Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, G.R. No.

136804

Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of
Appeals|

Facts: On May 17, 1994, Respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity)
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1)
illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the
Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification
problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his
complaint on April 18, 1995.

On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by
stipulation Guerrero's account is governed by New York law and this law does not
permit any of Guerrero's claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero's claims
for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees on the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that
the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the
motion.

The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden's affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for
brevity) stated that Guerrero's New York bank account stipulated that the governing
law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero's claims except actual
damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden
affidavit.

The RTC denied the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for
reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC
Orders. In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Bank's motion for
reconsideration.

Ruling of the CA: Sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary
judgment
Issue: W/N the Walden affidavit can serve as proof of the New York law|||

Held: No. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proven.

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign

authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication
or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer.

Exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeal where
attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the
particular foreign laws sought to be established may be allowed and used as basis
for favorable action

However, the bank cannot rely on the exception to support its cause, the Walden
affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The
Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not
only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New
York law on damages|||
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant's personal interpretation
and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence
without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various
U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the
U.S. courts.

Decision of CA Affirmed.
Crescent Petroleum Ltd. v. M/V "Lok Maheshwari", G.R. No. 155014

Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

FACTS:

M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is

owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of India and principally owned by the Government of
India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd.
(Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a
time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered
the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are
corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.

On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum,

Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that
is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for the use and
operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the
Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via
facsimile dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels
and related services, petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of
US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its
supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian
corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.

On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels

amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel
at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice
to petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner
Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which
check was duly encashed.

Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated
November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or
Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V 'Lok Maheshwari'" in the amount of
US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1, 1995.
The period lapsed and several demands were made but no payment was received.
Also, the checks issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the
bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence,
petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest,
tracking fees, and legal fees.

On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner
Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with
prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment" against
respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioner Crescent. The CA reversed
the Trial Courts Decision primarily on the ground of forum non conveniens.

ISSUE: W/N Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the foreign vessel found inside
Philippine waters for the enforcement of a maritime lien against said vessel and/or
its owners and operators.

HELD: The SC Affirmed the Decision of the CA.

First. Following the Lauritzen test: the following factors were considered: (1) place
of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of
foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum ; -- Out of the seven basic factors listed in the
case of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one the law of the forum. All
other elements are foreign Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the
allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the
flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Balancing these basic interests, it
is inconceivable that the Philippine court has any interest in the case that outweighs
the interests of Canada or India for that matter.
Second. P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 is inapplicable following
the factors under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Like the Federal
Maritime Lien Act of the U.S., P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 was
enacted primarily to protect Filipino suppliers and was not intended to create a lien
from a contract for supplies between foreign entities delivered in a foreign port.

Third. Applying P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and rule that a
maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of
the law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign
suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our laws even if they are not
entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping.
Finally. The submission of petitioner is not in keeping with the reasonable
expectation of the parties to the contract. Indeed, when the parties entered into a
contract for supplies in Canada, they could not have intended the laws of a remote
country like the Philippines to determine the creation of a lien by the mere accident
of the Vessel's being in Philippine territory.

It is well-settled that a party whose cause of action or defense depends upon a

foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. Such foreign law is treated as
a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved. Petitioner Crescent's insistence
on enforcing a maritime lien before our courts depended on the existence of a
maritime lien under the proper law. By erroneously claiming a maritime lien under
Philippine law instead of proving that a maritime lien exists under Canadian law,
petitioner Crescent failed to establish a cause of action.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption, the result will still be the
same.
EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 145587

Petition for Review on Certiorari |||

FACTS: Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI
to work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. After Gran had been working
for about five months for OAB, his employment was terminated through OAB's July
9, 1994 letter, 11 on the following grounds:

1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency primarily on

your salary and contract duration.

2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency.

3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions.

On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00
representing his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration releasing
OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.

After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994,
against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western
Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City for
underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: W/N Philippine laws should govern the matters not stated in the
employment contract.

HELD: Yes. the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi
Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes
for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties
(lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all
matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter;
thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded,
is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we
apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented.