JULIAN SANTULAN substituted by his children named PATROCINIO, ADORACION,

ARTURO, CONSTANCIA, and PEPITA, all surnamed SANTULAN and minor grandchildren,
JOCELYN, ROSAURO and ROBERTO, all surnamed SANTULAN assisted by their
guardian ad litem, PATROCINIO SANTULAN petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and ANTONIO LUSIN, substituted by his Heirs
named TEODOSIA BALANZA (widow) and Children LEOPOLDO, ARMANDO. ALFONSO,
EMILIANO, MAGDALENA, ERLINDA and ESTRELLA (ESTER), all surnamed LUSIN, and
Heirs of CAROLINA LUSIN-LUCERO named MANOLITO LUCERO and MARIO
LUCERO, respondents-appellees.

This case is about the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of the public domain with an area of
about four and one-half hectares located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite abutting on Bacoor
Bay and the Ankaw Creek.

It is protracted controversy that has been pending for more than thirty years between the rival
claimants Julian Santulan plan and Antonio Lusin, who have been succeeded by their heirs.

Santulan claimed that foreshore land was an extension of his land, Lot No. 986 of the Kawit
cadastre, with an area of 17,301 square meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original
Certificate of Title No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent. The northern boundary of
Lot No. 986 is Bacoor (Manila) Bay (Exh. A). The said foreshore land was allegedly formed by
soil deposits accumulated by the alluvial action of the sea.

On December 5, 1942 Santulan caused the said land to be surveyed. The survey plan was
approved by the Director of Lands in 1944 (Exh. B). On December 29, 1942 Santulan, pursuant
to Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, filed an application, F.L.A. No. V 562, to lease for five
years for agricultural purposes an area of 36,120 square meters of the said foreshore land (Exh.
F).

On that same date, December 29, 1942, Santulan, pursuant to Act No. 3077 and Lands
Administrative Order No. 8-3, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for a revocable
permit to occupy the said land. He indicated therein that he would use the land for 11 capiz beds
and oyster beds, the planting of bakawan and pagatpat and later to be developed into a
fishpond" (Exh. G).

Seven years later, or on December 22, 1949, Santulan filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an
application for an ordinary fishpond permit or lease of the said foreshore land (Special Use
Permit, pp. A. No. 5114, Exh. H).

At the instance of the Director of Fisheries, the Director of Forestry investigated the condition of
the said foreshore land. The latter in his first indorsement dated June 19, 1950 found that it was
swampy "and not an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin" and that it is within the
disposable areas for agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands (Exh. L-
1).

The chief of the division of commercial fisheries sent a letter to Lusin dated April 28, 1950
apprising him that he was reported to have illegally entered the area covered by Santulan's
fishpond permit application and directing him to refrain from introducing improvements, with the
warning that court proceedings would be taken against him (Exh. J).

On January 12, 1951 an attorney, acting for the Director of Lands wrote the following letter to
Lusin advising him to vacate the disputed land and maintain the status quo.

Santulan declared the said foreshore land in his name for tax purposes. Tax Declaration No.
2923, which took effect in 1948 and which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 13816 also in
Santulan's name, shows that the land was assessed at P460. He paid the realty taxes due on
the said land for the years 1945-46, 1948-55 and 195760 (Exh. C, D and E, el seq.).

On the other hand, Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945 (he died in 1962) filed with the Bureau of
Lands applications for a revocable-permit and lease of a foreshore land, respectively, for the
purpose of producing salt on the said land. He claimed that he had been in the continuous and
exclusive possession of the land since 1920, when it was still under water, and that he had used
it as a site of his fish corrals.

He allegedly converted two hectares of the said land into a fishpond. The entire area was
enclosed with mud dikes and provided with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made
of wood On the northern part of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close
intervals to serve as water breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the
action of the sea. Lusin introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953.

The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Santulan and Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands
Conflict No. 8 (N). The Director of Lands in his decision in that case dated February 1, 1951
found that the disputed land is foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the
ordinary tides that it is an extension of Santulan's Lot No. 986 and it was formerly a part of the
sea; that Santulan was the first to enter the land and to make dikes thereon, and that Lusin
entered the land later and made dikes also (Exh. K made a part hereof for reference as Annex
A).

The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land was subject "to reparian rights which may he
invoked by Santulan as owner of the upland in accordance with section 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1" (Exh. K). Hence the Director rejected Lusin's application for a
foreshore lease and for a revocable permit and gave due course to Santulan's foreshore lease
application.

Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration. The Director in his order of October 19, 1951 denied
that motion. lie found that Lusin was a possessor in bad faith: that it is not true that Lusin had
improved and possessed the said foreshore land for twenty years, that the disputed area is
covered by water, two to three feet deep during ordinary tides and is exposed land after the ebb
of the tides, and that Lusin's alleged possession and improvements could not nullify Santulan's
preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights. The Director ordered Lusin to
vacate the land within sixty days from notice (Exh. L made a part hereof for reference as Annex
B).

Lusin appealed to the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who in his decision
of October 13, 1952 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Director's 1951 decision (Exh. M
made a part hereof for reference as Annex C). Lusin's motion for reconsideration was denied in
the Secretary's order of February 28, 1953 (Exh. N made a part hereof for reference as Annex
D).

Lusin asked for a reinvestigation of the case. His request was granted. The Department ordered
a reinvestigation on May 12, 1953.

After receipt of the report of reinvestigation, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, by authority of the Secretary, in his order of December 14, 1954, reaffirmed the
rejection of Lusin's revocable permit and foreshore lease applications but ordered Santulan to
reimburse to Lusin the appraised value of his improvements (Exh. O made a part hereof for
reference as Annex E).

Lusin appealed to the President of the Philippines after his motion for reconsideration was
denied in the Undersecretary's order of May 19, 1955 (Exh. OO made a part hereof for
reference as Annex F).

Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo, by authority of the President, held in his decision of April 10,
1958 that section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 (promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on April 30, 1936 pursuant to Acts Nos. 2874 and 3038) was
"rendered obsolete" by section 67 of the Public Land Law which took effect on December 1,
1936 (Exh. P made a part hereof for reference as Annex G).

On the basis of the foregoing ruling and since the record is silent as to whether or not the land in
question has been declared by the President as not necessary for the public service and as
open to disposition (Sec. 61, Public Land Law), the Executive Secretary sustained Lusin's
appeal and reversed the orders of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in favor of Santulan. Secretary Pajo decided the case in the alternative as
follows:

On the assumption that the land in question has been declared open for
disposition and is not necessary for the public service, this Office directs that an
oral bidding for the leasing thereof to interested parties pursuant to the provisions
of Section 67 of Commonwealth Act .No. 141 be conducted and the contract of
lease awarded to the highest bidder whoever shall be the highest bidder, if other
than the appellant, shall be required to pay to the appellant the appraised value
of the improvements introduced by him on the land to be determined by that
Department.

If the land in question has not been so declared, this Office directs that a
revocable permit under Section 68 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be Id to the
appellant requiring him to pay permit fees since the year 1951.

Accordingly, the orders and decisions of that Department and the Bureau of
Lands are hereby revoked.

Santulan's case was distinguished from that of Gonzalo Monzon whose Lot No. 987 adjoins
Santulan's Lot No. 986. Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro (now Chief Justice) in his
decision of May 10, 1954 upheld the preferential right of Monzon to lease the foreshore land
north of his lot, which foreshore land is adjacent to the foreshore land now in dispute in this case
(Exh. Q made a part hereof for reference as Annex H).
Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in the letter of the Acting Executive Secretary
dated August 20, 1959 (Exh. W).

On October 22, 1959 Santulan filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition for
certiorari wherein he alleged that the Executive Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion
in misinterpreting certain provisions of Act No. 2874, Commonwealth Act No. 141, and Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1.

In the lower court the parties agreed that the case Involves only a question of law. On August
18. 1961 the lower court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Executive Secretary's decision.
Santulan appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution of July 21, 1967 elevated the
record to this Court on the ground that Santulan in his brief raised only the legal questions of
whether the Public Land Law repealed section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7 1 and
whether the Executive Secretary's decision is "legally sound and correct" (CA-G. R. No. 30708-
R).

It should be emphasized that. as found by tile investigators of the Bureau of Lands, Santulan
was the prior possessor of the foreshore land in question. lie had it surveyed in 1942. The
survey plan Psu-115357) was approved by the Director of Lands in 1944. Santulan paid the
realty taxes on that land .

It should further be underscored that the regulations pie him a preferential right to lease the land
as a riparian owner. Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936. which was issued
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon the recommendation of the Director
of Lands for the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain, provides:

32. Preference of the Reparian Owner The owner of the property adjoining
foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply
for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service,
subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that
he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.

Paragraph 32 quoted above is a substantial copy of paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative Order

No. 8-3 dated April 20, 1936, which was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands for issuance of temporary
permits of occupation and use of agricultural lands of the public domain.

The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental regulations is used in a broad
sense as referring to any property having a water frontage (Shepard's Point Land Co. vs.
Atlantic Hotel, 44 S. E. 39, 45, 132 N. C. 517, 65 C. J. S. 143, note 84). Strictly speaking,
"riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on the bank of a
river.

But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of
lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region
including both the land along the coast and the water near the coast or the shore zone between
the high and low watermarks.
Therefore, on the basis of paragraphs 32 and 4 of the said administrative regulations, Santulan
or his heirs Should be allowed to leased or occupy the said foreshore land.

But the Executive Secretary ruled that paragraph 32 was rendered obsolete by Commonwealth
Act No. 141 or, as held by the trial court, Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 was repealed by
the Public Land Law. Is that conclusion correct? We hold that it is wrong.

It is true that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 were issued when the 1919 Public
Land Act was in force or before the present Public Land Law took effect on December 1, 1936.
But that circumstance would not necessarily mean that the said departmental regulations are
not good under the 1936 Public Land Law.

In rationalizing the alleged repeal of paragraph 32, the Executive Secretary cited the following
provisions of Act No. 2874, the 1919 Public Land Act (15 Public Land laws 24):

SEC. 64. The lease or sale shall be adjudicated to the highest bidder; and if there
is no bidder besides the applicant, it shall be adjudicated to him. The provisions
of section twenty-seven of this Act shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or
part of the lots remain unleased or unsold the Director of Lands Shall from time
to time announce in the Offcial Gazette or otherwise the lease or sale of those
lots if necessary . (Section 27 refers to sealed bidding).

The Executive Secretary held that the above-quoted section 64 was by the for provisions of on
wealth Act No. 141 which took effect on December 1, 1936:

SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding-, and ajudication
shall be made to the highest bidder. However, where m applicant has made
improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him by competent
authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in
section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied wherever
applicable. If all or Dart of the lots remain unleased or unsold. the Director of
Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official Gazzate, or in any other
newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of those lots, if necessary.
(Section 26, like section 27 of Act No. 2874, refers to sealed bidding).

The Executive Secretary noted that under section 64 of Act No. 2874 sealed bidding was the
general rule of procedure in an award of a lease of foreshore land and that the t is entitled to
equal the bid of the highest bidder. On the other hand, under 67, oral bidding is the general rule.

Hence, the Executive Secretary assumed that, while under section 64 of the 1919 old Public
Land Act, the fact that the applicant has a preferential right to lease foreshore land was a crucial
factor it is thus under section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law because in oral bidding the
appellant is not entitled to equal the bid of the highest bidder.

The Executive Secretary concluded that, because the preferential right of the applicant to lease
foreshore land was immaterial under 67 of the present Public Land Law, paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, which gives such preference. had become "idle and useless".

That conclusion is wrong because it is based on the erroneous hypothesis that section 64 of the
1919 Public Land Act is different from section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law. They are not
different. The truth is that section 64 was amended by Act No. 3517 which took effect on
February 4, 1919 (24 Public Laws 416). Section 64, as thus amended, is substantially the same
as section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law.

That fact was overlooked by the Executive Secretary. Hence, his conclusion, that paragraph 32
of Lands Administrative Order No. 71 was repealed or rendered obsolete by section 67 of the
present Public Land Law, is wrong because its premise is wrong.

In other words, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, issued on April 30, 1936,
was promulgated under section 64 of the old Public Land Law, as amended. And since the
amended section 64 was substantially reproduced in section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law, it
is glaringly incorrect to say that section 67 rendered obsolete the said paragraph 32. Paragraph
32 is still in force and is good under the existing Public Land Law.

The foregoing discussion reveals that the Executive Summary's rationalization of the alleged
repeal of paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 (identical to paragraph 4 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 8-3) is not only deficient in clarity and cogency but is predicated on the
false assumption that section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is different from section 67 of the
present Public Land Law. Consequently, the aforementioned decision of Executive Secretary
Juan C. Pajo under review bas to be set aside.

This case is governed by the precedent established in the case of Gonzalo Monzon, which, as
already noted, is similar to this cm since the foreshore land involved in the Monzon case is
adjacent to the foreshore land involved in this case.

In the Monzon case, the Office of the President, applying the oft-cited paragraph 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 held that Monzon, the littoral owner of the registered
land abutting upon the foreshore land, has the preferential right to lease the foreshore
land,

The location of the lots of Santulan and Monzon and the foreshore lands abutting thereon is
shown in the following sketch bawd on the plan, Psu-115357 (Exh. B):

Manila Bay or Bacoor Bay

Disputed Area

Psu-1 15357 Psu- 1 15358

Foreshore land Forshore land

claimed by leased to
Julian Santulan Gonzalo Monzon

and

Antonio Lusin

Lot No. 986 Lot no. 987

Belonging to Belonging to

Julian Santulan Gonzalo Monzon

Considering that the foreshore land abutting upon Santolan's lot is in the same situation as the
foreshore land abutting upon Monzon's lot, there is no reason why Santulan should not enjoy,
with respect to the disputed foreshore land, the rights given to Monzon over the foreshore land
adjacent to his lot.

Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease
the foreshore land abutting on his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
which provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused
by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coast guard service", shall be declared by the
Government "to be the property of the owner of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof" (cited in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 338).

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according
to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the
action of the sea (Ker & Co. vs. Cauden 6 Phil. 732, 736, 223 U.S. 268, 56 L. Ed. 432, 435;
Jover vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 522, 40 Phil. 1094, 1100, 221 U.S. 623, 55 L. Ed. 884).
The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the
riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which
his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10
Phil. 567). So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should
gain by its recession (Banks vs. Ogden 2 Wall. 57, 67, 17 L. Ed. 818, 821).

That preferential right is recognized in American jurisprudence where the rule is that the owner
of the land adjacent to navigable waters has certain riparian or littoral rights of a proprietary
nature not possessed by the general public which rights are incident to the ownership of the
banks or the uplands: riparian as respects the waters of a river and littoral as to sea waters or
the waters of a lake (65 C.J. S. 143-145).

It may be mentioned that the Director of Lands stated in his manifestation of October 26, 1977
that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 are still in force and have not been
superseded by any later regulations and that the directive of the President of the Philippines to
the Director of Lands dated May 24, 1966, stopping the grant of foreshore leases all along
Manila Bay, towards Cavite and Bataan, has not rendered the instant case moot and academic
"because the foreshore lease application involved is pending award."

In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial court's decision and the decision of the
Executive Secretary dated April 10, 1958 are reversed and set aside and the order of the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated December 14, 1954 and the orders
of the Director of Lands dated February I and October 19, 1951 are affirmed.

The lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned in the order of February 1, 1951 should be
recorded in the names of his heirs and the obligation to make reimbursement mentioned in the
dispositive part of the Undersecretary's order should now devolve upon the heirs of Santolan.
The reimbursement should be made to the heirs of the late Antonio Lusin The obligation to
vacate the disputed land, as required in the Director's order of October 19, 1951 devolves upon
the heirs of Lusin Costs in both instances against respondent heirs of Lusin (As amended by
Resolution of February 17, 1977.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LASTIMADO, respondents.

This is a Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 30, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. Sp-01504
denying the State's Petition for certiorari and Mandamus.

Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967, in the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626
of the Mariveles Cadastre, consisting of 971.0569 hectares, pursuant to Republic Act No. 931, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2061, docketed as Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1097. In the
absence of any opposition, whether from the Government or from private individuals, private
respondent was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. On October 14, 1967, the trial Court
rendered a Decision granting the Petition and adjudicating the land in favor of private respondent.
The trial Court issued an order for the issuance of a decree of registration on November 20, 1967,
and on November 21, 1967, the Land Registration Commission issued Decree No. N-117573 in
favor of private respondent. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her
favor. Private respondent thereafter subdivided the land into ten lots, and the corresponding titles.
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 18905 to 18914 inclusive, were issued by the Register of Deeds.

On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the entry of the decree of registration, petitioner filed a
Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that during the
period of alleged adverse possession by private respondent, said parcel of land was part of the U.S.
Military Reservation in Bataan. which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only
on December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan and,
therefore, not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Law. Respondent field an
Opposition thereto, which was considered by the trial Court, as a Motion to Dismiss, and on
December 20,1968, said Court (Judge Tito V. Tizon, presiding) issued an Order dismissing the
Petition for Review mainly on the ground that the Solicitor General had failed to file opposition to the
original Petition for reopening of the cadastral proceedings and was, therefore, estopped from
questioning the decree of registration ordered issued therein. On January 28, 1969, petitioner moved
for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial Court in its Order dated May 20, 1969, for lack of
merit.

Petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal, which was objected to by
private respondent. On July 15, 1972, or three years later, * the trial Court (Judge Abraham P. Vera, presiding)
refused to give due course to the appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial Court denied it in its Order of October 14,
1972 on the ground that the proper remedy of petitioner was a certiorari petition, not an ordinary appeal, and that the Order sought to be
appealed from had long become final and executory as petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was pro-forma and did not suspend the
running of the reglementary period of appeal.

On November 9, 1972, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of
Appeals claiming that the trial Court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when, without the benefit of hearing, it summarily dismissed the Petition for Review; and since said
Petition raised certain issues of fact which cannot be decided except in a trial on the merits, the
dismissal of the Petition on the basis of private respondent's Opposition, considered as a Motion to
Dismiss, constituted a denial of due process of law. Petitioner then prayed that the Order of the trial
Court, dated December 20, 1968 dismissing the Petition for Review, be declared null and void, and
that said trial Court be directed to give due course to the Petition for Review; or, in the alternative, to
give due course to petitioner's appeal.

On September 30, 1974, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial Court's dismissal of the Petition for
Review stating:

... We cannot find any allegation in the petition for review which shows that private
respondent had committed fraud against petitioner. Its representations and officials
were duly notified of private respondent's petition for reopening and registration of
title in her name. In said petition, the technical descriptions of the portion of Lot No.
626 of the Mariveles (Bataan) Cadastre, subject-matter of the petition were expressly
stated, the boundaries, specifically delineated. The alleged ground that the land
forms part of a forest land exists at the time petitioner was duly notified of said
petition. Failure to file opposition is in effect, an admission that the petition is actually
not part of a forest land. Indubitably, therefore, no justifiable reason exists for the
annulment of the Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition) of the lower
court dismissing herein petitioner's petition for review of the decree issued in favor of
private respondent Lastimado. 1
The Court of Appeals then disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the respondent Judge has not committed any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the issuance of an Order,
dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition) dismissing herein petitioner's petition
for review, the present petition for review is hereby denied.

The issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for in the petition is no longer
necessary as this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and authority to
supervise orderly administration of justice, has already resolved on the merits the
question whether or not the dismissal of the petition for review had been done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 2

From this Decision, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorari assigning
the following errors to the Court of Appeals and to the trial Court:

1. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there can be
possession, even for the purpose of claiming title, of land which at the time of
possession is subject to a military reservation.

2. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that such land
which is subject to a government reservation, may appropriately be the subject of
cadastral proceedings, and hence. also of a petition to reopen cadastral proceedings.

3. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that a parcel of
land which is part of the public forest is susceptible of occupation and registration in
favor of private individual.

4. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
Republic of the Philippines is not estopped from questioning the decree of
registration and the title issued pursuant thereto in favor of respondent Lastimado
over the parcel of land in question.

5. The Lower Court erred in dismissing the petition for review of the Republic of the
Philippines.

6. The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's petition for certiorari and
mandamus.

Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides:

Section 38. Decree of registration, and remedies after entry of decree.

If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as
stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of
confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind
the land, and quiet title thereto. subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice of citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it
may concern". Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
 or other disability of any person affect thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within
one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. ... 3

The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: a) that the
petitioner has a real and dominical right; b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d)
that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and e) that the property has
not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. 4

However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts
upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. 5 The following ruling spells out the difference between extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud:

Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any

fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said
defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But
intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as
the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the present
action of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case. 6

The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court. 7

In its Petition for Review filed before the trial Court, petitioner alleged that fraud was committed by
private respondent when she misrepresented that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and adversely against the whole world as
owner for more than forty years when, in fact, the subject land was in. side the former U.S. Military
Reservation, which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only on December 22,
1965, and that she likewise contended that her rights, as derived from the original and primitive
occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial confirmation under existing laws, when the
truth is, said parcel of land is within the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, and is not subject to
disposition or acquisition by private persons under the Public Land Law.

The trial Court ruled, and was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that no fraud was committed by
private respondent, which deprived petitioner of its day in Court as there was no showing that she
was aware of the facts alleged by the Government, so that she could not have suppressed them with
intent to deceive. The trial Court also noted that petitioner had failed to file an opposition to the
reopening of the cadastral proceedings despite notices sent not only to the Solicitor General as
required by Republic Act No. 931. but to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry as well. It
then concluded that "the remedy granted by section 38 of the Land Registration Act is designed to
give relief to victims of fraud, not to those who are victims of their own neglect, inaction or
carelessness, especially when no attempt is ever made to excuse or justify the neglect." With the
foregoing as the essential basis, the trial Court dismissed the Petition for Review.

We find reversible error. Although there was an agreement by the parties to submit for resolution the
Opposition to the Petition for Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial Court, in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed the Petition outright but should have
afforded petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to constitute
actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private respondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson,
et al., 8 it was held that "the action of the lower Court in denying the petition for review of a decree of
registration filed within one year from entry of the d without hearing the evidence in support of the
allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated, is held to be in
error, because the lower Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it."

If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reservation at the time it
was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral p nor can it be the object of
reopening under Republic Act No. 931. 9 Similarly, if the land in question, indeed forms part of the public
forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Cadastral
Court to register under the Torrens System. 10

Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (although the
Solicitor General claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the
State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents. 11 Further, we cannot
lose sight of the cardinal consideration that "the State as persona in law is the juridical entity, which
is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land" under basic Constitutional Precepts, and
that it is moreover charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 12

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 1974, dismissing the
Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed before it, as well as the Order of the Court of First Instance
of Bataan (Branch I) dated December 20, 1968, dismissing the Petition for Review, are hereby set
aside and the records of this case hereby ed to the latter Court for further proceedings to enable
petitioner to present evidence in support of its Petition for Review.

CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY

FACTS:

Nature: original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on
PEAs then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim
portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with
AMARI involving such reclamation.

1973: The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay

1977: President Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating the PEA, which was tasked to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire x xx lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands. On the same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP)

1981: Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its contract with CDCP which stated
that CDCP shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP
 1988: Pres. Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed
under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known
as the Freedom Islands

1995: PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop
the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding

Pres. Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVA

1996: Senate Pres.Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. As a result, the Senate conducted investigations. Among the conclusions
were:

1. The reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands;
2. The certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
3. The JVA itself is illegal

1997: Pres. Ramos created the Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the
Senate Committee report.

1998: The Philippine Daily Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI

PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman ArsenioYulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were
members of the negotiating panel

Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in
the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the
renegotiations of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of
alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of
the Constitution on the right to information on matters of public concern

1999: PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres. Estrada approved

ISSUES:

1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of the subsequent
events
2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts
3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
 5. WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before
a final agreement
6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 constitution; and
7. WON the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement
is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
o Threshold issue: whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the
amended JVA 367.5 has. of reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in Manila Bay in view of
Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the 1987 constitution

HELD

(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing
its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution and if
already implemented, to annul the effects of an unconstitutional contract

(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions

Reasoning: the instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public

(3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal
or constitutional question

(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public importance and as such, there is the right of a
citizen to bring a taxpayers suit on these matters of transcendental public importance

(5) The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract and must therefore constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order

Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the peoples
right to information on matters of public concern. PEA must prepare all the data and disclose them to the public at
the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract. While the evaluation or review
is on-going, there are no official acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids or proposals but once the committee
makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government
(6) In a form of a summary:

o The 157.84 has.of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.

o The 592.15 has.of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain
and outside the commerce of man until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands
of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate

o Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 has.of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain
o Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 has.of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may
reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public services. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article 12 that
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Reasoning:

CA 141 of the Philippine National Assembly empowers the president to classify lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable (Sec. 6).The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into(a) Alienable of
disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands.
The President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them
open to disposition or concession.
Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by
the Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands (d) Lands not
included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 61 states that the lands comprised in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59 shall be disposed f to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the
public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained suis
generic as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to
private parties. The only way that the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquinos
issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer
needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.

in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, a public bidding is required
1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Article 12, Sec. 3 states that
alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000 has.in area.
Rationale behind the ban on corporations from acquiring except through lease is not well understood. If
the purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then the Consti could have simply limited the size of
alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. If the intent were to encourage
owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the
instant case, then placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing
the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland were registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death
of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the
farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from
one generation to the next. In actual practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without
the ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain
could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. He could even hide his ownership of a corporation by
putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation.

In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly
government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title
has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEAs patent or certificates of
title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEAs certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land
covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private
corporation.

Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public
ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership
previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the
registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. i[102] The registration of lands of the
public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. ii[103]

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable
land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like
PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly
stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:

NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity
with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts
of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral
part hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, except when authorized by Congress, the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain that are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section
44 of PD No. 1529, a statutory lien affecting title of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of
title.iii[104] Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain
public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their
disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.

Rationale: The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does
not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable
lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked
to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the
constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial
lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to
acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public
lands

As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide,

with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being
leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other
alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when
qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the
government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the
public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEAs charter expressly states that PEA shall hold lands of the public domain as
well as any and all kinds of lands. PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands.
Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to
PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEAs name does not automatically make such lands
private.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of
the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the
public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private
parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use
or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be
distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the
constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates
of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
 longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectaresiv[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares v[111] of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI
will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409vi[112] of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is outside the
commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and
uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Chavez v. NHA (2007) BALIKTAD NI SIYA SA CHAVEZ v PEA

Doctrines:
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare that all natural resources are owned by the State
and they cannot be alienated except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Facts:
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and
reclamation area to be converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially 40
hectares but the JVA was amended). The JVA also provides that as part of the consideration for the
Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands to RBI.
The reclamation of the area was made; and subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying
the reclaimed land to NHA.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and
the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in relation thereto,
for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.
Issues:
 1. W/N NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public
domain (Chavez claims that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is vested exclusively
with PEA). YES.
2. W/N NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands, as required (Chavez claims that they were not). YES.
3. W/N the reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
(Chavez claims that there was no proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed lands as
alienable and disposable).
4. W/N the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI is void since it did not undergo public bidding but by
negotiated contract.
5. W/N RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public
domain.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Although PEA was designated under EO 525 as the agency primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does not mention that
it has the exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. In fact, EO
525 provides that reclamation projects may also be undertaken by a national government agency
or entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land.
There are 3 requisites to a legal and valid reclamation project:
a. approval by the President;
b. favorable recommendation of PEA; and
c. undertaken by any of the ff:
i. PEA
ii. any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA
iii. the National government agency or entity authorized under its charter to
reclaim lands subject to consultation with PEA. (Same sa Chavez vs PEA)

Applying the above requirements, the SC concluded that the Project has met all 3 requirements:
a. There was ample approval by the President of the Philippines. Presidents Aquino and Ramos
issued Proclamations approving and implementing the reclamation of lands.
b. There was an implied grant of a favorable endorsement of the reclamation phase from PEA.
This is shown in the fact that PEA was a member of the EXECOM which was in charge of
overseeing the implementation of the Project.
c. The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency authorized to
reclaim lands under its charter and other laws. While the charter of NHA does not explicitly
mention reclamation in any of its listed powers, such power is implied since it is vital or
incidental to achieving the objective of an urban land reform and housing program.
2. YES. The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands
of the public domain. As such, it decides whether areas, like foreshore or submerged lands,
should be reclaimed or not and whether they should be classified as alienable and disposable.

In this case, when the President approved and ordered the development of a housing project with the
corresponding reclamation work, making DENR a member of the EXECOM (committee tasked to
implement the project), the required authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed
satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificates by the DENR shows its
ratification of the reclamation project.

3. YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under the administration and disposition of
the NHA) and 465 (increased the reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79 hectares) were issued,
the inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable
lands of public domain. Furthermore, when the titles to such reclaimed lands were transferred to
the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified as
lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State. The reason is obvious: if
the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be
useless to transfer it to the NHA since it will not be able to transfer such lands to qualified entities
and thus, it will not achieve its purpose.

4. VALID. Since the lands reclaimed became patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of
their titles to the NHA, the latter can therefore legally transfer them to RBI or to any other
interested qualified buyer without any bidding. Unlike the PEA, the NHA is a government
agency not tasked to sell lands of the public domain. END-USER

5. NO. RA 6957, as amended (BOT Law), states that a contractor can be paid a portion as
percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In this case, RBI
is a private corporation wherein Filipino citizens own at least 60% of its shares.
i

ii REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF

LANDS), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely,
ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE, LUIS RIBAYA, ANTONIA RIBAYACONDE, and JOHN DOE
REBAYA, all represented by ANDREA RIBAYA-BUENVIAJE as Administratrix of the
Estate of Luis Ribaya, respondents.
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution of 24 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
[1]

G.R. CV No. 17351, which set aside its earlier decision of 9 January 1991. The latter affirmed the
[2]

decision of 11 November 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi City, in Civil
[3]

Case No. 6198 which declared null and void an original certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree
and a decision in a land registration case decided on 18 September 1925.
After the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner their Reply, we gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial court's findings
of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We are thus compelled
[4]

to review the factual antecedents.

From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the
following were established:
On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits, on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a
[5]

parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, was
surveyed for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses Ribaya) by
Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to comprise an area of
25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly
approved by the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as noted by the Court of
Appeals in its 9 January 1991 decision, these exhibits do not at all show the surveyor's
[6]

signature. Moreover, as per Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the above
parcel of land was considered part of the public forest and released for disposition only on 31
December 1930. [7]

In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot covered by
Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay. The case was docketed as LRC
Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application, and hearing thereof were
published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette, and in its decision of 18 September
[8]

1925, the CFI granted the said application.

[9]

Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of
land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to
Plan II13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an aggregate area of
only 10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square meters. Plan II-13961-Amd.
appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26 February 1926. The application was[10]

not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not published.
On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued, while on 19 August 1926,
[11]

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd.
was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya. [12]

On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owner's
duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. PO-10848 (3947). [13]
 In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during
the war. [14]

In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land
covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075,
approved on 16 December 1968. Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate
[15]

Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were issued to the private respondents. [16]

In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land and claiming [17]

ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848
(3947). Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17 August
[18]

1978, with the CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of nullity of OCT
No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles emanating from the original title, viz.,
TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6198.
The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the
land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the
amended plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874. The [19]

petitioner further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the land covered therein
was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.
On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-in-intervention and prayed
that the land revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions respectively occupied by them
confirmed.
In its decision of 11 November 1987 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as
[20]

follows:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No.
RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without force and effect;
2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T-31336, T- 31337, T-
31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T-31343, T-31344, T-31345, T-31346, T-31347, T- 31348, T-
31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T-31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T-31358, emanating
from OCT No. 3947 and OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina
Revatoris, as likewise null and void and without force and effect;
3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT No. RO-
10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Albay, who (sic)
is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the same;
4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the Philippines, as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.

The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for registration, the
land was already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land; however, the then CFI, as a
land registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of publication or
republication in the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the decree of
registration and OCT No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947 and its derivative titles were void.
In so finding, it relied on Fewkes vs. Vasquez, where it was held that any amendment or alteration
[21] [22]

in the description of the land after its publication and decree of registration was not permissible unless
coupled with republication.
 The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the spouses
Ribaya and their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse under a bona
fide claim of ownership for the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any tax
declarations.It then concluded that the said Spouses may have occupied portions of the land at a later
time, but not in the concept of bona fide owners, for mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the
land did not constitute "possession" as contemplated by law. [23]

The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in its
decision of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court. The appellate
[24]

court further pointed out another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants was invalid,
thus:

[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in their names said
land was still part of the public forest. The land was released for public disposition only on December 31, 1930
as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhs K, K-5). Consequently, OCT
No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is void ab initio.

It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands, are incapable of registration
in the names of private persons and their inclusion in a title nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68
SCRA 177 and cases cited therein.) [25]

In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the amended survey plan was
unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court in Benin vs. Tuazon, the Court of Appeals held that
[26]

the facts in Benin were different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before the property
was decreed for registration, while in the present case:

[T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925, while its survey was performed sometime
in November and December 1925. The amended survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of the land in the
instant case was approved when the land was already decreed for registration. . . . [27]

There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496. [28]

The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this decision.

In its resolution of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration
[29]

and set aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the trial court of 11 November 1987, and
dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 6198 of Branch 7 of the
RTC of Legazpi City. In overturning its previous decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that OCT No.
3947 "is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec.
38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its
transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became
incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)." [30]

It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land applied for by the spouses
Ribaya, and even extended said presumption to their compliance with all conditions required by law, in
particular, their "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus burdened the Republic "to prove
otherwise." [31]

It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax receipts was not fatal, and
that although they actually lived in Oas, Albay, such did not negate the character of their possession
for "[p]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before he can be said that he is in possession." [32]
 The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkes case and applied, instead, the
decision in Benin, where this Court held that republication could be dispensed with in an amendment
in the application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a portion
covered by the original application and the original survey plan as published. Accordingly, the land
registration court retained its jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in question still formed part of
the public forest at the time of the application for registration. It asserted, instead, that there was
insufficient basis to conclude that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on the basis of the
date of approval of the land classification map, because such approval may have been made later by
authority of a prior executive declaration. [33]

Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that (1) the indefeasibility of title
does not lie against the State in an action for reversion of land; (2) the spouses-applicants failed to
prove possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their
possession was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership;
(3) the amended survey plan was not published, (4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part
of the forest land, hence, inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful. [34]

In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely raises factual matters
and argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land was no longer part
of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further contend, invoking Benin,
that the issue of republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey plan was
already had in compliance with law.Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-
applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the government and the
compensation they received from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for
damages sustained by the land during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners
of the land. Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner. [35]

As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No.
3947 and all its derivative certificates of title; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the amended
survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the General Land
Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of 18 September 1925.

As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to
repeat:

[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)
as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of
its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496). [36]

First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition
for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree.In the second place, there are other
remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance,
covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value
of a certificate of title." Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the
[37]

property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within
four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also be had against the Assurance
[38]

Fund. [39]
 Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the
public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land
registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic vs.
Animas, we ruled:
[40]

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to
the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the
state in such cases for the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of reversion
or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public
forest and released only on 31 December 1930, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction
[41]

over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the
certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by
prescription.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II-
13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total
want of publication of the second.
As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the
hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original
plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only
onepublication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two
publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for
want of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of
the jurisdiction of the registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite. Land registration is a
[42] [43]

proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of
the Land through publication and service of notice. [44]

Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey
plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan
II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court
amended its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even
attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued was based on the
amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned.
A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. On the basis of the
[45]

decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended
its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the
decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did
so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the
amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended
plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the
amended plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents,
however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our
pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon. This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine Manufacturing
[46]

Co. vs. Imperial, Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz, Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua, Lichauco
[47] [48] [49]

vs. Herederos de Corpus, and Director of Lands vs. Benitez, that only where the original survey
[50] [51]

plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in
the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the
registration of the area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment
does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was
published, no new publication is required.
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely
resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6 and 6-
A are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for
failure of the offer or to prove any of the exception provided therein and to established the conditions
for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.
Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in
OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9
January 1991 affirming in toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11
November 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

iii

ivELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN NAMED TERESA
MALABANAN, Respondents. (LOST)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set
aside the decision1 dated February 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which
dismissed the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the Resolutions dated November 3,
1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City.

The facts of the case, as shown in the records, are the following:

Respondents Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, and Teresa Malabanan, the heir of Tiburcio Malabanan, filed
a Complaint2 dated March 2, 1998 for Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC,
Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City against petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. Respondents claimed that they are
the owners, in fee simple title, of a parcel of land identified as Lot 9250 Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, Plan
Ap-04-008367, situated in Barangay Iruhin, Tagaytay City, containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Four
Thousand One Hundred Twelve (244,112) square meters, by occupation and possession under the
provisions of Sec. 48 (b)3 of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

For having been in continuous, public, and adverse possession as owners of the said lot for at least thirty
years, respondents stated that they were not aware of any person or entity who had a legal or equitable
interest or claim on the same lot until the time they were requesting that the lot be declared for tax
purposes. They found out that the lot was the subject of a land registration proceeding that had already
been decided by the same court 4 where their complaint was filed. They also found out that Decree No. N-
217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, was already issued on August 20, 1997 to the petitioner pursuant to the
Decision dated June 7, 1994 of the same court. They averred that they were not notified of the said land
registration case; thus, they claimed the presence of misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic
fraud. Thus, they argued that they were also entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction in order to restrain or
enjoin petitioner, its privies, agents, representatives, and all other persons acting on its behalf, to refrain
from committing acts of dispossession on the subject lot.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, were served on the petitioner on April 7, 1998. On April
29, 1998, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time, 5 which the trial court
granted6 for a period of ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading. Petitioner filed a Second
Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer7 dated April 29, 1998, which the trial court likewise granted. 8

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 9 dated May 9, 1998, stating that the pleading asserting the
claim of respondents stated no cause of action, and that the latter were not entitled to the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, setting the same for hearing on May 21, 1998. On the date of the hearing, the trial
court issued an Order,10 which granted the respondents ten (10) days from that day to file a comment, and
set the date of the hearing on July 23, 1998. Respondents filed a Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition to
Defendant Eland,11 together with the corresponding Comment/Opposition12 dated June 8, 1998.

On the scheduled hearing of September 23, 1998, the trial court issued an Order, 13 considering the Motion
to Dismiss submitted for resolution due to the non-appearance of the parties and their respective counsels.
The said motion was eventually denied by the trial court in an Order 14 dated September 25, 1998, ruling
that the allegations in the complaint established a cause of action and enjoined petitioner Eland to file its
answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of the same. Petitioner then filed two Motions for
Extension to File an Answer.15

Petitioner, on November 9, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the trial court's Order dated
September 25, 1998, denying the former's Motion to Dismiss. Again, petitioner filed a Motion for Final
Extension of Time to File Answer 17 dated November 6, 1998. Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition
to Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 1998. Subsequently, the trial court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in an Order18dated January 11, 1999.

Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default 19 dated November 17, 1998.
On December 4, 1998 Petitioner Eland filed its Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant Eland
in Default)20dated December 2, 1998, while respondents filed a Reply to Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to
Declare Defendant Eland in Default) 21 dated December 29, 1998. Thereafter, the trial court issued an
Order22 dated January 11, 1999 declaring the petitioner in default and allowed the respondents to present
evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 11 January
1999)23 dated February 5, 1999 on the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss and in declaring it in
default. The trial court in an Order 24 dated March 18, 1999, denied the former and granted the latter. In the
same Order, the trial court admitted petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam.

Earlier, petitioner filed its Answer Ad Cautelam (With Compulsory Counterclaim)25 dated November 12,
1998. Respondents countered by filing a Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records 26 dated
December 2, 1998. Petitioner filed its Opposition (to Plaintiff's Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the
Records)27 dated December 21, 1998, as well as a Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Expunge Eland's
Answer from the Records)28 dated January 26, 1999.

Consequently, respondents filed a Motion to Set Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte29 dated January 18,
1999, which was granted in an Order30 dated January 22, 1999.

On January 28, 1999, respondents presented their evidence before the Clerk of Court of the trial court
which ended on February 3, 1999; and, on February 10, 1999, respondents filed their Formal Offer of
Evidence.31 However, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Plaintiff's Ex Parte Presentation of
Evidence32 dated February 8, 1999. In that regard, the trial court issued an Order 33 dated February 11, 1999
directing the Clerk of Court to suspend the proceedings.

On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Clarification 34 as to whether or not the evidence
presented ex parte was nullified by the admission of petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam. Petitioner filed its
Comment35 dated May 13, 1999 on the said motion for clarification.

A pre-trial conference was scheduled on May 27, 1999, wherein the parties submitted their pre-trial
briefs.36However, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings 37 dated May 24, 1999 on the ground that
the same petitioner had filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, asking for the nullification of the Order
dated March 18, 1999 of the trial court and for the affirmation of its earlier Order denying petitioner's Motion
to Dismiss. The petition for certiorari was subsequently denied; and a copy of the Resolution 38 dated June
14, 1999 was received by the trial court. Hence, in an Order 39 dated July 7, 1999, the trial court ruled that
the reception of evidence already presented by the respondents before the Clerk of Court remained as part
of the records of the case, and that the petitioner had the right to cross-examine the witness and to
comment on the documentary exhibits already presented. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration40 dated July 19, 1999, but it was denied by the trial court in an Omnibus Order 41 dated
September 14, 1999.

Eventually, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 42 dated August 5, 1999, while petitioner filed
its Opposition43 to the Motion dated August 31, 1999. In its Resolution 44 dated November 3, 1999, the trial
court found favor on the respondents. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and it is
hereby adjudged that:

1. Plaintiffs are the absolute owners and rightful possessors of Lot 9250, CAD-355, Tagaytay
Cadastre, subject to the rights of occupancy of the farm workers on the one-third area thereof;

2. The Judgment dated June 7, 1994 in Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is set aside and the
Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686 dated August 20, 1997 is null and void;

3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be canceled, as well as tax declaration
covering Lot 9250, Cad-355.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the trial court with the CA, which dismissed it in a Decision dated
February 28, 2006, which reads:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated November 3,
1999, of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, in Civil Case No. TG-1784, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are the following:

5.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT
 RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 05, 1999 DID NOT
VIOLATE THE TEN (10)-DAY NOTICE RULE UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 35 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

5.2 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.

5.3 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE
ARE NO GENUINE FACTUAL AND TRIABLE ISSUES IN CIVIL CASE NO. TG-1784.

5.4 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO, BASED ON
TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES TAKEN WITHOUT GRANTING HEREIN
PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND UPON DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS
PRESENTED BUT NOT ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.

5.5 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO BASED ON FALSIFIED
"EVIDENCE."

5.6 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE
THAT THE COURT A QUO PATENTLY DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS IN RENDERING ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

5.7 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO CANCEL PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE (OCT) NO. 0-660 IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.

According to the petitioner, a motion for summary judgment must be served at least ten (10) days before
the date set for hearing thereof, and that a hearing must be held to hear the parties on the propriety of a
summary judgment, per Sec. 3 of Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was not observed because
the petitioner received a copy of the respondents' motion for summary judgment only on August 20, 1999,
or the very same day that the motion was set for hearing. Petitioner further claims that the trial court never
conducted any hearing on the motion for summary judgment.

Petitioner also argued that a summary judgment is only available to a claimant seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, and does not include cases for quieting
of title. Furthermore, petitioner also averred that a summary judgment has no place in a case where
genuine factual and triable issues exist, like in the present case. It added that the genuine and triable
issues were all raised in its Answer Ad Cautelam.

Another ground relied upon by petitioner is its failure to cross-examine the witnesses for the respondents
without fault on its part. It also stated that the trial court did not issue any order admitting in evidence the
documentary exhibits presented by the respondents. Hence, according to the petitioner, the trial court
gravely erred in relying upon the testimonies of the witnesses for the respondents, without having the latter
cross-examined; and upon the documentary exhibits presented but not admitted as evidence.
Petitioner further claimed that the trial court based its Resolution dated November 3, 1999 on falsified
evidence.

Lastly, petitioner raised the issue that by rendering summary judgment, the trial court deprived the former of
its right to due process.

Respondents, in their Comment45 dated October 16, 2006, countered the first issue raised by the petitioner,
stating that their filing of the motion for summary judgment fourteen (14) days before the requested hearing
of the same motion was in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court.

As to the second and third issues, respondents argued that petitioner had a constricted perception of the
coverage of the Rules of Summary Judgment, and that the latter's citation of cases decided by this Court
showed the diverse causes of action that could be the subject matters of summary judgment. Respondents
also posited that petitioner's statements in its Answer Ad Cautelam, although denominated as Specific
Denial, were really general denials that did not comply with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court.

Anent the fourth and fifth issues, respondents claimed that despite the opportunity, or the right allowed in
the Order dated July 17, 1999 of the trial court, for the petitioner to cross-examine respondents' witnesses
and to comment on the documentary evidence presented ex parte after the default order against the same
petitioner, the latter evasively moved to set aside respondents' evidence in order to suspend further
proceedings that were intended to abort the pre-trial conference. They added that petitioner neglected to
avail itself of, or to comply with, the prescription of the rules found in Rule 35 of the Rules of Court by
opting not to avail itself of the hearing of its opposition to the summary judgment after receiving the Order
dated August 20, 1999; by failing to serve opposing affidavit, deposition or admission in the records; and by
not objecting to the decretal portion of the said Order dated August 20, 1999, which stated that the motion
for summary judgment has been submitted for resolution without further argument. With regard to the
contention of the petitioner that the trial court wrongly appreciated falsified evidence, respondents asserted
that petitioner's counsel failed to study carefully the records of the proceedings for the presentation of the
evidence ex parte to be able to know that it was not only a single-day proceeding, and that more than one
witness had been presented. They further averred that the trial court did not only rely on the photographs of
the houses of the occupants of the property in question.

Finally, as to the sixth and seventh issues, respondents asseverated that their complaint alleged joint
causes of action for quieting of title under Art. 476 of the New Civil Code and for the review of the decree of
registration pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree or P.D. No. 1529, because they are
complimentary with each other.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The basic contention that must be resolved by this Court is the propriety of the summary judgment in this
particular case of quieting of title.

Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been
served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the
time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.
After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and
admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.46

In the present case, it was the respondents who moved for a summary judgment.

Petitioner contended that the ten-day notice rule was violated, because the copy of the motion for summary
judgment was served only on August 20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing. It also added that
even if the petitioner received a copy of the motion only on August 20, 1999, there was no hearing
conducted on that date because the trial court issued an order giving petitioner 10 days within which to file
its comment or opposition.

The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was correct in its observation that there was
substantial compliance with due process. The CA ruled, as the records show, that the ten-day notice rule
was substantially complied with because when the respondents filed the motion for summary judgment on
August 9, 1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on the same day as shown in the registry
receipt and that the motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10 days from the date of the filing
thereof.

Due process, a constitutional precept, does not, therefore, always and in all situations a trial-type
proceeding. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
one's evidence in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence of previous
notice, but the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.47

Petitioner further argues that summary judgment is not proper in an action for quieting of title. This
particular argument, however, is misplaced. This Court has already ruled that any action can be the subject
of a summary judgment with the sole exception of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation.48

Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds that the grant of summary judgment was not proper. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their
face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party
show that such issues are not genuine.49

It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a
motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial
court found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-blown trial.
However, a careful study of the case shows otherwise.

In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of any
genuine issue of fact. They merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and
opposed some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:

Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and uncontroverted facts and facts established there is
no more litigious or genuine issue of basic fact to be the subject of further trial on the merits.

The first defense as to the identity of the subject property, the issue has already become nil because of not
only the lack of seriousness in the allegations but also because the identity of the subject parcel of land Lot
9250 was proven by the approved plan Ap-04-008367 that was already presented and offered in evidence
as Exhibit "B" for the plaintiffs.

The second defense that plaintiffs' claim of the property is barred by prior judgment rule is unavailing
considering that the vital documentary evidence they presented in Land Registration Case No. TG-423
before this Honorable Court the markings and descriptions of such documents are stated in the Judgment
quoted as follows:

(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit "Q"; x x x.

(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit "R"; x x x.

(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit "S"; x x x.

(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit "T" x x x.

are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon by the plaintiffs in seeking the review and
nullity of the Decree No. 217313 issued on August 20, 1997 under LRC Record No. N-62686 pursuant to
the Judgment dated June 7, 1994 rendered by this Honorable Court penned by the acting presiding Judge
Eleuterio F. Guerrero in said Land Registration Case No. TG-423.

On the other hand, as to the gravamen of the claims in the complaint, the plaintiffs have presented clear
and convincing evidence as the well-nigh or almost incontrovertible evidence of a registerable title to the
subject land in the proceedings conducted on the reception of evidence ex-parte for the plaintiffs
establishing in detail the specifications of continuous, open, exclusive possession as aspects of acquisitive
prescription as confirmed in the affidavit herein attached as Annex "A";

In ruling that there was indeed no genuine issue involved, the trial court merely stated that:

This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs cause of action for quieting of title on the
disputed parcel of land is based on the alleged fraud in the substitution of their landholdings of Lot 9250,
Cad 355, Tagaytay Cadastre containing only an area of 244,112 square meters with Lot 9121, Cad 335,
Tagaytay Cadastre, containing only an area of 19,356 square meters. While defendant Eland in its answer
practically and mainly interposed the defenses of: (a) the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is not
the parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423; (b) the claim of the plaintiffs is
barred by prior judgment of this Court in said Land Registration Case; and (c) plaintiffs' complaint is barred
by the Statute of Limitation since Original Certificate of Title No. 0-660 has become incontrovertible.

Cross-reference of the above-cited Land Registration Case No. TG-423 that was decided previously by this
Court with the case at bench was imperatively made by this Court. Being minded that the Court has and
can take judicial notice of the said land registration case, this Court observed that there is no genuine issue
of fact to be tried on the merits. Firstly, because the supposed identity crisis of the controverted parcel of
land covered by the Land Registration Case No. TG-423 with the subject parcel of land is established by
Plan Ap-04-006275 (Exhibit "N") LRC Case No. 423 and by Plan A04 008367 (Exhibit "B" of the plaintiffs)
and the Technical Description of Lot 9250, Cad 355 (Exhibit "B-1" of the plaintiffs). Secondly, the prior
judgment rule cannot be availed of by defendant Eland since not only intrinsic fraud but extrinsic fraud were
alleged in and established by the records. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 1184436,
pro. March 21, 1997). Thirdly, it is incontrovertible that the complaint in this case seeking to review the
judgment and annul the decree was filed on March 5, 1998 or within one (1) year from August 20, 1997 or
the date of issuance of Decree No. 217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, hence, the Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-660 issued to defendant Eland has not attained incontrovertibility. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118436, prom. March 21, 1997).

Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of the basic
pleadings, the observation of this Court is that the plaintiffs were able to prove by the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in accordance with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth
Act 141, as amended, as hereinafter illustrated.
The CA, in affirming the above Resolution of the trial court, propounded thus:

The contention of defendant-appellant is untenable. Summary judgment is not only limited to solving
actions involving money claims. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Court, except as to the amount of
damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. The term "genuine issue" has been
defined as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue
which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial.

Thus, under the aforecited rule, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of
fact, which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Thus, even if on their face the pleadings
appear to raise issues, but when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.

It should be stressed that the court a quo which rendered the assailed resolution in Civil Case No. TG-1784
was the very court that decided the LRC Case No. TG-423. Such being the case, the court a quo was privy
to all relevant facts and rulings pertaining to LRC Case No. TG-423 which it considered and applied to this
case. Thus, where all the facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court, summary judgment may be
granted as a matter of right.

On the contrary, in petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam, genuine, factual and triable issues were raised, aside
from specifically denying all the allegations in the complaint, thus:

2. SPECIFIC DENIALS

2.1 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the
Complaint insofar as it alleges the personal circumstances of the plaintiff and one A. F.
Development Corporation for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth thereof.

2.2 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
the Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of said
allegations. And if the property referred to in said paragraphs is that parcel of land which was the
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 which was previously decided by this
Honorable Court with finality, said allegations are likewise specifically denied for the obvious reason
that the said property had already been adjudged with finality by no less than this Honorable Court
as absolutely owned by herein answering defendant as will be further discussed hereunder.

2.3 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the
Complaint insofar as it alleged that "(u)pon exercise of further circumspection, counsel for the
plaintiffs once followed-up in writing the 1994 request of the plaintiffs to have the subject parcel of
land be declared for taxation purposes" and insofar as it is made to appear that parcel of land being
claimed by the plaintiffs is the same parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No.
TG-423 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof and for
the reason that the names of the herein plaintiffs were never mentioned during the entire
proceedings in said land registration case and by reason of the Affirmative Allegations contained
hereunder.

2.4 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 10 (a),
10 (b), 10 (c), 10 (d), 10 (e), 10 (f), 10 (g), 10 (h), and 11 for the reason that there is no showing
that the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiff is the same parcel of land which was the
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG- 423, and in the remote possibility that the parcel
of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject of Land Registration
Case No. TG-423, the allegations contained in said paragraphs are still specifically denied for the
reason that no less than the Honorable Court had decided with finality that the parcel of land is
absolutely owned by herein defendant to the exclusion of all other persons as attested to by the
subsequent issuance of an Original Certificate of Title in favor of answering defendant and for
reasons stated in the Affirmative Allegations.

2.5 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the
Complaint for the obvious reason that it was the plaintiffs who appear to have been sleeping on
their rights considering that up to the present they still do not have any certificate of title covering
the parcel of land they are claiming in the instant case, while on the part of herein defendant, no
less than the Honorable Court had adjudged with finality that the parcel of land subject matter of
Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is absolutely owned by herein defendant.

2.6 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the
complaint for the reason that defendant has never ladgrabbed any parcel of land belonging to
others, much less from the plaintiffs, and further, answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations therein that plaintiffs engaged the services of a lawyer for a fee for lack of knowledge r
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

2.7 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17
and 18 of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as the truth
thereof.

2.8 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs IV (a) to IV (c)
for the reason that, as above-stated, if the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same
as that parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423, this Honorable Court
had already decided with finality that said parcel of land is absolutely owned by herein answering
defendant and additionally, for those reasons stated in defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

2.9 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph IV (d) of the
Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

Special and affirmative defenses were also raised in the same Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:

xxxx

4.1 The pleading asserting the claim of the plaintiff states no cause of action as asserted in the
Motion To Dismiss filed by herein answering defendant and for the reason that there is no evidence
whatsoever showing or attesting to the fact that the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs in
the Complaint is the same parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case
No. TG-423.

4.2 The complaint was barred by the prior judgment rendered by this Honorable in Land
Registration Case No. TG-423.

4.3 The complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation in that OCT No. 0-660 had become
incontrovertible by virtue of the Torrens System of Registration; and to allow plaintiffs to question
the validity of answering defendant's title through the instant complaint would be a collateral of OCT
No. 0-660 which is not permissible under the law.

4.4 Plaintiffs are barred by their own acts and/or omission from filing the present complaint under
the principles of estoppel and laches.
 4.5 Plaintiffs does not to the Court with clean hands as they appear to be well aware of the
proceedings in said Land Registration Case No. TG- 423 and inspite of such knowledge, plaintiffs
never bothered to present their alleged claims in the proceedings.

4.6 Answering defendant has always acted with justice, given everyone his due, and observed
honesty and good faith in his dealings.

Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for summary judgment have been duly
disputed and contested by petitioner, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown
trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial. 50 In the present case, the petitioner was able to point out the
genuine issues. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.51

It is of utmost importance to remember that petitioner is already the registered owner (Original Certificate of
Title [OCT] No. 0-660 issued by the Register of Deeds) of the parcel of land in question, pursuant to a
decree of registration (Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. 62686) based on the ruling of the same
court that granted the summary judgment for the quieting of title.

Incidentally, the findings of the trial court contained in the disputed summary judgment were obtained
through judicial notice of the facts and rulings pertaining to that earlier case (LRC Case No. TG-423)
wherein the same trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It is, therefore, disorienting that the same trial
court reversed its earlier ruling, which categorically stated that:

x x x There is overwhelming evidence or proof on record that the vendors listed in Exhibit "HH," with
submarkings, are the previous owners of the parcel of land mentioned in the same deed of sale and aside
form the tax declarations covering the same property (Exhibits "Q" to "T," inclusive), the uncontroverted
testimony of Atty. Ruben Roxas establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that applicant's (referring to
herein defendant-appellant) sellers/predecessors-in-interest are the grandchildren, great grandchildren and
great great grandchildren of the spouses Lucio Petate and Maria Pobleta Petate, the former owners of the
same property, whose ownership is further bolstered by tax receipts showing payments of realty taxes
(Exhibits "U" to "GG," inclusive, with submarkings).

xxx

On the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and considering that applicant is a domestic
corporation not otherwise disqualified from owning real properties in the Philippines, this Court finds that
applicant has satisfied all the conditions/requirements essential to the grant of its application pursuant to
the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as amended, inspite of the opposition filed by the Heirs of the
late Doroteo Miranda. Hence, the grant of applicant's petition appears to be inevitable.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the instant petition for land registration and, thus, places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the
land described in Plan Ap-04-006275 and containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Ninety-Four (242,794) square meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part
of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of the applicant, ELAND
PHILIPPINES, INC., with principal office at No. 43 E. Rodriguez Ave. (Espaa Extension), Quezon City,
Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith
issue.

SO ORDERED.

By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in effect annulled its former ruling based on a claim
of possession and ownership of the same land for more than thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown
trial. The fact that the respondents seek to nullify the original certificate of title issued to the petitioner on
the claim that the former were in possession of the same land for a number of years, is already a
clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact exists. This, together with the failure of the
respondents to show that there were no genuine issues involved, should have been enough for the trial
court to give the motion for summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant consideration. Trial courts have
limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue
as to any material fact.52

Based on the foregoing, this Court deems it necessary to delve briefly on the nature of the action of
quieting of title as applied in this case. This Court's ruling in Calacala, et al. v. Republic, et al.53 is instructive
on this matter, thus:

To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy
grounded on equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:54

Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for
the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in
equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in
property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under
him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim. In an action for quieting of title, the
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, x x x
not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect
and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best xxx.

Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainants title to real property or
any interest therein. The codal provision reads:

Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.

In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:

Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at
least, an equitable title on the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA,55 we ruled:

It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is
being alleged as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: ( 1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.

Respondents, in their Complaint, claim that they have become the owners in fee-simple title of the subject
land by occupation and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Law or
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Thus, it appears that the first requisite has been satisfied. Anent
the second requisite, respondents enumerated several facts that would tend to prove the invalidity of the
claim of the petitioner. All of these claims, which would correspond to the two requisites for the quieting of
title, are factual; and, as discussed earlier, the petitioner interposed its objections and duly disputed the
said claims, thus, presenting genuine issues that can only be resolved through a full-blown trial.

Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title, the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility
of the decree of registration come into question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree:

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall
not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right
of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one
year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent
phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case
may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for
the fraud.

As borne out by the records and undisputed by the parties, OCT No. 0-660 of petitioner was issued on
August 29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued on August 20, 1997, while the complaint for the quieting of
title in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998; hence, applying the above
provisions, it would seem that the period of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of registration has
not elapsed for the review thereof. However, a closer examination of the above provisions would clearly
indicate that the action filed, which was for quieting of title, was not the proper remedy.

Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an application for review
is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. 56 However,
the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual fraud. Shedding light on the matter is a
discussion presented in one of the recognized textbooks on property registration, 57 citing decisions of this
Court, thus:

The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of
title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a
decree of registration.58 One of the remedies available to him is a petition for review. To avail of a
petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:

(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;

(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;

(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Authority; and

(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. 59

A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Torrens
system. An important feature of a certificate of title is its finality. The proceedings whereby such a title
is obtained are directed against all persons, known or unknown, whether actually served with notice or not,
and includes all who have an interest in the land. If they do not appear and oppose the registration of their
own estate or interest in the property in the name of another, judgment is rendered against them by default,
and, in the absence of fraud, such judgment is conclusive. If an interest in the land will not by itself operate
to vacate a decree of registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.60

As further pointed out in the same book, 61 the petition for review must be filed within one year from entry of
the decree of registration. As written:

As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority and period of one year
has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration case continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the registration court. 62 After
the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review.

Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of registration may be filed "not later
than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration." Giving this provision a
literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final
decree has been entered. However, it has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time after the
rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final
decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera v. Moran,63 there can be no possible reason requiring the
complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim for fraud.

The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of
registration refers to the decree of registration described in Section 31, which decree is prepared and
issued by the Land Registration Administrator.64

The provision of Section 31 that every decree of registration shall bind the land, quiet title thereto, and be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the national government, and Sec. 32 that the decree
shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority or other disability or by any proceeding in
court, save only in cases of actual fraud and then only for one year from the entry of the decree, must be
understood as referring to final and unappealable decrees of registration. A decision or, as it is sometimes
called after entry, a decree of a registration court, does not become final and unappealable until fifteen
days after the interested parties have been notified of its entry, and during that period may be set aside by
the trial judge on motion for new trial, upon any of the grounds stated in the Rules of Court. 65 An appeal
from the decision of the trial court prevents the judgment from becoming final until that decree is affirmed
by the judgment of the appellate court.66

A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial
and the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the
grounds upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where petitioners acquired their interest in the
land before any final decree had been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in
these circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent purchasers in good faith. 67 1avvphi1

Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed within the one-year period from entry of the
decree, it is error for the court to deny the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation
of actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated. The petitioner should be afforded an
opportunity to prove such allegation.68

In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible
has not yet expired; thus, a review of the decree of registration would have been the appropriate remedy.

Based on the above disquisitions, the other issues raised by the petitioner are necessarily rendered
inconsequential.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. is
hereby GRANTED, and the decision dated February 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67417, which dismissed the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the resolutions
dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June 28,
2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City in Civil Case No. TG-1784 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

v ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners, (LOST)

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and RAFAELA
RASING, respondents.

The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals,[1] which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan,
[2]
declaring respondents as the absolute an lawful owners of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 139 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenza, all
surnamed Fontanilla. Rosa married Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and
Paciencia. Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and they had a daughter, petitioner Amparo
Rasca (married to Enriquito Serna). Jose had a son, respondent Santiago Fontanilla (married
to Rafaela Rasing). Hence, the parties involved are first cousins.
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a parcel of land, containing
an area of twelve thousand five hundred eight square meters (12,508 sq. m.), located in
Barangay Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan.[3]
 In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation purposes. In the same year,
Turner Land Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the
agreement that the cost of survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Bureau of
Lands. On March 2, 1923, the Bureau of Lands approved the survey plan.
In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio
Fontanilla sold the land to his daughter, Rosa Fontanilla. In 1939, Rosa began paying the
real estate property tax thereon.
On August 21, 1955, for a consideration of one thousand seven hundred pesos
(P1,700.00), Rosa sold the land to her nephew, respondent Santiago Fontanilla, evidenced
by a notarized deed of absolute sale, signed by Rosa. The instrument was not registered.
In 1955, respondents constructed their house of strong materials on the lot in question,
which was completed in 1957.
On December 16, 1957, Rosas heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two (2) children,
Fructoso and Paciencia, executed another deed of absolute sale over the same land in favor
of respondent Santiago Fontanilla.
In 1978, respondents went to the United States to visit their daughter Mila Fontanilla
Borillo. They stayed there until 1981.
On December 20, 1978, taking advantage of respondents' absence from the country,
petitioners Enriquito and Amparo Serna applied to the land registration court of Pangasinan
for registration[4] of the said parcel of land in their name.
In 1979, the land registration court approved the application, and pursuant to Decree N-
176768, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to
petitioners. On January 10, 1980, the title was transcribed in the registration book of the
register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On May 27, 1981, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XIII,
Alaminos, Pangasinan, an action for reconveyance with damages, and sought the annulment
of O.C.T. No. 139.[5]
In the trial court, petitioners admitted that Dionisio Fontanilla originally owned the land
in dispute. However, they claimed that in 1978 they bought the property for three thousand
pesos (P3,000.00) from Lorenza Fontanilla-Rasca. Lorenza, in turn, traced her title from her
husband, Alberto Rasca.
Petitioner Amparo said that when Dionisio failed to pay the survey costs in 1921,
Turner Land Surveying Company took the property in question as payment for
services. Her father, Alberto Rasca, redeemed the property from Turner evidenced by a deed
of sale, which, however, Amparo could not produce in court. When her father died,
Santiago Fontanilla borrowed from her mother the deed covering the transfer of the
property, which Santiago did not return. She said that the property was first declared in
Alberto's name for taxation purposes in 1951. Later, the property was ceded to her.
 After due trial and consideration of the evidence presented before the trial court and in
the land registration case, on June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs (herein respondents) spouses Santiago Fontanilla and Rafaela Rasing, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

"(a) Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute and legal owners of the land in question
particularly described and bounded and stated in paragraph two (2) of the complaint;

"(b) Ordering the defendants to Transfer and Recover [sic] Original Certificate of Title No.
139 to the plaintiffs;

"(c) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;

"(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages;

"(e) And to pay the costs, without pronouncement as to moral damages.

"Done at Alaminos, Pangasinan, this 5th day of August, 1992.

"(t/s) Vivencio A. Bantugan[6]

From the decision of the trial court, both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Respondents questioned the court a quo's failure to grant their claim for moral
damages. On the other hand, petitioners claimed that the trial court committed serious error
in the appreciation of facts and application of law and Jurisprudence.
On August 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the trial
court.
In a resolution dated February 26, 1996, [7] the Court of Appeals denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners submit these issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the appealed decision
is supported by evidence; (2) whether or not the decision is in accordance with law and
Jurisprudence.[8]
The first issue is factual, which we cannot review on appeal. [9] However, petitioners
make an issue of the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the one who
presided over the proceedings.
We have ruled in People vs. Rayray,[10] that the fact that the judge who heard the
evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision
constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per
se render his decision void. While it is true that the trial Judge who conducted the hearing
would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the
witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial
cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was not present during the trial can
rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his
decision. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process. [11]
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
upon us, and we will not normally disturb such factual findings. This is because in an
appeal by certiorari to this Court, only questions of law may be raised. [12] And for a question
to be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. [13] To reiterate the distinction between the two
types of questions: there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts. [14]
Petitioners claim ownership of the land based on the deed of sale executed by Turner
Land Surveying Co. in favor of Alberto Rasca, which, however, they failed to present in
court. The truth or falsity of this claim is a question of fact, which, as aforesaid, is not
reviewable in this appeal.
On the other hand, respondents proved that they were enjoying open, continuous and
adverse possession of the property for more than sixty (60) years tacking in the possession
of their predecessors in interest, Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa Pajaro. As early as 1921,
Dionisio Fontanilla was in adverse possession and paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn,
paid taxes for the first time in 1939, [15] while respondents began paying taxes in 1967.
[16]
They had their residential house built in 1955, which was completed in 1957. In 1980,
Santiago executed a tenancy agreement [17] with Sixto Fontanilla. Until 1984, Santiago paid
the taxes together with his tenant Sixto.
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the
declarant,[18] tax declarations and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land
when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. [19]
Going to the second issue that the appellate court's decision is not supported by law and
Jurisprudence, we find this to be vague and without merit as well.
At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as
amended. Later, Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended and
codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or
cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1)
year after the entry of the final decree." [20] After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes
incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review.
However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein
by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by
law[21] as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.
The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an
intentional omission of a fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it
must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the
original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration. [22]
An action based on implied on constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This
means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the time of
its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property." [23] Discovery of the
fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title
because registration of real property is considered a 'constructive notice to all persons' and it
shall be counted 'from the time of such registering, filing or entering. [24]
In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to the
land sometime after its registration (that is, there was INTRINSIC FRAUD), however, an
innocent purchaser for value had not acquired the property. Extrinsic fraud attended the
application for the land registration. It was filed when respondents were out of the country
and they had no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their name.
Fortunately, respondents' action for reconveyance was timely, as it was filed within ten
(10) years from the issuance of the torrens title over the property.[25]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. We
AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922

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