SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
STM Case Pool (3) |1
TOPIC: 3.0 GUARDIANSHIP (Rules 92-97 ROC; AM No.
03-02-05-SC 2003-05-01)
GUY vs. CA
Facts: The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the
estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents
Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati
City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his
surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that
his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the
issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion
to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping
should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived
by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for
financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios
and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from
any and all liabilities.
The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the
supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly
constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly
signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the
certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance
the wards?
Held: No, there was no repudiation. To be valid and effective, a waiver
must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him.
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The
Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose
of its execution. It did not specifically mention private respondents
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as
a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary
rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latters
claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may
accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be
accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
Repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and
guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of
inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best
interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the
release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-
respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have
yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It
would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which,
according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs, the court is
not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the
claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters
administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and
incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of
heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action
may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for
recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
PARCO vs. CA
Facts: This case stems from a previous Special proceedings for the
guardianship of incompetent Soriaya Rodriguez. The guardianship
proceeding originally pertained to Branch 1, CFI of Quezon.
Subsequently, it was transferred to Branch IV-Calauag, CFI of Quezon,
where respondent judge Kayanan took cognizance of the case.
The private respondent, Francisco Rodriguez Jr. was the appointed
guardian. Respondent judge approved the conveyance of three (3)
parcels of land belonging to the ward to the petitioners, the spouses
Parco.
Almost two years after the guardianship court's approval of the 'sale',
the private respondent filed an urgent petition for the examination of
the subject conveyance of the lots to the petitioners, by virtue of the
transfer of title to third parties. He argued that the conveyance was
actually a loan agreement with a right to recover while the spouses
alleged that there was an absolute sale of the lands in dispute.
Issue: Whether or not a guardianship court has jurisdiction to order
the reconveyance of the properties to the ward?
Held: No, in this case, it has no jurisdiction.
Under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or
concealing property of the ward. Upon complaint of the guardian
or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the
estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is
suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any
money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the
ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear
for examination touching such money, goods, interests, or
instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate against
such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
In Cui vs. Piccio et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the
court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons
suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property
belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which
may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to
protect the right of the ward. Generally, the guardianship court
exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the
delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in
extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where
his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court
direct its delivery to the guardian. 23 In effect, there can only be
delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property
of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case,
the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the person
said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be
determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship
proceedings.
Unlike in previous court decision, the facts of this case is not in all
fours as there is a cloud over the titles of the properties in question.
A reconveyance would require the determination of the ownership
or title of the subject three parcels of land, which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the guardianship court, and thus must be threshed out
in a separate and ordinary civil action.
In previous decisions, the court approved the reconveyance to the
ward of properties embezzled, concealed or conveyed when there is

not question as to the ward's title and ownership to the property.
Herein, it is premature to say based only on the pleadings that the
ward has clear and undisputable title to the properties.
G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982
PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner, vs. HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY,
Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Leyte and Southern Leyte; FELICIANA CALLE, court-appointed
guardian of the minors Shirley and Leandro, both surnamed
HOMERES; the SOLICITOR GENERAL; THE CITY FISCAL OF TACLOBAN;
and, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Tacloban City, respondents.
FACTS: In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, LILIA
Samson Homeres, and two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a
parcel of land (Lot No. 3085-G) situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City,
which lot he had inherited from his deceased father, Felizardo
Homeres. The said lot was sold by Lilia to CONCHITA Dumdum. Then,
Lilia filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and estate of
the minors. The petition was granted and she took her oath as a
guardian. Then, Conchita sold the Lot, which had been titled in her
name, to PETITIONER Patria Paciente. Consequently, petitioner was
issued a TCT by the ROD of Tacloban City. Petitioner then mortgaged
the Lot to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation.
The ROD filed a manifestation informing respondent court that the
Lot which is the subject of the guardianship proceedings had been
registered in the name of the petitioner and was mortgaged to
Consolidated Bank. Thereby, the respondent court issued an order
directing the petitioner and the manager of the bank to appear before
the court and show cause why the TCT, covering a parcel of land co-
owned by the minors Homeres, should not be cancelled for having
been alienated without authority from the court.
However, the petitioner and the manager did not appear before the
court. Instead, Conchita appeared and explained to the respondent
court that she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia to the
petitioner without obtaining the approval of the court because she
was not aware of such requirement regarding the properties of the
minors. Also, the petitioner's husband apprised the court that the
petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value of the lot in question.
However, the court did not heed to said explanation and issued an
order to the ROD to cancel the TCT of petitioner and to order the
issuance of a new title to include the minors as co-owners with the
petitioner for her having failed to comply with the court's order
directing her to pay the minors the reasonable price of their property
that their mother alienated without authority of a competent court.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent court acting as a guardianship court
has jurisdiction to issue said order.
HELD: YES.
Relying on the cases of Cui vs. Piccio, and Parco and Bautista vs.
CA, petitioner contends that respondent court in hearing a petition
for guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a
Torrens Title.
~ In the Cui case, this Court ruled:
... x x x that in the case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, the court made a
distinction between the provisions of sections 709 and 593 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which now correspond to section 6, Rule 88
and section 6 of Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. This Court in that case
said that while in administration proceedings the court under section
709 may only question the person suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed away property belonging to the estate, section
593 of the same Code authorizes the Judge or the court to issue such
orders as maybe necessary to secure the estate against concealment,
embezzlement and conveyance. x x x now as embodied in Rule 97,
section 6 of the Rules of Court in light of the ruling laid down in the
case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, the court may issue an order
directing the delivery or return of any property embezzled,
concealed or conveyed which belongs to a ward, where the right or
title of said ward is clear and indisputable.
xxx xxx xxx
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In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction
to issue his order in the guardianship proceedings requiring the
petitioners to deliver the rentals collected by them to the guardian
and authorizing the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the
reason that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings,
ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the
purpose of obtaining information which may be used in action later
to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and
that only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the
ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially decided,
may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. ~
~ and in the case of Parco and Bautista, We ruled:
In Cui vs. Piccio, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in
guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of
having embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property belonging to
the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used
in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right
of the ward. Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and
limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property
of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a
categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where
property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has
been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to
the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the
embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the
right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where
title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is
in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of said title or right
whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or
conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary
action and not in a guardianship proceedings. ~
Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the
delivery or return of the property conveyed are concerned, We find
the orders of the respondent court valid. The petitioner's contentions
in this regard are untenable. Even the aforecited cases relied upon do
not support her argument. While it is true that in these two cases We
ruled that where title to any property said to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed is in question, the determination of said title
or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to
have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be
determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship
proceedings, We also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward
to the property is clear and indisputable the court may issue an order
directing its delivery or return.
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property
is clear and indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question
from their father. The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by
their mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal
(Yuson de Pua vs. San Agustin).
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC,
Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A.
VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L.
Chua, respondents.
FACTS: During his lifetime, ROBERTO Lim Chua lived out of wedlock
with PRIVATE RESPONDENT Florita Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out
of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely,
Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo (MINORS).
On 28 May 1992, Roberto died intestate in Davao City. Private
respondent then filed with the RTC of Cotabato City a Petition for
declaration of heirship, guardianship over the persons and properties
of minors Robert and Rudyard, all surnamed Chua, and issuance of
letters of administration in her favor for the administration of the
estate of the deceased Roberto.
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition and
directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general

circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or
Davao City.
The herein PETITIONER Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing
to be the surviving spouse of Roberto, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of
the decedent's death, Davao City was his residence, hence, the RTC
of Davao City is the proper forum.
Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds that: (1) this petition is for the guardianship of the minor
children of the petitioner (PR) who are heirs to the estate of the late
Roberto and thus, under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, the
venue shall be at the place where the minor resides, which is in
Cotabato City; and (2) That the movant/oppositor Antonietta is not
the surviving spouse of the late Roberto but a pretender to the estate
of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage with any
woman until he died.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended
Petition changing its title, and no.4 of his allegation, in order to avoid
any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and
purpose of the petition.
The trial court held that petitioner had no personality to file the
motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife of the
decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of the
deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was
concurrent venue among the RTCs where the decedent had resided,
the RTC of Cotabato had already taken cognizance of the settlement
of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all others (Section 1, Rule
73). The trial court, then, issued an order appointing Romulo Lim Uy,
a first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the
decedent's estate, and also appointing private respondent as
guardian over the persons and properties of the two minors. Having
been denied her motion, hence this petition.
Petitioner alleges that: (1) at the time of the decedent's death, Davao
City was his residence, hence, the RTC of Davao City is the proper
forum; and (2) the original petition was one for guardianship and not
for issuance of letters of administration, hence, the trial court acted
beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration over
the said estate, thereby converting the petition into an intestate
proceeding, and there is also failure to allege and state the
jurisdictional facts required by the Rules of Court in petitions for
administration of a decedent's estate, and moreover there is an
admission on the part of the PR that the petition is for guardianship
of her minor children, as provided therein, indicated as follows:
1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor
children of the petitioner who are heirs to the estate
of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule
92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the place
where the minor resides.
as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private
respondent during the hearing:
ATTY. RENDON: We filed our opposition to the motion
to dismiss the petition because this is a petition for
guardianship of minors, not for intestate proceedings.
So this is a case where the mother wanted to be
appointed as guardian because she is also the litigant
here. Because whenever there is an intestate
proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and
under the Rules of Court in any guardianship
proceedings, the venue is at the place where the minor
is actually residing.
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether the filing of the petition for guardianship in this
case is properly filed in Cotabato City; and 2) Whether the trial court
acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration
over the said estate in a guardianship proceedings.
HELD: The petition is devoid of merit.
1) YES. Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court provides that in any
guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the place where the minor
is actually residing. (see codal) Hence, it correct that the petition for
guardianship is filed in Cotabato City.
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2) NO. The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the
petition is one which includes the issuance of letters of
administration.
The title of said petition reads:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS,
GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSON AND PROPERTIES
OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD
ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein
petition for the administration of the estate of the
deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration
A petition for letters of administration must be filed
by an interested person and must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and
the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent'
(c) The probative value and character of the property
of the estate;.
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed;
But no defect in the petition shall render void the
issuance of letters of administration. (emphasis ours).
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of
administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) residence at the
time of death in the province where the probate court is located; and
(3) if the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of
a foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate in the
province where the court is sitting.
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above
mentioned minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in
Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his
death, the omission was cured by the amended petitions wherein the
same paragraph now reads:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the
abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato
City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao
City. (Emphasis supplied.)
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required
to be stated in the petition for letters of administration.
Consequently, there was no need to publish the amended petition as
petitioner would insist.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion
to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have
any interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are
explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration Any
interested person, may by filing a written opposition,
contest the petition on the ground of incompetency of
the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's
own right to the administration, and may pray that
letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or
persons named in the opposition..
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of
letters of administration. An interested person is one who would be

benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and
not one that is only indirect or contingent.
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the
decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a
marriage contract which she failed to produce. The lower court
correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate
which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule,
together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court
correctly ruled that:
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates,
passports and other similar documents cannot prove
marriage especially so when the petitioner has
submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not
registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have
solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized
said alleged marriage. . . .
3) (addition) Finally, petitioner further argues that the ruling of the
CA treating the Special Proceeding as one for both guardianship and
settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling in Gomez
vs. Imperial, which the petitioner quotes:
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the
deceased is a function pertaining property not to the
guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding
which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.
Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the
action before the lower court was merely one for guardianship.
Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the
estate of the deceased. While in the case at bar, the petition filed
before the court was both for guardianship and settlement of estate.
G.R. No. L-10050 January 6, 1915
LUIS R. YANGCO, petitioner, vs.THE DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF THE CITY OF MANILA PRESIDED OVER BY THE
HONORABLE A. S. CROSSFIELD AS JUDGE, and TEODORO R.
YANGCO, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner herein was a young man, 21 years of age, the owner of
property valued at nearly P1,000,000, and temporarily traveling
abroad at the time the proceedings were had which terminated in the
declaration that he was a spendthrift and the appointment of a
guardian of his property.
The proceedings were begun by the respondent Teodoro R. Yangco in
the CFI of manila, he himself making the petition as a relative and
friend. It is conceded that no notice was given to the petitioner herein
personally, the only notice was given to the mother-in- law and
brother-in-law of the plaintiff, the latter being the acting manager of
the business of the plaintiff.
It is undisputed that, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, the
petitioner for the writ is a resident of the Philippine Islands and that
he was temporarily absent therefrom traveling abroad at the time the
proceedings complained of were instituted and the decree obtained.
Issue:
WON the decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and appointing
a guardian for his property was valid. no
Ruling:
In proceedings of this case notice as required by the statute is
jurisdictional and the lack of it deprives the court of power to make a
valid decree in the premises. Section 559 of the Code of Civil
Procedure requires personal notice to the alleged spendthrift when
he is a resident of the Philippine Islands. It provides: When it is
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represented to a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, by petition
verified by oath of any relative or friend, that any person who is an
inhabitant or resident of the province, is insane or is a spendthrift,
incompetent to manage his estate, praying that a guardian may be
appointed for such person, such court or judge must cause a notice
to be given to the supposed insane or incompetent person of the time
and place of hearing the petition, not less than five days before the
time so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be
produced on the hearing.
The statute does not authorized a substitute service except in cases
where, as provided in section 572, the person for whose property the
guardian is sought to the appointed is a resident of a foreign country.
Personal notice being essential under the statute, the notice to the
mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the alleged spendthrift was of no
legal value.
To declare a person of full age to be incompetent to manage his affairs
and thereby deprive him of the possession of and right to hold and
manage his property is a serious thing. It takes from him one of the
greatest privileges of life in contravention of those fundamental rights
which all men naturally have to possess, control, manage and enjoy
their own property.
Another matter of grave importance in this case should be noted.
Although no personal notice was given to the alleged spendthrift, the
only notice given at all being, as we have seen, solely to his mother-
in-law and brother-in-law, the court, nevertheless, made a decree
declaring him a spendthrift and appointing a guardian of his property
without taking any evidence and with absolutely nothing before it to
justify such a decree except the petition and the answer thereto of
Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal Regidor admitting and
confirming the petition.
Section 560 provides that the court shall appoint a guardian of his
person and estate only "after a full hearing and examination upon
such petition" and where "it appears to the court or Judge" from such
full hearing and examination "that the person in question is incapable
of taking care of himself and managing his property."
It is not a full hearing and examination to have A allege that B is an
incompetent and to have C come in and admit the allegation. The
court, before it can make the decree as provided for in the law, must
have before it competent evidence demonstrating the facts necessary
to sustain the decree, and that evidence must be clear and definite.
The law is not satisfied unless the court has before it facts which will
justify the decree. In proper cases, of course, the admissions made by
way of answer or otherwise by the party alleged to be a spendthrift
may be taken into consideration by the court in the determination of
the question involved and, under certain circumstances, will
doubtless be sufficient to sustain a decree of incompetency; but even
such admissions should be received with caution, for in cases of this
character the foundation of the petition is, in a way, the
incompetency of the person against whom the petition is directed
and the court should accept his admissions with considerable
hesitation. If there is doubt the court should, in spite of his
admissions, proceed with the hearing of the case and require the
production of evidence substantiate the allegation of incompetency.
Except by his own consent, it is legally impossible to declare a and
incompetent and deprive him of his property without clear and
positive evidence upon which the declaration and the deprivation are
based.
G.R. No. L-4898 March 19, 1909
SALVADOR GUERRERO, guardian of the minors Maria Manuela and
Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muoz,plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEOPOLDO
TERAN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
On the 18th day of March, 1908, the plaintiff commenced an action
against the defendant to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. This
amount was claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant upon the
theory that the defendant had been the administrator of the estate
of Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the 1st day of September, 1901, until
the 22d day of October, 1906.
In answer, the defendant admitted that he owed the plaintiff P188.39
but claimed that the plaintiff owed him the sum of P482.14, and that
the plaintiff, therefore, still owed to the defendant the difference
between P188.39 and P482.14, or the sum of P239.75, for which
latter amount the defendant prayed for judgment, with interest and
cots against the plaintiff.
The lower court found that the evidence that the defendant, as
administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz, owed the
plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46. The defendant appealed. hence this
petition.
Issue: WON defendant is liable as administrator of Antonio Sanchez
Munoz from September 1, 1901 to October 22, 1906 for the whole
amount claimed.
Ruling: NO
Evidence brought before the court are the following:
First. That the defendant Leopoldo Teran was, on the
17th day of September, 1901, appointed as
administrator of said estate. The record also discloses
that the defendant entered into a bond for the
faithful performance of his duties as such
representative of the estate of Antonio Sanchez
Muoz.
Second. On 18th day of March, 1902, the CFI
appointed Maria Muoz y Gomez as guardian for the
said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez
Muoz, and that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez gave
the required bond for the faithful performance of her
duties as such guardian.
Third. On the 6th day of October, 1906, the CFI, for
the reason that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez was
not a resident of the Philippine Islands at the time for
her appointment removed her as guardian and
appointed as guardian of said minors Felix Samson,
and required from said Samson, as provisional
guardian, a bond in the .
From the order of the judge annulling the appointment of the said
Maria Muoz y Gomez her lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court,
which appeal was subsequently withdrawn. The order therefore
revoking the appointment of the said Maria Muoz y Gomez became
final.
The mere fact, however, that she had been removed as said guardian
did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors
during the time that she was duly acting as said guardian. It must be
clear, therefore, that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez is responsible to
the said minors for administration of their interests in the estate of
the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the time of her acceptance of
said appointment on the 18th day of March, 1902, up to the time of
her removal on the 6th day of October, 1906.
If during this time she allowed other persons to handle the property
of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the
responsibility must fall upon her. Unquestionably, she may have an
action against the persons to whom she entrusted the direct
management of said estate for any loss which they may have
negligently and corruptly occasioned her. Therefore, if any loss
occurred to the plaintiff between the 18th day of March, 1902, and
the 6th day of October, 1906, they have a right of action only against
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the said Maria Muoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and under the
law the administratrix of the property of their estate.
In the claim presented by the plaintiff against the defendant no dates
are given showing the time of the particular loss and losses
occasioned by the defendant. As was said above, the defendant was
liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal
representative of the said minors in the management of their estate,
from the 17th day of September, 1901, up to the time that he was
superseded by the said Maria Muoz y Gomez, on the 18th day of
March, 1902. There is no proof showing that any of the losses
constituting the amount which the plaintiff claims occurred within
this period. However, the defendant acknowledged that of the
amount claimed by the plaintiff, he owes to them the sum of P188.39.
The record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed by the
plaintiff were due as a result of the management of the said estate
during the time while the said defendant was administering their
interests therein, except the sum of P188.39, admitted to be due by
the defendant, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the only
amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action is the
said amount of P188.39.
Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon
the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside
in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires
the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians.
However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory
requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the
responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards
of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty
by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no
statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO,
LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and,
LOURDES, all surnamed LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is
the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin
Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon arising from a sale of a parcel of land, four
(4) hectares more or less, situated in Malaking Kahoy, Paraaque,
Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow of the
deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children, Dionisio,
Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, who
thereafter challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their
contention that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from
the probate court on June 2, 1953, it could be, impugned as they were
not informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianship
proceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard without the
two elder children, Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo being notified
although they were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of
Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in
question, intervened in such action. In the lower court decision, they
were adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the
property, the sale by the widow being considered null and void insofar
as they were concerned. The rights of the Children of Leoncio Lorenzo

and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the three-fourths appertaining
to such spouses were likewise accorded recognition.
The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by
the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court in
its decision, now subject of this review, declared valid the deed of sale
executed by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses
Nery and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths, without prejudice
however to the children demanding from their mother their
participation in the amount paid for the sale of such property. It thus
ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged
orders, starting with the two elder children not being notified of the
petition for guardianship, even if they were already above 14, as
pointed out and stressed in their petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in its decision given the fact there was
failure of notice to the two children?
RULING: NO.
What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is
that it was the lower court and not the respondent Court of Appeals
that yielded obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It is worded
thus: "When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is
filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and
shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the
minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may
direct other general or special notice thereof to be given." The late
Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional character.
These are his words: "Service of the notice upon the minor if above
14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without
such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian."
The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of
First Instance, a 1915 decision. As was therein made clear: "There is
no need for interpretation or construction of the word in the case
before us. Its meaning is so clear that interpretation and construction
are unnecessary. Our simple duty is to leave untouched the meaning
with which the English language has endowed the word; and that is
the meaning which the ordinary reader would accord to it on reading
a sentence in which it was found. Where language is plain, subtle
refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a
particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly
harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which
has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what
the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure
the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English
language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here
and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the
legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed
upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have,
cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a
given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for
its 'interpretation and construction.' "
Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its
assumption that the probate court could have authorized the sale in
question. The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome.
It was the lower court that acted correctly. There is the more reason
for deciding as we do considering that the rights of minors are
involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one that is quite
commendable, that whenever their welfare may be affected, its
solicitude is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be ignored.
Precisely their stage of immaturity calls for every procedural principle
being observed before their interest in property to which they have a
claim could be adversely affected. It does not matter that their
guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811, in Salunga v.
Evangelista, Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a mother could
have an "interest opposed to that of her children." That may not have
been the precise situation in this case, but certainly from the facts as
found by the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would have been
better protected if they were notified as is required by law. If there is
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STM Case Pool (3) |6
any occasion then why there should be a strict insistence on rule
having the impress of a jurisdictional requirement, this is it.
Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or
individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care
of what concerns them, they have the political community to look
after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot
be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of
their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and
often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for
the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves."
G.R. No. L-23976 March 30, 1970
EXALTACION ZAFRA-SARTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JULIAN LUA, FRANCISCO UNABIA and
FELISA UNABIA, respondents.
From the record of this case we gather that respondent Exaltacion
Zafra-Sarte petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for
the appointment of a legal guardian over the person and property of
Remigia Zafra, whom said respondent herein alleged to be an
incompetent person, afflicted with mental disorder and other
ailments which rendered her incapable to take care of herself and to
manage her property. In her verified petition, Exaltacion prayed for
her appointment as the legal guardian of the person and property of
Remigia, claiming that she is a niece of the latter, being a daughter of
her (Remigia's) sister. Said petition was, however, opposed by Julian
Lua, who claimed that he and Remigia Zafra have lived together as
common-law husband and wife for more than 30 years, and by
Francisco Unabia, who claimed that he is a half-brother of the alleged
incompetent. The oppositors prayed that either of them be appointed
legal guardian of Remigia, should she be found incompetent.
At the conclusion of the trial, which forthwith followed after the
issues had been joined, respondent Judge found Remigia to be really
mentally deranged and for this reason appointed Exaltacion as legal
guardian of the former's person and property. Julian Lua and
Francisco Unabia submitted their motion for reconsideration of that
order of the respondent Judge, but on the same date, while such
motion was still unresolved and before the period for appeal had
expired, said respondent directed the issuance of the corresponding
letters of guardianship, and as a matter of fact such letters were
issued, after Exaltacion had submitted the required bond of P1,000.00
and had taken her oath of office as legal guardian of the person and
property of Remigia Zafra. They then filed their notice of appeal and
deposited their appeal bond of P120.00 in cash, they also filed their
Record on Appeal. Respondent Judge approved the record on appeal
of the oppositors in that proceeding and directed the Clerk to elevate
that case to this Court for review.
Thereafter, before such motion for reconsideration was resolved,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to enable her as such guardian to
bring the ward to the hospital before the Court of Juvenile & Domestic
Relations. On May 19, 1964, herein petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order of the court praying that the status
quo as to the custody of Remigia Zafra, who is under the charge of
Felisa Unabia, be maintained during the pendency of their appeal.
This motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge.
On the allegation that now respondents Julian Lua, the common-law
husband and her half-brother, Francisco Unabia as well as her half-
sister, respondent Felisa Urnabia, had no other speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to prevent the immediate

execution of the order by the Court of Juvenile & Domestic Relations,
a special civil action for certiorari was filed by them with respondent
Court of Appeals. They were able to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the enforcement of the aforesaid order
complained of. As noted in the brief for petitioner: "Upon the facts
above-stated, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the order
issued by the trial court in Special Proceeding, and the writ of
preliminary injunction was ordered stayed until such time the Court
of Appeals shall have the opportunity to review the merits of the
aforesaid order appointing Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte (herein petitioner)
as legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia Zafra."
ISSUE: WON the CA was justified in setting aside the order sought to
be assailed in the certiorari proceedings.
RULING: NO.
Petitioner would impress on us that the issue as to the power of
respondent Court to suspend the effectivity of an order appointing a
guardian in the event of an appeal therefrom was decided
in Mercader v. Wislizenus. To maintain such an assertion, she quoted
an excerpt from our opinion in that case thus: "The order declaring
the incompetency and appointing a guardian was good, until reversed
or set aside, and authorized the guardian, in spite of the appeal, to do
whatever was necessary under the direction of the Court, to protect
the property of the incompetent." The above citation does impart
more than a semblance of plausibility to her contention. It does
support her stand.
It is to be admitted that the excerpt on which petitioner would pin her
hopes resulted from the realization of this Court that if it were not
thus there was the fear, not without basis, that the property of the
person adjudged incompetent could be frittered away during the
pendency of such appeal or converted to the use of designing
persons. The above consideration does not detract from the general
principle announced that such appointment of a guardian should be
considered good until reversed or set aside on appeal. No such
weighty and persuasive reason that would call for a different ruling
may be discussed from the facts as found by the Court of Appeals. The
above statement from the opinion of Justice Moreland is thus
impressed with a force sufficient to give more than legal color to what
was ordered by the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations of
Manila. For it to yield deference to such a pronouncement by this
Court cannot certainly earn the stigma of a grave abuse of discretion.
Why did respondent Court view the matter otherwise? It relied on
two California decisions, one promulgated in 1911, Coburn v.
Hynes, and another in 1917, O'Donnel v. Sixth Judicial District. They
speak to the effect that upon the filing of in appeal, the guardian
appointed was automatically precluded from exercising her functions.
As correctly noted in the brief for petitioner the holding of each of the
above cases to that effect is predicated on relevant statutory
provisions of the State of California. As a matter of fact, such a
doctrine goes back to an 1892 pronouncement of the California
Supreme Court. Respondent Court should have displayed less
receptivity to the persuasive force of the above doctrine. It might
have been otherwise if there were no Mercader ruling. As it is,
respondent Court was not justified in setting aside the order sought
to be assailed in a certiorari proceeding made in reliance on a decision
of this Court.
CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA y LOPEZ MANZANO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. EL HOGAR FILIPINO, INC., MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC. and ERNEST
BERG, Defendants; EL HOGAR FILIPINO, INC. and MAGDALENA
ESTATE, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS:
A parcel of land was registered in the name of Andres Luna de Pardo
de Tavera, single; Carlos Pardo de Tavera, married to Belen Ramirez;
Maria Audotte Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 3 years of age, single;
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Roberto Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 9 years of age, single; and
Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano, 11 years of age, single.
The co-owners agreed to organize a corporation under the name of
Tavera-Luna, Inc. for the purpose of building a modern structure on
the parcel of land and to that end they also agreed to accept shares
of stock of the corporation to be organized in exchange for their
respective shares in the parcel of land and building erected thereon
to be transferred to the corporation.
The duly appointed guardian of the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y
Lopez Manzano, mother of the minor, filed a petition in the probate
court praying for the approval of the agreement referred to and
seeking authority to accept shares of stock of the corporation in
exchange for the share of the minor in the property. The probate
court approved the agreement in so far as the minor Carmen Pardo
de Tavera y Lopez Manzano was concerned and authorized the
guardian to accept the shares of stock of the corporation in exchange
for the share of the minor in the property.
After the transfer of the shares of the co-owners in the property, the
old title was cancelled and in lieu thereof a new title in the name of
Tavera-Luna, Inc. was issued.
Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the transfer of her right,
share and interest in the property made by her guardian to Tavera-
Luna, Inc.
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment annulling the
order of the probate court that had granted authority to the guardian
of the Plaintiff to transfer her wards right, share interest in the parcel
of land to Tavera-Luna, Inc.
The Plaintiff became of age and released from guardianship on 19
November 1940 and the action was brought on 17 November 1942,
or within the period provided for in section 579, Act No. 190, which
says:
No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a guardian can be
maintained by the ward, or by any person claiming under him, unless
it is commenced within three years next after the termination of the
guardianship, or, when a legal disability to sue exists by reason of
minority or otherwise, at the time when the cause of action accrues,
within three years next after the removal of such disability.
The Plaintiff contends and the trial court sustained her claim that the
order of the probate court of 28 August 1930 is a nullity because the
provisions of section 569, Act No. 190, the law then in force, were not
complied with and for that reason the probate court was without
jurisdiction to order the transfer of her share in the property to the
corporation to be organized and formed.
ISSUE:WON the probate court was correct when it authorized the
guardian to accept the shares of stock of the corporation in
exchange for the share of the minor in the property.
HELD: YES
That the probate court in guardianship proceedings had jurisdiction
over the petition filed by the guardian admits of no doubt.
Only upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction may an order entered by
a court be assailed collaterally. If the court had jurisdiction,
irregularities in the proceedings which would or could invalidate the
courts order may be assailed directly by means of an appeal but not
collaterally. Lack of verification of a petition filed in a probate court
for the sale of real property belonging to the estate of a minor is not
a jurisdictional defect.
It should have been attacked directly and not collaterally. In her
petition the guardian alleged that the transfer of her wards share in
the property to the corporation then to be organized would be to or
for her benefit and she expected that the construction of a new
building would enhance the value of her wards share in the property
and increase her income.

AUTHORITY OF GUARDIAN TO SELL PROPERTY OF
WARD;REQUISITES BEFORE AUTHORITY IS GRANTED
No other consideration or motive could have prompted the guardian,
mother of the minor, to file the petition. It is not necessary for a grant
of authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward to state that
the income is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to
maintain or educate the ward when a minor. It is enough, as the
other alternative of the law provides, that it appears to the
satisfaction of the court that it is for the benefit of the ward that his
real estate or some part thereof should be sold, and the proceeds
thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive security.
WHEN NOTICE TO NEXT OF KIN NOT NECESSARY; NEXT OF KIN
EXPLAINED
The petition of the guardian falls under the last quoted part of section
569, Act No. 190. That part of the section, requiring the probate court
to enter an order directing the next of kin to the ward and all persons
interested in the estate to appear before the court at a time and place
therein specified, was substantially complied with, because the next
kin to the ward was her own guardian and mother and all persons
interested in the estate of the ward were her uncles and aunt who
agreed to make the transfer of their respective shares in the property
to the corporation, Tavera-Luna, Inc.
Moreover, next of kin are those whose relationship is such that they
are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
There were no creditors to the wards estate. Notice to the next of
kin to the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear
before the judge or court, at the time and place therein specified,
was not necessary, because the next of kin to the ward and all persons
interested in the estate were her mother and guardian, uncles and
aunt.
Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that part of the
provision of section 569, Act No. 190, has been complied with.
Hearing on the petition, as required in said section does not
necessarily mean that witnesses testify or documents be produced or
exhibited. If the court be satisfied that the allegations of the petition
are true and the interested persons or close relatives of the ward did
not object because they themselves were interested in the scheme to
organize a corporation to which all their shares in the property were
to be transferred, the provisions of the law on hearing were also
complied with.
JESUS CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,
vs.
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, and
RAMON CRISOSTOMO, respondents.
FACTS:
A petition for the "Guardianship of the Incompetent Petrona
Crisostomo", was instituted sometime in 1928, the court, appointed
Jesus Crisostomo guardian of the person and property of the
incompetent.
While the incompetent was already released from the National
Psychopathic Hospital of Mandaluyon, Province of Rizal, where she
had been confined, the guardian, filed a verified petition asking that
the court which took cognizance of the guardianship case declare that
the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties, that she was
able to take care of her person and to administer her property, cancel
the bond filed by the guardian, and order the termination and filing
away of the record.
The petition was supported and accompanied by a verified statement
of the incompetent, who stated under oath that she was then 65
years of age, that she was in good health, that she had recovered her
mental faculties and that she was already able to take care of herself
and to administer her property. This sworn statement was stamped
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STM Case Pool (3) |8
by the ward with her thumbmark and made under oath on February
15, 1936, before the notary public Victoriano Matienzo.
The Petition was likewise supported and accompanied by two medical
certificates of Doctors Alfredo L. Guerrero and Ramon Syquia, dated
February 15, 1936, who stated that Petrona Crisostomo was under
their medical treatment and that she had recovered her mental
faculties. On February 29, 1936, the court which took cognizance of
the guardianship case was apprized of the petition and it favorably
acted thereon, issuing the order which states:
"It having been shown by a verified motion of the guardian and by
two medical certificates of well-known doctors that the incompetent
Petrona Crisostomo has recovered the full use of her mental faculties
and that she is now in a position to take care of her person and
administer her own property, and this court having approved the
accounts submitted by the said guardian including his administration
until February 14 of the current year, the court declares the said
Petrona Crisostomo able to take care of her person and to
administer her own property, wherefore, it orders the terminator of
this guardianship, the cancellation of the bond of the guardian and
the final filing away of this case.
After the lapse of about nine months from the issuance of such order,
Ramon Crisostomo, brother of the incompetent, filed a motion in the
guardianship proceedings and in the same court which had taken
cognizance of said special proceedings, asking that the restoration
order be set aside, that the case be reopened, and that a new
guardian of the person and property of Petrona Crisostomo be
appointed, alleging as grounds that the aforesaid order is null and
void because entered without notice to the nearest relatives of the
incompetent and without hearing and that the latter had not yet
recovered her mentality.
The petitioner objected to this petition on the ground that the order
sought to be annulled had already become final and that the court
had already lost jurisdiction to reverse or annul the same, but the
respondent judge issued an order annulling that of February 29 of the
same year.
The court declared it null and illegal for lack of notice and for failure
to hold the hearing mentioned in section 562 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It entertained the opinion that the respondent Ramon
Crisostomo should have been notified, being one of the nearest
relatives of the incapacitated, and that the want of this notice
divested the jurisdiction of the judge to issue the aforesaid order. The
second division of the Court of Appeals maintained this view. Counsel
for the appellant contends that the applicable section is 575 of the
same Code and that even applying section 562, the notice and the
hearing were unnecessary under the circumstances of the case.
ISSUE: WON the order of restoration to capacity of February 29, 1936
was valid.
HELD: No.
Section 575 is not applicable because its provisions are general in
character and that the case should be governed by section 562
because its provisions are special in character and the question at
issue directly comes under the said provisions. Section 562 is of the
following tenor:
SEC. 562. Restoration of competency. Any person who has been
declared insane or incompetent, or the guardian, or any relative of
such person within the third degree or any friend, may apply, by
petition, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the
appointment of guardians is made, and have the fact of his
restoration to capacity judicially determined. The petition shall be
verified by oath, and shall state that such person is then sane and
competent. Upon receiving the petition, the court must appoint a day
for hearing before the court, and shall cause notice of the trial to be
given to the guardian of the person so declared insane or
incompetent and to the ward. On the trial, the guardian, or relatives
of the person so declared insane or incompetent, and in the discretion
of the court any other person, may contest the right to the relief
demanded. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify, and

may be called and examined by the court on its own motion. If it be
found that the person be of sound mind, and capable of taking care
of himself and property, his restoration to capacity shall be adjudged
and the guardianship of such person, if such person be not a minor,
shall cease.
In order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship of an
incompetent may issue a valid order restoring him to capacity it is
necessary, under this section
(1) that a verified petition be presented by the incompetent, his
guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree, or
any friend of his;
(2) that said petition should allege that the incompetent has
recovered his mental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case may
be; and
(3) that upon receiving the petition the court should set the same for
hearing and notify the guardian and the incompetent thereof.
At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives of the incompetent, and, in
the discretion of the court, any other person may oppose the remedy
sought. The section does not require notice of the hearing to any
other person except the guardian and the incompetent. In the case
under study it happened that the verified petition was signed by the
guardian himself and was supported and accompanied by the sworn
statement of the incompetent.
In the petition it was stated that the incompetent had recovered her
mental faculties and this allegation was corroborated by her in her
sworn statement when she stated that she had already recovered her
mental faculties. In these circumstances the only logical conclusion is
that the requisites of section 562 have at least been substantially
complied with and that the notice and the hearing were unnecessary
and superfluous. It is true that under the section the respondent
Ramon Crisostomo could have appeared at the hearing and opposed
the petition, but this right given to him by law is not absolute in the
sense that he is also entitled to a personal notice. His situation is like
that of a person who, not being a defendant in an ordinary action and
not having been notified of the complaint, learns of the existence of
the suit and discovers that he has a direct interest in the subject
matter of the litigation; there is no question that he would be entitled
to take part therein as intervener, but he cannot successfully ask for
the annulment of the judgment to be rendered on the ground that he
had a right to be cited or notified and to be present at the trial
because it happened that he had an interest in the case.
Section 562, like the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
should be liberally interpreted pursuant to the provision of section 2
thereof in order to promote its object and assist the parties in
obtaining speedy justice. If, as it seems, the intention of the
respondent Ramon Crisostomo is to annul the donation which the
incompetent made of her property in favor of the petitioner, the
courts are open for him to bring an action for that purpose.
The order issued by the respondent judge annulling that of February
29 of the same year is null and void because the court was without
jurisdiction to enter the same after the accounts of the guardian had
been approved, his bond cancelled and the record of the guardianship
proceedings deemed closed and filed away definitely. When the
respondent Ramon Crisostomo filed his motion asking the annulment
of the order of February 29, 1936, the latter had already become final
and binding upon the parties.
The guardianship case was no longer before the court because the
accounts of the guardian had been definitely approved, his bond had
been cancelled, he had been relieved of his charge, and the
incompetent had recovered her capacity before the law.
Vda. De Bengson vs. Philippine National Bank
FACTS:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
STM Case Pool (3) |9
As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II,
Carmen Padilla Vda. De Bengson became entitled to certain accrued
insurance benefits and to a monthly death compensation for the rest
of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration.
Upon inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent,
the Veterans Administration filed Special Proceeding No. 586 in the
CFI of La Union, where in due course, an order was entered on August
8, 1957, adjudging Carmen to be an incompetent and appointing the
PNB as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the
said Veterans Administration. Letters of Guardianship were issued in
favour of PNB. Alleging that she had regained her competence, her
ward, by counsel, filed a petition asking for an order terminating the
guardianship, and for delivery to her of the residuary estate. The son
of the ward, Francisco Bengson, file a Manifestation to the effect
that he was the personal guardian of the incompetent and prayed to
be appointed guardian of the wards estate in place of the PNB. The
lower court appointed Francisco as guardian in place of PNB.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid removal of guardianship on the
part of PNB and the Veterans Administration.
HELD: NO. The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are
found in Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules of Court.
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of
discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or
mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to
render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable
notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the
estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto..
(emphasis supplied).
No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would
indicate, that there was any legal ground upon which the removal of
the PNB as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzons
manifestation nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear
that he PNB had become incapable of discharging its trust or was
unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed anything which the
Rules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears
incontestable that all throughout, the PNB has discharged its trust
satisfactorily. That it has received commissions allowed by law for its
services is no ground to remove it, especially since the Banks
commission averaged no more than P100.00 a year and is offset by
interest on the wards deposit and the sum that the son would
probably have to disburse in bond premiums. Neither is it sufficient
to base removal on the unsubstantiated opinion that it would be
more beneficial to the interests of the ward and more convenient for
the administration of the estate. A guardian should not be removed
except for the most cogent reasons; otherwise, the removal is
unwarranted and illegal.
TOPIC: 4.0 TRUSTEES (Rule 98)
Resurreccion De Leon, et al. vs. Emiliana Molo-Peckson, et al.
FACTS:
On January 24, 1941, Mariano Molo y Legaspi died leaving
a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, Juana Juan.
On May 11, 1948, Juana Juan in turn executed a will naming therein
many devisees and legatees, one of whom is Guillermo San Rafael,
mother of the plaintiffs de Leon, et al. and of the defendant Pilar.
On June 7, 1948, however, Juana Juan executed a donation inter vivos
in favor of Emiliana and Pilar almost all of her entire property leaving
only about P16,000.00 worth of property for the devisees mentioned

in the will. Among the properties conveyed to Emiliana and Pilar are
the ten parcels of land subject of the present action.
Juana Juan died on May 28, 1950.
On December 5, 1950, Emiliana and Pilar executed a document which
they called "Mutual Agreement"1 wherein the parties mutually
agreed to sell ten lots at P1 each, in conformity with the verbal wish
of the late Don Mariano Molo y Legaspi and the late Dona Juana
Francisco Juan y Molo.
On August 9, 1956, however, the same Emiliana and Pilar, assisted by
their husbands, executed another document in which they revoked
the so-called mutual agreement mentioned above, and another
relating to the same subject matter, stating therein that the parties,
"after matured and thorough study, realized that the above-
mentioned public instruments . . . do not represent their true and
correct interpretation of the verbal wishes of the late spouses Don
Mariano Molo y Legaspi and Dona Juana Francisco Juan y Molo."
On August 11, 1956, the beneficiary Resurreccion de Leon and Justa
de Leon, thru their counsel demanded the conveyance to them of the
ten parcels of land for the consideration of P1.00 per parcel as stated
in the document of December 5, 1950. And having the defendants
refused to do so, said beneficiaries consigned on July 8, 1957 the
amount of P10.00 as the consideration of the ten parcels of land.
TC: Trust has been constituted by the late spouses Mariano Molo and
Juana Juan over the ten parcels of land in question in favor plaintiffs
as beneficiaries.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in holding that the spouses
Mariano and Juana constituted a trust over the properties in question
petition with plaintiffs- appellees as beneficiaries.
HELD: The Mutual Agreement represents a recognition of pre-
existing trust or a declaration of an express trust impressed on the ten
parcels of land in question. A declaration of trust has been defined as
an act by which a person acknowledges that the property, title to
which he holds, is held by him for the use of another.
The document in question clearly and unequivocally declares the
existence of the trust even if the same was executed subsequent to
the death of the trustor, Juana Juan, for the right creating or declaring
a trust need not be contemporaneous or inter-parties.
The contention of appellants that the will and the donation executed
by their predecessors-in-interest were absolute for it did not contain
a hint that the lots in question will be held in trust by them does not
merit weight because the fact that an express trust was created by a
deed which was absolute on its face may be shown by a writing
separate from the deed itself.
The fact that the beneficiaries were not notified of the existence of
the trust or that the latter have not been given an opportunity to
accept it is of no importance, for it is not essential to the existence of
a valid trust and to the right of the beneficiaries to enforce the same
that they had knowledge thereof the time of its creation. Neither is
it necessary that the beneficiary should consent to the creation of the
trust. In fact it has been held that in case of a voluntary trust the
assent of the beneficiary is not necessary to render it valid because as
a general rule acceptance by the beneficiary is presumed.
It is true, as appellants contend, that the alleged declaration of trust
was revoked, and having been revoked it cannot be accepted, but the
attempted revocation did not have any legal effect. The rule is that in
the absence of any reservation of the power to revoke a voluntary
trust is irrevocable without the consent of the beneficiary. It cannot
be revoked by the creator alone, nor by the trustee. Here, there is no
such reservation.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
S T M C a s e P o o l ( 3 ) | 10
TEODORA SALTIGA DE ROMERO et al v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. 109307 NOVEMBER 25, 1999
FACTS
On Dec. 12, 1939 Eugenio Romero bought from spouses Macan the
latters rights, interest, and participation in a 12-hectare land. The
land in question was then public land.
When Eugenio Romero applied for a homestead patent for said land,
the same was disapproved by the Bureau of Lands because said
Romero already had applied for a homestead patent for 24 hectares
and was disqualified from owning additional 12 hectares
As a result, Eugenio Romero placed the application in the name of his
eldest son, Eutiquio Romero, allegedly in trust for all the children of
Eugenio. When Eutiquio got married and had children, the application
was transferred in the name of Lutero Romero. When Lutero in turn
got married, he relinquished the application in favor of his younger
brother Ricardo.
Eugenio Romero died in 1948. In 1961, his widow Teodora caused the
land in question to be subdivided among 6 of her children. The
appellants claimed that after the partition, they had been in
occupancy of their respective shares through their tenants.
However, Lutero claimed that in 1969, he was picked up by a
policeman and brought to the office of the mayor. He was then made
to sign 3 affidavits conveying his share to his sister Gloriosa, brother-
in-law Sabdullah and to Meliton Pacas. He said that he could not sell
his land because the 5-year period had not yet elapsed. He was made
to sign anyway. Subsequently, he repudiated the affidavits which
made his sisters file estafa charges against him.
ISSUE: WON A TRUST WAS CREATED BETWEEN THEIR FATHER AND
ROMERO FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE HEIRS OF THE FORMER.
RULING: NO. (Even if there was it would be void for being contrary
to law.)
Eugenio Romero was never the owner of the subject land because
what he obtained from the Macan spouses were the rights and
interests to the land. He could not have owned it as his application for
homestead patent was disapproved.
More importantly, there was no evidence of the supposed trust. A
trust is a legal relationship between a person having an equitable
ownership in property and another owning a legal title to such
property.
It has been held that a trust will not be created when, for the
purpose of evading the law prohibiting one from taking or holding
real property, he takes a conveyance thereof in the name of a third
person.
In this case, petitioners merely alleged that LUTERO, through
fraudulent means, had the title of Lot 23 Pls-35issued in his name
contrary to the alleged agreement between the family that LUTERO
would merely hold the lot in trust for the benefit of EUGENIOs heirs.
The alleged agreement was not proven and even assuming that the
petitioners duly proved the existence of the trust, said trust would
be of doubtful validity considering that it would promote a direct
violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act as regards the
acquisition of a homestead patent.
A homestead applicant is required by law to occupy and cultivate the
land for his own benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else.
Furthermore, under Section 12 of The Public Land Act (CA 141), a
person is allowed to enter a homestead not exceeding twenty-four
(24) hectares.

If we uphold the theory of the petitioners and rule that a trust in fact
existed, we would be abetting a circumvention of the statutory
prohibitions stated under the Public Land Act. We therefore find no
legal or factual basis to sustain the contention of the petitioners that
LUTERO merely held Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust for the benefit of the heirs
of EUGENIO.
HEIRS OF LORENZO YAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO.133047 AUGUST 17, 1999
FACTS:
Sometime in February 1966, respondent Ramon Yap purchased a
parcel of land situated in Galas, Quezon City. The lot was thereupon
registered in his name and thereafter, constructed a two storey 3-
door apartment for the use of the Yap family.
When Lorenzo (his brother, alleged owner) died, his heirs, herein
petitioners left their family dwelling in Lucena City to reside
permanently in Manila. Hence, Ramon allowed petitioners to use one
unit of the apartment building. On 18 March 1992, Ramon sold the
land and his share of the 3-door apartment to his brother Benjamin
Yap, his herein co-respondent.
Subsequently, petitioners claimed ownership over the property and
demanded respondents execute the proper deed necessary to
transfer title to them. Respondents then filed an action with the RTC
for quieting of title.
In their answer, petitioners contended that Ramon was merely used
as a dummy by Lorenzo since the latter and his wife were at the time
Chinese citizens. It was agreed that the property will be transferred
to Lorenzo upon his acquisition of Philippine citizenship, but that,
should be predecease, the lot will be transferred to his heirs upon the
latter's naturalization. When petitioners acquired Philippine
citizenship they requested Ramon to have the title to the lot
transferred to their names but they discovered that he had sold the
lot to his co-respondent. In addition, petitioners claimed that it was
Lorenzo who had caused the construction of the 3-door apartment,
merely entrusting the money to Ramon.
ISSUE: WON A TRUST WAS CONSTITUTED BETWEEN LORENZO AND
RAMON
HELD: NO. (Even if there was an implied trust, it could not have been
valid as it was in contravention of applicable laws.)
There is a basic distinction between implied and express trusts.
Express trusts cannot be proved by parole evidence. Even then, in
order to establish the existence of an implied trust in real property by
parole evidence, the prove should be as fully convincing as the facts
as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an
authentic document. The petitioners' evidence was insufficient to
prove clearly that a trust was constituted between their father and
Ramon.
However, even if the trust agreement between Ramon and Lorenzo is
indeed extant, it would have been in contravention of the
fundamental law. Then Section 5, Article XIII, of the 1935 Constitution
has provided that: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.The mandate has also been adopted
in Section 14, Article XIV, of the 1973 Constitution and now reiterated
under Section 7, Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution.
A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust would be invalid if the
enforcement of the trust or provision is against the law even though
its performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or
tortuous act. It likewise must follow that what the parties are not
allowed to do expressly is one that they also may not do impliedly
as, for instance, in the guise of a resulting trust.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
S T M C a s e P o o l ( 3 ) | 11
SOLEDAD CAEZO, substituted by WILLIAM CAEZO and
VICTORIANO CAEZO
vs.CONCEPCION ROJAS
FACTS:
- Petitioner Soledad Caezo filed a Complaint for the recovery of real
property plus damages with the MTC of Naval, Biliran, against her
fathers second wife, respondent Concepcion Rojas. The subject
property is an unregistered land with an area of 4,169 square meters
- The petitioner alleged that she bought the parcel of land in 1939
from Crisogono Limpiado, although the transaction was not reduced
into writing. Thereafter, she immediately took possession of the
property.
- When she and her husband left for Mindanao in 1948, she entrusted
the said land to her father, Crispulo Rojas, who took possession of,
and cultivated, the property. In 1980, she found out that the
respondent, her stepmother, was in possession of the property and
was cultivating the same. She also discovered that the tax declaration
over the property was already in the name of Crispulo Rojas.
- In her Answer, the respondent asserted that, contrary to the
petitioners claim, it was her husband, Crispulo Rojas, who bought the
property from Crisogono Limpiado in 1948, which accounts for the tax
declaration being in Crispulos name. From then on, until his death in
1978, Crispulo possessed and cultivated the property. Upon his death,
the property was included in his estate, which was administered by a
special administrator, Bienvenido Ricafort. The petitioner, as heir,
even received her share in the produce of the estate. The respondent
further contended that the petitioner ought to have impleaded all of
the heirs as defendants. She also argued that the fact that petitioner
filed the complaint only in 1997 means that she had already
abandoned her right over the property.
- MTC: rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner
- RTC: It then reversed the MTC decision on the ground that the action
had already prescribed and acquisitive prescription had set in. The
said property remains as the legitime of the defendant Concepcion
Rojas and her children.
- CA: The complaint filed by Soledad Caezo before the MTC is hereby
DISMISSED on grounds of laches and prescription and for lack of
merit.
ISSUE: WON the case filed was correctly dismissed on grounds of
laches and prescription and for lack of merit.
RULING: YES.
The petitioner insists that her right of action to recover the property
cannot be barred by prescription or laches even with the
respondents uninterrupted possession of the property for 49 years
because there existed between her and her father an express trust or
a resulting trust. Indeed, if no trust relations existed, the possession
of the property by the respondent, through her predecessor, which
dates back to 1948, would already have given rise to acquisitive
prescription in accordance with Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure).
Under Section 40 of Act No. 190, an action for recovery of real
property, or of an interest therein, can be brought only within ten
years after the cause of action accrues. This period coincides with the
ten-year period for acquisitive prescription provided under Section
41 of the same Act.
Thus, the resolution of the second issue hinges on our determination
of the existence of a trust over the property --- express or implied ---
between the petitioner and her father.
A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an
equitable ownership of property and another person owning the
legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former

entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise
of certain powers by the latter. Trusts are either express or
implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by
words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are
those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently, of
the particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity. An
implied trust may either be a resulting trust or a constructive trust.
It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot
acquire by prescription a property entrusted to him unless he
repudiates the trust.
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the
ownership of property entrusted to him, or that an action to compel
a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the
benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe, or that the defense
of prescription cannot be set up in an action to recover property held
by a person in trust for the benefit of another, or that property held
in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of
time.
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is
that the possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he
does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus,
Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not
apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust."
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in
trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has
not repudiated the trust.
As a rule, however, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is
on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and
satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. The
presence of the following elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or
settlor who executes the instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee,
who is the person expressly designated to carry out the trust; (3)
the trust res, consisting of duly identified and definite real
properties; and (4) the cestui que trust, or beneficiaries whose
identity must be clear. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to prove the existence of the trust relationship. And
petitioner sadly failed to discharge that burden.
The existence of express trusts concerning real property may not be
established by parol evidence. It must be proven by some writing or
deed. In this case, the only evidence to support the claim that an
express trust existed between the petitioner and her father was the
self-serving testimony of the petitioner. Bare allegations do not
constitute evidence adequate to support a conclusion. They are not
equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.
This allegation, standing alone as it does, is inadequate to establish
the existence of a trust because profit-sharing per se, does not
necessarily translate to a trust relation. It could also be present in
other relations, such as in deposit.
All the foregoing notwithstanding, even if we sustain petitioners
claim that she was the owner of the property and that she constituted
a trust over the property with her father as the trustee, such a finding
still would not advance her case.
Assuming that such a relation existed, it terminated upon Crispulos
death in 1978. A trust terminates upon the death of the trustee where
the trust is personal to the trustee in the sense that the trustor
intended no other person to administer it. If Crispulo was indeed
appointed as trustee of the property, it cannot be said that such
appointment was intended to be conveyed to the respondent or any
of Crispulos other heirs. Hence, after Crispulos death, the
respondent had no right to retain possession of the property. At such
point, a constructive trust would be created over the property by
operation of law. Where one mistakenly retains property which
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
S T M C a s e P o o l ( 3 ) | 12
rightfully belongs to another, a constructive trust is the proper
remedial device to correct the situation.
A constructive trust is one created not by any word or phrase, either
expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but
one which arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not
come about by agreement or intention but in the main by operation
of law, construed against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he
ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. 43
As previously stated, the rule that a trustee cannot, by prescription,
acquire ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he
repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied
trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may
supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship.
Necessarily, repudiation of the said trust is not a condition precedent
to the running of the prescriptive period. A constructive trust, unlike
an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary
relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are
linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust,
there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and
the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the
property for the beneficiary. The relation of trustee and cestui que
trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is
for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse.
In addition, a number of other factors militate against the petitioners
case. First, the petitioner is estopped from asserting ownership over
the subject property by her failure to protest its inclusion in the estate
of Crispulo. The CA, thus, correctly observed that:
Even in the probate proceedings instituted by the heirs of Crispulo
Rojas, which included her as a daughter of the first marriage, Caezo
never contested the inclusion of the contested property in the estate
of her father. She even participated in the project of partition of her
fathers estate which was approved by the probate court in 1984.
After personally receiving her share in the proceeds of the estate for
12 years, she suddenly claims ownership of part of her fathers estate
in 1997.
The principle of estoppel in pais applies when -- by ones acts,
representations, admissions, or silence when there is a need to speak
out -- one, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces
another to believe certain facts to exist; and the latter rightfully relies
and acts on such belief, so as to be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of those facts. Such a situation
obtains in the instant case.
TOPIC: 5.0 ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS
ANA JOYCE S. REYES vs.HON. CESAR M. SOTERO
FACTS:
- On 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the
late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Chichioco claimed
that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate.
- According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in
the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted
pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession
of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate.
- Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that
she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters husband, Serafin
Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the

petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an
administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising
who passed away without leaving any debts. She further asserted that
Chichioco is unfit to serve as administrator of Lisings estate because
of her "antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and
her alleged co-heirs have questioned the decedents title to a piece of
real property which forms a large part of the estate.
- Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
adoption. They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of
petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the
adoption case. Petitioners natural mother supposedly connived with
the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by
the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFIs order for initial hearing
was published in a weekly newspaper which was not authorized to
publish court orders in special proceedings. CA dismissed such case.
- Respondent filed a Comment to the opposition stating that
reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioners claim that she was
legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud."
Respondents also informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal
complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for alleged falsification of the adoption decree and
Judicial Form No. 43. And, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable
cause to charge petitioner with falsification of public
documents. Hence, advised to appeal. The Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor
and dismissed the criminal complaint against petitioner.
- On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents motion for the
appointment of a special administrator and appointed its branch clerk
of court, Atty. Saguyod. Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the
grounds that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on
the task of special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was
appointed without being required to file a bond. Petitioner also
reiterated that the petition should be dismissed because she is the
sole heir of the decedent.
- Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a
motion before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business
in a property belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged
that petitioner converted the basement of Lisings residence into a
billiard hall without authority of the special administrator.28
- RTC: The Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from
conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the
decedent. The Special Administrator is also empowered to take
control and possession of the listed personal and real properties of
the decedent and those that may be found to be owned or registered
in the name of the same. Hence, appeal.
- CA: rendered judgment nullifying the resolutions of the trial court.
It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely
abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as special
administrator. However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec.
Proceeding since the dismissal of other special proceeding was not a
judgment on the merits and did not operate as res judicata to the
former.
ISSUE: WON THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE
TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF
RULE 39.
RULING: YES
We agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal adoption
by any evidence other than those which she had already presented
before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification
from the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree was
registered therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a
certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
S T M C a s e P o o l ( 3 ) | 13
the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were
issued under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the
proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been regularly
issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform.
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public
documentrequired by law to be entered into the public records, the
official repository of which, as well as all other judicial
pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil
registrars office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local
civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioners
adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners
adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome
by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not
cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications
and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is
offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the
purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents
estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso. Accordingly,
respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the
adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners claim that she is the
sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an
appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the
certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein,
should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioners status as
an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious
challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore,
for as long as petitioners adoption is considered valid, respondents
cannot claim any interest in the decedents estate.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those
who, like them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first
cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in
view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted
children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code).
The same holds true as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant
case - considered valid. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily
exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they
are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings
below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the
resolution of the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec.
Proceeding is the logical consequence of our pronouncement relative
to the presumed validity of petitioners adoption.
Republic vs. Miller, GR No. 125932, April 22, 1999
Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed
with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child
under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows
aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended
approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation.
On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the
adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.
The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for
adoption by the RTC.

Issue: WON aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for
adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
prohibiting the same.
Held: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the
petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Vested right include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations created after the right has vested.
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed
a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel
Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her
petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-
married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no
longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of
the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the
minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children
abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for
the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was
consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as
witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos
to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written
consent of the adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of
the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the
adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents
is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his
parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the
filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the
child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
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S T M C a s e P o o l ( 3 ) | 14
Perez vs CA
Facts:
Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a
registered nurse working in the US are married couples who are
separated in fact with only one child.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to
surrender the custody of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding
custody of the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts order and awarded custody of the boy to him ruling that there
were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even
under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boys father
would be for the childs best interest and welfare.
Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no
child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that No
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore.
Issue:
WON custody of the child is to be given to the father.
Held:
No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven
years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word
shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term
separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a
child below seven years old shall not be separated from the mother
(Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the
Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the childs age to 5
years.
Santos vs Aranzanso, et al.
Facts:
A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8
years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of
Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been
unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to
locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned;
and that for years since their infancy, said children have been
continuously been in petitioners care and custody. The consent to
the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by
the Court. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court
granted the petition for the adoption.Subsequently eight years later
Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other
things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos
and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator
of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased,
filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator,
asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina
Issue:
WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to
imputations of irregularities.
Held:
No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence
other than those which she had already presented before the trial
court.An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be
entered into public records, the official repository of which, as well as
all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals,
is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which rendered
the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local
civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioners
adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners
adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome
by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations of irregularities will not
cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications
and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is
offered
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and
REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose
by any other name would smell as sweet?
FACTS: On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van
Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to
adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein
the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for
adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as
well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption
of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition,
private respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said
minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph.
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of
the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In
its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, 4 petitioner reiterated its
objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions
for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition
should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
RTC: Favored Spouses Munson granting the petition for adoption and
additionally granted the prayer for the change of name.
SOLGEN: A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name
are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from each other. Each action is individually governed by
particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve
disparate issues.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
S T M C a s e P o o l ( 3 ) | 15
1st ISSUE: W/N the RTC is correct in granting the change of name. NO.
The change of name should be made in a separate petition for that
purpose and not in the petition for adoption. There is no such thing
as automatic change of name, there must be a separate petition to
that effect. Upon the issuance of the decree of adoption, only the
surname of the child will change, not the given name or first name.
To change the given name or first name, there must be a separate
petition filed for that purpose pursuant to Rule 103.
SC RULING: Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain
terms the legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted
shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the
adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses;
and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other
blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and
obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond
the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in
nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor
furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be
used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, 17 and shall continue to
be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or
proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a
substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be
authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory
procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever
possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the
statute, a court to which the application is made should normally
make its decree recording such change. 18
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is
desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with
the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingly determined.
2ND ISSUE: W/N the petition for adoption and petition for change of
name can be joined in one special proceeding. NO. Petition for
adoption and petition for change of name are two separate and
distinct proceedings involving different issues. They do not have
conceptual unity and are not related to each other. Hence, the two
special proceedings cannot be joined.
SC RULING: Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be
filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person

desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by
the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person
in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least
three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of
name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and
place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the
Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the
veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of
the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that
the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a
copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality
concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. 19 It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by
means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or
an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our
remedial law system.
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no
express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption
and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation
between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or
character, much less do they present any common question of fact
or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these
petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
3RD ISSUE: W/N there is lawful ground for the change of name. NO.
The only grounds for change of name are those provided by
jurisprudence. The ground invoked by the adoptive parents are not
one of those mentioned by the jurisprudence.
SC RULING: Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following
grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the
change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest. 54
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that
one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known
and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of
baptismal names is not sanctioned. 55 For, in truth, baptism is not a
condition sine qua non to a change of name. 56 Neither does the fact
that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become
known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally
authorize a change of name. 57 A name given to a person in the church
records or elsewhere or by which be is known in the community -
when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial
and cannot be recognized as his real name. 58
TOPIC: 6.0 PROCEEDINGS FOR HOSPITALIZATION OF
INSANE PERSON (Rule 101)
CHIN AH FOO and YEE SHEE vs. CONCEPCION and LEE VOO
G.R. No. 33281 March 31, 1930
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
S T M C a s e P o o l ( 3 ) | 16
Facts:
This case concerns a man who was acquitted from the charge of
murder on the plea of insanity, and who was confined in an asylum,
and was subsequently permitted to leave the asylum without the
acquiescence of the Director of Health. The factor determinative of the
question has to do with the effect of section 1048 of the
Administrative Code on article 8 of the Penal Code.
Facts: November 15, 1927, Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo), was
charged in the CFI with the murder of Chin Ah Kim. Thereafter, the
trial judge rendered judgment declaring the accused not responsible
for the crime, and dismissing the case, but requiring the reclusion of
the accused for treatment in San Lazaro Hospital, in accordance with
article 8 of the Penal Code, provided that the accused be not
permitted to leave the said institution without first obtaining the
permission of the court.
In compliance with this order, Chan Sam was confined for
approximately two years in San Lazaro Hospital. During this period,
efforts to obtain his release were made induced by the desire of his
wife and father-in-law to have him proceed to Hongkong. Opposition
to the allowance of the motions came from the wife and children of
the murdered man, who contended that Chan Sam was still insane,
and that he had made threats that if he ever obtained his liberty he
would kill the wife and the children of the deceased and probably
other members of his own family who were living in Hongkong.
However, the respondent judge sustained the court's right to make
an order in the premises and allowed Chan Sam to leave the San
Lazaro Hospital to be turned over to the attorney-in-fact of his wife
so that he might be taken to Hongkong to join his wife in that city.
Issue: W/N Chan Sam (the insane person) was properly discharged.
Ruling No.
Article 8 of the Penal Code, pursuant to which the trial judge
purported to act in issuing his order of release, provides that among
those exempt from criminal liability are:
1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during
the lucid interval.
When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which
the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall order his
confinement in one of the asylums established for persons
thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has
superseded or supplemented article 8 of the Penal Code, provides as
to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for the
insane the following:
When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in
any Government hospital or other place for the insane is
temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released
without danger, he may discharge such patient, and shall
notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who ordered
the commitment, in case the patient is confined by order of
the court.
An examination of article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses
that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one
accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for
obtaining release from the institution. The respondent judge has
based his action in this case on this provision of the law. On the other
hand, section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants to the Director
of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an
insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of Health has
exercised his authority in this case, or that the head of the Philippine
Health Service has been asked to express his opinion.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
S T M C a s e P o o l ( 3 ) | 17

Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section
1048 of the Administrative Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and
section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that
both can stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal Code as in
force and construing this article and section 1048 of the
Administrative Code, we think that the Attorney-General was right in
expressing the opinion that the Director of Health was without
power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person
confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the
provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code.

Any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance

with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody
in an insane asylum until the views of the Director of Health have
been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or
permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other
words, the powers of the courts and the Director of Health are
complementary each with the other. As a practical observation, it
may further be said that it is well to adopt all reasonable precautions
to ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as insane should be
permitted to leave the asylum, and this can best be accomplished
through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in
proper cases.

After thorough discussion, our view is that while the respondent

Judge acted patiently and cautiously in the matters which came
before him, yet he exceeded his authority when he issued his orders
without first having before him the opinion of the Director of
Health.

Note: Sec. 4 of Rule 101 provides

Sec. 4. Discharge of Insane. When, in the opinion of the Director of Health, the
person ordered to be committed to a hospital or other place for the insane is
temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger he may
file the proper petition with the Court of First Instance which ordered the
commitment.