Nazareno v.

CA
GR No. 138842, 18 Oct 2000Facts:
Facts: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970,while
Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980.-They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo,Jose, Pacifico, and
Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and
his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.-After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed anintestate case and was
appointed administrator of his father's estate.-In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his
parents had executed severaldeeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad.-
One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon Citywhich were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of
Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970.By virtue of these deeds, TCTs were issued toNatividad for lots 3-B, 3, 10, 11,
13 & 14-Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B, w/c hadbeen occupied by Romeo, his wife, & Maximino, Jr.,to
Maximino, Jr.-Romeo filed the present case for annulment of salew/ damages against Natividad & Maximino Jr. on
theground that both sales were void for lack of consideration-Romeo presented the Deed of Partition &Distribution
executed by Maximino Sr. & Aurea in1962 & duly signed by all of their children, exceptJose, who was then abroad.
However, this deedwas not carried out. In 1969, their parents insteadoffered to sell to them the lots-He testified
that, although the deeds of saleexecuted by his parents in their favor stated that thesale was for a consideration,
they never really paidany amount for the supposed sale. The transfer wasmade in this manner in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes.-Allegedly, it was only Natividad who bought the lotsin question because she was the
only one financiallyable to do so-The trial court rendered a decision declaring thenullity of the Deed of Sale dated
January 29, 1970,except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which hadpassed on to third persons.-On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles toLot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno)
and Lot 3-B(in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well asto Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and orderedrestored
to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr.Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
1)Whether the restoration of the titles to thelots in question to the estate of Maximino Sr.was proper 2)Whether it
was the intention of Maximino,Sr. to give the subject lots to Natividad
Held:
1)Yes. The Nazareno spouses transferredtheir properties to their children by fictitioussales in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Facts & circumstancesindicate badges of a simulated sale w/c makethe Jan 29, 1970
sale void & of no effect.Natividad never acquired ownership over theproperty because the Deed of Sale in her favor
is also void for being w/o consideration.2)Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr.intended to give the six Quezon
City lots toNatividad. As Romeo testified, their parentsexecuted the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividadbecause the
latter was the only "female and theonly unmarried member of the family." She wasthus entrusted with the real
properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, sheintended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in theevent
the latter returned from abroad. There wasthus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art.1449 of the Civil Code
states:
There is also an implied trust when a donation ismade to a person but it appears that althoughthe legal estate is
transmitted to the donee, henevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.
There being an implied trust, the lots in questionare therefore subject to collation in accordancewith Art. 1061 which
states:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during thelifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may becomputed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition.
As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. will have to beupheld for it is an
innocent purchaser for valuewhich relied on the title of Natividad.

VIAJAR v. CA
It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against
the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream or
river.
FACTS:
 Private respondents Spouses Ladrido are owners of Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan Iloilo.
Petitioners are owners of the Lot 7340, which they bought from the Te. Viajar had lot 7340 relocated and found out
that the property was in the possession of Ladrido. She demanded the return but the latter refused. She instituted a
civil action for recovery of possession and damages. She also impleaded Te as defedant for the reason that if Ladrido
is going to be favored then the sale was to be annulled and plaintiff must be reimbursed. During the trial it was
proven that during the cadastral survey in 1926, the two lots were separated by the Suague River and that a part of
the land of Lot 7340 and the old river bed were in the possession of the defendants and that the plaintiffs have never
been in actual physical possession.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendants which the CA confirmed. There was a mention in the case that the issue from
which the decision of the CFI was not the issue appealed in the CA so the affirmation made by the CA should be void.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual or sudden
2) Whether or not the plaintiffs are protected by the Torrens System (in relation to the dimunition of the area of their
land because the plaintiffs are contending that Art 457 must be interpreted as applicable only to unregistered lands)
RULING:
It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague river overflowed its banks yearly and
the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river.
It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against
the dimunition of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream or
river. Accretions which the banks of the river may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
property of the owners of the banks.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTOS [G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012]
FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio
Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San
Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos,
Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-
applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more
than 30 years.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the
Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on the
survey plan, to wit:
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by
the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968. On May 10, 2000 the RTC granted the application for land registration. On May 27, 2003, the
CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land property survey inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 by the Bureau of Forest Devt. on Jan.
3, 1968 is classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.
HELD:
NO. The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; DISMISSES the application for
registration.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until
then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
 These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the
effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did not prove
that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert
acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the
Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the
river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless
there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.

HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC

Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public domain, even if the accretion results from rivers emptying into
the sea. It cannot be registered.
FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The story begins on 1946 upon his desire to
register land on the northern section of his existing property. His current registered property is bounded on the east
by Talisay River, on the West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila bay. Both rivers flow towards the
Manila Bay. Because of constantly flowing water, extra land of about 17hectares (thats about the size of Disney
Park!) formed in the northern most section of the property. It is this property he sought to register.
The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part of public domain (remember,
accretion formedby the sea is public dominion). His Motion for Reconsideration likewise burned. In 1960, he
attempted registry again, claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on accretion. He
claimed this land as riprarian owner. The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.
Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray opposing the same application, stating
the he leased part of the property sought to be registered. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the same
property. Sinforoso was not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that Navarro used stealth
force and strategy to occupy a portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed. During the
appeal, his original land registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual
took over the case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and therefore part of public domain. The
RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and also denied his land registration request.
Pascuals heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The Apellate court granted petition for registration!
The reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence it wasnt foreshore land. (BUT the
confusion lies in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent to Manila Bay which is sea!) Aggrieved, the Director of
Forestry moved for reconsideration (Government insists it is foreshore and hence, public domain). The Apellate court
denied all motions of the Director and the Government.
The matter went to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can be registered under the Torrens
system.
HELD:
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil Code
saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers
Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that
the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If theres any land to be
claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along
the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art
457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore cannot
be registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public use and declared as private
property capable of alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare
them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside. Registration cannot be allowed.

Ferrer vs. Bautista [G.R. No. 46963. March 14, 1994.]

Third Division, Vitug (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 25 November 1956, Gloria A. Ferrer filed with the CFI La Union, Branch III, a complaint for
reivindicacion (Civil Case A-86) against Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. Judge Antonio G.
Bautista dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the court had
no authority to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere
collateral attack.
Gloria A. Ferrer claims ownership a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay, La
Union by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT T-3280, which is immediately
north of the land in question. On the other hand, Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon equally assert
ownership over the property on account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title P-168, in the
name of Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent 309504 issued on 24 January 1966.
On 23 March 1976, Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then CFI La Union to Quiet Title to Real
Property against Balanag and Domondon (Civil Case A-514). On 07 December 1976, Judge Bautista issued
an order dismissing Ferrers complaint; because it constitutes a collateral or indirect attack on the Free Patent
and Original Certificate of Title. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on 3 May 1977.
Pursuant to the Supreme Courts Resolution, dated 19 August 1977, Ferrer was allowed to file the petition for
review on certiorari under RA 5440 considering that only questions of law had been raised. On 03 August
1978, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of interest due to the failure of Ferrers counsel to submit the
requisite memorandum in support of the petition. In a Resolution dated 28 September 1978, however, the
Court resolved to reconsider the dismissal and to reinstate the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside
the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court (Civil Case 514- A), and rendered judgment declaring Ferrer to be
the owner of the disputed parcel of land and ordering Balanag and Domondon to reconvey the same to Ferrer;
without costs.
1. Ferrer the lawful owner of accretion Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the Property, 2003 ( 67 ) Haystacks (Berne Guerrero) accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. Undoubtedly, Ferrer is the lawful owner of the accretion, she
being the registered owner of Lot 1980 which adjoins the alluvial property. Parenthetically, the same finding has also
been made by the trial court in Civil Case A-86.
2. Alluvion belongs to riparian owner; Rationale for the rule Alluvion gives to the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers or streams any accretion which is gradually received from the effects of the current of waters (Art. 457, Civil
Code; Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37; Cureg vs. IAC, 177 SCRA 313). The rationale for the rule is to provide
some kind of compensation to owners of land continually exposed to the destructive force of water and subjected to
various
easements (Agustin vs. IAC, 187 SCRA 218; Binalay vs. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374).
3. Director of lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land which ceased to be public land; Title issued null
and void. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private
ownership
and which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void
(Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37). The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the
land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latters authority being limited only to lands of
public dominion and not those that are privately owned (Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793). In the present
case, Balanag and Domondon acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the
time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain.
4. Title incontrovertible 1 year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant; Does not apply if issuance is null and void;
Action to declare title void does not prescribe Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it
is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare
the nullity of that void title does not prescribe (Agne vs. Director of Lands, supra); in fact, it is susceptible to direct, as
well as to collateral, attack (Estoesta, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 203).
5. 10 year prescription period applies to action for reconveyance if it is based on an implied or
constructive trust; In the present case, the judicial relationship is a patent nullity The ten-year prescriptive period is
applicable to an action for reconveyance if, indeed, it is based on an implied or constructive trust. Article 1456 of the
Civil Code, upon which a constructive trust can be predicated, cannot be invoked, however, since the public grant
and the title correspondingly issued to Balanag and Domondon that can create that juridical relationship is a patent
nullity.
6. Assuming, Prescriptive period interrupted when action is filed in court or if action is pending Even assuming,
nonetheless, that a constructive trust did arise, the running of the prescriptive period is to be deemed interrupted
when an action is filed in court (Art. 1155, Civil Code) or, obviously, when one is already there pending. In the present
case, the Free Patent was issued on 24 January 1966 and OCT P-168 was transcribed in the Registration Book of La
Union on 08 February 1966. At that time, Civil Case A-86 for reivindicacion between the parties was still pending in
court. After Civil Case A-86 was dismissed, without prejudice, on 10 February 1976, Ferrer, on 22 March 1976,
promptly filed Civil Case A-514.
7. Balanag and Domondon cannot claim ownership by acquisitive prescription Balanag and Domondon claim
ownership of the disputed property by acquisitive prescription. Ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years if the adverse possession is with a just
title and the possession is in good faith. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, this time without need of title or of good faith. (See Art.
1134, Civil Code.) Given the settings in the present case, the applicable period of acquisitive prescription, if at all,
would be thirty years. That possession, for purposes Property, 2003 ( 68 ) Haystacks (Berne Guerrero) of acquisitive
prescription, was deemed interrupted upon their receipt of summons (Art. 1123, Civil Code) in Civil Case A-86
pending since 1965, as well as Civil Case A-514 filed in 1976 following the dismissal the month previous of Civil Case
A-86.
8. Expeditious administration of justice Where the determinative facts are before the Supreme Court, and it is in a
position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by the resolution of
the case and thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case to the trial
court (Heirs of Crisanta Almoradie, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 91385, January 4, 1994; Lianga Bay
Logging
Co., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 357; Escudero vs. Dulay, 158, SCRA 69). Where the owner of the land is
determined, the court then, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may, instead of remanding the case to the trial
court, direct the owner to reconvey the disputed parcel to its lawful owner (Limaza vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 855; Agne vs.
Director of Lands, supra). Considering, moreover, the length of time that the case has been pending between the
parties, an order from the Supreme Court requiring such reconveyance can certainly be just and warranted.

AGUSTIN V. IAC
FACTS:
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying the western bank of the
Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin. From 1919 to 1968, the Cagayan
river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including Agustins Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by
Pablo Binuyag. In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course and returned
it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side. To
cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. When they were cultivating said lands, (they were planting corn)
Agustin accompanied by the mayor and some policemen claimed the land and drove them away. So Melad and
Binuyag filed separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its accretions. The Trial Court held ordered Agustin et.
al to vacate the lands and return them to respondents. On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the judgment thus the
case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by the sudden and abrupt
change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed
HELD: YES. Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these
elements are present: 1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it resulted from the effects of the current of the
water and 3) the land is adjacent to the river bank. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium
deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.
Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to floods and other damage due to
the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of
easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion.
Also, respondents ownership over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the
course of the river; their accretions were transferred to the other side. Art. 459 states when the current of a river x x
x segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of
segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the same w/in 2 years. And Art. 463 states that whenever
the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the
land retains ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.

BAES V. COURT OF APPEALS

The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin
canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or
loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the
course of the river is effected through artificial means.
FACTS:
In 1962, the Government dug up a canal on a private estate in order to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek (in other
words, there was a mand-made change of river course). Said private estate was acquired by petitioner Baes, and was
subdivided in to three lots. It was lot 2958-C which was totally occupied by the canal so the Government in exchange
granted him a lot near but not contiguous to C. The old river bed was filled up by soil from Lot C. Petitioner now
claims ownership over the old river bed on the basis of Article 461 which says that abandoned river beds belong to
the riparian owners whose land is occupied by the new course of water.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 461 applies
RULING: YES!
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes,
there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through
artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the
part of the government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated
to compensate the Baeses for their loss.
We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in
exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a
fair exchange because the two lots were of the same area and value and the agreement was freely entered into by
the parties.

JAGUALING V. CA | EDUAVE, 194 SCRA 607

FACTS:
Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later increased in size due to erosion
caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they
prevent squatters to come to the area.
The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura which
was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of the parties. In the amicable
settlement the heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an area of 1,289 square meters
more or less to Eduave.
Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they are the real owners of the
land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less. According to them, they acquired the land
by acquisitive prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They presented tax declarations and photos
of actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.
Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against Jagualing.
RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of
ownership over the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part of public domain not susceptible of
appropriation.
The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent thereto the
accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true owners of the land
subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to private
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?
HELD: No.
From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of Eduave actually
existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river. The CA, therefore, properly applied
Article 463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or isolated by river
movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation or isolation. The parcel of land in question is
part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated
outcrop of land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In
this regard the CA also did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is
longer than the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which
corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.
It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under
Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that
they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of
possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same
may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system
must itself still be registered.
However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required period and their
possession cannot be considered in good faith since by their admission they have recognized Eduaves ownership
over the land. Thus the land still belongs to Eduave.
Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin. However such accretion may
be lost to third parties thru prescription.