Turkish Studies

ISSN: 1468-3849 (Print) 1743-9663 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20

From constructive engagement to renewed

estrangement? Securitization and Turkeys
deteriorating relations with its Kurdish minority

Matthew Weiss

To cite this article: Matthew Weiss (2016) From constructive engagement to renewed
estrangement? Securitization and Turkeys deteriorating relations with its Kurdish minority, Turkish
Studies, 17:4, 567-598, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2016.1228456

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2016.1228456

Published online: 13 Sep 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 548

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ftur20

Download by: [Concordia University Libraries] Date: 07 July 2017, At: 16:02
TURKISH STUDIES, 2016
VOL. 17, NO. 4, 567598
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2016.1228456

From constructive engagement to renewed

estrangement? Securitization and Turkeys
deteriorating relations with its Kurdish minority
Matthew Weiss
Department of Public Affairs and Security Studies, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley,
Edinburg, USA

ABSTRACT
Over the last several years, the political will of the governing AKP in Turkey to
make the historic compromises necessary to complete the peace process with
the Kurds has sharply declined. This paper will examine the causes of the
breakdown in the Turkish-Kurdish peace process and the Turkish
governments lurch in a nationalist direction in its approach towards the
Kurdish minority from the standpoint of securitization theory. The key
catalysts, it is argued, for the re-emergence of a securitization paradigm in
Turkeys handling of the Kurdish issue are: (1) Turkeys stalled bid for
accession to the European Union; (2) the intensifying electoral competition
between AKP and the Kurdish movement parties, coupled with the
instrumentalization of the Kurdish peace process to serve President Recep
Tayyip Erdoans quest to install a dominant presidential system and (3) the
spillover effects of Syrias civil war on Turkeys relations with its own Kurdish
populace.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 7 April 2016; Accepted 14 August 2016

KEYWORDS Middle East; Turkish foreign policy; Kurds; PKK; PYD

Introduction
As recently as two years ago, one could confidently speculate that a compre-
hensive resolution to Turkeys long-standing Kurdish problem was gathering
momentum, even if the exact timeframe was open to question and its inevit-
ability hardly assured. A rare constellation of favorable conditions strong
leaders on both sides and the broad public legitimacy they commanded, the
enhanced political breathing space resulting from a unilateral cease-fire
declared by the insurgent organization, the Kurdish Workers Party
(Partiya Kerkeren Kurdistan, PKK), and well-established principles and
terms of reference for negotiations boded well for the success of the solution

CONTACT Matthew Weiss matthew.weiss@utrgv.edu Department of Public Affairs and Security

Studies, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, 1201 W. University Dr., Edinburg, TX 78539-2999, USA
2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
568 M. WEISS

process.1 Meanwhile, the Turkish government, led by then-Prime Minister

Recep Tayyip Erdoan, had shepherded through a new round of reform
packages that removed many of the impediments to the free use of the
Kurdish language, a core demand of Kurdish rights activists. Moreover,
Turks and Kurds were reaping the benefits of the lull in hostilities and had
little incentive to return to the status quo ante of all-out conflict.2 The road
of negotiations, however arduous, appeared the only viable way forward.
In just a matter of months, this once-promising horizon for peace has
evaporated. Harkening back to the dark days of the 1990s, Turkish warplanes
and helicopter gunships are strafing PKK hideouts and training camps in the
Kandil Mountains on a near-daily basis. The Turkish military has imposed
curfews and sieges on insurgent strongholds in the Kurdish-populated south-
east, while the political leadership led by Erdoan is once again indulging the
fantasy of an outright military victory. Meanwhile, radicalized youth affiliated
with the PKK (i.e. Yurtsever Devrimci Genlik Hareketi, YDGH) have asserted
autonomy in Cizre and several other Kurdish-majority towns in the southeast
of the country. How did the situation deteriorate so far and so fast, with the
peace process virtually in tatters?
This paper analyzes the causes of the virtual breakdown in the Turkish-
Kurdish peace process and the return to conflict in the last year and a half.
Employing the securitization theory, this paper contends that the return to
high levels of conflict in the region, especially in Syria, as the Arab Spring
events took a volatile turn, has led Turkey to adopt a narrowly nationalistic
stance towards the Kurdish peace process. In the process, Erdoan has
retreated from the groundbreaking approach that defined his earlier years
in office, in which age-old taboos against the recognition of Kurdish culture
and language, and contacts with the PKK, were shattered.
The driving force behind Erdoan reversion to a more nationalistic and
even chauvinistic stance towards the Kurds has been the territorial and politi-
cal gains of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yektiya Demokrat PYD) in
Syria, an offshoot of the PKK. The embryonic experiment in self-rule
launched by the PYD in Kurdish areas of Syria which the Syrian army evac-
uated at the outset of the civil war in 2011 has aroused fears in Turkey of irre-
dentist moves among its own Kurdish population. This has in turn induced
Turkey to adopt a tougher posture towards the PKK and the Kurdish move-
ment in general.
The shift to a more security-minded approach towards the Kurds is not
solely a function of the turbulence on Turkeys southern border, and the
growth of a Kurdish proto-state in northern Syria. This paper makes the
case that the European Unions (EU) lukewarm approach towards Turkeys
membership and the diminished salience of the liberal Copenhagen criteria
for accession as a touchstone for Turkeys treatment of its Kurdish and
other minority groups has also played a role. The enthusiasm of the
 TURKISH STUDIES 569

Turkish government to pursue democratic reforms towards the Kurds and

complete the solution process has waned as the prospects of EU membership
have receded from view.
The reversion to more authoritarian political patterns and the increasing
concentration of power in Erdoans hands have only amplified these ten-
dencies. In this context, Erdoans obsessive pursuit of an enhanced execu-
tive-style presidency has taken precedence over progress in the Kurdish
peace process. The peace process was at first subordinated to Erdoans pol-
itical ambitions, and eventually sidelined altogether, when it became evident
that the political wing of the Kurdish rights movement was not on board with
his personal political agenda.
The paper will begin with a discussion of the concept of securitization, fol-
lowed by a brief exploration of the historical evolution of the Kurdish question
in Turkey. This section will trace the shift from a policy of forcible assimila-
tion and complete denial of Kurdish identity in the early years of the Republic
to the groundbreaking initiatives that Erdoan made towards recognition of
Kurdish rights and identity. The paper will then examine the Turkish govern-
ments lurch in a nationalist direction over the last couple of years and
examine how the process of securitization influenced this shift. In this
context, the impact of the languishing EU accession bid, Erdoans personal
political ambitions and fierce competition with ethnic Kurdish parties, and
the destabilizing developments in Turkeys near abroad (especially Syria)
will be analyzed. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syrias (ISIS) ultimately unsuc-
cessful assault on the Kurdish-majority border town of Kobane, Syria in late
2014, and the PYDs capture of Tal Abyad in June 2015, will be examined as
turning points that intensified and crystallized the re-securitization of the
Kurdish question and the current extreme polarization between Kurds and
Turks.

Securitization
Securitization exists when national security elites successfully portray dom-
estic issues as so injurious to the nations security and/or territorial integrity
such that only coercive or repressive measures will suffice to deal with them.3
The demands, grievances and agendas of opposition groups may be labeled as
seditious and ascribed to the agendas of rival or enemy states with a history of
fomenting instability. When the sources of domestic groups grievances are
projected onto the designs of an enemy state, and claimed to pose a direct
threat to the states security and territorial integrity, they are defined as
being beyond the pale of peaceful political bargaining and rational public
debate that applies to other less politically charged issues.4 On the other
hand, when de-securitization takes shape, political issues become de-
coupled from external factors and the presumed agendas of rival states,
570 M. WEISS

permitting freer discussion. Issues that were previously considered even taboo
to mention (e.g. the notion that Kurds have their own identity, distinct from
Turks) are shorn of their existential character and acquire legitimacy, enabling
them to be addressed and debated through normal political processes.
There are several factors that can reinforce movement towards de-securi-
tization.5 One important variable relates to the subtle pressure and influence
of outside actors. For example, Turkeys acceptance as a candidate country to
the EU in 1999 was a key catalyst for its shift towards a more liberal, flexible
and pluralistic approach towards minority rights issues that the Kemalist
establishment had long portrayed as a threat to the unitary and ethnically
homogenous state of which they were the self-appointed guardians.6 Internal
democratization, and the erosion of the militarys paramount role in policy-
making, coupled with the opening of the political arena to a wider range of
actors, including civil society and the media, can also help accelerate move-
ment towards de-securitization.7 All of these changes gathered momentum
in Turkey within the last 15 years, and reinforced each other, creating a vir-
tuous cycle that brought many issues that were formerly securitized into the
realm of normal politics.
This paper argues that many of the same factors that Aras and Polat8 credit
with de-securitization in Turkey have changed for the worse in recent years,
particularly since approximately 2009. Accession negotiations with the EU
have stalled, and the democratic values that Erdoan once championed
have eroded as he has consolidated power and adopted an increasingly abra-
sive approach towards the opposition. A decade ago, the desire to meet the
strict Copenhagen criteria for EU membership instilled in Turkish policy-
makers a strong sense of urgency to accelerate democratic reforms. It
follows that the EUs increasingly lukewarm attitude towards Turkeys mem-
bership aspirations in recent years, with France and Germany expressing a
preference for a privileged partnership with Turkey, is in large part respon-
sible for Turkeys faltering commitment to democratic reforms. At the
same time, the regional security environment has deteriorated, especially
with the eruption of civil war in Syria in 2011. This unhappy combination
has swung the pendulum back towards a more nationalistic and zero-sum
approach towards the Kurdish question that contrasts sharply with the
more conciliatory and pluralistic approach that the AKP previously pursued.
Turkey has passed through various stages of securitization and de-securi-
tization concerning its approach to its Kurdish minority, and it is worthwhile
to briefly review these phases before addressing the current phase of re-secur-
itization. The phases can be roughly divided into three periods: (1) a securi-
tization phase between the founding of the republic and approximately the
late 1990s; (2) a de-securitization phase extending from approximately 2000
to 2009; (3) a re-securitization phase, which has unfolded over the last
several years.9
 TURKISH STUDIES 571

Securitization: 1923 late 1990s

For many decades, secular Kemalist state elites ruled out the possibility of
even granting modest concessions to Turkish Kurds demands for enhanced
status and mother tongue language rights. During the War of Independence,
the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, pro-
moted an inclusive notion of Turkish citizenship that emphasized the shared
identity of Turks and Kurds as fellow Sunni Muslims, and accorded explicit
recognition to the ethnic and cultural rights of the Kurds, as reflected in
the language of the Amasya Protocol of 1919.10 Kurdish tribal leaders
played a prominent role in the War of Independence against the foreign occu-
pation of Anatolia, as well as in the first national assembly formed in April
1920.11
Following the attainment of independence, however, Atatrk imposed a
narrower and ethnocratic conception of citizenship that privileged the
Turkish language and culture, and negated Kurdish identity.12 The drive to
create a unitary, culturally homogenous Turkish state virtually left little
room for the free expression of minority cultures and identities. The most
oppressive effects of Turkification were borne by Kurds, who fell victim to
exclusionary policies that prohibited the Kurdish language, militarized
Kurdish territories, outlawed Kurdish parties, and banned Kurdish cultural
activities.13 The racial overtones of Republican-era Turkish nationalism
were most evident in the propagation of an official historiography, under
the guidance of the Turkish Historical Society, which exaggerated the role
of the Turks in world history, casting them as the wellspring of all of the
worlds great civilizations, and as direct descendants of the Hittites and
Sumerians.14 At the same, Kurdish identity was devalued through other
founding myths, disseminated for nation-building purposes, which portrayed
the Kurds as extensions of various tribes with Turanian racial origins.15 The
state also resorted to small-scale population transfers in order to dilute large
concentrations of Kurds in restive areas, and pre-empt the eruption of further
nationalist uprisings such as the Sheikh Said (1925), Ar (Ararat) (193031)
and Dersim (193738) rebellions.16
At the same time, Kurdish national ferment was neutralized through the
deportation, arrest and execution of leaders of uprisings, the disbandment
of any traditional institutions that may have supplied the organizational back-
bone of a movement for Kurdish national rights, and the sharp reduction of
Kurdish representation in the national assembly.17 Complementing these
measures was a divide and rule policy whereby the Turkish state doled out
patronage to traditional sectors opposed to any radical social change par-
ticularly the Kurdish feudal large landowning class (aas) and tribal leaders
(eyhs) in exchange for their tacit cooperation in stanching any nationalist
fervor within their communities.18 Concomitantly, state elites sought to
572 M. WEISS

diminish the popular appeal of Kurdish rebellions by denying their national

authenticity and representative character, and by portraying them as being
animated solely by religious reaction.19
The states objections to legitimation of Kurdish identity claims centered
on the grounds that this would pose unacceptable risks to state security.
According to Kemalist orthodoxy, such concessions would inevitably whet
the Kurds ambitions, embolden them to demand territorial autonomy, and
in due course set the stage for the wholesale dismemberment of the Turkish
Republic. This Svres syndrome,20 in combination with the overarching per-
ception that the PKK guerilla organization was primarily a handmaiden of
meddlesome neighbors and great powers,21 as opposed to an authentic repre-
sentative of Turkeys Kurdish-speaking populace,22 had a chilling effect on
discourse. A healthy public debate concerning Kurdish rights was all but
impossible to air. As long as Kurdish activists harbored secessionist ambitions,
and threatened the ideal of a unitary Turkish state as the Kemalist elites
maintained coercion, rather than conciliation, was the only viable response
to Kurdish rights advocacy.

De-securitization: 20002009
Prior to the late 1990s/early 2000s, the only Turkish leader who challenged the
prevailing Kemalist approach of denial and assimilation was former president
and Prime Minister Turgut zal. zal openly acknowledged his partial
Kurdish roots and broke with Kemalist orthodoxy on the Kurdish question
by engaging the Kurdish leadership in northern Iraq in 1991 and laying the
groundwork for the eventual adoption of legislation that legalized the
public use of the Kurdish language and the dismantling of restrictions on
freedom of expression.23 He also arranged indirect meetings with PKK
leader calan.24 However, zals policies confronted the fierce resistance of
the powerful Kemalist military and bureaucratic establishment who reasserted
their political dominance following zals death in 1993 and dictated to weak
civilian leaders a hardline policy that combined strident denial of Kurdish
identity with the escalation of the war with the PKK.
Cracks in the long-standing official blanket denial of the very existence of a
separate Kurdish people surfaced with the acceptance of Turkey as an EU can-
didate country in 1999, thus inaugurating a de-securitization phase with
respect to the Kurdish question.25 The goal of winning a start date for EU acces-
sion negotiations, and specifically the need to fulfill the exacting Copenhagen
criteria, which requires inter alia, the protection of the cultural rights of min-
ority groups, served as a catalyst for the adoption of key legal and constitutional
reforms towards the Kurdish question. To signal its seriousness of purpose, in
October 2001, the Turkish parliament adopted a series of constitutional
amendments and in August 2002 and June 2003 the enabling legislation that
 TURKISH STUDIES 573

lifted the ban on Kurdish language broadcasting and education.26 Comple-

menting these steps was the October 2002 decision to abolish capital punish-
ment, thus enabling the commutation of calans death sentence to life
imprisonment.27 The coalition government then in power also oversaw a
phased ending of the emergency rule in the southeast and the adoption of a
policy to enable displaced Kurds to return to their homes and villages.28
The transformation in official Turkish attitudes underwent an even deeper
shift with the election of the moderate Islamist AKP, led by then-Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoan. Sharply departing from Kemalist orthodoxy, Erdoan
pushed five major EU harmonization packages through the Turkish Grand
National Assembly (Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisi, TBMM) with a direct
bearing on the Kurdish question in 2003 and 2004. The packages included land-
mark steps such as the drafting of enabling legislation to eliminate the practice of
torture, expand freedom of expression and association, restore Kurdish names
to Kurdish villages, and enable Kurdish language broadcasting by public and
private radio and television stations.29 The AKP also prepared a partial
amnesty law aimed at PKK militants and introduced the Return to Village
and Rehabilitation Project to provide a framework for the repatriation of
internally displaced Kurds to their original homes in the southeast.30
Reforms were expanded with the inauguration of the Democratic Opening in
2009.31 Among other initiatives, Turkey granted a license to a public satellite tel-
evision channel offering exclusive programming in the Kurdish language (TRT-
6), and relaxed long-standing restrictions on its use in election campaigns,
prisons, universities and mosque sermons.32 In a parallel move, in 2009, the gov-
ernment allowed Kurdish institutes and language departments to open in uni-
versities in various Kurdish-majority cities, and elective Kurdish courses in
private schools. However, Turkey stopped short of allowing public primary or
secondary education in Kurdish, let alone consenting to change the constitution
to upgrade the status of Kurdish to a second national official tongue.33
De-securtization was evident in the fact that the Turkish government now
drew a distinction between the PKK, which it deemed a terrorist group and
hence a security problem, while seeing the Kurdish rights question as a political
problem.34 Rather than viewing the mere expression of Kurdish grievances as
an existential threat, the AKP identified the basis of a solution in the formation
of a new social contract with peaceful representatives of the mainstream
Kurdish rights movement. The AKP even sought an accord with the PKK
itself between 2009 and 2011 in secret talks known as the Oslo Process.35

Resecuritization and the stalemated Peace process with the

Kurds: 2010-present
Over the last several years, the political will of the AKP to make the historic
compromises necessary to complete the solution process (zm sreci) has
574 M. WEISS

sharply declined. Many of the suspicious and chauvinistic attitudes towards

Kurds and other ethnic minorities that were supposedly eliminated with the
rise of a post-Kemalist elite to power are creeping back. The key catalysts
for the re-emergence of a securitization paradigm in Turkeys approach
towards the Kurds are: (1) the pronounced backsliding in Turkeys progress
towards democratization and the diminishing prospects of its admission
into the EU; (2) the intensifying electoral competition between AKP and
the Kurdish movement parties, coupled with the instrumentalization of the
Kurdish peace process to serve Erdoans quest to install an executive-style
presidency with vastly expanded powers and (3) the spillover effects of
Syrias civil war on Turkeys relations with its own Kurdish populace.36

The diminishing influence of the EU anchor

Turkey impressive headway towards democratization during the AKPs first
decade in power gave way to a more troubling dynamic in the last few
years, as Erdoan steadily concentrated power in his hands, while margin-
alizing voices of dissent, as witnessed in the governments repressive
responses to the Gezi Park (2013) and Soma coal mine disaster (2014) pro-
tests.37 To ensure a pliable media, Turkish authorities have routinely filed
lawsuits against critical columnists and media outlets on the frivolous
grounds of insulting the president.38 The principle of judicial indepen-
dence is also steadily eroding, as evidenced by Erdoans sacking of the pro-
secutors, judges and police officers conducting a probe into alleged
government corruption. Since his election as president in August 2014,
Erdoan has transformed the presidency from a largely ceremonial post
to one with expanded powers, and seeks to re-write the constitution to
codify these changes.39
The tepid attitude of some of the most powerful members of the EU,
especially France and Germany, towards Turkish membership may serve to
explain both Erdoans authoritarian impulses and his waning commitment
to usher in reforms that are widely noted as prerequisites for a solution
with the Kurds. These include full mother tongue language rights allowing
for the use of Kurdish in public education and services, political decentraliza-
tion, and a lowering of the restrictive ten percent electoral threshold for par-
liamentary representation that impose a special disadvantage on pro-Kurdish
parties. The AKP has renewed its reformist approach at various junctures,
such as the short-lived Democratic Opening of 2009 and the reform
package that it enacted in September 2013.40 However, moves to recognize
Kurds cultural rights and identity have been punctuated by repressive
measures that stand in stark contrast to the more flexible and pluralistic
approach the Erdoan government demonstrated in its first few years in
power.41
 TURKISH STUDIES 575

Previous literature has treated at length the connection between the EUs
slackening commitment to Turkish membership in the mid-2000s and the
diminishing political will of Turkish leaders to go the distance in reforms
concerning the Kurdish question.42 Therefore, this section will highlight
some additional manifestations of this relationship.43 The most conspicuous
manifestation of the dimming prospects for EU accession is the arbitrary
and indiscriminate application of a broadly written Anti-Terror Law that
fails to meaningfully distinguish peaceful political dissent from promotion
of separatism and violence.44 Part and parcel of a process of re-securitiza-
tion, Turkish authorities have invoked vague provisions of the Anti-
Terror Law and the Penal Code to stifle Kurdish activists freedom of
expression, and criminalize political speech and activities, such as partici-
pation in mass demonstrations, with no demonstrable violent intent. In
April 2009, at the same time that the Erdoan government launched the
Kurdish Opening, it authorized a broad crackdown against Kurdish acti-
vists, accusing them of links with the Kurdish movements umbrella organ-
ization, the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civakn Kurdistan,
KCK). Thousands of arrests were made, often on dubious charges of
spreading propaganda on behalf of a terrorist organization.45 With the
Kurdish population bearing the brunt of these draconian measures, this
trend represents a significant retreat from fundamental EU norms of pro-
tection and respect for the rights of cultural minorities.
Perhaps the most emblematic example of the EUs loss of leverage over
Turkeys policies towards the Kurds resulting from the floundering acces-
sion process is the shifting treatment of Leyla Zana. Zana, a renowned
Kurdish political activist and parliamentarian, was originally stripped of
her parliamentary immunity and sentenced to ten years in prison in
1994. In 2004, following the announcement of a date for the start of acces-
sion negotiations, when prospects of joining the EU seemed more promis-
ing than ever, Turkey responded positively in the favorable climate of the
time by releasing Zana, bringing it into compliance with a ruling by the
European Court of Human Rights. However, on June 24, 2012, at a time
when Turkeys EU bid was languishing, Zana was once again sentenced
to prison for spreading propaganda on behalf of the PKK for a series of
speeches she made.46 Similar punishments have been meted out to other
Kurdish activists and intellectuals committed to non-violence, such as
BDP parliamentarian Hatip Dicle, human rights advocate and publisher
Ragp Zarakolu, and Professor Bra Ersanl.
The re-conviction of Leyla Zana embodies a broader pattern whereby
advocates of Kurdish rights working exclusively within peaceful, civil
society channels have been routinely tarred with the same brush as PKK mili-
tants. This trend was most evident in the KCK arrests. Thousands of Kurdish
activists, including elected mayors of towns in the Kurdish southeast, BDP
576 M. WEISS

parliamentary deputies and party officials, students, journalists and civil

society activists were detained, though many have since been released
pending trial.47 The majority of those arrested were activists who agitated
for Kurdish rights and recognition through legal and political channels.48
In very few, if any, of these cases was there any credible evidence that the
detainees incited violence or participated in any activity falling within the
ambit of standard definitions of terrorism. According to PKK/KCK leader
Murat Karaylan, at least 85 percent of the detainees were not even
members of his organization.49 Just as problematic as the arbitrary nature
and broad scope of the arrests was the fact that almost of the arrested activists
were forced to endure extended periods of pre-trial detention.50
The heavy-handed and capricious manner in which Turkey has dealt with
peaceful Kurdish movement activists in the KCK operations has been deeply
counterproductive and self-defeating on many levels. The wave of arrests,
coupled with episodes of police abuse and the Uludere/Roboski incident of
December 2011, in which the Turkish Air Force bombed and killed 34
Kurdish smugglers near the Iranian border misidentified as PKK militants,
disempowered moderates and deepened the grievances of already disaffected
Kurdish youth, pushing some of them towards violence.51 Actions such as
these have precipitated a deep crisis of confidence towards the Turkish gov-
ernment and added yet another stumbling block to an already troubled
peace process.52
The lumping together of peaceful Kurdish rights advocates with those who
espouse separatism and violence has more in common with the Kemalist
legacy of denial and repression than the reformist path Erdoan initially
pursued. They also represent the fading influence of the EU anchor.
Respect for principles such as access to a fair trial, habeus corpus, due
process and freedom of expression and association, bedrock democratic
values that are enshrined in the Copenhagen Criteria and international
human rights treaties, has markedly declined.
Turkey has not been wholly impervious to EU criticism of its problematic
definition of terrorism. For instance, in one widely noted case, the Supreme
Court of Appeals (Yargtay), invoking the freedom of expression clauses in
the European Convention of Human Rights, struck down a ruling by the
Turkish Council of State (Dantay) that referring to PKK leader Abdullah
calan as Mr. and PKK insurgents as guerillas was tantamount to legitimiz-
ing terrorism, and ordered the release of two incarcerated BDP activists, Hatip
Dicle and Selim Sadak, on these grounds.53 However, this case was as an
exception to the rule. Despite the release of hundreds of activists detained
in the KCK cases in 2014, Turkish authorities reverted to an indiscriminate
approach to combatting terrorism in 2015, rounding up 847 Kurdish acti-
vists, many of them mayors and other Kurdish political figures with no appar-
ent connection to violence.54
 TURKISH STUDIES 577

Instrumentalization of the Kurdish Peace process for electoral

gain
The second major factor which accounts for the re-securitization of the
Kurdish question is the manipulation of the Kurdish peace process to
advance Erdoans ambitions to transform the office of the presidency
which he has occupied since 2014 from a largely figurehead role to a
French-style executive where the president exercises unquestioned primacy.
A recurring dynamic has been evident across numerous election cycles (par-
ticularly in 2007 and 2011) where the AKP abruptly retrenched from refor-
mist initiatives towards the Kurds in order to blunt a backlash from
nationalist voters and shore up its electoral support among this vital constitu-
ency.55 At other times, the AKP unveiled reform initiatives in the aftermath of
elections where its Kurdish rivals gained ground at its expense. This factor
partially explains the timing of the AKPs abortive 2009 Kurdish Opening,
designed in part to curry favor with Kurdish voters who had switched from
the AKP to the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum
Partisi, DTP) in the 2008 local elections, and pre-empt calans anticipated
release of a roadmap for a resolution to the Kurdish question.56
However, the factor that made the run-up to the 2015 election more con-
tentions than previously bitterly contested polls were the direct and personal
stakes that Erdoan attached to the outcome. At stake was not just AKPs
standing, but also Erdoans overarching ambition to obtain a supermajority
for the AKP that would give him a popular mandate and the seats in Parlia-
ment (60 percent, or 330 out of the 550 seats in the TBMM) to call a referen-
dum to amend the constitution to a dominant presidential system, a goal for
which he sought to enlist the support of the Kurdish national movement. The
AKP tied its willingness to advance the peace process to the PKK and HDPs
support for Erdoans favored executive presidency.57 In other words, pro-
gress in negotiations with the Kurdish movement was held hostage to Erdo-
ans parochial political ambitions.
The transformation of HDP into a catch-all protest party for Kurdish and
non-Kurdish voters alike who saw it as the best platform for reining in Erdo-
ans authoritarian tendencies, set the HDP and Erdoan on a collision course
in the wake of 7 June 2015 elections. The elections represented a watershed
moment in the history of the Turkish Republic as for the first time, a political
party drawn from the ranks of the Kurdish rights movement attracted a suffi-
cient percentage of votes (13 percent) to clear the restrictive ten percent
threshold and achieve representation in the Parliament. The HDPs impress-
ive electoral performance was due in large part to its concerted efforts to
rebrand itself as a mainstream liberal party and stitch together an umbrella
coalition of disparate forces extending well beyond its ethnic Kurdish base.
To this end, the party diversified its platform and successfully wooed
578 M. WEISS

constituencies marginalized by the AKPs increasingly conservative bent and

Erdoans authoritarian persona, including secular and liberal Turks, women,
environmentalists and gay rights activists.58 The HDP also managed to siphon
off some former Kurdish AKP supporters who had become disheartened by
Erdoans increasingly hostile attitude towards the Kurdish peace process.59
Arguably the most significant factor that transformed the HDP into the
leading thorn in Erdoans side was HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirta pro-
vocative campaign pitch urging the Turkish electorate to vote strategically.
Voters were encouraged to support HDP as a protest vote against Erdoans
pet project of installing a presidential system, and leave aside whatever reser-
vations they may have otherwise had about a movement steeped in Kurdish
identity claims.60 At the heart of this strategy was the HDPs framing of
itself as the only political force capable of and committed to thwarting Erdo-
ans presidential ambitions.61 The election results only deepened the polar-
ization between the two rival political forces as the HDP won enough seats
to rob the AKP of its ruling majority and dashed Erdoans dreams of an
executive-style presidency, turning the HDP into a lightning rod for the
AKPs post-election frustrations.62 In a Freudian slip that revealed the
degree to which Erdoan had instrumentalized the Kurdish peace process
to advance his own political agenda, Deputy Prime Minister Yaln
Akdoan characterized HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirta refusal to
support Erdoans presidential ambitions as a major provocation and the
move that started the real tension that culminated in the unraveling of the
peace process.63
According to both many Turkish Kurds and some non-Turkish critics of
Erdoan, from the moment the June 2015 election results were announced,
Erdoan sought to provoke a fight with the PKK that he could leverage for per-
sonal political gain.64 According to this alleged master plan, the renewal of
hostilities with the PKK was designed to embarrass the HDP, deflect public
attention from Erdoans shortcomings and authoritarian tendencies, and
shore up the support of nationalist voters. That would in turn enable the
AKP to coast to victory in snap elections and recoup its parliamentary majority,
push a weakened and discredited HDP below the threshold for parliamentary
representation, and leave Erdoan with a free hand to pursue his ambition of
rewriting the constitution to install a dominant presidential system.65
At the same time, Erdoan actively courted voters on the nationalist right
to broaden his base of support. From this vantage point, Erdoan apparently
concluded that distancing himself from the solution process and playing the
anti-PKK card was the best way to ingratiate himself with this segment of the
electorate. A quintessential representation of the sharp nationalist turn in
Erdoans approach towards the Kurds, arguably more pronounced than in
previous election cycles, was his recruitment of Yldrm Turul Trke
the son of the progenitor of Turkish ultra-nationalism, Alparslan Trke,
 TURKISH STUDIES 579

and deputy chair of the nationalist MHP to run in AKPs election slate, and
later to serve as Deputy Prime Minister.66 Indications are legion that domestic
political considerations have been paramount in Erdoans prosecution of the
military campaigns against both the PKK and ISIS.67 Inasmuch as Erdoan
has sacrificed historic reconciliation with the Kurds on the altar of his political
ambitions, Turkish-Kurdish relations are only bound to become more
polarized.

Spillover from the Syrian civil war

The development of a Kurdish pro-state in northern Syria, coupled with
Turkeys wariness of the PYDs ambitions, has also exerted a significant influ-
ence over the changing parameters of Turkeys relations with its Kurdish
populace. This was most evident in Turkeys belated and half-hearted
response to the events of Kobane, against which ISIS launched a devastating
assault in late 2014 that was eventually turned back by Kurdish forces on the
ground, backed by American airpower. The PYD is the Kurdish group that
rushed to fill the power vacuum left by the retreating Syrian army in the pre-
dominantly Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern Syria at the outset of the
uprising. It has set up three autonomous cantons in Jazira, Kobane and
Afrin (often collectively referred to as Rojava, or Western Kurdistan) that
Turkey fears might be a stepping stone towards full-fledged statehood.
These developments are a source of existential anxiety for Turkey for fear
that a successful Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria administered
by the PYD, an offshoot of the PKK, will rekindle secessionist ambitions
among its own Kurdish populace.68 Turkish anxieties are magnified by the
specter of a Kurdish mini-state in Syria drawing the KRG into its orbit,
which would leave Turkey encircled by a Greater Kurdistan.69
Turkey was thus loath to provide any form of military assistance to the
Kurdish defenders of Kobane, who were members of the Peoples Protection
Forces (Yekneyn Parastina Gel, YPG), the military wing of the PYD. Turkey
even denied permission to Turkish-Kurdish volunteers to cross over into Syria
in support of their ethnic kin in Kobane, and stationed tanks and soldiers on
its border crossings to prevent them from attempting to do so.70 As the crisis
wore on, Turkey relented to mounting international pressure to act by grant-
ing permission to 200 Kurdish peshmerga fighters attached to the KRG in
Northern Iraq with whom Turkey has amicable relations to cross over
into Syria to aid in Kobanes defense.71 Turkey adopted this decision as a
means of responding to pressures from the Obama Administration to adopt
a more active role in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS and rescue Kobane
from ISIS onslaught, without empowering PKK-affiliated groups.72
At times, Turkey has signaled its readiness to adopt a more pragmatic
policy line towards the PYD, as reflected in intermittent contacts between
580 M. WEISS

Ankara and Salih Muslim, the PYD chief.73 However, Turkey has set the bar
high for a supportive relationship, insisting that the PYD abandon its exper-
iment in self-rule (a non-starter), and focus its military resources on fighting
the Assad regime.74 Turkeys dominant approach has been to exert any lever-
age it has over co-opted Kurdish groups, especially Massoud Barzanis KDP
and its Kurdish offshoots in Syria, and elements of the non-Kurdish Syrian
opposition, to stifle the PYDs demands for autonomy and deny it a seat at
the table in determinations concerning Syrias future.75
The events in Syria and the PYDs rising fortunes there have caused
Erdoan to reassess Turkeys relationship with the Kurdish national move-
ment. Turkish authorities have re-securitized the Kurdish rights issue by
reverting to the old Kemalist pattern of interpreting the actions of the political
opposition or domestic minority groups through the prism of regional secur-
ity concerns. Fearing a demonstration effect, Turkish authorities have been
gripped by suspicions that long-standing demands by its own Kurdish popu-
lation for decentralization, legal and constitutional reforms, and enhanced lin-
guistic rights are a stalking horse for a separatist agenda.
These suspicions are reflected in Erdoans and other leading officials
increasingly abrasive and exclusionary discourse, which represents significant
backtracking from the vision of interethnic harmony he had earlier cham-
pioned. Erdoan has made brusque statements equating the PKK with
ISIS,76 and even stated: there is no Kurdish problem, only PKK terror. I
would have hanged calan.77 The truculent turn in Erdoans rhetoric has
been accompanied by sharp policy reversals on the solution process with
calan and the PKK. This trend first became evident in the run-up to the
June 2011 general elections, when Erdoan reportedly refused to endorse a
road map proposed by calan that the government negotiating team itself
found reasonable.78
Erdoans reluctance to make critical concessions has become more pro-
nounced in the last couple of years as he tacked sharply to the right and
sought to burnish his nationalist credentials in furtherance of his presidential
ambitions. This rigidity was reflected in Erdoans insistence on immediate,
unconditional PKK disarmament, without offering any initial confidence-
building measures, such as allowing Kurds who were forcibly displaced in
Turkish military operations to return to their native villages.79 At the same
time, he balked at following through on peace steps agreed to earlier with
the Kurdish movement party, Democratic Peoples Party (Halklarn Demok-
ratik Partisi, HDP) including a ten-point road map and the establishment of
a joint monitoring committee and South Africa-style Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission.80 Arguably the most conspicuous volte face by Erdoan
which dealt a serious blow to the peace process occurred in February
2015, when he opportunistically distanced himself from a framework peace
agreement concluded between Turkish government negotiators and an
 TURKISH STUDIES 581

HDP delegation at a meeting held in Istanbuls Dolmabahe Palace that he

had earlier blessed.81
The re-securitization of the Kurdish question cannot be adequately
explained without taking into account the events that transpired in northern
Syrian border town of Tal Abyad in June 2015. The capture of this key border
crossing from ISIS by a force dominated by YPG fighters was in many respects
for Turkey what Kobane was for Kurds. Just as the fallout from Turkeys lack
of enthusiasm for intervening in Kobane spilled over into the domestic peace
process and placed it in jeopardy, the events in Tal Abyad caused Turks to
harbor serious doubts regarding the commitment of the Kurds to peaceful
co-existence.
For Turkey, the outcome of the battle in Tal Abyad represented a virtual
nightmare scenario, offering the ultimate cautionary tale of what happens
when the West allows an affiliate of the PKK to flourish on Turkeys
borders. Not only did the PYD, backed by YPG fighters, manage to acquire
a key border crossing that could be used as a Kurdish corridor for the
cross-border movement of fighters and supplies. The YPGs successful con-
quest of ISIS-held territory also enabled it to fuse together the previously iso-
lated cantons of Kobane and Jazira,82 significantly enhancing the territorial
viability of a potential future Kurdish mini-state in northern Syria.
Ankaras apprehensions were amplified by reports that the advancing
Kurdish YPG forces were allegedly emptying villages inhabited by ethnic
Arabs and Turkmen in areas far removed from the front lines of the battle
against ISIS and forcing their residents to flee towards Turkey.83 This provoked
accusations of ethnic cleansing from the Turkish government, while the close
air support the YPG received from the US in the Tal Abyad campaign (and
earlier in Kobane) confirmed, in the minds of many Turks, that the US was
unconditionally supporting the PYDs maximalist aims.84 Ultimately, the
events in Tal Abyad raised the specter in the minds of many Turks of a
foreign-backed conspiracy to partition and dismember Turkey. This was
echoed in pronouncements issued by Turkish government officials, including
Erdoan himself, who bluntly accused the US-led coalition of launching air-
strikes against the Arabs and Turkmen of Tal Abyad and settling the PYD
and PKK terror organizations in their places.85 Erdoans angry missives res-
onate with large segments of the Turkish public, who harbor deep distrust of
American ambitions in the region and see the US as aiding and abetting the
PYDs perceived irredentist aspirations to carve out a separate Kurdish state
that will ultimately inspire Turkish Kurds to follow suit.
This line of thinking, which represents a revival of the Svres syndrome,
reduces disaffected ethnic minorities such as the Kurds to pawns of great
powers such as the US who are purportedly scheming to undermine
Turkeys territorial integrity and national unity. It also glosses over policy
nuances and differences of opinion towards the PYD within the US
582 M. WEISS

government,86 which suggest that the US is far more ambivalent about

Kurdish ambitions in Syria than Turkey alleges, and has not simply given a
green light to a proto-Kurdish state. The reversion to a siege mentality,
where Kurdish activism is invariably assumed to be the machination of
outside agitators as opposed to a homegrown phenomenon rooted in local
concerns, epitomizes the re-securitization of the Kurdish question.
Deepening polarization and re-securitization can be observed on the part
of Turkeys Kurdish population as well. In spite of the ultimately successful
defense of Kobane against ISIS massive assault, Turkish support came too
little and too late to avoid significant negative repercussions for Erdoans
standing among Turkeys Kurdish population. The perception had already
become entrenched among many Turkish Kurds that Erdoan was quietly
abetting ISIS attempted conquest of Kobane in order to crush the PYDs
embryonic experiment in autonomy and emasculate the PKK, a view
shared by some Turkey watchers.87 These suspicions were only reinforced
by allegations that in November 2012, Turkey enabled an Islamic extremist
Syrian rebel faction affiliated with al-Qaeda, Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra),
to infiltrate Syria from its safe haven in Turkey and attack the PYD.88 Sim-
mering resentment towards the Turkish governments perceived indifference
to the fate of Kobane boiled over in four days of clashes in October 2014
pitting protesters against police, and PKK supporters against rival street fight-
ers from the Kurdish Islamist Hda Par (Hr Dava Partisi) across Turkey,
which claimed 40 lives.89 Nothing underscored more the equation Turkish
Kurds have drawn between the fate of their brethren in neighboring countries
and prospects of Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation than the HDP leaderships
threat to the end the peace process if Kobane fell to ISIS.90
The fallout from the Kobane crisis spilled over into the June 2015 general
elections, with the recently formed Kurdish movement party, HDP, co-
chaired by Selahattin Demirta and Figen Yksekda, capturing over 13
percent of the vote and making deep inroads in the AKPs conservative
Kurdish base. The Kurds once supported Erdoan in droves as an agent of
transformation. However, Erdoans reversion to a security-minded approach
alienated this key electoral bloc, and the Kobane crisis may well have rep-
resented a tipping point.91 The HDPs confidence that it could turn
growing Kurdish disenchantment with Erdoan to its advantage was reflected
in its decision to run as a party rather than field independent candidates in the
June 2015 balloting.92
Since then, the re-securitization trends discussed in this article have only
intensified. The June 2015 election outcome appeared at first to hold the
promise of dramatically altering the political landscape in favor of a settle-
ment to the Kurdish question, with a pro-Kurdish party, the HDP, surpassing
the threshold and formally entering the Parliament for the first time in
history, coupled with the AKPs loss of its absolute majority in Parliament.
 TURKISH STUDIES 583

However, expectations that a chastened AKP would tone down its nationalist
posturing and re-engage with the newly empowered Kurdish rights move-
ment were dashed when interparty negotiations to form a governing coalition
came to naught, prompting Erdoan to call a snap election in November 2015,
in which the AKP regained its parliamentary majority.
The second development which crippled the Turkish-Kurdish peace
process was the resumption of daily air strikes by the Turkish military
against PKK guerilla sanctuaries in the Kandil Mountains of northern Iraq
in July 2015. The aerial Turkish bombardment followed a deadly PKK raid,
possibly the work of a splinter faction, which claimed the lives of two off-
duty Turkish police officers.93 Renewed Turkish-PKK hostilities have been
coupled with unrest in Kurdish-majority towns in southeastern Turkey,
especially Cizre, which has fallen under the virtual control of militant
Kurdish youth affiliated with the PKK (YDGH).
One of the main consequences of the developments of recent months is
that as a manifestation of re-securitization dynamics, Kobane, the ISIS
phenomenon, and the Kurdish rights issue in Turkey have become inextric-
ably intertwined in the minds of Kurds. This can be discerned in several
aspects of the current crisis. First, there was the polarizing effect of the
suicide bombing perpetrated against a Kurdish cultural center in the
Turkish border town of Suru on 20 July 2015, which claimed 33 lives, a
strike for which ISIS was blamed. This event accelerated the breakdown of
Turkish-Kurdish relations and triggered a violent Kurdish nationalist back-
lash, culminating in a sharp increase in PKK attacks.94
The harsh Kurdish reaction to the Suru suicide bombing can be attributed
in large measure to the fallout from Kobane.95 Harboring resentment towards
the Turkish government for its perceived indifference to the fate of Kobane
months earlier, many Turkish Kurds laid blame for the Suru attack as
much at Erdoans and the Turkish governments doorstep as they did at
ISIS door.96 The Suru attack cemented the perception of many Kurds that
the Turkish government was using ISIS as a cudgel to intimidate them and
tame their ambitions in Turkey and Syria.97 In short, perceptions that
Erdoan abandoned the Kurds of Kobane and tilted towards ISIS had a cor-
rosive effect that conditioned how the Kurdish populace framed the events in
Suru.
The framework and manner by which the Turkish military campaign
against ISIS has been conducted has further hardened and polarized
Kurdish attitudes towards Turkey. Following the Suru suicide bombing
and a lethal attack against Turkish army patrols along the Syrian border on
23 July 2015, for which ISIS was also held responsible, the Turkish govern-
ment adopted an active combat role against ISIS by staging retaliatory air-
strikes against ISIS positions in northern Syria and relenting to the Obama
Administrations demand for access to Turkish bases for coalition air
584 M. WEISS

operations. Every aspect of the campaign has only fueled Turkish Kurds sus-
picion that Turkeys belated participation in the anti-ISIS coalition was a ruse
aimed at gaining a free hand from its Western allies to emasculate the Kurdish
nationalist movement, under the guise of fighting terrorism.
First, the very fact that Turkey initiated massive airstrikes against PKK pos-
itions in Kandil concurrent with its decision to target ISIS eliminated any pol-
itical dividends that Erdoan may have reaped from Turkeys Kurds by going
after their arch-enemies and the perpetrators of the assaults on Kobane and
Suru. Second, the near-daily Turkish air raids against PKK sanctuaries in
Kandil, as contrasted with the more sporadic military operations against
ISIS, has only heightened suspicions among Turkeys Kurds that for
Ankara, defeating ISIS has taken a backseat to the goal of defanging the
PKK and its Syrian offshoots. Third, the recent nationwide anti-terror
sweep Turkish authorities carried out lent further credence to allegations
that Turkey is far more interested in confronting Kurdish nationalists than
ISIS. Of 1300 people Turkish authorities detained in the post-Suru crack-
down, 847 of those arrested were accused of ties to PKK, whereas only 137
were linked to ISIS.98 The indiscriminate nature of the arrests, which includes
mayors and other Kurdish political figures with no apparent connection to
acts of separatist violence a key indicator of the re-securitization dynamics
underway harks back to Kemalist policies in which the Turkish state routi-
nely conflated peaceful Kurdish rights activism with genuine threats to state
security.99
For each protagonist, heightened vulnerability and sensitivity to the plight
of their ethnic kin in Syria (which each blamed in whole or in part on the rival
ethnic group) exacerbated tensions and polarized relations at home. The
events in Kobane and Tal Abyad reawakened or at the very least crystallized
reciprocal feelings of mutual victimization, as a result of which the conflict
took on renewed existential overtones in the minds of Kurds and Turks
alike. Each sides prevailing interpretation of the events also made it virtually
impossible to compartmentalize the internal and external/regional dimen-
sions of the Kurdish question. Turks perceptions that the Kurdish movement
in Turkey seeks to emulate the goals and tactics of its ethnic kin in Syria has
prompted the realization that the Kurdish issue cannot be resolved within the
borders of Turkey alone; it has become part of a larger regional problem.100
This dynamic endangered the peace process since some degree of insulation
from regional developments was necessary for it to endure in a volatile and
rapidly changing regional environment.

Conclusion
This paper has employed the paradigm of securitization theory to account for
the vectors driving the sharp deterioration in relations between the Turkish
 TURKISH STUDIES 585

government and the Kurdish nationalist movement over the last couple of
years. This approach was used to elucidate the Turkish governments
retreat from a more inclusive, conciliatory and reformist approach towards
the Kurds in favor of a combative and hyper-nationalistic posture that culmi-
nated in the return to full-scale hostilities between the Turkish government
and the PKK in the summer of 2015. Turkeys receding EU accession pro-
spects and the Kurdish nationalist movements resistance to Erdoans over-
weening political ambitions to transform Turkey into a dominant presidential
system have contributed to these sharp policy reversals in Turkeys approach
towards the Kurds.
The paper also traced how the region-wide and still-unfolding repercus-
sions of the Syrian imbroglio have greatly amplified the trend towards re-
securitization. The events in Kobane and Tal Abyad have cemented the per-
ceptions of Turks and Kurds that the other party is taking or supporting
actions in Syria that are not only antithetical to its core national interests,
but also an existential threat to its security and well-being. The conflict has
increasingly acquired the characteristics of an ethnic security dilemma101
whereby Kurds and Turks see external developments in Syria in which each
sides interests are directly implicated as affecting their internal circumstances
and creating domestic threats that they regard as more threatening than the
external threat on its own. Mutual threat perceptions and fears of victimiza-
tion at the hands of the other (real or exaggerated) have driven increasingly
hostile and polarized discourses and conflictive interactions that only serve
to reinforce each others fears, and turn worst case expectations of full-
fledged conflict into a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Current trends suggest that the abovementioned securitization processes are
only bound to intensify for the foreseeable future. The expansion of the war
between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK into the cities of the
Kurdish southeast and the rise in casualties on both sides, coupled with the
PYD and YPGs moves to lay the groundwork for a proto-Kurdish state in
northern Syria, have fed into Erdoans growing tendency to deal with the
legal Kurdish opposition (HDP) in an manifestly heavy-handed and repressive
manner. The epitome of this pattern is the recent passage of a bill by the TBMM,
adopted at Erdoans behest and endorsed by the non-Kurdish opposition
parties, to strip deputies of their immunity from prosecution, so that they
can be tried for a host of politically motivated charges such as supporting ter-
rorism and disseminating propaganda on behalf of a terrorist organization.102
As the bill disproportionately targets pro-Kurdish legislators criminal
charges have been filed against all but 4 of the 59 members of the HDP par-
liamentary delegation103 it represents a significant escalation of the cam-
paign to criminalize and stigmatize dissent towards the governments
Kurdish policy and neuter the legal Kurdish opposition. The immunity-
lifting measure must also be viewed against the wider backdrop of Erdoans
586 M. WEISS

personal political ambitions. In many respects, it represents a continuation of

the strategy pursued by Erdoan between the June and November 2015 elec-
tions, whereby discord between Turks and Kurds was fomented and the war
against the PKK was escalated to strengthen Erdoans grip on power. Assum-
ing the pro-Kurdish MPs who lost their parliamentary immunity are con-
victed (as is widely expected), they will be required to resign their seats en
masse. This will in turn trigger new elections that the AKP is expected to dom-
inate. Under this scenario, Erdoan will advance substantially towards his goal
of monopolizing power, especially if the HDP falls below the ten percent
threshold, and the AKPs seat share rises to the number (330) required to
hold a popular referendum on changing the constitution to the executive pre-
sidential system Erdoan favors.104
As experts on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict have widely noted, successive
Turkish governments moves to suppress legal political outlets for the
expression of Kurdish grievances have invariably backfired,105 and theres
no reason to believe that the latest crackdown will fare any better. Far from
silencing the Kurdish opposition, repressive government measures to stifle
mainstream Kurdish politics have only driven Kurdish activists underground,
radicalized them (especially the youth), and boosted the appeal of the militant,
separatist strains of Kurdish nationalism represented by the PKK. The unfold-
ing dynamics of the conflict over the last few months are a good case in point.
The Turkish governments relentless demonization of the moderate HDP,
coupled with the escalation of the conflict and the pulling of both sides to
the extremes, have only served to marginalize the HDP, and forced it to
defend violent PKK actions that it would normally condemn for the sake of
salvaging its crumbling legitimacy.106 Instead of empowering moderate
Kurdish voices and isolating their radical counterparts, the governments
war on both camps has driven them into each others arms.
In future research, greater traction may be obtained on the anatomy of the
vicious cycle of hostility in which Turkey and the Kurdish national movement
are seemingly ensconced at the moment by shifting the analytical focus and
exploring the pathways by which the diverging identities of the two sides
have accelerated the breakdown of the peace process. This approach would
build upon the contributions of scholars such as Somer,107 who unpacks
the factors shaping the promotion of compatible vs. rival definitions of iden-
tity in Turkeys relations with Iraqi Kurds. Social constructivism,108 which
elucidates the dynamic process by which ideas and identities are reproduced
or altered through ongoing social interactions with other actors, could be par-
ticularly useful in further exploring the contribution of the events in Syria to
the increasingly combustible relations between the Turkish government and
the HDP and PKK. Such an approach would investigate how events in
Syria that each party considers traumatic and for which it holds the other
party responsible (e.g. the ISIS assault on Kobane, the PYDs capture of Tal
 TURKISH STUDIES 587

Abyad) became etched in its national memory and set the stage for growing
hostility between the two peoples.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes
1. International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 910.
2. Ibid, i.
3. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework; Williams, Words,
Images, Enemies.
4. Williams, Words, Images, Enemies.
5. Aras and Polat, From Conflict to Cooperation.
6. Ibid, 499.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid, 495515.
9. Demarcating the transition from de-securitization to re-securitization is at best
inexact, since between 2010 and 2015, sharp oscillations between reform-
oriented policies and repressive moves occurred in Turkeys approach
towards the Kurds. However, 2009/10 does represent a meaningful starting
point for tracing the emergence of re-securitization processes, since it coincides
with the breakdown of the short-lived Democratic Opening and the mass
arrests of Kurdish political activists in the KCK operations, both of which her-
alded the return to a heavy-handed approach on the part of the Turkish gov-
ernment towards the Kurds.
10. Yeen, Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question, 127.
11. Kirici, The Kurdish Question, 280.
12. Natali, Evolving National Identity, 75, 79.
13. Ibid, 812.
14. Inasmuch as it privileged Turkish culture, language and history at the expense
of minority identities, the Kemalist understanding of Turkish nationalism was
monocultural and ethnocratic in its essence. However, this author would
caution against drawing too close of a parallel between the racial overtones
of mainstream Turkish nationalism and the more virulent strains of racism
and fascism that swept up Europe in the 1930s. According to Yavuz (Five
Stages of the Construction, 9), race was never a constitutive element of Turk-
ishness and the 1924 Constitution defined a Turk in strictly civic terms. Turk-
ishness, he argues, did not assume a more racial or ethnic cast until the 1961
and 1982 constitutions were drafted.
Furthermore, as Balci (The Rise and Fall of Nine Lights Ideology, 153)
explains, except for a brief flirtation during the early years of World War II
when the threat from Nazi Germany peaked, the Turkish government
spurned the overtly racist, fascistic, expansionist pan-Turanist ideology of the
extreme nationalist right, represented by figures such as Alparslan Trke
and Nihal Atsz, the latter of whom believed that Turkish blood was a prerequi-
site for Turkishness. Balci (The Rise and Fall of Nine Lights Ideology, 147)
also argues that though a concerted effort was made by Republican elites and
588 M. WEISS

historians to classify Turks as Indo-European and Aryan in their racial

pedigree, this obsession was motivated by a defensive quest to overcome a
deep-seated inferiority complex, and bore little resemblance to the visceral,
ideologically charged racism that animated Nazi Germany and its fascist allies.
15. Natali, Evolving National Identity, 78.
16. Yavuz, Five Stages of the Construction, 8; Kirici, The Kurdish Question,
282.
17. Natali, Evolving National Identity, 79, 85.
18. Yavuz, Five Stages of the Construction, 34; Natali, Evolving National Iden-
tity, 87.
19. Yeen, Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question, 128.
20. Drawing upon traumatic memories of the abortive Treaty of Svres of 1920, in
which the victorious European powers of World War I unsuccessfully sought to
carve up the Turkish-speaking heartland of the defeated Ottoman Empire, the
Svres syndrome refers to the phobia of Kemalist elites that great powers
demands for Turkey to extend rights to minority groups are a pretext for
those states to renew their meddling in Turkeys internal affairs and lay
claim to its territories.
21. Kirici, The Kurdish Question, 290.
22. The PKK does not possess a monopoly of representation on Turkeys Kurdish
population. Conservative Kurdish voters tend to lean towards center-right
Turkish parties such as the AKP, while there are many independent Kurdish
factions that embrace Kurdish movement demands yet oppose the PKKs ideo-
logical rigidity and the cult of personality surrounding calan as obstacles to a
democratic solution to the Kurdish problem.
23. Kirici, The Kurdish Question, 287.
24. Pusane, Turkeys Kurdish Opening, 83.
25. Aras and Polat, From Conflict to Cooperation, 499. Abdullah calans capture
and arrest in February 1999 also served as a catalyst towards de-securitization, as
did the pledge he made during his trial to work for peace and reconciliation, and
the PKKs observance of a unilateral cease-fire between 1999 and 2004.
26. Kirici, The Kurdish Question, 279.
27. Ibid.
28. Pusane, Turkeys Kurdish Opening, 84.
29. Ibid, 85.
30. Ibid.
31. Pope, Turkey Needs to Change Course.
32. Tol, Kurdish Consensus at Home.
33. Ibid.
34. Ouzlu, Soft Power, 83.
35. Pope, Saving the PKK Peace Process.
36. An earlier draft of this paper examined the role of Turkeys military (TSK) in
the re-emergence of the securitization paradigm surrounding the Kurdish issue.
Whether the military has succeeded over the last couple of years in bending the
civilian authorities to its will and pushing Erdoan in a more truculent direc-
tion vis--vis the PKK and the solution process, as some sources maintain
(e.g. Karaveli, Kobani and the Future of Turkish Democracy; Tatekin,
Will Erdoans Backtracking Torpedo PKK Disarmament?), is debatable.
At the very least, a strong case can be made that the military has been exer-
cising greater influence over security and foreign policy decision-making in the
 TURKISH STUDIES 589

last couple of years, and has entered into a partnership of sorts with the civilian
authorities. A full analysis of the causes of this rapprochement is beyond the
scope of the paper, but two important factors can be adduced. First is the
schism between Erdoan and the movement of exiled cleric Fethullah Glen,
which shifted the power equation from one in which the AKP and the Glenists
collaborated to emasculate the military as a political actor (Kenar, Turkeys
Deep State Has a Secret Back Channel to Assad) to one where the Erdoan
and the military have made common cause against the Glenists. The judi-
ciarys overturning of many of the Ergenekon and Balyoz convictions last
year is a barometer of the new dynamic. A second factor working in favor of
harmonious civilian-military relations is that despite the frictions they
sparked, the probes themselves empowered the gradualist faction within the
TSK that favors cooperation with the AKP and opposes the guardianship
role traditionally exercised by the absolutist wing over the political process,
which has been used to justify repeated coups against Islamist-leaning govern-
ments (Aydnl, Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish Inner
State, 2345).
Overall, there is little evidence that we are witnessing a return to the old
pattern where the TSK acts as the final arbiter on military/security affairs,
and reduces the civilian leadership to a junior partner. In fact, the government
enacted a series of reforms in recent years that tied the militarys hands in the
fight against the Kurds by transferring responsibility for decisions concerning
the launching of domestic counter-terrorism operations from the military to
provincial and district governors (International Crisis Group, Turkey and the
PKK, 5; Yavuz and zcan, Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question,
79). Thus, if anything, the renewal of massive air and ground operations
against the PKK in 2015 indicates that the government, rather than taking its
cues from the TAF, disregarded its own restraints against moving up the
ladder of escalation too rapidly.
The unsuccessful coup attempt of 15 July 2016 has raised fresh questions
about the extent to which the Kemalist old guard within the military was
truly sidelined. It also remains to be seen whether the prevailing atmosphere
of suspicion, if not paranoia, following the coup and the governments extensive
purges of the officer corps will engender a long-lasting mutual crisis of confi-
dence in civilian-military relations and make it impossible to restore the coop-
erative equilibrium that seemed to have taken hold over the last couple of years.
37. Ouzlu, The Gezi Park Protests; Akkoyunlu, Opinion: Soma Disaster.
38. See, e.g. Yeginsu, Opposition Journalists Under Assault.
39. Arango, Turkish Leader, Using Conflicts.
40. The September 2013 democratization package legalized education in mother
tongue languages in private schools, gave state aid to political parties that
receive at least 3 percent of the national vote (of special benefit to pro-
Kurdish parties), lifted the ban on election propaganda in languages other
than Turkish, and allowed reinstatement of (mostly Kurdish) names for villages
and towns.
41. Efegil, Analysis of the AKP Governments Policy, 30. In 1991, Erdoan, as the
Refah Partys Istanbul Provincial Head, commissioned a report whose rec-
ommendations for a solution to the Kurdish problem were rather progressive.
Criticizing the prevailing policies of denial and assimilation, the report
endorsed core Kurdish demands such as the formation of local parliaments,
590 M. WEISS

decreasing the central governments powers and allowing the free use of the
mother tongue.
42. See especially Kirici, The Kurdish Issue in Turkey.
43. Kirici (The Kurdish Issue in Turkey, 335349) examines the mechanisms
which link the EUs ambivalence towards Turkish membership with the
slowing of the AKP governments reform drive vis--vis the Kurds. He
argues that intensive EU engagement with Turkey in the wake of the decision
to invite Turkey to be a candidate country for EU membership in 1999 tipped
the internal political balance in Turkey in favor of advocates of reform and
empowered moderate forces not aligned with the PKK on the Kurdish side
(Kirici, The Kurdish Issue in Turkey, 338, 345). Consequently, the constant
questioning of Turkeys membership on the grounds of identity (Kirici, The
Kurdish Issue in Turkey, 342) by key European states in the mid-2000s under-
mined the EUs capacity to induce a democratic transformation in Turkeys
approach towards the Kurdish question and strengthened forces resisting
reform and accommodation with the other ethnic group on both sides.
While this paper assumes that Turkeys putting the brakes on the reform
process and distancing itself from EU norms in respect to its treatment of
the Kurds can be primarily attributed to the EUs ambivalent attitude
towards Turkeys accession, rival interpretations should be entertained as
well. As an anonymous reviewer of this paper has suggested, some progressive
circles in Turkey and Europe have faulted the EU for not being critical enough
of the creeping authoritarianism in Erdoans policies. The recent migration
deal struck between the EU and Turkey has aroused anxieties that European
countries are prepared to soft pedal their criticisms of the Turkish govern-
ments human rights violations, overlook Turkeys poor compliance with the
Copenhagen criteria for accession, and fast-track Turkeys membership appli-
cation, in their zeal to offload their responsibility for the refugees to Turkey (see
Danforth, Erdoans Epic Europe Trolling).
However, concerns that the EU will simply disregard the Copenhagen prin-
ciples in favor of realpolitik on the issue of Turkeys EU accession are probably
overwrought. One important recent sign that the EU has not relented in its
insistence that Turkey fulfill the Copenhagen criteria is a progress report
issued by the European Parliament (EP) in April in which it denounced the
Turkish government for its serious backsliding, over the past two years, on
freedom of speech, expression and opinion and the increasingly authoritarian
tendencies of the leadership (andar, EU Report Ruffles Turkeys Feathers).
To sum up, if there was a period where the EU was too lenient on Turkey with
respect to its democratic deficits, the EP report confirms the impression that the
EU has now atoned for its mistakes and restored a conditionality-based
approach to Turkeys membership in the body.
44. Human Rights Watch, Protesting as a Terrorist Offense. The problem concerns
modifications to the Anti-Terror Law enacted in 2006 that broadened the
grounds for individuals to be charged with various terrorism-related offenses,
and which were applied prejudicially against Kurdish demonstrators to restrict
their civil liberties. Equally problematic are legal changes that enabled demon-
strators to be charged with acting in a PKK-inspired manner for innocuous
activities such as shouting slogans, making victory signs, holding up banners
and throwing stones.
 TURKISH STUDIES 591

45. Pope (Why Syrias Disaster Threatens a War in Turkey) argues that this move
may have been authorized by nationalist elements in the judiciary, as opposed
to Erdoan himself.
46. Gunter, The Kurdish Spring, 443.
47. International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 2.
48. andar, Dadan ini, 97. That the vast majority of the 3200 suspects detained
following the June 2011 general elections were registered members of the legal
pro-Kurdish BDP strengthens the impression that the KCK arrests were politi-
cally motivated.
49. International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 219, 22.
50. Gunter, The Kurdish Spring, 444.
51. International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 219, 256.
52. andar, Dadan ini, 85.
53. Radikal, Sayn calan ve gerilla demek.
54. Al Mukhtar and Wallace, Why Turkey Is Fighting.
55. Bengio, The Kurdish Spring in Turkey, 623; Pusane, Turkeys Kurdish
Opening, 8990.
56. Somer and Liaras, Turkeys New Kurdish Opening, 1556.
57. Akyol, Who Killed the Turkey-PKK Peace Process?; Zaman, A Bombing in
Ankara.
58. Guardian, Turkey Election 2015; Yildiz, Turkeys HDP Challenges
Erdoan. To a significant extent, the new constituencies that the HDP
courted overlapped with the groups who were in the forefront of the massive
anti-government Gezi Park demonstrations that took place in the summer of
2013. This also undeniably contributed to the cementing of the AKP and Erdo-
ans perceptions of the HDP as an archrival and the chief political force
obstructing the realization of the governing partys objectives.
59. Guiler, How the Kurds Upended Turkish Politics.
60. Ibid.
61. Demirta vowed before a meeting of the HDP parliamentary delegation: Dear
Recep Tayyip Erdoan, as long as HDP exists and members of HDP draw a
breath in these lands, you cannot be the chief. Dear Recep Tayyip Erdoan
we will not allow you to become the chief. See Cumhuriyet, Seni bakan
yaptrmayacaz.
62. Akyol, Who Killed the Turkey-PKK Peace Process?
63. Ibid.
64. Al Jazeera America, Amid Escalating Violence.
65. Grim, Obama to Turks; diz, Is Turkey Really Committed?
66. Yavuz and zcan, Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question, 83.
67. diz, Is Turkey Really Committed? According to an anonymous Western
diplomat,

Turkey has a right to respond to the PKK, but the way this is being done is
bound to generate doubts in the West as to what is really behind these
Turkish airstrikes and to raise concerns that the AKPs political agenda
may diminish its resolve against IS.
68. Tol, Syrias Kurdish Challenge.
69. Gunter, Unrecognized De Facto States, 174.
70. Tanchum, Turkey Moves.
71. Fahim and Shoumali, Turkey to Let Iraqi Kurds Cross.
592 M. WEISS

72. Turkey could not afford to defy the U.S. wishes altogether at a time when
Erdoan was rebuffing the Obama Administrations appeals that it allow its
air bases to be used for coalition airstrikes against ISIS, and ruling out partici-
pation in combat operations against the extremist group.
73. Pope, Turkeys Tangled Syria Policy.
74. Arango and Yeginsu, Turkey Seeks Buffer Zone. This is not to trivialize
Turkeys concerns about the PYDs ambitions. In July 2013, PYD leader
Salih Muslim reassured Ankara that the PYD does not aspire to self-rule and
that the institutions and social services it oversees in Syria are only stopgap
measures intended to ease the hardships of a war-ravaged civilian population.
The PYDs declaration of 12 November 2013, announcing the formation of a
constituent assembly as a prelude to the creation of a transitional government,
belies those assurances (Gunter, Unrecognized De Facto States, 1745).
75. Tol, Syrias Kurdish Challenge; Gunter, Unrecognized De Facto States, 174.
76. Aktar, Turkeys Clumsy Politics; Akyol, Turkeys New Kurdish Problem.
77. Tatekin, Will Erdoans Backtracking Torpedo PKK Disarmament?
78. International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 219, 4.
79. International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 5.
80. Tatekin, Will Erdoans Backtracking Torpedo PKK Disarmament?
81. Akyol, AKP Moderate Declared Traitor. Erdoan denounced the Dolma-
bahe Agreement after the fact, insisting he was never informed of the details
of the meeting and that any understandings the two parties reached were not
binding in any case. Former Deputy Prime Minister Blent Arn disputes
Erdoans account of the meeting.
82. Hubbard and Samaan, Kurds and Syrian Rebels.
83. While Yavuz and zcan (Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question, 80)
claim that Syrian Kurdish forces and the PKK ethnically cleansed the Arab and
Turkmen population when they took control of Tal Abyad, Hubbard (ISIS
Loses Control of Crucial Syrian Border Town) reported the day after the
YPG captured the city that no clear evidence of ethnic cleansing has come
to light. However, credible evidence that the YPG razed and emptied Arab
and Turkmen-inhabited villages in al-Hasakeh and al-Raqqa governorates in
subsequent months and barred the return of the displaced families suggests
that ethnic cleansing, albeit on a small scale, occurred elsewhere in northern
Syria (see, e.g. Amnesty International, Syria: U.S. Allys Razing of Villages
Amounts to War Crimes).
84. Yavuz and zcan, Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question, 81.
85. Voice of America, Turkey Warns U.S. Erdoan also expressed concerns for
the repercussions for Turkeys territorial integrity of the PYDs gains in Tal
Abyad, stating that [this] could lead to the creation of a structure [independent
state] that threatens our borders.
86. According to one source, the State Department is more deferential to Turkish
sensitivities and hence far more reticent about supporting the PYD/YPG on the
battlefield than the Pentagon. The article also points out that the U.S. has
denied a visa to PYD chief Salih Muslim solely in order to appease Ankara.
See Temel, ABD-PYD ilikileri.
87. For instance, Halil M. Karaveli opined that Turkey is ultimately using the no-
fly zone and talk of taking part in the coalition against ISIS as a cover for
seeking international legitimacy for what they actually want to do, which is
to crush the Kurds. See Arango, Turkish Leader, Using Conflicts.
 TURKISH STUDIES 593

88. Karaveli, Turkey: The Unhelpful Ally; Pope, Turkeys Tangled Syria Policy.
89. Mackey, Clashes Across Turkey.
90. International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 35, 39.
91. Tol, Turkeys Pro-Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party.
92. The significance of this move is that Turkey has a 10 percent electoral threshold
for parties to enter the Turkish Parliament, and thus Demirta felt confident
enough of his ability to siphon off Kurdish votes from the AKP that he
decided to take the chance to run as a party and risk not clearing the threshold.
93. Marcus, Turkeys Kurdish Guerillas.
94. Akyol, Who Killed the Turkey-PKK Peace Process?
95. The purpose of the gathering of Kurdish activists that was targeted in Suru,
namely to organize an initiative for the reconstruction of Kobane, only heigh-
tened Kurdish suspicions that Turkey was at best, turning a blind eye to ISIS
activities, and at worst, orchestrating the extremist groups attacks against
them.
96. andar, Is Ankara Headed Toward All-Out War?; Yeginsu, Strikes on Kurd
Militias.
97. The twin bombings of a peace rally in Ankara on 10 October 2015, also attrib-
uted to ISIS, intensified Kurds perceptions of Erdoan as the hidden hand
behind the Islamic States carnage, with Selahattin Demirta lashing out at
the AKP government for its alleged turning of a blind eye to ISIS infiltration
of Turkish soil and failure to properly investigate the Suru attacks, stating:
You [the AKP] are not killers, you are serial killers. See Zaman, A
Bombing in Ankara.
98. Al Mukhtar and Wallace, Why Turkey Is Fighting.
99. Nazish, Back to Square One. Erdoans appeal to the Turkish Parliament to
strip MPs with links to terrorist groups of their immunity from prosecution,
widely interpreted as targeting senior HDP leaders, is part and parcel of this
same re-securitization trend.
100. Yavuz and zcan, Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question, 80.
101. Posen, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.
102. Mortimer, How Erdoans Personal Ambitions; Weise, In Erdoans
Turkey.
103. Mortimer, How Erdoans Personal Ambitions.
104. Ibid.
105. See, e.g. Marcus, Blood and Belief; andar, Dadan ini.
106. Worth, Behind the Barricades.
107. Somer, Failures of the Discourse of Ethnicity, 109128.
108. Wendt, Social Theory.

Notes on contributor
Matthew Weiss is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Affairs and
Security Studies at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, who teaches classes
for both the undergraduate minor and the Masters of Arts program in Global Security
Studies. He was previously a post-doctoral research fellow at the Middle East Institute
of the National University of Singapore and a visiting lecturer for the Political Science
Department of the University of California Davis, where he obtained his PhD in 2011.
His article titled, A Perfect Storm: Water Scarcity, Institutional Breakdown and
Violent Conflict in Yemen, was published in the March 2015 edition of Water
594 M. WEISS

International, and he has several other articles under review at journals. His current
research interests center on the politics of international river basins, Turkish-Kurdish
relations, Turkish foreign policy, Middle East politics and non-traditional security
issues.

References
Akkoyunlu, Karabekir. Opinion: Soma Disaster Threatens Turkeys Fragile Social
Contract. CNN, May 16, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/16/opinion/turkey-
social contract/.
Aktar, Cengiz. Turkeys Clumsy Politics and the Kurdish Question. Al Jazeera,
September 29, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/turkey-
clumsy-politics-kurdish-q-20149297242780917.html.
Akyol, Mustafa. AKP Moderate Declared Traitor. Al Monitor, February 2, 2016.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/turkey-moderate-akp-pillar-
declared-traitor.html.
Akyol, Mustafa. Turkeys New Kurdish Problem. New York Times, October 23,
2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/opinion/mustafa-akyol-turkeys-new-
kurdish-problem.html.
Akyol, Mustafa. Who Killed the Turkey-PKK Peace Process? Al Monitor, August 4,
2015. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-syria-iraq-pkk-
peace-process-who-killed-kurds.html.
Al Jazeera America. Amid Escalating Violence, PKK Attacks Kill Two Soldiers in
Eastern Turkey. August 2, 2015. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/8/2/
kurdish-pkk-attacks-kill-two-soldiers-in-eastern-turkey.html.
Al Mukhtar, Sarah, and Tim Wallace. Why Turkey Is Fighting the Kurds Who Are
Fighting ISIS. New York Times, August 12, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/08/12/world/middleeast/turkey-kurds-isis.html.
Amnesty International. Syria: U.S. Allys Razing of Villages Amounts to War
Crimes. October 13, 2015. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/
syria-us-allys-razing-of-villages-amounts-to-war-crimes/.
Arango, Tim. Turkish Leader, Using Conflicts, Cements Power. New York Times,
October 31, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/world/europe/Erdoan-uses-
conflict-to-consolidatepower.html?emc=edit_th_20141101&nl=todaysheadlines
&nlid=41699871&_r=1.
Arango, Tim, and Ceylan Yeginsu. Turkey Seeks Buffer Zone on the Border with
Syria. New York Times, October 10, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/
world/middleeast/turkish-support-of-coalition-fighting-isis-centers-on-border-
buffer-zone-.html.
Aras, Blent, and Rabia Karakaya Polat. From Conflict to Cooperation:
Desecuritization of Turkeys Relations with Syria and Iran. Security Dialogue 39,
no. 5 (2008): 495515.
Aydnl, Ersel. Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish Inner State.
Turkish Studies 12, no. 2 (2011): 227239.
Balci, Tamer. The Rise and Fall of Nine Lights Ideology. Politics, Religion and
Ideology 12, no. 2 (2011): 145160.
Bengio, Ofra. The Kurdish Spring in Turkey and its Impact on Turkish Foreign
Relations in the Middle East. Turkish Studies 12, no. 4 (2011): 619632.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for
Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
 TURKISH STUDIES 595

andar, Cengiz. TESEV. Dadan ini PKK nasl silah brakr? Krt sorununun sid-
detten arndrlmas [Coming Down from the Mountain: How to Get the PKK to
Abandon Violence? Purging the Kurdish Issue of its Violent Dimension], 2011.
http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/dagdan_inis.pdf.
andar, Cengiz. EU Report Ruffles Turkeys Feathers. Al Monitor, April 15, 2016.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/turkey-european-union-
progress-report.html.
andar, Cengiz. Is Ankara Headed Toward All-Out War with Turkeys Kurds? Al
Monitor, August 7, 2015. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/
turkey-united-states-kurds-pkk-peace-process.html.
Cumhuriyet. Seni bakan yaptrmayacaz [We Will Not Allow You to Become the
Chief]. March 17, 2015. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/231943/_
Seni_baskan_yaptirmayacagz_.html.
Danforth, Nick. Erdoans Epic Europe Trolling. Foreign Policy, March 23, 2015.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/23/Erdoans-epic-europe-trolling-eu-migrant-
refugee-deal/.
Efegil, Ertan. Analysis of the AKP Governments Policy Toward the Kurdish Issue.
Turkish Studies 12, no. 1 (2011): 2740.
Fahim, Kareem, and Karam Shoumali. Turkey to Let Iraqi Kurds Cross to Syria to
Fight ISIS. New York Times, October 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/21/world/middleeast/Kobane-turkey-kurdish-fighters-syria.html.
Grim, Ryan. Obama to Turks: Dont Use the War on ISIS to Bomb the Kurds.
Huffington Post, August 6, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-
Erdoan-isis-kurds_55c38f07e4b0923c12bbdb7f.
Guardian. Turkey Election 2015: Kurdish Obama Is the Countrys Bright New Star.
June 7, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/08/turkey-election-
2015-kurdish-obama-is-the-countrys-bright-new-star.
Guiler, Kimberly. How the Kurds Upended Turkish Politics. Washington Post, June
8, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2015/06/08/
how-the-kurds-upended-turkish-politics/.
Gunter, Michael. The Kurdish Spring. Third World Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2013): 441
457.
Gunter, Michael. Unrecognized De Facto States in World Politics: The Kurds.
Brown Journal of World Affairs 20, no. 2 (2014): 161178.
Hubbard, Ben. ISIS Loses Control of Crucial Syrian Border Town. New York Times,
June 17, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/isis-loses-
control-of-crucial-syrian-border-town.html.
Hubbard, Ben, and Maher Samaan. Kurds and Syrian Rebels Storm ISIS-Held Border
Town. New York Times, June 15, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/
middleeast/kurds-and-syrian-rebels-push-to-evict-isis-from-border-town.html?_r=2.
Human Rights Watch. Protesting as a Terrorist Offense: The Arbitrary Use of
Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey.
November 1, 2010. https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/01/protesting-terrorist-
offense/arbitrary-use-terrorism-laws-prosecute-and.
diz, Semih. Is Turkey Really Committed to Fighting IS? Al Monitor, July 28, 2015.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkey-syria-pkk-kurds-
dilute-efforts-against-isis.html.
International Crisis Group. Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement. ICG Europe
Report No. 219. September 11, 2012. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/
europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement.aspx.
596 M. WEISS

International Crisis Group. Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process. ICG Europe
Report No. 234. November 6, 2014. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/
europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/234-turkeyand-the-pkk-saving-the-peace-process.pdf.
Karaveli, Halil. Kobani and the Future of Turkish Democracy: Why the Military May
Get the Upper Hand. Foreign Affairs, October 8, 2014.
Karaveli, Halil. Turkey: The Unhelpful Ally. New York Times, February 27, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/opinion/turkey-the-unhelpful-ally.html.
Kenar, Ceren. Turkeys Deep State Has a Secret Back Channel to Assad. Foreign
Policy, July 12, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/turkeys-deep-state-
has-a-secret-backchannel-to-assad/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email
&utm_campaign=New%20Campaig-&utm_term=%2AEditors%20Picks.
Kirici, Kemal. The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: Limits of European Union Reform.
South European Society and Politics 16, no. 2 (2011): 335349.
Kirici, Kemal. The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy. In The Future of
Turkish Foreign Policy, edited by Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, 277314.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004.
Mackey, Robert. Clashes Across Turkey as Kurds Demand Relief of Syrian Kin
Besieged by ISIS. New York Times, October 8, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/10/08/world/europe/clashes-across-turkey-as-kurds-demand-relief-of-syrian
-kin-besieged-by-isis.html.
Marcus, Aliza. Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence.
New York: New York University Press, 2007.
Marcus, Aliza. Turkeys Kurdish Guerillas Are Ready for War. Foreign Policy,
August 31, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/31/turkeys-kurdish-guerillas-
are-ready-for-war/.
Mortimer, Jasper. How Erdoans Personal Ambitions Impact War in Turkeys
Southeast. Al Monitor, June 24, 2016. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2016/06/turkey-syria-kurdish-problem-pkk-peace-erdogan.html.
Natali, Denise. The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey
and Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005.
Nazish, Kiran. Turkey and PKK Back to Square One. What Is Behind Ankaras
Major Turnabout on the PKK? Al Jazeera, July 30, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2015/07/turkey-pkk-square-150730074312972.html.
Ouzlu, Tark. The Gezi Park Protests and its Impact on Turkeys Soft Power
Abroad. Middle East Analysis/Ortadou Analiz 5, no. 55 (2013): 1015.
Ouzlu, Tark. Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy. Australian Journal of
International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 8197.
Pope, Hugh. Turkey Needs to Change Course over Own Insurgency. CNN,
November 9, 2012. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/09/turkey-
needs-to-change-course-over-own-insurgency/.
Pope, Hugh. Turkeys Tangled Syria Policy. Combating Terrorism Center, August
27, 2013. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/turkeys-tangled-syria-policy.
Pope, Hugh. Why Syrias Disaster Threatens a War in Turkey. The Guardian,
October 10, 2014a. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/
turkey/op-ed/pope-why-syrias-disaster-threatens-a-war-in-turkey.aspx.
Pope, Hugh. Turkey, Syria and Saving the PKK Peace Process. The International
Crisis Group, December 10, 2014b. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/
europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/op-ed/pope-turkey-syria-and-saving-the-pkk-peace-
process.aspx.
 TURKISH STUDIES 597

Posen, Barry R. The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival: Global Politics
and Strategy 35, no. 1 (1993): 2747.
Pusane, zlem. Turkeys Kurdish Opening: Long Awaited Achievements and Failed
Expectations. Turkish Studies 15, no. 1 (2014): 8199.
Radikal. Sayn calan ve gerilla demek artk su deil [To say Mr. calan and
guerilla Is no Longer a Criminal Offense], 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/
turkiye/sayin-calan-ve-gerilla-demek-artik-suc-degil-1088622/.
Somer, Murat. Failures of the Discourse of Ethnicity: Turkey, Kurds, and the
Emerging Iraq. Security Dialogue 36, no. 1 (2005): 109128.
Somer, Murat, and Evangelos Liaras. Turkeys New Kurdish Opening: Religious
versus Secular Values. Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (2010): 152165.
Tanchum, Michael. Turkey Moves Toward a Grand Bargain with Kurdistan. The
Turkey Analyst, October 22, 2014. http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/
turkey-analyst-articles/item/353-turkey-moves-toward-for-a-grand-bargain-
withkurdistan.html.
Tatekin, Fehim. Will Erdoans Backtracking Torpedo PKK Disarmament? Al
Monitor, May 6, 2015. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/
turkey-kurds-pkk-no-farewell-to-arms.html.
Temel, Emre. ABD-PYD ilikileri ve krmz izgiler [US-PYD relations and red
lines]. BBC Trke, June 27, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/06/
150627_abd_pyd.
Tol, Gnl. Kurdish Consensus at Home Can Serve Turkey Abroad. Middle East
Institute, February 9, 2012a. http://www.mei.edu/content/kurdish-consensus-
home-can-serve-ankara-abroad.
Tol, Gnl. Syrias Kurdish Challenge to Turkey. Middle East Institute, August 29,
2012b. http://www.mei.edu/content/syrias-kurdish-challenge-turkey.
Tol, Gnl. Turkeys Pro-Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party: Gaining Ground but
Facing Challenges. Middle East Institute, May 11, 2015. http://www.mei.edu/
content/article/turkey%E2%80%99s-pro-kurdish-people%E2%80%99s-
democratic-party-gaining-ground-facing-challenges.
Voice of America. Turkey Warns U.S. About Kurdish Advances in Syria. 2015.
http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-warns-us-about-kurdish-advances-in-
syria/2832298.html.
Weise, Zia. In Erdoans Turkey, Everyone Is a Terrorist. Foreign Policy, March 24,
2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/24/in-erdogans-turkey-everyone-is-a-
terrorist-kurds-pkk-terrorism/.
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
Williams, Michael C. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International
Politics. International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 511531.
Worth, Robert. Behind the Barricades of Turkeys Hidden War. New York Times
Magazine, May 24, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/magazine/behind-
the-barricades-of-turkeys-hidden-war.html.
Yavuz, M. Hakan. Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in
Turkey. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 3 (2001): 124.
Yavuz, M. Hakan, and Nihat Ali zcan. Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish
Question. Middle East Policy 22, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 7387.
Yeen, Mesut. Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question. Ethnic and Racial
Studies 30, no. 1 (2007): 119151.
598 M. WEISS

Yeginsu, Ceylan. Strikes on Kurd Militias Elevate Tensions in Turkey. New York
Times, July 26, 2015a. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/europe/
heightened-tensions-in-turkey-after-strikes-on-kurdish-militants-in-iraq.html.
Yeginsu, Ceylan. Opposition Journalists under Assault in Turkey. New York Times,
September 17, 2015b. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/europe/
opposition-journalists-in-turkey-increasingly-face-violent-attacks.html.
Yildiz, Guney. Turkeys HDP Challenges Erdoan and Goes Mainstream. BBC
News, June 8, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33045124.
Zaman, Amberin. A Bombing in Ankara and Erdoans Political War for Total
Power. Foreign Policy, October 15, 2015.