Sie sind auf Seite 1von 15

POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO AMEND AND SUSPEND PROCEDURAL RULES / LIBERAL

CONSTRUCTION RULE

G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001

MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs. CIRIACO, LEON, VICTORINA,
TOMASA and PABLO, all surnamed DE GUIA, respondents.

FACTS:
On October 11, 1990, plaintiffs Mariano De Guia, Apolonia De Guia, Tomasa De Guia and
Irene Manuel filed with the court below a complaint for partition against defendants Ciriaco,
Leon, Victorina and Pablo De Guia. They alleged that the real properties therein described were
inherited by plaintiffs and defendants from their predecessors-in-interest, and that the latter
unjustly refused to have the properties subdivided among them. Shortly after defendants filed
their traverse, an amended complaint was admitted by the lower court, in which plaintiff Tomasa
De Guia was impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason that she had become an unwilling
co-plaintiff.

on June 11, 1992, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-trial
conference on June 18, 1992 at 8:30 a.m. Copies of said notices were sent by registered mail to
parties and their counsel. It turned out that both defendants and counsel failed to attend the
pre-trial conference. Hence, upon plaintiffs motion, defendants were declared as in default and
plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.

On July 6, 1992, defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the June 16, 1992
Order which declared them as in default.

In an Order dated August 19, 1992, plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was denied and
on June 11, 1993, judgment was rendered ordering the partition of the controverted parcels of
land.

The CA sustained respondents claim that the trial court had improperly declared them in
default. It held that the Notice of pretrial received by their counsel a day before the hearing did
not bind the clients, because the Rules of Court in effect at the time mandated separate service
of such Notice upon the parties and their counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he Respondent Court of Appeals, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in
not finding private respondents as in default despite the existence of fraud, for being contrary to
law, and for being contrary to the findings of the trial court.

HELD:
No.
In this case, respondents received the notice on the afternoon of June 18, 1992, or after
the pretrial scheduled on the morning of that day. Moreover, although the Notice was also sent
to their counsel, it did not contain any imposition or directive that he inform his clients of the
pretrial conference. The Notice merely stated: You are hereby notified that the above-entitled
case will be heard before this court on the 18th day of June, 1992, at 8:30 a.m. for pre-trial. Such
belated receipt of the notice, which was not attributable to respondents, amounted to a lack of
notice. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring them in default and in denying them the
opportunity to fully ventilate and defend their claim in court.

G.R. No. 140486 February 6, 2001

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, petitioner,


vs.
JESUS S. YUJUICO and AUGUSTO Y. CARPIO, respondents.

FACTS:
On 24 July 1996, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City,
a complaint for the "Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages" against petitioner.
Respondent Yujuico averred being the registered owner of Lot 1 of the subject area along Roxas
Boulevard, Paraaque City. Respondent Carpio, in his case, himself maintained to be the
registered owner of Lot 2. The two lots were originally consolidated in one title registered in the
name of one Fermina Castro.

Sometime in 1989, petitioner Public Estates Authority (PEA) obtained ownership of


various parcels of land along Manila Bay for the purpose of constructing the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road. Private respondents claimed that a subsequent verification survey commissioned
by them showed that the coastal road directly overlapped their property and that a portion of
the area sold by petitioner to the MBDC was also owned by them.

Petitioner created a special committee of three PEA board directors to study the matter
of a possible settlement of the case and to submit its recommendation.

Following a series of negotiations, a compromise agreement was concluded. The


compromise was approved by the trial court.

On 14 September 1998, the new management of PEA filed a petition for relief. Private
respondents opposed the petition and prayed for its dismissal.

The petition for relief was dismissed by the trial court.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari but the
petition was dismissed by the appellate for petitioner's failure to pay the required docket fees
and for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and acted with grave
abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not exempt from the payment of docket and other
legal fees.

HELD:
No.

Section 1 and Section 19, Rule 141, of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

"Sec. 1. Payment of Fees. - Upon the filing of the pleading or other application which
initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full."

"Sec. 19. Government Exempt. - The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities, are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local governments
and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not
exempt from paying such fees."

Section 2, paragraph 10, of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines instrumentality as an


agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. The
term, under the Code, includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-
owned or controlled corporations.

Petitioner is a creation of Presidential Decree No. 1084, dated 04 February 1977, as a


government corporation wholly owned by the Government.

The payment of fees is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure.4 It is also an


indispensable step in the perfection of an appeal. While it is mandatory on the litigant, the court,
however, is not necessarily left without any alternative but to dismiss the appeal for non-
payment of docket fees.
SYSTEM OF CODE PLEADINGS v. COMMON LAW SYSTEM

G.R. No. L-4845 December 24, 1952

L. G. MARQUEZ and Z. GUTIERREZ LORA, plaintiffs.


L. G. Marquez, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO VARELA and CARMEN VARELA, defendants-appellees.
Amelito R. Mutuc for appellant
Jorge V. Jazmines for appellees.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Gutierrez Lora was authorized by defendants to negotiate the sale of their share
or interest in a parcel of land on Plaza Goiti, Manila, and having meet his co-plaintiff L. G.
Marquez, a real estate broker, both of them agreed to work together for the sale of defendant's
property. They found a ready, willing, and able buyer, which accepted defendants' price and
terms, but that thereafter defendants, without any justifiable reason, refused to carry out the
sale and execute the necessary deed therefor; and that as a consequence plaintiffs failed to
receive the commission which they were entitled to receive. The defendants presented a motion
to dismiss the complaint as to L. G . Marquez on the ground that he has no cause of action against
defendants.

The complaint was dismissed on the alleged ground that it states no cause of action
against the defendants.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed.

HELD:
No.

Under the former Code of civil procedure "every action must be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest," and "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and
in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs, " and " if any person having an
interest and in obtaining the relief demanded refuses to join as plaintiff, he may be made a
defendant and the fact of his interest and refusal to join to be stated in the complaint."

The principle underlying the rule is that all persons having a material interest under the
substantive law should be made parties, as distinguished from that of the common law which
allowed only a two-sided controversy, each party to be opposed to the other.

The case at bar clearly falls under the above rule. Plaintiff Marquez is entitled to be paid
his commission out of the very contract of agency between Lora and the defendants; Lora and
he acted jointly in rendering services to defendants under Lora's contract, and the same
questions of law and fact govern their claims. The rules do not require the existence of privity of
contract between Marquez and the defendants as required under the common law; all that they
demand is that Marquez has a material interest in the subject of the action, the right to share in
the broker's commission to be paid Lora under the latter's contract, which right Lora does not
deny.

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE


RULES ON RETROACTIVITY

G.R. No. L-23614 February 27, 1970

PEDRO M. BERMEJO, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23615 February 27, 1970
JOVITA CARMORIN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents-
appellees.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe" were of the crime of falsification of public
or official document. The two accused, being private individuals, conspired and confederated
together and mutually helped each other, and willfully and feloniously prepared and executed a
document consisting of an amended petition for habeas corpus entitled "Pedro M. Bermejo and
Jovita Carmorin, petitioners, vs. Jose M. Bernales and Wilfredo Bernales, respondents", which
petition Pedro M. Bermejo signed while Julia "Doe" placed her thumbmark over the name "Jovita
Carmorin", which petition was subscribed and sworn to by the two accused before the Clerk of
Court, and filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz thus the two accused stated and made it
appear in the amended petition that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita Carmorin as
one of the petitioners when in truth and in fact the said Jovita Carmorin never signed and swore
to it, because it was in fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition as Julia
Carmorin.

The City Judge, Hon. Isidro O. Barrios, issued, on August 24, 1963, an order for the arrest
of accused Bermejo. To prevent his incarceration, said accused put up the necessary bond.

Upon arraignment, Bermejo filed a motion to quash the information alleging the
information did not charge an offense because the amended petition for habeas corpus allegedly
falsified, is not a document contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The city fiscal filed his opposition to the motion to quash.

In G.R. No. L-23615, Jovita Carmorin was charged by respondent City Fiscal Quirico Abela
with perjury for allegedly having "subscribed and swore to an affidavit that she was really the
one who signed with her thumbmark as Jovita Carmorin; the amended petition for habeas
corpus; when in truth and in fact, as she very well knew, she had not done such act of signing
with her thumbmark said petition and it was another person, who signed with a thumbmark said
petition as Jovita Carmorin" The city fiscal also certified that he had conducted the preliminary
investigation in accordance with law before filing the information.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights to due process could have been violated.

HELD:
No.

Section 14, Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court invoked by them has no application in their
cases, it appearing that the new Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964 while the
preliminary investigations conducted by the city fiscal were conducted in 1963. The Rules of
Court are not penal statutes, and they cannot be given retroactive effect.

Since petitioner Bermejo was afforded the opportunity to appear at the preliminary
investigation but did not take advantage of it, he has no one to blame but himself.

Even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify petitioners, but had conducted the
preliminary investigations ex parte, their rights to due process could not have been violated for
they are not entitled as of right to preliminary investigation.
G.R. No. 154034FIRST February 5, 2007

FIRST AQUA SUGAR TRADERS, INC.


-versus-
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

FACTS:
Petitioners First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. and CBN International Corporation were the
plaintiffs in a civil case. Respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands was the defendant in that case.

The trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Petitioners
received a copy of the judgment on October 27, 2000. Hence, they had fifteen days to file a notice
of appeal. Instead, on November 6, 2000, or 10 days after, they opted to file a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in the order dated January 30, 2001. Petitioners claim they
received a copy of the January 30, 2001 order on February 16, 2001 and that they filed a notice
of appeal on the same day.

On February 19, 2001, the trial court gave due course to the notice of appeal on the
premise that the same was filed within the prescribed period.

Respondent, on the other hand, filed a motion to declare the October 16, 2000 judgment
final alleging that petitioners notice of appeal was filed out of time. According to respondent,
the January 30, 2001 order was sent to the address of petitioners counsel and was received there
by a certain Lenie Quilatan on February 9, 2001. Hence, petitioners had only five days left to file
the notice of appeal counted from February 9, 2001, or until February 14, 2001. Thus, the
February 16, 2001 filing was out of time.

Petitioners disputed respondents allegation and maintained their position that the
reckoning point of the remaining 5-day period should be the date of their actual receipt which
was February 16, 2001. They claimed that Quilatan, who allegedly received the January 30, 2001
order on February 9, 2001, was not in any way connected to them or their counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether the notice of appeal was filed on time.

HELD:
Yes.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
A party litigant may file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the
original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.

G.R. No. 154557 February 13, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


- versus -
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao without legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess without license eight (8) pieces of round
timbers and 160 bundles of firewood with a market value of P3,100.00, said forest products not
covered with legal transport document, and willfully and unlawfully load these forest products in
the pumpboat Rickjoy owned by Rico Lipao, nor the accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao holders
of a license issued by the DENR.

The offense is punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, as provided under Section 68 of PD No. 705.

During the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551 and before the RTC rendered its
Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA) 7691 took effect on April 15, 1994 or 15 days after its publication
on March 30, 1994. RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in
criminal cases to cover all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years
irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including civil penalties arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof. Before the amendments of RA 7691, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provided that the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than PhP 4,000, or both such fine
and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof.

The RTC rendered its Judgment, finding private respondents guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged.

On appeal, the CA granted the appeal of private respondents and dismissed the case
before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case against respondents.

HELD:
Yes.

It is quiet glaring from Section 7 of R.A. 7691 that said law has limited retroactivity only
to civil cases. As such, the CA indeed committed grave abuse of discretion as it acted in an
arbitrary and patently erroneous exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

HOW JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED AND DETERMINED

G.R. No. 149588 August 16, 2010


FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and
CARMELITA C. LLAMAS,
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI CITY and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of other forms of
swindling penalized by the Revised Penal Code. Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas sold
their property to Conrado P. Avila, representing it to be free from all liens and encumbrances
while it was leased to the Rural Bank of Imus.

The Regional Trial Court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed a petition for review but it was rejected by the Supreme Court for failure
to state material dates. The Court also denied subsequent motion for reconsideration and
rendered judgment of conviction final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction over the criminal case.
HELD:
Yes.

The established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action determines the jurisdiction of the court.

G.R. No. 154557 February 13, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner


v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 12TH DIVISION, RICO LIPAO, AND RICKSON LIPAO,
respondent

FACTS:
Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao were found in possession of 8 pieces of timbers and 160
bundles of firewood. Having failed to show the necessary license to transport the
aforementioned forest products, they were accused of violating Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277. Accordingly, the offense charged is punishable by Prision Correcional
in its medium period is imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day up to 6 years. The
Regional Trial Court found private respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged.

During the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551 and before the RTC rendered its
Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA) 7691 took effect on April 15, 1994 or 15 days after its publication
on March 30, 1994. RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in
criminal cases to cover all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years
irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including civil penalties arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof. Before the amendments of RA 7691, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provided that the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than PhP 4,000, or both such fine
and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the criminal case against private
respondents despite the effectivity of RA 7691.

HELD:
Yes.

It has been held as a general rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to
be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Where a court has
already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to
the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over
such proceedings in another tribunal.

Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of an action could not be ousted by the
passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which
to criminal cases is prospective in nature.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

G.R No. 151800 November 5, 2009

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN


v.
HEIRS OF VDA. DE VENTURA

FACTS:
Heirs of Margarita Ventura filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for
Falsification of Public Documents and violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 against Zenaida Palacio
and spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang. Palacio being the OIC of DAR designated Celerina to
investigate the claims of the Heirs against her former husband Edilberto. Celerina supported the
report with public documents which she falsified and Palacio issued a recommendation based on
that report to award the landholding in dispute to Edilberto.

The DARAB recommended that the charged against the respondents be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. The CA then took cognizance of the case and granted the provisional
dismissal the complaint against respondent for violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 but denied the
dismissal of the complaint for falsification of public documents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD:
No.

The CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.

That since the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in
criminal cases, its ruling on the case is void.

PRINCIPLE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION

G.R. No. 154557 February 13, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner


v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 12TH DIVISION, RICO LIPAO, AND RICKSON LIPAO,
respondent

FACTS:
Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao were found in possession of 8 pieces of timbers and 160
bundles of firewood. Having failed to show the necessary license to transport the
aforementioned forest products, they were accused of violating Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277. Accordingly, the offense charged is punishable by Prision Correcional
in its medium period is imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day up to 6 years. The
Regional Trial Court found private respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged.

During the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551 and before the RTC rendered its
Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA) 7691 took effect on April 15, 1994 or 15 days after its publication
on March 30, 1994. RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in
criminal cases to cover all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years
irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including civil penalties arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof. Before the amendments of RA 7691, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provided that the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than PhP 4,000, or both such fine
and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the criminal case against private
respondents despite the affectivity of RA 7691.

HELD:
Yes.

It has been held as a general rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to
be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Where a court has
already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to
the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over
such proceedings in another tribunal.

Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of an action could not be ousted by the
passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which
to criminal cases is prospective in nature.

JURISDICTION IN COMPLEX CRIMES

G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009

DAYAP v. SENDIONG, et. al.

FACTS:
EFFECT OF ESTOPPEL ON OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION

G.R. No. L-21450 April 16, 1968

SERAFIN TIJAM
v.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO

FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of sum of money filed by Serafin Tijam and
Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of
the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance
of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
P2,000.00.

The case has already been pending now for 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court
of Appeals adverse decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellants motion to dismiss on the ground of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

HELD:
No.

Laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do


that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court. The Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008

FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE

FACTS: