G.R. No.

L-19573 June 30, 1970

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUCIA CESAREA AGATON, VICENTE ESTORQUE and SALVADOR ESTORQUE, petitioner-
administrator and legatee-appellants,
vs.
SIMPLICIO ESTORQUE, oppositor-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

When Lucia Cesarea Agaton died on May 27, 1949, she left a will which was admitted to probate by the Court of First instance of
Capiz in its order of August 13, 1953. In said will she made the following dispositions of her properties:

(a) To her son Simplicio Estorque

1. Lot No. 328 of the cadastral survey of Dao, Capiz, with an area of 4,661 square meters and
covered by transfer certificate of title No. 1488;

2. Lot No. 1427 of the same cadastral survey, with an area of 5,691 square meters and covered by
original certificate of title No. 9639; and

3. One-half of the house owned by the deceased.

(b) To her other son Vicente Estorque

/6 of Lot No. 346 1 of the cadastral survey of Dao, Capiz, covered by original certificate of title No.
21374, which lot had an aggregate area of 157,368 square meters.

(c) To her granddaughter Teresita Estorque, daughter of Simplicio, the other half of the house above referred to.

(d) To her grandson Salvador Estorque, son of Vicente, the other 5/6 of lot No. 346.

In connection with lot No. 1427, the devise thereof to Simplicio Estorque was revoked automatically, pursuant to the terms of the
will, when the said property was redeemed from the testatrix by the former owner, from whom it had been acquired under a pacto
de retro sale,

In the order of the probate court of August 13, 1953, it was declared:

Por tanto, el Tribunal ordena la legalizacion del documento Exhibit "A" como testamento de la finada Lucia Cesarea
Agaton, sujeto, sin embargo, a una reduccion adecuada en la porcion legada a Salvador Estorque para cuyo fin las
partes gestionaran del Tribunal el nombramiento de los comisionados desinteresados para inspeccionar y avaluar el
valor actual de los bienes dejados ... (Emphasis supplied)

In due time the court appointed two commissioners of appraisal, who thereafter, on April 10, 1954, submitted their report containing
the following inventory of the properties left by the deceased:

(a) Lot No. 328, Dao Cadastre, with an area of 4,673 (4,661 according to description, Exhibits A, A-1), square
meters, valued then at P450.00;

(b) Lot No. 345, Dao Cadastre, with an area of 135,438 square meters, valued at P11,685.00, with 5 coconut trees
and 150 clumps of bamboos, valued then at P25.00 and P750.00, respectively;

(c) Granary or storehouse of iron roofing without flooring standing on Lot No. 345, valued then at P950.00;

(d) Lot No. 330, Dao Cadastre, with an area of 39,359 square meters, valued then at P2,345.00;

(e) House of iron roofing valued at P2,000.00; and

(f) 4 carabaos at P200.00 each.

In addition to the abovementioned properties, the estate had a cash balance of P7,404.89 in the possession of the administrator
Vicente Estorque as of December 29, 1960.

On March 18, 1961 the court, after eliminating lot No. 330 because it was already registered in the names of the two brothers,
Simplicio and Vicente Estorque, issued an order for the division and distribution of the rest of the estate, as follows:

As far as legally possible the will of the testatrix should be followed. As noted above, the testatrix has left only two
heirs has been expressly bettered. (sic). Under the old Civil Code then in force when the testatrix died she was free
to dispose or bequeath in favor of the legatees a portion not exceeding one-third of her estate.

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 To the legatee Salvador Estorque the testatrix herein bequeathed five-sixth (5/6) of Lot No. 345, referred to in
paragraph (b) of the list given above. Since said Lot No. 345 contains an area of 135,438 square meters, the
testatrix, therefore, bequeathed to the legatee Salvador Estorque a pro-indiviso portion thereof equivalent in area
of 112,865 square meters. This manifestly is in excess of what the law then allowed the testatrix to do without
impairing the legitimes of the heirs.

Since the testatrix specified Lot No. 345 from which to get the portion of her estate to be given as a legacy to her
grandson Salvador Estorque, her last will would be fulfilled by assigning to said legatee one third (/3) of said Lot
No. 345 or a pro-indiviso portion thereof equivalent in area to 45,146 square meters together with the granary or
storehouse standing thereon.

With this adjustment made pursuant to the order of this Court of August 13, 1953, the legacies given to the two
legatees named herein, as a whole, no longer impair the legitimes reserved by the law for the forced heirs.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the estate left by the decedent LUCIA CESAREA AGATON be divided,
partitioned and distributed, as it is hereby divided, partitioned and distributed as follows:

1. For the share of the heir Simplicio Estorque, the following are hereby adjudicated:

(a) The whole of Lot No. 328 with an area of 4,661 square meters;

(b) One third (/3) pro indiviso portion of Lot No. 345, or an area equivalent to 45,146 square
meters;

(c) Two (2) carabaos;

(d) One-half () of the cash balance of P7,404.89 in the possession of the administrator herein;
and

(e) One-half () of the house referred to in paragraph (e) of the list of properties given elsewhere
above.

2. For the share of the heir Vicente Estorque the following are hereby adjudicated:

(a) One third (/3) pro-indiviso portion of Lot No. 345, or an area equivalent to 45,146 square
meters;

(b) Two (2) carabaos;

(c) One-half () of the cash balance of P7,404.89 in the possession of the administrator herein.

3. For the share of the legatee Salvador Estorque, the following are hereby adjudicated:

(a) One third (/3) pro-indiviso portion of Lot No. 345, with an area equivalent to 45,146 square
meters; and

(b) The granary or storehouse standing on Lot No. 345, referred to in paragraph (c) of the list of
properties given elsewhere above.

4. For the share of the legatee Teresita Estorque, the following are hereby adjudicated:

(a) One-half () of the house referred to in paragraph (e) of the list of properties given elsewhere
above.

This proceeding is hereby declared closed and terminated.

Vicente Estorque and his son Salvador moved to reconsider the adjudication thus made, assailing in particular the division of Lot No.
345 into three equal parts instead of in accordance with the will of the deceased, wherein /6was bequeathed to Vicente and 5/6 to
Salvador. The motion for reconsideration was denied, and these two brought the case to us on appeal.

Appellants contend that the division of said lot as made by the testatrix in her will should not be disturbed; that the shares of her
two sons Simplicio and Vicente consisted only of the short legitime, or /3 of the estate, and that the share willed to Salvador was in
the nature of a mejora, did not impair that short legitime, and was therefore valid.

The value of the properties left by the testatrix, as inventoried by the commissioners appointed by the lower court, including the cash
balance of P7,404.89 and excluding lot 330 of the Dao cadastre, was P24,064.89. Of this amount, two-thirds corresponded to the
long legitime, or P16,043.24, of which one-half, or P8,021.62, was available for betterment. The remaining one-third, or P8,021.62,
was the freely disposable portion.

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There can be no dispute that the value of the properties willed to the two grandchildren, Salvador and Teresita Estorque, was more
than the free portion. The share of Salvador alone, consisting of 5/6 of lot No. 345, had a value of P10,383.30. That given to Teresita
was worth P1,000.00. Appellants, however, contend that insofar as the share of Salvador exceeded the free portion it was given in
concept of mejora or betterment, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 808 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 808. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of two-thirds of the hereditary estate of the
father and of the mother.

Nevertheless, the latter may dispose of one of the two-thirds forming the legitime in order to apply it as a
betterment to their legitimate children or descendants.

They may freely dispose of the remaining third.

Under the appellants' theory the disposition in favor of Salvador Estorque is valid since it does not impair the strict legitime of either
of the testatrix' children. The question is, was the bequest to him a mejora? According to Article 828 of the same code, "the bequest
or legacy made by the testator to one of the children or descendants shall not be considered a betterment (mejora) except where the
testator has expressly declared that such is his will or when it cannot be included in the free portion."

The will of the deceased Lucia Cesarea Agaton is in the Visayan dialect and the bequest to Salvador Estorque reads: "kag ang nabilen
nga lima ka bahin (5/6) akon ginahatag nga iya panubli-on sa alila ko nga apo nga si Salvador Estorque." The word "panubli," the
appellants point out, is the nearest equivalent in the Visayan dialect to the concept of mejora or betterment. We find no denial of the
assertion in the brief for the appellees. In any event, Article 828, above-quoted, also considers as mejora such bequest or legacy to a
child or descendant as cannot be included in the free portion, as long, of course, as the strict legitime of the compulsory heirs is not
impaired thereby.

The appellees argue that since Salvador Estorque is not himself a compulsory heir of the testatrix, no mejora could validly be given to
him, inasmuch as the mejora is part of the long legitime, which is destined exclusively for compulsory heirs the two sons, Vicente
and Simplicio in the present case. The language of Article 808 is that the parents "may dispose of one of the two-thirds forming
the legitime in order to apply it as a betterment to their legitimate children or descendants." The preponderant weight of authority is
to the effect that a descendant who is not a forced heir can be given a mejora; for example, a grandchild whose father still lives and is
entitled to the legitime. (Manresa, Vol. VI, 7th ed., pp. 486-489; Scaevola, Codigo Civil, Tomo 14, pp. 508-509; Puig Brutau, Derecho
Civil, Tomo V, Vol.30 pp. 62-64; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, December 19, 1903). The said decision, after tracing the
history of Spanish legislation on the subject, particularly Law 18 of Toro, which granted such right expressly, concludes that "there is
no provision in the Law of Bases or in the (Civil) Code which is contrary to what has been traditionally followed, as would have been
undoubtedly expressed were it really intended to change or modify such important piece of legislation ..."

In view of the foregoing considerations, as well as of the rule that as far as legally possible the expressed desire of the testator must
be followed, the dispositions of her properties made by the deceased Lucia Cesarea Agaton in her will must be upheld as valid. In
addition to the shares of the two compulsory heirs, as stated in the will, they are each entitled to one-half of the other properties not
disposed of therein, namely, the four carabaos and the cash balance of P7,404.89.

WHEREFORE the order of the trial court dated March 18, 1961 is set aside, and the case is remanded for the partition of the estate as
above indicated as well as for such further proceedings as may be necessary in connection therewith. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-45761 April 28, 1939

JULIA DEL ROSARIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ANTONIO DEL ROSARIO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

AVANCEA, C. J.:

The complaint alleges: That Ramon del Rosario and Florencia Arcega were husband and wife, the former having died in 1895 and the
latter in 1933; that the plaintiffs and the defendants are the heirs of both; that Ramon del Rosario died without a will, leaving
properties of the conjugal partnership valued at P19,000; that after the death of Ramon del Rosario, his widow Florencia Arcega
administered these properties and with the products thereof acquired others, which are those described in paragraph 9 of the
complaint. It is, moreover, inferred from the complaint that after the death of Ramon del Rosario, his intestate was not commenced
and the conjugal properties were not liquidated until Florencia Arcega died, after which the latter's testamentary proceedings were
initiated and are now in progress.

The plaintiffs bring this action to recover their share not only in the conjugal properties left by Ramon del Rosario but also in those
acquired by Florencia Arcega with the products of said properties.

A demurrer was interposed to the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties and for
the same cause of action; that there is a defect or party plaintiffs and party defendants, and that the complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The court sustained this demurrer and dismissed the case. From this resolution an appeal was taken.

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Both in the Court of First Instance as well as in this court, the parties discuss whether Act No. 3176, or the former law, is applicable to
the case. Act No. 3176 only amends the former law in the sense that upon the death of any of the spouses the community property
shall be liquidated in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. But whatever law might be applicable, and
even assuming that it was that prior to Act No. 3176, the intestate of Ramon del Rosario not having been commenced upon his death
in 1895 until his widow Florencia Arcega also died in 1933, and the testamentary proceedings of Florencia Arcega having been
subsequently initiated, wherein, among other things, the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the deceased Ramon del Rosario
should be made, the pendency of these testamentary proceedings of the deceased wife excludes any other proceeding aimed at the
same purpose (Zaide vs. Concepcion and Quintana, 32 Phil., 403). At the rate, the plaintiffs have a right to intervene in these
proceedings as parties interested in the liquidation and partition of the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses Ramon del
Rosario and Florencia Arcega among their heirs.

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962

LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809,
dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's
granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".

The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a
will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his
real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.

Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .

SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y universales herederos de todos
mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis
bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que,
abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .

SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, los
bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .

OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no
se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor
Villaflor.

The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he
bore any child with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows: .

DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan de institucion de herederos y los
legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar con
hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.

Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a
widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her
husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted a
project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the project of
partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received
by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said
project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause
7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin
perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .

On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any
child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with
the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.

The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his
will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".

4
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on
February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal
properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on
account of the fact that she never remarried.

We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his
widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted
by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was
meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used
by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion"
instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full
ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in
contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause
6). 1wph1.t

SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos
mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis
bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que,
abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed
by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras
viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article
791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy." .

SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of an instrument where there are
several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." .

Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed
to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is
well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion
mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the following: .

ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in
another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or
unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such
technical sense. (675a)

In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and
wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the
trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain
(TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).

La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y
obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa
voluntad patente, que no ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no ofrece
la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal
Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .

The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve cases where the only condition imposed
on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and
unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It
necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's
"sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the
widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for
their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.

5
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared
entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of
Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting and further
proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B.
LANABAN, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring
illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering
the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:

Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was
survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated
September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half
of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III),
and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their
legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV).

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal
lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in
that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her
husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue
influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix
Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he
withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay,
Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested
that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that
same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties
would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The
lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the
affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special
administrator of the decedent's estate.

Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally
claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate by
allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that
motion. The lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.

In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaa, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay,
Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of
alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaa
claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia
B. Pabaonon.

Montaa in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of
future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate
proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated October 15, 1973 manifested their
conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to
law and that an intestacy be declared.

6
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaa, assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditors was in order since the
parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaa and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February
28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the
issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate
its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and
16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.

Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration
of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaa had no authority to withdraw the petition for the
allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaa and signed by
Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaa's services and
informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their
repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied the motion in its order of
June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not
because of Atty. Montaa's arguments.

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion
to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial
court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a
will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996,
April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1wph1.t

But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving
husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the
conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be
upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a
coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38
Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but
should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise
intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children
to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)

The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had renounced his
hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article
1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only
for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be
effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art.
1083, Civil Code).

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and
1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal
estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion
of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.

7
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given
effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the
death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary
rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the
partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs.

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had
it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code
"the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to
him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever
title, the disposition shall take effect."

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set
forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but
since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal
estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.

The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents.
Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that
"the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were
no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1wph1.t

In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June
18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the
formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and
98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).

As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed
testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if
legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla
vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).

To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs.
Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary
disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the
testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-
23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).

As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions of the properties in his will
should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any disposition therein is better than that
which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors although no executor or regular
administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if
only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against
the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular
administrator and not that of a special administrator.

It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the estate and to pay such claims when duly
allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).

We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator (p.
30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in
cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his

8
administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should devote his
official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's estate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for
hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in
consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and
that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending
line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the
ground of absolute preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1wph1.t

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the
estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry
is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein. 1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of
law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation
will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-
on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. 3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This
exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give,
devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with
me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

9
 T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which
is similarly herein copied, thus

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments 4 shall be valid,
in so far as they are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre,
hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando
privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de
aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero
forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut
definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage
means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A.
2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132. 7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex
parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely
omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de
heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one-
sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se aade limitacion
alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la
legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial
en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos
en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos,
cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la
pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of
petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir
without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by
the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a
1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

10
 ... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente
interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso
pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el
acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un
testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a
los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta
consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con
repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del
derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se
acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no
autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque
parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion,
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a
will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give
the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman,
speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente
por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no
se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by
itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From this,
petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction
between pretention and disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in
turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In
Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria";
preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will
rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under
Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same
Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited",
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of
the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights
of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution
of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should
be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if
adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs
may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of
Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have
any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies
or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we
would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies
and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material

11
 to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and
distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately
treated in said article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an
institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies
"the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir,
and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-23135 December 26, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA PABELLA and ANDREA RAVALO, oppositors-
appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for the probate of a document alleged to
be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. Said document, written in Tagalog and dated
February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner as sole heir of the testator.

The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors appellants herein who questioned the due execution of the
document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament.
Aside from merely opposing the petition for probate, the first set of oppositors Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also claimed
that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The other oppositors representing themselves
simply as next of kin, appropriately prayed only for the disallowance of the will.

At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his evidence, and then rested his case on February 16, 1961. Reception of
oppositors' evidence was set for July 14, 1961. However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for
probate mainly on the ground that "the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the
decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death." Oppositors alleged that
after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land described
therein, so that at the time of the testator's death the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.

Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion for dismissal on July 17, 1961 supplemented it by another opposition on August 14,
1961, and by a rejoinder on August 21, 1961. Finally, on October 22, 1962 petitioner moved to strike out the oppositors' pleadings on
two grounds, namely:

1. That oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will
and testament of the testators; and

2. That oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing
valid right whatsoever.

On October 18, 1963 the court a quo issued the order now subject of this appeal, which read as follows:

Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors dated July 31, 1961, the same is hereby denied for the allegations
contained therein goes (sic) to the very intrinsic value of the will and other grounds stated on said motion to dismiss are
without merit.itc-alf With respect to the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings of oppositors filed by the
petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and
therefore the oppositors are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. This being so, the motion to
strike out opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto is hereby ordered stricken out of the record.

The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions
presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality
of any devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966).

To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required
by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings . . . for the probate of a
will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, 3
Phil. 424).

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Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on the ground that the testator had impliedly revoked his will
by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed of therein.

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another.itc-alf The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the
testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly
irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled
to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence
there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one,
but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to
bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the
particular devise or legacy.itc-alf (Fernandez, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23638 and Reyes, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23662, October
12, 1967.)

In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that they "have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth
degree as provided by law and therefore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate." They do not
attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of
certified true copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, support the said court's finding in this respect.

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
(Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. (Teotico vs.
Del Val, etc., G.R. No. L- 18753, March 26, 1965.)

The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may be prevented from
learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not
be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be
heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)

Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed
from is interlocutory. We deferred action on the motion until after the brief of both parties had been filed. The motion, although now
practically academic in view of our resolution of the main issue involved, must be denied, since the order of the lower court striking
out appellants' opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that they have no personality to intervene in the case, was final
and therefore appealable order insofar as they were concerned.

The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositors- appellants.

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