PEDROSA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when
G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001
Facts: In 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina de
Rodriguez initiated proceedings for the legal adoption of Maria
Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. This was granted. Miguel died
intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. In
1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption
of petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the EJ
partition has not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period
which should be applied is four years following the case
of Beltran vs. Ayson. She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which
provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two
requirements.
One, the party assailing the partition must have been
given notice, and
two, the party assailing the partition must have
participated therein.
Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in her
case, since she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition." She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA
27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of extrajudicial
partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had
no knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She
asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of
Miguel.
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had
already prescribed. Also, the non-participation of Maria Elena
in the extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status
as an adopted child was then under litigation.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed;
(2) whether or not said deed is valid; and
(3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots
which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.
Ruling:
(1) NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive
period
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or
had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.
Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable
in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)
years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial
settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed
within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds
and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on
January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the
questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the
basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule
on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
(2). NO. Under said provision, without the participation of all
persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial
settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule
contemplates a notice which must be sent out or
issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed
upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in
the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after,
which was when publication was done in the instant case.
Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since
Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the
settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when
the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on
the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed
without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious Maria Elena
is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother,
Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes
the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the
partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was
no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only
represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena.
Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares.
Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's
estate but only Pilar's estate.
(3). NO.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given
the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that
this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties
sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered
under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that
a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of
the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for
such purpose.
 SAMPILO and SALACUP vs. (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or
CA, and SINOPERA had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and,

G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958 (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
Facts: Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
four parcels of land. He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased themselves or through guardians.
brothers and sisters. In 1946, without any judicial proceedings,
his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because
Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial
ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent
sisters, nephews or nieces, but the widow the one and only left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time
person to inherit the above properties" This affidavit was of his death.
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. On the same
day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land Issue: W/N the action is barred by the statute of limitations.
in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale
was also registered. In 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the
Ruling: No.
said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this
sale was also registered. In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera
instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which
Teodoro Tolete and having secured her appointment as shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against
administratrix, brought the present action. third persons. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken
part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third
persons not Parties thereto.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no
right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato
Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is
neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one based on
properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no
a cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations. nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right
which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years
(Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does
Issue: W/N the right of action of the respondent administratrix not appear to have lapsed the action that was instituted. Judicial
has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought proceedings were instituted in March, 1950 and these
within the period of two years as prescribed in Section 4 of Rule
proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery
74 of the Rules of Court.
of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof
as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their
Ruling: No. defense, and they have not proved that when the action was
instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date that the
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs,
both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial
settlement. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have
been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the
estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their
rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the
distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or
interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the
provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights
within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part
in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent
or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is
unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert
their claims within the period of two years. To extend the
effects of the settlement to them, to those who did not take part
or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal
provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental
right to due process of law.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial

settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot
by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or
distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge
either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial
settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect
is made, either directly or by implication.

The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or

heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is
applicable only
 CUA vs. VARGAS
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
Facts: A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late
Paulina Vargas. In 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas'
heirs, namely Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida, Rosario, Gloria,
Antonina and Florentino, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share
of 11 square meters. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed it. On November 15, 1994, an EJ Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the
same heirs over the same property and also with the same
sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed the document and their respective shares
totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner
herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and
one of respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16,
1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being
demolished sometime in May 1995. She likewise claimed she
was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property.
Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property but was refused.
Thus she filed a case for annulment of the EJ settlement and
Legal Redemption.
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing
him the price of the sale. They likewise alleged that the 30-day
period following a written notice by the vendors to their co-
owners for them to exercise the right of redemption of the
property had not yet set in as no written notice was sent to them.
Issues:
1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound,
regardless of their failure to participate therein. No.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did
not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of
execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs
of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this
connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing
of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they
are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot
validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons even before
the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated
in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included
the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject
property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are
given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088
of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because
respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by
their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written
notice to start the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided
they do so within the period of one month from the
time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned
from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor
of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and
mandatory,20 actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some
other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. Though the
Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice
nor any distinctive method for written notification of
redemption, the method of notification remains exclusive, there
being no alternative provided by law.

2. whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to
his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to
stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the Civil allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner
Code can be dispensed with. No. given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.

Ruling:

Petitioner argues that the acquisition by petitioner of the subject

property subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was valid
because the partition was duly published. The publication of the
same constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their
implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore
estopped from denying the validity of the partition and sale at
this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid,
respondents no longer have the right to redeem the property.

The petition lacks merit.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex

parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons
who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice
that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement
and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has
already been executed as what happened in the instant case with
the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
 CRUZ vs. CRISTOBAL
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the
heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-
Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of
Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia
Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto,
Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also
the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his
second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
In 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land.
Sometime in the year 1930, Cristobal died intestate. More than
six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents
had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property
and transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners then filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Damages. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of the
Deed of Partition executed by respondents. Petitioner Elisa
testified that the [private respondents] divided the property
among themselves without giving the [petitioners] their share.
In 1948, respondent Eufrosina admitted having executed an EJ
Partition with her brothers and sisters of the property left by
their parents. She declared that since her father died in 1930,
Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo never asserted their alleged right
over the property subject of the present litigation.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of
Partition of the subject property executed by the private
respondents. No.
(2) whether or not petitioners right to question the Deed of
Partition had prescribed. No.
(4) whether or not petitioners right to recover their share of the
subject property is barred by laches.
Ruling:
(1).
subject property or money, as one of the children of private
respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject
property. This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of
the subject property. She learned afterwards that the title to the
subject property had been transferred to the names of private
respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of
herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura
Cristobal. The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs
of Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to their
respective shares in the subject property. Since petitioners were
not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition,
which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
the late Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such
settlement is not binding on them.
(2).
As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the private
respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of
petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased
father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold
that petitioners right to challenge the said settlement had
prescribed.
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property
does not affect the right of petitioners to inherit from their
deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the
subject property between petitioners and private respondents,
as the rule on succession prescribes.
(3).
In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant
case. Note that upon petitioner Elisas knowledge in 1994 that
the title to the subject property had been transferred to the
private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings
from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners
filed in 1995 a petition with their barangay to settle the case
among themselves and private respondents, but since no
settlement was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on
27 March 1995, to annul private respondents title over the land.
There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only
where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable
to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.

As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property

executed by the private respondents among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court, which states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall

be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Under the said provision, without the participation of all

persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial
settlement is not binding on said persons. In the case at bar,
since the estate of the deceased Cristobal is composed solely of
the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of
Cristobals estate. The partition of the subject property by the
private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since
petitioners were excluded therefrom. Petitioners were not aware
of the Deed of Partition executed by private respondents among
themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the
transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of
private respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by
private respondent Eufrocina to choose between a portion of the
G.R. No. L-31174 May 30, 1972
Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, ruled:
MACIAS vs. UY KIM
Facts: Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed a
petition against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co,
Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong, Reliable
Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of
First Instance, alleging that he filed on a complaint dated
for the annulment of a deed of sale, reivindicacion and
damages against respondents and prays for judgment (a)
declaring the deed of sale over the aforementioned lots
as null and void, (b) directing the cancellation of the
transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of Reliable
Realty Corporation.
Thus, in the 1970 case of De Leon vs. Salvador, 4 Mr.
The various branches of a Court of First
Instance of a province or city, having as
they have the same or equal authority
and exercising as they do concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction, should not,
cannot, and are not permitted to interfere
with the respective cases, much less with
their orders or judgments, by means of
injunction.

Herein respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim,

Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel
Sosantong filed their motion to dismiss the instant petition
on the ground that Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint, for
the said Branch X is without authority to review the
decisions of Branch IV, a coordinate branch of the Manila
Court of First Instance; and that petitioner-appellant had
already appealed the order of Judge Barcelona of Branch
VIII authorizing and approving the sale of the lots in favor
of respondent Reliable Realty.

It is not disputed that the orders sought to be annulled and

set aside by herein petitioner-appellant in his complaint
against private respondents which was assigned to
Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided
over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge
Barcelona presiding over Branch VIII of the same court.

Issue: W/N Branch VIII first acquired jurisdiction over the

case to the exclusion of all other branches.

Ruling: Yes.

The pretense of herein petitioner-appellant is without

merit.

Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first

taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all
questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed
before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance.

This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule

73, thus:

... The reason for this provision of the law

is obvious. The settlement of the estate
of a deceased person in court constitutes
but one proceeding. For the successful
administration of that estate it is
necessary that there should be but one
responsible entity, one court, which
should have exclusive control of every
part of such administration. To intrust it to
two or more courts, each independent of
the other, would result in confusion and
delay.

Even in other cases, it is also a general principle that the

branch of the court of first instance that first acquired
jurisdiction over the case retains such jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other branches of the same court of first
instance or judicial district and all other coordinate courts.
 BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners
and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963 title under the testator.

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and

wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding
for the settlement of his estate was instituted. Hermogena
Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased
Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral
relatives and intestate heirs.

On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in

the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the
will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the
testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes,
whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives
aforementioned. Later, these relatives filed an opposition to
the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-
project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the
properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio
Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone
but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

The petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in not

declaring that the probate court, having limited and special
jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and
erred in applying the exception to the rule.

Issue: May the Settlement Court determine properties as

conjugal or separate property? Generally no. But there is an
exception.

Ruling:

As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be

passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings," except
where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case
the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action. However, we have also held that when the parties
interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to
them to submit to the probate court a question as to title
to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the consent
of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial
administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in
the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third
persons are not prejudiced.

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the

question of ownership of certain of the properties involved
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the
husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his
heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of
course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by
her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the
executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily.

There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is

true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the
testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own
right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being
sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim
that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the
testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement