This book produced a clearly written account of a central issue in Aristotle's Rhetoric, and has

done so in a way that makes it almost impossible for the reader to get lost. While much of the
material was previously published, the seams don't show. The Introduction begins by
presenting the "Principal Claims of the Book." "The principal claim defended in this book is that,
for Aristotle in the Rhetoric, arousing the passions of others can amount to giving them proper
grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric"
(p. 1). Much turns on making sense of the proper grounds of conviction. "Aristotle has a
consistent view of rhetoric: as an expertise in producing 'proofs' (pisteis) -- understood as
'proper grounds for conviction' -- for the speaker's audience." To speak about proper grounds
for convictions means that there is something normative about the Rhetoric, even though Dow
rejects imputing an "ethics of rhetoric" to Aristotle. Proper grounds must be proper by norms of
the art of rhetoric itself, not some external moral criterion. He finds those proper grounds in
the political function of rhetoric. Next, he claims that "If the arousal of the passions is part of
rhetoric, thus understood, Aristotle must hold, second, a particular view of the passions: he
must think that they are representational states, in which the subject takes things to be the way
they are represented" (1). He divides the book into ten chapters organized into three main
parts; the first five chapters show how the proper grounds for conviction rest on the political
function of rhetoric, contributing towards good judgments in law courts and political
assemblies (9); the next two show how the arousal of emotions can constitute a proof, and
defends that interpretation against Aristotle's explicit statements that seem to reject appeals to
the passions; and the final three erect a theory of the passions as they operate in the Rhetoric.
The first chapter gives the background for the Rhetoric in alternative contemporary views of the
handbook writers on the one hand and Plato on the other. The second chapter, the longest in
the book, turns to the Rhetoric itself to show how Aristotle's conception of rhetoric can be, like
Plato and unlike the sophists, normative, but with the difference that for Plato rhetoric aims at
"the production of virtue in the souls of listeners; for Aristotle, it is well-founded judgments in
the listeners" (34). The third chapter turns from explicating Aristotle's idea to showing how one
might, and how Aristotle does, defend it. Dow raises the crucial question, in what is rhetorical
expertise an expertise? He argues that Aristotle distinguishes himself from the handbook
writers not by advocating a moral approach to rhetoric in opposition to their neutrality, but by
showing rhetoric's function in the state.

There are some obvious things he might have pointed out about irrelevant speaking -- that it
produces miscarriages of justice, vindicating the guilty and condemning the innocent, and that
it produces poor political decisions. Instead, he mentions none of these and bases his
objections to irrelevant speaking on a careful analysis of the proper roles of speaker and
juror/decision-maker in the state (69).

The emphasis on proper roles of speaker and hearer is critical. When Aristotle says that
irrelevant appeals "warp the juror" like "someone warping the ruler he/she is about to use,"
(1354a24-26), Dow comments that this removes the possibility that when "the juror's verdict is .
. . in the orator's favor, this confirms the correctness of the orator's position in just the same
way that a ruler can confirm the straightness of the carpenter's handiwork" (71). Not only is
restrained and methodical rhetoric of benefit to the state, and not only does it not harm the
judges by manipulating them, but its practice rebounds to the benefit of the practitioner by
letting him know when he's right and when wrong. "The orator's success itself requires the
good deliberation of the judge" (74); rhetoric, such as Gorgias advertises, that overwhelms the
judges and deprives them of the power of judgment does not, as it seems to, empower the
orator. The success of the speaker depends on the success of the judges.

Although the method of deliberative and judicial rhetoric is the same, and although deliberative
subjects are finer and more important to the state than private transactions, [the handbook
writers] have nothing to say about the former, and all try to describe the art of speaking in
lawcourts, because it is less serviceable to speak of things outside the subject in deliberative
situations.

Placing deliberation at the center of the art of rhetoric is the missing move that strengthens
Dow's case that rhetoric's normative dimension comes from its role in the state. Neglect of the
enthymeme and concentration on judicial rhetoric go together. Similarly, in arguing
that pistis has a normative dimension, he could have mentioned the two definitions of the
function of rhetoric, which emphasize the difference between that function, finding the
available means of persuasion, and actually persuading a given audience. (Just as pistis is
normative, so too is the "available" (endechomenon) means of persuasion, and endoxon,
reputable premises as well.)
In Chapter 4 Dow asks, Is Aristotle's Rhetoric about rhetoric? "Aristotle's view of rhetoric as all
about proofs makes sense if rhetoric is an expertise in promoting good public judgments, but
why should we think that this is what rhetoric is? Has he merely changed the subject?" Aristotle
says that the handbook writers had nothing to say about the enthymeme, which is the body of
persuasion (pistis), so one could say that according to Aristotle, the handbook writers were not
about rhetoric. Why couldn't they return the favor and claim that Aristotle was talking about
something else, maybe dialectic, but not rhetoric? Dow's answer:

In any genuine attempt to persuade, speakers themselves seem to aim not merely at getting
people to their point of view (in most cases, speakers would not consider that coercive means
would do just as well), but at convincing their listeners in a way that endorses the correctness
of their case (83).

Dow could add the definition of rhetoric at the end of I.1, and then again at the beginning of
I.2, which distinguishes between convincing an audience and finding the available means of
persuasion; it is the latter that is the function of the art of rhetoric (see p. 87). He could also
draw a connection between the endorsing he sees here and the issue he raises in the last part
of the book, on whether the emotions involve endorsement.

Chapter 5, "The Interpretation of Aristotle's Rhetoric," is only six pages long. Summarizing the
first part of the book, he says that his interpretation maintains the "moral neutrality of
Aristotelian rhetoric" while instead finding it "conforming to epistemic norms (governing
standards of inference, and relevance) in the production of proper grounds for conviction" (89).
He sees this as consistent with the older tradition of seeing rhetoric as the counterpart of
dialectic rather than classifying it alongside the Ethics and Politics. But his own argument,
especially in chapters 2 and 3, had argued for the legitimacy of rhetoric on the grounds of its
role in the polis and in political judgment. On p. 48 he does just that: "What it is to be a good
proof [pistis] is (at least in part) a matter of its credentials as a demonstration." Aristotle calls
rhetoric the counterpart of dialectic, but also says that it is the offshoot of both dialectic and
politics, so the choice between seeing it as part of the organon, which Dow claims was how
the Rhetoric was conceived until the 13 century, and its classification with ethics and politics
th

since then, is not straightforward. Moreover, there is a third way of placing the Rhetoric, which
also has some textual grounds and ancient provenance, if not as strong as its relation to
dialectic and politics. That is to see the Rhetoric as somehow a companion to the Poetics. There
are cross-references between the two works and some mutual illumination. But that is
complaining that Dow didn't write the book he didn't write.
Part 2 concerns the question that is the title of chapter 6: "How Can Emotion-Arousal Provide
Proof?" He begins by considering the third source of proof in addition to argument and
emotion, persuading through character or thos. He concludes:
Proofs through the argument itself involve the listener consciously believing the premises,
believing that the epistemic good standing of the conclusion is enhanced by the reputability of
the premises, and then coming to believe the conclusion on that basis. As we are now in a
position to see, character-proofs (and, I will hope to show, emotion-proofs) will simply be
variants on this standard case (99).

Although when asked "Why did you think Smith guilty," we don't answer: "Because I was afraid
of him," it does make sense to say that I think him guilty because I think him dangerous (104-
5). This account depends on the emotions having representational content and involving an
affirming of that content, and Dow will show how Aristotle supposes just that.

This simple account of how emotional appeals can be a legitimate part of rhetoric, though, runs
up against Aristotle's apparent condemnation of emotional appeals in the opening chapter of
the Rhetoric. Chapter 7 replies to that objection. Dow's central, and I think original, insight is
clearly stated on p. 111:
My central claim is that where Aristotle's text has 'slander and pity, anger and similar passions
of the soul (1354a16-17), this is not a list of passions, but a list of activities. He is referring to
the activity of diabol, and the activities advocated by handbook writers for using their set-piece
'recipes' for emotion-arousal -- recipes used to generate sections in a speech (often in the
introduction). These aimed to affect the state of mind of the listener, but were unconnected to
the specific subject matter at issue.
These set-pieces have a use in the introduction and peroration of a speech, but not in the
narration or "the pisteis section" (113). There is a difference between undoing the effect of
one's opponent's diabol, slander, and refuting his arguments. Teaching these set-pieces is
equivalent to the handbook writers neglecting the enthymeme. The set-pieces also are primarily
useful in judicial rhetoric, which is essentially agonistic, and not in deliberative oratory, which
Aristotle places at the center of the art of rhetoric.
In the final three chapters Dow looks again at how Aristotle must understand the passions for
them to play the role in rhetoric Dow has found in the first two sections of the book. "The view
defended here may be summarized very simply. Aristotle thinks that passions are pleasures and
pains, where these are understood as states with representational contents, and where these
contents are taken by the subject to be the way things actually are" (131). I thought that that
had been established in chapter 6, but now he focuses in chapter 8 on the definition of the
passions in Rhetoric II.1 and the treatment of individual passions in the next eleven chapters.
The final two chapters move from explicating Aristotle's understanding of the passions to
philosophically defending it. While the earlier chapters focused on the role the passions play in
"verdict formation," here the focus is on just how "they involve pleasure and pain" (180). While it
seems clear that an emotion involves representational content -- I am angry at Fred for having
insulted me -- to say that pleasure and pain have such content is a harder claim, and that is
what chapter 9 argues for. The final chapter focuses on the relation between phantasia and the
passions.
I see two weaknesses in the book, and they are related. First, Dow makes the Rhetoric out to be
more polemical than it is, even in the first three chapters on which he concentrates. That
Aristotle's thinking was shaped by certain debates -- something that Dow shows persuasively
and in detail -- does not mean that he saw himself as taking part in those debates. He concedes
that "in the treatise as a whole, Aristotle shows awareness of some other theorists and
practitioners of rhetoric, [but] he does not seem to have them in view when he argues for his
general position" (11). But Dow often organizes his analysis of the Rhetoric in terms of whom he
takes Aristotle to be arguing against: Chapter 1 is called "Rhetoric and the State -- Aristotle and
His Predecessors", Chapter 4 is called "Aristotle against His Rivals," and he often sees polemics
and "allusions" which he uses to explain the text. If the Rhetoric is as polemical as Dow thinks,
he should explain why the Rhetoric differs from the rest of Aristotle's works in this way (unless
he thinks that they are similarly agonistic).
And second, Dow shows how Aristotle develops an understanding of the nature of rhetorical
expertise, but I wish he had gone on to show how this understanding shapes the rest of
the Rhetoric. To take a fairly easy example, it should be possible to move from Dow's
presentation of the first three chapters to showing how the declared superiority of deliberative
over judicial rhetoric manifests itself in the treatments of the different kinds of rhetoric in the
rest of Book I. To take another example, Dow explicates the difference between real and
apparent enthymemes and notes that Aristotle says that a single faculty deals with both. Late in
Book II Aristotle devotes a chapter to apparent enthymemes. It is difficult to formulate a general
criterion for what counts as an apparent as opposed to a real enthymeme or as opposed to
something that doesn't even appear to be an enthymeme. It would be helpful if Dow could show
how the initial distinction of real and apparent enthymemes bore fruit in this more detailed
discussion or showed why no such derivation of a criterion is possible.
Dow notes but does not discuss the fact that while Aristotle engages with other teachers of
rhetoric, he barely mentions its practitioners, apart from Isocrates. Especially if the criterion for
propriety of the proper grounds for conviction is political, I wonder why Aristotle does not
discuss statesmen who used rhetoric for better or worse in assemblies, or practitioners such as
Demosthenes. None of the handbook writers was a citizen of Athens, which is I think relevant to
seeing the criterion for excellence as political. (Nor, of course, was Aristotle.) The remark
in Rhetoric I.1 that good laws forbid speakers from speaking outside the subject, on which Dow
leans, has its counterpart in the dicastic oath, which Aeschines and Demosthenes used in their
orations as a topic for argument. Extant speeches, too, are full of the sorts of appeals that
Aristotle thought would be excluded by good laws. The Poetics, by contrast, gives examples
from and judgments on tragedies, but there is nothing about other theories of poetry, not even
Plato's, and Socrates not only argues with the handbook writers but denies the status of Pericles
and argues too with prominent demagogues such as Critias and Alcibiades. I would like to hear
Dow's account of why Aristotle is not interested in particular orators. His question, is
the Rhetoric about rhetoric, would have greater bite if he compared the Rhetoric not only to the
handbook writers but to rhetorical practice.
A final criticism, although I'm not sure whether this is a criticism of Dow or of Aristotle. Dow
refers several times to Aristotle's optimism. "Aristotle is optimistic about the extent to which
popular views track the truth (1355a14-18)" (p. 60). "Aristotle's conviction of the beneficial
effects of rhetoric seems to rest upon an optimistic assessment of the tendencies of humans to
believe the truth" (66; see too 78. 224). This attitude is present at the beginning of
the Rhetoric. Rhetoric and dialectic, he says, are both concerned with opposites. "Of course, the
underlying facts are not equally good in each case, but true and better ones are by nature
always more productive of good syllogisms and, in a word, more persuasive" (1355a31-32).
Calling it optimism makes this attitude adventitious and not part of the argument itself. If the
claim that truth is more persuasive than falsity is not part of Aristotle's argument, what Dow
calls epistemic norms have no basis. If true, this is a dagger in the heart of the Rhetoric.

The Three Means of Persuasion

Ethos: The Appeal to the Speakers or Writers Character or
Reputation

If you wish to persuade, you need to establish credibility and authority with your
audience. A man may have the most logical and well-thought-out argument, but if his
audience doesnt think hes trustworthy or even worth listening to, all his reasoning will
be for naught.

For Aristotle, a speakers ethos consists of appearing knowledgeable about the topic
hes speaking about and being a man of good character. Aristotle and Cicero thought
that a speaker could only appeal to his ethos within the speech itself and that an orator
should spend the first part of his speech establishing his credibility. The classical
rhetorician Isocrates believed that developing ones ethos and credibility with the
audience began even before the speaker opened his mouth. Audiences naturally
approach speakers and writers with some suspicion, so theyll look to his past for
evidence that he is trustworthy and knowledgeable about what hes speaking or writing
about.
A speaker or writer can use ethos in several ways. First, you can simply begin your
speech or text by referring to your expertise on the subject. Share how long youve
studied the subject, mention how many articles youve published and where you
published them, and refer to awards or recognition youve received in relation to the
subject at hand.
A nuanced way to establish credibility and rapport with your audience is
to downplay your accomplishments. People dont like a braggart or one-upper. In some
cases, having a highfalutin resume might hinder people from trusting you. A bit of
modesty can go a long way to getting the audience to trust and like you, and
consequently, be persuaded by what you have to say.

Another powerful way to establish ethos with your audience is to find common ground
with them. Human beings are social animals. We have a tendency to trust others that
are like us (or at least appear like us). You can establish common ground by
acknowledging shared values or beliefs. You can establish common ground by simply
recognizing a shared history. You see this all the time with presidential candidates.
Theyll visit a state they have no immediate connection to, but theyll find some story
from their distant past that connects them to the state. Maybe their great-great-
grandfather passed through the area in a covered wagon. That commonality, however
slight or silly it may be, helps the audience feel connected to the speaker, and,
consequently, makes him more trustworthy.

Living a life of virtue is perhaps the best way to develop ethos. The very hint of
hypocrisy will doom even the most eloquent speech. Conversely, when you are
virtuous, honest, and earnestly committed to that which you speak of, this inner-
commitment will tinge each word you utter with sincerity. The audience will feel the
depth of your commitment and will listen far more intently then when they know it is
mere claptrap.

Pathos: The Appeal to Emotion

Men have a tendency to dismiss the power of emotion. I know a lot of guys who think
you should only persuade through pure reason and logic. But in a battle between
emotion and rationality, emotion usually wins, hands down. This isnt cynicism, its just
an acknowledgment of the reality of human nature.
What specific things can you do to inject some more emotion into your
arguments? Metaphors and storytelling are powerful tools of persuasion. People
are more likely to remember stories than facts because stories tap into our emotions.
Next time you give a presentation to a client at work, instead of just slapping up some
bar charts and bullet points in a PowerPoint presentation, make the extra effort to
weave those facts and figures into an engaging story with conflicts and a cast of
characters.
You can also call upon several figures of speech that are designed to provoke an
emotional response. Here is a sampling of the dozens you can use:
antithesis-Figure of balance in which two contrasting ideas are intentionally
juxtaposed, usually through parallel structure (I have a dream that my four little
children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of
their skin but by the content of their character. I have a dream today!-MLK)
aposiopesis Breaking off suddenly in the middle of speaking, usually to portray
being overcome with emotion. (Glenn Beck does this a lot.)
assonance-Figure of repetition in which different words with the same or similar
vowel sounds occur successively in words with different consonants. (I feel
the need, the need for speed. -Maverick in Top Gun)
conduplicatio The repetition of a word or words in adjacent phrases or clauses,
either to amplify the thought or to express emotion. (So I ask you tonight to return
home, to say a prayer for the family of Martin Luther King yeah, its true but
more importantly to say a prayer for our own country, which all of us love
a prayer for understanding and that compassion of which I spoke. -Robert Kennedy)
enargia Enargia, or vivid description, can be inherently moving, especially when
depicting things graphic in nature.
energia Energia, the vigor with which one expresses oneself, can obviously be
emotionally affecting.
epistrophe-Figure of repetition that occurs when the last word or set of words in one
sentence, clause, or phrase is repeated one or more times at the end of successive
sentences, clauses, or phrases. (and that government of the people, by the
people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. -A. Lincoln)

Logos: The Appeal to Reason

Finally, we come to logos, or the appeal to reason. Aristotle believed logos to be the
superior persuasive appeal and that all arguments should be won or lost on reason
alone. However, he recognized that at times an audience would not be sophisticated
enough to follow arguments based solely on scientific and logical principles and so the
other appeals needed to be used as well.
In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle states that appealing to reason means allowing the
words of the speech itself to do the persuading. This was accomplished through
making inferences using deductive reasoning, usually in the form of a formal syllogism.
Youve seen these before. You start with two premises and end with a conclusion that
naturally follows the premises. For example:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Easy, huh? When forming syllogistic arguments, one should ensure that
theyre sound. An argument is sound if:
1. the argument is valid, and;
2. all of its premises are true.

Alright, for an argument to be sound, it needs to be valid. Whats a valid argument? A

valid argument is one that has a conclusion that necessarily follows the premises. If we
switched things up in our above argument, we can make it invalid. Check it:

All men are mortal.

Socrates is mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is a man.

At first blush, it looks like a decent argument. But read it carefully. Just because
Socrates is mortal, doesnt necessarily mean hes a man. He could be a squirrel for all
we know. Thus, the argument is invalid.

Determining whether premises are true will depend on observation and your knowledge.

Syllogisms are a powerful rhetorical tool. Its hard to manipulate and argue against a
formally laid out, sound syllogism.

We could go into even more detail about formal logic (its one of my favorite subjects),
but it would be a series unto itself. So, Ill stop here and let you do some more reading
on your own.

In addition to formal logic, a rhetorician should be adept in informal logic. Whats

informal logic? Well, theres no clear cut answer. Philosophers still debate what exactly
makes up informal logic, but a rough answer would be that informal logic encompasses
several disciplines from formal logic to psychology to help individuals think more
critically about the input they receive every day.

A big component of informal logic are fallacies. A fallacy is a pattern of poor reasoning
which appears to be (and in this sense mimics) a pattern of good reasoning. Theres a
whole slew of logical fallacies and chances are youre familiar with a few of them: ad
hominems, slippery slopes, red herrings. Its important to be familiar with as many
fallacies as possible so a) you dont use them and thus lose credibility (ethos!) with your
audience, and b) you dont get sucked into arguments with scalawags who use them.
Well cover fallacies a bit more in depth in a later post. Stay tuned!
What Are Fallacies?
According to Aristotle in his treatise, The Art of Rhetoric, a speaker or writer has three
ways to persuade his audience: ethos (appeal to the speakers character), pathos
(appeal to emotion), and logos (appeal to logic). Aristotle believed that out of the three
means of persuasion, logos was superior and that ideally all arguments should be won
or lost on reason alone.

The problem with using logos as your sole means of persuasion is that its fraught with
many opportunities for you to mess up and make errors in reasoning. These errors are
called logical fallacies.

Just as there is formal and informal logic, there are formal and informal fallacies. Below
we provide a quick intro to formal and informal fallacies and give examples from both.

Formal Logical Fallacies

Aristotle was a big fan of formal syllogisms. In fact, he wrote a whole treatise on them.
Theres a reason why he liked them so much. Syllogisms are a powerful rhetorical
tool. Its hard to manipulate and argue against a formally laid out, sound syllogism.

A formal fallacy in syllogisms occurs whenever the structure of the argument itself is
flawed and renders the argument invalid. The premises and conclusion of the argument
might be true, but the argument can still be fallacious because the conclusion doesnt
follow from the premises. In my post about the three means of persuasion, I gave an
example of an invalid syllogism:

All men are mortal.

Socrates is mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is a man.

At first blush, it looks like a decent argument. But read it carefully. Just because
Socrates is mortal, doesnt necessarily mean hes a man. He could be a squirrel for all
we know. This right here is an example of the fallacy of the undistributed
middle. Lets take a look at a couple of other formal syllogistic fallacies.
Affirmative conclusion from a negative premise:
No cats are dogs.
No dogs can purr.
Therefore all cats can purr.

Just because there arent any dogs that can purr doesnt necessarily mean all cats can
purr.
Negative conclusion from affirmative premises:

Its impossible for a negative conclusion to be reached with affirmative premises.

All gods are immortal.

All immortals have beards.
Therefore, no gods have beards.

Informal Logical Fallacies

Informal fallacies are arguments that are fallacious for reasons other than a flaw in the
structure of the argument. Youre probably familiar with a few informal fallacies already:
red herrings, slippery slopes, etc. Below we list several of the most used informal
fallacies to look out for when taking part in a debate.

Red herring-an attempt to change the subject to divert attention from the original issue. You
can see countless examples of this when you watch presidential candidates debate.
Example: Yes, I would absolutely make the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq a priority. But with
the unemployment rate as high as it is, we really need to concentrate on domestic issues
and creating jobs, and under my plan.
ad hominem attacking the person instead of the argument. The goal is to discredit the
argument by discrediting the person advocating the argument. Ad hominem attacks are
popular in online discussions, especially when tempers flare. Well, youre wrong because
youre clearly an idiot! That sort of blatant insult is easy to spot. Harder to detect are
arguments that go something like, Well, I dont believe what Politician X has to say about
the tax plan because he has said some absolutely crazy things in the past. It may be true
that Politician X has proven himself to be a nut job on a variety of issues, and this may affect
his ethos, but it does not logically disprove what he has to say about the tax plan. He might
be wrong on everything but this one issue.
Argumentum ad populum concluding an argument is true simply because lots of people
think its true. We see this on commercials all the time: 9 out of 10 doctors recommend
Acme Brand Toothpaste, or 3 million Brand X Customers Cant be Wrong! Buy Brand X
Today.
Appeal to authority- concluding an argument is true because a person holding authority
asserts it is true. Doctor Who is an expert in quantum physics. If he says time travel is
possible, then it must be true!
Appeal to emotion- instead of appealing to reason, the arguer uses emotions such as fear,
pity, and flattery to persuade the listener that what he says is true. Wartime propaganda
posters are a good example of an appeal to emotion:
Appeal to motive- a conclusion is dismissed by simply calling into question the
motive of the person or group proposing the conclusion. Youll often see political
organizations use this tactic. The conclusion of Company Xs positive report on
the safety of natural gas fracking cant be true because they funded the research
and have an interest in ensuring there is a positive report. Sure, Company X
may have an interest in getting a positive result for natural gas fracking, but just
 because they have that motive doesnt mean the conclusion they reached
is necessarily false. Suspect, yes, but not false.
Appeal to tradition- concluding an argument is true because it has long been
held to be true.
Argument from silence- reaching a conclusion based on the silence or lack of
contrary evidence. Example: Aliens must not exist because we havent made
contact with them.
Reductio ad Hitlerum- comparing an opponent or their argument to Hitler or
Nazism in an attempt to associate a position with one that is universally reviled.
People seem to use this one a lot on the web. Example: You know who else was
a vegetarian? Hitler. Therefore, vegetarianism is bad.