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GABRIEL DUERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BERNARDO ERADEL

373 SCRA 11

January 4, 2002

FACTS:

Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bernardo Eradel entered and occupied petitioners land
located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of
P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the
land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private
respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.

On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages
and Attorneys Fees against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Meanwhile,
petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement. Inter alia, the agreement stated that the Ruenas
recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel
was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint. Petitioner
presented his evidence ex parte and judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to
peacefully vacate and turn over the lot to petitioner.

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a
tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in
the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land court denied the motion for new trial.

Private respondent filed before the RTC a petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion
for New Trial. The trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for
Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value
of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted. Private respondent filed his petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that respondent is not estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

(2) Whether or not the private respondent was not thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court
even after it successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom.

HELD:
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(1) The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

The petitioner through counsel submitted to the SC pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his
petition, to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to
Annex E 9 of his petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao,
specifically containing the notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." But it appears that Annex E of his
petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a
notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked this Court to refer to Annex F, 10
where he said the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at
the time the complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and
within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, the SC found that these annexes are both merely xerox copies.
They are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.

In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds.
Recall that it was petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties before the said court,
believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 7691 17 amending BP 129 had
become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC by to the MTC pursuant to said amendment.

(2) No, the private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even
cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the
court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that
the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated
in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the
question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell us that as a
general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as
a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious
and exceptional circumstances.

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Donato vs CA

GR No. 129638

December 8, 2003

Facts:

Antonio Donato is the registered owner of a real property located in Manila.Donato filed a complaint before MeTC
for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and all unknown occupants of the subject property.
Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month but were
impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying
rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter
constrained him to file the ejectment case against them. Only 20 private respondents filed a consolidated answer wherein
they denied the non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law
guarantees security of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the
purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to continue
payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the
rental while they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase. Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure,
the MeTC rendered judgment against the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate the premises occupied
by each of them, and to pay jointly and severally rents, interest, attorneys fee and cost of suit As to the 20 private
respondents, the MeTC issued a separate judgment sustaining their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring
petitioners cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case
without prejudice. Donato appealed to the RTC. RTC sustained the MeTC judgment. Donato filed a petition for review with
CA which dismissed the petition on 2 grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners
counsel and not by petitioner himself; and, (b) the only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision
but copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition are
not annexed. Donato filed a motion for reconsideration and Supplement. CA denied Donatos motion for reconsideration
and Supplement, ruling that petitioners subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition based on hyper-technical grounds

Held:

Yes. Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.

Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities." When technicality deserts its function of being an aid to
justice, the Court is justified in exempting from its operations a particular case. Technical rules of procedure should be
used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting
substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.

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The Courts pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals is worth echoing: cases should be determined on the merits,
after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. Thus, what should guide judicial action
is that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to
lose life, honor or property on mere technicalities.This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has satisfactorily
explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for reconsideration, as in this case.

Gonzaga vs. Court of Appeals

394 SCRA 472
27 December 2002

FACTS:

In 1970, Sps. Rene and Lerio Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from Lucky Homes, Inc., located in Iloilo. Said land was
specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) issued to them. The same was
mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their housing loan.

Sps. Gonzaga then began constructing their house, not on Lot No. 19, but on the adjacent land to it, denominated as Lot
No. 18, because Lucky Homes, Inc. mistakenly identified said lot as Lot No. 19.

Upon realizing this mistake, Lucky Homes, Inc. informed Sps. Gonzaga about the error. The latter offered to buy Lot No. 18
since the construction already began and so as to widen their premises. The spouses carried on with the construction of
their house.

Later on, Sps. Gonzaga defaulted on their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed and their TCT
was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS.

After the foreclosure of Lot No. 19, Sps. Gonzaga offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from Lucky Homes,
Inc. that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering
that their house was built therein. However, Luck Homes, Inc. refused. This prompted Sps. Gonzaga to file an action for
reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City on 13 June 1996.

On 15 January 1998, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

On 22 June 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC.

On 17 September 1998, Sps. Gonzaga filed an urgent motion to recall said writ, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
try the case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to P.D. 957.

On 30 June 1999, Sps. Gonzaga filed petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case.

On 29 December 1999, the CA denied the petition, relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in
the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.

ISSUE:

Can Sps. Gonzaga still challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC before the CA?

HELD:

NO. The Sps. Gonzaga themselves invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC by instituting an action for reformation of the
contract. It appears that, in the proceedings before the RTC, they vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not
even once did they ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It
was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first
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raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Sps. Gonzaga thus
effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed. This Court frowns upon
the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.

ARNEL ESCOBAL vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 124644

February 5, 2004

FACTS

The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police.

On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of
one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca.

On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City charging the petitioner and a certain
Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias Jun Bombita with murder.

On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the service.

When arraigned on April 9, 1991, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter,
on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth
Act No. 408, in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not
the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement.
He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should
now be reinstated.
On February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that he
had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March
9, 1994.
Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his
evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he
argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the
performance of his official function.
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995,
could not be applied retroactively.
The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and
unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official
mission when the crime was committed.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995
Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It
concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas
admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened.

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The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was
committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A.
No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel
Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It
reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering
that the petitioner had a salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had
commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should
continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial.
The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No.
1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case
against him as he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was
committed while in the performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade
below 27 committed in relation to office are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus
introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively.
In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in
accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied
retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner when the
amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995,
R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.

RULING
NO. The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the
remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the
statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the
inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers
in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the
discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the
crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.

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The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate
relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when
on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner
committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2
of the law:

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade
23. He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that
R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.
Agan, Jr. vs Philippine International Air Terminal Co., Inc (PIATCO)

G.R. No. 155001; G.R. No. 155661; G.R. No. 155547

May 5, 2003

Facts: In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic
development up to the year 2010. The ADP submitted a Draft Final Report to the DOTC in December 1989.

Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan,
George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President Fidel V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the
construction and operation of a new international airport terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they
formed the Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on September 15, 1993.

On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government for the development of NAIA
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement.

On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for competitive or
comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal. DOTC also issued an order constituting the Prequalification Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project.

On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil.
Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium)
submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC.

Both proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 million at no cost to the government
and to pay the government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five years of operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues
for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues for the last ten years of operation, in accordance with
the Bid Documents. However, in addition to the foregoing, AEDC offered to pay the government a total of P135 million as

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guaranteed payment for 27 years while Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the government a total of P17.75 billion for the
same period.

PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by the Paircargo Consortium since
AEDC failed to match Paircargos proposal.

On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO).

AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards
the prequalification of PIATCO.

AEDC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus
and Injunction against the Secretary of the DOTC, the Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and
Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee.

On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President,
Henry T. Go, signed the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise
to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in
accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the
concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the
option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO
shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.

November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA).
Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to the ARCA.

Meanwhile, MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing
concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering,
passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and
other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. Some of these service providers are the Miascor Group, DNATA-
Wings Aviation Systems Corp., and the MacroAsia Group.Miascor, DNATA and MacroAsia, together with Philippine Airlines
(PAL), are the dominant players in the industry with an aggregate market share of 70%.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their
employment upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin
the enforcement of said agreements. The service providers, joining the cause of the petitioning workers, filed a motion for
intervention and a petition-in-intervention. Several Congressmen and a number of employees of the MIAA likewise filed a
petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.

In G.R. No. 155001 individual petitioners are employees of various service providers[7] having separate concession
contracts with MIAA and continuing service agreements with various international airlines to provide in-flight catering,
passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing and
other services. Also included as petitioners are labor unions MIASCOR Workers Union-National Labor Union and Philippine
Airlines Employees Association.

Petitioners-Intervenors in the same case are all corporations organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in
the business of providing in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and
provisions, cargo handling and warehousing and other services to several international airlines at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport.

In G.R. No. 155661, petitioners constitute employees of MIAA and Samahang Manggagawa sa Paliparan ng Pilipinas
- a legitimate labor union and accredited as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in MIAA.

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On December 10, 2002, the Court heard the case on oral argument. After the oral argument, the Court then resolved
in open court to require the parties to file simultaneously their respective Memoranda in amplification of the issues heard in
the oral arguments within 30 days and to explore the possibility of arbitration or mediation as provided in the challenged
contracts.

Petitioners argument: PIATCO Contracts contain stipulations which directly contravene numerous provisions of the
Constitution, specific provisions of the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and public policy. Petitioners
contend that the DOTC and the MIAA, by entering into said contracts, have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction which can be remedied only by a writ of prohibition, there being no plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In particular, petitioners assail the provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA which grant PIATCO
the exclusive right to operate a commercial international passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon, except those
international airports already existing at the time of the execution of the agreement. The contracts further provide that upon
the commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III, the Government shall cause the closure of Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Passenger Terminals I and II as international passenger terminals. With respect to existing concession agreements
between MIAA and international airport service providers regarding certain services or operations, the 1997 Concession
Agreement and the ARCA uniformly provide that such services or operations will not be carried over to the NAIA IPT III and
PIATCO is under no obligation to permit such carry over except through a separate agreement duly entered into with
PIATCO.

With respect to the petitioning service providers and their employees, upon the commencement of operations of the
NAIA IPT III, they allege that they will be effectively barred from providing international airline airport services at the NAIA
Terminals I and II as all international airlines and passengers will be diverted to the NAIA IPT III. The petitioning service
providers will thus be compelled to contract with PIATCO alone for such services, with no assurance that subsisting
contracts with MIAA and other international airlines will be respected.

Petitioning employees of various service providers at the NAIA Terminals I and II and of MIAA on the other hand allege
that with the closure of the NAIA Terminals I and II as international passenger terminals under the PIATCO Contracts, they
stand to lose employment.

Respondents (PIATCO) argument: This Court is without jurisdiction to review the instant cases as factual issues are
involved which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve. Moreover, PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this
Court at the first instance is a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. They contend that trial courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court with respect to a special civil action for prohibition and hence, following the rule on hierarchy of
courts, resort must first be had before the trial courts

ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction to review that instant case

RULING: YES. After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues involved, this Court is of the view that the crux
of the instant controversy involves significant legal questions. The facts necessary to resolve these legal questions are well
established and, hence, need not be determined by a trial court.

The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The
said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction.

It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the relaxation of the rule. Both
petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are of transcendental importance as they involve the construction and
operation of the countrys premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for resolution are of first
impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court, procedural bars
may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant cases.

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The Liga Ng Mga Barangay National vs. The City Mayor Of Manila
G.R. No. 154599
January 21, 2004

Facts:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed by petitioner to nullify Manila City Ordinance No. 8039
and respondent City Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr.s Executive Order No. 011 implementing said ordinance. The assailed
ordinance enacted on June 2002 provided for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of
Manila and the setting of the elections for both chapters 30 days after the barangay elections. Petitioner claims that pursuant
to Section 493 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, it adopted and ratified its own Constitution
and By-laws to govern its internal organization. By virtue of section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said Constitution and
By-Laws, the Ligas own Election Code providing for the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters was
adopted and ratified.

The petitioner claims that the said ordinance by providing a different manner of electing its officers despite the fact that said
chapters elections, and the elections of all other chapters of the liga ng mga barangays for that matter, are by law mandated
to be governed by the Liga Constitution and By-Laws, contradict the Liga Election Code. Thus, respondent encroached
upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation which is a function that was clearly beyond the ambit
of the powers of the City Council.

The respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order and pray for the dismissal of the present
petition on the following grounds: (1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2) the petition should not
be entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions or petitions
questioning the subject ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and (4) the act sought
to be enjoined is fait accompli. The respondents allege that the enactment of the subject ordinance and issuance of the
executive order are legislative and executive functions not falling within the ambit of judicial functions to which the remedy
of certiorari cannot question.

Issue:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over petitioners action.

Ruling:
The Court dismissed the petition. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special
civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. For a
writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance
and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and
executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

This instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari seeking the declaratory relief by this Court of the unconstitutionality
or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. Under section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. Though this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
(as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with
the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. The principle of hierarchy of courts must still be
observed, a direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI

G.R. No. 139791
December 12, 2003

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FACTS: Eddy Ng Kok Wei, is a Singaporean businessman. On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent
addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit
at Valle Verde Terraces. It paid a reservation fee of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit
703) valued at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum of P729,830.00.
He was told that the unit shall substantially be completed and delivered to the respondent within fifteen (15) months from
February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and should there be no substantial completion a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid
shall be charged against petitioner.
He was informed of the substantial completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable forces
(such as coup d etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990.
Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990, respondent again flew back
to Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still
unlivable. Exasperated, he filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City, a complaint against the former for
specific performance and damages. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the
condominium unit and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, respondents cause of action has been limited to his claim
for damages. Petitioner now assails the jurisdiction of the trial court, assailing it is the HLURB who should have taken
cognizance of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: Yes, but only by reason of the Doctrine of Estoppel. While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction
over the case, petitioners active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. It is an undesirable
practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
Petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner
confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the
trial courts jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, pursuant to Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, it is the HLURB which has
jurisdiction over the instant case. Complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer
against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Agustin T. Sardido
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370
April 25, 2003
J. Carpio

Facts:
Judge Braulio Hurtado, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato was included as an accused in the
Amended Information for the crime of Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document. Private complainant
Teresita Aguirre Magbanua alleged that Judge Hurtado, who at that time was the Clerk of Court and ex-officio notary public,
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration (P600,000) which was apparently undervalued against what was
agreed under the terms of the sale (P16,000,000) for two parcels of land.

Judge Hurtado filed a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded to the Supreme Court. He
claimed that Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89 requires all cases involving justices and judges of the lower courts, whether
or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of
immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc. to be forwarded to the Supreme Court.

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Judge Agustin T. Sardido issued an Order excluding Judge Hurtado from the amended information and that his case be
forwarded to the Supreme Court.

The OCA found that Judge Sardido erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended Information. It
held that Circular No. 3-89 refers to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower
courts. The Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed against justices and judges of lower courts. The OCA
recommended that a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed on Judge Sardido for gross ignorance of the law.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Sardido committed gross ignorance of the law when he issued the order excluding Judge
Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended Information.

Held:
Yes. Judge Agustin Sardido is fined Ten Thousand Pesos for gross ignorance of the law.

Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. Trial
courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by justices of appellate courts and judges of lower
courts. This is clear from the Circular directing the IBP, and not the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases filed against
justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts to the Supreme Court. The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not
an administrative case filed with the IBP. It is a criminal case filed with the trial court under its jurisdiction as prescribed by
law.

The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal act and an administrative offense.
Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed before or after he became a judge is of no
moment. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against
an attorney or judge is distinct and separate from an administrative case against him. The dismissal of the criminal case
does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same set of facts. The quantum of evidence that
is required in the latter is only preponderance of evidence, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in
criminal cases.

Katon vs Palanca

437 SCRA 565

September 7, 2004

Facts:

On August 2, 1963, petitioner George Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait,
Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of approximately 18 hectares for the purpose of later applying for a homestead patent.

Records show that on November 8, 1996, Respondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a
portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that Respondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead
application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-
7089 on March 3, 1977 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.

Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain portions
of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner
prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity

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to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a
mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land
for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.

A motion to dismiss was granted by the RTC and petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for
allegedly being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court
with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforesaid Order.

Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while
petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a
homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land. The CA added that the annulment
and cancellation of a homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the State were matters between the latter
and the homestead grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to annul the grant, the homesteaders right
thereto stands.

In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five
members with two justices dissenting pursuant to its residual prerogative under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek
reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It
reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion of
the land to the public domain. Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petition based on a ground not raised in a petition.

Held: No.

Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3)
res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances,
the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.

In Gumabon v. Larin we explained thus:

x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court.
Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to

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be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of
Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a
court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x. (Italics
supplied)

The CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio on more fundamental
grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought.

In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land in
question. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land, that it had never been privately
titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act. This Court has
held that a complaint by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent means, and who
consequently prays for its annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must be dismissed.

VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

558 SCRA 63; G.R. No. 147406

July 14, 2008

FACTS: On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18. Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court
convicted the petitioner as charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time,
the trial courts jurisdiction. The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have
actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped
by laches from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari claiming that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first
time on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy that active participation of the petitioner in the trial
of his case amount to estoppel is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD: NO. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by
estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed
almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being
barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.

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The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants participation in
all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such
party from challenging the courts jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The
Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision
and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a courts
jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of
jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in
which it has actively participated.

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches
may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in
the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised
so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That
Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction
of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has
been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is
to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of
non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that
rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint,
not by the defenses contained in the answer.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of
the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable
period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel
by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of
the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights
be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarelyonly
from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must
be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment
of injustice. Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. 40 Hence, the Revised Rules
of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the
concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.

MICHAEL SEBASTIAN v. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG

G.R. No. 164594
April 22, 2015

FACTS:
When Michael Sebastian and Annabel Lagmay were still sweethearts, Annabel sent the amount of P350,000.00 as her
share in their joint investment for the purchase of a truck. After their relationship ended, however, Michael refused to return
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the money, hence Angelita, Annabels mother, filed a complaint before the Bangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva
Ecija. The parties entered into an agreement, evidenced by a document identified as kasunduan, whereby Michael agreed
to pay the amount of P250,000.00 on different dates. When the kasunduan was not honored by Michael, and alleging that
the kasunduan was not repudiated within 10 days, Angelita brought the matter back to the barangay, which failed to
enforce the judgment but issued a Certificate To File Action. One and a half year after the execution of the Kasunduan,
Angelita filed before the MCTC a Motion for Execution of the Kasunduan. Alleging violation of Sec. 15, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court, Michael moved for dismissal of the action, but the MCTC decided against him, and rendered a decision in favour
of Angelita. Michael appealed to the Regional Trial Court, but the RTC initially affirmed the MCTC decision. In his motion
for reconsideration, Michael argued that an amicable settlement before the barangay can be enforced by the Lupon within
six months, but after the lapse of six months it should be thru an ordinary civil action before the MTC or MCTC, not a mere
motion for execution; he assails the lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case as the amount of the claim (P250,000.00)
exceeded the MCTCs jurisdiction (P200,000.00). The RTC granted his motion for reconsideration and set aside the MCTC
decision for lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved, Angelita filed a petition for review with the CA, which granted it, holding that the
MCTC/MTC is the appropriate trial court referred to in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160
hence it has jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, regardless of the amount. Michaels failure to repudiate the kasunduan
in accordance with the Implementing Rules of RA 7160 rendered it final. Michael thus elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the compromise agreement, regardless of the
amount;

RULING:
Yes. The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.

The Court finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC's jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award issued
by the Lupon.

The court draws attention to the provision of Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six (6)
month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal
court.

The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for the execution
of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts,
Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be
no question that the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the
city or municipal courts regardless of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is that words must be given their literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity.

Irene and Reynaldo Sante vs. Hon. Edilberto Claravall and Vita Kalashian
G.R. No. 173915
February 22, 2010

FACTS:

Private respondent Vita Kalashian filed before the RTC Baguio City a complaint for damages against petitioners
alleging that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons
and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words which maliciously impute that Vita had sex with Bert, who
is her friend and one of her hired personal security guards and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioner's close
relative. Vita also alleged that petitioners went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting
and cuddling suspects in the said killing. Thus, Vita prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages
(300K), exemplary damages (50k), attorney's fees (50K), and litigation expenses (20K), and costs of suit.

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Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it was the MTCC and not the RTC of Baguio that had
jurisdiction of the case arguing that the amount of the claim for moral damages was NOT more than the jurisdictional
amount of 300K because the claim for exemplary damages, being discretionary should be excluded in computing
the total claim.

The RTC denied the Motion To Dismiss and held that the total claim of 420K was above the jurisdictional amount
for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. Petitioner filed a MR which the RTC denied.

Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA GR SP NO. 85465).

Meanwhile, Vita and her husband filed an Amended Complaint increasing the claim for moral damages from 300K
to 1M. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss which the RTC denied.

Petitioner the. filed with the CA another petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA GR SP NO. 87563) claiming that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment if the complaint.

CA RULING:

CA GR SP NO. 85465 (7th Division)

CA granted petition holding that the case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC because the claim for moral
damages is in the amount of 300K. It further held that the totality of claim rule cannot be applied because the claim
for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from the claim of moral damages.

CA GR SP NO. 87563 (17th Division)

CA affirmed RTC decision in denying the motion to dismiss holding that the total or aggregate amount demanded in
the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. It also held that respondent may amend her complaint because
the RTC has jurisdiction of the case.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

Yes. It is clear from the allegations of the complaint that respondent's main action is for damages. Hence, the other
forms of damages being claimed by respondent are NOT merely incidental to or consequences of the main action
but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. Where the claim for damages is the main cause of action,
or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court. The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of
damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the
same or different causes of action. Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was 420K, the Court of
Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

GARCIA vs. DRILON

June 25, 2013

Facts:

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Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before
the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to RA 9262.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children
exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued TPO effective for 30 days.

The trial court extended the TPO for another 10 days, and gave petitioner a period of 5 days within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Notwithstanding petitioners manifestation that he has not
received a copy of private respondents motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court renewed the TPO.

During the pendency of the civil case, petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and temporary restraining order, challenging the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the due process and
the equal protection clauses.

The appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings
before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.

Issue:

Whether or not family courts have jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

Family courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.

Inspite of tis designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.

Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality
of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue.

Thus, the contrary posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 could have been raised at the earliest
opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction
to determine the same, subject to the review of the Supreme Court.

REPUBLIC vs. BANTIGUE

G.R. no. 162322

March 14,2012

Facts:
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Respondent Bantigue Point Devt Corp. filed with the RTC of Rosario, Batangasan application for original registration of
title over a parcel of land with a total assessed value of P14,920. The RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the
records of the case to the MTC of San Juan because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than 100,000.
The MTC awarded the land to respondent Corporation. Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic maintain lack of jurisdiction
by the MTC, the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed
to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court
on appeal.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the Republic is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction
2) Whether or not the MTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

1) NO. The Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former raised the
jurisdictional question only on appeal.

The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence
of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such jurisdictional question if he has
actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the
event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him is based on the doctrine of estoppel by
laches. In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court
and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse decision on the merits from the
appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that
case, the Court held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of
lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa vs. People, the Court cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an
exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that
latter case.

The facts of this case are starkly different, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner republic
filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the RTC. At that point, petitioner
could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that
court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative
relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief. Clearly, the
exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned or
declined to assert it. In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that
warrants the conclusion that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower courts jurisdiction.

2) YES. The Property Registration Decree provides: Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court
shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing
which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

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In this case, the application for original registration was filed on July 17, 1997. A day after the filing of the application,
the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on October 22, 1997, which was 96 days
from the Order. While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in Sec. 23, this fact did
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent
Corporation by dismissing its application for registration on account of events beyond its control.

Also, the RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within 5 days from the filing
of the application for registration did not affect the courts jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely
directory. Jurisdiction cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.

Next, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: 1) where there
is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000. The
value of the property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant;
second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than 1, or third, from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. In this case, the value was determined using the first method. The value being 14,
920 as reflected in the Tax Decs., the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction.

Padlan vs Dinglasan
GR 180321
March 20, 2013

Facts:
The case at hand is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the CA, and the
Resolution dated October 23, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Elenita Dinglasan owned Lot No. 625 of the Limay Cadastre (covered by TCT No. T-105602).While on board a jeepney,
Elenita's mother, Lilia Baluyot, had a conversation with one Maura Passion regarding the sale of the said property. Believing
that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner's copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura
then subdivided the property into several lots (from Lot No. 625-A to Lot No. 625-O) under the name of Elenita and her
husband Felicisimo Dinglasan.

Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell
the lots to different buyers. Maura sold Lot No. 625-K to one Lorna Ong, who later caused the issuance of TCT No. 134932
for the subject property under her name. A few months later, Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00.
Thus, TCT No. 134932 was cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.

After learning what had happened, respondents demanded petitioner to surrender possession of Lot No. 625-K, but the
latter refused. Thus respondents filed a case before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of TCT No. 137466.
Summons was served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.

Respondents then moved to declare petitioner in default and prayed that they be allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Consequently, petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare Defendant in Default with Motion to Dismiss Case
for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of Defendant. Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her,
because the summons was not validly served upon her person, but only by means of substituted service through her
mother. Petitioner maintained that she has long been residing in Japan after she married a Japanese national and only
comes to the Philippines for a brief vacation once every two years.Charlie Padlan, the brother of petitioner, testified that his
sister is still in Japan and submitted a copy of petitioner's passport and an envelope of a letter that was allegedly sent by
his sister.

The RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and declared her in default. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding
petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the complaint.

Respondents sought recourse before the CA. The CA then reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered
the cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondents' own title. It found
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that found that petitioner purchased the property in bad faith from Lorna. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner.

The CA issued a Resolution denying the motion by reason of estoppels by laches. It reasoned that when the RTC denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner neither moved for a reconsideration of the order nor
did she avail of any remedy provided by the Rules. Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the case again
when the CA rendered a decision adverse to her claim.

Petitioner maintains that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy finds no application in the case at bar, since the said case is
not on all fours with the present case. Unlike in Tijam, wherein the petitioner therein actively participated in the proceedings,
petitioner herein asserts that she did not participate in any proceedings before the RTC because she was declared in default.

Petitioner insists that summons was not validly served upon her, considering that at the time summons was served, she
was residing in Japan. Petitioner contends that pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, when the
defendant does not reside in the Philippines and the subject of the action is property within the Philippines of the defendant,
service may be effected out of the Philippines by personal service or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
In this case, summons was served only by substituted service to her mother. Hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over her person.

Also, petitioner posits that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, considering that from the complaint, it can be
inferred that the value of the property was only P4,000.00, which was the amount alleged by respondents that the property
was sold to petitioner by Lorna.

Finally, petitioner stresses that she was a buyer in good faith. It was Maura who defrauded the respondents by selling the
property to Lorna without their authority.

Issue:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and subject matter of the case?

Held: NO
In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a
hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations
in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar,
the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to
petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject
property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration
of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessors Office. However,
they did not present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint
by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore,
all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, dated June 29,
2007, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2007, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, dated July I, 2005, is declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 438-ML is dismissed without
prejudice.

Notes:
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was
already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.
Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:
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Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended
to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Hannah Serana vs. Sandiganbayan

GR. No. 162059
January 22, 2008

Facts:
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. Hannah Serana, a UP student regent and his brother Jade serana were
accused of the crime estafa due to alleged misappropriation of 15M for the renovation Vinzons Hall of the University of
the Philippines supposed to be renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall,". Hannah serena allegedly
falsely and fraudulently represented herself to Pres. Joseph Estrada and was able to encashed 15M from the office of
the President. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over estafa or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent, the offense charged was not committed
in relation to her office and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
The Ombudsman countered that Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase
"in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner and that the
petitioner is considered a public officer even if not compensated. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash the
information and motion for reconsideration. Thus this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged?

Held:
Yes, under PD 1606 sec 4(B) the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. Also, under PD 1606 Section 4(A)(1)(g) the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category.

Pat-og Sr. vs Civil Service Commission

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GR No. 198755

June 5, 2013

Facts:

Robert Bang-on, second year student of Antadao National High School, attended his class at the
basketball court. Bang-on and some of his classmates joined Pat-ogs third year students who were playing
basketball. Pat-og instructed them to form two lines. Pat-og then held Bang-ons right arm and punched him in
the stomach without warning for failing to follow instructions. He suffered stomach pain and was confined.
Bang-on filed an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og before Civil Service Commission, Cordillera Administrative
Region (CSC-CAR). CSC-CAR directed Pat-og to file a counter-affidavit in which he denied the charges
against him. CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty of simple misconduct. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Pat-
og but was denied for lack of merit. CSC dismissed Pat-ogs appeal and affirmed with modification the decision
of CSC-CAR. Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC
over the case. He contended that administrative charges against public school teacher should have been
initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. CSC
denied the motion for reconsideration. It ruled that Pat-og was estopped from challenging the jurisdiction
considering his active participation in the administrative proceedings. CA affirmed the resolutions of CSC.
Motion for reconsideration was filed but CA denied the motion.

Issue:

Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the administrative case

Held:

Yes. In Puse vs Santos-Puse, it was held that CSC, Department of Education and Professional
Regulatory Commission have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
EO 202 and PD 809 expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. CSC has the inherent power to supervise and
discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers.

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of others. It was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over
the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to
the exclusion of DepEd and PRC.

Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 173946

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19 June 2013

Facts:

On 24 December 1997, petitioner Boston Equity Resources filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. During the pendency of the case, however,
Lolita disclosed before the court that her husband Manuel was already deceased; hence, he was relieved from the case as
a party.

At the commencement of the trial, only the petitioner, then acting as plaintiff, had presented its evidence, whereas the
reception of the respondents evidence was cancelled upon the parties agreement. When respondent was given a period
within which she should file a demurrer to evidence, Lolita opted to file a motion to dismiss the case, alleging inter alia that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo pursuant to Section 5 Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

The trial court issued an Order denying respondents motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The trial court also denied the motion for reconsideration based on her argument being
barred by estoppel by laches. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, the respondents petition for certiorari was
granted, stating that when issue on jurisdiction was raised by respondent, the court a quo have not yet decided the case,
hence, there is no basisto invoke estoppel to justify its denial of the motion The petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by CA; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that respondent Lolita Toledo is already estopped from questioning the
trial courts jurisdiction

Ruling:

Yes, the CA has erred in this case. However, the Supreme Court clarified at the onset that petitioners argument that
respondents motion to dismiss due to want of jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo was already barred by estoppel
by laches is misplaced. Petitioner was said to have failed to consider the several aspects of the concept of jurisdiction, and
that the aspect which may be barred by estoppel by laches is the jurisdiction over the subject matter, and not one over the
person.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court went on to rule that the jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo was never acquired
by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case against him when he receives summons, and it is in this act by which
the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. As there was no valid service of summons upon Manuel due to his demise
before the actual case was filed, no jurisdiction over the person was acquired by the trial court.

Hence, the trial court was correct in denying Lolitas motion to dismiss.

People vs Go

GR No. 168539

March 25, 2014

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Facts:

The Information filed against Henry Go is an offshoot of this Court's Decisio in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III. Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was Go, who was
then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Go for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Secretary Enrile was
no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.Go was then charged
before the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan then issued and Order giving the prosecution 10 days to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a
private person and the public official Arturo Enrile is already deceased.. The prosecution complied with the Order
contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB
has exclusive jurisdiction over Go's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a
public officer. Go filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts
adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Go also contended that, independently of
the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,Go, who is not a public
officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Prosecution filed its Opposition. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Go, granting the Motion to
Quash.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the person of Go

Held:

Yes. As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for
the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives
the court jurisdiction over the person."

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In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his
person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.

CITY OF MANILA V. CUERDO

715 SCRA 182

FEBRUARY 4, 2014

Facts:

The City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxed against private respondents SM
Mart, SM Prime Holdings, Supervalue etc. for the taxable period from January to December 2002. This is pursuant to
Sections 14, 15, 16, 18 and 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM). The private respondents paid under protest
the amount of P19, 316,458.77 since payment of the taxes was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits.
They thus filed a complaint with RTC Pasay denominated as Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously Collected
Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Furthermore, they averred
through an amended complaint that the pertinent Sections of the RRCM were violative of the Local Government Codes
prohibition against double taxation.

The RTC granted their application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The petitions filed an MR to stop the writ. The
RTC denied the same. The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari under with the CA, assailing the orders
of the RTC. However, the CA dismissed the petitioners petition for certiorari averring that appellate jurisdiction over the tax
refund is vested with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under RA 9282, and that the said
petition should be filed with the CTA. Thus, the petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing
the resolution of the CA.

Issue:

Did the appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal lie with the CTA?

Held:

Yes. RA 1125, creating the CTA, provides through Sec. 7 (3) that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review by appeal the Decisions, orders, or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
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resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction. Furthermore, the CTA also has jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders (such as a writ of preliminary injunction) issued by the RTC in local tax
cases filed before it. This is inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. A grant of appellate jurisdiction
implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the
subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the
CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate
jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the
acts of the latter.

Genesis Investment vs. Heirs of Ebarasadal

G.R. No. 181622
November 20, 2013

Facts:
The case is a petition for certiorari seeking to set reverse and rest aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals,
The Heirs of Ebarasadal filed against Genesis Investment a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees with the Regional Trial Court of Barili, Cebu.
The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss contending, among other, that RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case on
the ground that, as the case involves title to or possession of real property or any interest therein and since the assessed
value of the subject property does not exceed P20, 000.00, the action falls within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court.
RTC granted the petitioners Motion to Dismiss. Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing
that their complaint consists of several causes of action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
RTC issued an order granting respondents Motion and reversing its earlier order. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA dismissed the petition holding that the subject
matter of respondents complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that the main purpose of filing the action is to declare null and void the documents.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was, subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that the Regional Trial Court, Branch
60 of Barili, Cebu has jurisdiction over the instant case when the ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT clearly shows that
the main cause of action of the respondents is for the Recovery of their Title, Interest, and Share over a Parcel of Land,
which has an assessed value of P11,990.00 and thus, within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession
and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the
suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of partition of or
recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an action for declaration of nullity of contracts
and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

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If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance [now
Regional Trial Courts].

HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA v LINDO

G.R. No. 208232
10 March 2014

Facts: Alfredo Bautista inherited in a free-patent land. He subdivided the property and sold it to herein
Respondents. Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC.
Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner Epifania Bautista.
Some respondents entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners but other respondents, however, filed a Motion
to Dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. They asserted that
the total selling price of all the properties is only Php16,500 thus the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint since the
property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the Php20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.
Petitioners allege that an action for repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, it being
founded on privity of contract between the parties since what they seek is the enforcement of their right to repurchase the
subject property under Section 119 of CA 141.

Issue: Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property or any interest therein
or one incapable of pecuniary estimation

Held: The complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation. In
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, such actions where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These
cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.

The instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance. This action for specific performance is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and is therefore cognizable by the RTC. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is
solely dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or
remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the
lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the express provision
of CA 141.

Heirs of Telesforo Julao v De Jesus

736 SCRA 596
September 29, 2014

Facts:

Telesforo Julao filed before the DENR of Baguio City, two Townsite Sales Application (TSA) numbered V-2132 and V-6667.
Upon his death, his applications were transferred to his heirs. On April 30, 1979, Solito Julao executed a Deed of Transfer
of Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the property covered in V-6667 to respondent spouses Alejandro and Morenita
De Jesus. The spouses also constructed a house on the property they acquired.

Thereafter, the DENR denied the application on the lot pertaining to V-6667.
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Herein petitioners, Anita Julao Vda. De Enriquez, Sonia Tolentino and Roderick Julao, Teleforos other heirs, filed before
the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property alleging that they are the true and lawful owners of the
lot numbered V-2132 and that respondent spouses house encroached on 70 sqm of the subject property. Petitioners also
presented evidence to prove that Solito had no hereditary share in the estate because he was only the stepson of Telesforo,
his real name being Francisco Bognot. Respondents answered that they are the true and lawful owners and the possessors
of the subject property from petitioners brother, Solito, and that contrary to the claim of petitioners. TSA No. V-6667 and
TSA V-2132 pertain to the same property. Respondent spouses presented two letters from the DENR: (1) a letter stating
that it can be concluded that TSA V-2132 and TSA V-6667 referred to one and the same lot and (2) a letter stating that
the land applied for with assigned number 2132 was renumbered to 6667. They also presented two affidavits executed by
Sonia and Roderick acknowledging that Solito was their coheir and that he was the oldest son of Telesforo. The RTC
rendered a decision in favour of petitioners but the CA reversed it stating that 1) there is failure on the part of petitioners to
identify the property sought to be recovered and 2) there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC because the petitioners
failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property.

ISSUE: WON the RTC had jurisdiction to try the case.

HELD: No. In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the property must exceed P 20,000.
Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint, the assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed
the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. It fact, since the assessed value of the
property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Contrary to the claim of petitioners, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by respondents in their Appellants Brief. And
the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal is of no moment. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of
Court, defences not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction,
litis pendentia, re judicata, and prescription, which must be apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.

Tumbag vs. Tumpag

GR. 199133
September 29,2014

The case: Petitioner for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA. The CA dismissed the complaint for
recovery of possession and damages that petitioner filed before RTC because the complaint failed to allege the
assessed value of the disputed property.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Esperanza Tumpag filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against Samuel
Tumpag, respondent, before the RTC Kabankalan City, Neg. Occ. Petitioner alleged that she is the absolute owner
of parcel of land (Lot no. 1880 with an area of 12,992 square maters) and that defendant, Samuel Tumpag has been
occupying a portion of not less than 1000 square meter of the said parcel of land for more than 10 years, at the
tolerance of petitioner.

Petitioner orally demanded defendant of the return of the portion of land, but defendant refused and still refuses to
do so. Petitioner brought the matter before Office of Brgy. Captain for conciliation but unfortunately defendant refused to
vacate or return. Thus, certification of Barangay was executed certifying that the matter was brought to his attention for
conciliation.
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that it failed to state the cause of action; that the
action was barred by prior judgment; and lack of jurisdiction. RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss. During the
pendency of the case, the petitioner died and was substituted by her son Pablito Tumpag Belnas, Jr.

The RTC ordered the return possession of subject portion of property and to pay petitioner 10K actual damages,

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20k moral damages and 10k attorney's fees. On appeal to CA, CA agreed with respondent and nullified RTC's decision. It
held that petitioner's failure to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the disputed property warranted the
complaint's dismissal because the court's jurisdiction over the case should be determined by the material
allegations of the complaint. Petitioner moved to reconsider but the CA denied her motion.
Petitioner argues that the respondent, after having actively participated in all stages of the proceedings and
the case having been litigated before RTC for more than seven years, is now estopped from assailing RTC's
jurisdiction. Furthermore, he asserted that dismissal of complaint was not warranted considering that she attached to her
complaint was a copy of a Declaration of Real Property indicating that the assessed value of the disputed proeprty
is 20,790.
ISSUE:
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
Yes.
On Jurisdiction of RTC despite failure to alleged the assessed value of property, while attaching only the
Declaration of Real Property.
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by parties' action or conduct, and
is likewise determined from the allegations in the complaint. Under BP 129, RTC has jurisdiction over civil actions
involving title to, or possession of real property where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds 20,000;
or 50,000 for Metro Manila, except actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

Here, the petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property before the RTC but failed to allege in her
complaint the propertys assessed value. Attached, however, to the petitioners complaint was a copy of a
Declaration of Real Property showing that the subject property has a market value of P51,965.00 and assessed value of
P20,790.00. The CA was fully aware of this attachment but still proceeded to dismiss the petitioners complaint.

Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its
jurisdiction. However, in several cases RTC is also allowed to consider, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings
submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. Factual
allegations in a complaint should be considered in tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the documents
attached to it as annexes or integral parts.
In the present case, a mere reference to the attached document could facially resolve the question on jurisdiction and would
have rendered lengthy litigation on this point unnecessary.

On estoppel.
The defendant in filing the motion to dismiss, hypothetically admits the truth of the factual and material allegations in the
complaint, as well as the documents attached to a complaint whose due execution and genuineness are not denied under
oath by the defendant, and is considered actively particpating in the proceedings. However, we cannot apply the principle
of estoppel to the present case. Respondent is not estopped from assailing the RTCs jurisdiction over the subject civil
case. Records show that the respondent has consistently brought the issue of the courts lack of jurisdiction in his
motions, pleadings and submissions throughout the proceedings, until the CA dismissed the petitioners complaint,
not on the basis of a finding of lack of jurisdiction, but due to the insufficiency of the petitioners complaint.

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdictional issues, as a rule, cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred
by the acquiescence of the court.

Petition granted.

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MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES, Petitioners, v. GJH LAND, INC. (FORMERLY
KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A. STEVE JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP,
AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202664
November 20, 2015
Facts:
This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a petition for review on certiorari from the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 (Branch 276) dismissing Civil Case No. 11-077 for lack of jurisdiction.
On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales4 and Francis Martin D. Gonzales (petitioners) filed a
Complaint5 for "Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Three (3) and Twenty (20)Day Temporary
Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages" against respondents before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J.
Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially, petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were
already paid by them in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc. but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29,
2011 to the corporation's stockholders, hence, their plea for injunction. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
11-077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court. On August 9, 2011, said branch
issued a temporary restraining order, and later, in an Order, granted the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. After filing their respective answers to the complaint, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an intracorporate dispute and
should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City. In an Order, Branch 276
granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It found that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute that
is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed
out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch 256) was specifically designated by the Court as the
Special Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the case and cannot lawfully exercise
jurisdiction on the matter, including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.15 Accordingly, it dismissed the
case. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,16 arguing that they filed the case with the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to Branch 276 by raffle.17 As the
raffle was beyond their control, they should not be made to suffer the consequences of the wrong assignment of
the case, especially after paying the filing fees in the amount of P235,825.00. They further maintained that the
RTC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under Republic Act No. (RA) 8799,19 but since the Court selected
specific branches to hear and decide such suits, the case must, at most, be transferred or raffled off to the
proper branch. In an Order, Branch 276 denied the motion for reconsideration. Thus, the petition.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious. At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly categorized Civil Case No.
11-077 as a commercial case, more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute, hence, intra-corporate, which should
be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC25 dated June 17,
2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799. The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to
be followed when a commercial case - such as the instant intracorporate dispute -has been properly filed in the
official station of the designated Special Commercial Court but is, however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a
regular branch of that station. As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction
over a particular case's subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless
provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the
Court.26 In Lozada v. Bracewell,27 it was recently held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure
and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on
August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A was transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of general
jurisdiction. (Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799) To clarify, the word "or" in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was
intentionally used by the legislature to particularize the fact that the phrase "the Courts of general jurisdiction" is
equivalent to the phrase "the appropriate Regional Trial Court." In other words, the jurisdiction of the SEC over
the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction, that is
to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional Trial Courts. Therefore, one must be disabused of the
notion that the transfer of jurisdiction was made only in favor of particular RTC branches, and not the RTCs in
general. It is important to mention that the Court's designation of Special Commercial Courts was made in line

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with its constitutional authority to supervise the administration of all courts as provided under Section 6, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution. The objective behind the designation of such specialized courts is to promote expediency
and efficiency in the exercise of the RTCs' jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A.
Such designation has nothing to do with the statutory conferment of jurisdiction to all RTCs under RA 8799 since
in the first place, the Court cannot enlarge, diminish, or dictate when jurisdiction shall be removed, given that the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of legislative prerogative.
Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intracorporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court in
the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance
with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly
raffled to a regular branch, e.g., Branch 276, instead of being assigned44to the sole Special Commercial Court in
the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256. This error may have been caused by a reliance on the
complaint's caption, i.e., "Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages,"45 which,
however, contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail over its actual allegations that clearly make out an intra-
corporate dispute. Going back to the case at bar, the Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a
regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident
related to the exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa
City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to
be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as
a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated Special
Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.

Note that the procedure would be different where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple special
commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the Executive Judge, after redocketing the same as a commercial
case, should proceed to order its re-raffling among the said special branches. Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring
jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then it should refer the case to the nearest
RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial region.48 Upon referral, the RTC to
which the case was referred to should re-docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC
has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or
(b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among
those special branches. In all the above-mentioned scenarios, any difference regarding the applicable docket fees
should be duly accounted for. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any
excess, refunded. In fine, Branch 276's dismissal of Civil Case No. 11-077 is set aside and the transfer of said
case to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial Court of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City, under the
parameters above-explained, is hereby ordered. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines
shall be observed: 1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch,
the proper courses of action are as follows: 1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case,
and thereafter, assigned to the sole special branch; 1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special
Commercial Courts, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case,
and thereafter, raffled off among those special branches; and 1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated
as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special
Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to
should re- docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated
as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple
branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those special branches. 2. If an
ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a Special Commercial
Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case. Thereafter,
it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated special branches which, by statute,
are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for under existing
rules. 3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any
difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded. 4.
Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state the action's nature both
in its caption and body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion or by order of the court motu proprio,
be dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after due rectification. This last procedural rule is prospective in

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application. 5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded.cralawlawlibrary SO
ORDERED.

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