[G.R. No. 145391.
August 26, 2002] which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Resolution[1] dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Issue
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya
(Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-
delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case,
filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC
granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed
the civil case.
which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping,
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo
insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the
motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC
ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order
have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil
action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the
Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred
in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment
and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24,
2000.
Hence, this petition.
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of
them may think and believe that the accident was caused by the
fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the
aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence
against the second party. On the other hand, the second party,
together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real
aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the
criminal case.[4]
criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously
and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089,
constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and
Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is dierent from an action
resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in
the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the
only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict
but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action
party in the criminal case.
which can proceed independently of the criminal action.

In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally
defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further
alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question
the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy
of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the
petition raises the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code
while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages
based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions
arose from the same act or omission, they have dierent causes of
action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable
aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
quasi-delict against Laroya.
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative by the provisions of this Chapter.

Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal[5]
that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative
Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with
prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice,
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plainti cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he
being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suered damage
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private
action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the
1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.

is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

Forum-Shopping
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.[8] civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to
there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.[9] file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-
However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Filing of a separate civil action

 Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure liability arising from the oense charged shall be deemed
(1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a instituted with the criminal action unless the oended party
separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
the oended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

the oended party reserved the civil action before the presentation The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action
of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
same act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the and under circumstances aording the oended party a reasonable
criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil opportunity to make such reservation.

liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the x x x

recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the (b) x x x

Civil Code on Human Relations.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi- not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
delict under the 1985 Rules, the oended party had to reserve in the upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action. accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the oended liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions
party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on
act or omission of the accused.
these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions
actions separately waives the others.
based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal
be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and action.[10]

under circumstances aording the oended party a reasonable Under the present Rule 111, the oended party is still given
opportunity to make such reservation.
the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-
In no case may the oended party recover damages twice for the delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the
same act or omission of the accused.
prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the oended party is
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil
December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate
civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to
filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If recover damages ex-delicto.

the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the When civil action may proceed independently

criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo,
the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in who are not the oended parties in the criminal case, can file a
the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action separate civil action against the oended party in the criminal case.
filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:

independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases
the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
filing of the criminal action.
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 oended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal however, may the oended party recover damages twice for the
action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered supplied)

in the criminal action.

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the oended party to bring
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil
The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the the oended party recover damages twice for the same act or
oended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court omission charged in the criminal action.

trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence There is no question that the oended party in the criminal
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the oended party may bring such an action but the oended party may
oended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the
be tried and decided jointly.
oended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in
of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted Cabaero vs. Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
against the private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the
accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for
malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of
clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil
actions and the necessary consequences and implications
thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine
itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any
counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the
accused may file a separate civil case against the oended party
after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the
new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a
cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect
will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the
resolution of the criminal case.
is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address the lacuna
mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred
from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the
criminal case. However, the same provision states that any cause of
action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate
civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the
oended party is litigated in the criminal action.
to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
Conclusion
oended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil
action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the oended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of
the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111
refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil
action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal
action.
of the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of
Thus, the oended party can file two separate suits for the
same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action
to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other
a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum
shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of
the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict.
The only limitation is that the oended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In
most cases, the oended party will have no reason to file a second
civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for
the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be
litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in
the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The
accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the oended party. If the accused does not file a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since
the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is
filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right
criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim
in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the
MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision
the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has
always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950
the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code,
expressly provides that the independent civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA
result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA
declared:
SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON.
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon
to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON
the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q.
acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the RONDARIS, President/Chairman, respondents.
civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may DECISION
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of TINGA, J.:
the result of the latter.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated March 1, 2002,
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code petitioners assail the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
introduced the concept of a civil action separate and independent September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing
from the criminal action although arising from the same act or their petition for certiorari and denying their motion for
omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their complaint to
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their kin.

the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The The following facts are matters of record.

fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan)
apparent than real. In any event, there are sucient remedies under was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan
eect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans
dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old
rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers.
retroactive eect considering the well-settled rule that -
After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suer the
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a
their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil
that extent.[14]
liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby promulgated on December 17, 1998.[2]

GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages
24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q.
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to
SO ORDERED. their reservation to file a separate civil action.[3] They cited therein
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, JJ., concur. the judgment convicting Sibayan.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave. Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of
improper service of summons, prescription and laches, and
defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the
[G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005] dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate
personality of Viron Transit from its ocers.[4]

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among
others, that the right to file a separate action in this case prescribes
in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the
criminal action. As there was no appeal of the decision convicting
Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence
was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that
the cause of action had already prescribed. According to the trial
court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners
cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the
cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought
to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.[5]
physical injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for
dismissal of the complaint as summons was served through a
certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal department without mentioning
her designation or position.
that the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again
that the complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final
judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10)
years from the finality of the judgment.[6] The trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that petitioners
cause of action was based on quasi delict and had prescribed under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more
than four (4) years after the vehicular accident.[7] As regards the
improper service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling
that the complaint ought to be dismissed on this ground.
case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
which dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal.
[8] The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration reasoning that even if the respondent trial court
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as appeal was
available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was
brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of
certiorari in lieu of appeal.[9]
of petitioners in the petition.
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule
that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial
rejection of an existing obligation arising from the criminal liability of
private respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be
enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi
delict. The trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion
when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is
based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had prescribed.
respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the
judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was
procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the Court to exempt this
case from the rigid operation of the rules as they allegedly have a
legitimate grievance to vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and
liability had been adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right
to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment[10] dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist
in order. They point out that the averments in the complaint make
out a cause of action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4) years
should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be
enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the
criminal case. It is Viron Transits contention that the subsidiary
liability of the employer contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the
separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of
Appeals via certiorari was improper as petitioners should have
appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point
out several other procedural lapses allegedly committed by
petitioners, such as lack of certification against forum-shopping;
lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed order
of the trial court; and non-indication of the full names and addresses
Petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated September 14, 2002, while private
respondents filed a Rejoinder[12] dated October 14, 2002, both in
reiteration of their arguments.

We grant the petition.

shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable actual damages.

for a felony is also civilly liable.[13] Such civil liability may consist of In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees
consequential damages.[14] When a criminal action is instituted, the shall be paid by the oended party upon filing thereof in court for
civil liability arising from the oense is impliedly instituted with the trial.

criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the
injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the
accused; second, when the oended party reserves his right to have
the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take
full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third,
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a
separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan.
On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its
decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to
the latters civil liability.

when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their
private suit against the oender by instituting a civil action prior to reservation to file a separate civil action made in the criminal case,
the filing of the criminal case.
petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended Transit and its President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the
in 1988, which governed the institution of the criminal action, as well institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private respondents
as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Section civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its
1, Rule 111 thereof states:
misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is based on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4)
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the oended years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it of the accident.

separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised consistent with petitioners claim that the action was brought to
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit,
of the accused.
such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
actions separately waives the others.
already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the oended
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability
be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for
under circumstances aording the oended party a reasonable quasi delict under the Civil Code.

opportunity to make such reservation.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
In no case may the oended party recover damages twice for the separate civil liabilities on the part of the oender, i.e., (1) civil liability
same act or omission of the accused.
ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
When the oended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
damages, the filing fees for such action as provided in these Rules obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.[15] Either of these
liabilities may be enforced against the oender subject to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plainti cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and
the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules
above-quoted.
liability arising from crime.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the
cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed.
Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened
for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex
delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been
expressly reserved.
only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company[16] was decided
upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus
Company was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property. The plainti made an express reservation for
the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted which
conviction was armed by this Court. Later, plainti filed a separate
civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered
dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was
instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the accident and
thus, had already prescribed. Subsequently, plainti instituted
another action, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus
company. The trial court dismissed the action holding that the
dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the
action to enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action and
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is
not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the
employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character,
the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so
because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with
controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party
being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final
judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the
complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits,
considering petitioners allegations in their complaint, opposition to
the motion to dismiss[17] and motion for reconsideration[18] of the
order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil
This does not oend the policy that the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale
behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same
litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the oender.[19]
However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict
should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for
petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the
This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double
recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have
appealed the order of dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural
misstep, however, should be exempted from the strict application of
the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of securing
substantial justice.[20] We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the
indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a final judgment
of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent
such an injustice.[21]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE
the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders
of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let
the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
 procured the services of Frank for an additional fee of P1,500.00 in
order to determine the exact boundaries of the same by which they
G.R. No. 164601, September 27, 2006
will base the construction of their perimeter fence.

Consequently, Frank placed concrete monuments marked

SPOUSES ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK BATAL, Petitioners, - P.S. on all corners of the lot which were used as guides by Luz and
versus - SPOUSES LUZ SAN PEDRO AND KENICHIRO Kenichiro in erecting a concrete fence measuring about eight (8) feet
TOMINAGA in height and cost them P250,000.00 to build.

Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against Luz
D E C I S I O N
and Kenichiro before the barangay on the ground that the northern
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
portion of their fence allegedly encroached upon a designated right-

of-way known as Lot 1509-D. Upon verification with another

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari surveyor, Luz and Kenichiro found that their wall indeed overlapped
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision[1] dated the adjoining lot. They also discovered that it was not Frank but his
September 29, 2003 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in wife Erlinda Batal (Erlinda), who is a licensed geodetic engineer.

CA-G.R. CV No. 71758, which armed the Decision dated May 31, During their confrontations before the barangay, Frank
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan (RTC); admitted that he made a mistake and oered to share in the
and the CA Resolution[2] dated July 19, 2004.
expenses for the demolition and reconstruction of the questioned

portion of Luz and Kenichiros fence. He however failed to deliver on

This case originated from an action for damages filed with his word, thus the filing of the instant suit.

the RTC by Spouses Luz San Pedro and Kenichiro Tominaga In their defense, the defendants-spouses Frank and
(respondents) against Spouses Erlinda Batal and Frank Batal Erlinda Batal submitted that Frank never represented himself to be a
(petitioners) for failure to exercise due care and diligence by the licensed geodetic engineer. It was Erlinda who supervised her
latter in the preparation of a survey which formed the basis for the husbands work [and t]hat the house and lot of plaintis, Luz and
construction of a perimeter fence that was later discovered to have Kenichiro, were already fenced even before they were contracted to
encroached on a right of way.
do a resurvey of the same and the laying out of the concrete

monuments. The spouses Frank and Erlinda also refuted the

The facts of the case, as found by the RTC and spouses Luzs and Kenichiros allegation of negligence and averred
summarized by the CA, are as follows:
that the subject complaint was instituted to harass them.[3]

The spouses Luz San Pedro (Luz) and Kenichiro Tominaga On May 31, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
(Kenichiro) are the owners of a parcel of land, on which their house dispositive portion of which reads:

was erected, described as Lot 1509-C-3 with an area of 700 square WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
meters situated in Barangay Malis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Said plaintis and against defendants, as follows:

property was acquired by them from one Guillermo Narciso as 1. Ordering the defendants
evidenced by a Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa dated March 18, 1992.
[petitioners] to pay to plaintis
The spouses Luz and Kenichiro then contracted the [respondents] the sum of P6,500.00 as
services of Frank Batal (Frank) who represented himself as a refund for their professional fees by
surveyor to conduct a survey of their lot for the sum of P6,500.00. As reason of the erroneous relocation
Luz and Kenichiro wanted to enclose their property, they again survey of the property in question; 2.
 Ordering the defendants to pay to concrete monuments was without the
plaintis the sum of Three Hundred needed supervision of [respondent]
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) as Erlinda Batal, the one truly qualified to
actual damages; 3. Ordering the supervise the same. x x x x

defendants to pay to plaintis the sum

of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; and;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay to
plaintis the costs of this suit. SO
ORDERED.
The RTC found that indeed the perimeter fence
constructed by the respondents encroached on the right-of-way in
question; that the preponderance of evidence supports the finding
that the encroachment was caused by the negligence of the
petitioners; that, in particular, respondents constructed the fence
Regarding the issue whether the petitioners failed to based on the concrete cyclone monuments that were installed by
exercise due care and diligence in the conduct of the resurvey which petitioner Frank Batal and after he gave his assurance that they can
eventually caused damage to the respondents, the RTC held:
proceed accordingly; that the negligence in the installation of the
As against the bare and self-serving denials of the monuments was due to the fact that petitioner Erlinda Batal, the one
[petitioners], the testimony of [respondent] Luz San Pedro that she truly qualified, did not provide the needed supervision over the work;
constructed the encroaching perimeter fence in question using as and, lastly, that the testimonies of the petitioners on the whole were
guide the cyclone concrete monuments marked P.S. that were not credible.

installed by [petitioner] Frank Batal and his survey team, is more

credible. As testified to by [respondent] Luz San Pedro, she The petitioners appealed to the CA. On September 29,
proceeded with the construction of the perimeter fence in question 2003, the CA rendered its Decision arming the RTC decision in its
upon assurance given by [petitioner] Frank Batal that she could entirety.[6]

already do so as there were already concrete monuments placed on

the boundaries of her property x x x.
In concurring with the findings of the RTC, the CA in
x x x x It does not matter addition held that the petitioners cannot claim that the error of the
that the location plan dated May 3, construction of the fence was due to the unilateral act of
1992 (Exhibit B) was later approved by respondents in building the same without their consent, since the
the DENR, as it is quite apparent that former gave their word that the arrangement of the monuments of
the mistake committed by [petitioner] title accurately reflected the boundaries of the lot; and that, as a
Frank Batal pertains to the wrong result, the northern portion of the fence had to be demolished and
locations of the concrete monuments rebuilt in order to correct the error.

that he placed on the subject property

and which were used or relied upon by Hence, the instant Petition assigning the following errors:

the [respondents] in putting up the

fence in question. Such mistake or I. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling for the Respondents and
negligence happened because quite basing its decision [o]n the following jurisprudence: (a) [A] party,
obviously the installation of said having performed armative acts upon which another person based
his subsequent actions, cannot thereafter refute his acts or renege supported by the evidence on record. For these reasons, the
on the eects of the same, to the prejudice of the latter. (Pureza vs. petitioner's contentions bear no import.

Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 110); and (b) Findings of fact made

by the trial court [are] entitled to great weight and respect. (Lopez vs. Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two dierent senses:
Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 686).
either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or

omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an

II. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling in favor of Respondents by obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other
premising its Decision on [a] misapprehension of facts amounting to obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence
grave abuse of discretion . . . which is also a ground for a Petition for incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed,
Review.
and which increases the liability from such already existing
obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil
The petition must fail.
Code and the immediately following Articles; while culpa contractual

is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.

The petitioners insist that there had been no error in their resurvey,

but rather, the error occurred in respondents fencing; that the Articles 1170 and 1173 provide:

proximate cause of the damage had been respondents own

negligence such that the fencing was done unilaterally and solely by ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
them without the prior approval and supervision of the petitioners. guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
And to justify their case, the petitioners argue that the courts a quo contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

misapprehended the facts. Accordingly, they ask this Court to review

findings of fact.
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the

omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the

A review of the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are matters obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
not ordinarily reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari. Well- of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
established is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and the provisions of articles 1171 and 2202, paragraph 2, shall apply.

CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal save in exceptional circumstances, none of which obtains If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
in the present case. This Court must stress that the findings of fact observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight father of a family shall be required.

when these coincide with the factual findings of the trial court, as in

this case.
In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out

their contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence

The Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there is a
showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of
support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion. The petitioners failed to demonstrate this point. On the
contrary, the finding of the courts a quo that the damage caused to
the respondents was due to petitioners negligence is suciently
in the placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence
that was later constructed. The placement of the markings had been
done solely by petitioner Frank Batal who is not a geodetic engineer.
It was later discovered that it was not he but his wife, petitioner
Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed geodetic engineer and who is,
therefore, the one qualified to do the work. Petitioner Frank Batals
installation of the concrete cyclone monuments had been done
without the adequate supervision of his wife, Erlinda. As a result, the
placement of the monuments did not accurately reflect the
dimensions of the lot. The respondents, upon assurance given by
petitioner Frank Batal that they could proceed with the construction
of the perimeter fence by relying on the purported accuracy of the
placement of the monuments, erected their fence which turned out
to encroach on an adjacent easement. Because of the
encroachment, the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the
fence and, thus, suered damages.
Findings of fact made by the trial court is entitled to great weight and
respect. (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 686)
The Court arms and adopts the findings of the CA, to wit:
Records show that the services of the [petitioners] Frank and Erlinda
were initially contracted to segregate Luz and Kenichiros property
from its adjoining lots. When the [respondent] spouses Luz and
Kenichiro planned to fence the segregated lot, they again
commissioned [petitioners] Frank and Erlinda to conduct a resurvey
in order to determine the precise boundaries of their property upon
which they will base the construction of their fence. It was also
shown that in the course of the resurvey, Frank caused the
installation of monuments of title on the four (4) corners of Luz and
Kenichiros property and that he instructed them to just follow the
same in building their fence.
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
[Petitioners] Frank and Erlinda cannot thus validly claim that the error
in the construction of the northern portion of the fence was due to
the spouses Luz and Kenichiros act of building the same without
their consent. This is considering that the former led the latter to
believe the purported accuracy of the resurvey and exactness of the
lots boundaries based on the monuments of title which they
installed.
It has been ruled that [A] party, having performed armative acts
upon which another person based his subsequent actions, cannot
thereafter refute his acts or renege on the eects of the same, to the
prejudice of the latter. (Pureza v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 110)
The foregoing clearly supports the findings of the RTC that the
spouses Batal committed a mistake in the conduct of their business
that led to the encroachment of plaintis-appellees fence on the
adjoining alley-lot. As a result, the northern portion ha[d] to be torn
down and rebuilt in order to correct the error in its original
construction. The defendants-appellants cannot be excused from
the eects of their actions in the survey of plaintis-appellees lot.
We therefore concur with the findings of the RTC holding
defendants-appellants liable for damages in the case at bar.
Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for
damages suered by the respondents in accordance with Articles
1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code,[16] which state:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are
the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Thus, the Court agrees with the CAs armance of the findings of the
RTC on the matter of damages, to wit:
Going now to the claims for damages, Engr. Arnold Martin testified
on his computation and estimate (Exhibits G and G-1) that the total
cost for the demolition and reconstruction of the perimeter fence in
question would be in the total amount of P428,163.90, and this was
not at all disputed by the defendants, whose counsel waived cross-
examination. This estimate is practically double the amount of the
cost of constructing said fence as testified to by plainti Luz San
Pedro as she was told that it is much costlier to demolish and
reconstruct a fence than to simply erect one because of the added
expense involved in tearing it down and hauling its debris. On the SO ORDERED.

other hand, said plainti stated that the iron decorative grills of the
fence, which is re-usable, cost her P50,000.00, and it is only proper G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

to deduct said amount from the total cost of reconstructing the VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,

fence in question. At the same time, some figures in the said vs.

estimate appear to be quite excessive, such as the estimated cost COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
for demolition which was quoted at P25,000.00 in addition to the FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.

amount of excavation priced at P30,000.00 and the cost of hauling

of scrap materials at P10,000.00. The court believes that the sum of MENDOZA, J.:

P300,000.00 for the demolition and reconstruction of the fence in This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court
question would be reasonable considering that the original cost for of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of
its construction was only about P200,000.00, and considering the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding
further that its iron grills are re-usable.
damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as
plainti in an action for breach of contract of carriage.

The plaintis are likewise entitled to recover attorneys fees

considering that they were compelled by the defendants to resort to The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

court action in order to protect their rights and interest, as

defendants, particularly defendant Frank Batal, failed and refused At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent
repeatedly to even attend the confrontation of conciliation meetings Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in
arranged between him and the plaintis by the barangay authorities Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger
concerned, and to honor his promise to help in shouldering the cost jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the
of reconstructing the fence in question.
jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the
On the other hand, there is no legal or factual bases for the claim of back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

the plaintis for moral or exemplary damages as there was no On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney
showing at all that defendants acted with malice or in bad faith.
stopped to let a passenger o. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that in the doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
damages cannot be awarded. (R & B Surety Insurance Co. v. result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal
Intermediate Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 736; Guita v. Court of third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying
Appeals, 139 SCRA 576).[17]
skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and

case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she
AFFIRMED.
would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have

to ambulate in crutches during said period.

Costs against petitioners.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in supported by evidence.

failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.

Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against The petition has no merit.

Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.

took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by

Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch
37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to
Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a
contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier
failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The
appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the
same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon
the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.

and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
portion of its decision reads:
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
Vicente Calalas to pay plainti-appellant:
his destination.2 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
(5) to pay the costs.
carrier the burden of proof.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of
the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be
to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its
passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the
truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage
to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and
the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him
and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the
broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the
highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136,
as amended, or the Land Transportation and Trac Code, which
provides:

diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of

passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of Sec. 54. Obstruction of Trac. No person shall drive his motor
death or injury to passengers. It provides:
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of
any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary vehicles on the highway.

diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
of each case.
violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor
further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his
while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is vehicle than its registered capacity.

further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained
circumstances.
by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common transporting passengers.

carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted

negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of
petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
the care of his passengers.
petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very inevitable.3 This requires that the following requirements be present:
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to
against petitioner's contention.
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to
the
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of
carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a
that it is excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.
well taken.
The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the
hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indierent to the
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
Plainti-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.

student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University,

majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury, she was not WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
able to enroll in the second semester of that school year. She 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED,
testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to pursue DELETED.

her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my leg which SO ORDERED.

has a defect already."

Plainti-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under G.R. No. 180440 December 5, 2012

confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, Petitioner,

result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she vs.

has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD.
to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because And FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION,
"my left leg . . . has a defect already."
Respondents.

Those are her physical pains and moral suerings, the inevitable D E C I S I O N

bedfellows of the injuries that she suered. Under Article 2219 of the PEREZ, J.:

Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of
P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the
items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the
mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764,
in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in
For this Courts resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007, arming
the Decision2 of Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City in Civil Case No. 96-1367 dated 21 February 2006,
dismissing for lack of merit herein petitioner Dr. Genevieve L.
Huangs Complaint for Damages. Assailed as well is the Court of
Appeals Resolution3 dated 5 November 2007 denying for lack of
merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed on 28
2220.
August 1996 by petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang4 against herein
respondents Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI)5 and Dusit Thani Public
Co., Ltd. (DTPCI),6 as owners of Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit
Hotel); 7 and co-respondent First Lepanto Taisho Insurance
Corporation (First Lepanto),8 as insurer of the aforesaid hotel. The
said Complaint was premised on the alleged negligence of
respondents PHI and DTPCIs sta, in the untimely putting o all the
lights within the hotels swimming pool area, as well as the locking of
the main entrance door of the area, prompting petitioner to grope for
a way out. While doing so, a folding wooden counter top fell on her
head causing her serious brain injury. The negligence was allegedly
compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCIs failure to render
prompt and adequate medical assistance.
the hotels coee shop and went home. Thereupon, petitioner
Petitioners version of the antecedents of this case is as follows:
started to feel extraordinary dizziness accompanied by an
On 11 June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit
Hotel, invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a
swim at the hotels swimming pool facility. They started bathing at
around 5:00 p.m. At around 7:00 p.m., the hotels swimming pool
attendant informed them that the swimming pool area was about to
be closed. The two subsequently proceeded to the shower room
adjacent to the swimming pool to take a shower and dress up.
However, when they came out of the bathroom, the entire swimming
pool area was already pitch black and there was no longer any
person around but the two of them. They carefully walked towards
the main door leading to the hotel but, to their surprise, the door was
locked.9
MRI examination of the brain shows scattered areas of
Petitioner and Delia waited for 10 more minutes near the door
hoping someone would come to their rescue but they waited in vain.
Delia became anxious about their situation so petitioner began to
walk around to look for a house phone. Delia followed petitioner.
After some time, petitioner saw a phone behind the lifeguards
counter. While slowly walking towards the phone, a hard and heavy
object, which later turned out to be the folding wooden counter top,
fell on petitioners head that knocked her down almost unconscious.
10
Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel
telephone operator of the incident. Not long after, the hotel sta
arrived at the main entrance door of the swimming pool area but it
took them at least 20 to 30 minutes to get inside. When the door
was finally opened, three hotel chambermaids assisted petitioner by
placing an ice pack and applying some ointment on her head. After
petitioner had slightly recovered, she requested to be assisted to the
hotels coee shop to have some rest. Petitioner demanded the
services of the hotel physician.11
Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. She approached
petitioner and introduced herself as the hotel physician. However,
instead of immediately providing the needed medical assistance, Dr.
Dalumpines presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it be signed
by petitioner, otherwise, the hotel management will not render her
any assistance. Petitioner refused to do so.12
After eating her dinner and having rested for a while, petitioner left
uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which lasted until the
following day. Petitioner was constrained to stay at home, thus,
missing all her important appointments with her patients. She also
began experiencing "on" and "o" severe headaches that caused
her three (3) sleepless nights.13
Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a certain Dr. Perry Noble (Dr.
Noble), a neurologist from Makati Medical Center, who required her
to have an X-ray and a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) tests.14
The MRI Report15 dated 23 August 1995 revealed the following
findings:
CONSULTATION REPORT:
intraparenchymal contusions and involving mainly the left middle
and posterior temporal and slightly the right anterior temporal lobe.
Other small areas of contusions with suggestive pertechiae are seen
in the left fronto-parietal, left parieto-occipital and with deep frontal
periventricular subcortical and cortical regions. There is no mass
eect nor signs of localized hemorrhagic extravasation.
The ventricles are not enlarged, quite symmetrical without shifts or
deformities; the peripheral sulci are within normal limits.
The C-P angles, petromastoids, sella, extrasellar and retro orbital
areas appear normal.
The brainstem is unremarkable.
IMPRESSION: Scattered small intraparenchymal contusions mainly
involving the left middle-posterior temporal lobe and also right
medial anterior temporal, both deep frontal subcortical, left parieto-
occipital subcortical and cortical regions. Ischemic etiology not ruled Sometime in 1996, petitioner consulted as well a certain Dr. Victor
out. No localized intra - or extracerebral hemorrhage.16
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), an ophthalmologist from the Makati Medical
Petitioner claimed that the aforesaid MRI result clearly showed that Center, because of her poor vision, which she has experienced for
her head was bruised. Based also on the same MRI result, Dr. Noble several months.29 Petitioners Eye Report dated 5 March 199630
told her that she has a very serious brain injury. In view thereof, Dr. issued by Dr. Lopez stated: "IMPRESSION: Posterior vitreous
Noble prescribed the necessary medicine for her condition.17
detachment, right eye of floaters." Dr. Lopez told petitioner that her
Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Ofelia Adapon, also a detached eye is permanent and very serious. Dr. Lopez then
neurologist from Makati Medical Center, who required her to undergo prescribed an eye drop to petitioner.31

an Electroencephalogram examination (EEG) to measure the For petitioners frustration to dissipate and to regain her former
electrostatic in her brain.18 Based on its result,19 Dr. Ofelia Adapon strength and physical well-being, she consulted another neuro-
informed her that she has a serious conditiona permanent one. Dr. surgeon from Makati Medical Center by the name of Dr. Leopoldo P.
Ofelia Adapon similarly prescribed medicines for her brain injury.20
Pardo, Jr. (Dr. Pardo, Jr.).32 She disclosed to Dr. Pardo, Jr. that at the
Petitioners condition did not get better. Hence, sometime in age of 18 she suered a stroke due to mitral valve disease and that
September 1995, she consulted another neuro-surgeon by the name she was given treatments, which also resulted in thrombocytopenia.
of Dr. Renato Sibayan (Dr. Sibayan), who required her to have an X- In Dr. Pardo, Jr.s medical evaluation of petitioner dated 15 May
ray test.21 According to petitioner, Dr. Sibayans finding was the 1996,33 he made the following diagnosis and opinion:

same as those of the previous doctors that she had consultedshe DIAGNOSIS AND OPINION:

has a serious brain injury.22

This patient sustained a severe head injury in (sic) 11 June 1995 and
By reason of the unfortunate 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotels as a result of which she developed the following injuries:

swimming pool area, petitioner also started to feel losing her 1. Cerebral Concussion and Contusion

memory, which greatly aected and disrupted the practice of her 2. Post-traumatic Epilepsy

chosen profession.23 Thus, on 25 October 1995, petitioner, through 3. Post-concussional Syndrome

counsel, sent a demand letter24 to respondents PHI and DTPCI 4. Minimal Brain Dysfunction

seeking payment of an amount not less than P100,000,000.00 5. Cervical Sprain, chronic recurrent

representing loss of earnings on her remaining life span. But, It is my opinion that the symptoms she complained of in the
petitioners demand was unheeded.
foregoing history are all related to and a result of the injury sustained
In November 1995, petitioner went to the United States of America on 11 June 1995.

(USA) for further medical treatment. She consulted a certain Dr. It is further my opinion that the above diagnosis and complaints do
Gerald Steinberg and a certain Dr. Joel Dokson25 from Mount Sinai materially aect her duties and functions as a practicing physician
Hospital who both found that she has "post traumatic-post and dermatologist, and that she will require treatment for an
concussion/contusion cephalgias-vascular and neuralgia."26 She undetermined period of time.

was then prescribed to take some medications for severe pain and The percentage of disability is not calculated at this time and will
to undergo physical therapy. Her condition did not improve so she require further evaluation and observation.34

returned to the Philippines.27

Dr. Pardo, Jr. then advised petitioner to continue her medications.35

Petitioner, once again, consulted Dr. Sibayan, who simply told her to
just relax and to continue taking her medicines. Petitioner also
consulted other neurologists, who all advised her to just continue her
medications and to undergo physical therapy for her neck pain.28
advised her to undergo physical therapy. Her symptoms, however,
Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Tenchavez36 for her follow-
up EEG.37 He similarly prescribed medicine for petitioners deep
brain injury. He also gave her pain killer for her headache and
persisted all the more.38

In 1999, petitioner consulted another neurologist at the Makati
Medical Center by the name of Dr. Martesio Perez (Dr. Perez)
because of severe fleeting pains in her head, arms and legs;
diculty in concentration; and warm sensation of the legs, which
symptoms also occurred after the 11 June 1995 incident. Upon
examination, Dr. Perez observed that petitioner has been
experiencing severe pains and she has a slight diculty in
concentration. He likewise noted that there was a slight spasm of
petitioners neck muscle but, otherwise, there was no objective
neurologic finding. The rest of petitioners neurologic examination
was essentially normal.39
petitioner, who told her that she was hit on the head by a folding
Dr. Perezs neurologic evaluation40 of petitioner reflected, among
others: (1) petitioners past medical history, which includes, among
others, mitral valve stenosis; (2) an interpretation of petitioners EEG
results in October 1995 and in January 1999, i.e., the first EEG
showed sharp waves seen bilaterally more on the left while the
second one was normal; and (3) interpretation of petitioners second
MRI result, i.e., petitioner has a permanent damage in the brain,
which can happen either after a head injury or after a stroke. Dr.
Perez concluded that petitioner has post-traumatic or post
concussion syndrome.41
Dalumpines had already chanced upon Delia and petitioner at the
Respondents, on the other hand, denied all the material allegations
of petitioner and, in turn, countered the latters statement of facts,
thus:
the hotels swimming pool area. When asked by Dr. Dalumpines how
According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sucient notice had
been posted on the glass door of the hotel leading to the swimming
pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that the
swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.42
Though the hotels swimming pool area is open only between the
aforestated time, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for,
(1) security reasons; (2) housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning
of the swimming pool surroundings; and (3) people doing their
exercise routine at the Slimmers World Gym adjacent to the
swimming pool area, which was then open until 10:00 p.m., to have
a good view of the hotels swimming pool. Even granting that the
lights in the hotels swimming pool area were turned o, it would not
render the area completely dark as the Slimmers World Gym near it
was well-illuminated.43
however, had nothing to do with the 11 June 1995 incident. Instead,
Further, on 11 June 1995, at round 7:00 p.m., the hotels swimming
pool attendant advised petitioner and Delia to take their showers as
it was already closing time. Afterwards, at around 7:40 p.m., Pearlie
Benedicto-Lipana (Ms. Pearlie), the hotel sta nurse, who was at the
hotel clinic located at the mezzanine floor, received a call from the
hotel telephone operator informing her that there was a guest
requiring medical assistance at the hotels swimming pool area
located one floor above the clinic.44
Immediately, Ms. Pearlie got hold of her medical kit and hurriedly
went to the hotels swimming pool area. There she saw Delia and
wooden counter top. Although petitioner looked normal as there was
no indication of any blood or bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie still
asked her if she needed any medical attention to which petitioner
replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not need any
medical attention. Petitioner, instead, requested for a hirudoid cream
to which Ms. Pearlie acceded.45
At about 8:00 p.m., after attending to petitioner, Ms. Pearlie went
back to the hotel clinic to inform Dr. Dalumpines of the incident at
the hotels swimming pool area. But before she could do that, Dr.
hotels coee shop and the latter reported to Dr. Dalumpines that her
head was hit by a folding wooden counter top while she was inside
she was, petitioner responded she is a doctor, she was fine and she
was already attended to by the hotel nurse, who went at the hotels
swimming pool area right after the accident. Dr. Dalumpines then
called Ms. Pearlie to verify the same, which the latter confirmed.46
Afterwards, Dr. Dalumpines went back to petitioner and checked the
latters condition. Petitioner insisted that she was fine and that the
hirudoid cream was enough. Having been assured that everything
was fine, Dr. Dalumpines requested petitioner to execute a
handwritten certification47 regarding the incident that occurred that
night. Dr. Dalumpines then suggested to petitioner to have an X-ray
test. Petitioner replied that it was not necessary. Petitioner also
refused further medical attention.48
On 13 June 1995, petitioner called up Dr. Dalumpines. The call,
petitioner merely engaged in small talk with Dr. Dalumpines while
having her daily massage. The two talked about petitioners personal her allegation that the lights in the hotels swimming pool area were
matters, i.e., past medical history, dierences with siblings and shut o at the time of the incident. She did not even present her
family over inheritance and diculty in practice. Petitioner even friend, Delia, to corroborate her testimony. More so, petitioners
disclosed to Dr. Dalumpines that she once fell from a horse; that she testimony was contradicted by one of the witnesses presented by
had a stroke; had hysterectomy and is incapable of having children the respondents who positively declared that it has been a normal
for her uterus had already been removed; that she had blood practice of the hotel management not to put o the lights until 10:00
disorder, particularly lack of platelets, that can cause bleeding; and p.m. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming
she had an "on" and "o" headaches. Petitioner oftentimes called pool surroundings, including the toilets and counters. Also, the lights
Dr. Dalumpines at the hotel clinic to discuss topics similar to those were kept on for security reasons and for the people in the nearby
discussed during their 13 June 1995 conversation.49
gym to have a good view of the swimming pool while doing their
Also, during one of their telephone conversations, petitioner exercise routine. Besides, there was a remote possibility that the
requested for a certification regarding the 11 June 1995 incident hotels swimming pool area was in complete darkness as the
inside the hotels swimming pool area. Dr. Dalumpines accordingly aforesaid gym was then open until 10:00 p.m., and the lights radiate
issued Certification dated 7 September 1995, which states that:50
to the hotels swimming pool area. As such, petitioner would not
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
have met the accident had she only acted with care and caution.54

This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was The trial court further struck down petitioners contention that the
called to attend to an accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June hotel management did not extend medical assistance to her in the
1995.
aftermath of the accident. Records showed that the hotel
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the management immediately responded after being notified of the
folding countertop fell on her head when she lifted it to enter the accident. The hotel nurse and the two chambermaids placed an ice
lifeguards counter to use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.
pack on petitioners head. They were willing to extend further
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpines at the Coee Shop. emergency assistance but petitioner refused and merely asked for a
After narrating the poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines hirudoid cream. Petitioner even told them she is a doctor and she
oer of assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream was was fine. Even the medical services oered by the hotel physician
enough and that petitioner being a doctor herself, knew her were turned down by petitioner. Emphatically, petitioner cannot fault
condition and she was all right.
the hotel for the injury she sustained as she herself did not heed the
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever warning that the swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to
purpose it may serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City.51 (Emphasis 7:00 p.m. As such, since petitioners own negligence was the
supplied).
immediate and proximate cause of her injury, she cannot recover
Petitioner personally picked up the afore-quoted Certification at the damages.55

hotel clinic without any objection as to its contents.52

The trial court similarly observed that the records revealed no
From 11 June 1995 until 7 September 1995, the hotel clinic never indication that the head injury complained of by petitioner was the
received any complaint from petitioner regarding the latters result of the alleged 11 June 1995 accident. Firstly, petitioner had a
condition. The hotel itself neither received any written complaint past medical history which might have been the cause of her
from petitioner.53
recurring brain injury. Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not
After trial, the court a quo in its Decision dated 21 February 2006 prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995 accident and the
dismissed petitioners Complaint for lack of merit.
brain damage suered by petitioner. Even Dr. Perez himself testified
The trial court found petitioners testimony self-serving, thus, devoid that the symptoms being experienced by petitioner might have been
of credibility. Petitioner failed to present any evidence to substantiate due to factors other than the head trauma she allegedly suered. It
bears stressing that petitioner had been suering from dierent At the outset, it is necessary for our purpose to determine whether
kinds of brain problems since she was 18 years old, which may have to decide this case on the theory that herein respondents PHI and
been the cause of the recurring symptoms of head injury she is DTPCI are liable for breach of contract or on the theory of quasi-
experiencing at present. Absent, therefore, of any proof establishing delict.

the causal relation between the injury she allegedly suered on 11 x x x x

June 1995 and the head pains she now suers, her claim must fail.
Thirdly, Dr. Teresita Sanchezs (Dr. Sanchez) testimony cannot be
relied upon since she testified on the findings and conclusions of
persons who were never presented in court. Ergo, her testimony
thereon was hearsay. Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/
certifications issued by myriads of doctors whom petitioner sought
It cannot be gainsaid that herein petitioners use of the hotels pool
was only upon the invitation of Delia, the hotels registered guest. As
such, she cannot claim contractual relationship between her and the
hotel. Since the circumstances of the present case do not evince a
contractual relation between petitioner and respondents, the rules
on quasi-delict , thus, govern.

for examination or treatment were neither identified nor testified to
by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot
be given probative value. Even assuming that petitioner suered
head injury as a consequence of the 11 June 1995 accident, she
cannot blame anyone but herself for staying at the hotels swimming
The pertinent provision of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict."

pool area beyond its closing hours and for lifting the folding wooden A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-
counter top that eventually hit her head.56
delict or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
For petitioners failure to prove that her serious and permanent injury between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express
was the result of the 11 June 1995 accident, thus, her claim for or implied. Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the
actual or compensatory damages, loss of income, moral damages, following requisites must concur: (a) damages suered by the
exemplary damages and attorneys fees, must all fail.57
plainti; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
With regard to respondent First Lepantos liability, the trial court person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
ruled that under the contract of insurance, suce it to state that cause and eect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
absent any cause for any liability against respondents PHI and and the damages incurred by the plainti.

DTPCI, respondent First Lepanto cannot be made liable thereon.

Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals PHI and DTPCI and its employees were negligent? We do not think
with the following assignment of errors: (1) the trial court erred in so. Several factors militate against petitioners contention.

finding that the testimony of petitioner is self-serving and thus void
of credibility; (2) the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of
proximate cause in cases of breach of contract and even assuming
arguendo that the doctrine is applicable, petitioner was able to prove
by sucient evidence the causal connection between her injuries
and respondents PHI and DTPCIs negligent act; and (3) the trial
court erred in holding that petitioner is not entitled to damages.58
the advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter took her
On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool areas closing time
is 7:00 p.m.. She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she
was well aware of the sign when she and Delia entered the pool
area. Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, of the pools closing time,
she took the risk of overstaying when she decided to take shower
and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In fact, it was only upon
shower.

arming the findings and conclusions of the trial court.

Two. She admitted, through her certification that she lifted the
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this wise:
wooden bar countertop, which then fell onto her head. The
admission in her certificate proves the circumstances surrounding
the occurrence that transpired on the night of 11 June 1995. This is (3) Whether or not the cause of action of the petitioner can be based
contrary to her assertion in the complaint and testimony that, while on both breach of contract and tort.

she was passing through the counter door, she was suddenly
knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she
admitted having lifted the counter top, it was her own doing,
therefore, that made the counter top fell on to her head.
superior.
(4) Whether or not it is respondents PHI and DTPCI and its
employees who are liable to the petitioner for negligence, applying
the well-established doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat

Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioners assertion that the (5) Whether the petitioners debilitating and permanent injuries were
pool area was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a a result of the accident she suered at the hotel on 11 June 1995.

telephone at the counter after searching for one. It must be noted (6) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the payment of
that petitioner and Delia had walked around the pool area with ease damages, attorneys fees, interest, and the costs of suit.

since they were able to proceed to the glass entrance door from (7) Whether or not the respondent insurance company is liable, even
shower room, and back to the counter area where the telephone was directly, to the petitioner.

located without encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, she (8) Whether or not petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
could have easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something decision of the Court of Appeals is pro forma.60

while searching for the telephone. This negates her assertion that the Petitioner argues that the rule that "findings of fact of the lower
pool area was completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.
courts are conclusive and must be respected on appeal" finds no
x x x x
application herein because this case falls under the jurisprudentially
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion established exceptions. Moreover, since the rationale behind the
than that the proximate and immediate cause of the injury of afore-mentioned rule is that "the trial judge is in a vantage point to
petitioner was due to her own negligence.
appreciate the conduct and behavior of the witnesses and has the
Moreover, petitioner failed to suciently substantiate that the unexcelled opportunity to evaluate their testimony," one logical
medical symptoms she is currently experiencing are the direct result exception to the rule that can be deduced therefrom is when the
of the head injury she sustained on 11 June 1995 as was aptly judge who decided the case is not the same judge who heard and
discussed in the lower courts findings.
tried the case.

x x x x
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals in ruling that no
It bears stressing that in civil cases, the law requires that the party contractual relationship existed between her and respondents PHI
who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the armative of the and DTPCI since her use of the hotels swimming pool facility was
issue has the burden of proving it. Hence, for petitioner to be entitled only upon the invitation of the hotels registered guest. On the
to damages, she must show that she had suered an actionable contrary, petitioner maintains that an implied contract existed
injury. Regrettably, petitioner failed in this regard.59 (Emphasis between them in view of the fact that the hotel guest status extends
supplied).
to all those who avail of its servicesits patrons and invitees. It
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit follows then that all those who patronize the hotel and its facilities,
in a Resolution dated 5 November 2007.
including those who are invited to partake of those facilities, like
Hence, this Petition raising the following issues:
petitioner, are generally regarded as guests of the hotel. As such,
(1) Whether or not the findings of fact of the trial court and of the respondents PHI and DTPCI are responsible by implied contract for
Court of Appeals are conclusive in this case.
the safety and welfare of petitioner while the latter was inside their
(2) Whether or not herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are premises by exercising due care, which they failed to do.

responsible by implied contract to exercise due care for the safety Petitioner even asserts that the existence of a contract between the
and welfare of the petitioner.
parties does not bar any liability for tort since the act that breaks a
contract may also be a tort. Hence, the concept of change of theory
of cause of action pointed to by respondents is irrelevant.
respondents PHI and DTPCI are liable for quasi-delict under Articles
Petitioner similarly avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and
respondeat superior are applicable in this case. She argues that a
person who goes in a hotel without a "bukol" or hematoma and
comes out of it with a "bukol" or hematoma is a clear case of res
ipsa loquitur. It was an accident caused by the fact that the hotel
sta was not present to lift the heavy counter top for petitioner as is
normally expected of them because they negligently locked the main
entrance door of the hotels swimming pool area. Following the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondents PHI and DTPCIs
negligence is presumed and it is incumbent upon them to prove
otherwise but they failed to do so. Further, respondents PHI and
DTPCI failed to observe all the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employees, hence, following
the doctrine of respondeat superior, they were liable for the negligent
acts of their sta in not verifying if there were still people inside the
swimming pool area before turning o the lights and locking the
door. Had respondents PHI and DTPCIs employees done so,
petitioner would not have been injured. Since respondents PHI and
DTPCIs negligence need not be proved, the lower courts erred in
shifting the burden to petitioner and, thereafter, holding the hotel and
its employees not negligent for petitioners failure to prove their
negligence. Moreover, petitioner alleges that there was no
contributory negligence on her part for she did not do anything that
could have contributed to her injury. And, even if there was, the
same does not bar recovery.
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
Petitioner equally declares that the evidence on record, including the
objective medical findings, had firmly established that her permanent
debilitating injuries were the direct result of the 11 June 1995
accident inside the hotels swimming pool area. This fact has not
been totally disputed by the respondents. Further, the medical
experts who had been consulted by petitioner were in unison in their
diagnoses of her condition. Petitioner was also able to prove that the
falling of the folding wooden counter top on her head while she was
at the hotels swimming pool area was the cause of her head, eye
and neck injuries.
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
Petitioner reiterates her claim for an award of damages, to wit:
actual, including loss of income; moral, exemplary; as well as
attorneys fees, interest and costs of suit. She states that
19, 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code. At the same time, they are
liable under an implied contract for they have a public duty to give
due courtesy, to exercise reasonable care and to provide safety to
hotel guests, patrons and invitees. Respondent First Lepanto, on the
other hand, is directly liable under the express contract of insurance.
Lastly, petitioner contends that her Motion for Reconsideration
before the Court of Appeals was not pro forma for it specifically
pointed out the alleged errors in the Court of Appeals Decision.
The instant Petition is devoid of merit.
Primarily, only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this
Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.61 This Court is not a trier of facts and it is beyond its
function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of
the parties.62 Besides, this Court adheres to the long standing
doctrine that the factual findings of the trial court, especially when
armed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the parties and
this Court.63 Nonetheless, this Court has, at times, allowed
exceptions thereto, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the Court of Appeals findings are contrary to those by the
trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a dierent conclusion.64
This Court examined the records, including the TSNs, and found no
Upon meticulous perusal of the records, however, this Court finds
that none of these exceptions is obtaining in this case. No such
justifiable or compelling reasons exist for this Court to depart from
the general rule. This Court will not disturb the factual findings of the
trial court as armed by the Court of Appeals and adequately
supported by the evidence on record.
Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on
Also, this Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court
simply because the judge who heard and tried the case was not the
same judge who penned the decision. This fact alone does not
diminish the veracity and correctness of the factual findings of the
trial court.65 Indeed, "the ecacy of a decision is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague
who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is showing of grave
abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him."66 In this
case, there was none.
Presently, petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based
It bears stressing that in this jurisdiction there is a disputable
presumption that the trial courts decision is rendered by the judge in
the regular performance of his ocial duties. While the said
presumption is only disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted
or overcame by other evidence. Encompassed in this presumption of
regularity is the presumption that the trial court judge, in resolving
the case and drafting the decision, reviewed, evaluated, and
weighed all the evidence on record. That the said trial court judge is
not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence is
of little consequence when the records and transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) are complete and available for
consideration by the former,67 just like in the present case.
7. THAT, Hotel guest Delia started to panic while petitioner pacified
Irrefragably, the fact that the judge who penned the trial courts
decision was not the same judge who heard the case and received
the evidence therein does not render the findings in the said decision
erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor of
witnesses may sway a trial court judge in deciding a case, it is not,
and should not be, his only consideration. Even more vital for the
trial court judges decision are the contents and substance of the
witnesses testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, as well as the
object and documentary evidence submitted and made part of the
records of the case.68
reason to disturb the factual findings of both lower courts. This
Court, thus, upholds their conclusiveness.
In resolving the second and third issues, a determination of the
cause of action on which petitioners Complaint for Damages was
anchored upon is called for.
account of their negligence but not on any breach of contract.
Surprisingly, when the case was elevated on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner had a change of heart and later claimed that an
implied contract existed between her and respondents PHI and
DTPCI and that the latter were liable for breach of their obligation to
keep her safe and out of harm. This allegation was never an issue
before the trial court. It was not the cause of action relied upon by
the petitioner not until the case was before the Court of Appeals.
both on quasi-delict and breach of contract.
A perusal of petitioners Complaint evidently shows that her cause of
action was based solely on quasi-delict. Telling are the following
allegations in petitioners Complaint:
6. THAT, in the evening of 11 June 1995, between the hours from
7:00 to 8:00 oclock, after herein petitioner and her friend from New
York, Delia, the latter being then a Hotel guest, were taking their
shower after having a dip in the hotels swimming pool, without any
notice or warning, the Hotels sta put o all the lights within the
pool area including the lights on the hallway and also locked the
main entrance door of the pool area, x x x;
her by telling her not to worry as they would both find their way out.
Petitioner knowing that within the area there is a house phone,
started to look around while Delia was following her, eventually
petitioner saw a phone behind the counter x x x, that while slowly
moving on towards the phone on a stooping manner due to the
darkness CAUSED BY UNTIMELY AND NEGLIGENTLY PUTTING
OFF WITH THE LIGHTS BY THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS PHI AND
DTPCIS EMPLOYEE while passing through the open counter door
with its Folding Counter Top also opened, x x x, a hard and heavy
object fell onto the head of the petitioner that knocked her down embarrassment with her Diplomate friends in the profession and
almost unconscious which hard and heavy object turned out to be industry, her social standing in the community was greatly aected
the Folding Counter Top;
and hence, respondents PHI and DTPCI must be imposed the
8. THAT, Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified hereunder damages, prayed for x x x and Artile (sic) 2176 and 2199
the Hotel Telephone Operator about the incident, immediately the of the New Civil Code of the Philippines x x x.

hotel stas (sic) arrived but they were stranded behind the main door x x x x

of the pool entrance and it too (sic) them more than twenty (20) 22. THAT, as to Moral, Exemplary and Actual Damages, as well as
minutes to locate the hotel maintenance employee who holds the petitioners Loss of Income, the amounts are stated in its prayer
key of the said main entrance door;
hereunder.69

9. THAT, when the door was opened, two Hotel Chamber Maids
assisted the petitioner to get out of the counter door. Petitioner
being a Physician tried to control her feelings although groggy and
requested for a HURIDOID, a medicine for HEMATOMA, as a huge
lump developed on her head while the two Chamber Maids assisted
petitioner by holding the bag of ice on her head and applying the
medicine on the huge lump;
brain injury. The said negligence was allegedly compounded by
10. THAT, petitioner after having recovered slightly from her
nightmare, though still feeling weak, asked to be assisted to the
Hotel Coee Shop to take a rest but requested for the hotels
Physician. Despite her insistent requests, the Dusit Hotel refused to
lift a finger to assists petitioner who was then in distress until a lady
It is clear from petitioners allegations that her Complaint for
Damages was predicated on the alleged negligence of respondents
PHI and DTPCIs sta in the untimely putting o of all the lights
within the hotels swimming pool area, as well as the locking of its
main door, prompting her to look for a way out leading to the fall of
the folding wooden counter top on her head causing her serious
respondents PHI and DTPCIs failure to render prompt and adequate
medical assistance. These allegations in petitioners Complaint
constitute a cause of action for quasi-delict, which under the New
Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence.70

approached and introduced herself as the Hotels house Doctor.
Instead however of assisting petitioner by asking her what kind of
assistance the Hotel could render, in a DISCOURTEOUS MANNER
presented instead a paper and demanding petitioner to ax her
signature telling her that the Hotel Management would only assists
It is evident from petitioners Complaint and from her open court
testimony that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts
committed against her by respondents PHI and DTPCI, through their
management and sta. It is now too late in the day to raise the said
argument for the first time before this Court.71

and answer for all expenses incurred if petitioner signs the paper Petitioners belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of
presented, but she refused and petitioner instead wrote a marginal action cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Well-settled is the rule
note on the said paper stating her reason therefore, said paper later that a party is not allowed to change the theory of the case or the
on turned out to be a WAIVER OF RIGHT or QUIT CLAIM;
cause of action on appeal. Matters, theories or arguments not
x x x x
submitted before the trial court cannot be considered for the first
14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents time on appeal or certiorari.72 When a party adopts a certain theory
PHI and DTPCIs gross negligence despite medical assistance, in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
petitioner started to feel losing her memory that greatly aected and appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
disrupted the practice of her chosen profession x x x.
other party but it would also be oensive to the basic rules of fair
x x x x
play, justice and due process.73 Hence, a party is bound by the
19. THAT, due to respondents PHI and DTPCIs gross negligence as theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and
being narrated which caused petitioner to suer sleepless nights, cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory
depression, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, and
and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the
matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal.74
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the
following dierences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and
breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is
direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of contract,
negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual
obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation.75 In quasi-
delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a complete and
proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are
concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and
proper defense in the selection and supervision of employees.76 In
quasi- delict , there is no presumption of negligence and it is
incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the
defendant, otherwise, the formers complaint will be dismissed, while
in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be
proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on
the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying
out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed.77
aforesaid allegations were successfully rebutted by respondents PHI
Viewed from the foregoing, petitioners change of theory or cause of
action from quasi-delict to breach of contract only on appeal would
necessarily cause injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI. First, the
latter will have no more opportunity to present evidence to
contradict petitioners new argument. Second, the burden of proof
will be shifted from petitioner to respondents PHI and DTPCI.
Petitioners change of theory from quasi-delict to breach ofcontract
must be repudiated.
the pools surrounding, the toilets and the counters. It was also
As petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is
incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the following requisites
before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a)
damages suered by the plainti; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and eect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plainti.78 Further, since petitioners case is for quasi-delict , the
negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of
her action.79 The burden of proof is upon petitioner. Section 1, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court provides that "burden of proof is the duty
of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
law." It is then up for the plainti to establish his cause of action or
the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plainti
alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the
negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such
negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence.80
In this case, as found by the trial court and armed by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of
respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than petitioners self-serving
testimony that all the lights in the hotels swimming pool area were
shut o and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to
find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden counter top fell on
her head causing her injury, no other evidence was presented to
substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the night of
the accident inside the hotels swimming pool area was never
presented to corroborate her allegations. Moreover, petitioners
and DTPCI. Here, we quote with conformity the observation of the
trial court, thus:
x x x Besides not being backed up by other supporting evidence,
said statement is being contradicted by the testimony of Engineer
Dante L. Costas,81 who positively declared that it has been a normal
practice of the Hotel management not to put o the lights until
10:00P.M. in order to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of
confirmed that the lights were kept on for security reasons and so
that the people exercising in the nearby gym may be able to have a
good view of the swimming pool. This Court also takes note that the
nearby gymnasium was normally open until 10:00 P.M. so that there
was a remote possibility the pool area was in complete darkness as
was alleged by herein petitioner, considering that the illumination
which reflected from the gym. Ergo, considering that the area were
sucient (sic) illuminated when the alleged incident occurred, there
could have been no reason for the petitioner to have met said
accident, much less to have been injured as a consequence thereof,
if she only acted with care and caution, which every ordinary person preposterous. Her own Complaint armed that respondents PHI and
is expected to do.82
DTPCI aorded medical assistance to her after she met the
More telling is the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals, to wit:
unfortunate accident inside the hotels swimming pool facility. Below
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents is the portion of petitioners Complaint that would contradict her very
PHI and DTPCI and its employees were negligent? We do not think own statement, thus:

so. Several factors militate against petitioners contention.

14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool areas closing time PHI and DTPCIs gross negligence despite medical assistance,
is 7:00 p.m.. She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she petitioner started to feel losing her memory that greatly aected and
was well aware of the sign when she and Delia entered the pool disrupted the practice of her chosen profession. x x x.84 (Emphasis
area. Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, of the pools closing time, supplied).

she took the risk of overstaying when she decided to take shower Also, as observed by the trial court, respondents PHI and DTPCI,
and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In fact, it was only upon indeed, extended medical assistance to petitioner but it was
the advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter took her petitioner who refused the same. The trial court stated, thus:

shower.
Further, herein petitioners asseverations that the Hotel Management
Two. She admitted, through her certification, that she lifted the did not extend medical assistance to her in the aftermath of the
wooden bar countertop, which then fell on to her head. The alleged accident is not true. Again, this statement was not supported
admission in her certificate proves the circumstances surrounding by any evidence other that the sole and self-serving testimony of
the occurrence that transpired on the night of 11 June 1995. This is petitioner. Thus, this Court cannot take petitioners statement as a
contrary to her assertion in the complaint and testimony that, while gospel truth. It bears stressing that the Hotel Management
she was passing through the counter door, she was suddenly immediately responded after it received notice of the incident. As a
knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she matter of fact, Ms. Pearlie, the Hotel nurse, with two chambermaids
admitted having lifted the countertop, it was her own doing, holding an ice bag placed on petitioners head came to the petitioner
therefore, that made the counter top fell on to her head.
to extend emergency assistance when she was notified of the
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioners assertion that the incident, but petitioner merely asked for Hirudoid, saying she was
pool area was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a fine, and that she was a doctor and know how to take care of
telephone at the counter after searching for one. It must be noted herself. Also, the Hotel, through its in-house physician, Dr.
that petitioner and Delia had walked around the pool area with ease Dalumpines oered its medical services to petitioner when they met
since they were able to proceed to the glass entrance door from the at the Hotels coee shop, but again petitioner declined the oer.
shower room, and back to the counter area where the telephone was Moreover, the Hotel as a show of concern for the petitioners welfare,
located without encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, she shouldered the expenses for the MRI services performed on
could have easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something petitioner at the Makati Medical Center. Emphatically, petitioner
while searching for the telephone. This negates her assertion that the herself cannot fault the Hotel for the injury she allegedly suered
pool area was completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.
because she herself did not heed the warning at the pool to the
x x x x
eect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M. Thus, when the
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion petitioners own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
than that the proximate and immediate cause of the injury of of his injury, shecannot recover damages x x x.85

petitioner was due to her own negligence.83 (Emphasis supplied).

With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1)
Even petitioners assertion of negligence on the part of respondents petitioner stayed in the hotels swimming pool facility beyond its
PHI and DTPCI in not rendering medical assistance to her is closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that
eventually hit her head; and (3) respondents PHI and DTPCI
extended medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence can be
attributed either to respondents PHI and DTPCI or to their sta and/
or management. Since the question of negligence is one of fact, this
Court is bound by the said factual findings made by the lower
courts. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual
findings, when armed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive and
binding upon this Court, if they are not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence.
Petitioner has not presented sucient ground to warrant a deviation
from this rule.86
Here, we, respectively, quote the 11 June 1995 handwritten
With regard to petitioners contention that the principles of res ipsa
loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this
Court holds otherwise.
wit:
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or
the transaction speaks for itself." It relates to the fact of an injury
that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintis prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not
on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition
of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence
when direct evidence is lacking.87 Simply stated, this doctrine finds
no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of
negligence. If there is sucient proof showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the creative
reason for the said doctrine disappears.88
counter. However, in order to get behind the counter I had to lift a
Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the
accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2)
the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.89
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and
DTPCIs sta negligently turned o the lights and locked the door, lifeguards counter to use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.
the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on petitioners
head had she not lifted the same. Although the folding wooden
counter top is within the exclusive management or control of
respondents PHI and DTPCI, the falling of the same and hitting the
head of petitioner was not due to the negligence of the former. As
found by both lower courts, the folding wooden counter top did not
fall on petitioners head without any human intervention. Records
showed that petitioner lifted the said folding wooden counter top
that eventually fell and hit her head. The same was evidenced by
the, (1) 11 June 1995 handwritten certification of petitioner herself;
(2) her Letter dated 30 August 1995 addressed to Mr. Yoshikazu
Masuda (Mr. Masuda), General Manager of Dusit Hotel; and, (3)
Certification dated 7 September 1995 issued to her by Dr.
Dalumpines upon her request, which contents she never questioned.
certification of petitioner; her letter to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August
1995; and Dr. Dalumpines Certification dated 7 September 1995, to
Petitioners 11 June 1995 Handwritten Certification:
I was requested by Dr. Dalumpines to write that I was assured of
assistance should it be necessary with regard an accident at the
pool. x x x The phone was in an enclosed area on a chair I lifted
the wooden bar counter top which then fell on my head producing a
large hematoma x x x.90
Petitioners Letter addressed to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995:
Dear Mr. Masuda,
x x x x
x x x We searched and saw a phone on a chair behind a towel
hinged massive wooden section of the counter which subsequently
fell and knocked me on my head x x x.91
Dr. Dalumpines Certification dated 7 September 1995:
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was
called to attend to an accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June
1995.
folding countertop fell on her head when she lifted it to enter the
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpnes at the Coee Shop.
After narrating the poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines
oer of assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream was
enough and that petitioner]being a doctor herself, knew her the head trauma she allegedly suered. Emphasis must be given to
condition and she was all right.
the fact that petitioner had been suering from dierent kinds of
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever brain problems since she was 18 years old, which may have been
purpose it may serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City.92 (Emphasis the cause of the recurring symptoms of head injury she is
supplied).
experiencing at present.

This Court is not unaware that in petitioners Complaint and in her
open court testimony, her assertion was, "while she was passing
through the counter door, she was suddenly knocked out by a hard
and heavy object, which turned out to be the folding wooden
counter top." However, in her open court testimony, particularly
during cross-examination, petitioner confirmed that she made such
statement that "she lifted the hinge massive wooden section of the
counter near the swimming pool."93 In view thereof, this Court
cannot acquiesce petitioners theory that her case is one of res ipsa
Thirdly, Dr. Sanchezs testimony cannot be relied upon since she
testified on the findings and conclusions of persons who were never
presented in court. Ergo, her testimony thereon was hearsay. A
witness can testify only with regard to facts of which they have
personal knowledge. Testimonial or documentary evidence is
hearsay if it is based, not on the personal knowledge of the witness,
but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness
stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence -- whether objected to or not
-- has no probative value.94

loquitur as it was suciently established how petitioner obtained Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by
that "bukol" or "hematoma."
myriads of doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or
The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the treatment were neither identified nor testified to by those who issued
absence of any showing that the employees of respondents PHI and them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative
DTPCI were negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the value.1wphi1

appellate court found no negligence on the part of the employees of The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of dierent
respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus, the latter cannot also be held doctors in favor of petitioner cannot be given probative value and
liable for negligence and be made to pay the millions of pesos their contents cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts
damages prayed for by petitioner.
stated therein. It must be stressed that a document or writing which
The issue on whether petitioners debilitating and permanent injuries is admitted not as independent evidence but merely as part of the
were the result of the accident she suered at the hotels swimming testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts related
pool area on 11 June 1995 is another question of fact, which is therein.95 In the same vein, the medical certificate which was
beyond the function of this Court to resolve. More so, this issue has identified and interpreted in court by another doctor was not
already been properly passed upon by the trial court and the Court accorded probative value because the doctor who prepared it was
of Appeals. To repeat, this Court is bound by the factual findings of not presented for its identification. Similarly, in this case, since the
the lower courts and there is no cogent reason to depart from the doctors who examined petitioner were not presented to testify on
said rule.
their findings, the medical certificates issued on their behalf and
The following observations of the trial court are controlling on this identified by another doctor cannot be admitted as evidence. Since
matter:
a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be
Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might have been established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit
the cause of her recurring brain injury.
unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation qualifications.96 Thus, an unverified and unidentified private
between the 11 June 1995 accident and the brain damage suered document cannot be accorded probative value. It is precluded
by petitioner. Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms being because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the
experienced by petitioner might have been due to factors other than right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should truck of CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed
be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation forward their seats and pinned their knees to the seats in front of
the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a
evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its hole in the bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They
contents suspect and of no probative value.97
were brought to the Makati Medical Center where the doctors
All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI diagnosed their injuries to be as follows:

and DTPCI, as well as their management and sta, they cannot be Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella

made Iiable to pay for the millions of damages prayed for by the Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd

petitioner. Since respondents PHI and DTPCI arc not liable, it Lacerated wound, chin

necessarily follows that respondent First Lepanto cannot also be Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg

made liable under the contract or Insurance.

Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right3

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution or

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007 Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher

and 5 November 2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs Extensive lacerated wounds, right leg posterior aspect popliteal area

against petitioner.
and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with severance of muscles.

SO ORDERED.
Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and

antero-lateral compartment of lower leg.

G.R. No. 147791 September 8, 2006

Fracture, open comminuted, both tibial4

CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against
vs.
CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo
REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1)
PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS LAGUNA that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP
TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO DATINGUINOO, respondents.
and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey
trac laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of
D E C I S I O N
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
employees; (3) that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it
This petition for review assails the March 29, 2001 Decision1 of the lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its passengers to grave
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46896, which armed with danger; (4) that they suered actual damages amounting to
modification the February 9, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they
Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, finding suered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (BLTB) and Construction anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock,
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) liable for and lifelong social humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with
damages.
justice, give respondents their due, observe honesty and good faith
The antecedent facts are as follows:
which entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they
On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her are entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and litigation
granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a expenses.

BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached their
destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-
CDCP filed its Answer6 which was later amended to include a third- cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus,
party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, where a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
Inc. (Phoenix).7
been at fault or has acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry
On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding respondents to their destination gave rise to an action for breach of
CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable for damages, the contract of carriage while its failure to rebut the presumption of
dispositive portion of which, states:
negligence made it liable to respondents for the breach.9

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it owned
In the Complaint
bumped the BLTB bus from behind. Evidence showed that CDCP's
1. In favor of the plaintis and against the defendants BLTB, Wilfredo driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time of the incident.
Datinguinoo, Construction and Development Corporation of the The gross negligence of its driver raised the presumption that CDCP
Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr., ordering said was negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of its
defendants, jointly and severally to pay the plaintis the sum of employees which it failed to rebut thus making it and its driver liable
P79,254.43 as actual damages and to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as to respondents.10

attorney's fees or a total of P89,254.43;

Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the
2. In addition, defendant Construction and Development Corporation trial court, respondents moved that the decision be reconsidered but
of the Philippines and defendant Espiridion Payunan, Jr., shall pay was denied. Respondents elevated the case11 to the Court of
the plaintis the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to Appeals which armed the decision of the trial court but modified
plainti Rachel Fletcher and Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) the amount of damages, the dispositive portion of which provides:

Pesos to plainti Rebecca Estrella;

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated October 7, 1993 of the
3. On the counterclaim of BLTB Co. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo
Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila is hereby AFFIRMED with the
Dismissing the counterclaim;
following MODIFICATION:

4. On the crossclaim against Construction and Development 1. The interest of six (6) percent per annum on the actual damages of
Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, P79,354.43 should commence to run from the time the judicial
Jr.
demand was made or from the filing of the complaint on February 4,
Dismissing the crossclaim;
1980;

5. On the counterclaim of Construction and Development 2. Thirty (30) percent of the total amount recovered is hereby
Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC)
awarded as attorney's fees;

Dismissing the counterclaim;

3. Defendants-appellants Construction and Development
6. On the crossclaim against BLTB
Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan,
Dismissing the crossclaim;
Jr. are ordered to pay plainti-appellants Rebecca Estrella and
7. On the Third Party Complaint by Construction and Development Rachel Fletcher the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) each
Corporation of the Philippines against Philippine Phoenix Surety and as exemplary damages and P80,000.00 by way of moral damages to
Insurance, Incorporated
Rachel Fletcher.

Dismissing the Third Party Complaint.

SO ORDERED.12

SO ORDERED.8
The Court of Appeals held that the actual or compensatory damage
The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to sought by respondents for the injuries they sustained in the form of
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its hospital bills were already liquidated and were ascertained.
passengers. It must carry the passengers safely as far as human Accordingly, the 6% interest per annum should commence to run
care and foresight provide, using the utmost diligence of very from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the
complaint and not from the date of judgment. The Court of Appeals arising out of one incident where questions of fact are common to
also awarded attorney's fees equivalent to 30% of the total amount all. Thus, the cause of action based on culpa aquiliana in the civil suit
recovered based on the retainer agreement of the parties. The they filed against it was valid.

appellate court also held that respondents are entitled to exemplary The petition lacks merit.

and moral damages. Finally, it armed the ruling of the trial court The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for
that the claim of CDCP against Phoenix had already prescribed.
culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.13
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation imposed by
I
Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN persons for whom one is responsible. Consequently, an action
NOT HOLDING RESPONDENTS BLTB AND/OR ITS DRIVER based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an
WILFREDO DATINGUINOO SOLELY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of
SUSTAINED BY HEREIN RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND the subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of
ESTRELLA.
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.14 In
II
the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to prove
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
AWARDING EXCESSIVE OR UNFOUNDED DAMAGES, selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LEGAL INTEREST TO RESPONDENTS The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily
FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.
liable with BLTB for the actual damages suered by respondents
III
because of the injuries they sustained. It was established that
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as
NOT HOLDING RESPONDENT PHOENIX LIABLE UNDER ITS shown in the sketch of the police investigator.

INSURANCE POLICY ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.

It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 that the owner of
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether BLTB and its the other vehicle which collided with a common carrier is solidarily
driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for the damages liable to the injured passenger of the same. We held, thus:

sustained by respondents; (2) whether the damages, attorney's fees
and legal interest awarded by the CA are excessive and unfounded;
(3) whether CDCP can recover under its insurance policy from
Phoenix.
another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo,
Petitioner contends that since it was made solidarily liable with BLTB
for actual damages and attorney's fees in paragraph 1 of the trial
court's decision, then it should no longer be held liable to pay the
amounts stated in paragraph 2 of the same decision. Petitioner
claims that the liability for actual damages and attorney's fees is
based on culpa contractual, thus, only BLTB should be held liable.
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the
negligence of the driver of the bus on which plainti was riding
concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus
company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the
driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the
injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation
of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:

As regards paragraph 2 of the trial court's decision, petitioner claims Nor should it make any dierence that the liability of petitioner
that it is ambiguous and arbitrary because the dispositive portion did [bus owner] springs from contract while that of respondents
not state the basis and nature of such award.
[owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that petitioner is also at fault, early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil.
hence, it was properly joined as a party. There may be an action 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of
the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful
another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for
are jointly and severally liable for damages. x x x
him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to
x x x x
that of the others. x x x

As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-
plaintis did not stake out their claim against the carrier and the
driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of
contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege
alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot
insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an
aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole
amount. x x x

liable on such causes of action so long as private respondent A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort
and her co-plaintis do not recover twice for the same injury. feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist against the
What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plainti there to others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint
recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the tort feasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. x x x

holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable Of course the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort
because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the feasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may
same injury.16 (Emphasis supplied)
release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the
In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are charged
whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint and several" obligation, the jointly and severally.19

relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close
that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the
whole obligation. In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement
Corporation,17 we reiterated that joint tort feasors are jointly and
severally liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v.
Ocampo,18 we held that:
amount of P50,000.00 to respondent Fletcher and P25,000.00 to
x x x The diculty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail
to recognize that the basis of the present action is tort. They fail to
recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only
Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the
trial court's decision is ambiguous and arbitrary and also entitles
respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the body of the trial
court's decision, it was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver
Payunan, Jr., are jointly and solidarily liable for moral damages in the
respondent Estrella.20 Moreover, there could be no double recovery
because the award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the
award in paragraph 1 is for actual damages and attorney's fees.

individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also Petitioner next claims that the damages, attorney's fees, and legal
jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x
interest awarded by the Court of Appeals are excessive.

It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical
persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, injuries.21 The award of moral damages in favor of Fletcher and
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or Estrella in the amount of P80,000.00 must be reduced since
who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are prevailing jurisprudence fixed the same at P50,000.00.22 While moral
each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner damages are not intended to enrich the plainti at the expense of
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. x x x
the defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which the suering inflicted.23

they commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any number The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary
less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each. Exemplary damages
all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory damages.24
Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states that in quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.25 In this case, petitioner's driver was driving
recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who
has direct and primary liability for the negligent conduct of its
subordinates, was also found negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,26
we held, thus:
is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for payment of
ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may
be imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good.
While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right,
they need not be proved, although plainti must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. Exemplary Damages are imposed not
to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 that:
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the
so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an
attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The
basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client.
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for
damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a
litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law
where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article
2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to
the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.28
(Emphasis supplied)
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation as they may be
recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary
damages are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plainti's valid, just and
demandable claim; and in any other case where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.29
Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the rate of 6% from the
time of the filing of the complaint, we held in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,30 that when an obligation, regardless of its
source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts
interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,31
subject to the following rules, to wit
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of
a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest
due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may
be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual
base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on
the amount finally adjudged.
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.32 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin to run on February
9, 1993 when the trial court rendered judgment and not on February
4, 1980 when the complaint was filed. This is because at the time of
the filing of the complaint, the amount of the damages to which
plaintis may be entitled remains unliquidated and unknown, until it
is definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the court and
only upon presentation of proof thereon.33 From the time the
P20,000.00 each for Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher; and (4)
thirty percent (30%) of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees.
The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of judgment of the trial court until finality of this
judgment. From the time this Decision becomes final and executory
and the judgment amount remains unsatisfied, the same shall earn
interest at the rate of 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

judgment becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be SO ORDERED.
12% until its satisfaction.

Anent the last issue of whether petitioner can recover under its
insurance policy from Phoenix, we arm the findings of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, thus:

As regards the liability of Phoenix, the court a quo correctly ruled

that defendant-appellant CDCP's claim against Phoenix already
prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of P.D. 612, as amended, which
provides:

Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this
chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to the
insurance company concerned a written notice of claim setting forth
the nature, extent and duration of the injuries sustained as certified
by a duly licensed physician. Notice of claim must be filed within six
months from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be
deemed waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or
injury must be brought in proper cases, with the Commissioner or
Courts within one year from denial of the claim, otherwise, the
claimant's right of action shall prescribe. (As amended by PD 1814,
BP 874.)34

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written

notice of claim must be filed within six months from the date of the
accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six months
from the date of the accident, its claim has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46896 dated March 29, 2001,
which modified the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is held jointly and severally liable to
pay (1) actual damages in the amount of P79,354.43; (2) moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each for Rachel Fletcher and
Rebecca Estrella; (3) exemplary damages in the amount of