SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 1
STM Case Pool
TOPIC: 1. RULES OF SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Rule 72)
G.R. No. 16680 September 13, 1920
BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner, vs. ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First
Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents.
Facts: This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of
certiorari. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the
Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law
to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an
administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care,
management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision
of Act No. 190 permit him to appoint assessors in "special proceedings," The
petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of
assessors in such proceedings.
Held: The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of
assessors are the following:
(a) Section 57-62 of Act No. 190;
(b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190;
(c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267;
(d) section 2477 of Act No. 2711; and
(e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.
Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to
the city of Manila only. Act No. 2369 provides for the appointment of
assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190 provide for the
appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace. Therefore, the
only provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit the
appointment of assessors in "special proceedings" are sections 153-161 of
Act No. 190.
Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to
the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application,
the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ."
Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"?
Said section 1 of Act 190 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit in
a court of justice, while "every other remedy furnished by law is a 'special
proceeding."
An action is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying
legal remedies according to definite established rules.
The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the
statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally
granted upon an application or motion.
From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings
like the present the judge of the Court of First Instance is without authority
to appoint assessors.
[G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001]
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO,
and ISABELITA MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME,
MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S.
MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO,
respondents.
Facts: Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived
by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children. He left several real
properties.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the
surviving children filed a petition with the respondent RTC for the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari whereby they
contend among others that there was absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise among members of the same family, that the same should be
dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground
that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with,
that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the
same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222[14] of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue: whether or not the petitioner's contention is tenable?
Held: No, it is untenable.
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action
or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement
and Distribution of Estate belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in
the nature of an ordinary civil action.
The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition
for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of
the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the
City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent
and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all
the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.
The petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are
sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs
prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the
intention of the private respondents herein to seek judicial settlement of the
estate of their deceased father.
Concededly, the petition contains certain averments which may be typical of
an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took
advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called
Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an
Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses
and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages,
plus attorney's fees and costs in an apparent effort to make out a case of an
ordinary civil action an ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the
purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of
the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial
to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and
dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out
only in an ordinary civil action.
Moreover, herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation
of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the
petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 203.
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. This is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action

is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for
the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
sued for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein.
The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and,
as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. The private respondents herein merely
seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of
the probate court.
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR
OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO
FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent.
Facts: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered
owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano,
together with his six children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real
property.
Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six
children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of
Graciano and the Six children.
Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into
two separate lots and Graciano eventually sold the first lot to a third person
but retained ownership over the second lot.
Later, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the second lot to his wife Patricia as a result of which
TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name.
Then Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his
first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint filed by herein private respondents, they alleged that upon
Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of herein petitioner.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
The RTC held that the deed of sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial
separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from
entering (into) a contract of sale. Also, the deed as sale cannot be likewise
regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article
133 of the New Civil Code.
The CA reversed the decision and ruled that: "It is the probate court that has
exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The
court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title,
went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a
special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person."
Thus this present petition.
Issue: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in
an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate
matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the
decedent to any of the heirs?
Held: No, the RTC may not do so.
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Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and
special proceedings, in this wise:
a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the
rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a
special civil action.
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of
one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules.
The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the
statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of
the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as the Civil Case for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said
question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is
procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private
respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the
authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
G.R. No. 26751 (G.R. No. L-26085; G.R. No. L-26106) January 31, 1969
JOSE S. MATUTE, petitioner, vs. CA and MATIAS S. MATUTE, respondents.
FACTS:
Carlos Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both the
petitioner and the herein respondent Matias, filed in special proceeding
25876 (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal of
Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos') appointment in such capacity.
Carlos alleged that "for a period of more than two years from the date of his
appointment (on May 29, 1963), said Matias has neglected to render a true,
just and complete account of his administration," and that he "is not only

incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his
charge consisting of five haciendas on account of a criminal charge for
murder filed against him which is occupying most of his time."
The respondent Matias opposed to the petition and contended: That the
allegation is completely without basis and false, because the records show
that under date of May 20,1964, he submitted to this Honorable Court with
copies furnished to all the parties concerned, including Carlos, his accounting
for 1963, that on Feb. 8, 1965, he filed his accounting for 1964; That his
competence to act as administrator has been established to the satisfaction
of this Honorable Court as evidenced by his appointment by a fixed,
final and executory order dated May 29, 1963; and That the records of the
pertinent case in the CFI of Davao will easily discover that it has not occupied
any time at all of the herein Judicial Administrator, for aside from a single
hearing last December 1964 on his application for bail ... no hearing has been
held on the said case up to the present.
Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the movants' exhibits on
the ground that the same were hearsay,self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere
photostatic copies of supposed originals which were never properly
identified nor shown in court. Later, the counsel for Matias filed with leave of
court a "Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence" which avers that
"there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the motions
for the removal of the herein co-administrator Matias." In the same motion,
said counsel reserved the right to introduce evidence in behalf of his client
should the foregoing motion be denied.
Then the probate court issued an order removing co-administrator, Matias
S.Matute. Forthwith, Matias interposed with the CA a petition
for certiorari praying that the aforesaid order be set aside as a nullity for
having decreed his removal without due process and the appointment of
Jose Matute without the requisite hearing.
Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the reason in support of the
order of removal that the probate judge accorded the respondent all the
opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactibs
such as filing a motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the rule of the Rules of Court regarding judgment on
demurrer to evidence is applicable to special proceedings.
HELD: YES.
The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of
Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. As aptly
expressed in one case, "The sufficiency of any ground for removal should
thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first
place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court."
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action
taken by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or
administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.
In the case at bar, we are constrained, however to nullify the disputed order
of removal because it is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the
respondent from his trust without affording him the full benefit of a day in
court, thus denying him his cardinal right to due process.
It appears that shortly after the reception of evidence for the movants Carlos
Matute and the Candelario-Matute heirs, the respondent filed on January 8,
1966 a verified objection to the admission in evidence of the movants'
exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant
and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed originals which were never
properly identified nor produced in court. Four days later, or on January 12,
1966, the respondent filed with leave of court a "Motion to Dismiss and/or
Demurrer to Evidence", the pertinent and material portion of which reads:
... considering the specific objection to each exhibit contained in
said Objections to Admission of Movants' Exhibits and considering
further the ruling of this Honorable Court in open court that pleadings
filed in this case are evidence only of the fact of their filing and not of
the truth of the statements contained therein and considering still
further the fact that no competent single witness was presented by
movants in support of their respective contentions, we submit
that there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the
motions for removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S.
Matute and in the light of the authorities hereinbelow cited, the
motions to remove Matias S. Matute must be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
... However, in the remote possibility that this instant motion be
denied by this Honorable Court, the herein co-administrator expressly
reserves his right to present his own evidence ... at least five (5) days
from the receipt of said denial.... (emphasis supplied)
Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the
controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without
giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit
reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his
behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to
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evidence. We are of the view that the above actuation of the probate judge
constituted grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as
a nullity. In fact, even without the respondent's reservation, it was the
bounden duty of the probate judge to schedule the presentation and
reception of the respondent's evidence before disposing of the case on the
merits because only the movants at that time had presented their evidence.
This duty is projected into bolder relief if we consider, which we must, that
the aforesaid motion is in form as well as in substance a demurrer to
evidence allowed by Rule 35, by virtue of which the defendant does not lose
his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is denied. Said Rule
states:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. (emphasis supplied)
The application of the abovecited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at
bar, is authorized by section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the "absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."
But what is patently censurable is the actuation of the probate judge in
removing the respondent, not on the strength of the evidence adduced by
the movants (not a single exhibit or document introduced by the movants
was specifically cited in the disputed order as a justification of the
respondent's ouster), but on the basis of his (judge's) findings, which
he motu propio gleaned from the records of special proceeding 25876,
without affording the respondent an opportunity to controvert said findings
or in the very least to explain why he should not be removed on the basis
thereof.
The probate judge did find, as essayed in his disputed order, that the
respondent "has shown indifference to his duties as such co-administrator of
the estate" as evidenced by:
(1) the disapproval of his 1964 account by the probate court in an order
dated January 5, 1966 due to his "non-appearance and non-submission of
evidence to sustain his account on the date set for the presentation of the
same;"
(2) the considerable decrease in the income of the properties under his
charge, as reflected in said 1964 account, which circumstance "does not
speak well of his diligence and attention to the administration of said
properties;" and
(3) the failure of said 1964 account to disclose the number of calves born
during the accounting period, "thereby indicating a palpable omission of fact
which directly reduced the value of the income or the increase of the assets
of the estate."
But, significantly, the movants did not specifically invoke the aforesaid
grounds in support of their petition to oust the respondent. All of the said
grounds, which in the mind of the probate judge exposed the supposed
indifference and incompetence of the respondent in the discharge of his
trust, are based on alleged defects of the respondent's 1964 account. Under
these circumstances, it behooved the probate judge to inform the
respondent of his findings before ordering the latter's removal. We concede
that the probate judge enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the matter of
the removal of executors and administrators and he can cause their ouster at
his own instance. However, before they are deprived of their office they
must be given the full benefit of a day in court, an opportunity not accorded
to the respondent herein.
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO
MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors,
KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother,
REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
FACTS:
(PR) Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for
letters of administration before the RTC. PRs alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati
City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00
consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving
spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. PRs prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator
for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in
the meantime, petitioner Michael, son of the decedent, be appointed as
Special Administrator of the estate.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without

securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court. He further argued that PRs should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175
of the Family Code.
Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that PRs' claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993
Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and
educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and affirmed by the CA, hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether PRs are already barred from proving their filiation.
HELD: NO. The petition lacks merit.
The Court agrees with the CA that a ruling on the same would be premature
considering that PRs have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code
took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate
children was Article 285 of the Civil Code (1), which provides that: The action
for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the
father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority; x x x
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors
at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up
to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired
or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established
by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an
admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may
be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is
based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (see Articles 172, 173 and
175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code)
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends
on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving
their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this
case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier
of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the RTC after a full-blown
trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for
letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving
evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling
the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of
each heir. That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the
other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence. As held in Briz v. Briz:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in
any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child
and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one
which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct
causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no
absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior
to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to
compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by
this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered
well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment,
but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong
vs. Siguiong; Tiamson vs. Tiamson); and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella; Conde vs. Abaya; Ramirez vs. Gmur). In
neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that
in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might
take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is
appropriate to such proceedings.
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G.R. No. 167405 February 16, 2006
ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the
Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as
Special Administrator, CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA
ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the
RTC (Spec. Proc. No. 204). Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir
of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco
were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn
Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto Lising and
Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties, as well as assorted
pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of
petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco
prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a
bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lisings properties to the legal
heirs.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an
adopted child of Lising and the latters husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who
died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the petition should be
dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary,
since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any
debts.
Petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto a
Certification stating that Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos
Santos, and a Certification stating that a judgment was rendered (on
December 21, 1968) decreeing petitioners adoption by Elena Lising and
Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No.
43 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of
the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree
was recorded.
Respondents Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed a petition for
annulment of the adoption decree. They claimed that no proceedings for the
adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac and the OSG had no records of the adoption case. Petitioners natural
mother supposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear that
petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFIs order
for initial hearing was published in a weekly newspaper which was not
authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings. Hence, respondent
alleged "badges of fraud" of the adoption.
The CA, however, refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since it held that it
was incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was
indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the
appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption
decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that petitioner had to prove the
validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities.
HELD: YES. The petition is meritorious.
The Court agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal adoption
by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before
the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from the local
civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered therein and
also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of
court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac
City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and
were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been
regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform.
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public
document required by law to be entered into the public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting
the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court
which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the
clerk of court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in
the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of
petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or
overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not
cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of

nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate, as categorically held in
Santos v. Aranzanso. Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these
proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat
petitioners claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a
categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of
adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts
stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioners
status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no
serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore,
for as long as petitioners adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot
claim any interest in the decedents estate. For this reason, we agree with
petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like
them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot
intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in
the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins
(Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the
adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered valid.
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily
exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere
collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue
would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant
case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence
of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioners
adoption.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM,- versus - VICENTA UMENGAN,
FACTS
-The lots subject of the unlawful detainer are Lot No. 5427 and Lot No. 990
registered in the names of the original owners, spouses Pedro Cuntapay and
Leona Bunagan.
- In an instrument denominated as Deed of Confirmation, the heirs of the
said spouses conveyed the ownership of the subject lots in favor of their two
children, Irene and Isabel Cuntapay.
-In another instrument entitled Partition agreement, it was agreed that the
eastern half portion shall belong to the heirs of Isabel Cuntapay. On the
other hand, the west portion shall belong to the heirs of Irene Cuntapay.
- Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband, Domingo Turingan,
namely: Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo and Maria. When Domingo Turingan
passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other
children by him, namely: Trinidad and Rosendo.
-Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel
Cuntapay by her second husband) filed with the MTCC a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the
subject lot. Vicenta Umengan is the daughter of Abdon Turingan (son of
Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband).
- In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the
owners of the subject lot, having inherited it from their father. Rosendo
Lasam was allegedly the sole heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through
Isabel Cuntapay. During his lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily
allowed Vicenta Umengan to occupy the subject lot sometime in 1955. The
latter and her husband allegedly promised that they would vacate the
subject lot upon demand. However, despite written notice and demand by
the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly unlawfully refused
to vacate the subject lot and continued to possess the same.
- In her Answer , Vicenta Umengan countered that when Isabel Cuntapay
passed away, the subject lot was inherited by her six children by her first and
second marriages through intestate succession. Each of the six children
allegedly had a pro indiviso share of 1/6 of the subject lot.
- It was further alleged by Vicenta Umengan that her father, Abdon Turingan,
purchased the respective 1/6 shares in the subject lot of his siblings Maria
and Sado. These conveyances were allegedly evidenced by the Deed of Sale .
- Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the subject lot to Vicenta
Umengan and her husband as evidenced by the Deed of Sale. Also on June
14, 1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in the subject lot to her daughter
Vicenta Umengan as evidenced by the Deed of Donation.
- According to Vicenta Umengan, the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her
second husband (Rosendo and Trinidad Lasam) own only 2/6 portion of the
subject lot. She thus prayed that the complaint for ejectment be dismissed
and that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam be ordered to pay her damages.
- The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and
directed the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In so ruling, the MTCC gave
credence to the newly discovered last will and testament
(entitled Testamento Abierto) purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 5
STM Case Pool
where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo Lasam. RTC
affirmed in toto.
-Undaunted, Vicenta Umengan filed an appeal with the CA which reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA explained that the said last will
and testament did not comply with the formal requirements of the law on
wills.[6]
- The heirs of Rosendo Lasam sought the reconsideration thereof but their
motion was denied by the CA. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: WON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP MAY BE RULED UPON IN AN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE. YES
WON THE PURPOTED WILL IS VALID AND BINDING. NO
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE
- It is well settled that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of
ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to possession de facto.
SECOND ISSUE:
-Contrary to the ruling of the MTCC and RTC, the purported last will and
testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon to establish
petitioners right to possess the subject lot because, without having been
probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any
right.
-Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition
the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his
will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court for the allowance of wills after the testators
death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional
Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance
of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the
will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after
his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
- Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that [b]efore
any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will
means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority
for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and
testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be,
and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law,
and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to
establish the validity of the will.[13] Moreover, the presentation of the will for
probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.[14]
Following the above truisms, the MTCC and RTC, therefore, erroneously
ruled that petitioners have a better right to possess the subject lot on the
basis of the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to
date, has not been probated. Stated in another manner, Isabel Cuntapays
last will and testament, which has not been probated, has no effect whatever
and petitioners cannot claim any right thereunder.
Hence, the CA correctly held that, as against petitioners claim, respondent
has shown a better right of possession over the subject lot as evidenced by
the deeds of conveyances executed in her favor by the children of Isabel
Cuntapay by her first marriage.

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON,
FACTS:
- Spouses Audrey and Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,
Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
- On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her
entire estate to Richard.1 The will was admitted to probate before the
Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips
as executor due to Richards renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also
named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3
- In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with
whom he has two children.
- On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal. 4 As administrator of Audreys estate in
the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties: (1) Audreys conjugal share in real estate with improvements
(Makati property); (2) a current account in Audreys name with a cash
balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00.5
- On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his
entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to
probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James
N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty.
William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena &
Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
- Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.
- On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a
motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed
on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard
being apportioned the undivided interest and Kyle, the undivided
interest in the Makati property.10
- The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial
court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an
Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel
TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle (
undivided interest);
- On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the CA for the annulment of the
trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in
Special Proceeding No. 9625.16Respondent contended that petitioner willfully
breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of
Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her will.
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard,
then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire
Makati property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner
contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition
before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
knowledge of the State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate
succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests
of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive
their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be
annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
- CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Hence
this present petition.
ISSUE:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 6
STM Case Pool
- WON THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME
FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO
LONGER BE ANNULLED. NO
- WON THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID
NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY
ONEIL GUERSEYS ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES. NO
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
- A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be
corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like
any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
- The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993,
before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the
applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129
may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction
or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become
a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must
be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the
annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The
CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners failure to
follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good
faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the
Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence,
petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the
terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to
distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to
equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill.
- It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of
the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of
Audreys will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of.
Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of
the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission,
alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-
year period should be counted from the time of respondents discovery
thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richards
estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing
the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse
into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she
came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioners acts. Obviously,
respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the
annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly,
the same has not yet prescribed.
- Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. There is extrinsic fraud within
the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not
pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35
- Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he
occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to
exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance
of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the
estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence,
care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability
exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which
his conduct is to be judged.36
- Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys
estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable

law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
- It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in
Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No.
9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audreys death, she
was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last
Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated
before the Orphans Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly
authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and
attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the
Orphans Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was
authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of
the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law
of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 and Article 1039 of the
Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent."
-;As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of
Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder,
states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court
shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of
according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in
the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)
- While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however,
petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
-Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good
faith. The Court cannot accept petitioners protestation. How can petitioner
honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate
of Audreys will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore
that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As
asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law
firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal
resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to
exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence,
and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately,
petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
- The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the
national law of Audrey ONeill Guersey during the proceedings before the
court a quo.
- Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains
that the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle
as Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys estate according to the project of
partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and
deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.
-The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as
ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. The CA likewise observed that the
distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle,
whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property.
-Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action
appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a circumstance
that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas
omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latters
last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a
fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.
- Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard
Guersey were American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines,
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 7
STM Case Pool
although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the
Makati property.
Under Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to
lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the
acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw
in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee
is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed
on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended
the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our
lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO, vs. SEVERINO AND RAYMUNDO LANDICHO,
JULIAN ABELLO, MARTA DE SAGUN AND EDITHA G. SARMIENTO,
FACTS:
- Crisologo C. Domingo filed on April 20, 1993 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tagaytay City an application for registration,1 of five parcels of land
-In his application, Domingo claimed that he bought the lots from Genoveva
Manlapit (Genoveva) in 1948 and has since been in continuous, open, public,
adverse and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner.
-Domingo further claimed that prior to his purchase of the lots, Genoveva
had been in possession thereof in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years.3
- The Land Registration Authority (LRA) noted, a discrepancyl. The RTC thus
referred the matter to the Lands Management Sector for verification and
correction.
- The Director of Lands filed a Report that "per records of the Lands
Management Bureau in Manila, the land involved in said case was not
covered by any land patent or by public land application pending issuance of
patent." 10
- On November 26, 1993, herein respondents filed an
Answer/Opposition12 to Domingos application, claiming that they have been
in open, continuous, adverse and actual possession and cultivation of the lots
in the concept of an owner and have been paying real estate taxes thereon;13
- During the pendency of his application or on March 9, 1996, Domingo died.
His counsel, Atty. Irineo Anarna, did not, however, inform the RTC of his
death.
- RTC approved Domingos application for registration. Respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and dismissed Domingos application for registration of land title.
ISSUE: WON DOMINGO IS ENTITLED TO THE
RULING:
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.29 (Underscoring supplied)
To thus be entitled to registration of a land, the applicant must prove that (a)
the land applied for forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a

bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945.30
- All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State, and unless it has been shown that they
have been reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private
person, they remain part of the inalienable public domain.31
- To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.32
- While petitioner presented a document denominated as "2nd
Indorsement"33 issued by Land Management Inspector Amadeo Mediran that
the lots are "within the alienable and disposable zone under Project No. 3
LSC-3113 issued on April 5, 1978 as certified by the Director of the Forest
Development," the genuineness of the document cannot be ascertained, it
being a mere photocopy. Besides, the truth of its contents cannot be
ascertained, Mediran having failed to take the witness stand to identify and
testify thereon.
- In fine, Domingo failed to adduce incontrovertible evidence34 showing that
the lots have been declared alienable. They are thus presumed to belong to
the public domain, beyond the commerce of man, and are not susceptible of
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
- But even assuming arguendo that the lots are alienable, Domingo failed to
comply with the requirement on the period of possession. While he alleged
in his petition that he bought the lots from Genoveva in 1948, he failed, as
the appellate court correctly noted, to adduce the deed of sale executed for
the purpose, or to explain the reason behind the failure and to present
sufficient evidence to prove the fact of sale.
- Again, even assuming arguendo that the lots were indeed sold to him by
Genoveva, Domingo failed to adduce proof that Genoveva, from whom he
seeks to tack his possession, acquired registrable title over them on June 12,
1945 or earlier. Under the same assumption, Domingos claim that he has
been in actual, continuous, adverse and open possession of the lots in the
concept of an owner since 1948 is a conclusion of law which must be
substantiated with proof of specific acts of ownership and factual evidence of
possession.35
An examination of the tax receipts36 presented by Domingo shows that they
are of recent vintage, the earliest being dated January 8, 1993.
Tax Declaration Nos. 0298, GR-019-0884, and GR-019-0885,37 which appear
to have been issued in 1947 [sic], 1964, and 1968, respectively, contain the
declaration "Filed under Presidential Decree No. 464" below the title
"Declaration of Real Property." P.D. No. 464, "The Real Property Tax Code,"
took effect, however, only on June 1, 1974. Specifically with respect to the
first tax declaration, it even shows that Domingo subscribed and swore to it
on August 1, 1947 at which time he had not bought the lot yet, in 1948 by his
claim.
TOPIC: 2. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSON (Rule 73-90)
EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on
November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of
Quezon.
On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all
surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate
children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the
ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10,
1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence,
the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio,
and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
ISSUE: WON the venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 8
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RULING: NO.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was,
and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had
his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad
condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41
P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a
house and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said City. While transferring his
belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke
(probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.
Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he
was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before
November 26, 1952.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the
decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy
(70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence,
residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-
settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is
gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of
Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile,
it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are
essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently
(Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169;
Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off.
Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable
of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his
demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that
place permanently.
The house and lot in Quezon City were bought by the decedent because he
had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein
appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its is very likely that said advice
was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and
have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health",
even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp.
172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight,
D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
"What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this
connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated
November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don
Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing
thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The
latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was
received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date
the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14,
1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the
children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein),
moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the
present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16,
1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying
upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at
bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the
decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case
exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court
evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts
with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a
competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a
similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is
denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the
parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident
decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for
the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court

of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts
then have concurrent jurisdiction and, hence, the one first taking
cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts but, also, because
the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the
Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,
which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the
court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are
instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before
the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda.
De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the
proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the
case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding
proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of
Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of
the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should,
accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's
petition.
MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS
In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He
declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole
devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named
executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The petition was filed in RTC Makati
Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court determined that Arturo is
of sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his last will and
testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will and testament on February
16, 1996.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix,
filed a motion for the issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She
however withdrew the motion but later on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch
65.
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with
Branch 61 claiming that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew
of Arturo) he should be appointed as the administrator of the estate and that
he is an heir.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed
by Pacita to Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate
proceeding started in Branch 61, then it should be the same court which
should hear Pacitas motion. Branch 61 however refused to consolidate and
referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated
the case per refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion
for intervention filed by Octavio.
ISSUES: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the
probate proceeding?
Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court Makati, Branch 61 has
lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of
an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos?
HELD:
1. NO. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed
in Branch 61 has already terminated upon the allowance of the
will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with Branch 65, the same is
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 9
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already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of the now
concluded probate in Branch 61. There is therefore no reason for
Branch 65 to refer back the case to Branch 61 as it initially did.
Further even if the probate was terminated, under Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement of estates, it is
provided that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over
the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the
exclusion of the other branches.
2. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the
authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death
of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the
will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle
the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of
such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain
a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the
principle of ambulatory nature of wills.
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a
petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It
provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition
the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his
will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's
death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional
Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance
of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the
will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after
his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.
Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or
any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
time after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether
the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition
in the court for the allowance of his will.
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February
16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to
issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12
of the Rules of Court.
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the
testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the
estate was to be suspended until the latter's death. In other
words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a
manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.

MALIG VS. BUSH
On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they
were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line
of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born of the common-law
relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August,
1941;
That said John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception of the
plaintiffs, were not suffering from any disability to marry each other;
That they lived with their alleged father during his lifetime and were
considered and treated by him as his acknowledge natural children;
That said John T. Bush, at the time of his death, left several real and personal
properties;
That the defendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of the
deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate
of the deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila;
That she submitted to the court for approval a project of partition,
purporting to show that the deceased left a will whereby he bequeathed his
estate to three persons, namely: Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna
Berger;
That the defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged
natural children of the deceased; and
That they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the
defendant only in July, 1962.
They prayed that the project of partition be annulled and that the defendant
be ordered to submit a complete inventory and accounting of all the
properties left by the deceased and another project of partition adjudicating
to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the said estate and/or in the event
that the defendant had disposed of all or part of the estate, that she be
ordered to pay them the market value thereof; and that the defendant be
ordered to pay for the value of the fruits received, damages and attorney's
fees.
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res
judicata and statute of limitations. The plaintiffs opposed and the defendant
filed a reply to the opposition. On January 10, 1963 the lower court denied
the motion, "it appearing that the grounds upon which said motion is based
are not indubitable."
After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date
thereof the hearing was postponed upon the defendant's manifestation that
she would file a written motion to dismiss. The motion, when filed,
challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since the action was one
to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that
court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section
1, of the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the
motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the
defendant but because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to
reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal.
It must be remembered that the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack of cause
of action, res judicata and statute of limitations, was denied because those
grounds did not appear to the court to be indubitable. The second motion
reiterated none of those grounds and raised only the question of jurisdiction.
In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower court in
effect did so motu proprio, without offering the plaintiffs a chance to argue
the point. In fact the court did not even state in its order why in its opinion
the action had prescribed, and why in effect, without any evidence or new
arguments on the question, it reversed its previous ruling that the ground of
prescription was not indubitable.
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ISSUE: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the
motion to dismiss?
RULING: NO.
It will be noted that Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court fixes jurisdiction
for purposes of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns venue,
as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different
courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule
specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."
In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition
already made and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate
proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for recovery by the
plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through fraud,
they have been deprived.
Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant,
this Court believes that the plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed without
a hearing on the merits.
VDA. De MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Troadio Manalo, died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo,
and his eleven (11) children, who are all of legal age.
At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located
in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name
and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at Arty Subdivision,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
One of the orders of the TC is to set the application of Romeo Manalo for
appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased
Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon.
Petitioner averred that there was absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise among members of the same family.
ISSUE:
whether or not the petition is for judicial settlement of estate or actually an
ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE.
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action
or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.
A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein
petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of
death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his
residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death.
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country
are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest. The petition in the SP.PROC also contains
an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no
room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private

respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their
deceased father, Troadio Manalo.
Concededly, the petition in the SP. PROC. contains certain averments which
may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors
therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-
called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an
Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses
and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages,
plus attorney's fees and costs in an apparent effort to make out a case of an
ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the
purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of
the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court,
siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear
and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed
out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to
the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature
of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the
defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too
difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.
Petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to
be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis Article
222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground
for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners
contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily
include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the
invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code for the dismissal of the petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the
latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action
is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for
the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
sued in SP. PROC. for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was
imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. is a special proceeding
and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein
(private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of
their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of
the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in
the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with
the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA,
Facts:
It involves an action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Celestino Rodriguez entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant
case".
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of
Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez but before the
Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn.
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Petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other
things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died
without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as
Special Administratrix of the estate.
Thereafter, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this
Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.
It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque,
Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in
Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and
Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the
petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at
11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand
that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case
upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and
that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in
Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one
proceeding to preference over the other. Reconsiderations having been
denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on
Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco
vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
ISSUE: WON CFI Bulacan has jurisdiction over the case. YES!
HELD:
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon
the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4,
1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon
the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to
fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the
Revised Rules of Court
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published.
When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed
in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for
proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three
(3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate
has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a
petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court
may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no
petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is
made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to
the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez
was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while
petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a
will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar

the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in
Rizal province.
We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in
Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he
retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in
Paraaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked
jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents'
estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the
domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of
the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484;
Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr.
Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province
of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p.
48). That is sufficient in the case before us.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First
Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by
express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the
same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec.
1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to
take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be
of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose
jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners.
One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they
learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was
in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the
precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority
established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the
settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the
administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is
only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes
place in the absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only
with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates
the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases
provided in this Code.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final
decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession
be instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of
intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the
purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in
the settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the
probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It
is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO
EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and
CARLOS EUSEBIO, oppositors-appellants.
Facts:
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Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for
his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio,
who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the
City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, respondents, all surnamed Eusebio,
objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the
deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and
praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue
had been improperly filed.
The issue hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on
November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio
was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where
he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart
was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided
at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio
bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2).
While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr.
Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the
decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of
Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952.
On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law
wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died at
the age of seventy-four (74) years. Consequently, he never stayed or even
slept in said house at Espaa Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the
decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy
(70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence,
residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-
settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is
gained"
Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio
established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the
following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3)
intention to stay therein permanently.
Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and
had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise.
ISSUE:
WON Andres Eusebio intended to stay in Espaa Extension permanently. NO!
HELD:
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent
appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son,
petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon,
despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the
appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest
of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the
testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus
Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
Espaa Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some
light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This
notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay
permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said
property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he
had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein
appellee. It is not improbable in fact, its is very likely that said advice
was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and
have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health",
even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home."

Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San
Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed
Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A Espaa Extention,
Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a
month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his
residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the
decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued
in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by
the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion
Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior
to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers
of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that
the children of the deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee,
were represented on that occasion and would have objected to said
statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from
appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to
establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and
immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 which is
particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando,
Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been offset by
the evidence of record.
If proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are
instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before
the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda.
De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the
proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the
case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding
proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of
Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate
of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should,
accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's
petition.
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. CA
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by
his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the
first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children of the first
marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a
resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. While petition was
still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a
petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last will and
testament, where she was named executrix. Hence, Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance
resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the
probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in
CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue,
considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA
ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebus order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings.
HELD:
The rules on venue and jurisdiction, under Rule 73 (section 1),
provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
However, upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedents last will
has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his
conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 13
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children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating
that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take
cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate
of the decedents alleged last will. The residence of the decedent or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter
but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt
administration of justice. Therefore, the CFI of Quezon City did not act with
grave abuse of jurisdiction nor it acted without jurisdiction.
PATRICIA NATCHER vs. CA
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951,
Graciano, together with his six children, entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Gracianas estate adjudicating and dividing among themselves
the mentioned real property. In 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner
Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by
TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was
issued in the latters name. On 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs. The private
respondents filed a civil case against the petitioner before RTC Manila. They
alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No.
107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of another TCT No. in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein
private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
ISSUE:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction
in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate
matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the
decedent to any of the heirs?
HELD:
The court answered in the negative. The court ruled that an action
for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person
such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding which concomitantly requires the application
of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Matters which involve
settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as
to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir. In the case at hand, RTC
is acting in its general jurisdiction is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in
favor of herein petitioner. Moreover, the RTC of Manila Branch 55 was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. LUIS
FACTS:
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San
Luis. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. From the first
marriage contracted in 1942 he had six children, two of whom are the
petitioners in this case. His first wife died in 1963 and his second marriage to
an American citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971. In 1974
Felicisimo married Felicidad, the respondent in this case, in the USA. They

had no children but lived together for 18 years until Felicisimo died in 1992.
After his death, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and filed a petition for letters of administration. The children of
Felicisimo from his first marriage opposed this on the grounds that Felicidad
is only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wife subsisting. The
petitioners claimed that Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate the bigamous marriage because it would impair
the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
ISSUE:
Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration?
HELD:
Yes, Felicidad has legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration as she may be considered the co-owner of the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by the petitioners. Sec 2, Rule 79 provides
that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to
file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her
status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under article 144
of the civil code or article 148 of the family code.
*DE BORJA VS. TAN (see page 20 and 24 of Lakas Atenista TSN. I think
Maam had the wrong citation of the case in her syllabus.
MACIAS vs. UY KIM
G.R. No. L-31174 May 30, 1972
Facts: Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed a petition against
respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong,
Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance, alleging that he filed on a complaint dated for the annulment of a
deed of sale, reivindicacion and damages against respondents and prays for
judgment (a) declaring the deed of sale over the aforementioned lots as null
and void, (b) directing the cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles
issued in the name of Reliable Realty Corporation.
Herein respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio
Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong filed their motion to dismiss the
instant petition on the ground that Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint, for the said Branch X is
without authority to review the decisions of Branch IV, a coordinate branch
of the Manila Court of First Instance; and that petitioner-appellant had
already appealed the order of Judge Barcelona of Branch VIII authorizing and
approving the sale of the lots in favor of respondent Reliable Realty.
It is not disputed that the orders sought to be annulled and set aside by
herein petitioner-appellant in his complaint against private respondents
which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance
presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona
presiding over Branch VIII of the same court.
Issue: W/N Branch VIII first acquired jurisdiction over the case to the
exclusion of all other branches.
Ruling: Yes.
The pretense of herein petitioner-appellant is without merit.
Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all
questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of
First Instance.
This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule 73, thus:
... The reason for this provision of the law is obvious.
The settlement of the estate of a deceased person in
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 14
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court constitutes but one proceeding. For the
successful administration of that estate it is necessary
that there should be but one responsible entity, one
court, which should have exclusive control of every
part of such administration. To intrust it to two or
more courts, each independent of the other, would
result in confusion and delay.
Even in other cases, it is also a general principle that the branch of the court
of first instance that first acquired jurisdiction over the case retains such
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other branches of the same court of first
instance or judicial district and all other coordinate courts. Thus, in the 1970
case of De Leon vs. Salvador, 4 Mr. Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court,
ruled:
The various branches of a Court of First Instance of a
province or city, having as they have the same or equal
authority and exercising as they do concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with the respective cases, much
less with their orders or judgments, by means of
injunction.
BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died
on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate
was instituted. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon
petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased
Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate
heirs.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate
of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives
aforementioned. Later, these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's
project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own,
claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio
Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that
the probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no
power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
Issue: May the Settlement Court determine properties as conjugal or
separate property? Generally no. But there is an exception.
Ruling:
As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on
testate or intestate proceedings," except where one of the parties prays
merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in
which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However,
we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the
deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question
as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the consent of the parties,
matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken
cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided
interests of third persons are not prejudiced.
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to
the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter
properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the
decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of
her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the
executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily.
There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the
heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the

widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this
right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the
claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and,
consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the
parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are
all heirs claiming title under the testator.
ERMAC VS MEDELO
Summary settlement of estates of small value
FACTS:
Potenciano Ermac and spouse Anastacia Mariquit died leaving only one
parcel of land in Iligan City with an assessed value of Php 590.00. Cenon
Medelo, one of the grandchildren (being one of the children of their
predeceased daughter Digna Ermac) , filed a petition for summary
settlement of said estate.
All requirements having been complied with and there being no oppositions
thereto, the petition was granted, enumerating the heirs entitled to
participate in the inheritance and ordering Medelo to present the proper
project of partition of the lot.
Pedro Ermac, one of the children of the spouses, moved for reconsideration
claiming that the lot belongs to him and his wife. This motion was denied
with the court ruling that a separate suit is the proper remedy and
accordingly, Ermac instituted a separate civil case.
The court then approved the project of partition submitted by Medelo.
Ermac objected to this on the ground that the lot is subject of a pending
case. However, this was denied.
ISSUE: WON the court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion in approving the project of partition notwithstanding that it is
being claimed by petitioners in a separate civil action to be their property
and not of the estate.
RULING: NEGATIVE
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons with the least loss of time. This
is especially true with small estates for which the rules provide precisely a
summary procedure dispensing with the appointment of an administrator
together with the other involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily required
in the determination of the assets of the deceased and the persons entitled
to inherit therefrom and the payment of his obligations. Definitely, the
probate court is not the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims of
ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to the decedent's
estate. While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular
administration proceedings, it is not proper to delay the summary
settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a third person
claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate but to him. Such
claim must be ventilated in an independent action, and the probate court
should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal
obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the
results of the suit. For the protection of the claimant the appropriate step is
to have the proper annotation of lis pendens entered.
PCIB VS ESCOLIN (sux case)
FACTS:
The instant case refers to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges
as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by
about 5years and a half. Both of them were originally from Texas, USA and
they were childless. In their respective wills which were executed on
different occasions, each of them provided mutually that each of the
decedents estate shall go to the surviving spouse and that the spouse may
do whatever he/she pleases, with the condition that when the surviving
spouse likewise passes away, the residual estate shall pass on to the
surviving brothers/sisters of the first decedent (and if they die, the
corresponding heirs shall represent).
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Mrs. Hodges died first on May 23, 1957. Her husband was appointed special
administrator of her estate. As administrator, he was allowed by the probate
court to do several acts of administration. At some point, Mr. Hodges
allegedly renounced all the inheritance he got from his wife in favour of
Linnies siblings.
Shortly, he died on December 25, 1962 without having liquidated nor
distributed Linnies estate. Upon his death, Avelina Magno, an employee
closest to the spouses was appointed. She carried on acts of administration
in both esates until she was joined by Charles brother, Joe as co-
administrator.
They were subsequently replaced by several other individuals until only PCIB
was appointed sole administrator. (There were no records of why the
changes took place and why PCIB ended up the sole admin).
The instant petition was filed by PCIB against the court which handled both
proceedings (regarding the estate of Linnie and that of Charles) on the
ground that the Judge Escolin kept on approving motions apparently from
both estates, which led to confusing or even conflicting issues.
PCIBS ARGUMENTS:
A. Linnies will should be governed by Philippine Law even if she was a Texas
National because it was her intention as stated in her will and she was a
resident of the Philippines at the time of her death. This was in relation to
the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi. Therefore, her estate
could consists of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties,
the one-fourth being the legitime of her husband which she could not have
disposed of nor burdened with any condition.
B. There was no asset left to Linnies estate at the time of her husbands
death on the theory that it is practically closed since she bequeathed
everything to her husband. There is no Testamentary Substitution because
the elements are wanting. (That the first designated heir: 1. Predecease the
testator 2. Refuse to accept the inheritance and 3. Incapacitated to inherit)
AVELINA ARGUMENT:
A. Linnie never change nor intended to change her original residence of birth
in Texas,United States and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question
of her residence, she being a a citizen of Texas, the distribution of her estate
is subject to the laws of her State which, do not provide for any legitime.
Hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of
her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half
thereof.
ISSUES
1. WON THE ESTATE SHOULD BE PARTITIONED/LIQUIDATED ACCORDING
TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS?
2. WON THE LINNIES SIBLINGS WERE ENTITLED TO ANYTHING?
RULING
1. The court REMAND the issue to the Trial Court because it is an issue of fact
and that the evidence presented by both parties were not adequate enough
for it to properly render a decision.
The Supreme Court advised both the administrators to act in conjunction
with the other and never proceed with one estate independently.
2. AFFIRMATIVE
Linnies siblings or representative are entitled to her estate which should not
be less than one-fourth of the community estate at the time of her death,
minus whatever Charles may have gratuitously disposed of during his
administration and as sole heir.
PCIBs contention is erroneous when it views the said disposition exclusively
in the light of Substitutions covered by the Civil Code when it is obvious that
substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will so that he
may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.
The siblings of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes because the will does not say
that the said relatives would inherit if Mr Hodges would predecease, be
incapacitated or should repudiate the inheritance but rather, they are also

her heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, to certain
conditions.
The institution of Mr Hodges partakes of a Resolutory Term, that his
ownership of the inherited properties would end at his death while the
institution of Mrs. Hodges brothers and sisters is on the other hand an
institution subject to a Suspensive term, their inheritance having become
vested at the time of Mrs. Hodges death but only become operative upon
the death of Mr Hodges.
NOTE: Resolutory Condition/ Suspensive Condition ang ginamit sa case but
TERM jud dapat ang gamiton kay sure man jud muabot ang time mamatay
ta. . Sa SUX diba ni? Taas kaayo ang case.
CALMA vs TANEDO
FACTS
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of a
certain property. They were indebted to Esperanza Taedo in the sums of
P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum which are
chargeable against the conjugal property. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a
will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of
her properties.
In the probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma, was appointed
judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased. During the
prendency of these proceedings, Taedo filed a suit for collection of sum of
money against the husband. The lower court rendered a judgement in her
favor and ordered the sheriff to sell the conjugal property despite the third
party claim filed by Fausta.
Maria, as administratix of the estate of Fausta, now brought this action to ask
that the sale made by the sheriff of the property be annulled and that the
estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute heir.
ISSUE: WON THE SALE MADE BY THE SHERIFF VALID?
RULING: NEGATIVE
The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment
rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness
chargeable against the conjugal property is void and said property should be
deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta
Macasaquit.
The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were instituted
in accordance with Act No. 3176 which provides:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the
provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and
partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally
capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of
proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in
order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale
shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this
Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities
shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the
vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.
Consequently, the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having
been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by
reason of her marriage to Eulalio Calma should be made in these
proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose.
Furthermore, when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the
legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the
administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 16
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instituted to that end if there be any debts to be paid. Thus, Eulalio Calma
having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his
wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the
recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and
that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first
with the committee on claims.
G.R. No. L-2263 May 30, 1951
PAZ Y. OCAMPO, JOSEFA Y. OCAMPO, ISIDRO Y. OCAMPO, GIL Y. OCAMPO,
MAURO Y. OCAMPO, and VICENTE Y. OCAMPO vs. CONRADO POTENCIANO,
VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO
FACTS:
Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed purporting to
convey to his relative, Conrado Potenciano, and the latter's wife, Rufina
Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,5000, a town a lot
with a house in Laguna.
On that same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear that,
for an annual rental of P300, which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12% of
the purchase price, the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for
the duration of the redemption period.
Though registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him
and his wife as conjugal property.
The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year. The period
having elapsed without the repurchase, Potenciano filed with the register of
deeds an affidavit for the consolidation of title, which the register of deeds
issued TCT in the name of Potenciano and his wife.
Here Ocampo and Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option
to repurchase the property for P2,500 within 5 years, and a lease thereon for
the same period of time.
Paz Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to Potenciano at his
clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000 an amount sufficient to cover both
principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected, deposited the
money in court and brought an action in her own name and as judicial
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to compel Potenciano
to accept it and to have the title to the property reinstated in her name and
that of her husband.
Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes
(appellants), filed a cross-complaint, alleging that the option to purchase
granted by their father to Yatco was null and void as to the share of their
deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share
passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in
the same property they, the intervenors, were exercising the right of
redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common, for
which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth
day after they learned of said option through plaintiff's complaint.
CFI: favored children of Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco, who had
substituted the latter after her death.
CA: upheld CFI's decision.
ISSUE: WON spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco are the real owners
of the property.
RULING: YES. It is not disputed that the pacto de retro sale made by Edilberto
Ocampo in favor of Conrado Potenciano and his wife was in reality a loan
with security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for
interest. The consolidation of title effected by Potenciano in this case was,
therefore, null and void.
The CA, however, held that the mortgage contract was superseded, through
novation, by the option agreement for the repurchase of the property
mortgaged, and the appellants now contend that this war error because
Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after the death of
his wife. To this contention we have to agree. The CA erred in supposing that
the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator of the
conjugal estate. As pointed out by appellants, the decisions relied on by that
court in support of its view are now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the
rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the
husband must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been
changed by Act No. 3176 (approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2,
Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the marriage is
dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs
must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse.
Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the
option agreement in question was nothing more than mere extension of time
for the payment of the mortgagee debt, since in the mind of the parties the
real transaction had between them was that of loan with security, or

equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form
of sale with right to repurchase.
It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of
payment and consigned the necessary amount in court, the said contract of
loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal
currency , the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal
effect, which is that of relieving the debtor from liability.
Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the appellants and that
the CA erred in not declaring them owners of the property in question, they
having inherited one-half of it from their mother and acquired the other half
from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-
owners. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, these
appellants acquired nothing.
G.R. No. L-7516 May 12, 1955
LEONOR P. REYES vs. THE HONORABLE BONIFACIO YSIP
FACTS:
A petition was presented for the probate of the last will and testament of
decedent of Juan Reyes Panlilio.
Leonor P. Reyes (petitioner) is the natural daughter of the deceased filed an
opposition thereto.
The special administratrix, who had presented the will for probate, objected
to the personality and right of the petitioner herein to contest the will and
asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will before the hearing
thereon.
Both counsel for the proponent of the will and the opponent, petitioner
herein, understood that the above order permitted the oppositor to appear
and intervene in the hearing on the will, leaving her personality, put in
question by proponent, to be resolved later.
Thus Attorney for the proponent asked for a reconsideration of the court's
order and at a subsequent hearing (for the probate of the will), opponent on
her part offered evidence on her alleged filiation.
The attorney for the administratrix again objected to the presentation of said
evidence (supporting the claim of the filiation of the petitioner herein), but
the trial judge, the Hon. Bonifacio Ysip, held that only the probate of the
will was at issue and that the question of the presentation of evidence as to
the filiation of the oppositor, petitioner herein, was out of place.
Counsel for petitioner made attempts to have the court reconsider its order
but the court refused to do so. So her counsel begged the court to suspend
the proceedings, and he instituted the present petition for a writ to compel
the respondent judge to permit her to prove her alleged filiation as a
recognized natural child of the testator.
ISSUE: WON the court is obliged to accept or receive evidence of the filiation
of an oppositor in the hearing of a petition for the probate of a will.
RULING: NO.
Had the court prohibited or prevented the petitioner, oppositor to the
probate of the will, from intervening in the hearing on the will and
submitting evidence to support the grounds for her opposition to the
probate, perhaps the petitioner would have been justified in coming to us to
compel the judge to admit evidence of her filiation. But the trial judge ruled
that only evidence as to the execution of the will or in opposition to the
probate could then be admitted, postponing reception of evidence as to
the filation of the petitioner to another occasion or hearing, and perhaps
on the occasion of the hearing for the declaration of heirs. In this respect
the judge's ruling finds support in the circumstances. To allow petitioner,
oppositor in the probate, to prove her filiation would be injecting matters
different from the issues involved in the probate, which in this case were the
alleged non-execution of the will, or the execution thereof under pressure or
influence or by threat, or the alleged forgery of the signatures of the
testator. And if the court permitted submission of evidence as to the filiation
of the proceedings for probate, the nature of the evidence submitted would
nevertheless be only prima facie, and only to justify her intervention in the
probate proceedings, and it would not be decisive of her right to inherit as a
recognized natural child, as the final decision on the matter would be made
after hearing for the declaration of the heirs. So that no advantage could
have been gained by hearing the provisional or prima facie evidence of the
petitioner on her filiation, anyway the court was not depriving her of the
right or opportunity to contest the will. And the legal issue raised by the
proponent of the will would also tend to confuse or increase the number of
issues to be determined at the hearing on the will, all these without any
benefit or advantage to the parties, or prejudice to the petitioner because
she was not being denied the right to sustain or introduce evidence to
sustain her opposition to the probate of the will.Considerations of
convenience and expediency, therefore, support the ruling of the court in
refusing to admit evidence of petitioner's filiation and postponing the same
at a later stage in the distribution proceedings.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 17
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Therefore, find that the order of the court did not amount to a prohibition to
the petitioner to take part in the hearing for the probate of the will and was
motivated by a desire to avoid a multiplicity of the issues thereat and the
limitation thereof to the execution and the validity of the execution of the
will. The court, therefore, did not deprive the petitioner of any right which
she is entitled to under the law or rules, nor did it abuse its discretion in
refusing the submission of evidence as to filiation in the hearing for the
probate.
G.R. No. L-1313 February 16, 1948
ROSALINA CUNANAN vs. RAFAEL AMPARO
FACTS:
Bonifacio Soriano, one of the respondents filed a money claim for P880
against the decedent's estate.
He alleged that on various dates in 1937 and 1938, the deceased received
from him diverse sums of money aggregating P880.
On 1941, Rosalina Cunanan (petitioner), the administratrix Isaac Cunanan
and Candida Joaquin, filed a motion setting out Bonifacio Soriano's claim and
two others totalling P2,054, besides a debt of P1,600 in favor of one
Filomeno Santos bearing 12% interest per year.
To pay these obligations, and because funds were needed to defray the
expenses on the farm, she asked the court for authority to negotiate a loan in
such amount or to sell so much of the property described in the inventory as
might be sufficient to satisfy the said obligation. Judge Sotero Rodas granted
the motion.
On 1944, Rosalina Cunanan manifested to the court that she had tendered to
Bonifacio Soriano in March of that year P880 but that Soriano refused to
accept it on the ground that the money she offered was Japanese notes and
had no value. She prayed that the creditor be ordered to accept the amount
tendered, to execute the necessary deed of cancellation, and to return the
possession of two parcels of land which had been conveyed to him.
Judge Quintin Paredes, Jr. authorized the administratix to deposit with the
clerk of court P880 in full payment of the obligation in favor of Bonifacio
Soriano and ordered Soriano to deliver the property in his possession to the
administratix.
On July 17, 1944, the administratix filed a complaint against Soriano
for contempt of court, alleging that she had complied with the court's order
but that Soriano disobeyed that part of it which commanded him to return
the two parcels of land to the estate of Isaac Cunanan and Candida Joaquin
After hearing, Judge Paredes found Soriano not guilty of contempt but
reiterated his order that Soriano "deliver the property in question to the
administratix Rosalina Cunanan for the benefit of the Intestate Estate."
Bonifacio Soriano filed a MR of such order.
On August 16, 1946, the Judge Rafael Amparo, who now was presiding over
the CFI granted Soriano's motion. He justified the refusal of Bonifacio Soriano
to accept Japanese military notes and Soriano's insistence on being paid in
the same currency which he had paid for the land.
Rosalina Cunanan (petitioner) alleged that these orders were made "without
and/or in excess of his jurisdiction, with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WON these orders made by Judge Rafael Amparo were "without
and/or in excess of his jurisdiction, with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: YES. Petition granted.
As a general rule, with the consent of the parties matters affecting property
under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in
the course of the intestate proceeding provided the interests of third
persons are not prejudiced. Determination of title to property is within the
jurisdiction of CFI. The respondent Soriano's objection relates exclusively to
the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal
rights to a mode of practice which may be waived. Certainly, there is waiver
where, as here, and has been pointed out, the party who raises the objection
was the one who set the court in motion, and who, by failing to disclose the
existence of a sale under pacto de retro, suppressed jurisdictional facts that
might be in the way of his claim's success.
Soriano is bound by his own petition and by the court's adjudication of his
claim made in consonance with his prayer. A party can not trifle with a
court's decision or order which he himself sought with full awareness of his
rights under the premises, by taking it or leaving it at pleasure. The
allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusively as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a
position contradictory of, or inconsistent with, his pleadings. Specifically, he
is not allowed to ask money back when the peso value is good, and later say
he wants to keep the land when the peso's purchasing power is down. The
tender of payment by the administratix, to say the least, operated to
preserve her right of redemption.

The repurchase of the lots should have been effected in Commonwealth
currency is bereft of reason and justice and is not the law. Japanese war
notes were the only money in circulation in March, 1944. It seems to us
extremely unjust and unreasonable to expect the administratix at that time
to repurchase the lots in any other means of exchange. If it be correct a
point which we do not decide that the purchaser could not be compelled
to accept payment in the currency in use at the time of repurchase, then
the period of redemption should have been considered extended until that
currency was replaced with one more acceptable to the
creditor. Suspension of the time of repurchase should have followed the
vendor's inability to effect the redemption in Commonwealth currency by
reason of circumstances not of his own making.
Therefore, this was the least that should have been conceded to the debtor.
Thus given a grace, the administratix had until within reasonable time after
liberation top repurchase the property. It is fortunate, be it said to the credit
of the administratix, that she expressed to the respondent judge, before he
made the orders complained of, her willingness to pay the debt or to
repurchase the lots, as the case may be, in genuine Philippine money,
forgetting the deposit and without insisting that it be regarded as a sufficient
and valid exercise of her option.
Cortes vs. CA and Menandro Reselva GR No. 117417
Rule 73 Section 2- Where estate upon dissolution of marriage
Facts: - Sps. Teodoro and Lucresia has three children. They are Menandro,
Milagros and Florante. - The sps. was able to acquire a house and lot in
Tondo Manila and this was being occupied by their Son - Menandro. -
Lucresia died ahead of Teodoro and the later made a holographic will making
Milagros as the appointed executrix. - The will was probated and Milagros
also filed a motion to order Menandro to vacate the said property. - The said
motion was granted by the Probate Court, but was also reverse by the CA
upon Menandro's appeal. - The CA's decision is founded on their finding that
the order is beyond the probate court's limited jurisdiction.
Issue: WoN, the CA is correct.
SC Ruling: - The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge
of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties. - Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of
possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by
title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third persons, cannot be
entertained by the (probate) court." - In the present case, however, private
respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and lot is
not an "outside party" but one of the three compulsory heirs. - By way of
exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are all heirs of the
decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the
question of title to property." - Here, the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership. More so, when the opposing parties
belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate action would be most
expensive and inexpedient. - In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all
adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent since the former's theory
merely advances co-ownership with the latter. - In the same way, when the
controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal
partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the
conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which
is to be distributed among the heirs. - More importantly, the case at bar falls
squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
- RULE 73 SEC. 2.Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of either."
- CA's decision is set aside but without reinstating the decision of the RTC and
the case was REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings.
Silverio vs CA
Rule 72- Subject Matter of special proceedings. Sec 1. (i) Change of Name
Facts :
- Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a transgender. He wanted to change his
name, "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."in
his birth certificate. - The trial court granted his petition but the CA and SC
reverses Trial Court's decision. - The decision of the RTC lacks legal basis,
because there is no law allowing a person to change his/her name due to sex
reassignment.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 18
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Issue: WoN, change of name due to sex reassignment is allowed under rule
72 sec 1 (i) is allowed.
SC Ruling:
- RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. - Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. - The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. - It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. - In addition, RA 9048 likewise
provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition
for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
- Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. - In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. - The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not
fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by
the legislature, not by the courts. - Petition is hereby denied.
TOPIC: 2.1 SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES (Rule 74)
Monserrat vs Ibanez 88 Phil 584
Facts:
- Vicenta Salamanca died intestate leaving as heirs 1 son and 4 daughters.
Ramon (son) filed in CFI Laguna a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the properties of his deceased mother. - His sisters
(respondents) opposed saying that they are all of age; the debts and
obligations of the estate has already been paid; that they did not want to be
burdened with admin proceedings; and that Ramons remedy was to sue for
partition under Rule 74 of ROC. - Judge Ibanez issued an order stating that in
accordance with Fule v Fule the proper remedy should be an action for
partition because all the heirs were of age and there were no debts of the
estate. - He required the sisters to institute partition proceedings and that
the litigation begun by Ramon will be held in abeyance. - The sisters filed an
action for partition. Ramon filed this special civil action alleging that the
respondent judge had committed grave abuse of discretion. He prayed for
the court to proceed with the hearing of his petition for administration. -
Petitioner asserts that it is not known whether there are any debts because
these may be shown only in the administration proceedings but he did not
assert otherwise when respondents affidavit says that there was no debt. He
argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of
hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does Section 1 Rule 74
of ROC apply, and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the
corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate.
Issue: WON the administration proceedings should be held in abeyance.
HELD: - Yes. Fule v Fule applies: where there are no debts, the heirs are not
bound to submit the property to a judicial administration which is always
long and costly or to apply for an appointment of an admin by the court.
These proceedings are superfluous and unnecessary. - The creditors are
protected even if, without benefit of the administration, the estate is
distributed in an action for partition. - Questions as to what property
belonged to the deceased (and to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in
the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of
one heir. - The questions he seeks to raise in the admin proceedings may
equally de decided in the partition suit. - Besides, since the sisters constitute

4/5 of the heirs. The majority interest usually gets to select the
administrator. - SC also said that the admin proceedings will be dismissed
soon, inasmuch as the partition suit has already been instituted, because the
court has already intimated that the proceedings will be suspended pending
the presentation of other suit.
Rodriguez vs. Tan
Facts:
Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, leaving as his heirs the
following:
Petitioners
a. Fortunata (Widow) and six children
b. Benjamine,
c. Mercedes,
d. Luz
e. Antonio
Respondent
f. Abelardo
All the heirs, who were then already of age, verbally agreed not to liquidate
the estate and place under the administration of the Widow and each of the
children will be entitled to receive a portion of the income.
On March 19, 1952 Abelardo filed a petition for administration of their
inatestate estate of said deceased. The other heirs opposed conteding that
the estate having no debts and all the heirs were of age and that the heirs
had a verbal agreement to place the estate under the administration of
Fortunanta.
Repondent admitted the existence of the verbal agreement but contended
that the same was not carried out because in reality it was Benjamin who
took over the administration of the estate and in the discharge of his duties
he failed and refused to give him his share in the income.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abelardo and appointed him as the administrator.
Issue:
WoN it was proper to appoint Ablardo as administrator.
Held:
Yes. Under section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.
Construing the scope of said section 1, this Court repeatedly held "that when
a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held
that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings"
However, section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if
they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of
partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition,
it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as
may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention
were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall
as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that
the word may is used not only once but in the whole section which indicates
an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.
*Ferrera v. Ca
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 19
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Guico vs. Bautista
Facts:
Gertrudes Garcia died intestate on August 31, 1956 leaving as her legitimate
heirs plaintiffs and defendants. During her lifetime, she made several deeds
of donation of some of her properties in favor of all the defendants, but did
not provide that the properties donated would not be subject to collation.
She also left outstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation and the G.A. Machineries, Inc.
Dolores Guico then filed a complaint for partition over the estate of
Gertrudes. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
action is premature because it is admitted that Gertrudes has left certain
debts. The RTC and CA dismissed the action.
Issue:
WoN partition is proper.
Held:
No. Where the deceased left pending obligations, such obligations must be
first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided
among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how
such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted
to administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary
partition, the regular estate proceeding offer the advantage of requiring all
creditors of the deceased to disclose themselves and submit their respective
claims within a comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless
claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred; while in ordinary
judicial partitions the creditors 1claims are only extinguished by the
expiration of the period extinctive prescription. An heir, therefore, may have
an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed from
invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the very
estate proceeding sought to be avoided, and he may properly object to an
action for partition this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable
to assuming personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known
as well as those undisclosed, regular estate proceedings cannot be avoided.
G.R. No. L-273 March 29, 1947
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ZACARIAS
ANDAL, defendant-appellant. QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ
and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.
TUASON, J.:
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina
Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are
brother and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father
a parcel of land of which he died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the
Batangas cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel,
a portion which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A,
to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860.
This portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the
larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been
made (time not stated) among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but
which is not now important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land
sold to Andal. According to her original complaint, dated February 3, 1944,
she offered the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according
to that complaint, the amount Andal had paid for Maria Hernandez's and
Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with
the property.
It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for
P970 in favor of the intervenors, an amount which included Andal's
expenses as well as the normal sale price. The document of repurchase gave
as reason for the transaction the fact that it had been agreed that in the

event trouble should arise the sellers should return to the buyer what they
had received and pay the latter his expenses.
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was
filed. The intervenors alleged that there had been a partition among them
and their brother and sisters "with the share of each delineated and marked,
and after partition and delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and
independent possession of his portion in the partition." They charged the
plaintiff with bad faith in that "it was upon her request for chance that the
sale to the defendant, about to take place last November, was delayed till
January of this year when she finally informed the intervenors that they
could sell to the defendant, or she could pay only P150 and could not raise
the amount of P860 offered by the defendant."
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own
behalf. Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two complaints.
Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that he was in
possession of the land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He
declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land from him long after
he had bought it, that is, when she was about to file her action. He stated
that after he came from Candelaria, Tayabas, with the document of sale he
showed it to the plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of January. He was able to do
this because he lived near Cresencia and passed by her house on his way
home from Candelaria. He said that Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown
the document merely exclaimed, "Oh, so you already have a document."
When asked whether the land "described in the complaint of the herein
plaintiff has been the object of partition among the co-owners Pedro, Basilia,
Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez," counsel for the
plaintiff objected on the ground that the best evidence was the document
of partition, and the objection was sustained. The same objection and the
same ruling were made on the same ground when the witness was queried
how it was that the land he had bought from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez
had been specified in the deed of sale, Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did
not call any more witnesses but only announced that he had witnesses ready
to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters had been
made, mentioning the names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff
again objected asserting that "under the Rules of Court agreement
affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing
subscribed by the person against whom the proof is offered. "Upon this
objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court
(Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol
evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it
had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.
Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of
the land by Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was
illegal and in bad faith. It, however, did not seem to have found as a fact the
allegation that the resale was simulated.
ISSUE 1: Can there be an oral partition? YES. Oral partitions are not covered
by the Statute of Frauds since partitions are not conveyances of property
but merely segregation and separation. [read SC discussions below]
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is
such a contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds.
One line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no.
The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the
statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a
separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each
tenant in common. (27 C.J., 206.)
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts
of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly
performed.
It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol
partition that there are sharp divergences of opinion among the members of
this Court. This section reads:
If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument file in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after
the death of the decedent.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 20
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It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and
cannot be validated by any acts of the parties short of the execution of a
public document and its registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a
means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted
by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only."
(Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The decisions of this Court which we
have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil Code, too,
requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not
in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that
after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party
bound may be compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine
Co. vs .Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
ISSUE 2: Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of
partition? In other words, is writing the act that confers legal validity upon
the agreement? NO. There are no indications in the phraseology of this rule
which justify an affirmative answer to these questions. [read SC discussions
below]
It must be noted that where the law intends a writing or other formality to
be the essential requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear
and unequivocal terms. Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or
clear declaration that the required public instruments is to be constitutive
of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as
between the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting
this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties
dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. On
the other hand, the opposite theory is not without reasonable support. We
can think of possible factors against the proposition that a public document
and its registration were contemplated as necessary ingredients to give life
to a contract of partition so that without them no oral partition can bind the
parties.
In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration
forms a part were promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority
to deal with matters of procedure exclusively. For this court to prescribe
what is to be a binding agreement between co-heirs in the settlement of
their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of third parties would
be to transcends its rule-making power. We bring out this limitation upon the
authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to interpretation, as a method
of arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be
remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance and
serious juridical and practical implications. It is to be presumed that the
framers of the Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's functions
and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive rights of the parties to
the partition. To the extent the execution and registration of a notarized
instrument are made essential elements to validity to protect innocent
third parties, the rule is legitimate and necessary; legitimate because
decedent's estate are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts to
administer and distribute. The interests of third parties eliminated, the rule
loses its character as one of procedure and practice and invades the realm
of substantive law.
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is
enlightening and instructive. The former after stating that heirs may
apportion and divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not
otherwise." These words, in our opinion, were expressive of an intention to
make the written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol
partition. But what is far more to the point is that by logical process of
deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not
otherwise" imports the casting away from the prescribed public document
of its jural character which the document enjoyed in the former code. At
the same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision
serves to emphasize the necessity of a positive and clear language if a given
contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's binding
effect on the parties. It is of course unnecessary to say that the attaching of
jural character to the prescribed public instrument in section 596 of Act No.
190 is no argument for contending that such document must be clothed with
the same raiment in the new Rules. Act No. 190 was a mixture of procedural
and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the legislative body itself
which, unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled, except by the
fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects of legislation.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has, in our opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors
and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and
creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and
this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of

partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into
play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors
are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for
the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
NOTE: [This is a very short case]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1578 September 30, 1947
PEREGRINA REBONG, petitioner, vs. FIDEL IBAEZ, Judge of First Instance of
Laguna, respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari against the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna on the ground that the latter acted in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for
cancellation of the lien or annotation on the certificate of title issued to the
petitioner, of a land extrajudicially inherited by him as the only heir of her
predecessors in interest to the effect that the property described in the
title is subject to the claims of the creditors and other heirs of the deceased
Jose Rebong and Maria Rebong within two years from July 9, 1947, in
accordance with sections 1 and 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Will the liens and annotations on the certificate of title be cancelled
upon extrajudicial transfer of the property to the heirs? NO. If the said liens
and annotations have not yet terminated or ceased, then the rules of court
do not give authority to the judge to cancel those liens and annotations on
the title. [read SC discussions below]
The petitioner based on her petition on section 112 of Act No. 496 and
offered to file a bond of P5,000, the estimated value of the above mentioned
property to answer for such contingent claims.
The pertinent part of said section 112 of Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 112. ... Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time
apply petition to the court, upon the ground that the registered interests of
any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been created
which do not appear upon the certificate; ... and the court shall have
jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in
interest, and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief
upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may
deem proper; . . . .
According to the above quoted provisions, the court "may order the entry of
a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a
certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring
security if necessary," upon application of a registered owner on "the ground
that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased, or that new interests
have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate."
Applying these provisions to the present case, it is evident that, since the
registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs
of the petitioner's predecessors in interest, established by section 4 of Rule
74 has not yet terminated or ceased, for the period of two from July 9,
1947, have not yet elapsed, the respondent judge had no jurisdiction or
power to order the cancellation of said lien or annotation as prayed by the
petitioner. Neither section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court, nor section 112
of Act No. 496 authorizes interest of substitution of a bond for a lien or
registered interest of any description, whether vested, expedient, inchoate
or contingent, which have not yet terminated or ceased.
In view of the foregoing it is plan that the respondent judge has not acted in
excess of jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion, but in conformity
with the law, in denying the petitioner's petition, and the petition
for certiorari is therefore denied.
EN BANC
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 21
STM Case Pool
G.R. No. L-6871 January 15, 1912
JOSE McMICKING, administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. BENITO SY CONBIENG, administrator of the estate of Pio de la
Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco, defendant-appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
On or about the 5th of February, 1902, one Margarita Jose, a native of the
Philippine Islands, died at Amoy, in the empire of China, leaving an estate
consisting of personal property partly in Hongkong and partly in the
Philippine Islands. On the 16th of April, 1902, one Engracio Palanca was
appointed administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the said
Margarita Jose, deceased, by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties and
qualified as such in the sum of P60,000. After the execution of this bond the
said Palanca, as such administrator, took possession of all the property of the
said Margarita Jose, amounting in all to $58,820.29 Hongkong currency. On
the 22d of April, 1904, the Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of
Manila, testate. On the 11th of May, 1904, one Doroteo Velasco was
appointed administrator with the will annexed of said Mariano Ocampo
Lao Sempco, deceased, and on July 7 following Mariano Velasco and Pio de
la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator in the
sum of P30,000. Said Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco left him surviving as his
heirs at law and devises and legatees one daughter, to whom he devised
two-thirds of his estate, and three sons in China, to whom he devised the
remaining one-third. On the 27th of July, 1904, said Doroteo Velasco, as such
administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the
property of the deceased, together with a statement of all his debts and
liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an
instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of the said
Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partition of he estate among themselves
without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all
obligations against the estate. This agreement of partition was drawn and
executed under sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the
purposes and to attain the ends therein mentioned.
On the 30th of March, 1908, by virtue of an order made by the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, upon application of all parties interested, the
said Engracio Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the
estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased, and the plaintiff herein, Jose
McMicking, was appointed in his stead. The said Palanca was removed from
office by reason of the fact that he failed and refused to render an account of
the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, deceased,
which has come to his possession as such administrator, and failed and
refused, on order of the court, to deliver said property and funds or any
portion thereof to the court or to the said Jose McMicking, his successor.
Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said property and funds,
absconded with the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands. At
the time of his removal he was indebted to the estate in the sum of
P41,960.15, no part of which has ever been received by the estate or by its
representative.
ISSUE: W/N Doroteo Velasco, surety, is liable to the claims against the estate
of Mariano Ocampo. NO. Since the principal to the obligation, Pio Barretto
is not liable, then the surety is likewise not liable. Further, since there was
already extrajudicial settlement of the estate, then Velasco, being an
administrator is already discharged.
We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. We base our
affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased
Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself
had this action been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable
upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.
At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stands
sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in
certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful
age and legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the intestate estate,
or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family
council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves,
duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves,
as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. But if it shall appear, at
any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the
estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not
been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the
courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 22
STM Case Pool

interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the 1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two
assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of years after such settlement and distribution of estate."
paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain
charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after
2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court
such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been
for the appointment of an administrator.
made.

(1) In the case at bar no debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It
In the case at the bar we are of the opinion that, under the broad and liberal
was nearly four years after the partition of the estate and the taking
policy which we must adopt in the interpretation and application of the
possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even
provisions referred to, the decision of the property of Mariano Ocampo,
discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the
deceased, in the form, in the manner and for the purposes expressed, falls
estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five
within the provisions of said sections and may be termed, therefore, and we
years before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was
hold it to be, a partition of the property of a decedent without legal
fixed.
proceedings within the meaning of those sections. The fact of the prior
appointment of an administrator and the filing of an inventory before such
partition is of no consequence so far as the right of the owners to partition is (2) No creditor made his application.
concerned. The only requisite for such petition prescribed by the law is that
"there are no debts . . . or all the debts have been paid by the heirs." When The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case at bar it was five years
the condition is fulfilled the partition can take place, no matter what stage after the petition before the alleged creditor made any attempt whatsoever
the administration may have reached. By this it is, of course, not meant to "discover" or present his claim. He knew of the death of Ocampo very
that the partition after the appointment of an administrator will interfere soon after it occurred. He knew that it was among the possibilities that
with the rights acquired by third person dealing with said administrator Ocampo's estate might be called upon to respond for the failure of Palanca
within the limits of his authority and prior to the partition; nor that the to perform his duty as administrator. It was his duty to see to it that he
administrator can be deprived of the property of which he is legally in would be protected in that event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of
possession without proper proceedings and the consent of the court. Ocampo to be partitioned and distributed without protest and without the
presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and passive for nearly five
As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an years thereafter knowing that it was very probable that the property of the
administrators' bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of the estate was being consumed, incumbered, and transferred by the persons
principal precedes that of the surety. If Velasco incurred no liability, then his among whom it had been distributed.
surety incurred none. The question that naturally suggests itself is, then, In
what was Velasco at fault or in what did he fail? When the persons
interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreed voluntarily upon a
partition and division of the property of said estate and the actual partition
followed, the matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as administrator. EN BANC
The parties to the partition stood invoking their rights under section 596
and 597. Velasco was helpless. He was powerless to prevent the parties G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964
from taking the property to which they were entitled under the agreement,
it being conceded that they were actually entitled thereto in law. Those
sections were applicable to the situation and there was nothing that IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and
Velasco could do to prevent the estate from being divided according to DELFIN GERONA,petitioners, vs. CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN,
their provisions. In giving his consent to the partition and in assisting the CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN,
parties to obtain the approval of the court thereto he did no wrong. He PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN respondents.
simply aided in carrying out the provisions of the sections referred to. It is a
universal principle that one who follows a law commits no fault, incurs no CONCEPCION, J.:
failure and wounds no rights. If one obeys the law he is free not only in
person but in property. Observance of the law discharges obligations; it does
In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958,
not create them; and an obligation once discharged cannot be re-acted by
petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin,
the act of others in which the person as to whom it was discharged takes no
all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of
part. The proceedings under sections referred to were, after the partition
Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August
was actually made and the property duly turned over the administrator
9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife,
under the proper proceedings, a complete settlement of the estate of
Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman
Mariano Ocampo, deceased, as it then stood, so far as the administrator was
married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents
concerned. Nothing further needed to be done. Every duty which Velasco
Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed
owed up to the time of the partition had been met. All debts presented or
De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that
known had been paid. The court had given it approbation to the delivery of
subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-
the property by the administrator to the partitioning parties. Every obligation
judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman",
which lay upon him had been removed. Nor could there arise against him any
fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs
obligation in the future in relation to the same property. The instant that the
of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that
partition occurred, in the form and manner stated, he stood stripped of all
petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby
responsibility to the estate, to its creditors, to the heirs and to the court. He
succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7)
stood divested o every official duty and obligation, as fully as before his
parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new
appointment as completely as if he had not been appointed at all. In law,
transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion
therefore, he was no longer administrator with the will annexed of the estate
of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by the
of Mariano Ocampo, deceased. He was in effect, discharged. As to him the
petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners
estate had been wiped out as a legal entity. It had ceased to exist. And, while
forthwith demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said
at any time within two years after the partition the property, or a portion
properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents
thereof, then in the possession of the partitioning persons could have been
refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners.
placed in administration upon the happening of certain events, it would not
Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed
have been the same estate that had been represented by Velasco, nor would
of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation
Velasco have been the administrator of the estate by virtue of his
of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to
appointment in the old. It would have been necessary for the court, upon the
reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties;
proper application setting forth the conditions prescribed by the sections, to
ordering the register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title
appoint another administrator for the purposes specified therein. It might
secured by respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates of title
have been Velasco, if he would have accepted the appointment, or it might
in the name of both the petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of
have been another. The point is that it would have been necessary to appoint
1/8th for the former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to
a new administrator just as if one had not been named before. The new
render accounts of the income of said properties and to deliver to petitioners
administrator would have had new duties, some of which would have been
their lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and
quite different from those of the administrator appointed originally. He
attorney's fees.
would have had different sureties, who would have found themselves to
different obligations.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the
deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of
After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have
Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and
been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had
that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.
unless there occur the following requisites:

After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding
that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo
de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife, Camila
Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already prescribed, and, accordingly,
dismissing the complaint without costs. On appeal taken by the petitioners,
this decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with costs against them.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's
estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected
by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin
to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents,
which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said
period had not expired when the present action was commenced on
November 4, 1958.
ISSUE: W/N the action to cancel the certificates of title on the ground of
fraud had already prescribed. YES. The action has already prescribed since it
was filed after 10 years upon discovery of the fraud which is beyond the 4-
year period. [read SC discussion]
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action
for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as
the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title
(Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of limitations
operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by
the possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo v.
Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo
de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own
name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the
deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why
petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the
ground that the same is tainted with fraud. 1wph1.t
Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-
12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison v. Fernandez, L-11764, January 31, 1959;
Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956; and Sevilla v. De los Angeles,
L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an
action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or
implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of
limitations (Candelaria v. Romero, L-12149, September 30, 1960; Alzona v.
Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-
judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the
action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery
is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when
said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of
title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the
registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive
notice to the whole world (Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958;
Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v. Gonzaga, L-18788, January
31, 1964).
As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned
at least constructively, of the alleged fraud committed against them by
defendants on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extra-judicial settlement of
the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry
of deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4
November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona
became of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to have discovered
defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years from the
said date within which to file this action. Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona
became of age on 8 December 1949 or after the registration of the deed of
extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the remainder of the period of 4
years from December 1949 within which to commence her action. Plaintiff
Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9 January 1952 so that he was still a
minor when he gained knowledge (even if only constructive) of the deed of
extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin Gerona
became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a minor at the
time he gained knowledge (although constructive) of the deed of extra-
judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco Gerona and Delfin Gerona
had, therefore, two years after the removal of their disability within which to
commence their action (Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43,
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Act 190), that is, January 29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August
1954, with respect to Delfin.
PEDROSA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001
Facts: In 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina de Rodriguez
initiated proceedings for the legal adoption of Maria Elena Rodriguez
Pedrosa. This was granted. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and
Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate,
adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. In
1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the EJ partition has
not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period which should be applied is
four years following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson. She also avers that Sec. 4,
Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two
requirements.
One, the party assailing the partition must have been given
notice, and
two, the party assailing the partition must have participated
therein.
Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in her case, since she
did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition."
She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed
of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that
she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already
prescribed. Also, the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial
partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then
under litigation.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed;
(2) whether or not said deed is valid; and
(3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had
already been transferred to the respondent buyers.
Ruling:
(1) NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice
of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly
complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent
have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented
by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the
two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable
prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De
Guzman which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon
the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken
place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds
and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28,
1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 24
STM Case Pool

settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action
against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication
of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
(2). NO. Under said provision, without the participation of all persons
involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding
on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or
issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a
notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication
was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs.
Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the
settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed
of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and
vicious Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother,
Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral
relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate
Ruling: No.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section
1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should
take part in the extrajudicial settlement. As to them the law is clear that if
they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share
in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or
interest within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate
would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the
persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice
to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take
part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the
settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and
unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of
two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who did
not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal
provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due
process of law.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or
by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be
contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons
who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the
extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is
made, either directly or by implication.
The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from
such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only

(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is
of the extrajudicial partition, and,
imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time
Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of
Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly
vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent
interests did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate. have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented
by themselves or through guardians.
(3). NO.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the
heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the
of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow,
circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the
nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by
the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well
settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. Issue: W/N the action is barred by the statute of limitations.
The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for
such purpose.
Ruling: No.

In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly
a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third persons. It is only a
SAMPILO and SALACUP vs. CA, and SINOPERA bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings
but not against third persons not Parties thereto.
G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing
to the defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the
Facts: Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left four parcels of
deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that
land. He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and
the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself.
nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. In 1946, without any
Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years
judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the
(Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to
deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants
have lapsed the action that was instituted. Judicial proceedings were
or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or
instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted
nieces, but the widow the one and only person to inherit the above
soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the
properties" This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of
burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their
Deeds. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels
defense, and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four
of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also
years had already elapsed from the date that the interested parties had
registered. In 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to
actual knowledge of the fraud.
Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered. In March,
1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the
estate of Teodoro Tolete and having secured her appointment as
administratrix, brought the present action.
CUA vs. VARGAS
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to
execute the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired
any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended
answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such a Facts: A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas.
cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations. In 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by
and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida,
Rosario, Gloria, Antonina and Florentino, partitioning and adjudicating unto
Issue: W/N the right of action of the respondent administratrix has
themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square
prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period
meters. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. On
of two years as prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
November 15, 1994, an EJ Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again

executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with
the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square
meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of
respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original
house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995. She
likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property.
Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property but was refused. Thus she filed a
case for annulment of the EJ settlement and Legal Redemption.
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the
sale. They likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a written notice
by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the right of
redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice was sent
to them.
Issues:
1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless
of their failure to participate therein. No.
2. whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs
in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition
under Article 1088 of the Civil Code can be dispensed with. No.
Ruling:
Petitioner argues that the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property
subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was
duly published. The publication of the same constitutes due notice to
respondents and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents
are therefore estopped from denying the validity of the partition and sale at
this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid, respondents no
longer have the right to redeem the property.
The petition lacks merit.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The
rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no
notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of
settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested
parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as
what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of
extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to
the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection,
the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either
of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly
before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these
extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their
hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The
heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial
settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares
in the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents
are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the
Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were
never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the
provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of
redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated
to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of
the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 25
STM Case Pool
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the
time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
Written notice is indispensable and mandatory,20 actual knowledge of the
sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding.
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor
any distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the method of
notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law.
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this
requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to
redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness
and capacity to do so.
CRUZ vs. CRISTOBAL
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the
deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the
legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to
Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto,
Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata
Enriquez.
In 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land. Sometime in the
year 1930, Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners
learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of
the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners then filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages. In
their prayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by
respondents. Petitioner Elisa testified that the [private respondents] divided
the property among themselves without giving the [petitioners] their share.
In 1948, respondent Eufrosina admitted having executed an EJ Partition with
her brothers and sisters of the property left by their parents. She declared
that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo never
asserted their alleged right over the property subject of the present
litigation.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the
subject property executed by the private respondents. No.
(2) whether or not petitioners right to question the Deed of Partition had
prescribed. No.
(4) whether or not petitioners right to recover their share of the subject
property is barred by laches.
Ruling:
(1).
As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by
the private respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners,
the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in
the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said
persons. In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Cristobal is
composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Cristobals
estate. The partition of the subject property by the private respondents shall
not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded therefrom.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 26
STM Case Pool

Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by private

respondents among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of
the transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of private
respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by private respondent
Eufrocina to choose between a portion of the subject property or money, as
one of the children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an
apartment on the subject property. This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to
the status of the subject property. She learned afterwards that the title to
the subject property had been transferred to the names of private
respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of herself and her
siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of
Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal who
were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject property. Since
petitioners were not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of
Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
late Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not
binding on them.

(2).

As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the private respondents in

February 1948 did not affect the right of petitioners to also inherit from the
estate of their deceased father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate
court to hold that petitioners right to challenge the said settlement had
prescribed.

Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect
the right of petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall
then proceed to divide the subject property between petitioners and private
respondents, as the rule on succession prescribes.

(3).

In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note
that upon petitioner Elisas knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject
property had been transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion of
herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal,
petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their barangay to settle the case
among themselves and private respondents, but since no settlement was
had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul
private respondents title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure
or neglect on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the
reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to
enforce his legal rights.