PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG,
Moreover, her appointment of
THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, and the Heirs of JULIET
B. PULKERA, vs. CARMELING CRISOLOGO
G.R. No. 204626 June 9, 2014
The Facts
Carmeling Crisologo, represented by her attorney-in-
fact, Pedro Isican , filed her complaint for Recovery of
Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against
Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag,
and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the
MTCC.
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the
registered owner of two parcels of and covered by,
two (2) certificates of title; that the properties were
covered by an Assessment of Real Property; that the
payments of realty taxes on the said properties were
updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that
petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her
properties by stealth, by force and without her prior
consent and knowledge, and constructed their
houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal
occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo,
and Isican personally went to the properties and
verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the
premises and remove their structures thereon; that
the petitioners begged and promised to buy the said
properties for; that despite several demands they
were not able to pay and or vacate.;
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the
titles of Crisologo were products of Civil Registration
Case No. 1, Record 211, which were declared void by
the Supreme Court., that Crisologo failed to comply
with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No.
1271 for the validation of said titles, hence, the titles
were void; that petitioners had been in open, actual,
exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous
possession of the subject land, in good faith.
On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a
decision in favor of Crisologo.
The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered
owner of the subject parcels of land, who, as such,
had declared these properties for taxation purposes
since 1969 and regularly paid the realty taxes
thereon. It stated that with Crisologo being the
owner, petitioners were illegally occupying the land,
hence appealed was made with the RTC which
reversed and set aside the MTCC ruling.
Appeal to the CA was made. It held that Crisologo
was entitled to the possession of the subject parcels
of land. It explained that her possession was
established when she acquired the same by sale
sometime in 1967 and when the certificates of title
covering the properties were subsequently issued. It
added that her payment of realty taxes due on the
said properties since 1969 further strengthened her
claim of possession.
Isican as administrator of the subject properties and
her offer to sell the lots to the petitioners showed
that she had control over the same. Accordingly, the
CA concluded that Crisologos right to remain in
possession of the subject lots should be preferred
over the petitioners possession regardless of the
actual condition of her titles. Hence, the petitioners,
who used force in occupying her properties, should
respect, restore and not disturb her lawful possession
of the subject parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Who between petitioners and respondent Crisologo
have a better right of possession over the subject
parcels of land. Both contending parties claim that
they have a superior possessory right over the
disputed lands.
HELD:
The Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of
possession over the subject parcels of land.
Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion
publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is
to recover possession only, not ownership. When
parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the
court may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the
property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final
and binding determination of the issue of ownership;
it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession.
The nullity of the decrees of registration and
certificates of titles in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 is
not absolute.
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 127113 invalidated
decrees of registration and certificates of title within
the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO
Record No. 211, the nullity, however, is not that
sweeping. The said provision expressly states that
"all certificates of titles issued on or before July 31,
1973shall be considered valid and the lands covered
by them shall be deemed to have been conveyed in
fee simple to the registered owners" upon 1) showing
proof that the land covered by the subject title is not
within any government, public or quasi-public
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reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as certified
by appropriating government agencies; and 2)
compliance by the titleholder with the payment to
the Republic of the Philippines of the correct
assessed value of the land within the required period.
In the case at bench, the records show that the
subject parcels of land were registered on August 24,
1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid although
subject to the conditions set. But whether or not
Crisologo complied with the said conditions would
not matter because, this would be a collateral attack
on her registered titles.
At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are
not the proper parties to question the status of the
respondents registered titles. The Solicitor General
shall institute such actions or suits as may be
necessary to recover possession of lands covered by
all void titles not validated under this Decree."
The respondents certificates of title give her the
better right to possess the subject parcels of land.
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEA and RUPERTA
MENDOZA LIRIO vs. HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE
G.R. No. 137944 April 6, 2000
FACTS:
Prior to 1954 a parcel of land located in the Province
of Rizal was originally declared for taxation purposes
of the father (Sinfroso Mendoza) of herein respondent
who also is the present occupant of the land.
Subsequently the said tax declaration was cancelled
and declared under the name of Sinfroso's brother
(Margarito Mendoza) who are alsot the Petitioners'
father.
On October 15, 1975. respondent and another
brother of the petitioners ( Miguel) had a dispute
over the ownership of the land during the cadastral
survey of the same.
Trial Court rendred that the righful owner and
possessor of the land is the petitioners.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground
that the affidavits presented during trial had not
been sufficiently established. Moreover, the appellate
court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax
receipts and declarations paled in comparison with
respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed
parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous
possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave
her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is the lawful owner
and possessor of the parcel of land.
HELD:
YES. When respondent came of age in 1948, she
paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. Margarito
declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and
paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. When he died,
Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by
the CA, the respondent and her mother were living
on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until
1985 when he was physically ousted by the
respondent.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the
respondent is the preferred possessor because,
benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the
subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession
thereof for a longer period. On the other hand,
petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in
1952.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to
determine who between the claimants has proven
acquisitive prescription.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession for ten
years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent
showed through his tax receipt that she had been in
possession of the land for more than ten years since
1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to
reside there with her mother. When she got married,
she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the
disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until
1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land.
But by then, her possession, which was in the
concept of owner public, peaceful, and
uninterrupted had already ripened into ownership.
Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise,
declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land.
Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation, when coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, can be the basis of a
claim for ownership through prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years
of farming the subject land, did not acquire
ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be
acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with
the element of hostility toward the true owner,
occupation and use, however long, will not confer
title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover,
the petitioners cannot claim that their possession
was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although
their father and brother arguably acquired ownership
through extraordinary prescription because of their
adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985),
This supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire
disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that
they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that
their ownership of the disputed land was established
before the trial court through the series of tax
declarations and receipts issued in the name of
Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside
from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title
thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim
against the state and other interested parties.
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However, tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mereprima facie proof of ownership or
possession of the property for which taxes have been
paid. In the absence of actual public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for
tax purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the
petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel
has no legal basis.
Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,
Spouses Sabas Gepalago, G.R. No. 123713, April 1,
1998
Fact:
Both petitioner and respondent claim ownership over
a 3,625 sq.m land located at Bohol. Petitioner claims
ownership by virtue of inheritance from their father
who, during his lifetime took an uninterrupted
possession over the land, declared the property for
taxation purpose and religiously paid the real estate
tax. The respondent claims ownership as registered
owner of said lot as a portion of the lot owned by
Pedro Luspo who mortgaged his land to PNB and
subsequently was foreclosed. The respondents won
as the highest bidder and they became the owner of
that portion of land. The lower court ruled in favor to
the petitioners holding that they were in continuous
possession and cultivating the land for more than 30
years. Thus they acquired the land by prescription.
Although a Torrens Title is indefeasible and not
subject for prescription it is not when the
respondents purchased the land from PNB with prior
knowledge that the land was in possession of the
petitioners father. Upon appeal the CA reversed the
court ruling and declared the petitioners as the true
owners of the property.
Issue: Whether or not a land registered under the
Torrens system can prescribe in the instance case.
Held:
The court ruled that the land in dispute has been
covered by a Torrens Title more than 30 yrs before
the petitioners instituted the present action. Sec. 47
of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree states that no land under the
Torrens System be acquired through prescription.
Such title is indefeasible. It is wrong to contend that
the prior knowledge of the respondents on the
possession of the petitioners father defies the
Torrens titles inprescriptibility because there is no
flaw on the title when they purchased it from PNB
that was the registered owner of the land. The
vendee for value mainly relies on what appears on
the face of the title and is not compelled to go
beyond that. Moreover, the petitioner was unusually
silent with the previous transactions involving the
property when Luspo mortgaged the land to PNB,
when it was sold in public auction and the sale of the
land to the vendees. The court affirmed the decision
of the CA declaring the respondents as the true
owners of the land in dispute.
DBP VS. CA
316 SCRA 650
FACTS:
Spouses Pineda were the owners of a parcel of land
which they mortgaged to DBP in consideration of a
loan. As the loan was unpaid, the mortgage was
foreclosed and DBP took possession of the property.
It was opined by the Ministry of Justice that the
subject property may not be the subject of
foreclosure proceedings. The spouses then sought to
redeem the property but was denied as the land was
allegedly tenanted. They then sought the
cancellation of the title and specific performance.
HELD:
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw, which invalidates it and he who alleges bad
faith on the part of the possessor has the burden of
proof.
AZNAR V.YAPDIANGCO
13 SCRA 486
FACTS:
Theodoro Santos advertised in the newspapers the
sale of his Ford Fairlane 500. After the
advertisement, a certain de Dios, claiming to be the
nephew of Marella, went to the residence of Santos
and expressing his uncles intent to purchase the car.
Since Santos wasn't around, it was Irineo who talked
with de Dios. On being informed, Santos advised his
son to see Marella, which the son did. Marella
expressed his intention to purchase the car. A deed
of sale was prepared and Irineo was instructed by his
father not to part with the deed and the car without
receiving the purchase price from Marella. When
irineo and de Dios arrived at the residence of Marella,
the latter averred that his money was short and had
to borrow from his sister. He then instructed de Dios
and Irineo to go the supposed house of the sister to
obtain the money with an unidentified person. He
also asked Irineo to leave the deed to have his
lawyer see it. Relying on the good faith of Marella,
Irineo did as requested. Upon arriving at the house
of Marellas supposed to be sister, de Dios and the
unidentified person then disappeared together with
the car. This prompted Santos to report the incident
to the authorities. Thereafter, Marella was able to
sell the land to Aznar. And while in possession of the
car, police authorities confiscated the same. This
prompted Aznar to file an action for replevin.
HELD:
Marella never had title to the car as the car wasn't
ever delivered to him. While there was a deed of
sale in his favor, he was only able to obtain
possession of the car since he stole it from Santos.
The applicable law is Article 559. The rule is to the
effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has
been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to
recover it, not only from its finder, thief or robber,
but also from third persons who may have acquired it
in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The
said article establishes 2 exceptions to the general
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rule of irrevindicabiltyto wit, the owner has lost the
thing or has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In
these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner who may recover it without paying
any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired
it in a public sale.
Furthermore, the common law principle that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer a fraud
perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss
upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence,
has enable the fraud to be committed, cannot be
applied in this case, which is covered by an express
provision of law.

DE GARCIA VS. CA
37 SCRA 160

FACTS:

Guevarra was the owner of a ladys diamond ring

with white gold mounting, solitaire 2-karat diamond
as well as 4 brills. It was stolen from her house. On a
relevant date, while she was talking to Garcia, an
owner of a restaurant, she recognized the ring on the
latters finger and asked how she acquired the same.
Garcia averred that she bought it from her comadre.
Guevarra made Garcia know that the ring was stolen
from her place days before. It was ascertained the
ring was indeed Guevarras but despite written
demands, Garcia refused to return the ring.

HELD:

One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of

a movable may recover the same from the person in
possession of the same and the only defense the
latter may have is if he has acquired it in good faith
at a public sale in which case the owner cannot
obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefore. Guevarra who was unlawfully deprived of
the ring was entitled to recover it from de Garcia who
was found in possession of the same. The only
exception provided by law is when the possessor
acquired the property through a public sale, in which
case, the owner cannot recover without
reimbursement.

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