Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No.
08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders
dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.

The Facts

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for
Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33.
Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent
with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against
petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in
Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal
cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24,
20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues
similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated
Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on
the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon
which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing
in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
and reasoned that:

Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the
same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be
dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness
of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the
prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 29, 2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC
issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of
a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely
to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent
to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when
the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was
instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE
NO. LP-06-0197.11

The Courts Ruling

This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17,
1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which
states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in
the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above
provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and,
thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the
filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a
party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the
proceedings in the latter.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted
or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and
which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed
either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private
respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the
Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the
criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal
action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of
the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:

Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their
omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160.
Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be
consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare
et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when
harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible
of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil
action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The
clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code
may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed
during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or
during the trial with the court hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be
filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code
that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil
action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a
prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the
civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving
the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a
ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the
time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting
that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More
importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.

Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that
the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed
for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not

Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no
prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is
declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract
would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the
check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the
crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of
B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable
consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is
immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.

Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable
consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or
service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of
the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check
included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account.
This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by
Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad
or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to
adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.

At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not
the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because
the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.24
(Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the
parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in
the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP
22.lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that
the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed,
is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to
the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision
in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and
March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the
MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 88-90. Penned by Judge Salvador V. Timbang.

2 Id. at 65-67.

3 Id. at 75-76.

4 Id. at 23-27.

5 Id. at 28-41.

6 Id. at 42-45.

7 Id. at 46-48.

8 Id. at 67.

9 Id. at 75-76.
10 Id. at 90.

11 Id. at 11.

12 Carlos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109887, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 25, 33; Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 17, 1995, 249 SCRA 342, 351; Apa v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
112381, March 30, 1995, 242 SCRA 509, 512; Yap v. Paras, G.R. No.101236, January 30, 1994, 205 SCRA
625, 629; Umali v. IAC, G.R. No. 63198, June 21, 1990, 186 SCRA 680, 685.

13 G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.

14 R.E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 97 (4th ed., 1998).

15 G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509.

16 R.E. Agpalo, supra note 14, at 269-270.

17 Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006, 506
SCRA 81, 98; Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666, 680-81;
Baares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 49; Cabada v. Alunan III, G.R. No.
119645, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 838, 848; Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208, March 11, 1994,
231 SCRA 211; Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September 30, 1992, 214 SCRA 378, 392.

18 G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001, 366 SCRA 567.

19 Id. at 572.

20 Mejia v. People, G.R. No. 149937, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 209, 213-214.

21 Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 451, 461; Narte v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 336, 341; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105461,
November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 723, 726-727, citing People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992,
215 SCRA 79, 84-85 and Que v. People, Nos. L-75217-18, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 161, 165.

22 Supra note 20, at 214-215.

23 G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455.

24 Id. at 474-475.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City in an Information which reads:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Contrary to law.3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case
for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-
Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of
the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity
of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent
marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage
between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.

In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated
December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in
Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G.
Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the
issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned
case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the
humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the
second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or
incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more
bigamy to speak of.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision. The fallo
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006
OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043
AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER
PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS
HEREBY NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN
NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF
THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.

THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE
SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G.
TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND
UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN
THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a
ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the
first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of
bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that
his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled.11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of
the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is
clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the
second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

July 16, 2013

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on ___July 3, 2013___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 16,
2013 at 2:30 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)

LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO

Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong
and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 44-54.

2 Id. at 56-57.

3 Records, p. 1.

4 Rollo, p. 58.

5 Id. at 44-54.
6 Id. at 52. (Emphasis in the original)

7 Id. at 56-57.

8 Id. at 20.

9 Mercado v. Tan, 391 Phil. 809, 818-819 (2000).

10 G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.

11 Id. at 245-246. (Emphasis in the original.)

12 Merlinda Cipriano Montaez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012.

13 Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307, 314

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity
of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals
criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas
on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes
on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas,
before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned
of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner.
In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with
Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or
subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the
subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he
sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work
as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in
Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of
said marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for
lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR
PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of
his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent,
and prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence
of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the
form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986,
which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a
Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a
handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and
Tenebro were legally married.16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the
National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry
of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices
have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract,
which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions
relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that
a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on
October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly
show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely
attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to
the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage
ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of
the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is
absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil
registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19
There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused
himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner
informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all
tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage
to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note
that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are
dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after
the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the
first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared
void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our
mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void
purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.
The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct
character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age
of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826
may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is
that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third
time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant
in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused
displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such
activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an
individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution,
the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which
sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of
Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.

Vitug, J., see separate opinion.

Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.

Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.

Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.

Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.

Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.

Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION>

VITUG, J.:

Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to Hilda
Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his
second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.

The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings".1 Bigamy
presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the
prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its being bigamous.

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as
being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?

I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both
parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer
must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree
is required to establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has
underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain,
require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a
defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express
provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the
courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable
marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if
the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however,
of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense
in an indictment of bigamy.

It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy
although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is
contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong
reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous
marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court,
in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior
void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration
of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later
decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the
Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall
itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or
intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on
the matter.8

A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from
Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church
laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is
completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal
requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want
of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.

The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be
said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is
judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or
born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule
on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses rights and
obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable
marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First,
psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code,
breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the
other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in
the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity,
however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident.11 It would have been logical for the
Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent
attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable
marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might
be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense
of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code,
could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-
year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling
under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent.

Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to
psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise
dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of
the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior
"voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution
of a criminal offense for bigamy.

In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage,
this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court has
explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the
subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting
first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been contracted without the
necessary license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the second
(voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances,
however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the
requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to
be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.

Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements,
either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the
bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for
bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the
bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but,
being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no
defense on the part of the offender who had entered into it.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

Footnotes

1 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 4-11.

2 Record, p. 78.

3 Record, p. 84.

4 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 11-12; TSN, 13 September 1995, pp. 6-9.

5 Record, pp. 1-2.

6 Id., p. 66.

7 TSN, 11 December 1996, p. 6.

8 Id., pp. 6-7.

9 Id., pp. 7-8.

10 Penned by Judge Rumoldo F. Fernandez, Rollo, pp. 156-162.

11 Rollo, p. 7.

12 Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE. Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907.

13 Rollo, pp. 7-16.

14 Id., pp. 16-18.

15 Record, p. 85.

16 Record, p. 84.

17 Record, p. 148.

18 Record, p. 149.

19 Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992, 205 SCRA 337, 343, citing People v.
Borromeo, 218 Phil. 122, 126.

20 Decision dated November 20, 1995, penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional Trial Court of
Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. AV-885 (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 43).

21 Record, pp. 16-18.

22 Family Code, Art. 41.

23 Family Code, Art. 2.

24 Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, pp. 119-120, citing the Family
Code, Articles 2 and 3.

25 Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

26 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;

(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse
or his or her own spouse.

27 Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996.

28 Family Code, Art. 54.

VITUG,
1 Article 349, Revised Penal Code.

2 Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338; see also People vs Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033.

3 100 Phil 1033.

4 See People vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767.

5 Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122; Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327.

6 143 SCRA 499.

7 145 SCRA 229.

8 I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
even for purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that the marriage, at
least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be
required when either or both parties have not at all given consent thereto that verily results in a "no"
marriage situation or when the prior "marriage" is between persons of the same sex.

9 Deliberations of the family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996.

10 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

11 One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological incapacity merely renders
a marriage voidable, not void.

12 De la cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et.
Al., 109 Phil 155; Zapanta vs. hon. Montessa, et. al., 144 Phil. 1227; People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil 246;
People vs. Lara, 51 O. G. 4079.

13 People vs. Lara, supra.

14 De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.