Policy Paper

Reforming Composition of the

Electoral Administration:
Political vs. Professional Appointments

Elene Nizharadze
July, 2017
Executive Summary
Elections and referendums in Georgia are ad-
This paper discusses problems in the composi- ministered by the electoral administration. By
tion of the electoral administration, an agency virtue of the Election Code of Georgia, the elec-
that plays a leading role in the conduct of fair, toral administration is an administrative agency
transparent and democratic elections, which is independent from other public agencies.2 The
crucial for Georgias further development and high degree of independence delegated by the
Euro-Atlantic integration. A high level of public legislation is warranted by the important function
trust in the electoral administration is therefore that the electoral administration is entrusted with.
important, and any suspicions about lack of im-
partiality and objectivity of the electoral admin- To effectively perform its functions, the electoral
istration casts doubt on the conduct of fair elec- administration should be staffed with qualified,
tions, engendering public distrust in the agency independent and impartial members. This is a
as well as in elections. precondition for professional and impartial dis-
charge of powers by the electoral administration.
In addition to discussing problems in the com- According to the Code of Good Practice in Elec-
position of the electoral administration, this pa- toral Matters by the Venice Commission, inde-
per puts forward possible solutions by looking at pendent, impartial electoral commissions must
three composition models: appointment of pro- be set up from the national level to polling sta-
fessional members across the entire electoral ad- tion level to ensure that elections are properly
ministration, appointment of members by political conducted.3 Only transparency, impartiality and
parties across the entire electoral administration, independence from politically motivated manip-
and the existing mixed model of appointments. ulation will ensure proper administration of the
election process, from the pre-election period to
After careful analysis of advantages and dis- the end of the tabulaiton of results.4 The above
advantages of all three models, it was discov- statements attest that independence and impar-
ered that appointment of professional members tiality is an international standard that any elec-
across the entire electoral administration is the toral administration should meet.
best solution to the existing problems and the
most effective way to increase public trust in the The electoral administration in Georgia is made
electoral administration. up of the Central Election Commission (CEC),
district electoral commissions (DECs) and pre-
The present document proposes recommenda- cinct electoral commissions (PECs).5 Each com-
tions for successful implementation of the most mission that operates at national, district or pre-
suitable composition model. cinct level has 13 members, including 6 members
appointed as a result of a competition (profes-
Introduction sional appointments) and 7 members appointed
by political unions that receive funds from the
Source of the state authority in Georgia is the State Budget according to the Organic Law of
people. They exercise their power through ref- Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens (political
erendum, other forms of direct democracy and appointments).
6

elected representatives.1 The conduct of fair and

impartial elections and referendum is a corner- Political component in composition of the elec-
stone of any democratic states existence, in- toral administration has called its independence
cluding Georgia. and impartiality into question on numerous oc-

1 Constitution of Georgia, Art.5

2 Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia, Art.7
3 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, October 2002, para. 71
4 Ibid
5 And the Supreme Election Council (SEC) in Ajara A/R
6 Election Code of Georgia, Articles 10, 12, 13, 20, 24

1
casions over the past few years. Lack of pro- Commission (CEC). The provision of the Elec-
fessionalism of electoral commission members is tion Code that sets the requirement of a two-year
often the result of political appointments, which permanent residency for the said candidates
clearly has a negative impact on activities of the was interpreted by the CEC in favor of the ruling
electoral administration and the level of trust in party, putting the opposition party at a disadvan-
the agency. tage.7 Such decisions prevent consistent applica-
tion of the electoral legislation and establishment
Non-governmental organizations and political of good practice; more importantly, they cast a
parties have long been advocating for reforming shadow of doubt on political neutrality of com-
the composition of the electoral administration. mission members and their decisions.
An Inter-Factional Task Force on elections was
set up in the Parliament of Georgia in Febru- The above example is not an exception; rather,
ary 2013, and was put in charge of developing similar allegedly politically motivated decisions
amendments to the Election Code in a number of have been made other times for instance,
different areas and implementing a comprehen- during the parliamentary elections in 2012,
sive electoral reform. One of the Task Forces the CEC decision about the coalition Georgian
areas of focus was composition of the electoral Dreams number on ballot paper and prohibition
administration but it dissolved without discussing of photographing and video recording at polling
the issue. It was expected that a new inter-fac- stations on the Election Day was thought to be
tional group, established on December 26, 2013, biased.8
would address the problems in the composition
but it never did. Problems in composition of the electoral admin-
istration became clearly evident following the
This document summarizes problems in the ex- parliamentary elections of Georgia in 2012. As
isting composition model and analyzes possible noted earlier, by virtue of the Election Code sev-
solutions. More importantly, it puts forward rec- en members of the electoral administration are
ommendations about the most effective solution. appointed by political unions. After winning the
parliamentary elections, the coalition Georgian
Problem Description Dream secured the right to appoint six out of the
seven members. The only opposition party that
Decisions made by the electoral administration had the right to appoint a member of the elector-
of Georgia are frequently criticized as unfair or al administration was the United National Move-
inconsistent, which often leads to a confrontation ment. This proves that existing regulations may
between political unions, causes concern among put opposition parties at a disadvantage in com-
civil society organizations and more importantly, parison with the ruling party/parties. Opposition
discourages public trust in the electoral adminis- parties have fewer opportunities for influencing
tration. decisions made by the electoral administration,
which discourages political trust in the electoral
This is largely due to the rules that regulate com- administration.
position of the electoral administration these
rules allow appointment of members by politi- Based on the past election experience, anoth-
cal unions. The latest example of inconsistent er problem is political parties attempting to have
decisions occurred during the local self-govern- their supporters or proxies in previous elections
ment elections in 2014 and involved registration appointed as professional members. In addition,
of electoral subjects (contestants) Gamgebeli many of the DEC members selected following
and Mayoral candidates by the Central Election a competition in February 2016, had a partisan

7 Final Report of Monitoring the Local Self-Government Elections in 2014, International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, p.16. The report is available at http://
www.isfed.ge/main/777/eng/
8 Final Report of Monitoring the October 1, 2012 Parliamentary Elections, International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, p.18. The report is available at: http://
www.isfed.ge/main/330/eng/

2
past in particular, 67 out of 182 selected candi- objectivity of the electoral administration.
dates had served as electoral commission mem-
bers on a partys behalf.9 Possible Solutions
(Options)
Civil society organizations also found that some-
times parties and/or their representatives in elec- Problems in composition of the electoral ad-
toral commissions attempted to pressure other ministration are apparent and call for adequate
members into voting for candidates favored by solution. We will now examine three possible
the party.10 Selection of members of the Ajara solutions (options) and look at their advantages
Supreme Election Commission (SEC) in 2015 and disadvantages. These options are: 1) ap-
was also politically biased.11 By virtue of Ajaras pointment of professional members across the
election legislation, a candidate for chairmanship entire electoral administration; 2) appointment
or membership of the SEC may not be affiliat- of members by political parties across the entire
ed with any political party. This is not a mere electoral administration, and 3) maintaining the
formality but a requirement of political neutrality status quo.
of candidates. Nevertheless, 19 out of 24 regis-
tered candidates had been previously appoint- Option I - appointment of professional mem-
ed as commission members by political parties. bers across the entire electoral administra-
Three of the candidates eventually selected for tion
the SEC membership were politically affiliated.
Such poor practice naturally leads to public sus- This option has long been viewed as one of the
picions about lack of the electoral administra- key solutions to the problem and an effective
tions impartiality. way to ensure high public trust in the electoral
administration. Such comprehensive reform will
Following elections civil society organizations rule out any politically motivated decisions and
and other stakeholders often highlight lack of dispel any suspicions about lack of impartiality of
qualification of commission members as a ma- the electoral administration members. However,
jor problem, largely due to appointment of mem- some will argue that professional members can
bers by political parties. An election commission also be politically biased. This argument is not
member may not be withdrawn by a political entirely meritless considering that professional
party within 15 days before polling day12, which members can also engage in official misconduct;
allows replacement of as many members as po- however, this is less likely to happen. The pres-
litical parties wish to within the prescribed time- ent option may not absolutely eliminate all risks
frame. Frequent turnover of members makes it but it will certainly establish more effective reg-
difficult to ensure that all electoral commission ulations for ensuring impartiality and objective-
members are adequately trained and prepared, ness of the electoral administration.
which possibly leads to various irregularities on
the Election Day. Professional appointments across the entire
electoral administration will not preclude political
The above problems that constantly reappear parties from monitoring the polling day proce-
during elections illustrate the need to revise dures and taking adequate actions in response
rules that regulate composition of the electoral to violations because they will still have repre-
administration. Not every problem that has been sentatives in electoral commissions, as guaran-
revealed is a formal violation of the legislation teed by the existing legislation.
but the above trends undermine impartiality and

9 Detailed information about the competition is available in Report of Monitoring a Competition for Selection of DEC members, http://www.isfed.ge/main/1034/eng/. The
incident is also provided in GYLAs Assessment of Selection of DEC Members, Georgian Young Lawyers Association, https://gyla.ge/en/post/saia-saolqo-saarchevno-
komisiebis-shesarchev-konkurss-afasebs
10 Fifth Interim Report of Pre-Election Monitoring for the October 27, 2013 Presidential Elections, International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, http://www.isfed.
ge/main/472/eng/
11 Statement of ISFED about Results of Competition held by the Supreme Election Commission of Ajara, http://www.isfed.ge/main/929/eng/
12 Election Code of Georgia, Art.29

3
To ensure meaningful independence of electoral long-term perspective this model will be accept-
commission members, individuals with partisan able to all parties, because the right to appoint
past - party members or candidates within the last commission members is not guaranteed and it
2-3 years should be excluded from the selection depends on the number of votes garnered by a
process. Selection of individuals that were pre- party during elections. Having a neutral electoral
viously appointed as members of electoral com- administration free from any political influences
missions (national, district or polling station level) is in everyones best interests, while bringing
by political parties can also be limited. Using the stakeholders together to create a special format,
database available in the electoral administra- working to come to an agreement, and devel-
tion, it is relatively easy to verify in the electoral oping and adopting subsequent new regulations
administration if a candidate fulfills the last two may be less appealing to the government.
requirements; however, verifying a candidates
party membership is more challenging because Realization of the present option requires some
there is no unified register of party members time, because details of the model need to be
while requesting information from parties is cost- worked out among stakeholders and new reg-
ly and time consuming. Therefore, candidates ulations need to be developed and adopted.
themselves should be obligated to declare their This shouldnt be difficult if there is political will.
party affiliation, like it is required today. Providing The process will possibly take from four to five
false information should be ground for suspen- months.
sion and imposition of administrative penalty.
Option II - appointment of members by po-
Some may argue that it will be difficult to attract litical parties across the entire electoral ad-
applicants/candidates for professional appoint- ministration
ments unlike for political ones. This argument is
meritless, as evidenced by the latest competition Staffing the electoral administration fully with
for selection of DEC members where number of members appointed by political parties can be
applicants for 193 vacant positions was 771.13 viewed as another solution. This will increase
the number of political parties authorized to ap-
This option also envisions reducing number of point members and improve party representation
members e.g. from 13 to 7, especially the CEC in the electoral administration. This model will
and DEC members because 13 members are require new criteria for determining which par-
more than enough for national and district lev- ties have the right to appoint members. Option
el commissions and reducing their number will II is convenient because it will most likely enjoy
eliminate unnecessary state expenditures. For support from all political parties. It will also be
instance, by reducing the number of CEC mem- easy to make corresponding changes in a rela-
bers the state will be able to save GEL 455,44614 tively short period of time. Similar to the Option
a year, which can be used for more meaningful I, the process will possibly take from four to five
purposes by the electoral administration. This months.
will also help select more qualified candidates.
Main disadvantage of the model is its ineffective-
In terms of political support, this option will be ness to solidify and encourage public trust in the
more appealing for opposition parties with few- electoral administration. In fact, it may harm im-
er opportunities to appoint commission members age of the administration and lead public to be-
or influence decisions of electoral commissions lieve that the agency is guided by political inter-
in a meaningful way even when they appoint ests and considerations. In addition, domination
members. It is also safe to assume that from a of the electoral administration by any one party

13 In December 2015, the CEC announced a competition for selection of DEC members because the five-year term of office had expired for 193 members. Applications
for 193 vacant positions were submitted by 771 candidates
14 Based on the information provided by the CEC about its salary expenditures in 2015. For more information, please refer to the Report of Monitoring Central Election
Commission Salary Expenditures in 2011-2015, International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, http://www.isfed.ge/main/1046/eng/

4
will still be possible in theory and will put other
parties at a disadvantage. This will naturally pro-
duce feelings of injustice and suspicions about
lack of objectivity of decisions that were made to
advance someones political interests.
Option III maintaining the status quo
Third option is to maintain existing rules that reg-
ulate composition of the electoral administration;
however, it is less likely that maintaining the sta-
tus quo will help remedy the problems. Similar
to Option II, this option allows domination of an
electoral commission by one political union by
appointing majority of members envisaged for
party quota (7 members). Option III is also in-
effective in addressing suspicions about lack of
impartiality of decisions made by the adminis-
tration or about lack of political neutrality of its
members. Members appointed by parties may
still pursue political interests. This will lead public
to question objectivity of the administration and
criticize its decisions, and will eventually discour-
age trust in the electoral administration.
This option is advantageous because it will prob-
ably be easier to make a political decision to
maintain the existing composition model rather
than to implement a substantial reform. Maintain-
ing the status quo does not require discussions
with stakeholders, working to come to an agree-
ment, and developing and adopting any new reg-
ulations.
Recommendations
Having examined all three options, it is safe to
conclude that the best solution that will encour-
age trust in the electoral administration and will
help establish its reputation as a stable, inde-
pendent agency is appointment of professional
members across the entire electoral administra-
tion. Below are recommendations for successful
implementation of the reform:
5
Creating a special task force whose mem-
bership includes representatives from the govern-
ment, civil society organizations and opposition
political parties (parliamentary, non-parliamenta-
ry). The task force will debate and develop new
legal regulations;
Determining who will be in charge of staff-
ing the electoral administration e.g. CEC mem-
bers shall be appointed only by the parliament
or other branches of the government should also
participate in the process of appointment. Work-
ing out details of selection and evaluation of can-
didates for the CEC membership is important.
The same is true for lower (district and precinct)
level electoral commissions;
High quorum for selection of CEC mem-
bers by the parliament should be established.
This will ensure participation of opposition politi-
cal forces in the decision-making process;
Individuals with partisan past - party
members or candidates within the last 2-3 years
should be excluded from the selection process;
Public information campaign will be an ef-
fective way to support the reform, promote trust
in the electoral administration and attract more
qualified and interested candidates. The public
information campaign can be financially support-
ed by donors;
For more effectiveness and to avoid chal-
lenges as much as possible, changes can be im-
plemented gradually, step by step. For instance,
the reform can begin by appointing professional
members across the national, district or precinct
level electoral commissions. It is not important
which level is reformed first.
Conclusion

In a country like Georgia, where electoral pro-

cesses take place in a polarized environment,
amid confrontations between political actors and
exchange of accusations, high level of unwaver-
ing public trust in the electoral administration is
vitally important. This can be achieved by impar-
tiality of the electoral administration, which is one
of the preconditions for ensuring that there are
no suspicions about effectiveness of the elector-
al administration or doubts about fair and demo-
cratic conduct of the elections. This is especially
important for a developing country like Georgia.

Purpose of this paper was to analyze and under-

stand problems in the composition of the elec-
toral administration, which call independence
and impartiality of the agency into question, Af-
ter careful consideration of different options, it
is safe to conclude that the best way to reme-
dy the existing problems is appointment of pro-
fessional members across the entire electoral
administration. It is an effective way to achieve
political neutrality of the electoral administration
and ensure that its members are more qualified
and experienced. This will eventually lead to an
increased level of public trust in the electoral ad-
ministration, which will directly translate into im-
proved public confidence in elections.

In light of the foregoing, reforming composition

of the electoral administration in conformity with
Option III will be a step forward for further devel-
opment of the electoral administration. It does
not require making of any additional public ex-
penditures and in presence of political will suc-
cessful implementation of the model should not
be a challenge.