Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
)
Process and Personality
Actualization of the Personal World With Process-Oriented Methods
PROCESS THOUGHT
Edited by
Advisory Board
Volume 17
Gudmund J. W. Smith
Ingegerd M. Carlsson (Editors)
ontos
verlag
Frankfurt I Paris I Ebikon I Lancaster I New Brunswick
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
Printed in Germany
by buch bcher dd ag
Published in remembrance of
Ulf Kragh
CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Gudmund Smith and Ingegerd Carlsson
1. What is perceptgenesis really about? 7
Gudmund Smith
2. Perceptgenesis: its origins, accomplishments and propects 23
Juris Draguns
3. A mosaic of seven perceptgenetic themes 51
Ulf Kragh
4. A note on the concept of stimulus in perceptgenetic theory 65
Anders Zachrisson
5. Defense mechanisms in psychosomatic groups: a heuristic 77
model
Mikael Henningsson
6. Defense mechanisms and posttraumatic symptoms among 91
male Bosnian and Croatian refugees in psychiatric treat-
ment
Gunilla Kivling Bodn and Elisabet Sundbom
7. Influence of gender and age in the defense mechanism test 113
among adolescents and adults
Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom
8. Mature and immature defenses. A study of repressors and 127
trait anxiety groups
Ingegerd Carlsson and Fredrik Neuman
9. Heart rate variability during the meta-contrast technique 143
Peter Jnsson
10. Perceptgenetic techniques in the study of cognitive styles 167
and defense mechanisms: from assessment toward psycho-
therapy
Uwe Hentschel and Juris Draguns
11. Which type of norm for S-CWT research? 191
Alex Rubino, Federica Tozzi & Alberto Siracusano
12. Pilots and ground officers investigated by process tests of 201
creativity, extraversion, and stress control
Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnr & Gudmund Smith
13. Vision forming and brain storming: different aspects of 221
creativity captured by a perceptgenetic measurement and
other measurements of creativity
Eva Hoff and Ingegerd Carlsson
14. Something old, something new, something borrowed, some- 241
thing blue: microgenesis in the 21st century
Joseph Glicksohn
15. Actualization and causality 263
Jason Brown
Name Index 289
Subject Index 296
Contributors 299
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Among all people who inspired and helped organize the meeting in Del-
phi, the breeding ground of this book, we particularly want to thank Dr.
Dimitri Kyriazis, himself an expert in the application of the DMT.
INTRODUCTION
Gudmund Smith and Ingegerd Carlsson
The volume also contains original work from applied contexts. In two
studies, Mikael Henningsson (5), and Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom
(7), employ partial squares discriminant analysis to demonstrate the reli-
ability and validity of the Defense Mechanism Test as a diagnostic tool in
different contexts. Henningsson manages to define patients with a chronic
fatigue syndrome as a group different from other clinical groups and
Fransson and Sundbom are able to capture the influences of age and gen-
der on the use of defenses; females, for instance, preferred different vari-
ants of the perceptual defense identifications with the opposite sex. They
also found particular characteristics in refugees suffering from post-
traumatic disorder.
Eva Hoff and Ingegerd Carlsson (13) compared perceptgenetic and tradi-
tional measures of creativity in a sample of children and explored the rela-
tionship between creativity and the results of a self-image inventory.
Among other things, Hoff and Carlsson draw the conclusion that a crea-
tive disposition does not necessarily imply that the child holds her/himself
in high esteem.
Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnr and Gudmund Smith (12) are able to
discriminate within a group of fighter pilots and between pilots and ground
officers, using both the Creative Functioning Test, the Serial Color-Word
Test, as well as a process test of extraversion-introversion (the so-called
Spiral Aftereffect Technique, to be described in that chapter). In this ex-
ploratory study of personality patterns, the pilots formed subgroups that
were, when compared afterwards, significantly separated in age and com-
petence, as well as in other categories that had been established on the ba-
sis of questionnaires with open questions about their work and their inter-
ests.
1. WHAT IS PERCEPTGENESIS REALLY
ABOUT?
Gudmund J.W. Smith
INTRODUCTION
tions, the more dangerous the imminent deflection from the ultimate task
of the pilot: an optimal control of the outside events flashing by.
The obvious interindividual variation between PG protocols also encour-
aged the use of PG methods for clinical purposes. A technique originally
based on attempts at utilizing subliminal stimulation, the Meta-Contrast
Technique, MCT (Smith, Johnson, Almgren, & Johanson, 2001), was ap-
plied already in the fifties. Here the contrasting stimuli, contrary to the
procedure in the DMT, consisted of two different pictures. While the
viewer was adjusted to the second stimulus beforehand, the first stimulus,
incongruent with the second one or implying a threat to its central charac-
ter, was only introduced by small steps, PG fashion. The intention of this
arrangement was to find out how the subject accepted the intrusion of con-
troversial stimulation into a situation which he had identified beforehand.
The MCT was proven successful as a clinical tool (Smith, 2001; see also
Chapters 8 and 9). It could also be remodeled to serve specific purposes,
e.g. the analysis of flight phobia (Amnr, 1997). At the same time the use
of the DMT was extended to new problem areas, like traffic accidents
(Svensson & Trygg, 1994). Its utility in clinical practice was effectively
demonstrated by Sundbom and her associates (Sundbom, 1992; Sundbom,
Jacobsson, Kullgren, & Penayo, 1998; and Chapters 5, 6, and 7). One of
their most obvious feats was to separate borderline patients as a particular
category in a sea of neurotic and psychotic disturbances, and also to iden-
tify the symptom profile of people complaining of chronic fatigue (Hen-
ningsson, 1999).
Andersson (1995) developed a special variant of the DMT termed the
Defense Mechanism Technique, modified (DMTm) implying, among other
things, the use of representatives of both sexes at the place of the threat as
well as at the place of the central figure (the hero), and a revision of the
scoring scheme. A further development introduced stimulus motifs refer-
ring to, among other things, early attachment and separation. This was tried
out with favourable outcome by Nilsson (Nilsson & Svensson, 1999).
10 Gudmund J.W. Smith
ity. Such intermittent losses of control are also evident in tests of cognitive
skills, for example, the Serial Color-Word Test (see Table 1 and also
Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001).
This was only one example among many that processes at different levels
of actualization share formal characteristics. They also share the fate of ab-
breviation upon repetition. If the experimenter intends to bring about proc-
esses optimized for close scrutiny, the participant should be unacquainted
with the stimulation entertained in the experiment. It may sometimes be
necessary, for instruction purposes, to open the door slightly to the ex-
perimental situation. But a door wide open may ruin the experiment com-
pletely (cf. Smith, 2007).
What could be more sensible than to regard process as the very hub of per-
sonality theory? But the essence of contemporary personality theory seems
elusive. The most typical reference in periodicals devoted to personality
research is to some sort of factorial construction, e.g., the so-called big
five (see Wiggins, 1996). Here personality is described as a complex of
interacting, reified components or traits worked out on the basis of sys-
tematized self-descriptions. For a hard-headed scientist neither theory nor
its empirical fundaments would look impressive. But it can be demon-
strated that traits are relatively stable units, at least in normal adult people.
The disadvantage with that kind of theory is that it limits the psychologi-
cal description to a few mechanistic assumptions. The developmental per-
spective is usually ignored and perception, like in classical psychoanalysis,
relegated to a marginal existence. The concept of process thus does not
seem fit for commonplace personality theory. Still, process would not nec-
essarily be a too impalpable ingredient among the reified traits making up
the factorial space called personality. As pointed out by Rapaport (1967),
process with a slow rate of change eventually acquires the stability of a
structure, or of a standing wave. This fitting metaphor was employed by
the evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith and, originally, by the
mathematician Alan Turing. But while traits are abstract entities, structure,
What is perceptgenesis really about? 13
history can never be fully understood. In the same way workers in the PG
tradition regard the present as an actualization of the past. The ongoing re-
newal at the spearhead of reality construction cannot be comprehended
without reference to the phases preceding the final phase. Defenses emerg-
ing in late sections of a PG are often foreboded in early sections, e.g., by
signs of anxiety or uncertain identity. It is also equivalent with psychoana-
lytic presumptions to see development as a hierarchy of subsequent phases,
differing not only in distinctness but above all qualitatively. Thus precon-
scious experiences should not be regarded as weak copies of conscious
ones - they are different.
Like in psychoanalysis, emotions in the PG model are not just substances
added to existing cognitive structures. They are intrinsic attributes of the
processes of construction. Usually early sections of these processes are
more dominated by emotions, eventually yielding to more and more objec-
tive, person-independent structures in late sections. But emotions are never
totally absent, at least not in normal persons. Without emotions per-
ceptgeneses cannot unfold in a virtual representation of reality. In order to
serve as mortar in the process of reality construction, however, emotions
have to be available for reconstruction (as demonstrated in experiments
with children, Smith & Carlsson, 1990) or, to use equivalent terms, the
level of procedural knowledge (Schachter, 1987) must be made accessi-
ble to categorical (reality-proximal) organization (see also Smith & Carls-
son, 2005).
OTHER ASSOCIATIONS
A focus on process implies, at least as the present writer sees it, actualiza-
tion of a biological perspective (see also Chapter 14). The term biological
is often understood in a narrow physiological sense, a reduction of expla-
nations to neurochemistry or kindred topics. But biology is a life science
in a much wider meaning, including adaptation, competition, cooperation,
desire, and striving towards a goal. It is paradigmatic that Jason Brown
(e.g., 2000) found PG to be a useful theme in this neurobiological theoriz-
ing but at the same time used neurological data as a general frame in his
picture of human perception and action. Moreover, like Luria he finds
16 Gudmund J.W. Smith
CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
The Beginnings
As a term, concept, and topic of investigation, perceptgenesis (PG) origi-
nated around the midpoint of the twentieth century. Its seeds were sown
by Gudmund Smith (1949) in his research on afterimages in twins. Kragh
(1955) crystallized the perceptgenetic modus operandi by developing tech-
niques that continue to be used to this day. In a series of articles Smith
(1952, 1954, 1957) articulated the distinctive features of the perceptgenetic
conceptual framework and mapped research directions that have been pur-
sued ever since.
Five decades later, time is ripe for taking stock of the accomplishments
of PG, both empirically and conceptually. To this end, the following
questions will be posed: What are the fundamental attributes of PG, and
what, if anything, differentiates it from related and overlapping ap-
24 Juris G. Draguns
proaches? What is the knowledge that has been gained in the course of re-
search on perceptgenesis? What difference, if any, has it made, theoreti-
cally and practically, in a variety of applied human endeavors? What is its
current status, conceptually and empirically? What problems have been
resolved, and what conceptual and methodological hurdles remain to be
overcome? Finally, what are the new vistas of investigation that have been
opened, but as yet not explored, and what research questions remain to be
pursued?
These questions are asked by a sympathetic observer who, although not a
member of the original perceptgenetic research team at Lund University,
has followed the evolution of the perceptgenetic orientation with fascina-
tion, ever since the appearance of Kragh' s (1955) landmark monograph.
As an outsider who has been strongly influenced by the PG in his thinking,
research, and clinical operations, he now extends this outlook to a selective
and personal appraisal of the accomplishments and prospects of the per-
ceptgenetic enterprise.
Perceptgenetic Techniques
Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). DMT was developed by Kragh (1955)
in an attempt to apply microgenetic techniques for the systematic explora-
tion of personality in process. To this end, thematic stimuli are presented,
depicting an external but psychodynamically and symbolically significant
threat to the main person, or hero, in the picture. This picture is shown to
the person at 22 successive exposures, from 10 to 2000 milliseconds. Scor-
ing is focused on the prerecognition responses to the threatening stimuli
which are assumed to represent defense mechanisms, ranging from repres-
sion to reaction formation. In light of the current test manual (Kragh,
1985), DMT has demonstrated its usefulness in a variety of personnel,
clinical, and personality contexts. An impressive amount of consistent
validational findings has been obtained, and interscorer reliability for the
various defenses has been found to be high. Specific results will be de-
scribed in later sections of this chapter.
Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT). MCT (Smith, Johnson, Almgren, Johan-
son, 2001) involves repeated presentation at tachistoscopic exposure
speeds of pairs of stimuli, one of which is exposed right before the other.
The first stimulus is presented at subliminal speeds. It is not recognized,
but it affects the response to the subsequently exposed, clearly supralimi-
nal, stimulus. The first stimulus is designed to represent a threat to the per-
son who is depicted in the second stimulus. The first stimulus upon the
second triggers manifestations of anxiety and/or defense in responding to
the second stimulus. Applied in a variety of mental health and psychoso-
matic contexts, the MCT has yielded positive and replicated findings. The
MCT has also produced promising results in relation to creativity, both in
young adults and aged people. Both interrater and test-retest reliability has
been found to be high, and validity, defined as diagnostic differentiation,
has shown a high degree of correspondence to clinical criteria. Smith et al.
(2001) also reported on some recently developed specialized versions of
MCT, such as the Test of Flight Phobia, Test of Self Confrontation, and
Perceptgenesis: its origins, accomplishments, and prospects 27
tudes of both anxiety and defense, in the course of PG have been thor-
oughly investigated from early childhood through adolescence (Smith &
Danielsson, 1982).
(3) Two early reports (Kragh, 1955; Smith & Kragh, 1955) documented
striking parallels between the chronology of biographical events and the
sequence of their representation in the perceptgenetic series. Subse-
quently, this phenomenon was further scrutinized on the case level by
Kragh (1986) who formulated explicit predictions about the occurrence
and sequence of specific events in a person's life experience on the basis of
their appearance on DMT. More recently, Westerlundh and Terjestam
(1990) focused on women who had experienced loss of their mothers
through divorce. They were able to confirm a trend toward the correspon-
dence of this loss between PG and the year in life in which separation from
mother had occurred. Of a total of 38 predictive statements, Kragh (1986)
in his study was able to confirm 28 on the basis of the person's recollec-
tions. These findings go far beyond the formal correspondence between
ontogenesis and microgenesis postulated in Werner's (1957) orthogenetic
principle. Not surprisingly, they have provoked a great deal of skepticism.
Yet, reports of perceptgenesis recapitulating biographical events have sur-
vived the imposition of methodological safeguards against suggestion and
other artifacts. When and why do these phenomena occur? This question
should guide further systematic research by blending Kraghs pioneering,
innovative and flexible, approaches with new research designs that permit
the investigation of complex and seemingly intractable phenomena.
(4) Hentschel (1980) extended perceptgenetic research to the investiga-
tion of cognitive styles in relation to the DMT. He was able to demon-
strate substantia1 canonical correlations between isolation and adaptation
to interference tasks and to the low productivity of free associations as well
as between projection and sharpening. The relationship between repres-
sion and cognitive styles proved to be more complex, and consistent posi-
tive correlations with the cognitive style of leveling that were hypothesized
on the basis of ego-psychology, failed to materialize. Also relevant to this
issue are the studies that have sought to correlate DMT and MCT scores
with the regulative styles observed in serial procedures such as the Color
Word Test (e.g., Rubino & Siracusano, 2004). These perceptgenetic ef-
34 Juris G. Draguns
forts constitute the most systematic attempts extant to discover links be-
tween the stylistic and defensive aspects of adaptation.
(5) Another novel line of research has been opened by Ozolins (1989)
who studied defense patterns in relation to bodily movements and other
modes of nonverbal behavior. On the DMT, distinct modes of correlates
were established between these variables and the two distinct and often
contrasting defenses of isolation and repression. This contrast was espe-
cially striking when the threatening vs. neutral character of the situation
was taken into account. As hypothesized, repressors tended to be generally
more motorically restless while persons relying upon isolation as their
principal defense exhibited motoric rigidity and froze in the face of
stress.
(6) One of the earliest and most remarkable achievements of the DMT
was its ability to predict success and failure in military pilot training (cf.,
Kragh, 1970), a finding that was subsequently extended and confirmed on
the basis of accident records in Sweden (Neuman, 1978) and Greece (Kyri-
azis, 1991). Successful and unsuccessful pilot candidates were character-
ized by distinctive progressions of DM's. This conclusion was found to be
applicable to other stressful military and civilian occupations such as long
distance truck drivers (Svensson & Trygg, 1994) and naval attack divers
(Vaernes, 1982). Moreover, defensive functioning has been found to vary
with the nature of danger and the occupational context. Thus, per-
ceptgenetic instrumentation has carved a unique niche in providing predic-
tors of performance in occupations that have the reputation of posing for-
midable challenges for personnel selection.
(7) In the clinical context, a lot of information has been gathered, begin-
ning with Kragh's (1955) identification of the characteristic DM's of obses-
sive compulsives. By this time, data on DMs are also available for con-
version disorders (Sundbom, Binzer, & Kullgren, 1999), depressives
(Kyriazis & Karaminas, 1986), hysterics vs. obsessive compulsives (Nils-
son, 1983), eating disorders (Gitzinger, 1993), borderline personalities
(Sundbom, & Armelius, 1992), suicidal individuals (Fribergh, Trskman-
Benz, jehagen, & Regnell, 1992), and several other syndromes. Psycho-
somatic disorders have been prominent topics of recent perceptgenetic re-
search (e.g., Hennigsson, 1999), and the relevance of perceptgenetic tech-
Perceptgenesis: its origins, accomplishments, and prospects 35
stones to that end are the construction of such measures as the Test of
Flight Phobia, Test of Self Confrontation, Identification Test (Smith et al.,
2001), and Perceptgenetic Object Relations Test (Smith, 2001). A further
step is suggested by the procedures of an overlooked study on subliminal
perception by Emrich and Heinemann (1966) who ascertained, by means of
inquiry and free association, personally arousing emotional stimuli for
each of their participants. Similarly, it is not past imagining that an artist
could create a picture representing a threat described by the client in the
course of the interview. Specific themes and features of stimuli could also
be computer generated. Such pictorial stimuli could then be presented
tachistoscopically, by means of the meta-contrast procedure, or by other
techniques of stimulus impoverishment or protraction. Appropriate analy-
ses for N=1 could then be applied, as Kragh (1986) has already done in his
case studies of micro-macro correspondence.
(7) While perceptgenetic research has been systematically implemented
since the 1950s, experimentation on microgenesis in the broader sense of
the term has also proceeded apace, more fitfully and in spurts rather than
continuously. What this effort has yielded must be pinpointed and as-
sessed in order to integrate it with the store of perceptgenetic research.
The pursuit of such an ambitious goal is beyond the scope of the present
chapter. However, a limited number of research based conclusions on mi-
crogenesis can be identified. The first of these comes from the systematic
study of the neurophychological aspects of microgenesis (Brown, 1991;
Hanlon, 1991), and it calls into question some widely shared conclusions
of an earlier era. Graumann (1959), for example, dismissed the idea of a
temporal phasic development of standard, apparently instantaneous per-
cept as phenomenologically untenable. Now neuropsychological indica-
tors have accumulated that point to a process that is extended across micro
time and has affinities with the theoretically postulated, prototypical mi-
crogenetic or perceptgenetic sequence as specified by Cegalis (1991) and
Smith (2001). These findings suggest that perceptgenesis is not an artifi-
cial or atypical progression, but that it is germane to the understanding of a
broad range of perceptual activity. The other conclusion comes from
Bachmanns (2001) thorough and perceptive analysis of microgenetic ex-
perimentation. It points to organic growth rather than to a logical com-
Perceptgenesis: its origins, accomplishments, and prospects 41
REFERENCES
Bckstrm, M., Ozolins, A., Persson, B., & Sjbck, H. (1995). Danger-
situations and defence strategies. Psychol.Res.Bull.: 35, (2).
Bachmann, T. (2000). Microgenetic Approach to the Conscious Mind.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Beck, R. & Froehlich, W. D. (1984). Visual evoked potentials in a micro-
genetic task of object recognition. In: Psychological Processes in Cogni-
tion and Personality, ed. W.D. Froehlich, G. Smith, J.G., Draguns, &
U.Hentschel. Washington: Hemisphere, pp. 247-262.
Beyn, E. S., Zhirmunskaya, E. A., & Volkov, V. N. (1967). Electroen-
cephalographic investigations in the process of recognizing images of ob-
jects during their tachistoscopic presentation I. Neuropsychologia, 5: 203-
217.
Bleger, J. (1967). Simbiosis y Ambigudad (Symbiosis and ambiguity).
Buenos Aires: Paidos.
Brown, J. W. (1977). Mind, Brain, and Consciousness. New York: Aca-
demic Press.
Brown, J. W. (1988). The Life of the Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brown, J. W. (1991). Self and Process. Brain States and the Conscious
Present. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Brown, J. W. (2001). Foreword. In: G. J. W. Smith The Process Ap-
proach to Personality. New York: Kluwer/Plenum, pp.v-xiv.
Bruner, J. S. & Postman, L. (1949). Perception, cognition, and behavior. J
Pers., 18: 14-31.
Carlsson, I., Lilja, ., Smith, G. J. W., & Johanson, A. M. (1991). Appli-
cation of a perceptgenetic methodology to neuropsychology. In: Cognitive
Microgenesis: A Neuropsychological Perspective, ed. R. E . Hanlon. New
York: Springer, pp. 106-121
Cegalis, J. A. (1984). On the role of conflict in microgenesis. In: Psycho-
logical Processes in Cognition and Personality, ed. W.D. Froehlich, G.
Smith, J.G. Draguns, & U. Hentschel. Washington: Hemisphere, pp. 107-
125.
Perceptgenesis: its origins, accomplishments, and prospects 43
The following seven topics are all related to the perceptgenetic (PG) frame.
The first three of them are loosely interconnected, whereas the remaining
four stand more isolated. Only brief presentations will be given here.
liminary finding was that the contents of the associations very frequently
seemed to coincide with reports obtained from the early tachistoscopic
presentations of the photo in question, and that these contents were closely
related to early experiences in the subject's life, sometimes even layered in
chronological order. Two preliminary statements could be formulated: (1)
Pre-stages of perception ordered in a PG mode (P-phases), are equivalents
of associations, the latter being normally reconstructed after the establish-
ment of perception/recognition, and (2) the order of P-phases (in tachisto-
scopic PGs) correspond temporally with the subject's historical develop-
ment.
The first point is, of course important for bridging the gap between the
psychology of perception and the conceptual and methodological frames of
psychoanalysis.
Early PG experiments by Kragh (1955) demonstrated a shortage of
P-phases in compulsive subjects compared with a control group. This is in
agreement with clinical findings of the difficulties compulsive persons
have in producing free associations (cf, e.g., Fenichel, 1955).
The second point, the "parallellistic", or "micro-macro" hypothesis, has
even more far-reaching implications.
4. Sequels of lying.
I am certainly not going to deal, in this brief discourse, neither with
life-style as portrayed by H. Ibsen - or with defenses in general, most of
them falsifying to some extent the self and/or the object. Even the more
restricted task of discussing how the defenses of denial (A. Freud) and ne-
gation (S. Freud) relate to each other or to lying, will not be tried; just a
short note on the momentary act of lying, in the light of an experimental
device. There has not yet been tried, to my knowledge, any such approach.
This experiment investigates the immediate consequences of lying, by
using short-time presentation of a subliminal stimulus preceded by a supra-
liminal set-inducing one. The former may be any picture motif, the latter
consists in the instruction to the subject, not to tell what has really been
seen but something else.
A few casual observations indicate that the subject, when lying, in that
very instant forgets what was really seen, which is also henceforward lost.
The substantiation of these preliminary findings would demonstrate an es-
sential effect of lying: the destruction of preconscious "reality" (maybe to-
gether with a loss of the faked contents). The structural precipitates of ex-
periences would normally be conserved in their genuine cogni-
tive/emotional shape: the preconscious "tells the historical truth" ("wie es
56 Ulf Kragh
like tests, in which both affect and ideational contents are transformed into
symbolic presentations with the quality of stiffness and inertia.
(b) In some "animal responses" in the DMT, coded as repression, infor-
mation regarding movement is lacking but should be explored, if possible
(if movement is not recorded, repression is coded). There are a few striking
examples of this variant of repression: that of an owl, in infantile animal
phobia (Kragh, 1970c), and of a "Dalmatiner dog" (Kragh, 1984) in agora-
phobia, in a late phase of the DMT. The latter instance demonstrates a
combination of repression (dog), isolation (white dog), and anxiety "leak-
ing through" defense (black dots).
Reference may also be made here to Freud's famous cases of "little
Hans" (a horse), and the "wolf man" (white wolves sitting in a tree).
Compare also with Rubino et al. (1992), who contrasted a group of con-
version patients with a "normal" one, and found "animal responses" to be
the ones differentiating specifically among the DMT signs.
(c) The characteristic of "stiffness" in DMT repression is not always easy
to distinguish from "dead" ("mutilated", etc.) person, coded as introaggres-
sion. The "differentia specifica", however, would be the quality of stiffness
and inertia in repression vs. that of destruction in introaggression.
(d) Cooper and Kline (1986, 24) repeated an experiment from the sixties
(Kragh, 1970b), in which the frequency of defenses in an "ordinary" DMT
was compared with that of a picture with the same central figure together
with a non-threatening peripheral person (other changes of configuration
were minimized). They were able to confirm the findings viz.: that the re-
moval of threat was accompanied by an overall reduction of defenses; in
their experiment, however, repression made an exception. Accordingly,
they express doubt regarding this defense sign in the DMT. From a
psychodynamic stand-point his criticism would not apply, since a signifi-
cant difference between the two experimental conditions would not be pre-
dicted: even a non-threatening oedipal picture motif provokes anxiety and
mobilizes repression in subjects prone to such a defense. Stronger defenses
may also be substituted for repression at an increase of threat/anxiety (cf.
follow.), notably in these subjects.
(e) According to "classical" psychoanalytic theory there would exist, as a
rule, a relationship between an increase of signal anxiety, and the activa-
A mosaic of seven perceptgenetic themes 59
7. Color in perceptgenesis
Color in tachistoscopic PGs has been investigated only little, and never as
a separate issue. This has mainly been due to the almost exclusive use of
black-and-white-stimuli. However, "black painting" and "white painting"
are signs coded in the DMT and elsewhere, the former indicating anxiety
and the latter isolation defense. White (stimulus-inadequate) color seems to
have a twofold function: to cover blackness, and to efface structure.
Localized color other than black and white is coded in the DMT as a
variant of regression. It must, however, be admitted that the intrinsic nature
of the phenomenon is not well understood although clinical findings as
well as other criteria seem to substantiate the assumed regressive character
of color responses (Rubino, Pezzarossa, & Ciani, 1991; Svensson & Trygg,
1994).
Kohuts (1976) remarks that dreams in color of narcissistic patients "of-
ten appear to signify the intrusion of unmodified material into the egos in
the guise of realism, and the egos inability to integrate it completely"
(p.172). One clinical case may prove illustrative. A grown-up male patient,
diagnosed as schizophrenic, saw in the 3-4 first phases of both DMT se-
60 Ulf Kragh
ries, a person centrally placed. Thereafter he saw, in just one phase in both
series "a red sunset over the sea". Two variants of regression are coded:
deterioration of contents, and color. Though it was indeed tempting to
prod into the traumatical background of this early DMT phase, I had to re-
frain for ethical reasons (the handling of massive anxiety ensuing).
To inquire into regressive contents would be another instance of "testing
the limits" of meaning cf. theme 3 I can note just one example where
color (in many P-phases) did not indicate regression, in the DMT of quite a
successful manager.
Systematic investigations with colored stimuli presented tachistoscopi-
cally have not been published, but one example may be worth mentioning.
The stimulus was a woman wearing a green blouse, together with a man in
a blue cap. In the first phases the subject saw two children playing joyfully
and harmoniously with each other on a green meadow. The scene then
changed to two children standing on each side of a blue brook, separating
them. The green color of the meadow has been displaced from the woman's
blouse, and the blue color of the brook from the mans cap. Hypothetically,
green has been used to characterize harmony, and blue alienation.
In the PG after-image test the stimulus is a sketchy, oval red face. The
breadth of the after-image is measured, and the color recorded. One well
established result indicates a close relationship between dark and large af-
terimages, and (more or less chronic) anxiety. This finding would corre-
spond to the interpretation of dark painting" as coded in the DMT and
other tachistoscopic PGs.
FINAL REMARK
The reader is certainly left with many open questions, and many results
and investigations omitted. However, my intention was primarily to turn
the attention to some fields, which to my mind are as yet little explored,
though of considerable interest for PG theory as well as for its applica-
tions.
A mosaic of seven perceptgenetic themes 61
REFERENCES
n-1
P Pn C (1)
This means that the individual phase content is determined by both the
preceding phases and the last phase. (Note that P does not refer to the
sum of phases but to their serial organisation, i e the series as Gestalt).
However, the perceptual process is characterized by distinct displacements
between the components in this function. We thus have the following
scheme for the process from the first phase, (P1), to the last, (Pn) in a series
of exposures with increasing exposure time:
0
P P1 C
1
P P2 C
n-1
P Pn C (2)
\__/
In the last line, both Pn and C refer to the last phase in the percept-
genesis. This double-position elucidates the relation of the last phase to the
concepts construction and reconstruction. When the analysis of the
perceptual process starts from the first phase (P1), the last phase is the end-
product of the individuals process of construction (Pn in the scheme). The
last phase constitutes the starting-point when the analysis starts from the
end. Then it is regarded as absolute, and transforms the preceding phases
in a uniform manner. In this sense it constitutes "a representative of
reconstruction (C in the scheme, Kragh, 1955, p. 70). These processes,
construction and reconstruction, (indicated by the two vertical arrows in
the scheme) explain the direction of the perceptual process towards the last
phase (construction); and the successive elimination of alternative
directions of development in favour of the "correct" end-phase
(reconstruction) (op. cit. p. 69). It is on this level the area of psychology is
constituted in percept-genetic theory: in the dual processes of the
construction of reality and the reconstruction of meaning.
68 Anders Zachrisson
The indices of S, t1, t2 etc, denote the series of exposures of the stimulus
picture with gradually increased exposure times.
The schemes 2 and 4 belong to different conceptual levels in the theory,
and we called scheme 4 an interpretation of 2. This is not to be understood
as a deduction of 4 from 2. We could as well have gone the other way,
from 4 to 2 (an operational definition?). The point is to make the
conceptual relationships clear.
In scheme 4, the vertical dimension is temporal, denoting the gradual
prolongation of stimulus exposure time in the experiment. In scheme 2, the
corresponding dimension is construction/reconstruction, denoting the
frame of reference for understanding perception as process. It is on this
level, scheme 2, that we can claim the continuity of the motif (the identity
of the last phase) in percept-genetic experiments without being guilty of
the classical stimulus-error.
Scheme 4 makes clear certain features of the stimulus concept in percept-
genetic theory. Traditionally, in experimental psychology one makes a
sharp distinction between dependent and independent variables. The
methodological interpretation of the classical stimulus-organism-response
scheme (S-O-R) rests on that very dichotomy. This can not, however, be
maintained in a percept-genetic view, because stimulus is not independent
of the individual's response. The stimulus-picture, (the (N)stimulus) in a
perceptual experiment, can only be defined as an end-product: the
experimenters or a groups average description or the subjects last phase
behaviour. The relation between S and R in the S-O-R scheme is thus
reduced to two different aspects of the same end-product of development
(Kragh, 1955, p 62).
This is clear for stimulus in a strict sense, the exposed picture. Stimulus
can, however, also be taken in a wider sense, and in addition to the picture
include the experimental situation: the exposure times, the light intensity in
the tachistoscope and in the test room, the instruction a s o. These elements
in the experimental situation can of course be manipulated as independent
variables. Then, however, we must observe that the experimental situation
is designed to make the prestages in the perceptual process accessible for
analysis. Perception in the experimental situation is equivalent to
perception in ordinary circumstances (for a discussion of this statement,
70 Anders Zachrisson
see Kragh & Smith, 1970, p. 20-22), but it is too swift to be studied
without special techniques. These (percept-genetic) techniques function as
tools or media, in analogy with e.g. the microscope, designed to make the
process accessible to analysis. The point of the argument is that the
distinction between dependent and independent variables is a problematic
one in the investigation of perceptual processes. We can not define the
external world as stimulus independent of the individual perception of it.1
The stimulus has a meaning for the observer; therefore, it cannot be treated
as an independent variable. Another consequence is that we must revise the
position of the stimulus as a "cause" of responses. The percept is not the
effect of a chain of occurrences starting in the stimulus. It is the resultant
of stimulus and organism as a dynamic system. This is the meaning of the
double arrow between S and O in scheme 4. However, the relation between
the two components changes in the perceptual process. The stimulus
increases in importance as determinant. (In scheme 2, this corresponds to
the increase in importance of the last phase as a reference). However,
stimulus is only one determinant in the process; the personality structure of
the individual is the other (the percept-genesis conceptualized as a
succession of adaptive states, reflecting the personality structure).
Stimulus as determinant is thus the percept-genetic correspondent to
stimulus as a "cause" in traditional S-R-experiments. In its general form,
this is valid for all kinds of percept-genetic experimentation. If we limit
our discussion to a specific picture in a tachistoscopic experiment, it is
possible to be more precise. In the Defense Mechanism Test, for instance,
the pictures are designed to function in analogy with the psychoanalytic
theory of defence mechanisms; depicting a threatening person turned
towards an innocent hero figure. By such an interpretation of the picture,
1
Epistemologically, percept-genetic theory is related to the Neo-Kantian position (P.
Natorp, E. Cassirer). The distinction between the two schemes above indicates the touch
of the percept-genetic stand. We note that Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenological
approach to knowledge is quite close to percept-genetic thinking. In his analysis of the
physiological reflex-concept, he concludes: "The adequate stimulus cannot be defined in
it self and independent of the organism; it is not a physical reality, it is a physiological or
biological reality" (Merleau-Ponty, 1965, p. 31).
A note on the concept of stimulus in perceptgenetic theory 71
within a group will approach perfection. This has, as we will see later,
interesting consequences for some percept-genetic applications.2
The situation is not necessarily a problematic one. If, in an experiment,
stabilized last phases are recorded for all subjects and if they broadly
coincide with the test leader's last phase on the description level used in the
data analysis, there is no problem. The test leader's, the groups average
and the individual subject's last phases broadly coincide and can be
generalized to (N)stimulus. (That this is the case is an implicit assumption
in traditional psychology of perception).
Problems arise with deviations from the above case. I shall discuss two
such complications, both related to Defense Mechanism Test.
1. In the testing of a group of subjects, not all will reach a stabilized
last phase within the series of exposures. And, in order to keep
down the spreading of information about the picture in the group,
it is often unsuitable to add a long time exposure to the regular
series.
This problem can be evaded by a stimulus analysis on a separate
group of subjects, asked to describe the picture at long time
exposure. The result of such an analysis makes the basis for the
(N)stimulus definition and for the determination of the criteria for
"correct" descriptions (C-phase criteria i the DM-test). The
stimulus analysis can of course also be used for the reversed case,
(in the construction of a new picture): to adapt the picture to the C-
phase criteria already given in the test manual, and to reduce the
variation in last phase descriptions of it.
2. In the testing of clinical cases or in advanced personality analyses,
where the specific meaning of the picture for the subject is
essential, we have reasons to reckon with differences between the
(N)stimulus definition and the subjects last phase. Usually this
can be checked by adding a long time exposure that gives a
stabilized last phase. If this last phase deviates from the
(N)stimulus definition, we have a problem. To which last phase
2
The problematic nature of the objective definition of reality also has interesting
consequences in the philosophy of science. There too, we find solid arguments to
substitute inter-subjective for objective (Zachrisson & Zachrisson, 2005).
A note on the concept of stimulus in perceptgenetic theory 73
the picture can, in principle, affect the percept-genesis in two ways: they
can lead to displacements of the threshold phases in the series, and they
can entail structural changes in the genesis.
The first point is a matter of course in percept-genetic experiments. For
such an experiment to give interesting results at all, the series of exposures
must cover the developmental process of the percept, i.e. give enough P-
phases. This depends partly on the experimental conditions, especially the
series of exposure times, partly on the physical characteristics of the
picture. Unsuitable contrast or relative degree of darkness in the picture
can give a too precipitous or too slack development of the percept and a
too late first phase or a too early last phase in the series. This will result in
reduced amount of information because part of the P-phase sequence is not
recorded at all or is condensed in few phases. A "calibration" of the
instrument in this respect, is a sine qua non in any kind of percept-genetic
experiment.
Probably a change in contrast in the picture will also result in structural
changes in the percept-genesis, because the condensation of phases
increases or decreases. However, more interesting causes for structural
changes are those that can be referred to changes in the motif (content) of
the picture, the (N)stimulus. A change of content means a change of
stimulus as operator. Different motifs will therefore activate different part-
structures and conflict-areas in the personality (Kragh, 1985; Zachrisson,
1967). Choice of, and variation of, motif must be related to theory and to
the aim of the investigation. Now, every developmentally oriented
personality theory stresses the family relationships of the individual, the
relationship to parents, siblings, partner (and one-self). Therefore, pictures
containing one or more persons in different situations are most common in
percept-genetic investigations. Those pictures are related to fundamental
factors in personality development and give more relevant information for
issues in the psychology of personality, compared to pictures of e.g.
objects. On the other hand, such pictures can be relevant in the
investigation of perceptual processes from the point of view of general
psychology.
The comments above refer to percept-genetic experimentation in general.
For the Defense Mechanism Test the discussion can be more concrete
A note on the concept of stimulus in perceptgenetic theory 75
CONCLUSION
3
It is true that e g a "neutral" father-son-picture can activate perceptual defence
structures. In clinical cases, we often meet with this (Kragh, 1970). In such cases
however, we have to derive the anxiety provocation from the anamnestic connection of
the phase (the life history). We cannot refer it to the subjects last phase, if this is in
agreement with the (N)stimulus definition of the picture, i.e. denote a neutral relation.
76 Anders Zachrisson
REFERENCES
This study had two aims. First, to compare a chronic fatigue syndrome
group to other clinical groups according to their responses to Defense
Mechanism Test (DMT). Secondly, to use the DMT data from the groups
chronic fatigue syndrome, multiple chemical sensitivity, conversion disor-
der and healthy controls to create an empirical model describing the dif-
ferences and similarities in defense patterns between the groups. The re-
sults showed that the chronic fatigue syndrome group used defense pat-
terns that was most alike the none-patient group, when contrasted to the
other two patient groups. When contrasted only with the non-patient group
some clear differences appeared but these differences had another quality
than the differences between e.g. multiple chemical sensitivity and non-
patients. After that, all four groups were used to create an empirical model
describing how the groups were related to each other according to the use
of different defense patterns. All four groups were clearly separated in the
model and the results from this model were then generalized to a theoreti-
cal model describing defense styles in psychosomatic groups. This model
suggests a Two-axis evaluation, based on the concepts Relational Focus
and Defense Style, of how the individual effectuates his/her defenses. The
implication of the model for clinical work is also discussed.
Participants
Fifteen chronic fatigue syndrome patients, all of them fulfilling the criteria
(mean = 42.3 years; range 28-52, all females) were assessed using the
DMT. These patients participated in a larger treatment project at Huddinge
University Hospital, Sweden (Sderberg & Evengrd, 2001). All but two
of the patients had previously held qualified jobs. At the time of the study,
two of the patients were working full-time and five part-time. The follow-
ing contrast groups were used: multiple chemical sensitivity (n = 10; mean
= 46,8 years; range 30-55, 6 females and 4 males) and conversion disorder
(n = 10, mean = 43,6 years; range 27-54, 5 females and 5 males) according
to the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric Association,
1994). A more detailed description of these patient groups is found in
Henningsson and Sundbom (2000). The non-patient group was mixed, re-
cruited from a DMT database of healthy controls, and age matched as well
as possible (n = 14; mean = 42,1 years; range 35-52, 11 females and 3
males). Most of these subjects consisted of ward staff and workers.
at which the reactions occur. Variables of sex and age (1-2) and several of
those describing the test situation (126-129) were excluded because they
are not usually coded in the DMT. Interrater agreement on the 124 vari-
ables, rated by three experts on the test, has shown that the variance related
to effects of these raters, using Eta values, had an average of 2 %. Ratings
were made under blinded conditions (Henningsson & Sundbom, 2000).
The DMT interrater reliability coefficient in the present study was 0.90
based on 15 cases (five randomly selected cases from each patient group)
and blindly coded by two trained judges.
RESULTS
6
CO
CO
4 CO CO
CO NP
CO
2 CO CO
CO NP
PLS 2
0 CO MC NP
MC NP NP
MCMC NP NP
-2 MC NP
MC NP NP
MC
MC
MCMC
-4
-6
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PLS 1
Figure 5.1. PLS-scores for all original cases in the psychosomatic model. CO =
Conversion Disorder, MC = Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, NP = Non Patients.
Elipse = Hoteling T2 (0.05).
The main result of the previously mentioned study was that the clinical
groups, located to the left in the figure, showed evidence of many more
non-emotional defenses (e.g. delay of thresholds and identification with
opposite sex) as compared to the non-patients portrayed to the right. How-
ever, the way the groups manifested this difference was specific for each of
the clinical groups. The multiple chemical sensitivity patients group was
characterized above all by a blocking style (e.g. a lateness of perception),
82 Mikael Henningsson
while the defensive strategy of the conversion disorder group was mainly
distortion of content. Figure 2 below shows the projections of the chronic
fatigue syndrome patients onto this model.
CF
6
4 CF
2 CF
CF
CF CF
CF
PLS 2
CF
0 CF
CF
-2 CF CF
CF CF
CF
-4
-6
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
PLS 1
Figure 5.2. Predicted scores in the psychosomatic model for the Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome group. Elipse = Hoteling T2 (0.05)
The figure shows that most of the subjects in the syndrome group, with a
few exceptions, are located in the right-hand part of the model defined as
the non-patient area (cf. Figure 1). Consequently, the chronic fatigue syn-
drome group seems to use similar kinds of defenses as those of the non-
patient group. Furthermore, in order to compare these patients with psychi-
atric patients, they were projected onto a previous PLS model consisting of
DMT data from the groups schizophrenic disorder, borderline personality
disorder and healthy controls (Sundbom, Jacobsson, Kullgren, & Penayo,
1998). The result was the same; the chronic fatigue syndrome seemed to
use defenses like non-patients.
nation of whether there are any DMT differences between the syndrome
group and a healthy group, a new PLS analysis was carried out involving
only these two groups.
Two significant PLS components according to cross-validation criteria
were obtained. In total, they formed a PLS model explaining 92,7 % of the
variance in group affiliation by 16,9 % of the variation in DMT variables
(Figure 3). The model seemed to have strong predictive power, since the
goodness of prediction (Q2) was quite high (Q2 = 0.62).
NP
4 CF NP
NP
CF NP
2 CF NP
NP
CF
CF NP
NP
PLS 2
0 NP NP
CF NPNP
CF
CF
CF NP
-2 CF
NP
CF
CFCF
-4
CFCF
-6
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
PLS 1
Figure 3 shows that the two groups are completely separated from each
other. The non-patients are positioned in the upper right-hand part of the
picture and the chronic fatigue syndrome group in the left-hand part. This
means that there are significant differences between the groups in how they
respond to the stimulus picture in the DMT. In order to examine the sub-
stance of these differences, we need to look at the loadings of the DMT
variables, i.e., the most important variables according to their discriminat-
ing power. This result revealed that the chronic fatigue syndrome group is
characterized primarily by a difficulty in perceiving the aggressive facial
expression of the peripheral person, together with the defenses of denial
(negation) of aggressive affect, and reaction formation. Compared to these
84 Mikael Henningsson
CO NP
NP
4 NP
NP
CO
2 CO NP NP
CO CO CO NP
NP
CO CF
NP
PLS 2
CO CO
0 MC MCMC CF
MC MC CF CF
NP CF
CO CF CF
-2 CF
MC MC MCCF CF CF
MC MC CFCF
CF
CF
-4
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PLS 1
ponent should be handled with precaution. In total, 24% (9% + 15%) of the
variation in DMT variables accounted for 42% (21% + 21%) of the mod-
eled variance in group affiliation. The projection of the subjects onto this
model is illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 5.5. The most discriminating variables in the empirical chronic fatigue
syndrome nonpatient multiple chemical sensitivity conversion disorder
model. (The numbers in the table indicate the variable number in the DMT list,
see Sundbom, Binzer, & Kullgren, 1999).
The figure shows that the four groups in the model are fairly well sepa-
rated, with one group in each corner of the model. To understand the con-
tents of the two components used in this projection, we will examine the
variable pattern used to establish them. Variables with VIP (Variable Im-
portance in the Projection) values > 1.00, and characteristic for some of the
four groups are schematically summarized in Figure 5.
86 Mikael Henningsson
Distorting
Defense Style
4 1
Distorting Distorting
negative object negative affect
Objects Affects
Relational Focus Relational Focus
3 2
Blocking Blocking
negative object negative affect
Blocking
Defense Style
Figure 5.6. Theoretical model showing relational focus and defense style in dif-
ferent psychosomatic groups.
DISCUSSION
A Heuristic Model
As stated before the multiple chemical sensitivity patients, the conversion
disorder, and the healthy groups differed in their handling of the threat in
the DMT (Henningsson & Sundbom, 2000). We called these differences
distorting and blocking defense styles. It appears that the same defense
styles are found between non-patients and chronic fatigue syndrome, al-
though the level of psychological functioning differs (Figure 3). This as-
sumption was also confirmed by the last four-group model above (Figures
4), where two components could be used to describe the groups different
ways of handling the situation induced by the test.
Based on these empirical results, we suggest a model for description of
psychological defenses in psychosomatic states, consisting of two main
dimensions: (1) objectsaffects issues (level of relational focus) and (2)
distortingblocking maneuvers (defense style). This model is presented in
Figure 6.
This model has much in common with that of McWilliams (1994) for di-
agnostic purposes. She describes two main dimensions that must be con-
sidered in psychoanalytic diagnosing: a developmental dimension and a
typological dimension. The developmental dimension primarily examines
the maturational level of the individual and the typological dimension con-
siders the defensive style. The two main dimensions in our model can be
used to describe the four styles of defensive strategies (groups 1-4 in Fig-
ure 6) in terms of organizing principles of defensive strategies (Stolorow &
Atwood, 1992).
The organizing principle of the first group is a relational focus on the
affect level. One could say that the objects (the persons in the picture) are
stable and not subject to debate. The main defensive strategy is distortion
of affect in the form of introaggressive defenses aimed at maintaining a
psychological balance, even if this group is able to recognize the threat
correctly in the end. This means that this group has adaptive defenses and
good reality testing, even when they are exposed to the anxiety-provoking
stimuli in the DMT. The non-patients illustrate this group.
88 Mikael Henningsson
REFERENCES
American Psychiatric Association: (1994). Diagnostic and statistical man-
ual of mental disorders. Fourth Edition. Washington, DC: APA.
Evengrd, B., Schacterle, R.S., & Komaroff, A.L. (1999). Chronic fatigue
syndrome: New insights and old ignorance. J Int Med., 246:455-469.
Fukuda, K., Straus, S., Hickie, I., Sharpe, M., Dobbins, J., & Komaroff, A.
(1994). Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. A comprehensive approach to its defi-
nition and study. Ann Int Med, 121:953-959.
Henningsson, M, & Sundbom, E. (2000). Interrater reliability among three
judges on 130 Defense Mechanism Test variables: a multivariate approach.
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 91:959-969.
Henningsson, M., & Sundbom, E. (2000). The Defense Mechanism Test
and "Multiple Chemical Sensitivity": A comparative study of defensive
structures in different diagnostic groups. Perceptual and Motor Skills,
91:803-818.
Henningsson, M., Sundbom, E. Armelius, B-., & Erdberg, P. (2000). PLS
Model Building: A Multivariate Approach to Personality Test Data. Scan-
dinavian Journal of Psychology, 42:399-409.
Kragh, U. (1985). DMT-Manual. Stockholm: Swedish Psychology
International AB.
McWilliams, N. (1994). Understanding Personality Structure in the Clini-
cal Process. New York. Guilford Press.
Orange, D. M., Atwood, G. E., & Stolorow, R. D. (1997). Working Inter-
subjectively. Contextualism in Psychoanalytic Practice. Hillsdale, NJ,
Analytic Press.
Stolorow, R. D., & Atwood, G. E. (1992). Contexts of Being: the Intersub-
jective Foundations of Psychological Life. Hillsdale, NJ, Analytic Press.
90 Mikael Henningsson
The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between responses
to the projective Defense Mechanism Test and the post-traumatic symptom
level as measured by the self-report Harvard Trauma Questionnaire. The
results showed that it was possible to identify two main patterns of percep-
tual reactions on the test, one positively and the other negatively corre-
lated to the level of post-traumatic symptoms. A blocking defense style as
well as a lack of affective responses characterized patients with a high
post-traumatic symptom level, while patients with a low symptom level
were characterized by many different perceptual distortions and more ver-
bal expressions of affects. Symptoms from all three symptom clusters of
post-traumatic stress disorder as well as feelings of shame and guilt, and a
general distrust of other people, were associated with a blocking defense
style. However, the results also give rise to another interpretation, namely,
that the blocking reactions for those with high symptom levels were simply
perceptual delays caused by their extreme arousal and anxiety, and had
nothing at all to do with a different defense style.
Association, 1980, 1987, 1994) have been developed for the assessment of
post-traumatic symptomatology (e.g., Allen, 1994; Miller, Kamenchenko,
& Krasniasnski, 1992) and have been used in different traumatized groups
as well as in factor-analytical studies focusing on PTSD symptom structure
(e.g., Watson et al., 1991; Foa, Riggs, & Gershuny, 1995). The findings
from these studies vary between different traumatized groups and across
samples of seemingly similarly traumatized persons, and thus far have not
given any unambiguous answers to questions about the existence of a gen-
eral core of post-traumatic reactions. Furthermore, these studies are not
easy to compare, since they have different designs and the assessment in-
struments used address somewhat varying symptoms. In a study using the
self-report Harvard Trauma Questionnaire among severely traumatized
Indo-Chinese refugees (Mollica et al., 1992) the most frequently reported
symptoms were intrusion and intentional avoidance, while the inability to
recognize emotions, i.e., numbing, was one of the least frequent symptoms
in this group, despite the fact that 70% of the subjects had a PTSD diagno-
sis. Re-experiencing symptoms and an avoidance of thoughts about the war
were also the most frequent symptoms among severely traumatized Bos-
nian refugees, while numbing symptoms along with arousal symptoms had
a comparatively low frequency (Weine et al., 1995).
A comorbidity between PTSD and other anxiety disorders, depressive,
and dissociative disorders, which is not only due to symptom overlap, has
been frequently observed (e.g., Bleich, Koslowsky, Dolev, & Lerer, 1997;
Carlier, Lamberts, Fouwels, & Gersons, 1996; Bremner et al., 1992). In a
study of van der Kolk et al. (1996) PTSD, dissociation, somatization, and
affect dysregulation seemed to represent a spectrum of adaptations to
trauma and often occurred together but in various combinations over time
among traumatized treatment-seeking and non-treatment-seeking subjects.
These results correspond well with the modern psychodynamic view of
PTSD, which has been greatly influenced by the work of Krystal (1985,
1988), who stressed the impact of traumatization on expression and toler-
ance of affects. He noted a high prevalence of psychosomatic diseases both
among war veterans and in his work with concentration camp survivors.
Van der Kolk et al. (1996) emphasized the fact that a one-sided focus on
Defense mechanisms and post-traumatic symptoms among refugees 93
Participants
The participants were male refugees from the former Yugoslavia, who had
been traumatized by organized violence during the war and the ethnic per-
secutions, and who were granted political asylum by the Swedish immigra-
tion authorities. At the time of the study, which was conducted between
February, 1995 and August, 1996, they were outpatients at a Swedish psy-
chiatric unit specifically set up for the treatment of this target group. Pa-
tients were referred to the unit in different ways, e.g., by primary care phy-
sicians and local refugee counsellors. Some were self-referred. The pa-
tients were informed about the study and asked about participation after a
minimum treatment period of one month. Two patients did not agree to
participate, two were excluded due to psychotic symptoms, and one patient
broke off participation. Twenty-one people (mean age 37.6 years; range
22-58) participated in the study. Eighteen participants were Bosnian Mus-
lims, two were Muslims from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and
one was self-identified as being of Croatian national heritage. Mean length
of residence in Sweden at the first contact with the clinic was 18.6 months
(range 2.5-36.0). There was no significant age difference between the
group and drop-outs (t = 0.81; df = 24; p = 0.42) and they were also com-
96 Gunilla Kivling Bodn and Elisabet Sundbom
parable with regard to ethnicity and residence time in Sweden. Two per-
sons had an educational level of 8 years, 14 of 11-12 years, and 5 people of
more than 12 years. All had been employed or self-employed before the
ethnic persecutions and the war started. Fourteen participants were mar-
ried, five were single, one was widowed, and one was divorced. Two had
undergone psychiatric treatment on one occasion in their country of origin.
One of these had a documented, war-related PTSD diagnosis from his na-
tive country, but no history of psychopathology before the war.
PROCEDURE
RESULTS
Seventeen people (81 %) met the DSM III-R criteria for PTSD in the clini-
cal interview, and 11 persons (52 %) had depressive symptoms of varying
degrees. There was no significant difference in the mean symptom ratings
on the HTQ between participants with and without depressive symptoms (t
= .58; df = 19; p = .57). The average number of experienced trauma events
reported on the HTQ was 13.0 (SD = 3.3) with a range of 5.0 - 17.0. The
most commonly reported traumatic events were: lack of food or water (n =
21), ill health without access to medical care (n = 21), lack of shelter (n =
21), being close to death (n = 20), unnatural death of family member or
friend (n = 19), murder of family member or friend (n = 18), murder of
stranger or strangers (n = 18), and imprisonment (n = 17). The mean score
of all 30 symptoms of the HTQ was 2.4 (SD = .41, range 1.8 - 3.4), of the
16 proper PTSD symptoms 2.6 (SD = .46, range 1.9 - 3.8), and of the 14
PTSD-related symptoms 2.2 (SD = .47, range 1.4 - 2.9). In other words,
post-traumatic symptoms were frequent in the group, and also the four
people who had not met the PTSD criteria (DSM III R) in the clinical in-
terview reported post-traumatic symptoms to some degree on the HTQ.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the mean symptom rating on
the entire HTQ and the number of reported trauma events was r = .46 (p =
.04).
Defense mechanisms and post-traumatic symptoms among refugees 99
Table 6.1. Variable Importance in the Projection (VIP) values of the 12 Defense
Mechanism Test variables associated with a high level of post-traumatic symptoms
Var. no. VIP value Description of the DMT variables
Blocking defense style
Disappearance and reduction
19 2.79 Attribute disappearance, Middle
20 2.28 Attribute disappearance, Late
23 1.03 Hero reduction, Middle
24 2.19 Hero reduction, Late
25 1.49 Peripheral person reduction, Early
High threshold values:
4 1.06 First meaningful percept is seen late
12 1.06 First Hero is seen late
13 1.21 First Peripheral person is seen late
Distorting defense style
Interchanges of sex
29 1.02 Many changes of sex, Hero
30 1.61 Many changes of sex, Peripheral person
Affective responses
Introaggression (Turning aggression against oneself)
87 1.35 Hero without Peripheral person, Middle
3 1.05 High anxiety in the test situation
A PLS model was established for the DMT variables (X) and the average
symptom score on the entire HTQ (Y). Two significant information-
bearing dimensions (component 1 and component 2) according to cross-
validation criteria were obtained. In total 16.9 % of the variance in the
DMT variables accounted for 93.5% of the variance in the symptom
100 Gunilla Kivling Bodn and Elisabet Sundbom
Table 6.2. Variable Importance in the Projection (VIP) values of the 25 Defense
Mechanism Test variables associated with a low level of post-traumatic symptoms
Var. no. VIP Description of the DMT variables
value
Blocking defense style
Disappearance and reduction
22 1.17 Hero reduction, Early
26 1.22 Peripheral person reduction, Middle
High threshold values:
14 1.45 First Attribute is seen late
21 1.14 No Attribute is seen
Repression
40 1.13 Total
46 1.18 Peripheral person, Middle
47 1.36 Peripheral person, Late
stimulus picture (var. nos. 4, 12-13, and 19-20, 23-25, 29-30, respectively),
a high anxiety level in the test situation (var. no. 3), but also to some extent
associated with turning aggression against oneself (var. no. 87, e.g. Hero is
perceived as sick, hurt or depressed).
Table 6.2 shows that a low level of post-traumatic symptoms was asso-
ciated with much more varied defensive strategies. Among the 25 DMT
variables with VIP values above 1.00, a stereotyped wrongly perceived
Hero with regard to age or sex (var. no. 110) had an outstandingly high
VIP value (2.34), but there were also other massive distortions, such as
turning aggression against oneself (var. nos. 35, 84-86, 89-91), perceiving
the threatening Peripheral person as younger (var. no. 113), identification
with the opposite sex (var. nos. 95, 97-98) and signs of sexualization be-
tween the persons (var. no. 125). Further distortions were an explicit nega-
tion of the threat (var. no. 66) and reaction formation (var. no. 75).
Additionally, a PLS analysis was carried out to obtain information about
how the specific post-traumatic symptoms or clusters of symptoms were
associated with the defenses. The DMT data (X) of the 16 patients with the
lowest and highest average HTQ symptom scores (range: 1.3-2.3 and 2.6-
3.4, respectively) were related to the 30 HTQ symptom ratings (Y). In Ta-
ble 6.3, the symptoms with a goodness of prediction value greater than .10
(Q2 value) are presented.
Sixteen of the 30 HTQ symptoms contributed significantly to the asso-
ciation with the different defense patterns. Specific symptoms from all
three clusters of PTSD as well as shame, guilt, and feelings of distrust to
other people were the most important ones that could be predicted by the
perceptual defenses.
DISCUSSION
The overall aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between
responses to the projective Defense Mechanism Test and the post-
traumatic symptom level as measured by the self-report Harvard Trauma
Questionnaire among severely traumatized refugees from the former
Yugoslavia. The results showed that it was possible to identify two main
patterns of perceptual reactions on the DMT, one positively and the other
Defense mechanisms and post-traumatic symptoms among refugees 103
Table 6.3. Descriptions and Goodness of Prediction (Q2 values) of the most differenti-
ating symptoms.
HTQ item no Q2 value Symptom description (abbreviation)
Intrusion
H1 0.26 Recurrent thoughts or memories of the trauma
Avoidance
H4 0.20 Detached and withdrawn from people
H11 0.16 Avoiding activities reminding of the trauma
H13 0.32 Less interest in daily activities
Arousal
H6 0.14 Exaggerated startle reaction
H7 0.38 Concentration difficulties
H8 0.11 Difficulties sleeping
H10 0.29 Irritable or outbursts of anger
Distrust
H26 0.16 Others are hostile
H27 0.12 No one to rely on
H30 0.32 Someone I trusted betrayed me
Dissociative
H28 0.11 Found out about actions that I can not remember
Others
H20 0.27 Survival guilt
H21 0.11 Hopelessness
H22 0.27 Shame of traumatic experiences
H24 0.12 Feeling as if I am going crazy
the post-traumatic symptom level, the severity of the trauma and the sub-
jective meaning of the traumatic experience, earlier experiences, and the
basic modes of defensive functioning. In other words, blocking from con-
sciousness (denial) or distortion of content (disavowal) has to be consid-
ered when assessing these patients suitability for different therapeutic
techniques. Thus, for patients with a strong blocking defense style and lack
of affective responses associated with a high post-traumatic symptom level
and strong feelings of shame, guilt, and distrust of other people, the sup-
portive elements in the psychotherapy are suggested to be important parts
of the treatment. A secure life situation and a secure therapeutic setting are
particularly important conditions for establishing a working alliance with
these individuals, which may take a considerable time (Varvin, 1998; Var-
vin & Hauff, 1998). Patients with a low symptom level, on the other hand,
characterized by a distorting defense style and with an ability to verbalize
emotions, seem to be more suitable for expressive therapy.
The finding that people with lower posttraumatic symptom levels had
better defenses in the form of using a distorting defense style and an ability
to pronounce affective responses may seem particularly impressive, con-
sidering the comparatively great homogeneity in the entire research sample
with regard to traumatization and symptom level. The result contributes to
the construct validity of the DMT. It gives support to previous DMT stud-
ies, where the type of defense style (blocking or distorting) was shown to
be one significant discriminator between different clinical groups (e.g.,
Henningsson, 1999). Our conclusion is that the DMT and multivariate
modeling of data may be useful methods for future replication studies in
finding discriminating patterns of perceptual defenses among severely
traumatized patients and for use in psychotherapy research.
A shortcoming of this study is the lack of a contrast group with no post-
traumatic symptoms but comparable to the study group with regard to cul-
ture, age, sex, and other relevant background factors. Furthermore, the
sample was small and consisted of male subjects only. Although the pre-
dictive validity (Q value) was comparatively high in the present study and
the PLS method permits statistical analysis of a small number of individu-
als in relation to the number of variables studied (Henningsson et al., 2001)
Defense mechanisms and post-traumatic symptoms among refugees 107
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study was supported by grants from the Swedish National Board of
Health and Welfare. The authors wish to thank Richard F. Mollica and
Yael Caspi-Yavin for permission to use the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire
in this study, and Per-Axel Karlsson for his psychiatric assessments of the
subjects.
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee, Faculty of Medicine,
University of Ume.
REFERENCES
Allen, S. N. (1994). Psychological assessment of post-traumatic stress dis-
order. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 17: 327-349.
Allodi, F. (1985). Physical and psychiatric effects of torture: Canadian
study. In: The breaking of bodies and minds: Torture, psychiatric abuses
and the health professions, eds. E. Stover & E. O. Nightingale. New York:
Freeman, pp. 66-78.
American Psychiatric Association. (1980). Diagnostic and statistical man-
ual of mental disorders (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical man-
ual of mental disorders (3rd ed., revised.). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical man-
ual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Andrews, G., Singh, M., & Bond, M. (1993). The Defense Style Question-
naire. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 181:246-256.
Bernstein Carlson, E., & Rosser-Hogan, R. (1991). Trauma experiences,
posttraumatic stress, dissociation, and depression in Cambodian refugees.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 148:1548-1551.
Birmes, P., Warner, B. A., Callahan, S., Sztulman, H., Charlet, J-P., &
Schmitt, L. (2000). Defense styles and posttraumatic stress symptoms.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 188:306-308.
108 Gunilla Kivling Bodn and Elisabet Sundbom
Bleich, A., Koslowsky, M., Dolev, A., & Lerer, B. (1997). Post-traumatic
stress disorder and depression. An analysis of comorbidity. British Journal
of Psychiatry, 170:479-482.
Bond, M., Gardner, S., Christian, J., & Sigal, J. J. (1983). Empirical study
of self-rated defense styles. Archives of General Psychiatry, 40:333-338.
Bremner, J. D., Southwick, S., Brett, E., Fontana, A., Rosenheck, R., &
Charney, D. S. (1992). Dissociation and posttraumatic stress disorder in
Vietnam combat veterans. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149:328-332.
Carlier, I. V., Lamberts, R.D., Fouwels, A. J., & Gersons, B. P. (1996).
PTSD in relation to dissociation in traumatized police officers. American
Journal of Psychiatry, 153:1325-1328.
Davidson, K., & MacGregor, M. W. (1998). A Critical Appraisal of Self-
Report Defense Mechanism Measures. Journal of Personality, 66(6):965-
991.
Foa, B. E., Riggs, D. S., & Gershuny, B. S. (1995). Arousal, numbing, and
intrusion: Symptom structure of PTSD following assault. American Jour-
nal of Psychiatry, 152: 116-120.
Frank, G. (1992). On the use of the Rorschach in the study of PTSD. Jour-
nal of Personality Assessment, 59:641-643.
Fransson, P., Sundbom, E., & Hgglf, B. (1998). A comparative study of
adolescents in psychiatric care assessed using the Defense Mechanism Test
(DMT) and the DSM- IV classification system. Nordic Journal of Psychia-
try, 52:527-536.
Frueh, B. C., & Kinder, B. N. (1994). The susceptibility of the Rorschach
Inkblot Test to malingering of combat-related PTSD. Journal of Personal-
ity Assessment, 62:280-298.
Frueh, B. C., Leverett, J. P., & Kinder, B. N. (1995). Interrelationship be-
tween MMPI-2 and Rorschach variables in a sample of Vietnam veterans
with PTSD. Journal of Personality Assessment, 64:312-318.
Hartman, W. L., Clark, M. E., Morgan, M. K., Dunn,V. K., Fine, A. D.,
Perry, G. G., & Winsch, D. L. (1990). Rorschach structure of a hospital-
ized sample of Vietnam veterans with PTSD. Journal of Personality As-
sessment, 54:149-159.
Defense mechanisms and post-traumatic symptoms among refugees 109
Sundbom, E., Jacobsson, L., Kullgren, G., & Penayo, U. (1998). Personal-
ity and defenses: A cross-cultural study of psychiatric patients and healthy
individuals in Nicaragua and Sweden. Psychological reports, 83:1331-
1347.
Swanson, G. S., Blount, J., & Bruno, R. (1990). Comprehensive system
Rorschach data on Vietnem combat veterans. Journal of Personality As-
sessment, 54:160-169.
Van der Kolk, B. A., & Ducey, C. P. (1989). The psychological processing
of traumatic experience: Rorschach patterns in PTSD. Journal of Trau-
matic Stress, 2:259-274.
Van der Kolk, B. A., Pelcovitz, D., Roth, S., Mandel, F. S., McFarlane, A.,
& Herman, J. L. (1996). Dissociation, somatization, and affect dysregula-
tion: The complexity of adaptation to trauma. American Journal of Psy-
chiatry, 153:83-93.
Varvin, S. (1998). Psychoanalytical psychotherapy with traumatized refu-
gees: Integration, symbolization, and mourning. American Journal of Psy-
chotherapy, 52:64-71.
Varvin, S., & Hauff, E. (1998). Psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy
with torture survivors. In: Caring for victims of torture, eds. J. M. Jaranson
& M. K. Popkin. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press, pp.117-
129.
Watson, C. G., Kucala, T., Juba, M., Manifold, V., Anderson, P. E. D., &
Anderson, D. (1991). A factor analysis of the DSM-III post-traumatic
stress disorder criteria. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 47:205-214.
Weine, S. M., Becker, D. F., McGlashan, T. H., Laub, D., Lazrove, S., Vo-
jvoda, D., & Hyman, L. (1995). Psychiatric consequences of ethnic clean-
sing: Clinical assessment and trauma testimonies of newly resettled Bos-
nian refugees. American Journal of Psychiatry, 152, 536-542.
Vojvoda, D., & Laub, D. (1995). Narrative constructions of historical reali-
ties in testimony with Bosnian survivors of ethnic cleansing. Psychiatry,
58, 246-260.
Westerlundh, B., & Smith, G. (1983). Perceptgenesis and the psychody-
namics of perception. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 6, 597-
640.
7. INFLUENCE OF GENDER AND AGE
IN THE DEFENSE MECHANISM TEST
AMONG ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS
Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom
The aim was to study gender and age differences in a group (N =100) of
healthy adults (n = 67) and adolescents (n = 33) assessed by means of the
projective percept-genetic Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). First, gender
differences within the adults and the adolescents were investigated sepa-
rately. Secondly, similarities and dissimilarities, in respect of gender dif-
ferences, between these two groups were compared. Thirdly, the relation
between gender and age was investigated by studying all the participants
simultaneously. The test protocols were scored in respect of 124 DMT
variables and analyzed by means of partial least squares (PLS) discrimi-
nant analysis including a pattern analysis of the DMT variables. The re-
sults showed significant gender differences in the adult as well as the ado-
lescent group. The gender differences within each group revealed obvious
similarities, although differences were also found. A common feature in the
DMT pattern for the females was different variants of the perceptual de-
fense identification with the opposite sex, while the common features for
older and younger males were less obvious. However, when the subgroups
(adult female, adult male, girl and boy) were scrutinized simultaneously
they were all significantly separated from each other. Adult males and fe-
males were separated by the same dimension, while separate dimensions
were needed to separate both the boys and the girls. It was concluded that
both gender and age (adolescent/adult) must be considered in the DMT.
adolescents (Coleman & Henry, 1990; Offer & Boxer, 1991). These two
views imply different interpretations of the adolescent transition, which
make it interesting to compare adolescents with adults.
Empirical studies of gender- and age differences in relation to projective
tests are rather scant and hard to interpret. In a meta-analysis focusing on
aggression Hyde (1984) found reasonably reliable but not large gender dif-
ferences. It was shown that the method of measurement influenced the
magnitude of obtained gender differences. For example, gender differences
tended to be larger when projective tests were used compared to self-report
questionnaires. In Bckstrm (1994) a variant of the Defense Mechanism
Test (DMT) with different picture material was used to investigate gender
differences among male and female students. The overall results showed
that men and women reacted differently to threat themes. Women com-
pared to men had, among others, a higher rate of identification with the
opposite sex i.e., they assigned wrong gender to the figures. Carlsson and
Smith (1987) using the projective test Meta Contrast Technique (MCT)
found considerable gender differences among a group of youngsters. The
boys scored higher on isolating defenses while girls showed a preference
for sensitivity-projection defenses. Another example of gender differences
in projective tests has been presented by Waehler and Zaback (1991) using
the Draw-A-Person test. They found that female subjects drew the opposite
sex much more often than male subjects and that this was associated with
low self-esteem in men but not in the women. Age differences in coping
and defenses in a sample of subjects aged 10-77 years were investigated by
Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larsson, and Hobart (1987). They found increasing
maturity in coping and defense with a leveling off during adulthood. These
results indicate that one could expect to find different defense mechanisms
in adolescent and adult samples.
We have earlier studied typical DMT patterns for adolescents belonging
to different diagnostic groups (Fransson & Sundbom, 1997; Fransson,
Sundbom, & Hgglf, 1998). The results from these studies were com-
pared to the results from very similar studies performed on adults (Ar-
melius & Sundbom, 1991; Sundbom & Kullgren, 1992). The comparisons
between adolescents and adults revealed surprisingly similar patterns for
corresponding diagnostic groups, for instance, both adult and adolescent
Influence of gender and age in the defense mechanism test 115
Participants
One hundred non-patients were assessed using the DMT. Two comparison
groups were formed. One group of adults (n = 67; mean age = 32 years;
range 21-46; 33 women and 34 men) mainly consisting of medical person-
nel and university students. The second group consisted of adolescents,
upper secondary school students (n = 33; mean age = 17 years; range 16-
19; 18 girls and 15 boys). The DMT was examined by psychologists, well
trained in this method.
116 Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom
RESULTS
4
F
M F
M F
F
M FF
2 F
F
F F F
FF
M F F
M M F F
PLS 2
M F
0 F
M MM F FF
F
M MM
MM M F FF F F
M M M F F
MM M M
M
M M
M F F
-2 M
M M
M
M
M
-4
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
PLS 1
Figure 7.1. PLS scores. Projections for each individual plotted in a two-
dimensional window created by the first significant and the second non-
significant PLS dimensions. M = male; F = female.
Table 7.1. Discriminating DMT variables (loadings > .15) for males and females.
Variable PLS 1 (loadings) Description of DMT variables
Males
14 -.21 First Attribute is seen late
112 -.19 Introjection: Hero > 34 years
Isolation
48 -.17 Total
59 -.15 Hero and Peripheral person are separated
Females Identification with the opposite sex
99 .23 Hero (late)
98 .18 Hero (middle)
95 .16 Total
97 .15 Hero (early)
Disappearance
19 .19 Attribute (middle)
18 .17 Attribute (early)
20 .16 Attribute (late)
33 .17 Aggressive Hero
118 Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom
Figure 7.1 shows that the males are located in the left part of the window
and the females in the right part. The gender groups are fairly well sepa-
rated, although some overlapping does occur. According to the first and
significant dimension, 93% of the subjects are correctly classified. This
PLS model can also be used to determine the most influential DMT vari-
ables in the separation of the two groups. In Table 7.1 the most important
variables (loadings > .15) are presented.
Table 7.1 shows that the most distinguishing features for the adult males
are to perceive the Attribute late, a too old Hero gestalt and isolation re-
sponses. Adult females are characterized by many variants of identification
with the opposite sex (perceiving a man instead of a woman), as well as
Attribute disappearance and aggressive Hero.
G G
2 G
B G G
B GG G G
G
B B GGG
B B
PLS 2
0 B
B G G
B
B
B G
-2
B
B G
B G
-4
B
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
PLS 1
Figure 7.2. PLS scores. Projections for each individual plotted in a two-
dimensional window created by the first significant and the second non-
significant PLS dimensions. B = boy; G = girl.
Table 7.2. Discriminating DMT variables (loadings > .15) for boys and girls.
Variable no. PLS 1 (loa- Description of DMT variables
dings)
Boys
Disappearance
19 -.24 Attribute (middle)
20 -.20 Attribute (late)
18 -.16 Attribute (early)
Comparisons between adult females and males and adolescent girls and
boys
Finally the relation between gender and age was investigated by a PLS
analysis carried out on all the subjects jointly (N = 100). Four dummy vari-
ables were created composed of adult female, adult male, adolescent girl or
adolescent boy. The reason for this design was that we wanted to study dif-
ferences and similarities between the four groups as unbiased as possible.
Three information-bearing dimensions (PLS 1, PLS 2 and PLS 3) were
significant and accounted for 52 % (21 % + 20 % + 11 %) of the variance
in group membership with the help of 14 % (5 % + 5 % + 4 %) of the vari-
ance in the DMT variables. The results are depicted in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3. PLS scores. Projections for each individual plotted in a three-
dimensional space created by the three significant PLS dimensions. B = adoles-
cent boy; G = adolescent girl; M = adult male; F = adult female. The size of each
circle indicates how deeply within the three-dimensional model separate subjects
are located.
Influence of gender and age in the defense mechanism test 121
Figure 7.3 shows that the first dimension (t 1) is responsible for the sepa-
ration of males toward the left and females toward the right. The second
dimension (t 2) is accountable for the separation of the girls located in the
lower part of the figure. Finally the boys, in the front of the figure, are
separated from the other groups by the third dimension (t 3). Although
some overlapping did occur in all the three dimensions it was possible to
separate all the four groups significantly from each other. Accordingly the
same dimension separates the adult males and females, while separate di-
mensions are needed to separate both the adolescent girls and boys. The
VIP value showed that the number of unique variables (unique = the only
group with positive regression coefficients and VIP value > 0.8) for each
group were quite different. The rank order was adult females, girls, males
and boys showing from eleven to one unique variable for each group. Con-
sequently the female persons seemed to react with more unique distortions
than the males.
DISCUSSION
The main aim of this study was to investigate discriminating gender pat-
terns in DMT among healthy adults and adolescents. The overall result
showed that gender seems to have a substantial influence on the DMT re-
sponses in both populations. When gender differences within the adult and
the adolescent groups were compared, it was found that the most typical
feature of adult females and girls compared to their male counterparts was
a misjudged gender of the Hero and/or Peripheral person gestalts. Common
similarities were also found within the masculine groups as both adult
males and boys perceived a too old Hero gestalt. Also the magnitude of the
gender differences within the adolescent and adult groups showed similari-
ties. This could lead to a premature conclusion that girls are identical to
adult females and boys identical to adult males, in terms of the DMT.
However, this did not seem to be the case, because all groups (adult fe-
male, adult male, girl and boy), when scrutinized simultaneously, were
significantly separated from each other. An interesting finding was that
adult males and females were separated by one single dimension, repre-
senting opposite poles with diametrical values on significant variables. On
122 Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom
the contrary, boys and girls were separated by one dimension each. Thus,
adult gender differences can be described as two sides of the same coin,
while adolescent gender differences better can be described as two coins.
These findings touch upon the discussion that boys and girls may follow
somewhat different developmental trajectories according to Eriksons
(1968) psychosocial stages.
How can we interpret the obtained gender differences? The first plausible
explanation is that they are caused by different stimulus-pictures. Against
this hypothesis stands the fact that gender differences have been revealed
in many different areas e.g. self-image (Offer & Boxer, 1991), defense
mechanisms (Levit, 1991), and aggression (Hyde, 1984). In particular the
results of Carlsson and Smith (1987) indicate that the gender differences in
this study might be genuine. They also found gender differences with an-
other projective perceptgenetic test (MCT), although both sexes were pre-
sented with the same stimulus-pictures. Also the results of Bckstrm
(1994), using a DMT like method, are pointing in the same direction. The
obtained age differences would in any case be expected as adolescents and
adults, according to Erikson (1968), are supposed to struggle with quite
different psychosocial dilemmas.
How can we understand that both adult and adolescent females were
characterized by identification with the opposite sex, compared to their
male counterparts? It is not easy to give these results a crystal-clear inter-
pretation. However, similar findings from other studies have indicated that
women more than men seem to be disposed to identify with the opposite
sex (Matsumoto, 1996; Waehler & Zaback, 1991 and Intons-Peterson,
1988).
Another significant DMT variable separating the genders in both the
adult and adolescent groups was Attribute disappearance. This defense
strategy is not included in the DMT manual, but still proved to be impor-
tant in this context.
A Hero perceived to be too old characterized both boys and adult males,
compared to their female counterparts. One might interpret this as a
slightly omnipotent compensation for a threatened self, as the boy in the
stimulus-picture is transformed into an adult man. In the case of the boys
this pattern was also strengthened by reaction formation: trying to cheer
Influence of gender and age in the defense mechanism test 123
up a bit. This is well in line with results from several studies showing that
men, as measured by personality inventories, tend to be more assertive
(Feingold, 1994).
It should be noted that the comparisons of perceptual defenses in the pre-
sent study with defense mechanisms and other personality traits obtained
in other studies should be made with caution. First, the construct validity
of the concepts of defense mechanisms is far from unambiguous (e.g.
Guldberg, Hglend, & Perry, 1993). For example Olff, Godaert, Brosschot,
Weiss, and Ursin (1991) found poor agreement between defenses in the
DMT and other methods of assessing defense mechanisms (e.g. Defense
Mechanism Inventory). Second, straight-off comparisons between results
obtained by more traditional statistical methods and multivariate projection
methods respectively, are also doubtful.
The main conclusion of the results is that both gender and age (adoles-
cent/adult) must be considered when the DMT is used. In the research con-
text these differences can be dealt with by using separate PLS models or by
carefully matched groups according to gender and age. In clinical practice
knowledge of the critical DMT variables is important.
REFERENCES
Armelius, B-., & Sundbom, E. (1991), Hard and soft models for the as-
sessment of personality organization. In: Quantification of Human De-
fense Mechanisms, eds. M. Olff, G. Godaert, & H. Ursin.
Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer Verlag, pp. 138-147.
Blos, P. (1967), The second individuation process of adolescence. Psycho-
analytic Study of the Child, 22:162-186.
Bckstrm, M. (1994), The Defence Mechanism Test at a Turning Point.
Doctoral Dissertation. Department of Psychology, Lund University.
Carlsson, I., & Smith, G. J. W. (1987), Gender differences in defense
mechanisms compared with creativity in a group of youngsters. Psycho-
logical Research Bulletin, 27(1), Lund University.
Coleman, J. C., & Henry, L. (1990), The nature of adolescence (2nd ed.).
London: Routledge.
Erikson, E. (1968), Identity, youth and crisis. New York: Norton.
124 Per Fransson and Elisabet Sundbom
The repressor concept has traditionally been used to signify people with
heightened recognition thresholds for anxiety-provoking stimulation
(Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). Repressors also show an ob-
vious inconsistency between how they describe themselves calm, happy,
with high self-esteem and their outer appearance, as others perceive it.
Inspired by psychoanalytic defense mechanisms theory, the idea has been
that a repressor uses strong defensive structures in order to uphold an im-
age of him/herself that is quite different from the more objective reality, as
others see it.
128 Ingegerd Carlsson and Fredrik Neuman
METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate courses at three different
departments within the humanities and social sciences. They filled out
questionnaires on trait anxiety, social desirability and dreams. On the form
the participant could volunteer to take part in a psychological experiment.
A total of 140 students answered the form and constituted the group that
was classified into repressors, low-anxious and high-anxious groups, to be
described in the results section. Of the total group, 58 people volunteered
for further individual testing with the MCT.
Dream questionnaire
The questionnaire contained a form constructed for this study with the fol-
lowing six questions about dreams. 1. How often do you dream (once a
month or less, once a week, almost every night)? 2. How often do you re-
Mature and immature defenses: a study of repressors and trait anxiety groups 131
member what was in your dream (very seldom, sometimes, pretty often)?
3. How often do you have unpleasant dreams or nightmares (rather often,
sometimes, almost never, never)? 4. Do you dream in color (yes, no, I
dont know)? 5. What are your dreams like (often realistic and ordinary,
often imaginative and unreal, both realism and unreality)? 6. Have you
ever experienced paranormal dreams, like for instance dreams that came
true, telepathic dreams or other weird things (never, once, several
times)?
the picture. The manual divides the signs into mild, moderate, or grave
anxiety.
Regression. All regressive signs imply a return to a more immature defen-
sive level, and the depth can be defined as the difference between the base-
line level and the final level. The different categories vary from very con-
crete experiencing (for instance that the participant sees him/herself in the
picture, or describes clear colors in the black and white picture), to sudden
perceptions that everything is chaotic or nothing is perceived, to defensive
regressions (where an advanced sign of, for instance, isolation is replaced
by an immature one).
Projection sensitivity. Projective signs appear early in the development.
Categories 1 3 include clear projective answers (for example perception
of plain movements or that the threat is described as a nice and friendly,
living, person). Signs of sensitivity indicate that the individual reacts early
in the testing to the influence of the subliminal threat by perceiving slight
changes in the habituated picture of the boy. Transformations of a sensitive
type belong in category 4 (for example changes in picture perspective or
posture of the hero). To be classified for sensitivity at least two such
changes must be scored. Uncertain, single responses (but not sensitivity)
were scored as a tendency to projection.
Repression. Efforts to de-cathect the threat are subsumed under the head-
ing of repression. The grouping presupposes that the adult strategy of re-
pression originates at the behavioral level in the preschool age. According
to the manual, immature signs of repression are found in subcategories 1
2 (for example eye-shutting behavior, when the participant closes his eyes,
yawns heavily, turns his head away, looks down, etc, after a quick glance
at the screen, or that he or she sees only parts of the threat, the tip of a nose
instead of a whole face). In categories 3 5, at more mature levels, the
threat becomes for example a lifeless (harmless) mummy, or is dressed up,
transformed into a bike, tree, flowerpot, or other common object. A vague
response was coded as a tendency to repression.
Isolation. The different categories in isolation all strive to separate the
threatening emotion from the hero figure. Categories 1 3 are considered
to come low in the hierarchy (for example to increase the distance to the
threat, either literally walking backwards from the screen, or perceiving
Mature and immature defenses: a study of repressors and trait anxiety groups 133
that the threat is placed further away on the screen, or even to state that it is
not an angry monster anyway). Categories 4 6 imply greater cognitive
maturity (for instance reports that the threat is turned away, or is trans-
formed into a white distinct light, or hidden by a protecting surface). A
vague or unsure response was scored as a tendency.
Depression. Depressiveness implies a stereotyped, monotonous and often
long series of reports of a misinterpreted threat figure, indicative of inhibi-
tion. Category 1 contains more immature, childlike expressions (for exam-
ple that the boy is crying). Categories 2 3 consist of more or less massive
stereotypical series (at least five reports in a row of an unchanged misin-
terpretation of the threat). Also included is so-called softened stereotypy,
in which the series is slightly changed, indicating depressive tendencies.
Quantification of the separate defense categories. For regression, projec-
tion and depression a clear sign got two points and tendencies one point.
Sensitivity got one point, if no projection was scored. For the categories of
isolation and repression, scores in more than one subcategory earned three
points, one subcategory was given two points, and a tendency earned one
point.
Overall defense sum. In order to gain information about overall defense
score for each individual, a sum was calculated containing the points for all
categories. The maximum thus was twelve which was a theoretical
maximum, since depressive stereotypy excludes most other defenses.
Immature defense sum. To quantify immature defense, as regards regres-
sion and projection, those categories were considered immature and every
sign got two points, with one point for a tendency or for sensitivity. In the
categories of repression, isolation and depression, two points were given if
the protocol got a score in an immature sub-category and one point for a
tendency. The maximum thus was ten points.
RESULTS
Trait Anxiety
Mean for trait anxiety was 41.6 (SD = 9.47) in the whole group. No sex
difference was found (men: M = 39.8, SD = 8.8, versus women: M = 42.4,
SD = 8.76, n.s.).
134 Ingegerd Carlsson and Fredrik Neuman
Social Desirability
The social desirability mean was 27.3 (SD = 4.08) in the whole group. A
negative correlation was found with trait anxiety (Pearsons r = -.20, p =
.02, two-tailed).
No sex difference was found (men: M = 27.1, SD = 4.35 and women: M
= 27.4, SD = 3.98, n.s.).
Dreams
The intention was to form an index with the six questions concerning per-
ceived closeness to ones dreams. The answer categories were assigned
numbers and were reversed for questions 3 and 4. However, significant
correlations were found only between the first three questions (p < .01,
Mature and immature defenses: a study of repressors and trait anxiety groups 135
Spearmans rs, 2-tailed), which were put together to an index with a mini-
mum of 2 and maximum of 9. The median in the group became 7. On the
index the women had significantly higher points than the men (Mann-
Whitney U = 1344.0, p < .001, 2-tailed). A difference between groups was
found only in the men, where the repressors had lower points than the male
high-anxious group (Mann-Whitney U = 64.00. p < .02, 2-tailed). The rep-
ressors and the low-anxious group did not differ.
Table 8.1. The distribution of participants in the three groups, as well as the number
of men and women and the means and standard deviations for age, trait anxiety and for
social desirability in the whole cohort and in the MCT subgroup
Repressor Low-anxious High-anxious
n = 37 n = 19 n = 84
Number of women (men) 25 (12) 11 (8) 63 (21)
Age, M (SD) 24.16 (4.87) 23.42 (6.88) 23.49 (4.83)
Trait anxiety, M (SD) 32.41 (3.44) 33.37 (4.36) 47.58 (7.17)
Social desirability, M (SD) 30.41 (2.95) 24.00 (2.11) 26.73 (3.99)
MCT subgroup (n) n = 14 n=7 n = 37
Women (men) 7 (7) 5 (2) 31 (6)
Age, M (SD) 22.67 (2.77) 22.00 (2.83) 23.14 (4.08)
Trait anxiety, M (SD) 32.27 (3.71) 34.00 (2.83) 47.49 (7.35)
Social desirability, M (SD) 29.67 (2.82) 23.57 (2.07) 26.57 (3.62)
MCT
Thresholds. A calculation was made to find out if the groups differed at
which exposure level they first described a (mis-) representation of the
threat stimulus. The means lay between 22.0 - 23,2 ms. which was not sig-
nificant when tested with ANOVA.
Anxiety. No significant difference was found for anxiety.
The separate defense categories. As regards the single categories the only
significant difference was found in the category of repression. More high-
anxious people had signs of clear repression (2 or 3 points) than those in
the low-anxious group (the contrast was 19 18 versus 7 0, p = .03,
Fishers exact test, two-sided). The repressors got an intermediate place.
Overall defense sum. As can be seen in table 2 both the repressors and the
high-anxious group scored higher on overall defense than the low-anxious
group (p < .05, versus p = .03, Fishers exact test, two-sided). It could be
136 Ingegerd Carlsson and Fredrik Neuman
noted that a sum as high as eight points was reached by two participants,
both in the repressor group.
Immature defense sum. Table 2 also shows that the repressors got higher
scores on immature defense than both the high- and the low-anxious
groups (p = .04, versus p < .05, Fishers exact test, two-sided). It was
moreover noted that nobody in the low-anxious group got any points for
immature defense.
Table 8.2. Number of Participants in the Repressor and Anxiety Groups with Low (0
2) or High (3 8) Points for Overall Defense and for Immature Defense
Overall defense Immature defense
02 38 02 38
Repressor group 7 7 7 7
Low-anxious group 7 0 7 0
High-anxious group 19 18 30 7
DISCUSSION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to thank Gudmund Smith for solving the most persistent
MCT knots.
REFERENCES
Smith, G. J. W., & Amnr, G. (1995). Inflammatory bowel disease and in-
fantile emotional fixations. Psychological Research Bulletin, 35 ( 6). De-
partment of Psychology, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
Smith, G. J. W., & Nyman, G. E. (1961). A serial, tachistoscopic experi-
ment and its clinical application. Acta Psychologica, 18:67 84.
Smith, G. J. W., Johnson, G., Almgren, P-E., & Johanson, A. (2001). MCT.
The Meta-Contrast Technique, Manual. Department of Psychology, Lund
University, Lund, Sweden.
Smith, G. J. W., & van der Meer, G. (1993). Alexithymia in two groups of
psychosomatic patients: Morbus Crohn and Ulcerative colitis. In:
Experimental Research in Psychosomatics, U. Hentschel & E. H. M.
Bontekoe, eds. Leiden: DSWO Press.
Spielberger, C. D. (1983). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(Form Y). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Vaillant, G. E. (1971). Theoretical hierarchy of adaptive ego mechanisms.
Archives of General Psychiatry, 24:107 118.
Weinberger, D. A., & Davidson, M.N. (1994). Styles of inhibiting emo-
tional expression: Distinguishing repressive coping from impression man-
agement. Journal of Personality, 62:587 609.
Weinberger, D. A., Schwartz, G. E., & Davidson, R. J. (1979). Low-
anxious, high-anxious, and repressive coping styles: Psychometric patterns
and behavioral and physiological responses to stress. J. of Abnormal Psy-
chology, 88 (4):369 380.
Zimmermann, G., Rossier, J., Meyer-de-Stadelhofen, F., & Gaillard, F.
(2005). Alexithymia assessment and relations with dimensions of personal-
ity. European J. of Psychological Assessment, 21 (1):23 33.
9. HEART RATE VARIABILITY DURING
THE META-CONTRAST TECHNIQUE
Peter Jnsson
EMOTION
Emotions are action dispositions that reflect central activation and prepara-
tion for actions (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Lang, 1995). A similar
view was held by Darwin (1872/1948) who proposed that affective expres-
sions had evolved primarily because they prepared and motivated the or-
ganism for action. Later, Tomkins further developed this theory and argued
144 Peter Jnsson
When people are shown slides with unpleasant or aversive content, heart
rate (HR) decelerates, the activation of the facial corrugator muscle around
the eye increases (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Dimberg &
Karlsson, 1997), and the magnitude of the eye blink startle reflex increases
(Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1990; Vrana, Spence, & Lang, 1988). When
shown pleasant pictures quite the opposite occurs; HR and the activation of
the facial zygomatic muscle increases (Lang et al., 1993; Dimberg &
Karlsson, 1997), and the startle blink reflex decreases (Bradley et al., 1990,
Vrana et al., 1988).
However, besides that physiological autonomic responses covary with
the parameters of valence and arousal, the autonomic responses are also
dependent on the context. When people imagine or think about unpleasant
events they respond with HR acceleration (Vrana & Lang, 1990), but show
HR deceleration when shown unpleasant pictures (Lang et al., 1993). As
noted by Lang (1995) this is similar to findings in animal research. HR and
blood pressure decrease in response to a conditioned tone (associated to a
shock) when animals are physically restrained, whereas they increase when
the conditioned signal is presented to freely behaving animals (Iwata &
Heart rate variability during the meta-contrast technique 145
The functions of the two branches of the autonomic nervous system (ANS)
cannot be viewed as a single continuum ranging from sympathetic to para-
sympathetic control. Instead the autonomic control ought to be described in
a two-dimensional space (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991). Hence
an emotional stimulus may produce coactivation of the sympathetic and
parasympathetic nervous system depending on which activational input is
greater, the consequent heart rate response can be acceleratory, decelera-
tory, or unchanged from a prestimulus level (Cacioppo et al., 1993). For
example, an increase of both sympathetic and parasympathetic activity, as
well as a decrease, may result in an unchanged HR. However, power spec-
trum analysis of heart rate variability (HRV) provides a tool to study the
balance between the sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous system,
i.e. the sympathovagal balance (for a review see Berntson et al., 1997).
Three different frequency bands, reflecting neurally mediated oscilla-
tions, have been distinguished within the power spectrum of the HRV. The
high frequency band (HF) around 0.25 Hz is related to respiratory sinus
arrhythmia and is almost exclusively due to parasympathetic influences
reflecting vagal activity (Akselrod et al., 1985; Eckholt & Lange, 1990;
Pomeranz, et al., 1985). A region around 0.1 Hz constitutes the medium
frequency band (MF), which mirrors the baroreceptor feedback loop con-
trolling blood pressure, the Mayer-waves. The MF band is supposed to re-
flect both sympathetic and parasympathetic activity, but mainly the latter.
Fluctuations above 0.1 Hz seem to be mediated solely by the parasympa-
thetic system. (Akselrod et al., 1985, Eckholt & Lange, 1990). Finally the
low frequency band (LF) below 0.09 Hz has been related to the rhenin an-
giotensin system and thermoregulatory mechanisms (Hyndman, Kitney, &
Sayers, 1971; Kitney, 1975), and is proposed to reflect a mixture of both
parasympathetic and sympathetic activity (Akselrod et al., 1981; 1985;
Eckoldt & Lange, 1990).
146 Peter Jnsson
The ratio between LF/HF has been proposed as an index of the sym-
pathovagal balance and is suggested to be a valid estimate under many
psychological situations, especially when the interest is in the study of
changes in the sympathovagal balance under various conditions (Akselrod,
1995; Berntson et al., 1997).
METHOD
Participants
Fifty persons were recruited to the study via wanted lists briefly describing
the experiment. Participants were told not to eat, or use caffeine or nicotine
within two hours before the experiment. None used any kind of medication
or suffered from any disease known to affect the cardiovascular system.
Eleven participants were excluded from the study: three reported changes
in the masking picture when the target picture was exposed subliminally,
four were excluded on account of artifacts in data sampling, one got an al-
lergic reaction and began to sneeze, one was excluded because of problem
with one of the tachistoscopes, and finally two owing to periodical double
beats.
Two experimental groups were formed: one receiving a threatening
stimulus, and one receiving a non-threatening stimulus. After the exclu-
sions the former consisted of two men and seventeen women aged 18-29
years (M = 24.8, SD = 2.5) and the latter of five men and thirteen women
aged 20-29 years (M = 23.4, SD = 2.7). All examinations took place be-
tween 10.00 and 12.00 a.m.
ANXIETY MEASURES
the tachogram. In connection with the FFT data were linearly detrended
and filtered using a Bartlett window.
The integral of the power spectrum was studied in two major frequency
bands: a low frequency region (LF, 0.02-0.05 Hz), and a high frequency
region (HF, 0.15-0.5 Hz). The LF and HF were expressed in relative terms.
The LF/HF ratio was used as a measure of the sympathovagal balance. The
spectral values for both frequency regions were transformed into natural
logarithmic (ln) values to approach normally distributed data.
Procedure
First the state and trait scales of STAI were completed. After that the ECG
registration followed during five conditions:
1, Resting condition. 10 min of ECG registration whereof the last 5 min
was used as baseline. During this registration the test leader asked the par-
ticipant about age, education, occupation, etcetera, in order to hold the
amount of speech approximately at the same level as in the following con-
ditions.
2, The Mask was presented in repeated exposure with increasing exposure
times (the first exposure at 8 ms). After each exposure the participant gave
a short verbal report of what he or she had noticed. Exposure time was in-
creased until the participant correctly apprehended the Mask. Then the ex-
posures proceeded, at the same exposure time until 5 min of ECG re-
cording had been completed.
3, The targets (Threat or Non-Threat) were then introduced subliminally
without the participants knowledge, and immediately followed by the
Mask. Half the group received the Non-Threat, half the group the Threat.
The duration for the target started at 8 ms and was repeatedly presented
with increased exposure times; five exposures at each exposure time. This
procedure was intended to take at least 5 min with the target at a subliminal
level (subjective threshold). No new structures or changes reported in the
Mask were permitted. For example, if a participant reported that there is
something strange happening in the window or the window seems to be
darker, she or he was excluded from further analysis.
Heart rate variability during the meta-contrast technique 151
4, The targets (Threat or Non-Threat) were, together with the Mask, re-
peatedly presented supraliminally (i.e. targets and Mask correctly recog-
nized and described) during 5 min.
5, Five minutes rest.
After this a second state anxiety form was completed. By way of conclu-
sion the participants were informed about the purpose of the study.
RESULTS
STAI
The means for the total group on the trait anxiety scale was M = 40.3 (SD
= 8.0), and for the state anxiety scale assessed before the experimental
conditions M = 35.1 (SD = 7.1). The means were used to split the partici-
pants into two groups with higher and lower levels of trait (M =33.7, SD =
0.9 and M = 46.6, SD = 1.2) and state anxiety (M = 29.8, SD = 0.7 and M
= 41.4, SD = 41.4, SD = 1.1). The mean on the state scale measured after
the test session was 32.7 (SD = 7.1), and after mean split (M = 28.2, SD =
0.8 and M = 33.3, SD = 1.4). A 2 (Stimulus) x 2 (State anxiety; before,
after) repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect yielding that the
difference between the state anxiety before and after the test measures was
significant (F(1,35) = 4.58, p < .05). No other effects were found.
Table 9.1. Summary of Exposure Times and Number of Exposures. Groups divided by
received target (Non-Threat/Threat) and trait anxiety (Low/High)
Experimental Condition
Group Anxiety Mask Subliminal Supraliminal N
Exposure time
Non-
Low 78.7 (16.4) 32.9 (18.8) 168.7 (118.3) 10
Threat
High 87.2 (18.2) 29.4 (16.7) 234.5 (195.9) 8
Tot 82.5 (17.2) 31.3 (17.4) 197.9 (156.0) 18
Threat Low 59.0 (0.5) 19.1 (9.0) 167.1 (108.8) 9
High 58.7 (9.7 16.8 (4.7) 158.6 (111.8) 10
Tot 58.8 (6.9) 17.8 (7.0) 162.6 (107.4) 19
Total Low 69.3 (15.4) 26.4 (16.2) 167.9 (110.7) 19
High 71.4 (20.0) 22.4 (12.9) 192.3 (154.7) 18
Tot 70.3 (17.6) 24.4 (14.6) 179.8 (132.6) 37
Number of expo-
sures
Non-
Low 12.5 (2.5) 14.9 (3.1) 12.4 (2.8) 10
Threat
High 13.6 (2.8) 15.7 (3.1) 13.6 (2.9) 8
Tot 13.0 (2.6) 15.3 (3.0) 12.9 (2.8) 18
Threat Low 13.7 (1.7) 16.1 (1.7) 14.0 (2.5) 9
High 13.5 (2.1) 17.0 (2.0) 14.2 (3.1) 10
Tot 13.6 (1.9) 16.6 (1.9) 14.1 (2.8) 19
Total Low 13.1 (2.2) 15.5 (2.5) 13.2 (2.7) 19
High 13.6 (2.4) 16.4 (2.5) 13.9 (3.0) 18
Tot 13.3 (2.3) 15.9 (2.6) 13.5 (2.8) 37
Note. Values are means (standard deviations within brackets). Low/High = trait anxiety
category. Non-Threat/Threat = received target stimulus.
The exposure times are presented in Table 1. Besides an obvious main ef-
fect for Condition (F(2, 66) = 37,2, p < .001, = .513), a 2 (Target) x 2
(Trait anxiety) x 3 (Condition) repeated measures ANOVA showed that
there were no significant differences between the groups.
Analyses where State anxiety replaced Trait anxiety as between groups
variable were also conducted. No significant results were found. Neither
did the following analyses reveal any significant results for State anxiety
and will therefore not be further commented.
Heart rate variability during the meta-contrast technique 153
HR and HRV
Initial Rest. HR and the LF/HF ratios are summarized in Table 9.2. A 2
(Target) x 2 (Trait anxiety) ANOVA revealed no significant results regard-
ing HR or LF/HF.
Low anxious
,8
,6
,4
LF/HF
,2
0,0
Target
-,2
Non-Threat
-,4 Threat
Mask Subliminal Supraliminal
Condition
High anxious
,8
,6
,4
LF/HF
,2
0,0
Target
-,2
Non-Treat
-,4 Threat
Mask Subliminal Supraliminal
Condition
Figure 9.1. LF/HF ratio as a function of experimental condition: In the first con-
dition (Mask) the masking stimulus was presented alone; in the second condition
(Subliminal) the target stimuli (Non-Threat or Threat) were backwardly masked
and presented at exposure times below the subjective threshold for recognition;
and in the third condition (Supraliminal) the target stimuli were presented above
the subjective threshold.
154 Peter Jnsson
Heart Rate. HR was found to vary among the three experimental condi-
tions (see Table 9.2 for a summary of the HR). A 2 (Target) x 2 (Trait
anxiety) x 3 (Condition) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main ef-
fect for Condition: F(2, 66) = 14.69, p < .001 = .962. Tests of within
subjects contrasts showed that HR decreased in the second experimental
condition, when respective target stimuli were subliminally introduced,
compared to the first experimental condition when the Mask was presented
alone (F(1, 33) = 4.77, p < .05). HR was further decreased in the Supra-
liminal condition, compared to the first experimental condition, (F(1, 33)
= 24.21, p < .001).
Furthermore, an interaction effect was found for Condition x Trait
anxiety; F(2, 66) = 4.15, p < .05, = .962. In connection to this interac-
tion there was a significant contrast between the Mask and the Sublimi-
nal condition (F(1, 33) = 5.54, p < .05), as well as between the Mask
and the Supraliminal condition (F(1, 33) = 6.25, p < .05). The HR for the
high trait anxious group was decreased in each condition. For the low trait
anxious group the HR was rather equal in the first two conditions, whereas
it decreased in the last (see Table 9.2).
Final Rest. Analyses of the rest condition after the experimental condi-
tions did not reveal any significant results.
Heart rate variability during the meta-contrast technique 155
156 Peter Jnsson
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study indicate that high trait anxious individuals
were more affected by the target stimuli than the low trait anxious group.
Low anxious individuals had rather the same LF/HF ratio during the three
sessions. The two high anxious groups, however, responded differently
depending on the stimulus they were exposed to. Those who received the
Threat had lower LF/HF ratio compared to those that received the Non-
Threat. This was the case when the pictures were presented at exposure
times beneath the subjective threshold for recognition as well as above. In
the first experimental condition when the masking picture was presented
alone the groups did not differ.
Conclusion
Hence, in a novel and unfamiliar test situation anxious individuals may be
in a state resembling freezing; with an increased vigilance they are scan-
ning the environment to detect possible threats. When exposed to threaten-
ing pictures the freezing condition is accentuated with accompanying auto-
nomic reactions; when exposed to non-threatening stimuli the freezing
condition is diminished. However, in the light of a theory by Robinson
(1998), an alternative explanation regarding non-threatening stimuli may
be considered. Robinson (1998) argues that fear and anxiety are the only
emotions that can be generated solely by unconscious processing. He pro-
poses two distinct modules that account for this dissociation; one module
that makes preattentive judgments about valence information of a stimulus,
and one module that makes preattentive judgments about the urgency of
the information. The preattentive valence module serves the function of
deciding whether a stimulus should receive focal attention or not. If it
does, primary and secondary appraisal occurs (as described by Smith &
Lazarus, 1990), and at a conscious level an emotion is experienced. How-
ever, with reference to works by Winkielman, Zajonc, and Schwarz (1997)
and Bargh and associates (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992),
Robinson states that the detection of valence is not (per se) sufficient to
160 Peter Jnsson
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
REFERENCES
Vrana, S. R., Spence,E.L., & Lang,P.J. (1988). The startle probe response:
a new measure of emotion? J. Abnorm. Psychol., 97(4):487-491.
Whalen, P. J., Rauch, S. L., Etcoff, N. L., McInerney, S. C., Lee, M. B., &
Jenike, M. A. (1998). Masked presentations of emotional facial expres-
sions modulate amygdala activity without explicit knowledge. J. Neurosci.,
18:411-418.
Williams, J. M., Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1996). The emotional
Stroop task and psychopathology. Psychol. Bull., 120, 3-24:189-197.
Williams, J. M., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1997). Cogni-
tive psychology and emotional disorders. (2nd ed.) Chichester: Wiley.
Winkielman, P., Zajonc, R. B., & Schwarz, N. (1997). Subliminal affective
priming resist attributional interventions. Cognit. Emot., 11, 433-465.
Wittling, W., Block, A., Genzel, S., & Schweiger, E. (1998). Hemisphere
asymmetry in parasympathetic control of the heart. Neuropsychologia,
36(5):461-468.
10. PERCEPTGENETIC TECHNIQUES IN
THE STUDY OF COGNITIVE STYLES
AND DEFENSE MECHANISMS: FROM
ASSESSMENT TOWARD PSYCHO-
THERAPY
Uwe Hentschel and Juris G. Draguns
The goal of the present chapter is to identify perceptgenetic and other pro-
cedures that may be useful for assessing cognitive styles and defense
mechanisms. Cognitive styles are enduring individual dispositions that
may be partially conscious and intentional. Defense mechanisms are pre-
dominantly unconscious and unintentional. The relationship between these
two constructs is explored on the basis of the accumulated findings and
their implications for psychotherapy and spelled out. These leads are con-
sidered as possible stepping stones toward integrative research designed
to link stylistic consistencies in human adaptation, defensive operations,
and psychotherapeutic interventions. Conceptual affinities between de-
fenses, as registered by perceptgenetic techniques and as assessed in psy-
chotherapy, are tentatively identified. The chapter concludes with a list of
eight potential topics of psychotherapy research in which perceptgenetic
techniques can be employed.
tient sample was recruited from among out-patients and in-patients at the
psychiatric clinics of the University of Lund in Sweden. Persons with or-
ganic or psychotic diagnoses were excluded, and the members of the sam-
ple were in psychiatric treatment for a variety of neurotic conditions, corre-
sponding in the current official psychiatric nomenclature to anxiety,
somatoform, and dissociative disorders. There were 91 participants, all of
them female. Control group consisted of 63 women undergoing dental
treatment at a university clinic. None of them were in any kind of psychi-
atric treatment nor did they carry any psychiatric diagnosis. The age range
of the two groups was identical, i.e., 18 to 40 years, and their means and
standard deviations were comparable.
With the exception of tolerance of unrealistic experience, measures of
cognitive styles used by Gardner et al. (1959) were included, along with
the defense mechanisms for the patient sample, based on their clinical re-
ports. For measuring adaptation to the interference task, Serial Color-
Word Test (S-CWT) (Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001) was
used, a perceptgenetic technique that allows to capture the process of adap-
tation and not only the level of performance at a given moment.
Upon factor analysis, seven cognitive control dimensions were extracted
for the patients as well as for the control group. Factorial composition in
the two samples was highly similar though not identical. The seven factors
extracted were as follows: field dependence-field independence; success-
ful vs. unsuccessful adaptation to interference tasks; productivity in free
association; focusing; scanning; phenomenal regression to the real object;
and leveling-sharpening. This listing bears closer resemblance to the cog-
nitive styles described by George S. Klein and his associates (e.g., Klein,
1951) than it does to Gardner et al.'s (1959) factor analytic results. Focus-
ing and scanning, moreover, constituted separate factors. Given the differ-
ences in the perceptual processes involved in the two operations, centering
attentional efforts and changes in eye movements (cf. Wachtel, 1967) re-
spectively, this result appears to be meaningful and interpretable.
On the basis of the ratings for defense mechanisms and the factor scores
obtained for the cognitive style-factors, canonical correlations between the
two sets of variables were computed. Proceeding from the perceptgenetic
conceptualization of defenses, the following six defenses were investi-
172 Uwe Hentschel and Juris G. Draguns
Figure 10.1.
Figure 10.2.
Figure 10.3.
On the left side are the characteristics that patients bring to the therapy
situation. It is assumed that not only do their symptoms matter, but so do
their personality traits, cognitive styles, and defense mechanisms. These
individual characteristics coalesce with the person's experiences and ex-
pectations in generating transference reactions. An allowance is made for
additional factors, as yet unidentified, that might affect both patients sub-
jective experiences and their overt conduct in psychotherapy.
Similarly, the therapists impact upon psychotherapy is co-determined by
his or her personality characteristics, the "school" of therapy espoused, and
176 Uwe Hentschel and Juris G. Draguns
the experiences accumulated - along with additional factors, not yet pin-
pointed but potentially relevant.
Between these two parties to the transaction, a therapeutic alliance is
forged, attempts at problem solving are undertaken, and the process of
therapy is initiated. The patient's learning ability comes into play as spe-
cific tasks to be learned are gradually identified and tackled. The basic
question is: What is to be learned and how?
In reference to what is learned, defense mechanisms are relevant:
how they are learned is in part influenced by cognitive styles. Leads in
the preceding section are potentially useful to therapists here and now.
What is as yet lacking is a systematic demonstration of the contribution of
cognitive styles to the therapy process, and the same can generally be said
about defenses. As a start toward filling this gap, the next section of this
chapter contains suggestions for a program of studies focused on defenses
in psychotherapy.
the defense mechanisms for which the test responses are explicitly scored.
Such responses emerge in encounters with emotionally arousing and/or
threatening stimuli as they gradually emerge and become distinct.
This operation, though compressed into a tight time frame, has affinities
with the clients experience in psychotherapy. In both cases, the person is
confronted with ambiguity. The challenge is to reduce uncertainty and to
impose structure. Moreover, as Erdelyi (1985) observed, defenses are ap-
plied in an uneven, saltatory, and multistage fashion. During this process,
hypotheses vie and alternate. On the DMT, these hypotheses are traceable
to the vague impressions and fragmentary clues gleaned during the tachis-
toscopic presentations and to the threats, conflicts, and anxieties triggered
by them. The dual task is to come to grips with the stimulus and avoid dis-
tress and discomfort in the process. Instead of the intervention of a ho-
munculus derided by the critics of perceptual defense (e.g., Eriksen, 1960),
a sequence consisting of several stages unfolds (Erdelyi, 1974, 1985),
punctuated by attempts to reduce stress that closely resemble defenses as
described by psychoanalysts.
What happens in psychotherapy is not very different. Here too, the ob-
jective is the discovery of truth about the complex and multiple facets of
the persons past experience and present behavior. The expectation is that
the resulting insight will promote cognitive understanding, affective con-
trol, and eventually behavioral change. Moreover, insight may be self-
reinforcing, perhaps as a personal equivalent of the aha-phenomenon.
These observations should not, however, lead us to gloss over the differ-
ence between these two progressions. The 22 presentations of DMT, with
exposure times gradually from 5 milliseconds to 2 seconds, lead inexorably
to veridical recognition. In full, unimpeded view the nature of the stimulus
can scarcely be denied, even if it generates discomfort. In contrast, there is
a lot more spontaneity and less predictability in psychotherapy. The quest
for insight may be diverted, overridden, or postponed by real-life events
and developments. The client or analyzand may fortuitously or defen-
sively switch to another area of experience or concern, or may even inter-
rupt therapy. It is as though the clients phenomenal field were filled with
countless DMT stimuli triggering emotional arousal and competing for at-
tention.
Perceptgenetic techniques in the study of cognitive styles 179
CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
The Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT) is one of the main paradigms of per-
cept-genetic research. The repeated confrontation with a table of incongru-
ent color-words (Stroop task) allows the assessment of the individuals
style of regulation, i.e., his or her pattern of adaptation to a conflict situa-
tion. In this study, four types of norms were compared (Swedish clinical,
Italian nonclinical, internal, based on reading times). Two groups of
women outpatients with DSM-IV principal diagnoses of Anorexia (n=29)
and of Bulimia (n=28) were given the S-CWT. Only the norms based on
reading times significantly discriminated between groups on Primary
Types and on ITA. Inter-group differentiation was allowed by all norms on
Secondary V - Types, and was not reached by any norm on Secondary R -
Types. Present findings suggest that norms based on reading times are to
be preferred, at least with nonpsychotic samples.
The Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT) (Smith & Klein, 1953; German re-
vised manual by Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001) is one of the
basic paradigms in percept-genetic research and represents one of the main
instruments for assessing individual differences in patterns of adaptation.
According to the S-CWT, the subject is repeatedly confronted with the
Stroop task, which consists in naming the printing hue of color-words
printed in incongruent hues, ignoring the printed word (e.g., the word
green is printed in red, and the proband must say red). A 100 color-word
table is administered five times (each representing a subtest), and reading
times are taken every 20 words. The fundamental measures are linear (R)
and nonlinear (V) change, both within subtests (primary variables), and
between them (secondary variables). The combination of R and V deter-
mines four patterns of adaptation to the conflict situation: (1) Stabilized
(S), when both R and V are below the normative medians, (2) Cumulative
(C), when R is high and V is low, (3) Dissociative (D), when R is low and
V is high, (4) Cumulative-Dissociative (CD), when both R and V are above
192 I. Alex Rubino, Federica Tozzi, and Alberto Siracusano
the medians. The most frequent pattern in the five subtests dictates the
Primary Type. R and V are then calculated both on the five Rs (Secondary
R-Types) and on the five Vs (Secondary V-Types). Three further adaptive
variables of the Serial Color-Word Test are Initial Types A and B (ITA and
ITB), and the Adaptation Index (Rad); these three variables are dichoto-
mised into high or low (cf. the above cited manual, for further informa-
tion). Summing up, each protocol yields six classifications: Primary Type,
Secondary R-Type, Secondary V-Type, ITA, ITB, and Rad (e.g., D, CR,
CDV, ITA +, ITB -, Rad +).
The S-CWT seems to have many virtues, as it is quick (about 15 m.),
doesnt need a laboratory, is practically water-proof against any motive-
tional bias, does not depend on any interpretation by the researchers, has
very interesting discriminant properties when applied to clinical and non-
clinical samples, shows good predictive validity, is linked to a psycho-
dynamic framework and is embedded in the percept-genetic model of per-
ception-personality. Few other psychological instruments display so many
qualities, but, in spite of this, the S-CWT is practically ignored around the
world. One of the main reasons for this bizarre situation is that US research
workers have not yet discovered it (despite the fact that the test was born
in the US half a century ago and that most of the recent papers have been
published in US journals, but by European authors). Another cogent reason
is that it takes time for an interested reader to really understand to what the
many variables of the S-CWT refer: although the S-CWT certainly ex-
plores processes of adaptation which are deeply ingrained in the individual
personality, it leaves little to common sense and intuition and sounds very
formalistic, mathematical and reality-far. It is indeed difficult to explain on
a descriptive psychological level whats the difference between, say, a DR
or a CR pattern. Much correlational research is still needed to acquire a suf-
ficient knowledge of the mental and behavioural counterparts of S-CWT
patterns (Smith and Kleins seminal 1953 paper is an outstanding example
in this direction).
As is clear from the aforementioned brief description of the S-CWT, the
aim of the instrument, i.e., the pattern classification of the individual, is
wholly dependent on the normative medians. Very low medians inevitably
lead to a scarcity of S types, while very high medians determine a low fre-
Which type of norm for S-CWT research? 193
quency of C, D, and CD. Most studies until the beginning of the nineties
employed either clinical or internal norms: the first ones had been derived
from a sample of Swedish psychiatric inpatients and were stratified for sex
and age (cf. manual, pp. 55-57), the second ones were constructed each
new time on the specific investigated sample. In 1990 two psychosomatic
groups were compared with nonclinical norms, i.e., norms derived from a
rather large segment of the Italian general population, with the same strati-
fication criteria employed for clinical norms (Rubino, Grasso, & Pez-
zarossa, 1990). Later on, the finding of significant positive product-
moment correlations between reading times and subtests V scores led to
the new proposal of basing the stratification not on sex and age, but on
reading times, in order not to confound pattern assessment with level of
performance (the latter is the traditional target of the Stroop task, in its
neuropsychological usage, as distinguished from the field of personality
assessment, where the S-CWT is located) (Rubino, Claps, et al., 1997).
These norms on reading times comprised five strata, characterized by in-
creasing reading times (from a min. total time of 270 sec., to a max of 930
sec.); the 889 subjects of the sample spanned from nonclinical volunteers
to schizophrenic outpatients.
The problem of which type of norm is best fitted for research received a
first answer in a study comparing two quite different psychopathological
samples, i.e., temporo-mandibular and bulimic women patients on clinical,
nonclinical and reading times norms (Baggi et al., 1998). Only Primary
Types were explored. Clinical norms did not differentiate significantly be-
tween the two clinical groups, nonclinical norms fared better (p=.02) and
norms on reading times showed the most powerful discriminant properties
(p=.0006). However, many further studies are needed before one can con-
clude that norms on reading times are really superior to the other ones, at
least with nonpsychotic samples.
The present study represents a new step toward clarifying the latter issue.
Four types of norm (clinical, nonclinical, internal, or reading times) have
been used with the same two clinical groups (anorexia nervosa and bulimia
nervosa), with the aim of comparing their respective ability to discriminate
between pathologies. Given the within-instrument methodological focus of
194 I. Alex Rubino, Federica Tozzi, and Alberto Siracusano
METHOD
Participants
Two groups, each of 30 consecutive outpatients attending a university
clinic, were asked to participate in the study, with the following inclusion
criteria: (1) age above 15 and below 30 years: (2) at least 8 years of school-
ing; (3) DSM-IV diagnosis of Anorexia Nervosa or Bulimia Nervosa (con-
firmed with the SCID-P interview); (4) absence of psychotic symptoms,
drug dependence, alcoholism, pathology of the CNS, colour blindness. All
patients signed an informed consent. The anorexic group had a mean age
of 19.8 years (SD=4.6); the bulimic group had a mean age of 21.2 years
(SD=3.5). There was no significant age difference between the groups.
The S-CWT
The S-CWT was administered following standard instructions. Testing
took place during the second visit. One anorexic and two bulimic protocols
had to be excluded because of more than 10 uncorrected errors during col-
our-words reading. Therefore, the final anorexia group comprised 29 pa-
tients, and the bulimic one 28 patients.
RESULTS
The frequencies of S-CWT types were compared between groups with the
Fishers Exact Test, two-tailed (significant findings listed in Table 11.5).
On Primary Types (Table 11.1), all the norms (with the exception of the
clinical ones) led to higher frequencies of the CD pattern in the anorexia
group; nonclinical norms approached significance, while norms on reading
times did reach it (Table 11.5).
Table 11.2 displays the distribution of Secondary R-Types. The DR pat-
tern (norms on reading times) was more frequent among anorexic patients,
but the data were far from statistical significance. No statistical between-
group difference was found concerning R-Types.
Which type of norm for S-CWT research? 195
Table 11.1. Distribution of S-CWT primary types among anorexia (n=29) and bulimia
patients (n=28), according to four different norms
Clinical Norms
S C D CD Not Classified
Anorexia 14 1 9 1 4
Bulimia 17 3 6 1 1
Nonclinical Norms
S C D CD Not Classified
Anorexia 4 1 11 9 4
Bulimia 6 4 13 3 2
Norms on Reading Times
S C D CD Not Classified
Anorexia 3 4 8 10 4
Bulimia 5 3 11 3 6
Internal Norms
S C D CD Not Classified
Anorexia 7 4 9 8 1
Bulimia 10 5 5 4 4
Table 11.2. Distribution of S-CWT secondary R-types among anorexia (n=29) and
bulimia patients (n=28), according to four different norms
Clinical Norms
SR CR DR CDR
Anorexia 15 2 10 2
Bulimia 13 5 9 1
Nonclinical Norms
SR CR DR CDR
Anorexia 8 1 13 7
Bulimia 10 3 10 5
Norms on Reading Times
SR CR DR CDR
Anorexia 6 2 16 5
Bulimia 9 4 11 4
Internal Norms
SR CR DR CDR
Anorexia 6 7 8 8
Bulimia 8 8 7 5
196 I. Alex Rubino, Federica Tozzi, and Alberto Siracusano
With all the norms, on Secondary V-Types, the anorexia group had
higher frequencies of DV and CDV patterns, and lower frequencies of CV,
compared with the bulimia group (cf. Table 11.3). As usual, clinical norms
did not reach significance, while, on the main comparison, i.e., CV vs
DV+CDV, nonclinical, internal and reading times norms all showed strong
p-levels. The same norms did even evidence a significant intergroup dif-
ference for the comparison CV vs DV (CV being linked with Bulimia, and
DV with Anorexia).
Everyone familiar with the obvious personality differences between the
pure anorexic and the pure bulimic patients, knows that the former is
typically rigid, ascetic, anancastic, while the latter is impulse-ridden, cha-
otic, hysteroid. In S-CWT terms this is translatable into the expectation
that the anorexia group should show higher frequencies of the ITA + pat-
tern. Table 11.4 shows indeed the latter imbalance of distribution, but only
norms on reading times reached statistical significance. In this instance,
nonclinical norms performed very poorly, almost as poorly as the clinical
norms. The reason of the latter finding lays in one often forgotten fact: ITA
scores are significantly higher in the general population than in clinical
samples, and therefore nonclinical norms for ITA, being very high, are of
little discriminant power with psychiatric and psychosomatic groups. Fur-
thermore, a closer inspection of Table 11.4, on the section of the norms on
reading times, reveals that the significant intergroup difference is attribut-
able more to the particular paucity of ITA+ patterns among bulimic pa-
tients, than to a markedly high frequence of ITA+ among anorexic patients.
Unfortunately, no between-norms comparison was possible regarding the
Adaptation Index (Rad), because neither the clinical nor the nonclinical
norms contain normative medians for this very interesting variable.
Which type of norm for S-CWT research? 197
Table 11.3. Distribution of S-CWT secondary V-types among anorexia (n=29) and
bulimia patients (n=28), according to four different norms
Clinical Norms
SV CV DV CDV
Anorexia 6 8 7 8
Bulimia 7 14 3 4
Nonclinical Norms
SV CV DV CDV
Anorexia 3 3 10 13
Bulimia 4 12 5 7
Norms on Reading Times
SV CV DV CDV
Anorexia 4 2 9 14
Bulimia 5 10 4 9
Internal Norms
SV CV DV CDV
Anorexia 5 4 11 9
Bulimia 8 12 5 3
Table 11.4. Distribution of S-CWT secondary ITA- and ITB-types among anorexia
(n=29) and bulimia patients (n=28), according to four different norms
Clinical Norms
ITA + ITA - ITB + ITB -
Anorexia 14 15 14 15
Bulimia 7 21 15 13
Nonclinical Norms
ITA + ITA - ITB + ITB -
Anorexia 12 17 11 18
Bulimia 7 21 11 17
Norms on Reading Times
ITA + ITA - ITB + ITB -
Anorexia 16 13 11 18
Bulimia 7 21 14 14
Internal norms
ITA + ITA - ITB + ITB -
Anorexia 17 12 13 16
Bulimia 11 17 15 13
198 I. Alex Rubino, Federica Tozzi, and Alberto Siracusano
DISCUSSION
The doubts regarding choice of norms for S-CWT research are not dis-
pelled by the present results. The only certain conclusion is that clinical
norms (by far the most known and employed norms) are not to be em-
ployed, at least with nonpsychotic samples. If the future of clinical valida-
tion of the S-CWT should lay on clinical norms, one could easily predict a
relative failure and the premature death of such a promising paradigm.
Internal norms performed well enough, although missing both the Pri-
mary Types and ITA. Furthermore, internal norms are not always permit-
ted: for instance, two diagnostic groups not exactly matched on demo-
graphic variables and sample size would give dubious results, when classi-
fication should refer to internal normative medians. Last but not least, a
classification on internal norms simply tells us which of the, say, two
groups is more Cumulative or Dissociative compared with the other, but
doesnt give information on how the two groups are posited in a broader
context (for instance, general population or nonpsychotic psychiatric pa-
tients).
Norms on reading times and nonclinical norms were the best performers;
it may also be concluded that, in this study, norms on Reading Times fared
better than nonclinical norms, because they were the only ones able to dis-
Which type of norm for S-CWT research? 199
REFERENCES
Baggi, L., Rubino, I. A., San Martino, L., Cuzzolaro, M., Pezzarossa, B., &
Martignoni, M. (1998), Patterns of adaptation to conflict in Bulimia and
Temporo-Mandibular Joint Disorder. Percept. & Mot. Skills, 86:979-984.
Rubino, I.A., Grasso, S., & Pezzarossa, B. (1990), Microgenetic patterns of
adaptation on the Stroop task by patients with Bronchial Asthma and Pep-
tic Ulcer. Percept. & Mot. Skills, 71:19-31.
Rubino, I.A., Claps, M., Zanna, V., Caramia, M. C., Pezzarossa, B., &
Ciani, N. (1997), General cognitive abilities and patterns of adaptation: for
Serial Color-Word Test norms based on reading times. Percept. & Mot.
Skills, 85:1347-1353.
Schub, W., & Hentschel, U. (1978), Improved reliability estimates for the
serial color-word test. Scand. J. Psychol., 19:91-95.
Smith, G. J. W., & Klein, G. S. (1953), Cognitive controls in serial behav-
ior patterns. J. Personal., 22:188-213.
200 I. Alex Rubino, Federica Tozzi, and Alberto Siracusano
Are pilots creative? This question was put to the present investigators by
the head of a Swedish wing and was the origin of this investigation. How-
ever, when venturing upon our task to study air force pilots, we felt it im-
portant to include other personality dimensions as well.
Earlier research has brought out the importance of personality factors for
pilots (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsouka, 1970), who have been characterized by
emotional stability and extraversion (Bartram, 1995; Bartram & Dale,
1982; Jessup & Jessup, 1971; Okaue, Nakamura, & Nira, 1977; Reinhardt,
1970). The creativity dimension was found to have been little studied in
pilots (but cf. Bachelor & Michael, 1991). Most previous research has used
202 Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnr and Gudmund Smith
self-report scales, however, and it has been argued that such scales are less
apt to discriminate in small samples (John, 1989). Since the present study
comprised a limited number of participants, we decided to try behavioral
tests as alternatives to self-report scales. Thus, the stability, or cognitive
control dimension, was measured on-line in a pressing situation, while
creativity, as well as extraversion, were studied with perceptual techniques.
Stress can be defined as a psychophysiological reaction to adaptive de-
mands in new or challenging circumstances (Levi, 1981). Coping with
press implies constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts (Laza-
rus & Folkman, 1984), and the interaction between demands and control is
of importance (Karasek & Theorell, 1990). In the present study we investi-
gated individual differences in keeping a stable control, when adapting
over time to a (modified) Stroop test, namely The Serial Color Word Test
(Smith, Nyman, Hentschel, & Rubino, 2001). The pilots in particular were
assumed to manage this test in an even and stable manner.
Another basic requirement for pilots is the ability to appreciate the out-
side world relatively free of valuation and close to facts, that is extraver-
sion (Eysenck, 1967). This dimension was investigated with an implicit
perceptual technique, namely the The Spiral After Effect Technique
(Andersson, 1995). A low proportion of introverted subjectivity was thus
expected in the present cohort.
The creative personality has been characterised by originality, independ-
ence and introversion, as well as androgyny, and an interest in complexity
and elegant solutions (Barron, 1988; Carlsson, 1992; Crutchfield, 1964;
Jnsson & Carlsson, 2000). In a strict organisation with minutely defined
functions, any creative activity must be kept within firm frames (Amabile,
1983; Ekvall, 1991). We therefore expected to find few officers with high
creativity. But since a flexible hold was considered important, a relatively
large proportion of creativity in the middle range was presumed. Thus, the
final test battery encompassed, besides the aforementioned tests of extra-
version and stress control, also the Creative Functioning Test (Smith &
Carlsson, 2000). These personality variables were furthermore compared
with answers to open questions and with achievement ratings made by
each participants superior officer. For sake of comparison, a group of
ground officers was included in the investigation.
Pilots investigated by tests of creativity, extraversion, and stress control 203
Participants
All available pilots, and a selected group of other young officers, employed
at a Swedish wing, were asked to participate by the head of the wing. No
one refrained from participation. The pilot group consisted of 22 men (age
24-42 years, M = 29.9). There was one colonel, two majors, four captains,
three first-, and twelve second lieutenants among the pilots.
The ground officer group consisted of five women and nine men (age 24-
32 years, M = 28.9). There were four captains, five first- and five second
lieutenants. None of the ground officers had a pilot education. They
worked as fighter controllers, engineers, and instructors. The participants
comprised about one tenth of the employees at the wing.
Procedure
An introductory letter together with a questionnaire with open questions
was sent to the participants in advance. In it the participant was guaranteed
of confidentiality. The questionnaire was returned to the experimenters be-
fore the testing. The testing was done at the wing. One experimenter gave
the tests of creativity and extraversion, and the other one administered the
stress test, checked for missing answers in the questionnaire, and did the
debriefing.
creasing series, in which the perceived meanings can vary considerably be-
tween individuals. The number of different interpretations in the increasing
series correlated moderately with independent criteria of creativity (Smith
& Carlsson, 1990). However, in this part it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween associating fluency on the one hand and the ability to shift from ra-
tional thought to more primary process oriented cognition on the other.
This distinction was put to the test in the decreasing portion of the CFT:
Thus, when the participant has got a hold on the visual contents in the pic-
ture, this objective perception supposedly exerts a considerable influence
on the viewer. Relying on rational analysis, individuals would treat their
own subjective picture interpretations as incorrect and in the decreasing
series would comply with what seems as the right answer. From a more
cognitivistic perspective, a formulation such as creativityproduced by
an absence of cognitive inhibition (Eysenck, 1995, p. 253) is feasible.
Thus when correct recognition has been attained, a low-creative person
would inhibit, or not consciously attend to, any subjective interpretation
from the increasing series during the decreasing part. On the other hand,
highly creative individuals would be inclined to shift from rational (secon-
dary) thought processes and assign priority to their subjective (imaginary)
representational world. In other words, they would prefer to perceive com-
plexity rather than the simplicity of the logical solution.
Scoring. In the increasing series the number of different interpretations (for
example a person or a landscape) adds up to a measure of creative fluency.
Next, in the decreasing series, the ability to shift from rational thought to
more holistic cognition, or creative flexibility, is put to a test.
Final classification. In the manual the scale for the decreasing series con-
sists of six steps which were in this study compressed into three levels:
High (steps 4 6): The whole or a substantial part of the picture is eventu-
ally interpreted in a completely different way. Medium (steps 2 3): Only
vague changes or plastic transformations of the picture. Low: No change,
or at the most that the picture is perceived to get foggy or darker.
Validity. Correlations have ranged from .46 to .83 with richness of ideas,
expressiveness and originality, creative interests, and predictions of crea-
tive achievement. This has been judged by external raters in studies of re-
searchers, professional artists, children and youngsters (Smith & Carlsson,
206 Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnr and Gudmund Smith
Final classifications. Very low (LL), or low aftereffects (L-, L+) imply a
reliance on extraceptive signals; medium lengths (M-, M0, M+) show a
balanced hold; and high aftereffects (H-, H+) indicate that subjective sig-
nals dominate. (For details, consult Andersson, 1995).
Validity. Neuroticism on the Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI (later
EPI), Eysenck, 1959) has been found to coincide with long aftereffects
(Andersson, 1969), which also proved typical of people with neurotic con-
flicts and depressive inhibition (Amnr, 1997; Andersson & Bengtsson,
1985). A medium level has correlated with warmth in contacts. Extraverts
on the MPI more often had low aftereffects with minus trend (Andersson,
1969). Decreasing aftereffects (minus trend), or a low level, have coin-
cided with a certain cool and reserved attitude (Andersson, Almgren,
Englesson, Smith, Smith, & Uddenberg, 1984). University teachers with
brief aftereffects more often described their organization as open (Ryham-
mar & Smith, 1999).
RESULTS
press (2corr. = 7.93, p < .01) and saw insecure employment as a negative
aspect of their work (2corr. = 4.24, p < .05).
Discriminant Analysis
A stepwise canonical discriminant analysis for pilots versus ground offi-
cers was performed (Klecka, 1980), comprising 42 variables (the test vari-
ables, sex, age, and superiors ratings). The prediction of group was suc-
cessful for 83.3 %. Significantly contributing variables were achievement
rating (r = -.61, p < .001), high after-effects (H) (r = .44, p < .01), and in-
stability during stress (D / CD) (r = .34, p < .05). Thus, the pilots got
higher ratings, and had less introversion and less unstable stress control
than the ground officers. Another differentiating variable, which, for statis-
tical reasons, did not play part in the analysis, was increasing reading times
(primary C) on the stress test, found in eight pilots but none of the ground
officers (p < .05, Fishers exact test).
Cluster Analyses
Since the pilots and ground officers were distinctive groups, it was deemed
appropriate to look for subgroups within each. Using the above 42 vari-
ables, hierarchical cluster analyses (Ward) were performed (Everitt, 1980).
Based on squared Euclidean distances, the Ward analysis provides valid
estimates of the connections in four-field tables. Solutions with either two
210 Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnr and Gudmund Smith
or three clusters were tried, and solutions with three clusters were settled
on, since they yielded more significant connections with the questionnaire.
Thus, after the clustering, in a second step, the questionnaire was tested
for significance against the clusters. The differentiating answers are listed
in the bottom part of tables 12.1 (the pilots) and 12.2 (the ground officers).
Finally, the complete questionnaires were checked again, and two more
differences between the clusters were then noticed that had not previously
been categorized. These additional categories are added below in the text
for those clusters that were concerned.
DISCUSSION
As predicted, the pilot group had better stress control and were less intro-
verted than the ground officers. They also got higher achievement ratings.
It is probable that the thorough selection of pilots contributed to a well-
functioning group with good control. But it seems that experience also
contributed, since none of the youngest pilots got high ratings by their su-
periors.
Stress Control
It appears favourable for the wing that few participants showed instability
when stressed. It is probable, that the distribution for the pilots on the Se-
Pilots investigated by tests of creativity, extraversion, and stress control 213
rial Color-Word Test is not the same as in the population at large. Only
two, young, pilots had an unstable stress control. Good control, or execu-
tive functioning, is crucial for not becoming disorganized when dealing
with rapid changes (Kyriazis, 1991).
Regarding the ground officers, the stability in the first group was para-
doxical, since their work appeared less pressing. Of interest is that for this
group the stress test resulted in a pervading evenness on all classifications.
In these technically minded people a more active inhibiting mechanism
may have contributed to somewhat over controlled reactions (Gray, 1970;
Pickering & Gray, 1999). As described by Clark and Watson (1999), con-
strained and conscientious people plan carefully, avoid risk and danger,
and are controlled more strongly by the long-term implications of their be-
haviour (p. 403).
Extraversion
Only two pilots were introverted on the SAT, which was in line with ear-
lier research. The other pilots showed extraversion, or a balanced hold. The
youngest, hot pilots (Tempereau, 1956) had an extraverted reaction,
which could be a strategy to compensate for their relative lack of experi-
ence. This objective hold may have had the positive effect to make them
more aware of limitations in their own performance. Not realising own in-
adequacies has been found characteristic of pilots involved in serious acci-
dents (Alkov, Gaynor, & Borowsky, 1985). Extraversion can be explained
by a strongly activated outward-directed approach system (Rothbart,
Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). The approach system would shorten the illusory
aftereffect and, analogously, allow further information processing of the
outer world, including ones own behavior.
For the second pilot group, flying was experienced as a sufficient but not
overpowering challenge. This seems to have been mirrored by their bal-
ance between intraceptive and extraceptive factors on the SAT.
In contrast, the third group of pilots included people with either long
(H+) or extremely short (LL) aftereffects. These unbalanced reactions
might be interpreted as reflecting a certain press in their work, since they
had responsibilities as senior officers. Their complaints about rigid rules
are in line with the wording by Rothbart et al. (2000): positive anticipa-
214 Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnr and Gudmund Smith
tory tendencies may result in negative affect through the frustration or sad-
ness resulting when an expectation is not met (p. 126). It might be of in-
terest that three pilots in this group got top rates from their superiors on
both expertise and critical discernment, which no other pilot got. This dif-
ference is probably smaller than it would have been had all participants
been rated against each other, and not against next higher grade.
Creativity
Medium creative flexibility on the Creative Functioning Test was found in
more than 60 % of the present group. When compared with a sample of
132 university teachers (Ryhammar & Smith, 1999), the present partici-
pants had a significantly higher share of medium creativity (2 = 10.89, p <
.001). This middle way implies a balance between what is realistic and
what is not (Smith, 1995; cf. Ekvall, 1997). Medium creative flexibility
could be described in terms of controlled imagination, which was actually
described early on to distinguish a well-functioning pilot (Anderson,
1919). These creative realists (Moss Kanter, 1984) may be able to make
implementations on the basis of pre-attentive cues. Similarly, contempo-
rary aviation psychology emphasizes the necessity for good piloting to
watch out even for small and oft-neglected risks (Besco, 1994). We con-
ceive this to be affiliated with a neurophysiological orienting dimension,
implying perceptual sensitivity (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000).
Although post-hoc, the questionnaire items relevant for the creative par-
ticipants emphasized a wish for an individualistic position. This was most
clearly recognized in the second ground officer cluster, having creative
flexibility. This group did not focus on the family and like things, but in-
stead described an urge to develop. These people might improve their crea-
tivity in another, less restricted context (cf. Smith & Carlsson, 1983).
work. For example, a majority of the pilots in the first group expressed
feelings of insufficiency, and were found in a subsequent analysis to be
younger than the other pilots.
The more general applicability of the results depends in part on how rep-
resentative the selected officers were of military staff. The pilots included
practically all the flying personnel at the unit, and should therefore be re-
garded as more representative than the small and select group of ground
officers. Probably a randomised sample of ground officers would have re-
sulted in groups that had partly different characteristics. Also, the ground
officer group was younger and not properly matched to the pilots. Thus it
is necessary to under build the results in this study, found with exploratory
techniques, with further, hypothesis-testing research.
A final question could be raised about to what extent the clusters were
the outcome of stable personality structures, or if they were influenced by
the participants present context. Interaction effects seem probable. Quite
generally, persons qualify trait descriptions of themselves by specifying
under what particular situations a general disposition is likely to influence
their behavior (McAdams, 1992, p. 347). For instance, in this study the
pilots as a group had a relatively stable hold when pressed. But this did not
exclude that those with leadership tasks showed signs of tension, and
moreover expressed frustration at their work. Conceivably, adaptation to
strain is a dynamic balance not only between systems of affective reactivity
and cognitive control, but also including the external pressures that influ-
ence these internal systems (cf. Mischel & Shoda, 1999). We believe that
further descriptions and validations of such interactions/personality pat-
terns, are important in future investigations. In the future it is also of inter-
est to complement the behavioral process tests with questionnaires con-
strued to tap these same personality dimensions, as well as with biological
markers.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Alf Ingesson-Thor, Olof Rydn and Bert Westerlundh are thanked for
valuable advice.
REFERENCES
Levi, L. (1981). Society, Stress and Disease Working Life, IV, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Magnusson, D. (1999). Holistic interactionism: A perspective for research
on personality development. In: Handbook of Personality: Theory and Re-
search, 2nd ed., eds L. A. Pervin & O.P. John. New York: The Guilford
Press, pp 219-247.
Magnusson, D. & Trestad, B. (1993). A holistic view of personality: A
model revisited. Annual Review of Psychology, 44:427-452.
McAdams, D.P. (1992). The five-factor model in personality: A critical
appraisal. In: The five-factor model: Issues and applications, ed. R.R.
McRae. Journal of Personality, 60, 2:329-361.
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1999). Integrating dispositions and processing
dynamics within a unified theory of personality: The cognitive affective
personality system. In: Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research,
2nd ed., eds L. A. Pervin & O.P. John. New York: The Guilford Press, pp.
197-218.
Moss Kanter, R. (1984). The Change Masters. Cooperate Entrepreneurs at
Work. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Okaue, M., Nakamura, M., & Nira, K. (1977). Personality characteristics
of pilots on EPPS, MPI and DOSEFU. Reports of Aeromedical Labora-
tory, 18:83-93.
Pickering, A.D., & Gray, J.A. (1999). The neuroscience of personality. In:
Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2nd ed., eds L. A. Pervin
& O.P. John. New York: The Guilford Press, pp. 277-299.
Reinhardt, R. (1970). The outstanding jet pilot. American Journal of Psy-
chiatry, 127:732-736.
Rothbart, M.K., Ahadi, S.A., & Evans, D.E. (2000). Temperament and per-
sonality: Origins and outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 78(1):122-135.
Ryhammar, L., & Smith, G.J.W. (1999). Creative and other personality
functions as defined by percept-genetic techniques and their relation to or-
ganizational conditions. Creativity Research Journal, 12(4):277-286.
Schoon, I. (1992). Creative Achievement in Architecture. Leyden, Holland:
DSWO Press.
220 Ingegerd Carlsson, Gunilla Amnr and Gudmund Smith
METHOD
Participants
The participants of this study were 69 10- and 11-year-old children in six
classes from three different Swedish schools, with somewhat different
demographic profiles. There were 35 girls and 34 boys. The number of
participants varied between 65 and 69 in the different tests because some
children were absent at some testing sessions.
RESULTS
DISCUSSION
One main conclusion of this study was that more traditional ways of test-
ing creativity were related to the percept-genetic creativity measurement
concerning the fluency dimension, but not to the cognitive flexibility di-
mension (the main dimension of CFT). Probably different creativity tests
elicit different aspects of creativity and that a non-relation does not neces-
sarily mean that one is invalid as a measuring instrument. As we see it,
creativity is such a complex phenomenon that many constructs are possible
and probably necessary - to be able to enfold the whole phenonomenon.
Another conclusion was that there is no simple association between self-
image and creativity. We have shown that creative primary school children
do not generally have positive self-images. However, we found no con-
vincing proof of the opposite either, although the high creativity groups
had non-significantly lower means in four of five self-image dimensions.
There were both confident and well-adjusted creative children and insecure
and socially less conforming ones.
tion to the other tests in this study. In their research, Lubart, Jacquet, Pac-
teau, and Zenasni (2000) use the term flexible thinking as an aspect,
which they show is not related to flexibility (flexibility of ideas) in Tor-
rances measurement. Their morphing technique might lean on similar
assumptions as Smith and Carlssons percept-genetic measurement. In
Lubart et als morphing test a picture is shown on a computer screen and
then the picture is gradually transformed to another picture. Those partici-
pants who see the new picture at an early stage are considered to have a
flexible thinking style and to be creative. Perhaps CFT and the morphing
test measure a similar aspect of creativity, may one call it creative func-
tioning or flexible thinking.
However, even though both tests use the perceptual process and both re-
quire flexible participants in one way or the other, there is one difference,
and a reason to doubt that they measure the same aspect of creativity. CFT
requires a willingness to abandon the objective picture (reality) to the ad-
vantage of, often earlier reported, subjective themes (imaginary). Cognitive
flexibility between reality and imagination is defined as creativity in this
percept-genetic instrument. The morphing test on the other hand, demands
the participants readiness to observe differences in the picture (reality).
This alertness or ability to notice small changes in reality is defined as
creativity in the morphing test. Further testing would be required to inves-
tigate whether there is relation or not.
When assessing the Unusual Uses Test, we only chose to use fluency of
ideas and flexibility of ideas, but the test might also be scored in Tor-
rances originality and elaboration dimensions. The other dimension of
CFT, scored in the increasing series, is also a fluency dimension of creativ-
ity, and accordingly there was a relation to the Unusual Uses Test, which
has also been found in earlier research (Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg,
2000). If one applied Torrances elaboration and originality dimensions to
both the Unusual Uses Test and CFT, some more relation between the two
tests would probably have been found. Engagement in creative activities
and hobbies (AQ) was related to the fluency and flexibility dimensions of
the UUT, a relationship also shown in earlier research (Hoff, 2000).
If we, however, look upon the different creativity tests used in this study
from the perspective of Sternberg and Lubarts multidimensional model
Vision forming and brain storming 231
(1999), all the tests tend to appear rather one-dimensional, even if the four
dimensions of Torrances had been used. Considering the six resources
needed for creativity, according to Sternberg and Lubart Investment The-
ory of Creativity (1999), only some of them are measured by the tests of
this study. Among the intellectual resources both CFT and the Unusual
Uses Test measure synthetic (idea generation) ability. However what
Sternberg and Lubart call analytic and practical-contextual intellectual
ability is not systematically studied by any of the tests of this study. These
concepts have to do with the elaboration and realization of creative ideas.
The knowledge resource is difficult to measure in a creativity context and
none of our tests did. CFT classifies different styles of thinking, which is
the third resource of creativity. If judged by the originality dimension, the
Unusual Uses Test also can be a test of styles of thinking. No test in this
study has motivation, the fourth resource, as its focus, but nevertheless fa-
vorable scores in any of the tests will indicate motivated participants. The
Activity Questionnaire is one type of personality measurement, where par-
ticipants are asked about their creative every-day activities and hobbies.
Personality is the fifth resource and environment is the last resource that
Sternberg and Lubarts model includes and an aspect of creativity that our
tests did not measure. Nevertheless, the environment in which the tests are
taken influences the results. It has for example been shown that a competi-
tive environment might decrease creativity among some participants and
increase it among others (Amabile, 1983; Baer, 1998). Some of the tests in
this study were taken in a group and one (CFT) was taken individually. In
fact, this difference might be another reason for the low relation between
some of the tests of this study, in addition to the fact that they seem to
measure different aspects.
However, when it comes to measuring creativity from the environmental
perspective no inventories exist, as far as we know, that are especially de-
signed for testing children.
232 Eva Hoff and Ingegerd Carlsson
Creative Types
In the cluster analysis of different aspects of creativity and self-image,
some different creativity types were discerned among the clusters. The
seven clusters can be compressed into three larger groups owing to the
creativity results joining the groups of positive and negative self-images
together. One group with low creativity results in general (two clusters)
and one with especially high scores on the Creative Functioning Test (two
clusters) and the last group with high creativity results on the Unusual
Uses Test (three clusters). In the presentations of these groups, we try to
outline some possible differences between these creative types.
Most cluster groups had an equal number of boys and girls. However the
two clusters of visionaries (below) had both a majority of one sex (one
cluster with female dominance and one with male).
As cluster analysis is an exploratory statistical tool, further hypothesis
testing is needed to see how stable the clusters groups are with respect to
both self-image and creativity.
The Conformists
There were two cluster groups of conformists with generally low creativity
scores that were not especially imaginative or good at idea association.
One group of 17 children reported being successful in school, having many
friends but was below average when it came to mental stability. The other
group of 10 children had generally negative self-image, especially about
the physical appearances. However, these children reported having average
psychological soundness.
Visionaries
There were two cluster groups of visionaries, that is, imaginative children
that easily moved between subjective and objective aspects of reality.
These children showed cognitive flexibility and fluency of ideas (CFT).
Individuals that excell in CFT are sticking to their subjective themes in the
test and perhaps in real life have an ability to trust their subjective ideas
and to use them when solving problems in real life. We believe that these
creative aspects are needed to be able to form imaginative pictures about
the present and the future and therefore named these individuals visionar-
Vision forming and brain storming 233
ies. Eysenck (1995) used the concept of disinhibition for people who are
creative. He meant that creative people do not inhibit, what most people
would consider, irrelevant associations. They are influenced by a much
larger number of subjective and objective thoughts compared to less crea-
tive individuals when engaged in a creative task. Disinhibition could be
used to explain why some participants in the CFT can see for example, a
person instead of the actual bottle in the decreasing series, that is after hav-
ing seen the bottle properly. The ability of disinhibition may help these in-
dividuals return to subjective themes and to break free from the chains of
reality. A visionary could probably also use this ability to be able to per-
ceive less common perspectives on reality or the future. Non-creative indi-
viduals tend to consciously or unconsciously inhibit unusual thoughts and
therefore have difficulties in looking at their lives from new angles. Com-
pared to those participants that scored high on the unusual uses test (the
brainstormers; see below), the CFT high-scorers might be less verbally flu-
ent and perhaps more dependent on visual perception in their creative abil-
ity.
The children in this group described themselves as having average skills
and abilities. One cluster of 17 children, mostly boys, had a generally posi-
tive self-image (but only average on the skill and ability-scale). The other
cluster contained 11 children with a majority of girls that reported negative
self-image (but average on the skill and ability-scale). These children had
also high scores on the Activity Questionnaire. They are thus often in-
volved in creative activities.
The Brainstormers
The brainstormers are a collection of three small cluster groups, where all
participants had an ability to quickly come up with a broad range of ideas
and were engaged in creative activities and hobbies. Our idea about this
group is that these creative aspects would be needed in brainstorming (as-
sociative idea generation). This creative aspect is connected to verbal flu-
ency as it is a test where words are generated on a limited period of time,
however there is no indication of a connection to language skill. A certain
amount of disinhibition would probably be needed for this ability too (see
the visionaries), but it would probably be under more control compared to
234 Eva Hoff and Ingegerd Carlsson
pendent lives, away from regulated school life and parental restrictions? Or
will they rather stop creating due to lack of self-confidence and due to lack
of encouraging environments? Maybe it is simply possible to be creative
and have a negative self-image. Longitudinal research is needed to study
the self-image of creative individuals from a developmental perspective.
Finally, there actually are a few creativity studies that have proposed dif-
ferent types of creative personalities (Ryhammar, 1996; Carlsson, Amner,
& Smith, Chapter 13). Ryhammar (1996) for example maintained that
there is one introvert and one extravert type of creative individual. These
findings are more congruent with the present results. It is perhaps high
time for a revision of the creativity models where only one creative per-
sonality is described.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks to the participating children and their teachers who have
made this study possible. We also want to express our gratitude to Per
Alm, Peter Jnsson and Birgitta Wanek, who have given us useful pieces
236 Eva Hoff and Ingegerd Carlsson
REFERENCES
APPENDIX
List of Categories for the Flexibility dimension of the Unusual Uses Test
Object: Empty Milk Packages
Recycling: folding or cleaning the packages
Containers in general: box, package, jar, to put things in.
Containers for special purposes: pencil-box, drawers for cooking recipes,
mug, ash tray, piggy bank, jar for jam
Toys: doll, animals, car, boat, aeroplane, robot
Accessories for pets: bird pool, nesting box, feeding table for birds, hur-
dles for rabbits and hamsters, mouse house
Vision forming and brain storming 239
Ponder the title of this chapter while reading this introductory section:
Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue.
What is the relationship between the title of the chapter and its content?
One usually announces at the outset what one intends to do, and then goes
on to do it. The writing, as a finished product, entails a linear presentation.
This volume, however, is concerned with what some authors might con-
sider to be a nonlinear (and nonadditive) view of cognition rather an
unfolding of cognition. A more appropriate format might therefore be a
hypertext, with its multiple linkages. As a compromise, given the necessity
of adopting a linear exposition, I shall be referring to the elements of the
title throughout the text, thus emulating somewhat the cognitive process
under discussion.
242 Joseph Glicksohn
In order to know where you are going, you must know from where you
have come. Some modern ideas are not quite so modern (Valsiner,
1996). The microgenetic school of thinking has seen a renaissance in re-
cent years, with researchers looking at a number of different aspects of
visual perception, utilizing a microgenetic technique (e.g., Bachmann,
1987; Nakatani, 1995; Reynolds, 1978; Schulz, 1991; Sekuler & Palmer,
1992; Uhlarik & Johnson, 1978). But in these research programs, there is
an emphasis on a microgenetic procedure which is employed within the
information-processing paradigm (Palmer & Kimchi, 1986), which is a du-
bious marriage (something borrowed). Now it is true that information-
processing theorists view the microgenetic school as something of a found-
ing parent (Haber, 1969, 1974). But, there is a clear distinction between
the two: The information-processing conception is clearly mechanistic and
244 Joseph Glicksohn
suggested for the process, a particular apt one being: Developing a pho-
tographic print after the exposed photographic paper has been bathed into
the developer (Bachmann, 1998, p. 151). And as Brown (1998, p. 78)
stresses, Microgenetic theory entails that objects are recognized before
they are consciously perceived, that objects are remembered into percep-
tion. This is a far cry from standard information-processing views on the
relationship between cognition and consciousness (Velmans, 1991; see
Glicksohn, 1993b). And heres another troubling thought: Modularity
implies an additive-factor model (Sternberg, 1969) or ANOVA-like type of
thinking (Valsiner, 1996) for information processing. But, if Gestalt psy-
chology starts where information processing ends (Robertson, 1986, p.
182), while microgenesis (i.e., the breakdown of modularity) ends where
information processing starts, then just how much theoretical worth can be
wedged between the two?
Recall that Werner (1948) had suggested, that less developed systems
become subordinated to, and regulated by, more developed ones, but are
never actually lost. Normally, these former "drafts" (to use the term sug-
gested by Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992) are not readily accessible, unless
the system is faced with a stressful situation, novel or difficult task (i.e.,
the microgenetic procedure). In this event, the system reverts to a more
primitive mode of cognitive functioning, much as one sees in the reversion
from an abstract to a concrete mode of thinking. Akin to this microgenetic
theory is that of the nineteenth-century neurologist Hughlings Jackson
(Taylor, 1958), who suggested that the neurocognitive manifestation of
such a reversal would be the disinhibition (i.e., release) of more primitive
brain functioning (e.g., that of the limbic system) due to cortical dysfunc-
tion. Both Jackson (Taylor, 1958) and Werner (1948) suggested that there
are different levels of cognitive functioning (Werner, 1957/1978).
But as Brown (1988) has argued, there are differences between microge-
netic theory and Jacksonian concepts:
A persistent release of a lower level would be construed as a regres-
sion to a more primitive mode of behavior (...) In contrast, the micro-
genetic idea is that preliminary stages are not released or disinhibited
from above, but exhibit a form of cognition consistent with a certain
level of derivation.... Early processing stages are transformed to later
246 Joseph Glicksohn
ones, but the early stages also persist, in some sense, in the structure
of the ones that follow. The direction of processing is not one of con-
trol by higher centers over lower output levels but an emergent proc-
ess from depth to surface. (pp. 7-8)
One can also refer to an expansion of awareness, as the microgenetic
process is inspected from within (Glicksohn, 2001), and perhaps thereby
disrupted. This would constitute what others have termed a mind-
manifesting, or psychedelic, experience, indicative of a shift to an altered
(or alternate) state of consciousness (ASC) (e.g., Hunt, 1989a, 1989b). To
quote Glicksohn (1998):
As Hunt (1989b) has argued, altered-state cognition is readily there in
the background, but is normally masked because (...) conditions favor
a normal, characteristic mode of operation. However, by changing ex-
ternal conditions, or internal ones (...) the normal microgenetic se-
quence of the unfolding of perception becomes disrupted, and both
perception and thought take on a more metaphoric-symbolic, dream-
like quality. I would argue that in these circumstances, perception and
thought are dedifferentiated, or syncretic (...) Thus, the dreamlike
quality of perception (Smith & Westerlundh, 1980), the cognitive-
sensory schematization of figurative language (Haskell, 1989) and the
visuo-spatial, presentational form of thought (Hunt, 1989b) are all
variations on a common, syncretic theme (Werner, 1948) (.) (p. )
How can one characterize the primitive phases of microgenesis, or what
workers in the perceptgenetic variant term the P-phases (e.g., Kragh, 1955;
Smith, 1990, 1999; Smith & Carlsson, 2000)? Following the fundamental
Gestalt notion of Prgnanz, a radical change in external conditions (em-
ployment of a microgenetic procedure) will result in a qualitatively differ-
ent form of perceptual experience. As stated by Koffka (1935), Prgnanz
refers to the notion that "psychological organization will always be as
'good' as the prevailing conditions allow" (p. 110). Thus, what would
normally be a preattentive phase of perceptual processing is made con-
scious, and "colours" perceptual experience.
In fact, I can provide an example here, taken from some work carried
quite out some time ago (Glicksohn, 1983). In that study, I employed the
same microgenetic procedure as utilized by Kreitler and Kreitler (1984)
Microgenesis in the 21st century 247
clicking and dragging to the estimated vertical. This version of the RFT
was modeled on a number of studies in the literature (e.g., Goodenough,
Oltman, & Cox, 1987; Marendaz, Brenet, Ohlmann & Raphel, 1988). Note
that computerized versions of the tests add performance measures of a na-
ture familiar to the cognitive psychologist, thereby lending to a better un-
derstanding of individual differences in the personality-cognition interface
(something new).
That there should be an intrinsic relationship between the cognitive style
of field dependence-independence (FDI) and microgenesis is a point made
by Draguns (1991):
In fact, close parallels are discernible between the characteristics of
field dependent persons as described by Witkin et al. and the global
and undifferentiated mode of responding attributed to the holistic type
by Sander (...) As far as the detail-oriented or, possibly, the field-
independent person is concerned, his features, as expressed in the
course of microgenesis, were not discovered until somewhat later,
when the integrative type was described (...) These persons are capa-
ble of fitting components into supraordinate stimuli and, conversely,
can extract details from complex wholes. (p. 289)
Earlier (Draguns, 1984), he nevertheless notes his reservations:
Recent microgenetic research (...) highlights the difficulty of eliciting
diffuse whole responses at the beginning of microgenesis, even by the
classical techniques of tachistoscopically presenting the complete
stimulus. Individual differences come into play, perhaps akin to the
cognitive style of field dependence-field independence, although em-
pirical attempts to link established measures of this variable with
characteristic modes of microgenetic progression have, so far, failed
to yield conclusive results .... Apart from such enduring stylistic and
other personality variables, situationally determined sets, explicitly
communicated through experimental instructions or implicitly as-
sumed by the subject, undoubtedly come into play (...) Extricating
these three strands of stimulus, person, and task characteristics as they
steer the course of microgenesis toward the apprehension of the whole
or the accumulation of detail remains an important task for future mi-
crogenetic research. (p. 6)
252 Joseph Glicksohn
In any event, in the next few years we shall be looking in earnest at the re-
lationship between FDI and microgenesis. It is specially important to look
at individual differences not only by means of paper-and-pencil tests, but
also by using laboratory tasks.
The third approach, which is currently being looked at in my own lab, is
drawn from the following analogy: If you want to identify an extravert,
then you can either use a questionnaire (e.g., Glicksohn & Abulafia, 1998),
or else observe the person in action in a party situation; the extravert will
be the one enjoying himself in a circle of people, while the introvert will
most probably be the person sitting alone, in the corner. Thus, why not
look at individual differences within the microgenetic experiment itself
(something new). We are currently looking at the trait of impulsivity
(e.g., Barratt, 1993). How would an impulsive subject perform in a micro-
genetic study?
Take for example the Creative Functioning Test (CFT; Smith & Carls-
son, 2000), looking at the forward series (i.e., standard microgenetic series
of presentations). The impulsive subject will, by definition, make speedy
judgments. He or she might very well lock on to a particular referent early
on in the series, as a result of a hasty judgment process (quick, what is
it?), resulting in premature perceptual closure. As such, the described
percept might very well be primitive in the Wernerian sense. Alterna-
tively, the impulsive subject might very well be inconsistent in report,
shifting from one referent to another, with no apparent, lawful microge-
netic unfolding of one referent to another. Both alternatives would be eas-
ily detected, in a number of ways: (1) in the sequential analysis of the con-
tent of the verbal reports; (2) in the length of the reports; (3) in the time
taken to make the report (i.e., between end of presentation till start of re-
port); (4) in the relation of hypothesized to actual target. We are currently
investigating this promising avenue of research.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
REFERENCES
Smith, G., & Carlsson, I. (1987), A new creativity test. J. Creat. Behav.,
21: 7-14.
Smith, G., & Carlsson, I. (2000), CFT: The Creative Functioning Test
Manual. Lund: Lund University.
Smith, G., & Westerlundh, B. (1980), Perceptgenesis: A process perspec-
tive on perception-personality. Rev. Person. Soc. Psychol., 1: 94-124.
Spence, D. P., & Holland, B. (1962), The restricting effects of awareness:
A paradox and an explanation. J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol., 64: 163-174.
Sternberg, S. (1969), On the discovery of processing stages: Some exten-
sions of Donders' method. Acta Psychol., 30: 276-315.
Taylor, J. (Ed.). (1958), Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson (Vol.
2). London: Staples.
Tolaas, J. (1986). Transformatory framework: Pictorial to verbal. In:
Handbook of States of Consciousness, eds. B. B. Wolman & M. Ullman.
New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, pp. 31-67.
Uhlarik, J., & Johnson, R. (1978), Development of form perception in re-
peated brief exposures to visual stimuli. In: Perception and Experience,
eds. R. D. Walk & H. L. Pick, Jr. New York: Plenum, pp. 347-360.
Valsiner, J. (1996), Development, methodology and recurrence of unsolved
problems: On the modernity of ''old'' ideas. Swiss J. Psychol., 55: 119-125.
Velmans, M. (1991), Is human information processing conscious? Behav.
Brain Sci., 14: 651-668.
Wapner, S. (1964), An organismic-developmental approach to the study of
perceptual and other cognitive operations. In: Cognition: Theory, Re-
search, Promise, ed. C. Scheerer. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 6-44.
Werner, H. (1948), Comparative Psychology of Mental Development. New
York: International Universities Press.
Werner, H. (1978), The concept of development from a comparative and
organismic point of view. In: Developmental Processes: Heinz Werner's
Selected Writings, Vol. 1, eds. S. S. Barten & M. B. Franklin. New York:
International Universities Press, pp. 107-130. (Originally published in
1957)
Wertheimer, M. (1959), Productive Thinking (Enlarged Edition, Ed. M.
Wertheimer). New York: Harper & Brothers.
Microgenesis in the 21st century 261
I writhe in doubt over every line. I ask myself - is it right? - is it true? - do I feel it
so? - do I express all my feeling? And I ask it at every sentence - I perspire in in-
certitude over every word. ( Joseph Conrad)
Cognitivism is but one expression of a mode of thought that over the latter
half of this past century has had a profound impact on contemporary life
(Brown, 2001). The assumption of timeless, repeatable or self-identical ob-
jects exemplified by the concept of representations has had a power-
ful influence on the way we think about the significance of intrinsic rela-
tionality and the subjectivity of mental states. What is the nature of a thing
that makes it what it is, or what is the quality of difference that is decisive
for the individuation of things that are ostensibly identical? We see this
influence in the tension in Western culture between a relative homogeneity
of thought and a striking diversity of lifestyle, as if tattoos and nose-rings
could authenticate an individuality that has been threatened with absorp-
tion and loss. We see it in the triumph of immediate pleasure over sus-
tained engagement, or in the cult of celebrities who blend into a din of uni-
formity, with exaggerated importance given to the superficial marks of dis-
tinctiveness.
We see it, too, in aesthetics, in the debate as to what counts as an art-
work, or the boundaries that divide Real Art from popular or commercial
art, or found art. The emphasis on the formal properties of an artwork sac-
264 Jason Brown
rifices the latent (if any) content of the work to the drama of a momentary
impression. Or, the artwork is a melange of elements that does not exist
aesthetically unless it is vetted and disambiguated by experts. The puzzled
observer may be asked to contribute more to the interpretation of the work
than the artist, who may profess to not having any idea as to what the work
is about, its meaning or reference, and claim that it is an expression of feel-
ing, even if he is oblivious to what feeling is being expressed. In such in-
stances, even the feeling of the artwork has an external or objective
character. The problem of identity also appears in the distinction between a
copy and an original, or in the comparison of autographic and allographic
art.
In an age of cloning, when human embryos can be implanted in the
uterus of a cow and grandmothers can deliver the babies of their sons and
daughters, we wonder what, after all, is a mother. Just as there is a rethink-
ing of what it means to be an artwork, we ask, what does it mean to be a
person. The question spills into the debates on human rights, and the rights
of animals, fetuses, the aged and the ill. What does it mean to be human?
Where does humanity begin, where does it end? The nature of identity be-
devils neuroscience and philosophy of mind. The so-called identity the-
ory reduces mind to brain by finessing the mind, discarding what is essen-
tial to personality. We have disputes over zombies and humans, computers
and brains, silicon chips and carbon molecules, which for many are debates
over whether consciousness and qualia are to be given privileged status in
the description of mental states.
These examples of uncertainty as to what a thing is, apart from its ap-
pearance and external relations, arise from the fact that objects have been
drained of their intrinsic quality, their history and context. A person, an
artwork, is stripped of temporality in order to isolate it as a scientific ob-
ject, that is, as an objective fact. Diverse entities are conflated on the basis
of similar content or output. For example, two minds having the same mo-
mentary propositional content are said to be in identical states. Or, equally
incomprehensible to me, it is claimed that different mental states can ac-
company the same physical state (Burge, 1993). The result is an indiffer-
ence to what is unique or telling about the mind/brain state: namely, the
potential behind the semblance of surface form and its transition to actual-
Actualization and causality 265
ity. In the field of value, this translates to the centrality of character in rela-
tion to its expression in conduct. This lost background, the real existence
and the historical individuality of the object, tends to be lost in the en-
chantment with the external relations of an artificially isolated object, its
causal role and evanescent contacts.
At the same time that analytic and computational philosophy and mo-
lecular biology have led to the conceptualization of man as a repertoire of
mental contents and outward behaviors, deconstructionism has had the re-
verse effect, diluting the autonomy of objects by nesting them in context.
Objects are, finally, replaced, or defined not by their intrinsic quality, but
by their contextual surround. The object itself is not conceived as rela-
tional, but rather as something embedded in a matrix of relations, still a
substantive dependent on the relations around it, a point of view, an opin-
ion. The result is that an object or a person is either a causal implementa-
tion of a set of natural or formal rules, or a virtual construction of a mani-
fold of perspectives. On the one hand, individuals are products that can be
replicated like carburetors with no value other than their utility; on the
other, the individual is what others take him to be, the sum of his acts and
the impressions they provoke.
The upshot is that the importance and the reality of the internal relations
of an object are ignored, eliminated or displaced, thus annihilating the very
process that is, ultimately, the existence and reality of the object. For sci-
ence, the real is what can be measured. For contextualism, the real is per-
spectival. We are even getting used to the idea that belief in the real is na-
ve and outmoded, or that there are equivalent levels or perspectives, each
of which is objectively real. Causal theory saps purpose from behavior and
displaces signification from individuals to actions in the world. Perspecti-
val theory turns the self into an image for others. We are left with a nexus
of causal relations or a phantom that eludes description. And we ask, still,
what is an individual?
All of these trends impact on the concept of the self and the nature of
value and moral responsibility. The disinterest in the interior or temporal
dynamic of objects and mental states has as its main symptom the loss of
self. The search for the true self is, as it was for romantic idealism begin-
ning with Fichte, the anxiety of our times. The frantic nature of this search
266 Jason Brown
transition. Mental events or contents in the mental state deposit and are re-
placed, they do not cause other events to occur. Objects are reinstated by
change, in a transition from potential to actual that recurs. Whiteheads
metaphysic is constructed on this basis. The replaced state is the ground
(?cause) over which the replacing state is deposited (?effect). Each state
unfolds over the immediately preceding one. Is the replacement causal if
the constraints of the just-prior state delimit the immediately ensuing one?
Are constraints causes? Hume was uncertain. Does a chair or a particle
cause itself to recur each moment? The causal persistence of objects has
been largely ignored, since objects are considered to be self-identical over
time. Russell [1948] noted this fact, and made a distinction between causal
persistence and causal interaction. He wrote, Owing to the fact that the
persistence of things is taken for granted and regarded as involving identity
of substance, this form of causation has not been recognized as what it is.
In the relational change of process theory, all change is a kind of object
persistence, i.e. the outcome of constraints on the iterated specification of
novel form. In contrast, the mental objects of cognitive psychology change
by way of an interaction that conforms to the model of ordinary billiard-
ball causation.
A transition from potential to actual traverses subjective phases in the
process leading to a perceptual object and its infrastructure in the personal-
ity. The variety of methods that have been used to probe this hidden under-
surface demonstrate that the experiential content of a perceptual object is,
in the ordinary sense, pre-perceptual. That is, the feeling, meaning and rec-
ognition of an object are not attached to things out there in the world after
they are perceived, in a second-pass process that follows perception, but
are phases ingredient in the same process through which the perception oc-
curs.
To most psychologists, this statement would appear so radical and
wrong-headed as to be hardly worth refuting. Moreover, the approach un-
dermines the realism, consensual validation and objectivity of a descriptive
science of the mind. It is much simpler to interpret the psychic contribu-
tion to object perception as an addition to physical nature. Yet the tradi-
tional model of objects as assemblies of sensory bits linked to feeling and
meaning, associated to memories for recognition and interpretation and
Actualization and causality 269
then projected back into the world where we see them, though at first blush
appealing to common sense, is so implausible that one is mystified by its
universal acceptance. What is more astonishing is the prevailing indiffer-
ence to anatomical and psychological evidence that runs counter to what
has been standard theory for over a century. This evidence not only in-
cludes percept-genetic and subliminal perception research [Smith, 2001],
but cytoarchitectonic findings, blindsight, masking, priming, some studies
on commissurotomy cases, gestalt psychology and clinical work on micro-
genesis. That these studies have had a limited impact on theory and ex-
perimentation in psychology reflects the latters intolerance of alternative
modes of explanation and the hegemonic influence of mass presupposi-
tions in the search for scientific truth.
WHAT IS POTENTIAL?
The object in perception, as well as the final action, utterance and idea, are
endpoints of a phase-transition that contains all of the potential
choices and their resolutions en route to that endpoint. The persistence of
preliminary phases in the final object owes to the temporal unity of the tra-
versal. By this I mean that antecedent phases in an act of cognition are not
historical events in relation to occurrent ones, but are imminent in the pre-
sent content. This presentness of the immediate past in the final actuality
gives the richness of experience, the meaning and feeling to passing events
at each moment. The final object in a transition of phases does not just sur-
vive a sequence of alternative paths to become what it is: at each phase, a
pre-object configuration moves closer to possibility. The transition from
potential to actual is continuous. Every phase except the final one, and
perhaps even that, has a potential for another transformation. In this proc-
ess, drive-based conceptual primitives distribute into conceptual feelings
affects, object-concepts and meaning content which then deliver the im-
ages, acts and words of conscious experience as the process actualizes into
object form, motility and lexical morphology.
Acts and percepts consist of this complex layering. Sensation limits the
object-development to produce a conceptual model of the physical world.
Actions lack the external constraints of sensation, and therefore depend
inter alia on perceptual monitoring by recurrent collaterals and configural
biases at each phase to drive the action forward. These biases determine the
distribution of the action in the axial and distal musculature, whether con-
duct will be restrained or impulsive, emotive or rational, selfish or compas-
sionate, pragmatic or reflective. Every perception, every thought and action
incorporates the world of its occasion. The individual creates an object
world for his enjoyment, as the outer world of sensation and the inner
world of habit limit what actions and objects are to be enjoyed. It may
seem odd to say that perception is creative, in view of its repetition and
stability. After all, we perceive what is out there. A person might vividly
imagine that he is living on Mars, but unless he is psychotic or hallucinat-
ing he perceives the Earth as it is. Yet imagination is the foundation out of
which the perception of reality develops. Within every perception there
Actualization and causality 275
The objects of thought, like the thoughts they are, also think up the self
as their subjective phase. In this process of thinking and perceiving, the
self and its private space are antecedent to the minds creation of the world.
Since the world sets limits on the actualization process, the self is as much
a creation of the world, i.e. the constraints of sensation, as the latter is a
creation of the self, i.e. a perceptual realization. To have a self is to have
objects to perceive. From pathological cases we know that the world does
not survive an erosion of the self, nor does the self survive a loss of its ob-
jects. The preliminary locus of the self, and the intermediate locus of ideas
and images in the course of the actualization, implies that the character and
personality of the subject are at stake in every thought, gesture and object.
We all see the same objects, but we see them differently; some we notice
and care about, others we ignore or dislike. These are not the responses of
the subject to a neutral object, but are subjective precursors in a transition
from character to fact in the striving of the mind toward objectification.
Every forming object conveys its subjective phase into the perception even
as it exteriorizes a space that is independent of the viewer.
This background of subjectivity emphatic at antecedent phases, inap-
parent in the object provides coherence and continuity to the mental life.
The constructs out of which objects, thoughts and actions develop con-
ceptual primitives, along with animal beliefs and experiential memories
are what we mean by the core self, or character, which is the thematic in
personality or the mean of its fluctuations. We cannot see a mans charac-
ter, but we judge it by his pattern of behavior. An examined life may de-
termine which of the values that went into ones character are least deserv-
ing of credit or blame, but the sum, the average or the limits of their ex-
pression, constitutes a kind of dispositional matrix of the self that reflects
its value distribution. Core values are biases in the self that are the precur-
sors of preobject-concepts and conscious valuations.
Admittedly, it is far from clear how we are to describe an unconscious
value in the self-concept other than as a configural bias arising in a genera-
tive set of neurons that specifies the drive-representations or presupposi-
tions that will guide ensuing concepts and feelings. The actions that flow
from the core self, as well as conscious valuations, are always in flux ac-
cording to the conditions of life and the needs of the actor, but the values
Actualization and causality 277
that drive those actions are constitutional and slow to change. Consider the
dictator of Togo, who originally threw his enemies to the crocodiles, but
later, in a concession to modernity, tossed them out of helicopters!
Character is the source of the conscious contents of our mind, but not their
cause. The relation of character to action is that of potential to actual, not
cause and effect. The action individuates through a qualitative sequence
that is constrained by the elimination of maladaptive possibilities. Charac-
ter does not cause or produce a behavior, no more than the root of a flower
causes the petals, but it is ingredient as an anticipatory phase in a dynamic
structure. An action is a sign of character, not its product, as a thought is
not the output of a thinker but a kind of signature of his feelings and intel-
ligence.
When interpreted from the standpoint of potential and actual, which is the
path of self-realization, the transition from character to conduct, from the
core self to its acts and objects, can be seen to correspond with the transi-
tion from the creative unconscious to an artwork, and a life can be viewed
as an aesthetic object. The generation of an artwork over many attempts is
a concentrated sampling in the recurrence of behavior out of personality. In
behavior, as in art, the fragmentary or piecemeal does not convey authen-
ticity and power. When an act is partial or deficient, it barely taps the po-
tential of what might have been a greater life or a greater work. This is the
difference between an ordinary and a creative personality, or a mediocre
and an inspired work of art. As in morality, the creative arises as a recon-
ciliation of self and other, as the conventions of tradition are molded by
what is distinctive in personality. Over the lifespan, there is, to a varying
degree, a satisfaction of the wholeness that, ideally, should have energized
every act. The self-measure of a strong character is its completeness of ac-
278 Jason Brown
images that retain features of preliminary cognition. One could say, the
feeling of passivity for a creative idea is a mark of its imaginative depth.
The feeling that thoughts are unsolicited, especially those with creative
force, recalls the passivity of the self to the content of a dream or halluci-
nation. Again, the sense of agency is linked to the phase of actualization of
the thought, which differs for waking and dreaming, or habitual and crea-
tive thinking. The strength of the feeling of agency is a symptom of the
depth of the thought, not a result of the effort applied by the subject to the
thought-content, and should not be taken as psychological evidence for
agent-causation. The sense of agency for thoughts and actions differs from
the feeling of passivity to perceptual objects, including many forms of
mental imagery. Some perceptual images have a volitional quality, such as
imagination and eidetic images. The incidental quality of agentive and pas-
sive feeling, i.e. the observation that the feeling of agency which accompa-
nies the thought points to the dominant phase in its development, is dem-
onstrated by instances in which the subject is uncertain as to whether he is
an agent or recipient of his own thought content, e.g. in trance, psychosis
and other states of altered consciousness.
In process theory, acts and agents are realized and revived. The antece-
dent does not cause the consequent, but is transformed into it in a qualita-
tive series of whole-part shifts. The seed becomes the flower, it does not
cause it. The child does not cause an adult but becomes one. An early seg-
ment of process becomes a later segment, not by intrinsic causal links, but
through the gradual change in replications and the constraints on emergent
form. The feeling of agent causation that underwrites responsibility is a
powerful but necessary deception, explicable in terms of the microstructure
of the mind/brain state. The feeling of agency probably develops when a
child reaches for something. My son, Ilya, at five months old, mimicked
his mother as he rotated his arms and hands during a French nursery song.
In the evening, alone in bed, he would look intently at each arm and hand
as he separately rotated them; then, he did the same with his feet, which
were not part of learning the song. I mentioned this observation to Jerry
Bruner one evening at our home and asked, had I witnessed the birth of a
volition? Jerry was skeptical. Perhaps he was not conversant with, or sym-
280 Jason Brown
pathetic to, the works of Guyau, who said that the reach of a child for an
object is the nucleus of the idea of the future, and of causation.
I think the sense of agency is more closely related to causal persistence
and replacement than object causation. The experience of object causation
is not internalized as psychic causation but, rather, the process is the re-
verse. The feeling that the self is the present cause of bodily and other ef-
fects in the immediate future arises in the continuity over replications of
successive mind/brain states. This feeling of psychic causation is then re-
ferred outward as a theory of object causation. As in the example above,
the feeling of the child that he can move his limbs at will, or touch or
seize an external object or compute the position and grasp an object in mo-
tion is the basis on which object causation and serial time develop out of
the acausality and timelessness of magical thinking.
CONFLICT
or the quality and quantity of the same entity conflict can be interpreted
as a reflection of the degree to which a given object-concept actualizes its
prefigurative potential, or as a sign of the feeling that is residual in undis-
charged object-concepts. The contrast of an anxious life with one that is
integrated reflects the completeness with which conceptual feeling is real-
ized, in objects and in the part-acts of behavior. Frustration, stress, guilt,
are affective residues of conceptual feelings that fail to achieve adequate
realization over repeated trials; they are symptoms of an incomplete resolu-
tion of the dialectic of self and other, in other words, signs of moral dis-
tress.
These stresses are not necessarily undesirable. Conflict is the engine of
adaptation, and to many theorists an essential factor in moral decision.
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a life free of guilt or regret, though in
retrospect, painful choices are often forgotten, and reason serves to justify
errors of judgment, whether honest or inconsiderate, and to excuse foolish
decisions, the outcomes of which could not have been foreseen. The cul-
tural influences on this process are not insignificant. For an egocentric and
forward-looking society, such as present-day America, guilt tends to be
perceived as a tether on freedom and self-expression, i.e. a trauma to be
overcome, not a sign of moral decay or an incitement to growth and salva-
tion.
For conflict to play a constructive role in the psychic life, it must be a
topic for reflection and re-enactment, in other words, decisions need to be
recalled and replayed in the imagination. If, as has been claimed, conduct
is 90% of life, and morality is the life of deeds, not thoughts, the 10% that
is unexposed, the world of privacy, imagination, doubt, misgivings, the
world that I inhabit, is often the intenser part of many lives. The act is less
alive in the world, where it dies, than in the mind, where it is rehearsed,
anticipated, and then re-lived in memory after it has perished. We may ad-
mire the man of action, but contemplation, expectation and revival are of-
ten the most vivid, lived experiences of the act. Bradley wrote, The
breadth of my life is not measured by the multitudes of my pursuits, nor
the space I take up amongst other men, but by the fullness of the whole life
which I know as mine. The fullness is not just the subjective complement
of an act, it is an interior vision of wholeness, a unity of will and conduct, a
Actualization and causality 283
vigilant passivity to the call of the other, a resolution of desire and obli-
gation, of thought and its realization, and the continuation of the will of the
individual into family, community and nation.
concordance in the mix of values that drive his behavior. Such a person,
we say, is at peace with himself. The coherence is a felt experience of
comfort in decision; its danger is complacency. Conflict is the felt experi-
ence of choice; its danger is anxiety or stress. In either case, self-esteem is
at stake.
Self-esteem is value as worth emphatic in the self rather than in an ob-
ject. The value that deposits in the self does not leave the self and then, re-
flexively, return to fill the self as it fills other objects; rather, the self is
filled with its own value prior to the derivation of this value into ideas and
external objects. Self-esteem is a state of the self, not the infusion of value
into the self as a secondary phenomenon. The self is not like other objects,
even in reflection. The self in reflection is superficial to the core self that
drives the content of the introspective state. The generative self is uncon-
scious. The other side of self-esteem is the denial of ones shortcomings.
Denial is so common in normal and, especially, pathological states, that it
has to be considered an essential feature of the selfs own derivations, with
those values retained that promote self-esteem, and those subdued that
threaten the sense of integrity.
As objects become worthless when their valuation is diminished, the self
lacks esteem when it does not receive an adequate share of its own self-
valuation, i.e. when self- and other-centered values are discordant. Unlike
the self, however, objects are not the locus of conflict. Objects realize po-
tential, or specify options. They are endpoints in the mind/brain state, not
occasions of intrinsic choice in the subject, where possibility is still alive.
The manifold of potential selves within a person contrasts with the finality
of his objects. We are looking at the subjective and objective segments of
the mind/brain state that correspond to phases closer to potential or actual-
ity.
A weakness of will (akrasia) is not a sign of a weakness of character or
fragility of will, but of a conflict in values that implodes on the will that
seeks to mobilize them. The weakness is the inertia resulting from the op-
position of equal and contradictory forces. When values concur, the will is
forceful. A weakness of self-valuation, like a diminution of object worth,
may lead the individual to feel unworthy, or to feel his objects are worth-
less. This reflects a prominence of values that do not serve self-interest,
286 Jason Brown
pain or deprivation for another. If the good is more than mere enjoyment, it
must be a good that is good for others. The fusion of good with pleasure
substitutes a moral judgment for a drive satisfaction. When good and bad
are conceived as judgments applied to conduct, either by others or by a ra-
tional self, they stand in relation to drive as truth does to reason. A coher-
ence theory of value entails a coherence theory of truth, just as a corre-
spondence theory of truth entails a good that appeals to an abstract stan-
dard or ideal. Paton seems to accept this distinction when he writes that
reflection or critical judgment follows on the activity which creates the
value.
With regard to the interpretation of will as volition or agency, clinical
studies have shown that the volitional feeling in an act depends on that
phase in its structure which is the focus of emphasis in the normal fluctua-
tion of consciousness, or it points to that phase in an act of cognition that
receives the major brunt of a pathology. Barring coercion, and from an en-
dogenous or subjective standpoint, whether an act appears or feels volun-
tary, purposeful, automatic or passive, or whether the self feels an agent or
a victim, is a function of the microstructure of the act. Volition does not
reflect a stronger or weaker will that is imposed on an action, or an impulse
of the self that propels that action; the self does not cause a volition which
then causes an action. Agency is not an output of a self that stands behind
an action and urges it forward; rather, the feeling of volition is created as a
kind of byproduct of act- and object- realization.
REFERENCES
Brown, J.W. (1996) Time, Will and Mental Process. New York: Plenum.
Brown, J.W. (2001) Microgenetic theory: reflections and prospects. Neu-
ropsychoanalysis 3:61-74
Brown, J.W. (2002) Prospects in the study of aphasia, In: The Sciences of
Aphasia; from Therapy to Theory, eds. I. Papathanasiou, & R. De Blesser.
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Brown, J.W. (2005). Process and the Authentic Life. Heusenstamm: Ontos
Verlag.
288 Jason Brown
Brown, J.W. & Pachalska, M. (2003) The nature of the symptom and its
relevance for neuropsychology. Acta Neuropsychologica 1:1-11.
Burge, T. (1993) Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In: Men-
tal Causation, eds. J. Heil & A. Mele. Oxford: Clarendon,.
Hartshorne, C. (1987) Wisdom as Moderation. Albany: SUNY Press.
Paton, H. (1927) The Good Will. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Royce, J. (1901) The World and the Individual. Macmillan.
Russell, B. (1948) Human Knowledge. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Smith, G. (2001) The Process Approach to Personality. New York: Ple-
num.
289
NAME INDEX
Aarsse, H.R. 138, 140 Bernstein Carlson, E. 96, 107
Abulafia, J. 252, 256 Berntson, G. G. 144-46, 161
Adam, D. 164 Besco, R. O. 214, 217
Ahadi, S. A. 213-14, 219 Beyn, E. S. 30, 42
Akselrod, S. 145-46, 161 Bigger, J. T. Jr. 161
Albano, C. 80, 90 Bijleveld, C. J. H. 175, 186
Alkov, R. A. 213, 216 Binzer, M. 34, 49, 79-80, 85, 90, 110, 116, 125
Allen, S. N. 92, 94, 107, 219, 288 Bird LaFrance, E. 236
Allioti, N. C. 224, 238 Birmes, P. 93, 104, 107
Allodi, F. 97, 107 Blanchard, D. C. 158-59, 161
Almgren, P. E. 9, 21, 26, 49, 127, 129, 131, Blanchard, R. J. 158-59, 161
141, 149, 164, 208, 216 Bleger, J. 39, 42
Amabile, T. 202, 216, 222-23, 231, 236 Bleich, A. 92, 108
Amnr, G. 5, 9, 19, 139, 141, 201, 208, 216, Blendon, R. J. 109
298 Blinder, B. 170, 187
Anderson, D. 111 Block, A. 165
Anderson, H. G. 214, 216 Blos, P. 113, 123
Anderson, P. E. D. 111 Blount, J. 94, 111
Andersson, A .L. 9, 13, 19, 202, 207-08, 216- Bodlund, O. 94, 110
17, 255 Bollini, P 109
Andrews, G. 93, 107 Bond, M. 93, 107-08
Angrilli, A. 164 Bornstein, R. F. 242, 255
Arieti, S. 242, 249, 254 Borowsky, M. S. 213, 216
Armelius, B-. 34, 49, 80, 89, 97, 109, 114, Bourassa, M. G. 138, 140
116, 123-124 Boxer, A. M. 114, 122, 125
Arsenault, L. 94, 110 Boysen, S. T. 144, 161
Atkinson, M. 158, 163 Bradley, M. M. 143-44, 161, 163, 283
Atwood, G. E. 78, 87, 90 Brecht, K. 177, 184
Bremner, J. D. 92, 108
Bachelor, P. 201, 217 Brenet, F. 251, 258
Bachmann, T. 24, 29, 40, 42, 243, 245, 254 Brett, E. 108
Bckstrm, M. 32, 42, 59, 61, 114, 122-23 Brosschot, J. F. 123, 125, 138, 140
Baggi, L. 193, 199 Brown, J. W. 3, 14-17, 19, 24, 29, 37, 40, 42,
Barger, A. C. 164 188, 217, 244-45, 255, 263, 266, 273, 287-
Bargh, J. A. 159-61 88, 298
Baron-Cohen, S. 244, 254 Bruner, J. S. 28, 42, 279
Barratt, E. S. 252, 254 Bruno, R. 94, 111
Barron, F. 202, 217, 223, 236 Burge, T. 264, 288
Barten, S. S. 244, 248, 254, 260 Byrnes, D. A. 223, 236
Bartram, D. 201, 217
Bates, D. E. 248, 257 Cacioppo, J. T. 144-45, 161
Baumeister, R. F. 128, 140 Callahan, S. 93, 107
Beck, R. 30, 42, 47 Calvo, M. G. 158, 161
Becker, D. F. 111 Canestrari, R. 174, 185
Benfari, R. 170, 183 Caramia, M. C. 199
Bengtsson, M. 208, 216 Carlier, I. V. 92, 108
Benson, H. 248, 255 Carruthers, M. 146, 162
Berger, A. C. 161 Caspi-Yavin, Y. 107, 109
Berglund, M. 174, 184 Castillo, M. D. 158, 161
290
Manifold, V. 111 Nilsson, A. 9, 13, 20, 34, 39, 47, 57, 62, 163,
Marden, B. 157, 163 216
Marendaz, C. 251, 258 Nira, K. 201, 219
Marlowe, D. 128, 130, 140 Nisbett, R. E. 249, 258-59, 261
Martignoni, M. 199 Norton, W. A. 123, 185, 224, 237
Martin, J. L. 93, 110 Nyman, E. 12, 21, 191, 200
Martin, M. 157, 163 Nyman, G. E. 129, 141, 171, 189, 202, 206,
Martindale, C. 223, 237 220
Maslow, A. H. 223, 237
Massagli, M. P. 110 Offer, D. 114, 122, 125
Masson, A. 138, 140 Ohlmann, T. 251, 258
Mathews, A. 157, 163, 165 hman, A. 146, 156, 160, 163-64
Matsumoto, D. 122, 124 jehagen, A. 33, 139, 140
McAdams, D. P. 215, 219 Okaue, M. 201, 219
McCraty, R. 158, 163 Olff, M. 94, 110, 123, 125, 177, 180, 187
McFarlane, A. 111 Oltman, P. K. 250, 257, 261
McGlashan, T. H. 111 Orange, D. M. 78, 89
McInerney, S. C. 165 Orlans, V. 220
McInnes, K. 110 Ouvinen-Birgerstam, P. 226, 237
McNally, R. J. 157, 164 Ozolins, A. R. 32, 34, 42, 47, 177, 180, 187
McNaughton,N. 158, 162
McWilliams, N. 87, 89 Pachalska, M. 273, 288
Merleau-Ponty, M. 70, 76 Pacteau, C. 230, 237
Messick, S. 253, 258 Palmer, S. E. 243, 258-59
Meyer-de-Stadelhofen, F. 141 Palomba, D. 146, 164
Michael, W.B. 201, 217 Parkhurst, H. B. 222, 224, 237
Middleton, G. 223, 236 Paton, H. 286-88
Miller, F. D. 249, 259 Pelcovitz, D. 111
Miller, T. W. 92, 109 Penayo, U. 9, 21, 35, 49, 82, 90, 94, 111
Mini, A., 164 Perry, G. G. 104, 108
Mischel, W. 179, 187, 215, 219 Perry, J. C. 110, 123-24, 180, 182, 187
Mogg, K. 157, 163 Persson, B. 32, 42
Mollica, R. F. 92, 95-97, 107, 109-10 Petrenko, V. F. 30, 38, 47
Monahan, J. L. 146, 163 Petrides, K. V. 137, 140
Moran, J. D. 224, 238 Pezzarossa, B, 59, 62, 188, 193, 199
Morgan, M. K. 108 Pham, T. 109-10
Morphy, M.A. 174, 185 Pickering, A. D. 213, 219
Morris, E. 93, 110 Plutchik, R. 177, 184
Moss Kanter, R. 214, 219 Pollack, R. H. 225, 249, 258
Munz, D. 37, 43 Pomerantz, J. R. 242, 249, 258
Murphy, E. 110 Pomeranz, B. 145, 164
Murphy, S. T. 146, 156, 163 Poole, C. 110
Porges, S. W. 161
Nagaraja, H. N. 161 Postman, L. 28, 42
Nakamura, M. 201, 219 Pratto,F. 159, 161
Nakatani, K. 243, 258 Prinz, W. 41, 47, 162
Neisser, U. 244, 258
Nemeroff, C. 41, 43 Quigley, K. S. 145, 161
Neuman, F. 4, 127
Neuman, T. 34, 47 Rafanelli, C. 174, 185
Newman, L. S. 128, 140 Rapagna, S. O. 224, 237
Rapaport, D. 12, 20
Raphel, C. 251, 258
294
SUBJECT INDEX
Core self 276-77, 285
A C-phase 72-73, 75
Activity Questionnaire 226-27, 231, 233, 235, Creative flexibility 205-06, 212, 214
298 Creative fluency 137, 205, 212, 221
Affective responses 91, 99, 101, 103-04, 106 Creative functioning test (CFT) 5, 11, 27, 35,
Akrasia 285 56, 201-02, 204, 214, 221, 226, 232, 237,
Altered consciousness 279 252, 260
Amauroscopic 11, 13, 21, 31, 62 Creativity 5, 19, 23, 26-27, 35, 45, 48, 123,
Anorexia nervosa 193-194 137-41, 183, 201-39, 255, 260, 277-78
Antecedent configurations 272
D
Anxiety 14-16, 18, 20, 24, 26, 32-33, 44, 48,
50, 57-60, 62, 75, 86, 88, 91-92, 99, 101, Deconstructionism 265
103, 127-28, 130-37, 139, 141, 143, 147-49, Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) 8, 13, 21, 49,
151-54, 157-64, 168, 171, 177, 179, 182, 61-62, 123
186, 206, 216, 220, 265, 281, 285 Defence Mechanism Inventory (DMI) 177, 182
Associationism 1, 14 Defence Mechanism Rating Scale (DMRS)
Authenticity 263, 266, 277, 283-84, 286 180
Automatization 8, 29, 48 Defence Mechanism Technique, modified
Autonomic nervous system 145 (DMTm) 9, 11, 13
Defence mechanisms 13, 17, 26, 28-29, 31-32,
B 39, 41, 43-45, 75, 93, 95, 110, 114, 117,
Biological perspective 15 122-23, 127-28, 131, 137, 141, 167-88
Blocking defense style 87, 91, 99-100, 103, Denial 55, 83, 88, 101, 106, 129, 170, 285
106 Distorting defence style 88, 99-100, 106
Borderline personalities 34 Dream questionnaire 130
Brainstormers 233-34 Dreams 29, 59, 127-28, 130-31, 134, 136, 204,
Bulimia nervosa 193-194 211-12, 226, 257, 259
Buddhist metaphysics 266
C E
Character 8-9, 34, 59, 263-66, 270, 275-77, Eating disorders 34, 44
283-86 Evolutionary brain process 273
Chronic fatigue syndrome 5, 77-79, 80-90 External constraints 270, 274
Cognitive styles, 33, 45, 167-71, 175-76, 183, Extraversion 5, 201-20
186, 188
F
Cognitivism 17, 263
Coherence 276, 283-87 Field dependence 169-72, 251-52, 257
Conflict 13, 21, 37, 42, 46-47, 50, 62, 74, 138, Field independence 169, 171, 251
149, 168, 177-178, 182, 186, 191, 199, 280- Free association 33, 40, 52, 171-72
82, 284-86 Frustration 56, 214-15, 282
Conformists 232
Constrictive-flexible ego control 169 G
Construction 7, 10, 12, 15, 21, 24, 28, 40, 48, Gender differences 39, 113-15, 121-24, 221,
65, 67, 69, 72, 88, 265, 273 224-25, 227, 235, 237
Continuity 18, 27, 69, 275-76, 280
Conversion disorder 34, 49, 77, 79, 81-82, 84-
88, 90, 110, 125
297
H Process-oriented methods 11
Projective tests 27-28, 114, 177
Harvard Trauma Questionnaire 91-92, 95-96,
Psychic causation 266-67, 278, 280
102, 107, 109
Psychoanalysis 2-3, 7, 12-15, 17, 19, 50, 52,
Heart rate 143-45, 147, 149, 154, 158, 161-64
54, 111, 176-77, 179, 185, 187, 243, 297
I Psychosomatic diseases 92, 139
Psychotherapy 4, 61, 90, 105-06, 110-11, 125,
Identification Test (IT) 11, 27, 40, 56 167, 173-83, 185, 187
Immature defense mechanisms 127 Psychoticism 173, 223
Intelligence 173, 236, 277
Introjection 100, 117, 119, 170, 172 R
Introversion 5, 202, 207, 209, 211, 218, 223
Radical interactionism 248
Isolation 33-34, 51, 57-59, 101, 117-18, 132-
Reaction formation 26, 56, 83, 101-03, 119,
33, 137-38, 170, 172-73, 179, 181
123, 172-73
L Reconstruction 15, 19-20, 41, 54, 65, 67, 69,
218, 237
Leveling-sharpening 168-69, 171 Regional Cerebral Blood Flow 37
Regression 11, 59-60, 93, 121, 132-33, 138,
M 171, 199, 207, 245
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale Repression 2, 26, 33-34, 51, 57-59, 62, 100,
128, 130, 140 127, 132-33, 135-38, 170, 172, 181, 186,
Medium Creative Flexibility 212, 214 188, 271
Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT) 4, 9, 11, 21, Repressor 4, 34, 127-41
23, 26, 44, 49, 129, 141, 143, 149 Rorschach 28, 53, 61, 94, 104, 108-11, 139,
Metaphoric thinking 242, 272 170, 188
Microgenesis 2, 19-20, 24-25, 30-31, 33, 35,
37-38, 40-45, 52, 186, 241-61, 269 S
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity77, 79, 81, 84-89 Self-actualization person 269-70
Self-esteem 78, 114, 127-28, 238, 285
N Self-image inventory 5, 221, 226
Negation 55, 83, 101-03 Sensitivity-projection 114
Neoteny 278 Serial Color-Word Test (S-CWT) 4, 11, 21,
Neuroticism 173, 208, 223 169, 171, 173, 183, 191-200, 206
Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory
P 130, 148
Spiral Aftereffect Technique (SAT) Stress
Parallelistic hypothesis 52 control 5, 11, 207, 210-13, 216
Partial least squares (PLS) 36, 80, 97, 113, Stabilization 29, 31, 48
115-116 Standing wave 12, 18
Patterns of adaptation (in the Serial Color- Subliminal perception 16-17, 19, 37, 40, 43,
Word Test) 188, 191, 206 269
Perceptgenetic Object Relations Test (PORT) Suicidal ideation 174
11, 13, 40 Suicidal individuals 34
Personality inventories 27, 123 Sympathovagal balance 4, 143, 145-47, 150,
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 91-93, 160
96-98, 102-04, 108, 111 Syncretic mode of cognition 241, 248
Potential to Actual 267-68, 270, 273-74, 277-
78, 283 T
P-phases 52-53, 59-60, 66, 246, 248
Preattentive processing 146 Test of Flight Phobia 26, 40
Presentness of the immediate past 274 The self 28, 31-32, 55, 61, 91-93, 102-03, 209,
Process monism 266 228, 234-35, 265-66, 275-81, 283-87
298
CONTRIBUTORS
Amnr, Gunnilla, Ph.D., senior advisor, Learning and Teaching Development Centre,
Lund University, Sweden
Brown, Jason W., Ph. D., professor, Medical Faculty, New York University, 952 Fifth
Ave, New York NY, 10021 USA.
Carlsson, Ingegerd, Ph.D., professor, Dept. of Psychology, PO Box 213, SE-22100,
Lund, Sweden
Draguns, Juris G., Ph.D., professor, Dept of Psychology, Penn. State Universiy, 417
Bruce Moore Bld, University Park PA, 16802 USA.
Fransson, Per, Ph.D., assoc. professor, Dept. of Psychology, Ume University, 90187
Ume, Sweden.
Glicksohn, Jospeh, Ph.D., assoc. professor, Dept. of Criminology and the Multidicipli-
nary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52100 Israel.
Henningsson, Mikael, Ph.D., assoc. professor, Dept.of Psychology, Ume University,
90187 Ume, Sweden.
Hentschel, Uwe, Ph.D., professor, Department of Psychology, Leiden University, Was-
senaarseweg 52, RB2300, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Hoff, Eva, Ph.D., lecturer, Malm College, Hjlmaregatan 1, 20506 Malm, Sweden.
Jnsson, Peter, Ph.D., lecturer, Dept. of Psychology, Lund University, PO Box 213,
22100 Lund, Sweden.
Kivling-Bodn, Gunilla, Ph.D., deceased
Kragh, Ulf, Ph.D., deceased
Neuman, Fredrik, B.A., Dept. of Psychology, Lund University, PO Box 213, 22100
Lund, Sweden.
Rubino, I. Alex, Ph.D., professor, Dept of Psychiatry, Tor Vergata University, Rome,
Italy.
Siracusano, Alberto, M.D., Chairman, Dept. of Psychiatry, Tor Vergata Univesity,
Rome, Italy
Smith, Gudmund J.W., Ph.D., professor, Dept. of Psychology, PO Box 213, 22100
Lund, Sweden.
Sundbom, Elisabet, Ph.D., professor, Dept. of Clinical Sciences, Ume Univesity,
90187 Ume, Sweden.
Tozzi, Federica, Ph.D., Psychiatrist, Dept. of Psychiatry, Tor Vergata University,
Rome. Italy.
Zachrisson, Anders, Psychoanalyst, Professor Dals Gate, 0353 Oslo, Norway.
Process Thought
Edited by Nicholas Rescher Johanna Seibt Michel Weber
Advisory Board
Mark Bickard Jaime Nubiola Roberto Poli
Volume 1 Volume 7
Michel Weber (Ed.) Michel Weber
After Whitehead Whitehead's Pancreativism
Rescher on Process Metaphysics The Basics
ISBN 3-937202-49-8 ISBN 13: 978-3-938793-15-2
Hardcover, 339 pp., EUR 89,00 Hardcover, ca. 255 pp, EUR 84,00
Volume 2 Volume 11
Jason W. Brown Nicholas Rescher
Process and the Authentic Life Process Philosophical Deliberations
Toward a Psychology of Value ISBN 13: 978-3-938793-37-4
ISBN 3-937202-73-0 Hardcover, 195 pp., EUR 69,00
Hardcover, 700 pp., EUR 119,00
Volume 12
Volume 3 Sergio Franzese, Felicitas Kraemer (Eds.)
Silja Graupe Fringes of Religious Experience
Der Ort konomischen Denkens Cross-perspectives on William Jamess The Varieties
Die Methodologie der Wirtschaftswissenschaften im of Religious Experience
Licht japanischer Philosophie ISBN 978-3-938793-57-2
ISBN 3-937202-87-0 Hardcover, 210 pp., EUR 79,00
Hardcover, 362 pp., EUR 98,00
Volume 13
Volume 4 Pierfrancesco Basile, Leemon B. McHenry (Eds.)
Wenyu Xie, Zhihe Wang, George E. Derfer (Eds) Consciousness, Reality and Value
Whitehead and China Essays in Honour of T. L. S. Sprigge
Relevance and Relationships ISBN 978-3-938793-71-8
ISBN 3-937202-86-2 Hardcover, 330 pp., 98,00
Hardcover, 220 pp., EUR 87,00
Volume 14
Volume 5 Michel Weber, Pierfrancesco Basile (Eds.)
Gary L. Herstein Subjectivity, Process, and Rationality
Whitehead and the Measurement Problem of ISBN 13: 978-3-938793-38-1
Cosmology Hardcover, 358 pp., EUR 98,00
ISBN 3-937202-95-1
Hardcover, 202 pp., EUR 69,00 Volume 15
Silja Graupe
Volume 6 The Basho of Economics
Edward J. Khamara An Intercultural Analysis of the Process of Economics
Space, Time, and Theology in the Leibniz-Newton Translated and Introduced by Roger Gathman
Controversy ISBN 978-3-938793-08-4
ISBN 3-938793-26-0 Hardcover, 325 pp., EUR 79,00
Hardcover, 180 pp., EUR 69,00
Volume 16
Mark Dibben & Thomas Kelly (Eds.)
Applied Process Thought I
Initial Explorations in Theory and Research
ontos verlag ISBN 978-3-938793-75-6
Frankfurt I Paris I Ebikon I Lancaster I New Brunswick 389 pp., Hardcover, 98,00