ONG CHIA vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127240; March 27, 2000

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of CAs decision

(CA reversed RTCs [Branch 24 Koronadala S. Cotabato] decision admitting Ong
Chia to Philippine Citizenship)

FACTS
[1989] Petitioner, at the age of 66, filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino
citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended.
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony.
Petitioner, born on January 1923 in Amoy, China
In 1932 (9y/o), petitioner arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel Angking and
stayed in the Phils. since then
He got employed/eventually started his own business and married a Filipina with whom he had
4children
Administrative was first sought in filing a petition for naturalization with the Special Committee
on Naturalization (Office of the SolGen) but the same was not acted upon as it was not
reconstituted after Feb 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions by Administrative
process was suspended.
Hence, the consequence of seeking judicial intervention.
With such testimony, the Prosecutor got impressed asking the trial court to admit petitioner
to Philippine citizenship and wished not to present any evidence to counteract/refute the
testimony for the petitioner which the trial court did (in 1999).
The State, however, through the Office of the SolGen, appealed for:
failure to his other name in 1989 petition
o a copy of the 1977 petition filed with the Committee was annexed to the States
appellant brief, in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong
Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong
failure to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7
o as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner resided at
"J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition
failure to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of 2
o petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953
until they were married in 1977
o petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any
having no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been
insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2
o income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his
net income could hardly support himself and his family
failure to support his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence
CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contention: The appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as
evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so it was
argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners contention is tenable.

HELD: NO. The SC found the contention to have no merit.

(1) Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence. The
rule on formal offer of evidence is clearly not applicable to a petition for naturalization;
Decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata
Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rules shall not apply
to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.

The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable
to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is
not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on
appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that
decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently,
a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the
grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

(2) Same; Same. The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which
has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to
their admissibility.
Petitioner cannot claim that, as a result of the States failure to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, thus, depriving
him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting
the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to
object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.

(3) Same; Same; Public Documents. Where a party fails to make a satisfactory showing
of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of documents which
have been executed under oath, the court may rely on them.
The Court notes that the documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax
returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may
cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is in the conclusion of the SC that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

Disposition: Decision of the CA AFFIRMED; instant petition DENIED.

SASAN SR. et al vs. NLRC GR NO. 176240

FACTS:

Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank) entered into a Contract for Services with
HI. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform
janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. Petitioners were among those employed
and assigned to E-PCIBank.

Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against
E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal. Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by the Labor
Arbiter but the parties still failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence, the Labor
Arbiter ordered that they submit their respective position papers. On the basis of the parties
position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding that HI
was not a legitimate job contractor and is only a labor-only contractor and that he real employer
of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.

Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI

appealed the same to the NLRC. In support of its allegation that it was a legitimate job
contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC several documents which it did not present before
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly
capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in
labor-only contracting.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job
contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Petitioners object to the acceptance
and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence presented by HI for the first time on
appeal. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: WON submission of additional evidence for the first on appeal is allowed in labor cases

RULING: YES.

This is not a novel procedural issue and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases
allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to
the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor
cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest
of due process.

The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New
Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not
controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this
directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and
affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional
evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit
counter-evidence.

Therefore, the petition was DENIED.

PEOPLE vs VALDEZ

G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS:

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly
caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs maybe
manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao,
SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the
police force, who testified how the information was received, the commencement of their
operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they
found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two
rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned
the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They
uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented a
certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the land
cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were found, was part of the public
domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no
Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable
farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with
the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the
marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed
policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then
asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge
thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team
then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant
reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. Appellant
contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had
more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found
in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the
immunity of ones person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful
and the seized evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination
of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said
warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only
under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection
extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of
high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal
search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana
plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search
and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned
tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and
relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a
crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against
the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and
competent. Competent evidence is generally admissible evidence. Admissible evidence, in
turn, is evidence of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow
it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial courts part to have
admitted evidences against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for
said evidence is doubly tainted.
In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To justify the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of
proof of an accuseds guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Caption:
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
(253 SCRA 699)
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts:

Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin.
Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents
consisting of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private
respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered
judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of Martins Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are
admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice.
Ruling/Held:

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity, who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.

The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
of fidelity that each owes to the other.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ADOR

G.R. No. 140538-39

June 14, 2004

FACTS:

The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts of gunfire, statrtling the otherwise
tranquil but sanguine folks of Pacol, Naga City.

In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused for the murder of Abe Cuya and Ompong
Chavez, the prosecution presented a total of sixteen (16) witnesses.

Mercy Beria testified that she ran straight to Chavez after she heard gunshots. She then
found him catching his last breath. Beria asked Chavez what happened and replied saying
tinambangan kami na Ador. About eight (8) meters from where Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay
Abe Cuya, dead.

The following morning, Barangay Captain Perez accompanied the police to the Adors,
namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, and were brought
by SPO1 Barbosa to the PNP Central Police Headquarters. The Adors were informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to choose their own counsel. They were then brought
to the PNP Crime Laboratory and were subjected to paraffin tests. On the way to the crime
laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort that he had been entrusted with a handgun which
he kept in his residence.

Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to
their backyard, retrieved the gun from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter.
Godofredo allegedly told the police that he fired the said gun outside their house on the night of
March 10 after he heard several gunshots. PO3 Nepomuceno identified the gun as a caliber .38
paltik handgun. PO3 Nepomuceno then turned over the handgun to Major Idian who likewise
identified it as a .38 caliber revolver. Major Idian returned the handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno for
ballistic and paraffin examination.

Also, on the same day, Dr. Joel S. Jurado conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Chavez and
Cuya. Dr. Jurado further testified that he recovered a slug from Cuyas head.

Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar testified that based on the ballistic examination he
conducted on the bullets, the .38 caliber slug recovered from Cuyas head matched the three
(3) .38 caliber test bullets which were test-fired from the suspected firearm surrendered by
Godofredo. The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Services for examination and yielded the presence of gunpowder nitrates.

The prosecution also presented Pablo Calsis as a witness. Calsis testified that on the night of
the incident, while about to urinate outside the house of one Lola Kissing, he heard several
gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas tree. As he was about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr.,
Diosdado III, Godofredo and another unidentified man run away.

Based on the foregoing, accused Godofredo and Diosdado III Ador were found guilty of the
crime of murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting them of murder based on
circumstantial evidence.

HELD: YES. For circumstantial evidence to suffice,

(1) There should be more than one circumstance;

(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
 The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be consistent with the
guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence.

Accordingly, we have set guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence:

(1) It should be acted upon with caution;

(2) All the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;

(3) The facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and

(4) The facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense.

Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the conviction of the accused based on
the circumstantial evidence presented.

The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that the accused were
supposedly seen fleeing from the locus criminis, armed with their respective weapons. The
testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used against Diosdado III whom he miserably failed
to positively identify during trial. Absent such clear and positive identification, the doctrine that
the defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused must yield to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo. However, Insp. Fulgar,
testified that the indorsement coming from the City Prosecutors Office alleged that the .38
caliber live bullet was fired from a .38 caliber revolver. But our office found out that the firearm
was not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber revolver. Thus, even the third circumstance,
the .38 caliber slug supposedly recovered from the head of the victim loses evidentiary value as
its source is now highly questionable.

Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of Chavez nor on the results of the
paraffin tests to convict either Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. Sad to say, no specific name
was ever mentioned by Mercy Beria. Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) Adors
were involved. Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify
with certainty the assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance. Also, the fact that the
accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder nitrates does not conclusively show that they
fired the murder weapon, for such forensic evidence should be taken only as an indication of
possibility or even of probability, but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also admittedly found
in substances other than gunpowder.

The admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including the gun
in question cannot be considered in evidence against him without violating his constitutional
right to counsel. Godofredo was already under custodial investigation when he made his
admissions and surrendered the gun to the police authorities. Consequently, the rights of a
person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel, have already attached to the
Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights
should be in writing and undertaken with the assistance of counsel. Admissions under custodial
investigation made without the assistance of counsel are barred as evidence.

The case of the prosecution has been reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and
speculations. It is hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of
conviction in a criminal case. Courts must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly
on sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice.

Wherefore, accused Godofredo Ador and Diosdado Ador III are acquitted.

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ,
- versus - COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ

G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

Facts

Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez,
on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private
respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to
"M". Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence; on

the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence. A motion for
reconsideration from petitioner was denied. A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner
in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision against the petitioner, stating that: the tape
recordings are not inadmissible per se and the petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate
to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. Hence, this present
petition.

Issue
Whether or not the tapes presented are admissible before the court.

Ruling

No, the tapes are not admissible in court. In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed
order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of
telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were
made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap
his home telephone. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes"
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.

Clearly, the respondents Trial Court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same,
the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared
inadmissible in evidence.

UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORP v. TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION

G.R. No. 126619; December 20, 2006

Ponente: J. Tinga

FACTS:

The case originated from an action for a sum of money filed by Titan-Ikeda Construction and

Development Corporation (Titan) against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation

(Uniwide) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City arising from Uniwides

non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of three projects covered by

agreements they entered into with each other.

Upon Uniwides motion to dismiss/suspend proceedings and Titans open court manifestation

agreeing to the suspension, Civil Case No. 98-0814 was suspended for it to undergo arbitration.

Titans complaint was thus re-filed with the CIAC. Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer
which was later amended and re-amended, denying the material allegations of the complaint,

with counterclaims for refund of overpayments, actual and exemplary damages, and attorneys

fees.

An Arbitral Tribunal consisting of a chairman and two members was created in accordance with

the CIAC Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration. It conducted a preliminary

conference with the parties and thereafter issued a Terms of Reference (TOR) which was

signed by the parties. The tribunal also conducted an ocular inspection, hearings, and received

the evidence of the parties consisting of affidavits which were subject to cross-examination.

On 17 April 1995, the Arbitral Tribunal promulgated a Decision, the decretal portion of which is

as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

On Project 1 Libis:

[Uniwide] is absolved of any liability for the claims made by [Titan] on this Project.

Project 2 Edsa Central:

[Uniwide] is absolved of any liability for VAT payment on this project, the same being

for the account of the [Titan]. On the other hand, [Titan] is absolved of any liability on the

counterclaim for defective construction of this project.

[Uniwide] is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P6,301,075.77 which is

ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 19 December

1992 until the date of payment.

On Project 3 Kalookan:

[Uniwide] is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P5,158,364.63 which is

ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 08 September

1993 until the date of payment.

[Uniwide] is held liable to pay in full the VAT on this project, in such amount as may be
computed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to be paid directly thereto. The BIR is hereby

notified that [Uniwide] Sales Realty and Resources Corporation has assumed responsibility and

is held liable for VAT payment on this project. This accordingly exempts Claimant Titan-Ikeda

Construction and Development Corporation from this obligation.

ISSUE:

Whether the award given by CIAC is final

HELD:

As a rule, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have

acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally

accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In

particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not

reviewable by this Court on appeal. This rule, however admits of certain exceptions.

In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled that, as exceptions,

factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner

proves affirmatively that:

(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;

(2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the

arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the

controversy;

(4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of

Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other

misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or

(5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final

and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

Other recognized exceptions are as follows:

(1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of

jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the

Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators,

(2) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and

(3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process.

Pp vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"

FACTS

In the case at bar, accused-appellant was sentenced to death for the special complex crime of
rape with homicide and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim. Appellant was charged to have
had carnal knowledge of a certain Kathylyn Uba against her will and with the use of a bladed
weapon stabbed the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in her.

Appellant raises the issue of credibility of witnesses specifically assigning as error on the part of
the trial court the latters giving of much weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution
notwithstanding their doubtfulness.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the appellants contentions as regards the witnesss credibility are
meritorious.
2. Whether or not there was Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence

HELD:

1.

NO. The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.

2.

Circumstantial evidences to be sufficient to warrant a conviction must form an unbroken chain

which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused to the exclusion of others is the
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence three
requisites must concur, 1) There is more than one circumstance, 2) facts on which the inferences
are derived are proven and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Sps. Binarao v. Plus Builders

FACTS:

Herein, petitioner spouses Binarao, purchased a house and lot in Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision
through Plus Builders Inc. An affidavit of undertaking whereby they agreed to pay P 96, 791.95.00
in the following manner was executed:

P 5000.00 upon signing of contract

And the remaining P 91, 791.95 within 15 days after.

Petitioners paid P 20,000.00 leaving a balance of P 65, 571.22 payable in three installments.

However, spouses failed to comply prompting Plus Builders to file a complaint for Sum of Money.

RTC- ordered to spouses to pay balance

CA- Affirms RTC

SC- Petition for certiorari denied

ISSUE:

Whether or not allegations, statements, or admission contained in the pleadings is judicial

admission.

HELD:

Rule 8, Rules of Court, provides:

Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in the
complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted
when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are
deemed admitted if not denied under oath.
Under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court

A specific denial of an allegation of the complaint may be made in any of three ways, namely: (a)
a defendant specifies each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, sets forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his
denial; (b) a defendant who desires to deny only a part of an averment specifies so much of it as is
true and material and denies only the remainder; and (c) a defendant who is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint
states so, which has the effect of a denial.

SIENA REALTY CORPORATION and LILIBETH MANLUGON v. HON. LOLITA GALANG, ANITA CO
NG and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 145169, 13 May 2004, THIRD DIVISION

Petitioners Siena Realty Corporation and Lilibeth Manlugon (Siena) filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA) concerning the Regional Trial Court of Manilas (RTC) Order
dismissing Sienas complaint. Upon CAs dismissal of the petition, Siena filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Pending resolution of the motion, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
approving the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The said
resolution provided that in case of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the 60-day
period shall be counted from the denial of the said motion. CA then dismissed Sienas Motion
for Reconsideration on the ground that the said amendment applies to Sienas motion. Hence,
this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion for applying the amendment
retroactively

HELD:

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence states that judicial departments are mandated to
take judicial notice even without the introduction of evidence, hence, even if petitioner did not
raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals,
it should have taken mandatory judicial notice. The resolution did not have to specify that it had
retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter.

The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, Sienas petition fails. At the time Siena filed
before the appellate court their Petition for Certiorari on the 60th day following their receipt of
the Order of RTC, the said Order had become final and executory after the 15th day following
Sienas receipt thereof.
SUPLICO vs NEDA

G.R. No. 178830; July 14, 2008

FACTS:

Triple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a
TRO and/or preliminary injunction were filed and consolidated in the SC. The prayers of the said
petitions, among others, sought the annulment of the award of the contract for the national
broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation and to enjoin any activity in connection with
the said deal.

On October 2, 2007, during a meeting, Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity informed Pres.
Hu Jintao of China that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the
ZTE-NBN project. Later, the Solicitor General made a manifestation and motion stating that in an
Indorsement by the Legal Division of the DOTC, it has been informed that the Philippine
Government has decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project. That said, there is no more
justiciable controversy for the Court to resolve. The public respondents then prayed that the
present petitions be dismissed.

The petitioners, in their respective replies, argued that the Indorsement is self-serving and not a
sufficient basis that the deal has been permanently scrapped. Assuming arguendo that the
petition has become moot, the Court may still take cognizance thereof to educate the bench and
the bar. Further, because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised, the Court
should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.

The petitioners ultimately contended the declarations made by officials belonging to the
executive branch on the Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN
Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible.

ISSUE:

WON the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President GMA?
HELD:

The SC dismissed the petition. It held that It has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the
official act of the President.

Under the Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take
judicial notice of the official acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive
branch of our government. It is further provided in the said rule that the court shall take judicial
notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of
cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the
meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive
department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.

Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of
the executive officials of informing this Court of the governments decision not to continue with
the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the
contrary. The Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the
present instance.

St. Marys Farm, Inc. v. Prima Real Properties

560 SCRA 704

Facts:

St. Marys was the registered owner of an originally 25,598 sqm of land in Las Pinas under TCT
S-1648.

In compliance with a final court decision in another civil case, St. Marys passed and approved in
1988 a board resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision
4,000 sqm of the abovementioned land.

Agana did not return to plaintiff the said title. Instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of St.
Marys authorizing Agana to sell the remaining 21,598 sqm of land. This board resolution was
duly notarized. Agana was also with a Special Power of Attorney when it dealt with T.S. Cruz and
Prima Real Properties.
Eventually, a deed of absolute sale was signed by Agana and Prima Real Properties transferring
ownership of the land from St. Marys to Prima.

Prima effected the cancellation of TCT S-1648 in the name of St. Marys and another TCT T-6175
in its name was issued by the Registry of deeds, Villanueva.

Prima purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the 4,000 sqm portion of the land.

St. Marys filed an action for rescission of the sale and the reconveyance of the property.

According to St. Marys:

Sale of the realty entered into between Agana and Prima is null and void for lack of authority on
the part of Agana to sell the property.

The board resolution allegedly granting Agana the authority to sell in behalf of the company, as
certified by Corp. Secretary Agcaoili is a forgery as no board meeting was held on June 27, 1988;
the said document was merely presented to the notary public for notarization without Atty.
Agcaoili appearing before him.

Consequently, the deed of absolute sale was void for being a result of a fraudulent transaction.

Prima contends:

It acted in good faith when it relied solely on the face of the authorization of Agana and paid in
full the purchase price of P2,567,760.00 making it a buyer in good faitgh and for value.

Even assuming that the authorization of Agana was forged, St. Marys, through its president,
accepted and received part of the purchase price knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds
of the sale of the property, St. Marys is now estopped from asking for rescission.

FIRST ISSUE:

Whether or not Prima was a buyer in bad faith

HELD:

No, Prima was a buyer in good faith and for value.

On the basis of the board resolution, Prima had every reason to rely on Aganas authority to sell
the land.

A buyer for value and in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays full and fair price for the
same, at the same time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the said claim or interest.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the
face of the title of the property. Sufficient that the following conditions concur:

The seller is the registered owner of the land

Owner has possession of the land

At the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in
the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey
title to the property

All the three conditions are present in the case.

Prima exerted efforts to verify the true background of the subject land

Agana presented to Prima the notarized board resolution, separate Certification by St. Marys
president authorizing Agana to sell the land, and a TCT of the property

SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not Agana was authorized to sell the subject property

HELD:

Yes, Agana had the authority to sell the subject property by virtue of the notarized board
resolution and the Special Power of Attorney.

RATIO:

The document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized. It is a public
document where the notarial acknowledgement is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due
execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between knowing
and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him replacing it with a presumption sanctioned
by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he executed
the document, understood its import and signed it. The buyer is given the luxury to rely on the
presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA.

Prima also relied on the confirmation and certification of the Register of Deeds of Las Pinas and
Mr. T.S. Cruz. When Agana first sold the 4,000 sqm portion to T.S. Cruz, he showed a similar
authorization by the petitioner which was also signed by the corporate secretary, Atty. Agcaoili.
Agana acted as St. Marys authorized agent and had full authority to bind the company in that
first transaction with Cruz.
The board resolution also negates the assertion by St. Marys that Aganas authority was only
limited to negotiate and not to sell. The resolution further averred that Agana was authorized
and empowered to sign any and all documents, instruments, papers or writings which may be
required and necessary for this purpose to bind the corporation in this undertaking. The
certification of St. Marys president also attests to this fact. With this, Agana, undeniably had the
authority to cede the subject property, carrying with it all the concomitant powers necessary to
implement said transaction.

NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, assisted by her husband ALFREDO CANDIDO, and VICTORIA C.

RUMBAUA, assisted by her husband AMOR RUMBAUA, petitioners

COURT OF APPEALS and SOFRONIO DABU, respondents.

FACTS:Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria Rumbaua are co-owners of a first-class

irrigated riceland with an area of 21,193 square meters located in Orion, Bataan. Respondent
Sofronio Dabu served as their agricultural tenant. On 21 July 1986 petitioners lodged a
complaint[1] with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against respondent Dabu for termination of
tenancy relationship and recovery of unpaid rentals from crop-year 1983 plus attorneys fees
and litigation expenses.

Petitioners averred in their complaint below that a team from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
had fixed a provisional rental of twenty-six (26) and twenty-nine (29) sacks of palay for the rainy
and dry seasons, respectively, which respondent failed to pay beginning the crop-year 1983 dry
season up to the filing of the complaint.

Private respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that until 1983
their sharing system was on a 50-50 basis. He denied any provisional rental allegedly fixed by the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform and at the same time maintained that only a proposal for thirteen
(13) cavans for the rainy season crop and twenty-five percent (25%) of the net harvest during
the dry season was put forward. He claimed that he paid his rentals by depositing thirteen (13)
cavans of palay for the 1984 rainy season crop, thirteen (13) cavans for 1985 and eight (8)
cavans representing twenty-five percent (25%) of the dry season harvest.

On motion of respondent upon issues being joined, the case was referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for a preliminary determination of the existing relationship between the
parties and for certification as to its propriety for trial. Thereafter the DAR certified that the
case was proper for trial but only on the issue of non-payment of rentals and not on the
ejectment of respondent Dabu. Accordingly trial proceeded on the issue of non-payment of
rentals.
After finding that no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove the provisional rental alleged
to have been fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the lower court dismissed the complaint.
The counterclaim of respondent Dabu was likewise dismissed after it was established that the
tenancy relationship prevailing between the parties was on a 50-50 basis.

The Court of Appeals confirmed the findings of the court a quo.

Petitioners would impress upon us that the verified complaint and the affidavit presented by
petitioners to the DAR are proofs of the provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was error for
the trial court not to have taken cognizance of these documents.

ISSUE1: Whether the verified complaint and affidavits presented by petitioners may be
considered evidence absent any formal offer

HELD1: A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to
object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it.[8] A formal offer is
necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only -and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.[9] To allow a party to attach any
document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw
unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the
document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing
documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the
records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the
hearing of the case.

ISSUE2: Whether or not the court should take judicial notice of petitioner Natividad C. Candidos
affidavit despite absence of any formal offer

HELD2: NO. Petitioners would insist that we take judicial notice of the affidavit of petitioner
Natividad C. Candido despite absence of any formal offer during the proceedings in the trial
court. This is futile since this is not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires to
be taken judicial notice of; neither can we consider it of public knowledge, or capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.

The testimony of petitioner Natividad Candido cannot even be relied upon, to say the least.
Quite interestingly, she could not even recall when private respondent first failed to pay his rent,
if indeed there was any failure on his part to comply with his obligation. She only said that it
was sometime in 1982 or 1983, and did not even know precisely how many cavans of palay were
being harvested per crop-year.
Petitioners definitely failed to establish their cause of action. They never proved that
respondent Dabu failed to pay his rentals starting 1982. Neither were they able to
competently confirm the provisional rate of rentals allegedly fixed by the team of the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform.

EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 152392 May 26, 2005

FACTS:

Korean Airlines (KAL), through its appointed counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint in RTC
for the collection of the principal amount etc. against Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI). The
verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo.

The ETI sought for the dismissal of the case; disputing the authority of Atty. Aguinaldo to
execute the requisite verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as the resident agent
and counsel of the respondent.

In an attempt to show proof of such authority or representation, KAL through its general
manager, executed and submitted an Affidavit alleging: that the board of directors conducted a
special teleconference; that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a
resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to
file the complaint; and that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
However, such attempt casted veritable doubt not only on its claim that such a teleconference
was held, but also on the approval by the Board of Directors of the said resolution.

Finally, the petitioner pointed out that teleconferencing is not recognized as a legitimate means
of gathering a quorum of board of directors for purposes of passing a resolution; hence, the trial
court cannot take judicial notice of the said teleconference without prior hearing, nor any
motion therefor.
The RTC and CA dismiss the petition. In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice
because of the onset of modern technology. The CA, likewise, gave credence to the respondents
claim that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as
well as Atty. Aguinaldos certification.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take judicial notice of the said teleconference without
prior hearing.

HELD:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must
be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.

Although the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by
individuals through teleconferencing. The Court agrees that persons in the Philippines may have
a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or
corporate governance.

In this case, however, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted. And even if there had
been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically
authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against
forum shopping. The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a
teleconference and approved the said resolution is not credible, given the additional fact that no
such allegation was made in the complaint.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference never took place,
and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors during the
said teleconference was a mere concoction for the purpose of creating an impression on the RTC,
the CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.

In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the lower courts were set aside and the
complaint filed by the respondent was dismissed.

State Prosecutors vs Judge Manuel Muro (A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994)

Facts: The petitioners in this case are state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of
Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the
law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of
the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent
judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The respondents decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the
court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He
further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has
made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is
discretionary on his part.

The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters
he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper
publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction
published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case? (YES)

Ruling: The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It
cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the Circular
No. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper, believing that
the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and
such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his
discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a
newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity.

When the Presidents statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of
not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial
notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the
public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:

the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact
cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of
the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the
knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and
one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he
obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of
a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the
prosecution the right to be heard and of due process.

Sec. 2. Discretionary Judicial Notice

Landbank vs. Wycoco

Facts:

Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted
rice land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and situated in the Barrio of San
Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija. Pursuant to the CARP, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell his land to the
DAR for P14.9 million. The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were the
following: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation; and (3)
letter dated July 10, 1992 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR. However, the offered
price of the DAR is only P2,280,159.82, thus, he rejected the offer. He then filed a case before
the RTC for the determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in his favor. It ruled that
there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public
knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is
from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and
fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total
of P13,428,082.00.

Issue:

WON the just compensation determined by the RTC was valid and within its jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial
court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically
assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining
just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to
be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition,
the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations
thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just
compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another
way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can
be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it
will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge
of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.

Digest: Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. CA (1995) G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995 Lessons
Applicable: Territoriality Principle (conflicts of law)

FACTS: Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp & Company (C.F.), through its Japan
branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the
Northwest authorized the C.F. to sell its air transportation tickets March 25, 1980: Unable to
remit the proceeds of the ticket sales, Northwest sued C.F. in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages April 11, 1980: writ of summons
was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan The attempt to serve the
summons was unsuccessful because Mr. Dinozo was in Manila and would be back on April 24,
1980 April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve the summons but he refused to
receive claiming that he no longer an employee After the 2 attempts of service were
unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal
documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan> Japanese Embassy in Manila>Ministry
(now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines>Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila who ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit>C.F.
Main Office August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of
summons but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered
judgment ordering the C.F. to pay 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per
annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed March 24, 1981: C.F.
received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. C.F. did not appeal so it became
final and executory May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment a RTC
July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice and/or
with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact. The foreign judgment in the
Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant considering that this is an action in personam. The process of the Court in Japan
sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the
defendant in the case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar CA sustained RTC: Court
agrees that if the C.F. in a foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign court such court
could acquire jurisdiction over the person of C.F. but it must be served in the territorial
jurisdiction of the foreign court ISSUE: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F. HELD:
YES. instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it
denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages
Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service
of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. Applying it,
the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for
that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by
law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. If the foreign
corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and
service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official
designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance
company (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation (c) the
Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to
do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or
official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal proccess to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the
service. The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a
purpose to assimilate.

Laureano vs. CA
Rule 129: What need not be Proved
Section 2: Discretionary Judicial Notice

In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited
(SAL). In 1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some
employees. Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it
was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against
SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the case
here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the termination of
Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of
lack of jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.
HELD: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of
Laureano is not proved in court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination
if the termination is indeed valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not
take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed
to prove such law hence Philippine law shall apply. However, the case must be
dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from
employer-employee relationships must be filed within three years from the time the
cause of action accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was
terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from
1982. Hence he is already barred by prescription.

Republic VS Court of Appeals

107 SCRA 504 Sept. 10, 1981

FACTS:
 On May 17, 1979, petitioner asked the CFI Bulacan for a fifth motion for
extension of time to file notice of appeal from May 18, 1979 to June 17, 1979.
Petitioner filed its notice of appeal on June 7, 1979 although the lower court has not
yet acted on its fifth motion for extension of time. The private respondents filed an
opposition in the notice of appeal on the ground that the same was filed beyond the
reglementary period because petitioners motion dated May 17, 1979 was filed on
May 21, 1979.
Petitioner filed its opposition to the objection of the private respondents, contending
that the said May 17, 1979 motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May
18, 1979, which was the last day of the extended period allowed by the lower courts
order on his fourth motion for extension of time.
The lower court dismissed the appeal of petitioner on the ground that the fifth motion
for extension of time and the record on appeal were filed out of time; and found the
said fifth motion was actually mailed on May 21, 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 as the
latter relied on the date stamped on the envelope by Manila Post Office.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the said motion was filed
on time and attached therein the letter of the postmaster stating that the mail was
received by their office on May 18, 1979; however, it was not included in the May 19
dispatch to Bulacan and was actually dispatched on May 21, 1979. The said motion
for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, their appeal was also denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the practice of the post office of stamping immediately on the
envelope the date on which a letter was posted is one that cannot be a proper subject
of judicial notice.
RULING:
YES. The post office practice of which the lower court took judicial notice is not
covered by any of the instances provided by the Rules. Neither can it be classified
under matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. For
a matter to be taken judicial notice of by the courts of law, it must be a subject of
common and general knowledge. In other words, judicial notice of facts is measured
by general knowledge of the same facts.
Indeed, the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubts upon
the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
JUMAMIL vs CAF et al, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005
FACTS:
In 1989, Petitioner Jumamil filed before the RTC OF Panabo a petition for declaratory
relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public
respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution
No. 7, Series of 1989. This Resolution was for enacting Appropriation Ordinance No.
111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls
around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market. Subsequently,
Resolution No. 49 was passed appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the
construction of additional stalls.
Prior to the passage of these resolutions, Mayor Caf had already entered into
contracts with several parties who were close friends and/or relatives of the public
respondents. Thus the petitioner assails that the Resolutions were unconstitutional.
It appears that on May 21, 1990, both parties agreed14 to await the decision in CA
G.R. SP No. 20424, which involved similar facts, issues and parties. The RTC,
consequently, deferred the resolution of the pending petition. The appellate court
eventually rendered its decision in that case finding that the petitioners were not
entitled to the declaratory relief prayed for as they had no legal interest in the
controversy. Upon elevation to the Supreme Court as UDK Case No. 9948, the
petition for review on certiorari was denied for being insufficient in form and
substance.
ISSUE: Whether the parties were bound by the outcome in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 20424.
HELD: YES
Adverting to the first issue, we observe that petitioner was the one who wanted the
parties to await the decision of the Supreme Court in UDK Case No. 9948 since the
facts and issues in that case were similar to this. Petitioner, having expressly agreed
to be bound by our decision in the aforementioned case, should be reined in by the
dismissal order we issued, now final and executory. In addition to the fact that nothing
prohibits parties from committing to be bound by the results of another case, courts
may take judicial notice of a judgment in another case as long as the parties give their
consent or do not object.
As opined by Justice Edgardo L. Paras:
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own
records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition, judicial notice
will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between
the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of
another case between different parties in the same court.