People v. Gonzales / G.R. No. 80762 / March 19, 1990 open to door.
open to door. Ah Chong asked who the person was, twice,
FACTS: Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodio
Gonzales Sr., Custodio Gonzales, Jr. , Nerio Gonzales and
Rogelio Lanida were all found guilty of murder for killing Lloyd
Peacerrada. All of them except for Custodio Sr. withdrew
their appeal. The decision of the trial court was based on the
testimony of witness Jose Hunto ria. Huntoria said that
appellant was also one of the attackers of the deceased.
Appellant maintained that he was asleep at the moment. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected appellants
defense of alibi.
ISSUE: Whether appellant was guilty.
RULING: The Supreme Court found Huntoria to be an
unreliable witness. Huntoria admitted during cross-
examination that he cannot determine the group of people
stabbing t he deceased. He failed to point definitely that
appellant also did the crime. As stated in Arts. 3 and 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, for one to be criminally liable, an act
should be committed. The SC found no sufficient proof that
appellant has acted. Lastly, the SC found Huntoria was an
interested witness as he was also the tenant of the deceased.
His testimony was sought to ingratiate himself with the
deceased s family. The SC found appellant s guilt not proven
by reasonable doubt thus acquitting him.
People v. Silvestre / December 14, 1931 / G.R. No. L-35748
FACTS: Romana Silvestre was found guilty by the trial as
accomplice to arson with Martin Atienza as the principal.
Silvestre and Atienza were illicit partners and they were
charged of adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Silvestre second
husband. After pleading to Joaquin, he dropped the charges
and Atienza lived in another barangay. Silvestre still secretly
met with Atienza with the pretense of meeting her son from
his first husband Nicolas de la Cruz. On the day of the
incident, Atienza burned the de la Cruz house with Silvestre
silently watching.
ISSUE: Whether Silvestre was an accomplice.
RULING: An accomplice means doing nothing on the crime
itself but cooperated by executing acts before or after the
crime. The Supreme Court found mere presence and silence
do not constitute cooperation. She did not encouraged
Atienza to do the act. The SC reversed the decision on
Silvestre while they affirmed the decision on Atienza.
US v. AH CHONG / G.R. No. L-5272 / March 19, 1910
FACTS: Because of recent bouts of burglaries, Ah Chong kept
a knife under his pillow fo r protection. On the day of the
incident, he also placed a chair in front of the door for further
protection. He was awakened when someone was trying to
but did not reply until the cha ir was struck above his knees.
In a fit of panic and confusion and believed that he was being
attacked, he grabbed his knife and stabbed the intruder who
turned out was his roommate, Pascual. He died after and Ah
Chon was charged of murder.
ISSUE: Whether was guilty?
RULING: The Supreme Court decided that it was mistake of
fact. Ah Chong thought that the person behind the door was
an intruder. The SC was convinced that he acted in good faith
and was defending himself. There was no malice and he only
protected h is life and property.
PEOPLE v. OANIS / G.R. No. L-47722 / July 27, 1943
FACTS: Policemen, Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
received information regarding whe reabouts of the criminal
Anselmo Balagtas who is with Irene Requinea. Once, on t he
location, Oanis and Galanta found a man with his back
towards and started sho oting him. The man found to be
Serapio Tecson, Requinea s paramour. Oanis and Galanta
gave the trial court contradictory testimonies which they did
not believe and held them guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence.
ISSUE: Whether Oanis and Galanta was guilty.
RULING: The Supreme Court said that the most important
fact was that Tecson was shot wit h his back towards the
respondents. Even though they acted in mistake of fact an d
honest performance of their duty, they found respondents
guilty of murder. The SC said that both men had time not to
use violent means. Tecson was not resi sting or showing signs
of defense. Also, both men committed treachery making it a
qualifying circumstance to murder. Their arguments of
mistake of fact and honest performance was held as
mitigating circumstances.
Diego v. Castillo
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673 August 11, 2004
FACTS:
January 9, 1965: Crescencia Escoto contracted
marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., both Filipinos,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of
Dagupan City
February 15, 1978: Jorge filed a Decree of Divorce in
Texas
June 4, 1987: Crescencia Escoto using the name
Lucena Escoto married Manuel P. Diego before the
Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City
The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of
bigamy against Escoto
RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt
beyond whisper of a doubt and gave credence to the
defense of the accused that she acted without any
malicious intent for believing in good faith that her
 marriage was already annulled by a foreign
judgment
An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio
Q. Castillo for Knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal
Code
ISSUE: W/N Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of
the Revised Penal Code
US v. MARASIGAN / G.R. No. L-9426 / August 15, 1914
FACTS: Filemeno Marasigan struck and slashed the hand of
Francisco Mendoza after a scuf fle. As a result of the fight
Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in
the left hand, with his middle finger of the left hand was
rendered useless. Marasigan asserts that he should be given a
new trial as the useless middle fing er would be healed
through a surgical operation.

HELD: NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is
FINED P10,000 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely
The law requires that:
(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for
decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust;
(d) he knew that said judgment is unjust
ISSUE: Whether Marasigan should be allowed to be given a
new trial based on his contention.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the offended party is
not obliged to offer himself to surigical operation. It does not
matter whether the finer can be used again but the fact that
his fin gered as rendered useless because of Marasigan s act.
The SC denied Marasigan s petition

even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an

accused, he still cannot be administratively charged
lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in
his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action,
even though such acts are erroneous.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which
a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.
error committed by respondent Judge being gross and
patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a
nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action

PEOPLE v. CAGOCO / GR No. L-38511 / October 6, 1933

FACTS: The RTC found Francisco Cagoco guilty of killing Yu

Luon in a treacherous manner when he hit him on the back of
his head and fell down causing a laceration on h is neck.
During the incident, Cagoco was not quickly caught but was
apprehended when he was place on a line. Yu Yee, the
victims father, along with 2 witnesses pointed him without
hesitation. They also identified him through his facial
features. Cagoco argued that there was doubt on whether he
was the attacker and if he was, the crime committed was only
physical injuries and not murder.

ISSUE: Whether Cagoco committed murder.

RULING: The Supreme Court found the testimony of all the

witnesses to be credible especi ally when Yee picked him in a
group of eleven. On whether he should be guilty of murder,
the SC said that even if there was no intention to kill, he
acted in a treacherous manner. He was found guilty of murd
er with treachery becoming a qualifying circumstance. His
contention of killing with without bad faith only becomes a
mitigating circumstance.