellants
extrajudicial confession is invalid.

10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABULENCIA

[G.R. No. 138403, August 22, 2001]

PER CURIAM:

FACTS: The accused Rolly Abulencia was charged of having raped and killed a 10 year old girl named Rebelyn Garcia. The body
of Rebelyn was found lifeless and naked while floating in a creek in Pangasinan. The examination of the body found signs that
she was raped and that shedied of drowning. According to eye witness accounts, the accused was last person who was seen to
have been with the victim before she died. While in detention, the accused was interviewed by a radio commentator of DZWN
Bombo Radio and admitted of having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge which caused her death. The interview was
taperecorded and was submitted as evidence in court.The trial court sentence the accused to a penalty of death hence this
petition by the accused arguing that there is no direct evidence linking him to the commission of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted based on circumstantial evidence and his admission in a radio interview.

HELD:

YES. Normally, the crime of rape whether simple, qualified or complexed with other
crimes is committed in seclusion, thereby rendering its prosecution difficult owing to the
absence of witnesses to its commission. The prosecution of such crime becomes even more
intricate and complex if homicide is committed since the victim herself would no longer be able to testify against the
perpetrator. In most cases, only circumstantial evidence is available to prove its commission. The absence of direct evidence,
however, does not preclude the conviction of a person accused of the complex crime of rape with homicide. Circumstantial
evidence can be as potent as direct evidence to sustain a conviction provided that there is a concurrence of all ther equisites
prescribed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Likewise, the Court held that an accused can be convicted
based on circumstantial evidence if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
The totality of all the circumstances obtaining, taken together with the condition of Rebelyn's body when found, eloquently
indicate that the appellant sexually assaulted her before drowning her to death. It bears stressing that appellant admitted
having raped Rebelyn when he was interviewed by Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Radio. Mojares' testimony
lends support to the courts conclusion. We have held that "a confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not
shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is
apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear."
12