G.R.No.173915.February22,2010.* alleged malicious acts of petitioners.

The complaint principally

IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, petitioners, vs. sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as attorneysfeesandlitigationexpenses,fortheallegedshameand
Presiding Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners utterance
BaguioCity,andVITAN.KALASHIAN,respondents. whiletheywereatapolicestationinPangasinan.Itissettledthat
jurisdictionisconferredbylawbasedonthefactsallegedinthe
Actions; Jurisdiction; Jurisdictional Amount; In cases where the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
claimfordamagesisthemaincauseofaction,oroneofthecauses
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. It is
of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
clear,basedontheallegationsofthecomplaint,thatrespondents
determiningthejurisdictionofthecourt.Butwheredamagesis
main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages
the main cause of action, should the amount of moral damages
beingclaimedbyrespondent,e.g.,exemplarydamages,attorneys
prayedforinthecomplaintbethesolebasisfordeterminingwhich
fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or
courthasjurisdictionorshouldthetotalamountofallthedamages
consequencesofthemainactionbutconstitutetheprimaryrelief
claimedregardlessofkindandnature,suchasexemplarydamages,
prayedforinthecomplaint.
nominaldamages,andattorneysfees,etc.,beused?Inthisregard,
Administrative Circular No. 0994 is instructive: x x x x 2. The
Same; Same; It is a basic jurisprudential principle that an
exclusionofthetermdamagesofwhateverkindindetermining
amendmentcannotbeallowedwhenthecourthasnojurisdiction
thejurisdictionalamountunderSection19(8)andSection33(1)of
overtheoriginalcomplaintandthepurposeoftheamendmentisto
B.P.Blg.129,asamendedbyR.A.No.7691,appliestocaseswhere
conferjurisdictiononthecourt.Wefindnoerror,muchlessgrave
thedamagesaremerelyincidentaltooraconsequenceofthemain
abuseofdiscretion,onthepartoftheCourtofAppealsinaffirming
causeofaction.However,incaseswheretheclaimfordamagesis
theRTCsorderallowingtheamendmentoftheoriginalcomplaint
themaincauseofaction,oroneofthecausesofaction,theamount
from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a
ofsuchclaimshallbeconsideredindeterminingthejurisdictionof
petitionforcertiorarifiledbeforetheCourtofAppeals.Whileitisa
thecourt.
basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be
allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original
Same;Same;Same;Whereitisclear,basedontheallegationsof
complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer
thecomplaint,thatthemainactionisfordamages,theotherforms
jurisdictiononthecourt,here,theRTCclearlyhadjurisdictionover
ofdamagesbeingclaimede.g.,exemplarydamages,attorneysfees
theoriginalcomplaintandamendmentofthecomplaintwasthen
and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or
stillamatterofright.
consequencesofthemainactionbutconstitutetheprimaryrelief
prayed for in the complaint.In the instant case, the complaint
filedinCivilCaseNo.5794Risfortherecoveryofdamagesforthe
VILLARAMA,JR.,J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari 1under Rule 65 of
the1997RulesofCivilProcedure,asamended,filedbypetitioners
Irene and Reynaldo Sante assailing the Decision 2dated January
31, 2006 and the Resolution3dated June 23, 2006 of the
SeventeenthDivisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.
87563. The assailed decision affirmed the orders of the Regional
TrialCourt(RTC)ofBaguioCity,Branch60,denyingtheirmotion
to dismiss the complaint for damages filed by respondent Vita
Kalashianagainstthem.
Thefacts,culledfromtherecords,areasfollows:
OnApril5,2004,respondentfiledbeforetheRTCofBaguioCitya
complaint for damages4against petitioners. In her complaint,
docketedasCivilCaseNo.5794R,respondentallegedthatwhile
shewasinsidethePoliceStationofNatividad,Pangasinan,andin
thepresenceofotherpersonsandpoliceofficers,petitionerIrene
Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as
follows,"Howmanyroundsofsexdidyouhavelastnightwithyour
boss, Bert? You fuckin bitch!" Bert refers to Albert Gacusan,
respondents friend and one (1) of her hired personal security
guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the
killingofpetitionerscloserelative.Petitionersalsoallegedlywent
aroundNatividad,Pangasinantellingpeoplethatsheisprotecting
andcuddlingthesuspectsintheaforesaidkilling.Thus,respondent
prayedthatpetitionersbeheldliabletopaymoraldamagesinthe
amount ofP300,000.00;P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages;P50,000.00 attorneys fees;P20,000.00 litigation
expenses;andcostsofsuit.
PetitionersfiledaMotiontoDismiss5onthegroundthatitwasthe
MunicipalTrialCourtinCities(MTCC)andnottheRTCofBaguio,
thathadjurisdictionoverthecase.Theyarguedthattheamountof
theclaimformoraldamageswasnotmorethanthejurisdictional
amountofP300,000.00,becausetheclaimforexemplarydamages
shouldbeexcludedincomputingthetotalclaim.
On June 24, 2004,6the trial court denied the motion to dismiss
citingourrulinginMoversBasecoIntegratedPortServices,Inc.v.
Cyborg Leasing Corporation.7The trial court held that the total
claimofrespondentamountedtoP420,000.00whichwasabovethe
jurisdictionalamountforMTCCsoutsideMetroManila.Thetrial
court also later issued Orders on July 7, 2004 8and July 19,
2004,9respectivelyreiterating its denial of themotion to dismiss
anddenyingpetitionersmotionforreconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for
Certiorari andProhibition,10docketed asCAG.R. SP No. 85465,
before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004,
respondent and her husband filed an Amended
Complaint11increasing the claim for moral damages
fromP300,000.00 toP1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to
DismisswithAnswerAdCautelamandCounterclaim,butthetrial
courtdeniedtheirmotioninanOrder12datedSeptember17,2004.
Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition13beforetheCourtofAppeals,docketedasCAG.R.SP
No.87563,claimingthatthetrialcourtcommittedgraveabuseof
discretioninallowingtheamendmentofthecomplainttoincrease
theamountofmoraldamagesfromP300,000.00toP1,000,000.00.
ThecasewasraffledtotheSeventeenthDivisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
On January 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division,
promulgatedadecisioninCAG.R.SPNo.85465,asfollows:
WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
[the]RegionalTrialCourtofBaguio,Branch60,inrenderingthe
assailedOrdersdatedJune24,2004andJuly[19],2004inCivil
CaseNo.5794RtheinstantpetitionforcertiorariisGRANTED.
TheassailedOrdersareherebyANNULLEDandSETASIDE.Civil
CaseNo.5794R for damagesis orderedDISMISSED for lackof
jurisdiction.
SOORDERED.14
The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the
jurisdictionoftheMTCCastheallegationsshowthatplaintiffwas
seeking torecover moral damagesin theamount ofP300,000.00,
which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the
MTCC.TheCourtofAppealsaddedthatthetotalityofclaimrule
used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be
appliedtotheinstantcasebecauseplaintiffsclaimforexemplary
damageswasnotaseparateanddistinctcauseofactionfromher
claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the
prayerforexemplarydamagesshouldbeexcludedincomputingthe
totalamountoftheclaim.
OnJanuary31,2006,theCourtofAppeals,thistimeinCAG.R.SP
No.87563,renderedadecisionaffirmingtheSeptember17,2004
Order of the RTC denying petitioners Motion to DismissAd
Cautelam.Inthesaiddecision,theappellatecourtheldthatthe
totaloraggregateamountdemandedinthecomplaintconstitutes
thebasisofjurisdiction.TheCourtofAppealsdidnotfindmeritin
petitioners posture that the claims for exemplary damages and
attorneysfeesaremerelyincidentaltothemaincauseandshould
notbeincludedinthecomputationofthetotalclaim.
TheCourtofAppealsadditionallyruledthatrespondentcanamend
her complaint by increasing the amount of moral damages
fromP300,000.00 toP1,000,000.00, on the ground that the trial
courthasjurisdictionovertheoriginalcomplaintandrespondentis
entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right under the
Rules.
Unabletoacceptthedecision,petitionersarenowbeforeusraising
thefollowingissues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE (FORMER)
SEVENTEENTH DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALSWHENITRESOLVEDTHATTHEREGIONALTRIAL
COURT OF BAGUIO CITY BRANCH 60 HAS JURISDICTION
OVERTHESUBJECTMATTEROFTHECASEFORDAMAGES
AMOUNTINGTOP300,000.00;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE HONORABLE
RESPONDENTJUDGEOFTHEREGIONALTRIALCOURTOF
BAGUIOBRANCH60FORALLOWINGTHECOMPLAINANTTO
AMEND THE COMPLAINT (INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGESTO1,000,000.00TOCONFERJURISDICTIONOVER
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE DESPITE THE
PENDENCYOFAPETITIONFORCERTIORARIFILEDATTHE
COURTOFAPPEALS,SEVENTHDIVISION,DOCKETEDASCA
G.R.NO.85465.15
Inessence,thebasicissuesforourresolutionare:
1)DidtheRTCacquirejurisdictionoverthecase?and
2)DidtheRTCcommitgraveabuseofdiscretioninallowing
theamendmentofthecomplaint?
Petitioners insist that the complaint falls under the exclusive
jurisdictionoftheMTCC.Theymaintainthattheclaimformoral
damages,intheamountofP300,000.00intheoriginalcomplaint,is
the main action. The exemplary damages being discretionary
should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional
amount.Andhavingnojurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterofthe
case,theRTCactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitallowed
theamendment of thecomplaint to increasetheclaim for moral
damagesinordertoconferjurisdiction.
In her Comment,16respondent averred that the nature of her
complaintisforrecoveryofdamages.Assuch,thetotalityofthe
claimfordamages,includingtheexemplarydamagesaswellasthe
other damages alleged and prayed in the complaint, such as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses, should be included in
determining jurisdiction. The total claim beingP420,000.00, the
RTChasjurisdictionoverthecomplaint.
Wedenythepetition,whichalthoughdenominatedasapetitionfor
certiorari,wetreatasapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule
45inviewoftheissuesraised.
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 17as amended by
RepublicActNo.7691,18states:
SEC.19.Jurisdictionincivilcases.RegionalTrialCourtsshall
exerciseexclusiveoriginaljurisdiction:
xxxx
(8)Inallothercasesinwhichthedemand,exclusiveofinterest,
damagesofwhateverkind,attorneysfees,litigationexpenses,and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundredthousandpesos(P100,000.00) or, in suchother cases in
MetroManila,wherethedemand,exclusiveoftheabovementioned
itemsexceedsTwohundredthousandpesos(P200,000.00).
Section5ofRep.ActNo.7691furtherprovides:
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and
Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act,
shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00):Provided,however,ThatinthecaseofMetroManila,
theabovementionedjurisdictionalamountsshallbeadjustedafter
five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred
thousandpesos(P400,000.00).
Relatedly,SupremeCourtCircularNo.2199wasissueddeclaring
that the first adjustment in jurisdictional amount of first level
courts outside of Metro Manila fromP100,000.00 toP200,000.00
tookeffectonMarch20,1999.Meanwhile,thesecondadjustment
fromP200,000.00toP300,000.00becameeffectiveonFebruary22,
2004inaccordancewithOCACircularNo.652004issuedbythe
OfficeoftheCourtAdministratoronMay13,2004.
Basedontheforegoing,thereisnoquestionthatatthetimeofthe
filingofthecomplaintonApril5,2004,theMTCCsjurisdictional
amounthasbeenadjustedtoP300,000.00.
Butwheredamagesisthemaincauseofaction,shouldtheamount
ofmoraldamagesprayedforinthecomplaintbethesolebasisfor
determining which court has jurisdiction or should the total
amountofallthedamagesclaimedregardlessofkindandnature,
suchasexemplarydamages,nominaldamages,andattorneysfees,
etc.,beused?
Inthisregard,AdministrativeCircularNo.099419isinstructive:
xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
appliestocaseswherethedamagesaremerelyincidentaltoora
consequenceofthemaincauseofaction.However,incaseswhere
theclaimfordamagesisthemaincauseofaction,oroneofthe
causesofaction,theamountofsuchclaimshallbeconsideredin
determiningthejurisdictionofthecourt.(Emphasisours.)
Intheinstantcase,thecomplaintfiledinCivilCaseNo.5794Ris
for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of
petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral
andexemplarydamages,aswellasattorneysfeesandlitigation
expenses,fortheallegedshameandinjurysufferedbyrespondent
by reason of petitioners utterance while they were at a police
stationinPangasinan.Itissettledthatjurisdictionisconferredby
law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprisesaconcisestatementoftheultimatefactsconstitutingthe
plaintiffscausesofaction. 20Itisclear,basedontheallegationsof
thecomplaint,thatrespondentsmainactionisfordamages.Hence,
the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent,e.g.,
exemplarydamages,attorneysfeesandlitigationexpenses,arenot
merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but
constitutetheprimaryreliefprayedforinthecomplaint.1avvphi1
InMendozav.Soriano,21itwasheldthatincaseswheretheclaim
for damages is the main causeof action, or oneof thecauses of
action,theamountofsuchclaimshallbeconsideredindetermining
thejurisdictionofthecourt.Inthesaidcase,therespondentsclaim
ofP929,000.06 in damages andP25,000 attorneys fees plusP500
per court appearance was held to represent the monetary
equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. The Court
thereinheldthatthetotalamountofmonetaryclaimsincludingthe
claimsfordamageswasthebasistodeterminethejurisdictional
amount.
Also,inIniegov.Purganan,22theCourthasheld:
Theamountofdamagesclaimediswithin thejurisdictionofthe
RTC,sinceitistheclaimforallkindsofdamagesthatisthebasis
of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for
damagesarisefromthesameorfromdifferentcausesofaction.
xxxx
Considering that the total amount of damages claimed
wasP420,000.00,theCourtofAppealswascorrectinrulingthat
theRTChadjurisdictionoverthecase.
Lastly,wefindnoerror,muchlessgraveabuseofdiscretion,onthe
partoftheCourtofAppealsinaffirmingtheRTCsorderallowing
the amendment of the original complaint fromP300,000.00
toP1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari
filedbeforetheCourtofAppeals.Whileitisabasicjurisprudential
principlethatanamendmentcannotbeallowedwhenthecourthas
nojurisdictionovertheoriginalcomplaintandthepurposeofthe
amendmentistoconferjurisdictiononthecourt, 23here,theRTC
clearlyhadjurisdictionovertheoriginalcomplaintandamendment
ofthecomplaintwasthenstillamatterofright.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, for lack of merit. The
DecisionandResolutionoftheCourtofAppealsdatedJanuary31,
2006 and June 23, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED. The
RegionalTrialCourtofBaguioCity,Branch60isDIRECTEDto
continuewiththetrialproceedingsinCivilCaseNo.5794Rwith
deliberatedispatch.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
G.R.No.164594.April22,2015.*
MICHAELSEBASTIAN,petitioner,vs.ANNABELLAGMAY
NG, represented by her Attorneyinfact, ANGELITA
LAGMAY,respondent.
Local Government Code; Amicable Settlement; An amicable
settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a
period of ten (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by:
first,executionbytheLuponwithinsix(6)monthsfromthedateof
thesettlement;orsecond,byanactionintheappropriatecityor
municipaltrialcourt(MTC)ifmorethansix(6)monthsfromthe
date of settlement has already elapsed.A simple reading of
Section 417 of the Local Government Code readily discloses the
twotiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement. The
provisionreads:Section417.Execution.Theamicablesettlement
or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon
within six(6) months from thedate of the settlement. After the
lapseofsuchtime,thesettlementmaybeenforcedbyactioninthe
appropriate city or municipal court. [Emphasis ours] Under this
provision,anamicablesettlementorarbitrationawardthatisnot
repudiatedwithinaperiodoften(10)daysfromthesettlementmay
beenforcedby:first,executionbytheLuponwithinsix(6)months
from the date of the settlement; or second, by an action in the
appropriatecityormunicipaltrialcourtifmorethansix(6)months
fromthedateofsettlementhasalreadyelapsed.
Same; Same; Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code
(LGC),theamicablesettlementandarbitrationawardshallhave
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
expirationoften(10)daysfromthedateofitsexecution,unlessthe
settlementorawardhasbeenrepudiatedorapetitiontonullifythe
awardhasbeenfiledbeforethepropercityormunicipalcourt.
Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable
settlementandarbitrationawardshallhavetheforceandeffectof
a final judgment of acourt upon the expiration of ten (10) days
fromthedateofitsexecution,unlessthesettlementorawardhas
beenrepudiatedorapetitiontonullifytheawardhasbeenfiled
before the proper city or municipal court. Moreover, Section 14,
Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules
statesthatthepartys failuretorepudiatethesettlementwithin
theperiodoften(10)daysshallbedeemedawaiveroftherightto
challengethesettlementonthegroundthathis/herconsentwas
vitiatedbyfraud,violenceorintimidation.
StatutoryConstruction;Abasicprincipleofinterpretationisthat
words must be given their literal meaning and applied without
attemptedinterpretation wherethe words of a statuteare clear,
plainandfreefromambiguity.Thelaw,aswritten,unequivocally
speaksoftheappropriatecityormunicipalcourtastheforumfor
theexecutionofthesettlementorarbitrationawardissuedbythe
Lupon.Notably,inexpresslyconferringauthorityoverthesecourts,
Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount
involvedorthenatureoftheissueinvolved.Thus,therecanbeno
questionthatthelawsintendmentwastograntjurisdictionover
the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or
municipalcourtstheregardlessoftheamount.Abasicprincipleof
interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning
andappliedwithoutattemptedinterpretationwherethewordsofa
statuteareclear,plainandfreefromambiguity.
BRION,J.:
Weresolvethepetitionforreviewoncertiorari, 1filedbypetitioner
Michael Sebastian (Michael), assailing the March 31, 2004
Decision,2andtheJuly15,2004Resolution3oftheCourtofAppeals
(CA)inCAG.R.SPNo.65450.
TheCAdecisionreversedandsetasidethedecisionoftheRegional
TrialCourt(RTC)ofPalayanCity,Branch40,inSP.Proc.CaseNo.
0096P.
FactualBackground
Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as
representative and attorneyinfact of her daghter Annabel
Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the Barangay
JusticeofSiclong,Laur,NuevaEcija.Shesoughttocollectfrom
MichaelthesumofP350,000.00thatAnnabelsenttoMichael.She
claimedthatAnnabelandMichaelwereoncesweethearts,andthat
they agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a
truck.SheallegedthatwhileAnnabelwasworkinginHongkong,
AnnabelsentMichaeltheamountofP350,000.00topurchasethe
truck. However, after Annabel and Michaels relationship has
ended,MichaelallegedlyrefusedtoreturnthemoneytoAnnabel,
prompting the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay
Justice.
OnJuly9,1997,thepartiesenteredintoanamicablesettlement,
evidenced by a document denominated as "kasunduan"4wherein
Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount ofP250,000.00 on
specificdates.ThekasunduanwassignedbyAngelita(onbehalfof
Annabel), Michael, and the members of the pangkat ng
tagapagkasundo.Thekasunduanreads:KASUNDUAN
Nagkasundoangdalawangpanignapagkayaringlabingapatna
buwan (14 months) simula ngayong July 9, 1997 hanggang
September1998aykailanganngmaibigayniMr.Sebastianang
peraniMs.AnabelleLagmay.
AtnapagkasunduanaydalawanghuloganghalagangP250,000.00
naperaniMs.LagmayatsimulangpagbibigayniMr.Sebastianay
sabuwanngSeptember1998.
Atupangmaykatunayananglahatngnapagusapanaylumagda
saibabanitoatsaharapngmgasaksingayongika9ngHulyo,
1997
Mrs.AngelitaLagmay(Lagda)
Mr.MichaelSebastian(Lagda)
Saksi:KagawadRolandoMendizabal(Lagda)
HepeQuirinoSapon(Lagda)
BenjaminSebastian(Lagda)
JunRoxas(Lagda)
Angelitaallegedthatthekasunduanwasnotrepudiatedwithina
periodoften(10)daysfromthesettlement,inaccordancewiththe
Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local
Government Code of 1991 [Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160], and
Section14ofitsImplementingRules.WhenMichaelfailedtohonor
thekasunduan,AngelitabroughtthematterbacktotheBarangay,
but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and
instead,issuedaCertificationtoFileAction.
Afteraboutoneandahalfyearsfromthedateoftheexecutionof
the kasunduan or on January 15, 1999, Angelita filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon,
NuevaEcija,aMotionforExecutionofthekasunduan.
MichaelmovedforthedismissaloftheMotionforExecution,citing
asagroundAngelitasallegedviolationofSection15,Rule13ofthe
1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
OnJanuary17,2000,theMCTCrenderedadecision5infavorof
Annabel,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads,asfollows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff through counsel has satisfactorily
proven by preponderance of evidence basedonExhibits "A," "B,"
"C,""D,"and"F,"thatdefendanthasobligationtotheplaintiffin
theamountofP250,000.00.
INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,theMotionforExecutionfiledby
the plaintiff is hereby granted based on Sec. 2, Rule 7 of the
ImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRepublicActNo.7160,and
therefore,defendantisherebyorderedwithin15daysuponreceipt
ofthisdecisiontopaytheplaintifftheamountofP250,000.00as
evidencedbytheKasunduan(Exhibit"C")withlegalinterestsfrom
July9,1997untilsaidobligationisfullypaid,andtopayattorneys
feesfortheplaintiffscounselintheamountofP15,000.00andto
paythecostofthesuit.
SOORDERED.
Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in prematurely deciding the
case.Michaelalsopointedoutthatahearingwasnecessaryforthe
petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of the
kasunduan.TheRegionalTrialCourtsRuling
InitsNovember13,2000Decision,6theRTC,Branch40ofPalayan
City upheld the MCTC decision, finding Michael liable to pay
Annabel the sum ofP250,000.00. It held that Michael failed to
assailthevalidityofthekasunduan,ortoadduceanyevidenceto
disputeAnnabelsclaimsortheapplicabilityoftheImplementing
RulesandRegulationsofR.A.No.7160.Thedispositiveportionof
thedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE,theassailedDecisionandOrderofthelowercourt
isherebyMODIFIEDinthattheappellantisorderedtopaythe
appellee the amount of Two hundred Fifty Thousand pesos
(P250,000.00) plus twelve percent interest(12%) per annum from
September,1998 up to the time it is actually paid and fifty
ThousandPesos(P50,000.00)representingattorney'sfees.
Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that: (i) an
amicablesettlement orarbitrationawardcanbeenforcedbythe
Luponwithinsix(6)monthsfromdateofsettlementorafterthe
lapseofsix(6)months,byordinarycivilactionintheappropriate
City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for
execution;and(ii)theMCTCdoes nothavejurisdictionoverthe
casesincetheamountofP250,000.00(asthesubjectmatterofthe
kasunduan) is in excess of MCTCs jurisdictional amount
ofP200,000.00.7
InitsMarch13,2001Order,theRTCgrantedMichaelsMotionfor
Reconsideration,andruledthatthereismeritinthejurisdictional
issueheraised.ItdismissedAngelitasMotionforExecution,and
setasidetheMCTCDecision.Thedispositiveportionofthesaid
Order reads: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.TheDecisionoftheCourtdatedNovember13,2000is
herebySETASIDE.TheDecisionoftheMunicipalTrialCourtof
Laur,NuevaEcijadatedJanuary17,2000islikewiseSETASIDE
and the Motion for Execution of Kasunduan is DISMISSED, the
said court having had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
matter.8
Angelita moved for the reconsideration of the March 13, 2001
Order, but the motion was subsequently denied. Aggrieved, she
filedaPetitionforReview9withtheCA.
TheCourtofAppealsRuling
On August 2, 2001, the CA initially dismissed the petition for
reviewonameretechnicalgroundoffailuretoattachtheAffidavit
of Service. Angelita moved for reconsideration, attaching in her
motiontheAffidavitofService.TheCAgrantedthemotion.
On March 31, 2004, the CA rendered its decision granting the
petition,andreversingtheRTCsdecision.TheCAdeclaredthat
the"appropriatelocaltrialcourt"statedinSection2,RuleVIIof
theImplementingRulesofR.A.No.7160referstothemunicipal
trialcourts.Thus,contrarytoMichaelscontention,theMCTChas
jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award,
regardlessoftheamountinvolved.
The CA also ruled that Michaels failure to repudiate the
kasunduaninaccordancewiththeprocedureprescribedunderthe
Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160, rendered the kasunduan
final.Hence,Michaelcannolongerassailthekasunduanonthe
groundofforgery.
Michaelmovedtoreconsiderthisdecision,buttheCAdeniedhis
motioninitsresolutiondatedJuly15,2004.Hence,thispetition.
ThePetition
Inthepresentpetitionforreviewoncertiorari,Michaelallegesthat
the kasunduan cannot be given the force and effect of a final
judgment because it did not conform to the provisions of the
KatarungangPambarangaylawembodiedinBookIII,TitleOne,
Chapter 7 of R.A. No. 7160. He points out the following
irregularities in the kasunduans execution, and claims that the
agreement forged between him and Angelita was fictitious and
simulated:
(1)therewasnorecordofthecomplaintintheBarangay;
(2)therewasnonoticeofmediationsenttohim;
(3) there was no constitution of the Pangkat Ng
Tagapagasundo;
(4)thepartieswerenevercalledupontochoosethethree(3)
membersfromamongtheLuponmembers;
(5) he had no participation in the execution of the
kasunduan;
(6)hissignatureinthekasunduanwasforged;
(7)hedidnotpersonallyappearbeforetheBarangay;
(8)therewasnoattestationclause;
(9)thekasunduanwasneitherreportednorfiledbeforethe
MCTC;and
(10)Annabel,therealpartyininterest,didnotpersonally
appearbeforetheBarangayasrequiredbythelaw.
Michaeladditionallyclaimsthatthekasunduanismerelyinthe
nature of a private document. He also reiterates that since the
amountofP250,000.00thesubjectmatterofthekasunduanis
in excess of MCTCs jurisdictional amount ofP200,000.00, the
kasunduan is beyond the MCTCs jurisdiction to hear and to
resolve. Accordingly, the proceedings in the Barangay are all
nullity.
TheIssues
Theissuestoberesolvedinthepresentpetitionare:
1. Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and
jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the
amountinvolved;
2.Whetherornotthekasunduancouldbegiventheforce
andeffectofafinaljudgment;and
3.Whetherornotthekasunduancanbeenforced.
TheCourtsRuling
Wedenythepetition.
A perusal of the body of the motion for
execution shows that it is actually in the
nature of an action for execution; hence, it
wasaproperremedy;
WenoteattheoutsetthatMichaelraisedinhisbriefbeforethe
CA the issue of wrong remedy. He alleged that Angelitas
recourseshouldhavebeentofileacivilaction,notameremotion
forexecution,inaregularcourt.However,theCAfailedtoaddress
this issue and only ruled on the issues of the kasunduans
irregularitiesandtheMCTCsjurisdiction.
A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code
readilydisclosesthetwotieredmodeofenforcementofanamicable
settlement.Theprovisionreads:
Section 417. Execution. The amicable settlement or arbitration
award maybe enforcedby execution by thelupon within six (6)
months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such
time,thesettlementmaybeenforcedbyactionintheappropriate
cityormunicipalcourt.[Emphasisours.]
Underthisprovision,anamicablesettlementorarbitrationaward
that is not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the
settlementmaybeenforcedby:first,executionbytheLuponwithin
six(6)months fromthedateofthesettlement; orsecond,byan
actionintheappropriatecityormunicipaltrialcourtifmorethan
six(6)monthsfromthedateofsettlementhasalreadyelapsed.
Underthefirstmodeofenforcement,theexecutionofanamicable
settlement could be done on mere motion of the party entitled
theretobeforethePunongBarangay.10Theproceedingsinthiscase
aresummaryinnatureandaregovernedbytheLocalGovernment
CodeandtheKatarungangPambarangayImplementingRulesand
Regulations.
Thesecondmodeofenforcement,ontheotherhand,isjudicialin
natureandcouldonlyberesortedtothroughtheinstitutionofan
action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial
Court.11Theproceedingsshallbegovernedbytheprovisionsofthe
Rules of Court. Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the
kasunduanunderthesecondmodeandfiledamotionforexecution,
whichwasdocketedasSpecialProceedingsNo.4599.Thequestion
for our resolution is: Whether the MCTC, through Angelitas
motion for execution, is expressly authorized to enforce the
kasunduanunderSection417oftheLocalGovernmentCode?
TheCourtrulesintheaffirmative.
It is undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was
captioned"motionforexecution,"ratherthanapetition/complaint
forexecution.
A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it
containsthematerialrequirementsofaninitiatoryaction.
First, the motion is sufficient in form 12and substance.13It is
complete with allegations of the ultimate facts constituting the
causeofaction;thenamesandresidencesoftheplaintiffandthe
defendant; it contains the prayer for the MCTC to order the
executionofthekasunduan;andtherewasalsoaverificationand
certificationagainstforumshopping.
Furthermore, attached to the motion are: 1) the authenticated
specialpowerofattorneyofAnnabel,authorizingAngelitatofile
thepresentactiononherbehalf;and2)thecopyofthekasunduan
whosecontentswerequotedinthebodyofthemotionforexecution.
It is wellsettled that what are controlling in determining the
natureofthepleadingaretheallegationsinthebodyandnotthe
caption.14
Thus,themotionforexecutionthatAngelitafiledwasintendedto
be an initiatory pleading or an original action that is compliant
withtherequirementunderSection3,Rule6oftheRulesofCourt
thatthecomplaintshouldallegetheplaintiffscauseofactionand
thenamesandresidencesoftheplaintiffandthedefendant.
Angelitasmotioncouldthereforebetreatedasanoriginalaction,
and not merely as a motion/special proceeding. For this reason,
AnnabelhasfiledtheproperremedyprescribedunderSection417
oftheLocalGovernmentCode.
However,Angelitashouldpaytheproperdocketfeescorresponding
to the filing of an action for execution. The docket fees shall be
computed by the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, with due
consideration,ofcourse,ofwhatAngelitahadalreadypaidwhen
hermotionforexecutionwasdocketedasaspecialproceeding.
Thekasunduanhastheforceandeffectofafinaljudgment.
Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable
settlementandarbitrationawardshallhavetheforceandeffectof
a final judgment of acourt upon the expiration of ten (10) days
fromthedateofitsexecution,unlessthesettlementorawardhas
beenrepudiatedorapetitiontonullifytheawardhasbeenfiled
beforethepropercityormunicipalcourt.
Moreover, Section14,RuleVIoftheKatarungangPambarangay
ImplementingRulesstatesthatthepartysfailuretorepudiatethe
settlement within the period of ten (10) days shall be deemed a
waiveroftherighttochallengethesettlementonthegroundthat
his/herconsentwasvitiatedbyfraud,violenceorintimidation.
In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never
repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed by the
law.1wphi1Hence,theCAcorrectlyruledthatthekasunduanhas
theforceandeffectofafinaljudgmentthatisripeforexecution.
Furthermore,theirregularitiesinthekasunduansexecution,and
theclaimofforgeryaredeemedwaivedsinceMichaelneverraised
thesedefensesinaccordancewiththeprocedureprescribedunder
the Local Government Code. Thus, we see no reason to discuss
theseissuesinthepresentcase.
TheMCTChastheauthorityandjurisdiction
toenforcethekasunduanregardlessoftheamountinvolved.
The Court also finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTCs
jurisdictiontoenforceanysettlementorarbitrationawardissued
bytheLupon.
WeagaindrawattentiontotheprovisionofSection417oftheLocal
GovernmentCodethatafterthelapseofthesix(6)monthperiod
fromthedateofthesettlement,theagreementmaybeenforcedby
actionintheappropriatecityormunicipalcourt.
Thelaw,aswritten,unequivocallyspeaksofthe"appropriatecity
ormunicipalcourt"astheforumfortheexecutionofthesettlement
or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly
conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no
distinctionwithrespecttotheamountinvolvedorthenatureofthe
issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the laws
intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awardstothecityormunicipalcourtsthe
regardlessoftheamount.Abasicprincipleofinterpretationisthat
words must be given their literal meaning and applied without
attemptedinterpretation wherethe words of a statuteare clear,
plainandfreefromambiguity.15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
March31,2004DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.
65450.
AngelitaLagmayisORDEREDtopaytheproperdocketfeestobe
computed by the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial
CourtofLaurandGabaldon,NuevaEcija,withdueconsideration
ofwhatshehadpaidwhenhermotionforexecutionwasdocketed
asaspecialproceeding.
SOORDERED.

G.R.No.176492.October20,2014.*
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V.
NONATO,respondent.
Civil Law; Property Regimes of Void Marriages; Under this
propertyregime,propertyacquiredbybothspousesthroughtheir
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co
ownership.Anypropertyacquiredduringtheunionisprimafacie
presumedtohavebeenobtainedthroughtheirjointefforts.Aparty
whodidnotparticipateintheacquisitionofthepropertyshallbe
consideredashavingcontributedtothesamejointlyifsaidpartys
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.The records reveal that Nonato and Barridos
marriagehadbeendeclaredvoidforpsychologicalincapacityunder
Article36oftheFamilyCode.Duringtheirmarriage,however,the
conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations.
Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147
specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses
property relations. xxx This particular kind of coownership
applieswhenamanandawoman,sufferingnoillegalimpediment
tomarryeachother,exclusivelylivetogetherashusbandandwife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is
clear,therefore,thatforArticle147tooperate,themanandthe
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
unioniswithoutthebenefitofmarriageortheirmarriageisvoid.
Here,alltheseelementsarepresent.Thetermcapacitatedinthe
firstparagraphoftheprovisionpertainstothelegalcapacityofa
partytocontractmarriage.Anyimpedimenttomarryhasnotbeen
showntohaveexistedonthepartofeitherNonatoorBarrido.They
livedexclusivelywitheachotherashusbandandwife.However,
theirmarriagewasfoundtobevoidunderArticle36oftheFamily
Codeonthegroundofpsychologicalincapacity.Underthisproperty
regime,propertyacquiredbybothspousesthroughtheirworkand
industryshallbegovernedbytherulesonequalcoownership.Any
propertyacquiredduringtheunionisprimafaciepresumedtohave
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participateintheacquisitionofthepropertyshallbeconsideredas
having contributed to the same jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Effortsinthecareandmaintenanceofthefamilyandhousehold
areregardedascontributionstotheacquisitionofcommonproperty
byonewhohasnosalaryorincomeorworkorindustry.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Private
Documents;Withoutthenotarialseal,adocumentremainstobe
privateandcannotbeconvertedintoapublicdocument,makingit
inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated.It must
benotedthatwithoutthenotarialseal,adocumentremainstobe
privateandcannotbeconvertedintoapublicdocument,makingit
inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated.
Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and
authenticity.Infact,shemerelyannexedsaidDeedofSaletoher
positionpaper.Therefore,thesubjectpropertyremainstobeowned
in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in
accordancewiththerulesoncoownership.
PERALTA,J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by
petitioner Marietta N. Barrido questioning the Decision 1of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 16, 2006, and its
Resolution2datedJanuary24,2007inCAG.R.SPNo.00235.The
CA affirmed the Decision3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ofBacolodCity,Branch53,datedJuly21,2004,inCivilCaseNo.
0312123,whichorderedthepartitionofthesubjectproperty.
Thefacts,asculledfromtherecords,areasfollows:Inthecourseof
the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner
MariettaN.Barrido,theywereabletoacquireapropertysituated
inEroreco,BacolodCity,consistingofahouseandlot,coveredby
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T140361. On March 15,
1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to
maintain their coownership over the property, Nonato asked
Barridoforpartition,butthelatterrefused.Thus,onJanuary29,
2003,NonatofiledaComplaintforpartitionbeforetheMunicipal
TrialCourtinCities(MTCC)ofBacolodCity,Branch3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject
propertyhadalreadybeensoldtotheirchildren,JosephRaymund
and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaintbecausetheMTCClackedjurisdiction,thepartitioncase
beinganactionincapableofpecuniaryestimation.
TheBacolodMTCCrenderedaDecisiondatedSeptember17,2003,
applyingArticle129oftheFamilyCode.Itruledinthiswise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered, ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses
LeonardoandMariettaNonato,ahouseandlotcoveredbyTCTNo.
T140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City, which was their
conjugaldwelling,adjudicatedtothedefendantMariettaNonato,
thespousewithwhomthemajorityofthecommonchildrenchoose
toremain.
Furthermore,defendantscounterclaimisherebygranted,ordering
plaintiff to pay defendantP10,000.00 as moral damages for the
mentalanguishandunnecessaryinconveniencebroughtaboutby
thissuit;andanadditionalP10,000.00asexemplarydamages to
deter others from following suit; and attorneys fees ofP2,000.00
andlitigationexpensesofP575.00.
SOORDERED.4
NonatoappealedtheMTCCDecisionbeforetheRTC.OnJuly21,
2004,theBacolodRTCreversedtherulingoftheMTCC.Itfound
thateventhoughtheMTCCaptlyappliedArticle129oftheFamily
Code,itneverthelessmadeareversibleerrorinadjudicatingthe
subjectpropertytoBarrido.Itsdispositiveportionreads:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thedecisiondatedSeptember
17, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgmentisherebyrenderedorderingtheparties:
(1)toequitablypartitionthehouseandlotcoveredbyTCT
No.T140361;
(2)toreimburseJosephRaymundandJosephLeoNonatoof
theamountadvancedbytheminpaymentofthedebtsand
obligation of TCT No. T140361 with Philippine National
Bank;
(3)todeliverthepresumptivelegitimesofJosephRaymund
andJosephLeoNonatopursuanttoArticle51oftheFamily
Code.
SOORDERED.5
Uponappeal,theCAaffirmedtheRTCDecisiononNovember16,
2006. It held that since the propertys assessed value was
onlyP8,080.00,itclearlyfellwithintheMTCCsjurisdiction.Also,
although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the
FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its
decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the
property. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was,
however,deniedforlackofmerit.
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for
Review.SheassignedthefollowingerrorsintheCADecision:
I.
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINHOLDING
THATTHEMTCCHADJURISDICTIONTOTRYTHEPRESENT
CASE.
II.
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINHOLDING
THAT THE LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. T140361 IS
CONJUGALAFTERBEINGSOLDTOTHECHILDREN,JOSEPH
LEONONATOANDJOSEPHRAYMUNDNONATO.
III.
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINHOLDING
THAT ARTICLE 129 OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO
APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE
ASSUMPTION
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.6
Thepetitionlacksmerit.
ContrarytoBarridoscontention,theMTCChasjurisdictiontotake
cognizanceofrealactionsorthoseaffectingtitletorealproperty,or
fortherecoveryofpossession,orforthepartitionorcondemnation
of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. 7Section 33 of
BatasPambansaBilang1298provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.
MetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourts,andMunicipal
Circuit
TrialCourtsshallexercise:
xxxx
(3)Exclusiveoriginaljurisdictioninallcivilactionswhichinvolve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
wheretheassessedvalueofthepropertyorinterestthereindoesnot
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided,Thatvalueofsuchpropertyshallbedeterminedbythe
assessedvalueoftheadjacentlots.(asamendedbyR.A.No.7691)9
Here,thesubjectpropertysassessedvaluewasmerelyP8,080.00,
an amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit
ofP20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall within
thejurisdictionoftheMTCC.Therefore,thelowercourtcorrectly
tookcognizanceoftheinstantcase.
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barridos marriage had been
declaredvoidforpsychologicalincapacityunderArticle36 10ofthe
Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
Article12911providesforthe
procedureincaseofdissolutionoftheconjugalpartnershipregime,
Article147specificallycoverstheeffectsofvoidmarriagesonthe
spousespropertyrelations.Article147reads:
Art.147.Whenamanandawomanwhoarecapacitatedtomarry
eachother,liveexclusivelywitheachotherashusbandandwife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wagesandsalariesshallbeownedbytheminequalsharesandthe
propertyacquiredbybothofthemthroughtheirworkorindustry
shallbegovernedbytherulesoncoownership.
Intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,propertiesacquiredwhile
theylivedtogethershallbepresumedtohavebeenobtainedbytheir
jointefforts,workorindustry,andshallbeownedbytheminequal
shares.ForpurposesofthisArticle,apartywhodidnotparticipate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemedtohavecontributedjointlyintheacquisitionthereofifthe
former'seffortsconsistedinthecareandmaintenanceofthefamily
andofthehousehold.
Neitherpartycanencumberordisposebyactsintervivosofhisor
hershareinthepropertyacquiredduringcohabitationandowned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
terminationoftheircohabitation.
Whenonlyoneofthepartiestoavoidmarriageisingoodfaith,the
shareofthepartyinbadfaithinthecoownershipshallbeforfeited
infavoroftheircommonchildren.Incaseofdefaultoforwaiverby
anyorallofthecommonchildrenortheirdescendants,eachvacant
shareshallbelongtotherespectivesurvivingdescendants.Inthe
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party.1wphi1In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
terminationofthecohabitation.
This particular kind of coownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impedimentto marry each other,
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriageorwithoutthebenefitofmarriage. 12Itisclear,therefore,
thatforArticle147tooperate,themanandthewoman:(1)mustbe
capacitatedtomarryeachother;(2)liveexclusivelywitheachother
ashusbandandwife;and(3)theirunioniswithoutthebenefitof
marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are
present.13The term "capacitated" inthe first paragraph of the
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage.14Anyimpedimenttomarryhasnotbeenshowntohave
existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived
exclusivelywitheachotherashusbandandwife.However,their
marriagewasfoundtobevoidunderArticle36oftheFamilyCode
onthegroundofpsychologicalincapacity.15
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
throughtheirworkandindustryshallbegovernedbytheruleson
equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Apartywhodidnot participate in the acquisitionof the
property shall be considered as having contributed to the same
jointlyifsaidparty'seffortsconsistedinthecareandmaintenance
ofthefamilyhousehold.16Effortsinthecareandmaintenanceof
the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisitionofcommonpropertybyonewhohasnosalaryorincome
orworkorindustry.17
IntheanalogouscaseofValdez,18itwaslikewiseaverredthatthe
trialcourtfailedtoapplythecorrectlawthatshouldgovernthe
dispositionofafamilydwellinginasituationwhereamarriageis
declared void ab initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the
partofeitherorbothpartiesinthecontractofmarriage.TheCourt
held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in
utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the
formerspousesownthefamilyhomeandalltheircommonproperty
inequalshares,aswellasinconcludingthat,intheliquidationand
partitionofthepropertythattheyownedincommon,theprovisions
on coownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. 19The
rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
propertyregimesrecognizedforvalidandvoidablemarriages,are
irrelevanttotheliquidationofthecoownershipthatexistsbetween
commonlawspousesorspousesofvoidmarriages.20
Here,theformerspousesbothagreethattheyacquiredthesubject
propertyduringthesubsistenceoftheirmarriage.Thus,itshallbe
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Barrido,however,claimsthattheownershipoverthepropertyin
questionisalreadyvestedontheirchildren,byvirtueofaDeedof
Sale.Butasidefromthetitletothepropertystillbeingregistered
inthenamesoftheformerspouses,saiddocumentofsafedoesnot
bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that
without thenotarialseal,adocumentremains to beprivate and
cannot be converted into a public document, 21making it
inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due
22
executionandauthenticity.Infact,shemerelyannexedsaidDeed
of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property
remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which
shouldbedividedinaccordancewiththerulesoncoownership.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepetitionisDENIED.The
DecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,datedNovember16,2006,aswell
asitsResolutiondatedJanuary24,2007inCAG.R.SPNo.00235,
areherebyAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
G.R.No.138896.June20,2000.* deemedtobemorewithinthecompetenceofcourtsoffirstinstance,
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner, vs. whichwerethelowestcourtsofrecordatthetimethatthefirst
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR, namely: EUGENIO organiclawsoftheJudiciarywereenactedallocatingjurisdiction
SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, (Act136ofthePhilippineCommissionofJune11,1901).
EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON
Same;Same;Same;TwoPhasesofExpropriationProceedings.In
SYLIANCO,LAWINAS.NOTARIO,LEONARDOSYLIANCO,
the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the
JR.andLAWFORDSYLIANCO,respondents.
recoveryofasumofmoney.Rather,itdealswiththeexerciseby
Actions;EminentDomain;Expropriation;Jurisdiction;Courts;An
thegovernmentofitsauthorityandrighttotakeprivateproperty
expropriationsuit is incapableof pecuniary estimation, and falls
forpublicuse.InNationalPowerCorporationv.Jocson,theCourt
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.We agree
ruledthatexpropriationproceedingshavetwophases:Thefirstis
with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of
concernedwiththedeterminationoftheauthorityoftheplaintiffto
pecuniaryestimation.Thetesttodeterminewhetheritissowas
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
laiddownbytheCourtinthiswise:Areviewofthejurisprudence
exerciseinthecontextofthefactsinvolvedinthesuit.Itendswith
ofthisCourtindicatesthatindeterminingwhetheranactionisone
an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation
thesubjectmatterofwhichisnotcapableofpecuniaryestimation,
declaringthattheplaintiffhasalawfulrighttotaketheproperty
thisCourthasadoptedthecriterionoffirstascertainingthenature
soughttobecondemned,forthepublicuseorpurposedescribedin
oftheprincipalactionorremedysought.Ifitisprimarilyforthe
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
determinedasofthedateofthefilingofthecomplaint.Anorderof
pecuniaryestimation,andwhetherjurisdictionisinthemunicipal
dismissal,ifthisbeordained,wouldbeafinalone,ofcourse,since
courtsorinthecourtsoffirstinstancewoulddependontheamount
itfinallydisposesoftheactionandleavesnothingmoretobedone
of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
bytheCourtonthemerits.So,too,wouldanorderofcondemnation
thantherighttorecoverasumofmoney,orwherethemoneyclaim
beafinalone,forthereafterastheRulesexpresslystate,inthe
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
proceedingsbeforetheTrialCourt,noobjectiontotheexerciseof
sought,likeinsuitstohavethedefendantperformhispartofthe
therightofcondemnation(ortheproprietythereof)shallbefiledor
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
heard. The second phase of the eminent domain action is
annulmentofajudgmentortoforecloseamortgage,thisCourthas
concerned with the determination by the court of the just
consideredsuchactionsascaseswherethesubjectofthelitigation
compensationforthepropertysoughttobetaken.Thisisdoneby
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
exclusivelybycourtsoffirstinstance.Therationaleoftheruleis
commissioners.Theorderfixingthejustcompensationonthebasis
plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of
oftheevidencebefore,andfindingsof,thecommissionerswouldbe
damages,demandaninquiryintootherfactorswhichthelawhas
final,too.Itwouldfinallydisposeofthesecondstageofthesuit,
and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue,xxx
Same; Same; Same; It should be stressed that the primary
considerationinanexpropriationsuitiswhetherthegovernment
oranyofitsinstrumentalitieshascompliedwiththerequisitesfor
the taking of private property.It should be stressed that the
primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
governmentoranyofitsinstrumentalitieshascompliedwiththe
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts
determinetheauthorityofthegovernmententity,thenecessityof
theexpropriation,andtheobservanceofdueprocess.Inthemain,
thesubjectofanexpropriationsuitisthegovernmentsexerciseof
eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
PANGANIBAN,J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts,regardlessofthevalueofthesubjectproperty.
TheCase
BeforeusisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariassailingtheMarch
29, 1999 Order1of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City
(Branch58)inCivilCaseNo.CEB21978,inwhichitdismisseda
Complaintforeminentdomain.Itruledasfollows:
Premisesconsidered,themotiontodismiss is herebygrantedon
the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
Accordingly,theOrdersdatedFebruary19,1999andFebruary26,
1999,aswellastheWritofPossessionissuedbyvirtueofthelatter
Orderareherebyrecalledforbeingwithoutforceandeffect. 2
Petitioner also challenges the May 14, 1999 Order of the RTC
denyingreconsideration.
TheFacts
PetitionerfiledbeforetheMunicipalTrialCourt(MTC)ofTalisay,
Cebu (Branch 1)3a Complaint to expropriate a property of the
respondents.InanOrderdatedApril8,1997,theMTCdismissed
theComplaintonthegroundoflackofjurisdiction.Itreasonedthat
"[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private
propertyforpublicuseafterpaymentofjustcompensation.Inan
actionforeminentdomain,therefore,theprincipalcauseofaction
istheexerciseofsuchpowerorright.Thefactthattheactionalso
involvesrealpropertyismerelyincidental.Anactionforeminent
domainisthereforewithintheexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionofthe
RegionalTrialCourtandnotwiththisCourt."4
AssailedRTCRuling
TheRTCalsodismissedtheComplaintwhenfiledbeforeit,holding
thatanactionforeminentdomainaffectedtitletorealproperty;
hence,thevalueofthepropertytobeexpropriatedwoulddetermine
whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC.
ConcludingthattheactionshouldhavebeenfiledbeforetheMTC
sincethevalueofthesubjectpropertywaslessthanP20,000,the
RTCratiocinatedinthiswise:
The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the
currentTaxDeclarationofthelandinvolvedthatitsassessedvalue
is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00).
PursuanttoSection3,paragraph(3),ofRepublicActNo.7691,all
civilactionsinvolvingtitleto,orpossessionof,realpropertywith
anassessedvalueoflessthanP20,000.00arewithintheexclusive
originaljurisdictionoftheMunicipalTrialCourts.Inthecaseat
bar,itiswithintheexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoftheMunicipal
Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property involved is
located.
The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real
property is a real action affecting title to or possession of real
property,hence,itistheassessedvalueofthepropertyinvolved
which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That the right of
eminentdomainorcondemnationofreal,propertyisincludedina
real action affecting title to or possession of real property, is
pronouncedbyretiredJusticeJoseY.Feria,thus,"Realactionsare
thoseaffectingtitletoorpossessionofrealproperty.Theseinclude
partitionorcondemnationof,orforeclosuresofmortgageon,real
property...."5
Aggrieved,petitionerappealeddirectlytothisCourt,raisingapure
question of law.6In a Resolution dated July 28, 1999, the Court
deniedthePetitionforReview"forbeingpostedoutoftimeonJuly
2, 1999, the due date being June 2, 1999, as the motion for
extension of time to file petition was denied in the resolution of
July14,1999."7InasubsequentResolutiondatedOctober6,1999,
theCourtreinstatedthePetition.8
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for the
considerationofthisCourt:
Whichcourt,MTCorRTC,hasjurisdictionovercasesforeminent
domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject
propertyisbelowTwentyThousand(P20,000.00)Pesos?9
ThisCourt'sRuling
ThePetitionismeritorious.
MainIssue:
JurisdictionoveranExpropriationSuit
Insupportofitsappeal,petitionercitesSection19(1)ofBP129,
which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigationisincapableofpecuniaryestimation;....."Itarguesthat
the present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent
domain,andthatsuchrightisincapableofpecuniaryestimation.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Complaint for
EminentDomainaffectsthetitletoorpossessionofrealproperty.
Thus,theyarguethatthecaseshouldhavebeenbroughtbeforethe
MTC,pursuanttoBP129asamendedbySection3(3)ofRA7691.
This law provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original
jurisdictionoverallcivilactionsthatinvolvetitletoorpossessionof
realproperty,theassessedvalueofwhichdoesnotexceedtwenty
thousandpesosor,incivilactionsinMetroManila,fiftythousand
pesos exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees,litigationexpensesandcosts.
Weagreewiththepetitionerthatanexpropriationsuitisincapable
ofpecuniaryestimation.Thetesttodeterminewhetheritissowas
laiddownbytheCourtinthiswise:
AreviewofthejurisprudenceofthisCourtindicatesthatin
determiningwhetheranactionisonethesubjectmatterof
whichisnotcapableofpecuniaryestimation,thisCourthas
adoptedthecriterionoffirstascertainingthenatureofthe
principalactionorremedysought.Ifitisprimarilyforthe
recoveryofasumofmoney,theclaimisconsideredcapable
ofpecuniaryestimation,andwhetherjurisdictionisinthe
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basicissueissomethingotherthantheright torecovera
sumofmoney,orwherethemoneyclaimispurelyincidental
to,oraconsequenceof,theprincipalreliefsought,likein
suitstohavethedefendantperformhispartofthecontract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigationmay not be estimatedinterms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance.Therationaleoftheruleisplainlythatthesecond
classcases,besidesthedeterminationofdamages,demand
aninquiryintootherfactorswhichthelawhasdeemedtobe
morewithinthecompetenceofcourtsoffirstinstance,which
werethelowestcourtsofrecordatthetimethatthefirst
organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating
jurisdiction(Act136ofthePhilippineCommissionofJune
11,1901).10
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the
recoveryofasumofmoney.Rather,itdealswiththeexerciseby
thegovernmentofitsauthorityandrighttotakeprivateproperty
for public use.11InNational Power Corporation v.Jocson,12the
Courtruledthatexpropriationproceedingshavetwophases:
The first is concerned with the determination of the
authorityoftheplaintiffto exercisethepowerofeminent
domainandtheproprietyofitsexerciseinthecontextofthe
factsinvolvedinthesuit. It ends withanorder,ifnot of
dismissaloftheaction,"ofcondemnationdeclaringthatthe
plaintiffhasalawfulrighttotakethepropertysoughttobe
condemned,forthepublicuseorpurposedescribedinthe
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determinedasofthedateofthefilingofthecomplaint."An
orderofdismissal,ifthisbeordained,wouldbeafinalone,
ofcourse,sinceitfinallydisposesoftheactionandleaves
nothingmoretobedonebytheCourtonthemerits.So,too,
wouldanorderofcondemnationbeafinalone,forthereafter
astheRulesexpresslystate,intheproceedingsbeforethe
Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or
heard."
Thesecondphaseoftheeminentdomainactionisconcerned
with the determination by the court of "the just
compensationforthepropertysoughttobetaken."Thisis
donebytheCourtwiththeassistanceofnotmorethanthree
(3)commissioners.Theorderfixingthejustcompensationon
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissionerswouldbefinal,too.Itwouldfinallydisposeof
thesecondstageofthesuit,andleavenothingmoretobe
donebytheCourtregardingtheissue....
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an
expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalitieshascompliedwiththerequisitesforthetakingof
privateproperty.Hence,thecourtsdeterminetheauthorityofthe
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process.1In the main, the subject of an
expropriationsuitisthegovernment'sexerciseofeminentdomain,
amatterthatisincapableofpecuniaryestimation.
True,thevalueofthepropertytobeexpropriatedisestimatedin
monetaryterms,forthecourtisdutyboundtodeterminethejust
compensationforit.1avvphi1This,however,ismerelyincidentalto
the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only
afterthecourtissatisfiedwiththeproprietyoftheexpropriation.
Verily, the Court held inRepublic of the Philippines
v.Zurbanothat "condemnation proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance,"14the forerunners of the
regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the
effectivityoftheJudiciaryActof1948which,likeBP129inrespect
to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation."15The 1997
amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change
thesejurisprudentialprecedents.
Wearenotpersuadedbyrespondents'argumentthatthepresent
actioninvolvesthetitletoorpossessionofaparcelofland.They
cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent
authority in remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation
proceedingsareexamplesofrealactionsthataffectthetitletoor
possessionofaparcelofland.16
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to
distinguishbetween real and personal actions. His discussion on
thispointpertainedtothenatureofactions,nottothejurisdiction
of courts. In fact, in his prebar lectures, he emphasizes that
jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs
underthe1997Rules.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the
governmentmayexpropriateprivatepropertyunderthegivenset
of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents'
titletoorpossessionofthesame.Indeed,itisnotaquestionofwho
hasabettertitleorright,forthegovernmentdoesnotevenclaim
that it has atitletotheproperty. It merelyasserts its inherent
sovereignpowerto"appropriateandcontrolindividualpropertyfor
thepublicbenefit,asthepublicnecessity,convenienceorwelfare
maydemand."17
WHEREFORE,thePetitionisherebyGRANTEDandtheassailed
OrdersSETASIDE.TheRegionalTrialCourtisdirectedtoHEAR
thecase.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
G.R.No.202664.November10,2015.* particular cases subject matter is different from incidents
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES and FRANCIS MARTIN D. pertainingtotheexerciseofitsjurisdiction.Jurisdictionoverthe
GONZALES, petitioners, vs. GJH LAND, INC. (formerly subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a courts
known as S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG a.k.a. exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is
STEVE JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, and governedbytheRulesofCourtorbytheordersissuedfromtimeto
timebytheCourt.InLozadav.Bracewell,720SCRA371(2014),it
ATTY.ROBERTOP.MALLARIII,respondents.
wasrecentlyheldthatthematterofwhethertheRTCresolvesan
Mercantile Law; Corporations; IntraCorporate Controversies;
issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
SpecialCommercialCourts;Jurisdiction;Applyingtherelationship
jurisdictionasaspecialcourtisonlyamatterofprocedureandhas
testandthenatureofthecontroversytest,thesuitbetweenthe
nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. Pertinent to this
parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intracorporate
caseisRA8799whichtookeffectonAugust8,2000.Byvirtueof
relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative
said law, jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of
rightsandobligationsundertheCorporationCodeandtheinternal
PresidentialDecreeNo.902AwastransferredfromtheSecurities
and intracorporate regulatory rules of the corporation, hence,
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of
intracorporate,whichshouldbeheardbythedesignatedSpecial
generaljurisdiction.
CommercialCourtasprovidedunderA.M.No.030303SCdated
June17,2003inrelationtoItem5.2,Section5ofRepublicAct(RA)
Same;Same;Same;Same;OnJune17,2003,theSupremeCourt
No. 8799.Applying the relationship test and the nature of the
(SC) issued A.M. No. 030303SC consolidating the commercial
controversytest,thesuitbetweenthepartiesisclearlyrootedin
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) courts and the
theexistenceofanintracorporaterelationshipandpertainstothe
intellectualpropertycourtsinone(1)RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)
enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the
branchinaparticularlocality,i.e.,theSpecialCommercialCourt,
CorporationCodeandtheinternalandintracorporateregulatory
tostreamlinethecourt structureandto promoteexpediency.It
rules of the corporation, hence, intracorporate, which should be
wasonlyonNovember21,2000thattheCourtdesignatedcertain
heard by the designated Special Commercial Court as provided
RTCbranchestotryanddecidesaidSECcaseswithout,however,
under A.M. No. 030303SC dated June 17, 2003 in relation to
providingforthetransferofthecasesalreadydistributedtoorfiled
Item5.2,Section5ofRA8799.
withtheregularbranchesthereof.Thus,onJanuary23,2001,the
Same;Same;Same;Same;ByvirtueofRepublicAct(RA)No.8799,
CourtissuedSCAdministrativeCircularNo.082001directingthe
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential
transfer of said cases to the designated courts (commercial SEC
Decree (PD) No. 902A was transferred from the Securities and
courts).Later,oronJune17,2003,theCourtissuedA.M.No.03
ExchangeCommission(SEC)totheRegionalTrialCourts(RTCs),
0303SC consolidating the commercial SEC courts and the
beingcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction.Asabasicpremise,letitbe
intellectual property courts in one RTC branch in a particular
emphasized that a courts acquisition of jurisdiction over a
locality,i.e.,theSpecialCommercialCourt,tostreamlinethecourt
structureandtopromoteexpediency.Accordingly,theRTCbranch
sodesignatedwasmandatedtotryanddecideSECcases,aswellas
those involving violations of intellectual property rights, which
were,thereupon,requiredtobefiledintheOfficeoftheClerkof
CourtintheofficialstationofthedesignatedSpecialCommercial
Courts.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; So as to avert any future
confusion, the Supreme Court (SC) requires henceforth, that all
initiatorypleadingsstatetheactionsnaturebothinitscaptionand
thebody.Accordingtojurisprudence,itisnotthecaptionbutthe
allegationsinthecomplaintorotherinitiatorypleadingwhichgive
meaningtothepleadingandonthebasisofwhichsuchpleading
maybelegallycharacterized.However,soastoavertanyfuture
confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all initiatory
pleadingsstatetheactionsnaturebothinitscaptionandthebody,
which parameters are defined in the dispositive portion of this
Decision.
RaffleofCases;RegionalTrialCourts;SpecialCommercialCourts;
TheerroneousrafflingtoaregularbranchinsteadoftoaSpecial
Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure that is, an
incidentrelatedtotheexerciseofjurisdictionand,thus,should
notnegatethejurisdictionwhichtheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)of
Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the
proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be
dismissed;instead,Branch276shouldhavefirstreferredthecase
to the Executive Judge for redocketing as a commercial case;
thereafter,theExecutiveJudgeshouldthenassignsaidcasetothe
only designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e.,
Branch 256.The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous
raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial
Courtisonlyamatterofprocedurethatis,anincidentrelatedto
the exercise of jurisdiction and, thus, should not negate the
jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already
acquired.Insuchascenario,thepropercourseofactionwasnotfor
thecommercialcasetobedismissed;instead,Branch276should
havefirstreferredthecasetotheExecutiveJudgeforredocketing
asacommercialcase;thereafter,theExecutiveJudgeshouldthen
assignsaidcasetotheonlydesignatedSpecialCommercialCourt
inthestation,i.e.,Branch256.Notethattheprocedurewouldbe
different wheretheRTCacquiringjurisdictionover thecasehas
multiplespecialcommercialcourtbranches;insuchascenario,the
ExecutiveJudge,afterredocketingthesameasacommercialcase,
should proceed to order its reraffling among the said special
branches.
Same; Same; Same; If the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acquiring
jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special Commercial
Court, then it should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a
designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial
region.IftheRTCacquiringjurisdictionhasnobranchdesignated
asaSpecialCommercialCourt,thenitshouldreferthecasetothe
nearestRTCwithadesignatedSpecialCommercialCourtbranch
withinthejudicialregion.Uponreferral,theRTCtowhichthecase
wasreferredtoshouldredocketthecaseasacommercialcase,and
then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a
Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special
branch;or(b)ifthesaidRTChasmultiplebranchesdesignatedas
SpecialCommercialCourts,raffleoffthecaseamongthosespecial
branches.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The designation of Special
Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to
expeditetheresolutionofcommercialcasesinlinewiththecourts
exerciseofjurisdiction.TheCourtfindsitapttopointoutthatthe
sameprinciplesapplytotheinversesituationofordinarycivilcases
filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to its branches
designatedasSpecialCommercialCourts.Insuchascenario,the
ordinarycivilcaseshouldthenbereferredtotheExecutiveJudge
forredocketingasanordinarycivilcase;thereafter,theExecutive
Judgeshouldthenordertherafflingofthecasetoallbranchesof
thesameRTC,subjecttolimitationsunderexistinginternalrules,
andthepaymentofthecorrectdocketfeesincaseofanydifference.
Unlikethelimitedassignment/rafflingofacommercialcaseonlyto
branchesdesignatedasSpecialCommercialCourtsinthescenarios
stated above, the reraffling of an ordinary civil case in this
instancetoallcourtsispermissibleduetothefactthataparticular
branchwhichhasbeendesignatedasaSpecialCommercialCourt
does not shed the RTCs general jurisdiction over ordinary civil
casesundertheimprimaturofstatutorylaw,i.e.,BatasPambansa
Bilang(BP)129.Torestate,thedesignationofSpecialCommercial
Courtswasmerelyintendedasaprocedural tool toexpeditethe
resolutionofcommercialcasesinlinewiththecourtsexerciseof
jurisdiction.Thisdesignationwasnotmadebystatutebutonlyby
aninternalSupremeCourtruleunderitsauthoritytopromulgate
rules governing matters of procedure and its constitutional
mandate to supervise the administration of all courts and the
personnelthereof.Certainly,aninternalrulepromulgatedbythe
Court cannot gobeyondthecommandingstatute. But asamore
fundamentalreason,thedesignationofSpecialCommercialCourts
is, tostress,merelyanincidentrelatedtothe courts exerciseof
jurisdiction,which,asfirstdiscussed,isdistinctfromtheconceptof
jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter.TheRTCsgeneraljurisdiction
overordinarycivilcasesisthereforenotabdicatedbyaninternal
rulestreamliningcourtprocedure.
PEREZ,J.,DissentingOpinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts;
Jurisdictions; View that the ponencia proceeds from the wrong
premisethatthelawvestedjurisdictionovertransferredSecurities
andExchangeCommission(SEC) casesonalltheRegionalTrial
Courts(RTCs)andthatthedesignationbytheSupremeCourt(SC)
of Special Commercial Courts concern only an exercise of
jurisdiction.Withallduerespect,theponenciaproceedsfromthe
wrong premise that the law vested jurisdiction over transferred
SECcasesonalltheRegionalTrialCourtsandthatthedesignation
bytheSupremeCourtofSpecialCommercialCourtsconcernonly
anexerciseofjurisdiction.
Statutory Construction; View that it is first axiom in legal
hermeneuticsthatastatutoryprovisionisreadasawholeandnot
indisjointedparts.Itisfirstaxiominlegalhermeneuticsthata
statutoryprovisionisreadasawholeandnotindisjointedparts.
Theruleisasrespectedasitisancient.Itssumandsubstancehas
notbeendilutednomatterhowfrequentthefreeparaphraseshave
been.
RemedialLaw;CivilProcedure;RegionalTrialCourts;Jurisdiction;
ViewthatSection5,Item5.2ofRepublicAct(RA)No.8799didnot
transfer the cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree(PD)No.902AtoalltheRegionalTrialCourts(RTCs).
Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 did not transfer the cases
enumeratedunderSection5ofP.D.No.902AtoalltheRTCs.If
thatwasthelegislativeintention,thentheprovisionshouldhave
simply stated that such cases are hereby transferred to the
Regional Trial Courts. The complete investiture is, however, on
thecourtsofgeneraljurisdictionortheappropriateRegionalTrial
Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
shallexercisejurisdictionoverthecases.Ifthelawisageneral
conferment of jurisdiction on all RTC, then the phrase or the
appropriateRegionalTrialCourtisaninutilesurplusageandthe
proviso that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority
may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall
exercisejurisdictionoverthecasesisapurposelessappendageand
wastedwords.AgeneralgranttoallRTCsrendersirrelevantthe
Supreme Courts exercise of authority on the matter. Such a
generalgrantrendersmeaninglessthedesignationbytheSupreme
CourtoftheRTCbranchesthatshallexercisejurisdictionoverthe
cases.
Same;Same;Same;Same;ViewthatSection5,Item5.2ofRepublic
Act(RA)No.8799shouldthereforebereadtomeanthatSecurities
and Exchange Commissions (SECs) jurisdiction over all cases
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902A is
transferred to the specific Regional Trial Court (RTC) branch
designated by the Supreme Court (SC) in the exercise of its
authority.Section5,Item5.2ofR.A.No.8799shouldthereforebe
readtomeanthatSECsjurisdictionoverallcasesunderSection5
of P.D. No. 902A is transferred to the specific RTC branch
designatedbytheSupremeCourtintheexerciseofitsauthority.
This is the reading of the Supreme Court as expressed with
precisioninA.M.No.001103SCdated21November2000which
is aptly titled Resolution Designating Certain Branches of
Regional Trial Courts To Try and Decide Cases Formerly
CognizablebytheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionarising
withintheirrespectiveterritorialjurisdictionswithrespecttothe
NationalCapitalRegionandwithintherespectiveprovincesinthe
First to the Twelfth Judicial Regions. This En Banc Resolution
openedwithapurposeclausereadingtoimplementtheprovisions
of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation
Code).ThisisanunequivocalstatementthattheCourtinterprets
the provision to mean that only the RTC Branches that it shall
designatetohearanddecideSpecialCommercialCourtcasescan
exercisejurisdictionoversuchcases.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Viewthatabsentsuchjurisdiction,the
nonSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regional Trial
Court (RTC) cannotdirectthecasetothepropercourt.There
hasbeen,asjustenumerated,asmanyiterationsbythecourtitself
ofitsreadingofSection5,Item5.2ofR.A.No.8799i.e.,thatthe
lawtransferredtheSECjurisdictionoverthecaseslistedinSec.5
ofP.D.No.902AtotheparticularbranchesoftheRTCsdesignated
by the Supreme Court as such. Unavoidable, therefore, is the
conclusion that all other Branches of the RTCs without the
Supreme Court designation are without jurisdiction over SEC
cases.AndfollowingunreversedrulingstheotherBranchesofthe
RTCbeforewhomaSECcaseisfiledmustdismisssuchcasefor
want of jurisdiction. Furthermore, absent such jurisdiction, the
nonSECRTCcannotdirectthecasetothepropercourt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)CommercialCourthasexclusivejurisdictionovercommercial
cases and can still exercise jurisdiction over regular cases if, as
determinedbytheSupremeCourt(SC),thecaseloadsnecessitate
suchexercise.Palpably,RTCcaseloadsandtheneedtoequalize
thecaseloadsamongallbranchesdeterminetheneedfortheCourt
toissueregulationsregardingtheCommercialCourtsexerciseof
jurisdictionovernoncommercialcases.Inall,theRTCCommercial
Courthasexclusivejurisdictionovercommercialcasesandcanstill
exercise jurisdiction over regular cases if, as determined by the
Supreme Court, the caseloads necessitate such exercise. While
theremaybeargumentsinfavorofasimplerarrangementwhereby
all the RTCs in all the Judicial Districts are made Commercial
Courts,suchargumentscannotbesubmittedforresolutionbythe
Court.Thesettlementisinthelegislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the designation of Special
Commercial Courts, as implemented by the Supreme Court (SC)
through its various rules, pertains to the statutorily conferred
jurisdiction and not merely an incident related to the courts
exercise of jurisdiction.Plainly, the designation of Special
CommercialCourts,asimplementedbytheSupremeCourtthrough
itsvariousrules,pertainstothestatutorilyconferredjurisdiction
and not merely an incident related to the courts exercise of
jurisdiction. The ponencia fails to address an equally important
precept on subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction is
determined by the averments and allegations of the complaint
whichinthisinstanceisinarguablyacommercialcaseconcerning
subscriptionofsharesinacorporation.Fromtheonset,petitioners,
by the filing of their Complaint, supplied the occasion for the
exerciseofjurisdictionvestedbylawinaparticularcourt.Inshort,
petitionersinvokedthejurisdictionoftheRTC(notasacourtof
generaljurisdiction),andwiththeallegationsintheirComplaint,
specificallyinvokedtheRTCdesignatedasaSpecialCommercial
CourtunderSection5.2ofR.A.No.8799,implementedunderA.M.
No. 030303SC. Petitioners cannot just simply file their
Complaint before the RTC without any specificity, given the
allegationscontainedthereinandthereliefstheyprayedfor.
Same;Same;Same;Same;ViewthatBranch276oftheRegional
Trial Court (RTC), to which the Complaint was consequently
raffled,intheexerciseofitsgeneraljurisdiction,cannotorderthe
transfer of the Complaint to Branch 256, the designated Special
Commercial Court. Branch 276 cannot do so on the basis of
authorityoverthecasewhichitdidnothave.Neitherdoesithave
authorityoveracoequalcourt.Withtheincorrectlabelingoftheir
Complaint and the wrong invocation of the RTCs regular
jurisdiction, the designated Special Commercial Court did not
acquirejurisdictionovertheComplaintbythemerefilingthereof
with the multi sala RTC. Since petitioners had filed what they
labeled as a Civil Case, they knowingly filed it pursuant to the
generaljurisdictionoftheRTCunderSec.19ofB.P.Blg.129.The
merefilingoftheComplaintbeforetheOfficeoftheClerkofCourt
in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, in the official station of the
designatedSpecialCommercialCourtaswhatoccurredherein,is
not equivalent to the correct and proper filing of the Complaint
beforetheappropriateRegionalTrialCourtspeciallydesignatedby
the Supreme Court to hear and decide cases enumerated under
Section5ofP.D.No.902A.Branch276oftheRTC,towhichthe
Complaintwasconsequentlyraffled,intheexerciseofitsgeneral
jurisdiction,cannotorderthetransferoftheComplainttoBranch
256,thedesignatedSpecialCommercialCourt.Branch276cannot
dosoonthebasisofauthorityoverthecasewhichitdidnothave.
Neitherdoesithaveauthorityoveracoequalcourt.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Viewthatcourtsshouldnotthemselves
correcttheproceduralmistakesofpleaders.Indeed,Weshould,as
warranted, require from counsels disciplined knowledge of
procedure. Courts should not themselves correct the procedural
mistakes of pleaders. I cannot overemphasize, and ultimately
reverttothefact,thatsubjectmatterjurisdictionwasconferredby
law (Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799) to the appropriate RTC as
determinedthruthedesignationbytheSupremeCourt.
LEONEN,J.,ConcurringOpinion:
RemedialLaw;CivilProcedure;RegionalTrialCourts;Jurisdiction;
View that the designation of certain Regional Trial Court (RTC)
branches as Special Commercial Courts does not work to confer
jurisdictionoverthebranchesdesignatedassuch.Iconcurwith
theponenciasconclusionthatthedesignationofcertainRegional
TrialCourtbranchesasSpecialCommercialCourtsdoesnotwork
toconferjurisdictionoverthebranchesdesignatedassuch.Itwas
anerrorfortheMuntinlupaCityRegionalTrialCourt,Branch276,
to dismiss the Complaint filed by petitioners. As the ponencia
underscores,Branch276shouldhaveinsteadtransferredthecase
to the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, the
branchdulydesignatedtoperformtheMuntinlupaCityRegional
TrialCourtsfunctionsasaSpecialCommercialCourt.Thepresent
Petitionmust,thus,begranted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that jurisdiction over what the
ponencia collectively refers to as Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Cases was vested by Republic Act (RA) No.
8799,otherwiseknownastheSecuritiesRegulationCode(SRC),in
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and is not limited to the RTC
branches designated by the Supreme Court (SC) as Special
Commercial Courts.Jurisdiction over what the ponencia
collectivelyreferstoasSECCaseswasvestedbyRepublicActNo.
8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, in
RegionalTrialCourtsandisnotlimitedtotheRegionalTrialCourt
branchesdesignatedbythiscourtasSpecialCommercialCourts.It
isonlythelegislaturethathasthepowertodefine,prescribe,and
apportionthejurisdictionofvariouscourts[.]AsCongressdoesnot
sharethispowerwiththiscourt,inrelationwiththeseissues,this
courtscompetenceislimitedtoadministrativesupervisionoverall
courts[,]as wellas the [p]romulgat[ionof]rules concerning...
pleading,practice,andprocedureinallcourts[.]Itwaspurelyin
the exercise of these powers, and not for the purpose of vesting
jurisdiction where previously there was none, that this court
designated certain Regional Trial Court branches as Special
CommercialCourts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that jurisdiction over all cases
enumeratedunderSection5ofPresidentialDecree(PD)No.902A,
whichwerepreviouslyunderthejurisdictionoftheSecuritiesand
ExchangeCommission(SEC),wasvestedinRegionalTrialCourts
(RTCs)bySection5.2oftheSecuritiesRegulationCode(SRC).
Jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902A, which were previously under the
jurisdictionoftheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission,wasvested
inRegionalTrialCourtsbySection5.2oftheSecuritiesRegulation
Code.
Same;Same;Same;Same;ViewthatA.M.No.001103SCdidnot
work to confer jurisdiction independently of Section 5.2 of the
Securities Regulation Code (SRC). A.M. No. 001103SC itself
declaresthatitwasadoptedmerely[t]oimplementtheprovisions
of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8799.This statutory
provision was adopted pursuant to the legislatures power under
ArticleVIII,Section2ofthe1987Constitutiontodefine,prescribe,
andapportionthejurisdictionofvariouscourts[.]Incontrast,the
designation of Special Commercial Courts, through this courts
November 21, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 001103SC, was
pursuanttothiscourtspowerunderArticleVIII,Section6ofthe
1987Constitutiontoexerciseadministrativesupervisionoverall
courts.A.M.No.001103SCdidnotworktoconferjurisdiction
independently of Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code.
A.M. No. 001103SC itself declares that it was adopted merely
[t]o implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No.
8799[.]
Same;Same;Same;Same;ViewthattheidentityofRegionalTrial
Courts (RTCs) as courts of general jurisdiction is no bar to
designatingcertainRTCbranchestofocusoncertaintypesofcases.
The identity of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general
jurisdictionisnobartodesignatingcertainRegionalTrialCourt
branchestofocusoncertaintypesofcases.Tothecontrary,itis
this identity which permits it. Designating branches to focus on
certain types of cases, in order to facilitate the efficient
dispensation of justice, is well within their nature as courts
competent to take cognizance of cases not falling under the
exclusivejurisdictionofanyothercourt,tribunal,person,orbody.
Designatingbranchesassuchbalancestwoconsiderations:onthe
onehand,theirnatureascourts,whichbecausetheyhavegeneral
jurisdiction, can exercise jurisdiction over the specific matter to
whichtheywereassigned;andontheother,theirdutytospeedily
administerjustice.
Same;Same;Same;Same;ViewthatSection5.2squalificationthat
thiscourtspowertodesignateisnecessarilyonlyintheexerciseof
itsauthorityisilluminating.Section5.2squalificationthatthis
courtspowertodesignateisnecessarilyonlyintheexerciseofits
authorityisilluminating.Itistosaythat,ingoingaboutitstask
ofdesignating,thiscourtcannotactinexcessofitsconstitutional
authority. This affirms the Constitutions segregation of the
competencies ofCongressfromthoseofthis court.Itaffirmsthe
exclusivityofCongresspowertodefine,prescribe,andapportion
thejurisdictionofvariouscourts[.]Thisaffirmstherealitythat,
bereft of this power, this courts competence is limited to
administrative supervision over all courts[,] as well as the
[p]romulgat[ion][of]rulesconcerning...pleading,practice,and
procedureinallcourts[.]
Same;Same;Same;Same;ViewthatinadoptingA.M.No.0011
03SC,thiscourtwasfullycognizantofhowSection5.2limitedits
authoritytodesignateonlyintheexerciseofitsauthority.A.M.
No.001103SCdidnotcreateanewclassofcourts.Itspurposeis
operational efficiency. In its own words, it was adopted to serve
theinterestofaspeedyandefficientadministrationofjustice[.]It
is,thus,butaproceduralandadministrativemechanismaimed(to
echo the words of the ponencia) to promote expediency and
efficiency in the exercise of the [Regional Trial Courts]
jurisdiction[.] Also in its own words, A.M. No. 001103SC was
adoptedonly[t]oimplementtheprovisionsofSec.5.2ofRepublic
Act No. 8799 [or the Securities Regulation Code]. Thus, in
adoptingA.M.No. 001103SC, this courtwas fullycognizant of
how Section 5.2 limited its authority to designate only in the
exercise of its authority[.] Indeed, this court could not have
intendedtooversteptheconstitutionallimitsofitsauthority.
PERLASBERNABE,J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a petition for review
oncertiorari,1from the Orders dated April 17, 2012 2and July 9,
20123of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City,
Branch276(Branch276)dismissingCivilCaseNo.11077forlack
ofjurisdiction.
TheFacts
On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales 4and
Francis Martin D. Gonzales (petitioners) filed a Complaint 5for
"InjunctionwithprayerforIssuanceofStatusQuoOrder,Three(3)
andTwenty(20)DayTemporaryRestrainingOrders,andWritof
Preliminary Injunction with Damages" against respondents GJH
Land,Inc.(formerlyknownasS.J.Land,Inc.),ChangHwanJang,
Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto P. Mallari
II6(respondents) before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to
enjointhesaleofS.J.Land,Inc.'sshareswhichtheypurportedly
bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially,
petitionersallegedthatthesubscriptionsforthesaidshareswere
alreadypaidbytheminfullinthebooksofS.J.Land,Inc., 7but dismissal is upheld.18TheyfurthermaintainedthattheRTChas
were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the
corporation's stockholders,8hence, their plea for injunction.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11077 and raffled
toBranch276,whichisnotaSpecialCommercialCourt.On
August 9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining
order,9andlater,inanOrder10datedAugust24,2011,grantedthe
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Afterfilingtheirrespectiveanswers 11tothecomplaint,respondents
filedamotiontodismiss12onthegroundoflackofjurisdictionover
the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an intra
corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated
SpecialCommercialCourtofMuntinlupaCity.13
TheRTCRuling
InanOrder14datedApril17,2012,Branch276grantedthemotion
todismissfiledbyrespondents.Itfoundthatthecaseinvolvesan
intracorporate dispute that is within the original and exclusive
jurisdictionoftheRTCsdesignatedasSpecialCommercialCourts.
It pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256
(Branch 256) was specifically designated by the Court as the
SpecialCommercialCourt,hence,Branch276hadnojurisdiction
over the case and cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction on the
matter, including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.15Accordingly, it dismissed the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,16arguingthattheyfiledthecasewiththeOfficeof
theClerkofCourtoftheRTCofMuntinlupaCitywhichassigned
thesametoBranch276byraffle.17Astherafflewasbeyondtheir
control,theyshouldnotbemadetosuffertheconsequencesofthe
wrongassignmentofthecase,especiallyafterpayingthefilingfees
in the amount of P235,825.00 that would be for naught if the
jurisdictionover intracorporatedisputes under Republic Act No.
(RA)8799,19butsincetheCourtselectedspecificbranchestohear
and decide such suits, the case must, at most, be transferred or
raffled off to the proper branch. 20
InanOrder21datedJuly9,2012,Branch276deniedthemotionfor
reconsideration,holdingthatithasnoauthorityorpowertoorder
thetransferofthecasetotheproperSpecialCommercialCourt,
citingCallejav.Panday22(Calleja);hence,thepresentpetition.
TheIssueBeforetheCourt
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
Branch276oftheRTCofMuntinlupaCityerredindismissingthe
caseforlackofjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter.
TheCourt'sRuling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly
categorized Civil Case No. 11077 as a commercial case, more
particularly,anintracorporatedispute,23consideringthatitrelates
to petitioners' averredrights over theshares of stock offered for
saletootherstockholders,havingpaidthesameinfull.Applying
therelationshiptestandthenatureofthecontroversytest,thesuit
betweenthepartiesisclearlyrootedintheexistenceofanintra
corporate relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their
correlativerightsandobligationsundertheCorporationCodeand
the internal and intracorporate regulatory rules of the
corporation,24hence,intracorporate,whichshouldbeheardbythe
designatedSpecialCommercialCourtasprovidedunderA.M.No.
030303SC25datedJune17,2003inrelationtoItem5.2,Section5
of RA
The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to be
followedwhenacommercialcasesuchastheinstantintra
corporate dispute has been properly filed in the official
stationofthedesignatedSpecialCommercialCourtbutis,
however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular
branch of that
Asabasicpremise,letitbeemphasizedthatacourt'sacquisitionof
jurisdictionoveraparticularcase'ssubjectmatterisdifferentfrom
incidentspertainingtotheexerciseofitsjurisdiction.Jurisdiction
overthesubjectmatterofacaseisconferredbylaw,whereasa
court'sexerciseofjurisdiction,unlessprovidedbythelawitself,
isgovernedbytheRulesofCourtorbytheordersissuedfromtime
totimebytheCourt.26InLozadav.Bracewell,27itwasrecentlyheld
thatthematterofwhethertheRTCresolvesanissueinthe
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdictionasaspecialcourtisonlyamatterofprocedure
and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.
PertinenttothiscaseisRA8799whichtookeffectonAugust8,
2000.Byvirtueofsaidlaw,jurisdictionovercasesenumeratedin
Section528ofPresidentialDecreeNo.902A29wastransferredfrom
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tothe RTCs,
beingcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction.Item5.2,Section5ofRA
8799provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 5.Powers and Functionsof the Commission. x x x
x x x x
5.2TheCommission'sjurisdictionoverallcasesenumerated
underSection5ofPresidentialDecreeNo.902Aishereby
8799. transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court:Provided,that the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over the cases. The Commission shall
retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intracorporate
disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved
station. within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitationcasesfiledasof30June2000untilfinally
disposed.(Emphasissupplied)@
The legal attribution ofRegional Trial Courts as courts of
general jurisdictionstems from Section 19 (6), Chapter II of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,30known as "The Judiciary
ReorganizationActof1980":chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section19.Jurisdictionincivilcases.RegionalTrialCourtsshall
exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
(6)Inallcasesnotwithintheexclusivejurisdictionofanycourt,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functions; x x x x
@

As enunciated inDurisol Philippines, Inc. v.
CA:31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Theregionaltrialcourt,formerlythecourtoffirstinstance,isa
courtofgeneraljurisdiction.Allcases,thejurisdictionoverwhichis
notspecificallyprovidedforbylawtobewithinthejurisdictionof
any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
@ havebeensubmittedforresolutionwillcontinue.Atthesametime,
To clarify, the word "or" in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was
intentionallyusedbythelegislaturetoparticularizethefactthat
thephrase"theCourtsofgeneraljurisdiction"isequivalenttothe
phrase"theappropriateRegionalTrialCourt."Inotherwords,the
jurisdictionoftheSECoverthecasesenumeratedunderSection5
ofPD902Awastransferredtothecourtsofgeneraljurisdiction,
thatistosay(or,otherwiseknownas),theproperRegionalTrial
Courts. This interpretation is supported bySan Miguel Corp. v.
Municipal Council,33wherein the Court held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]heword"or"maybeusedastheequivalentof"thatistosay"
and gives that which precedes it the same significance as that
which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes
interpretativeorexpositoryoftheprecedingword.34@
Further, as may be gleaned from the following excerpt of the
Congressionaldeliberations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Senator [Raul S.] Roco: x x x.
x x x x
xxx.ThefirstmajordepartureisasregardstheSecuritiesand
ExchangeCommission.TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission
hasbeenauthorizedunderthisproposaltoreorganizeitself.Asan
administrativeagency,westrengtheneditandatthesametimewe
take away the quasijudicial functions.The quasijudicial
functions are now given back to the courts of general
jurisdiction the Regional Trial Court,except for two
categories of cases.
Inthecaseofcorporatedisputes,onlythosethatarenowsubmitted
forfinaldeterminationoftheSECwillremainwiththeSEC.So,all
thosecases, both memos of theplaintiff and the defendant, that
casesinvolvingrehabilitation,bankruptcy,suspensionofpayments
andreceivershipsthatwerefiledbeforeJune30,2000willcontinue
withtheSEC.inotherwords,weareavoidingthepossibility,upon
approvalofthisbill,ofpeoplefilingcaseswiththeSEC,inmanner
of speaking, to select their court.35
xxxx(Emphasissupplied)@
Therefore,onemustbedisabusedofthenotionthatthetransferof
jurisdiction was made only in favor of particular RTC branches,
and not the RTCs in general.
Consistent with the foregoing, history depicts that when the
transfer of SEC cases to the RTCs was first implemented, they
were transmitted to the Executive Judges of the RTCs for raffle
between or among its different branches,unless a specific
branchhasbeendesignatedasaSpecialCommercialCourt,
in which instance, the cases weretransmittedto said
branch.36It was only on November 21, 2000 that the Court
designated certain RTC branches to try and decide said SEC
cases37without, however, providing for the transfer of the cases
alreadydistributedtoorfiledwiththeregularbranches thereof.
Thus, on January 23, 2001, the Court issued SC Administrative
Circular No. 08200138directing the transfer of said cases to the
designatedcourts(commercialSECcourts).Later,oronJune17,
2003, the Court issued A.M. No. 030303SC consolidating the
commercial SEC courts and the intellectual property under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
courts39inone RTC branch in a particular locality, i.e., the Constitution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Special Commercial Court,to streamline the court structure Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
and to promote expediency.40Accordingly, the RTC branch so supervisionoverallcourtsandthepersonnelthereof.@
designatedwasmandatedtotryanddecideSECcases,aswellas
those involving violations of intellectual property rights, which Theobjectivebehindthedesignationofsuchspecializedcourtsisto
were,thereupon,requiredtobefiledintheOfficeoftheClerkof promote expediency and efficiency in theexerciseof the
Court in theofficial station of the designated Special RTCs'jurisdictionoverthecasesenumeratedunderSection5of
CommercialCourts,towit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary PD902A.Suchdesignationhasnothingtodowiththestatutory
1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts confermentofjurisdictiontoallRTCsunderRA8799sinceinthe
throughthe:(a)ResolutionsofthisCourtdated21November2000, first place, the Court cannot enlarge, diminish, or dictate when
4July2001,12November2002,and9July2002allissuedinA.M. jurisdictionshall beremoved,giventhat thepowertodefine,
No.001103SC;(b)Resolutiondated27August2001inA.M.No. prescribe,andapportionjurisdictionis,asageneralrule,a
015298RTC;and(c)Resolutiondated8July2002inA.M.No.01 matteroflegislativeprerogative.42Section2,ArticleVIIIofthe
12656RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED 1987Constitutionprovides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
asSpecial Commercial Courts to try and decidecases involving Section2.TheCongressshallhavethepowertodefine,prescribe,
violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
jurisdictionandthosecasesformerlycognizablebytheSecurities deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
and Exchange Commission:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

x x x x
4.TheSpecialCommercialCourtsshallhavejurisdictionovercases
arisingwithintheirrespectiveterritorialjurisdictionwithrespect
totheNationalCapitalJudicialRegionandwithintherespective
provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions.
Thus,casesshallbefiledintheOfficeoftheClerkofCourtinthe
official station of the designated Special Commercial Court;41
xxxx(Underscoringsupplied)@
ItisimportanttomentionthattheCourt'sdesignationofSpecial
Commercial Courts was made in line with its constitutional
authoritytosupervisetheadministrationofallcourtsasprovided
x x x x
@
Here, petitioners filed a commercial case,i.e., an intracorporate
dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, which is theofficial station of the designated
SpecialCommercialCourt,inaccordancewithA.M.No.030303
SC.Itis,therefore,fromthetimeofsuchfilingthattheRTC
of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the nature of the action.43Unfortunately,the
commercial case was wrongly raffled to a regular
branch,e.g., Branch 276, instead of being assigned44to the
sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City,whichisBranch256.Thiserrormayhavebeencausedbya
relianceonthecomplaint'scaption,i.e.,"CivilCaseforInjunction
with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages," 45which,
however,contradictsandmoreimportantly,cannotprevailoverits
actual allegations that clearly make out an intracorporate
dispute:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
16.TothesurpriseofMLCGandFMDG,however,intwoidentical
lettersbothdated13May2011,undertheletterheadofGJHLand,
Inc., Yap, now acting as its President, Jang and Kim demanded
payment of supposed unpaid subscriptions of MLCG and FMDG
amountingtoP10,899,854.30andP2,625,249.41,respectively.
16.1Copiesofthelettersdated13May2011areattachedhereto
andmadeintegralpartshereofasAnnexes"J"and"K",repectively.
17.On29July2011,MLCGandFMDGreceivedanOfferLetter
addressedtostockholdersofGJHLand,Inc.fromYapinformingall
stockholders that GJH Land, Inc. is now offering for sale the
unpaidsharesofstockofMLCGandFMDG.Thesameletterstates
that the offers to purchase these shares will be opened on 10
August 2011 with payments to be arranged by deposit to the
depositorybankofGJHLand,Inc.
17.1 A copy of the undated Offer Letter is attached hereto and
madeandmadeanintegralparthereofasAnnex"L".
18.TheletterofGJHLand,Inc.throughYap,istotallywithout
legal and factual basis because as evidenced by the Deeds of
AssignmentsignedandcertifiedbyYapherself,alltheS.J.Land,
Inc.sharesacquiredbyMLCGandFMDGhavebeenfullypaidin
the books of S.J. Land,
19.Withtheimpendingsaleoftheallegedunpaidsubscriptionson
10August2011,thereisnowacleardangerthatMLCGand
FMDGwouldbedeprivedoftheseshareswithoutlegaland
factual basis.
20.Furthermore,iftheyaredeprivedofthesesharesthroughthe
scheduled sale, both MLCG and FMDG would suffer grave and
irreparable damage incapable of pecuniary estimation.
21.Forthisreason,plaintiffsnowcometotheHonorableCourtfor
injunctive relief so that after trial on the merits, a permanent
injunction should be issued against the defendants preventing
themfromsellingthesharesoftheplaintiffs,therebeingnobasis
forsuchsale.46@
Accordingtojurisprudence,"itisnotthecaptionbuttheallegations
inthecomplaintorotherinitiatorypleadingwhichgivemeaningto
thepleadingandonthebasisofwhichsuchpleadingmaybelegally
characterized."47However,soastoavertanyfutureconfusion,the
Court requires henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings state the
action'snaturebothinitscaptionandthebody,whichparameters
are defined in the dispositive portion of this Decision.
Goingbacktothecaseatbar,theCourtnonethelessdeemsthatthe
erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special
Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure that is, an
incidentrelatedtotheexerciseofjurisdictionand,thus,should
notnegatethejurisdictionwhichtheRTCofMuntinlupaCityhad
alreadyacquired.Insuchascenario,thepropercourseof action
wasnotforthecommercialcasetobedismissed;instead,Branch
276shouldhavefirstreferredthecasetotheExecutiveJudge
for redocketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the
Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only
Inc. designated Special Commercial Court in the
station,i.e.,Branch 256.
Note that the procedure would be different where the RTC
acquiring jurisdiction over the case hasmultiple special
commercial court branches;in such a scenario, the Executive
Judge, after redocketing the sameas a commercial case, should
proceed to order itsreraffling among the said special
branches.
Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring jurisdiction hasno branch
designated as a Special Commercial Court, then it
shouldreferthecasetothenearestRTCwithadesignatedSpecial
Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. 48Upon
referral,theRTCtowhichthecasewasreferredtoshouldredocket
thecaseasacommercialcase,andthen:(a)ifthesaidRTChas
onlyonebranchdesignatedasaSpecialCommercialCourt,assign
the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has
multiplebranchesdesignatedasSpecialCommercialCourts,raffle
off the case among those special branches.
Inalltheabovementionedscenarios,anydifferenceregardingthe
applicabledocketfeesshouldbedulyaccountedfor.Ontheother
hand,alldocketfeesalreadypaidshallbedulycredited,andany
excess, refunded.
Atthisjuncture,theCourtfindsitfittingtoclarifythattheRTC
mistakenly relied on theCallejacase to support its ruling.
InCalleja,anintracorporatedispute49amongofficersofaprivate
corporation with principal address at Goa, Camarines Sur, was
filedwiththeRTCofSanJose,CamarinesSur,Branch58instead
of the RTC of Naga City, which is the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur.
Consequently,theCourtsetasidetheRTCofSanJose,Camarines
Sur's order to transfer the case to the RTC of Naga City and
dismissedthecomplaintconsideringthatitwasfiledbeforeacourt
which, having no internal branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, had no jurisdiction over those kinds of
actions,i.e., intracorporate disputes.Calleja involved two
differentRTCs,i.e.,theRTCofSanJose,CamarinesSurandthe
RTCofNagaCity,whereastheinstantcaseonlyinvolvesone
RTC,i.e.,the RTC of Muntinlupa City, albeit involving two
different branches of the same court,i.e.,Branches 256 and 276.
Hence,owingtothevarianceinthefacts attending,itwasthen
improper for the RTC to rely on the Calleja ruling.
Besides, the Court observes that the fine line that distinguishes
subject matter jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction had been
clearlyblurredinCalleja.Harkeningbacktothestatutethathad
conferred subject matter jurisdiction, two things are apparently
clear:(a)thattheSEC'ssubjectmatterjurisdictionoverintra
corporatecasesunderSection5ofPresidentialDecreeNo.902A
was transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction, i.e., the
appropriateRegionalTrialCourts;and(b)thedesignatedbranches
oftheRegionalTrialCourt,aspertherulespromulgatedbythe
SupremeCourt,shallexercisejurisdictionoversuchcases.Item
5.2,Section5ofRA8799provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 5.Powers and Functions of the Commission. x x x
x x x x
5.2TheCommission'sjurisdictionoverallcasesenumerated
underSection5ofPresidentialDecreeNo.902Aishereby
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriateRegionalTrialCourt:Provided,thattheSupreme
Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shallexercise
jurisdictionoverthecases,xxx.@
Incontrast,theappropriatejurisprudentialreferencetothiscase
wouldbeTanv.Bausch&Lomb,Inc.,50whichinvolvesacriminal
complaint for violation of intellectual property rights filed before
theRTCofCebuCitybutwasraffledtoaregularbranchthereof
(Branch21),andnottoaSpecialCommercialCourt.Asitturned
out, the regular branch subsequently denied the private
complainant'smotiontotransferthecasetothedesignatedspecial
courtofthesameRTC,onthegroundoflackofjurisdiction.The
CA reversed the regular branch and, consequently, ordered the
transfer of the case to the designated special court at that time
(Branch 9). The Court, affirming the CA, declared that theRTC
hadacquiredjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter.Inview,however,
ofthedesignationofanothercourtastheSpecialCommercialCourt
intheinterim(Branch11ofthesameCebuCityRTC),theCourt
accordinglyorderedthetransferofthecaseandthetransmittalof
therecordstosaidSpecialCommercialCourtinstead. 51Similarly,
the transfer of the present intracorporate dispute from
Branch276toBranch256ofthesameRTCofMuntinlupa
City, subject to the parameters abovediscussed is proper
andwillfurtherthepurposesstatedinA.M.No.030303SC
ofattainingaspeedyandefficientadministrationofjustice.
Forfurtherguidance,theCourtfindsitapttopointoutthatthe
same principlesapply to the inverse situation of ordinary
civilcasesfiledbeforetheproperRTCsbutwronglyraffled
toitsbranchesdesignatedasSpecialCommercialCourts.In
such a scenario, theordinary civil case should then be
referred to the Executive Judge for redocketing as an
ordinarycivilcase;thereafter,theExecutiveJudgeshould
then order the raffling of the case toall branchesof the herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.Civil Case No. 11077
same RTC, subject to limitations under existing internal
rules,andthepaymentofthecorrectdocketfeesincaseof
any difference.Unlike the limited assignment/raffling of a
commercial case only to branches designated as Special
CommercialCourtsinthescenariosstatedabove,thererafflingof
anordinarycivilcaseinthisinstancetoallcourtsispermissible
duetothefactthataparticularbranchwhichhasbeendesignated
as a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of
statutorylaw,i.e.,BatasPambansaBilang(BP)129.52Torestate,
thedesignationofSpecialCommercialCourtswasmerelyintended
asaproceduraltooltoexpeditetheresolutionofcommercialcases
inlinewiththecourt'sexerciseofjurisdiction.Thisdesignation
wasnotmadebystatutebutonlybyaninternalSupremeCourt
ruleunderitsauthoritytopromulgaterulesgoverningmattersof
procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the
administrationofallcourtsandthepersonnelthereof. 53Certainly,
aninternalrulepromulgatedbytheCourtcannotgobeyondthe
commanding statute. But as a more fundamental reason, the
designationofSpecialCommercialCourtsis,tostress,merelyan
incidentrelatedtothecourt'sexerciseofjurisdiction,which,asfirst
discussed, is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the
subjectmatter.TheRTC'sgeneraljurisdictionoverordinarycivil
casesisthereforenotabdicated byaninternalrulestreamlining
court procedure.
Infine,Branch276'sdismissalofCivilCaseNo.11077issetaside
andthetransferofsaidcasetoBranch256,thedesignatedSpecial
CommercialCourtofthesameRTCofMuntinlupaCity,underthe
parameters aboveexplained, is hereby ordered.
WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED. The Orders dated
April17,2012andJuly9,2012oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil Case No. 11077 are
isREFERREDtotheExecutiveJudgeoftheRTCofMuntinlupa
City for redocketing as a commercial case. Thereafter, the
Executive Judge shallASSIGNsaid case to Branch 256, the sole
designated Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, which isORDEREDto resolve the case with reasonable
dispatch. In this regard, the Clerk of Court of said RTC
shallDETERMINEtheappropriateamountofdocketfeesand,in
sodoing,ORDERthepaymentofanydifferenceor,ontheother
hand, refund any excess.
Furthermore, the Court herebyRESOLVESthat henceforth, the
followingguidelinesshallbeobserved:
1.If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly excess, refunded.
raffled toitsregular branch, the proper courses of actionare as
follows: 4.Finally,toavertanyfutureconfusion,theCourtrequiresthatall
1.1If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special initiatorypleadingsstatetheaction'snaturebothinitscaptionand
CommercialCourt,thenthecaseshallbereferredtotheExecutive body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, uponmotion or by
Judge for redocketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, orderofthecourtmotuproprio,bedismissedwithoutprejudiceto
assigned to the sole special branch; its refiling after due rectification. This last procedural rule is
prospective in application.
1.2If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special
CommercialCourts,thenthecaseshallbereferredtotheExecutive 5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed
Judgeforredocketingasacommercialcase,andthereafter,raffled superseded.@
off among those special branches; and
SOORDERED.
1.3If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special
CommercialCourt,thenthecaseshallbereferredtothenearest
RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within
thejudicialregion.Uponreferral,theRTCtowhichthecasewas
referredto shouldredocket thecaseasacommercialcase,and
then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a
Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special
branch;or(b)ifthesaidRTChasmultiplebranchesdesignatedas
SpecialCommercialCourts,raffleoffthecaseamongthosespecial
branches.
2.IfanordinarycivilcasefiledbeforetheproperRTCiswrongly
raffled to its branch designated as a Special Commercial Court,
then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re
docketingasanordinarycivilcase.Thereafter,itshallberaffledoff
to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated special
branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising
general jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for
under existing rules.

3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the

appropriate docket fees in case of any difference. On the other
hand,alldocketfeesalreadypaidshallbedulycredited,andany