Jun 27 at 12:06am

Labour and Immigration

Richard Seymour

I. Labour's policy on immigration is as yet unclear.

Corbyn has said that, though Labour is not

'wedded' to 'free movement', he refuses to set
reducing immigration as a goal, or set any targets.

The Labour manifesto committed Labour to a "fair"

system of managing immigration, without it being
clear what that meant. There were some inclusive,
humane signals such as a promise to review
Britain's diabolical asylum system, and end income
thresholds for residency. But what does 'fairness'
look like when it comes to migrant labour? Is it
even possible?

A Labour policy paper leaked during the general

election indicated that the party would favour
adapting the current five-tiered visa system,
"including the currently unused tier applicable to
those seeking low-skilled, unskilled or seasonal
work".

This would imply that, rather than using the

Schengenian 'free movement' system, Labour
would operate a US-style 'green card' system. In
such a system, those migrating at the bottom tier
might have a shorter visa stay than those higher
up. This might potentially change the composition
of labour migration indeed, Nigel Farage might
get exactly what he claimed to want, with more
migrants coming from other parts of the world like
India. But it need not necessarily reduce the total
number of migrants, since Labour has made it clear
that reducing net totals is not a priority. What it
would do, unarguably, is significantly expand
border controls.

II. Schengenian 'free movement' is a liberal

institution that is also racist in principle. Free
movement, so far as it goes, is desirable, and
something is lost by ending even this limited form.
The answer to Schengen racism is not Little Britain
racism. However, it is analytical dereliction not to
grapple with what 'free movement' actually means.

The Schengen Agreement is one of the laws of the

European Union, originally developed in 1985.
Incorporated into the EU legal structure with the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, this law allows for
the free movement of people within the Union.

It is one of the famous "four freedoms" in the

Union, the others being freedoms for capital. Free
movement of people was a logical extension of the
plans to create a single market: in effect, to treat
the members of the Union as parts of one
interlocked capitalist economy.

But freedom within meant raising walls and razor-

wire to the outside. Coterminously, therefore, there
was a tightening of border controls around Europe,
and new systems such as FRONTEX were created
to help prevent what it called, and continues to
call, illegal migration.

The majority of 'illegal' migrants arrive with

passport and visa by plane, and work in the jobs
they were hired to work in. But that is not what the
labelling was getting at. If states, is it were, 'state',
one of the ways they do so is by creating social
classifications and giving them normative and
juridical force. Any naming in this sense is
performative. To call a particular group of
immigrants illegal if you are a state is, in a way, to
make them so. Certainly, insofar as the states of
the European Union preemptively deemed the vast
majority of asylum seekers to be 'illegal', it treated
them as such, and developed expanding systems of
surveillance and monitoring to arrange speedy
deporttations.

The Dublin Agreement, struck in 2004, stated that

refugees had to place their asylum claim in the
first country they arrived at. In practice, since
refugees travel overland or by sea, often the first
country they arrive at will be Greece or Italy, so
that countries of north-western Europe like
Germany arent bothered. Their fingerprints are
taken where they land, and fed into a database so
that they can be tracked.

Since 2009, the unelected executive of the EU, the

European Commission, has been developing new
protocols under the rubric of the European Pact on
Immigration and Asylum, tightening up frontier
controls and mandating deportation of all illegals
in all member states. These changes were
informed by the increasingly securitarian and
Islamophobic drift of many member states,
especially France which then held the EU
presidency, in the aftermath of the war on terror.

And, of course, the system is currently supported

not only by FRONTEX raids on refugee boats,
resulting in a spike in mediterranean drownings,
but also by the biggest of all illegal pushbacks,
consecrated in the deal between Merkel and
Erdogan.

If you take the approach of Domenico Losurdo,

there is nothing particularly paradoxical in a
fundamentally liberal institution, free movement,
having this fundamentally racist obverse.
Liberalism has always been distinguished by its
logic of exclusions; there is always someone for
whom the universal doesn't apply.

III. There has, since the 1990s, been a significant

increase in labour migration in the United
Kingdom, the great majority of it coming from
within the European Union. The percentage of
foreign-born workers in the UK increased from 3
million (7.2% of the total labour force) in 1993 to 7
million (16.7%) in 2015.
About a third of these live and work in London, on
the pattern of 'global cities'. The low-paid among
them, the majority, have become a racialised
'reserve army of labour' in the classic marxian
pattern. This has been accompanied, not by the
thinning out of the middle expected by 'global
cities' literature, but by professionalisation of
occupations in the London labour market, with a
growing number of managers and professionals.
Nonetheless, there was some occupational
polarisation with an absolute increase in top jobs,
and a complementary absolute increase in the
number of low-wage jobs at the bottom.

Why has this happened? There is a marxist political

economy, rooted in the study of migrant economies
in apartheid South Africa, which can explain some
of it. In particular, the costs of reproducing migrant
labour in a 'free movement' zone are much lower
than the costs of reproducing domestic labour. The
price of labour is suppressed by a number of
factors, including the fact that for short-term
migrants, the inputs are determined in part by
prices in Warsaw or Bucharest so, if you have a
family to send money back to, a little extra money
made in London counts for a lot more back home.
There are also the collective conditions of housing
and transport for many workers, which reduces
costs even more.

But, of course, 'the economy' is never free-

standing, never exists apart from its political and
legal constitution. The impact of welfare policies,
labour market laws, and 'managed migration'
collectively help constitute hierarchies in work.
Successive British governments since the
Thatcher-era have made a competitive advantage
out of low wage labour, relying on supply-side
improvements to reduce the 'natural' level of
unemployment. They have rolled back state
protections and wage bargaining, imposed
competition in local services, and relied on
markets to discipline the bottom end of the labour
market and impose flexibility. Changes to the
welfare system, hailed as 'workfare', have been
designed to promote this flexibility and low-wage
culture. This means that where labour markets are
tight, and shortages need to be filled, it is less
likely that they will be filled by raising wages: that
is not what is meant by 'making work pay'.

It is within this broadly neoliberal growth formula

that it makes sense for employers to turn to low-
wage, insecure migrant labour. The Work
Foundation, a think-tank initially set up under Will
Hutton's leadership, elucidates some of the
assumptions behind this. In short, it argues that
given the government's macroeconomic
commitments, the choice was between turning to
migrant labour, or using high interest rates to
deflate wage pressures arising from tighter labour
markets at the bottom.
In other words, this racialised form of labour
market segregation is not just a product of
economic processes, but is a result of a whole
orientation of statecraft what David Harvey
somewhere called a "spatio-temporal fix" for
capitalist dysfunction.

IV. Does this mean, then, that UK-born workers are

in some sense being undercut by migrant workers?
Not so fast.

First of all, remember that many of the new low-

wage jobs which have been created simply couldn't
be filled by workers born and permanently residing
in the UK, given the costs of reproducing their
labour. The jobs market is not, in that sense, a zero-
sum game. Migration allowed for a significant
expansion in total employment, some of which
otherwise would not have happened.

Second, insofar as there is increased competition

in the labour market, there is very little evidence
for any generalised wage-depressant effect.
Research suggests that there is no net negative
impact from migration on wages. Many studies, for
example by the centre-left IPPR think-tank, suggest
a moderate net increase in wages, as does a
similar study by the Centre for Research and
Analysis of Migration (CRAM) at UCL.

Third, there is, however, plenty of evidence that

migrant labour itself is exploited by this system,
and that insofar as there are wage-depressant
effects at the bottom, migrant workers are the
ones to suffer. This is indicated by LSE research,
which finds that "the only sizeable effect of
increased immigration is on the wages of those
immigrants who are already here."

The CRAM analysis suggests that in fact the

moderate overall growth of wages is concentrated
at the top of the wage structure, and that one
possible explanation for this is that as migrant
workers are being paid less than the market value
of their labour in the UK, there is an additional
surplus that is redistributed up the chain.

On top of this, some of the redistribution is worked

out through the social wage. The net fiscal impact
of immigration was estimated by the Migration
Observatory at Oxford to be small but positive. And
the OBR estimates that higher rates of migration,
by increasing the working age population relative
to the dependent population, reduces the pressure
on government borrowing. This doesn't mean
migration in certain areas didn't increase the load
on local services; it just means that there was no
reason why the government couldn't have more
than covered any additional outlay necessary.

In the last analysis, in marxist terms, all state

expenditures are a deduction from profits. Even if
they're funded by consumption taxes, that merely
tends to push up the price of labour. Of course,
things in the real world are never as pure as in the
last analysis, since raising consumption taxes can
be one moment in a wider process of ruling class
struggle intended to cut working-class
consumption overall. That is, after all, what
austerity is all about. And it is quite possible that
concretely, in the actual rhythm of political
struggle, an increase in revenues to the Treasury
would have helped offset the pressure to cut
expenditures. But, from the point of view of this
last analysis, we would have to say that the net
contribution of migrant labour to British coffers is
a net saving to profits.

However, all of these effects are minor relative to

the total labour market and to total state
expenditures. What I am describing is a situation in
which a combination of 'workfare', 'flexibility',
privatisation, competition, 'free movement' in some
areas, and 'managed migration' in others,
increased the rate of exploitation of migrant
workers to the benefit of the capitalist class. But it
is also a truism that labour market segregation
harms the bargaining power of those supposedly in
the 'privileged' position in it.

V. All of these claims and measurements are, of

course, relative to a set of prevailing
macroeconomic assumptions. If you make a
different set of assumptions about how economies
work, then different conclusions are entailed.
What I mean is this. The debate about migrant
labour is structured around the red herring of
whether 'free movement' undercuts UK-born
workers in terms of employment and wages. Even if
there were significant evidence of it doing so, it
would be a red herring, since the grammar of the
question is wrong. There is no abstract 'free
movement', only the freedom of movement within a
given economic and policy context. You can have
free movement on a neoliberal and racist-
exclusionary basis which, indeed, is part of a
system which does disadvantage UK-born workers
as well as migrant workers or you can have free
movement on a socialist, or at least social-
democratic, basis.

For example, suppose a Labour government were to

reverse decades of neoliberal orthodoxy. Suppose
that, in place of counter-inflation it privileged full
employment and high wages as its main economic
policy priority. Suppose its goal was to create
competitive advantages through state investment,
rather than eke out competitive advantages from
low-wage labour. Suppose it rolled back anti-union
legislation, so that the long decline of union
representation was reversed. Suppose it
reorganised the welfare state, abolishing workfare
and sanctions and all the forms of coercion
designed to make people more available for low-
wage work. Suppose it rolled back privatisation
and competition measures, and introduced
collective bargaining where possible.
Setting aside the difficulties in actually achieving
this against entrenched opposition from the
business class, such an approach would have to
imply an attack on labour market segregation. If
anyone is tempted to say this means ending free
movement, let me say they've missed the point
entirely. Creating new legal restrictions on migrant
labour simply increases its precarity and
vulnerability.

By expanding the remit of the border men, and

intensifying surveillance, one wouldn't even
necessarily reduce the total amount of migration
and Labour has said this isn't a priority but it
would help drive migrant workers further into the
shadows where they are more susceptible to
violence and hyper-exploitation. They would end up
with less pay, with more immiserated existence,
living in even worse death-trap accommodation. It
would create more "illegal" migrants, and thus
more misery. That doesn't suppress wage-
competition. It might give it a new, more
segregated structure, with a sharpened, racialised
set of advantages and disadvantages but that
would in aggregate intensify labour market
competition and strengthen the bargaining position
of employers, particularly the cut-throat poverty
employers.

Rather, for a leftist growth model to work, one

would need to give up completely on the idea of
squeezing a competitive advantage out of a
bargain basement economy. One would need, if
anything, a far more egalitarian labour market
policy. One would need to proactively suppress
labour market segregation on all axes. One would
need various measures to ban exploitation along
gender and racial axes. One would need all
workers, regardless of origin, to have equal pay for
the same work, equal access to the state, equal
protection under law, equal access to housing and
welfare, equal access to union representation, and
so on.

Breaking with neoliberalism means breaking, not

with free movement as a goal and principle, but
with a racially segregated labour system. This isn't
uncomplicated. Suppressing competition through
state intervention reduces the 'pull' factors for
migrants. From a certain point of view, it reduces
their opportunities. But it does so, precisely by
levelling up, by attacking labour market
segregation as a principle.

VI. It would be completely unrealistic to expect

Labour to embrace an open borders policy. The
balance of forces in Labour, let alone the wider
country, simply wouldn't let that happen. I'm not
even sure who would be able to organise around
such a demand, or what the political effects of
doing so would be. "Momentum for Open Borders"?
I can't see it.
However, that doesn't mean progress cannot be
made, and reaction resisted. To an extent, it
already has been. In the New Labour era, we had
what proved to be a toxic combination; a 'free
movement' system organised along segregated
patterns supported by labour market and workfare
policy; and a set of political triangulations in which
every other week a minister would expound on the
need to control immigration and enforce
integration, especially of those troublesome
Muslims. Taken alongside the breakdown of large,
unionised workforces as Labour allowed
manufacturing to go bust, and the concomitant
growth of racial segregation among UK-born
workers in the labour market, this contributed to
gains made by the far right.

The last general election abruptly changed the

dynamic. Labour didn't win, but it surged to a
degree without precedent post-1945. And it did so,
despite (or because of) the fact that Corbyn was
widely depicted as someone who wanted an
immigration free-for-all. Despite (or because of) the
fact that he was attacked day in and day out as an
alibi of foreign terrorists. Despite (or because of)
the fact that he systematically repudiated the very
right-wing arguments on immigration to which all
previous Labour leaderships have grovellingly
deferred. Despite (or because of) the fact that he
refused to set a target for reducing immigration
levels.
Yes, Labour's official position was ambiguous, and
yes that may have softened the attitude of some of
the 'red' Ukippers, and defused some of the
attacks. But in retrospect, and in future, I don't
think it can be taken for granted that a broadly pro-
immigrant stance is an electoral liability. I think,
with the electorate changing, it is possible over the
medium term to a) win the argument for
maintaining such free movement as we currently
have, b) win the argument for de-stigmatising
refugees, abolishing the detention centres and
ending the appalling conditions in Calais; and c)
addressing the decades-long, systematic, racist
exclusions aimed at citizens of what used to be
called the 'New Commonwealth'.

At the very least, the election showed that

provided it has a radical agenda that excites its
supporters, Labour doesn't have to be scared of the
Crosby smear-and-dog-whistle machine, of tabloid
poison, or even of Ukip. The Left can be confident,
rather than cowed, in its arguments. It doesn't
have to accept either a defensive posture of
uncritically crawling to the EU and its version of
free movement, or an even more defensive posture
of demanding an end to free movement.