Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2005 by the American Psychological Association

2005, Vol. 131, No. 1, 7275 0033-2909/05/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.72

Working Memory and Intelligence: Different Constructs.

Reply to Oberauer et al. (2005) and Kane et al. (2005)

Margaret E. Beier Phillip L. Ackerman

Rice University Georgia Institute of Technology

The authors address agreements and disagreements with the M. J. Kane, D. Z. Hambrick, and A. R. A.
Conway (2005) and K. Oberauer, R. Schulze, O. Wilhelm, and H.-M. Su (2005) commentaries on P. L.
Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005). They discuss the following issues: (a) the relationship
between working memory (WM) and general intelligence (g), (b) the reanalyses included in the
comments, (c) the use of a fixed-effects model versus a random-effects model for the meta-analysis, (d)
the use of structural equation modeling analyses and structural coefficients as equivocal evidence for the
relationship between WM and intelligence, and (e) the problem of confirmation bias in research on WM.
Although the authors disagree with their commentators about the magnitude of the relationship between
WM and g, in the final analysis it appears that all concerned parties agree that WM and intelligence are
different constructs.

The Kane, Hambrick, and Conway (2005) and Oberauer,
Schulze, Wilhelm, and Su (2005) commentaries on Ackerman,
Beier, and Boyle (2005) raise issues about the meta-analysis of
working memory (WM) and general intelligence (or g) relations
and some more general issues. There are several points of dis-
agreement between their commentaries and the conclusions of the
target article, but there are several points of agreement as well. We
begin by discussing issues related to the relationship between WM
and g and then address some of the methodological questions. We
conclude by discussing ongoing concerns about research on WM
and intelligence.
The Relationship Between WM and g
The main conclusion of Ackerman et al. (2005) was the refuta-
tion of the claim that WM and g are isomorphic constructs (e.g.,
Engle, 2002). We estimated the shared variance between WM and
g was about 25%. In their comments, Kane et al. (2005) claimed
that it is 50%, and Oberauer et al. (2005) claimed that it is 72.3%.
On the fundamental question raised by Ackerman et al. (2005; i.e.,
same or different constructs?), it seems clear that there is no
substantial disagreement with the assertion that WM and g are
indeed different constructs. However, we assert that the differ-
ences between the constructs are substantial, whereas the commen-
We thank Werner Wittmann and Roberto Colom for their helpful
discussions related to the issues of working memory and intelligence and
this reply.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Margaret
E. Beier, Department of Psychology, Rice University, MS-25, 6100 Main
Street, Houston, TX 77005, or Phillip L. Ackerman, School of Psychol-
ogy, Georgia Institute of Technology, MC 0170, 654 Cherry Street, At-
lanta, GA 30332-0170. E-mail: beier@rice.edu or phillip.ackerman@
psych.gatech.edu
tators emphasized the similarity between them. After reading their
comments, we remain unconvinced of the similarity of these
constructs.
Kane et al. (2005) chose a subset of studies and tasks for
reanalysistasks that they believed would allow for a better
evaluation of the relationship between WM and general fluid
intelligence (Gf)/reasoning than found in the Ackerman et al.
(2005) meta-analysis. However, the tests designated by Kane et al.
(2005) as markers for Gf/reasoning ability frequently contradict
the identification of the underlying abilities for these tests. For
example, space relations, cards, and flags are generally considered
tests of speeded rotation; cube comparison and paper folding are
spatial visualization tests; and problem solving and necessary facts
tests have complex loadings on fluid, crystallized, and numerical
abilities (see, e.g., Ackerman, Bowen, Beier, & Kanfer, 2001;
Carroll, 1993; Lohman, 1979). Across the various sets of tasks
used by Kane et al. (2005), it is doubtful that they well represent
Gf/reasoning ability. Nonetheless, Kane et al. (2005) reported that
the relationship between WM and Gf/reasoning in their subset of
studies was larger than that reported in Ackerman et al. (2005). We
have no disagreement that a selective sampling might result in a
larger estimated relationship than we reported (though the lack of
fit statistic information makes this representation difficult to eval-
uate in that context). However, we disagree that this type of
selective inclusion of studies for meta-analysis provides the best
evidence for the size of the relationship. Consequently, we remain
unconvinced that the relationship between WM and g is larger than
that reported in Ackerman et al. (2005).
Also, we were confused by Kane et al.s (2005) statement that
a Gf latent variable based on syllogistic and analogical reasoning
tests is free of deduction- and induction-specific ability; a [work-
ing memory capacity] latent variable based on tests for words and
for arrows is free of content-specific storage (p. 67). The confu-
sion seems to stem from their unusual usage of terms for factor
analysis. According to factor analytic theory (see, e.g., Harman,

72
 WORKING MEMORY AND INTELLIGENCE: REPLY
1976), an individual test variance can be decomposed into com-
mon factor variance, specific factor variance, and error variance.
Given that all specific test variance is orthogonal to common
factor variance, then it is, by definition, true that a common factor
is independent of test-specific variance. However, contrary to the
implication of Kane et al. (2005), two tests may share variance on
a number of common factors (including cognitive styles or strat-
egies), so in the example given by Kane et al. (2005), a Gf latent
variable based on syllogistic and analogical reasoning tests might
actually include deduction-common variance if these processes are
correlated in the sample. Also, the Gf latent variable might include
variance associated with strategies common to both tests or any
number of other influences (see, e.g., Kyllonen, Lohman, & Snow,
1984). As noted by Humphreys (1962),
from the facet point of view there are no pure tests. One obtains
better and better measures of an element by adding together as many
elements on other facets as possible. Common variance associated
with the element is increased while variance associated with other
elements is decreased but cannot be reduced to zero by control of
heterogeneity. (p. 481)
As pointed out by Oberauer et al. (2005), we did not eliminate
WM tasks (WMTs) from our analysis on the basis of recent work
identifying certain tasks as poor markers for the construct. Again,
we agree that selecting a subset of WMTs would have likely
changed the outcome of the meta-analysis. However, the definition
of a good WMT and, more generally, the definition of the con-
struct of WM remain unclear. For example, Oberauer et al. (2005)
indicated that WM is not executive function, meaning that WM
is not the supervision of basic processes (p. 61). In contrast,
Kane et al. (2005) stated that WM represents attention-control
capabilities (p. 67). It is unclear how supervision of basic pro-
cesses and attention-control capabilities differ from attention.
The lack of clarity was highlighted in a recent review of WM
measurement, in which Oberauer (in press) stated that there is no
clear picture as to what the good WMTs have in common theo-
retically and that the definition advocated by others in the field
that working memory capacity is the ability to control attention in
the face of distraction seems . . . too broad given that some
executive control tasks are only weakly related to other measures
of working memory.
Oberauer et al. (2005) also suggested that the correlation be-
tween WM and g is underestimated in Ackerman et al. (2005)
because of paradigm, content, and method variance. They asserted
that these are unwanted sources of variance that usually diminish
the measured correlation with the criterion variables (i.e., if they
do not affect the criterion variable as well) (Oberauer et al., 2005,
p. 62). We disagree. In fact, many reported relations between WM
and ability measures are likely inflated by overlapping paradigms,
contents, and methods (as we discussed in Ackerman et al., 2005,
and as can be seen in the cited literature). As such, we assert that
it is far more likely that the correlations are overestimated in such
cases rather than underestimated.
Methodological Issues
The fixed-effects model in meta-analytic methods is designed to
take into account the universe of correlations and report an average
73
of these relationships (Hunter & Schmidt, 2000)which was our
intent. That said, we agree with Oberauer et al. (2005) that a
random-effects model would have increased the size of the confi-
dence intervals we reported. However, what Oberauer et al. did not
acknowledge is that adopting their framework would also have the
effect of reducing the power to show that the relationship between
short-term memory (STM) and ability is statistically different from
the relationship between WM and ability (something that neither
set of commentators would probably view as a positive finding for
their respective approaches). Indeed, recent research has shown
that WM and STM are perhaps more highly related constructs than
originally thought (R. Colom, personal communication, August 5,
2004; Kane et al., 2004) and that STM is more highly related to
intelligence than researchers have previously suggested (see, e.g.,
Beier & Ackerman, 2004).
In Ackerman et al. (2005) we acknowledged the structural
equation modeling (SEM) analysis violated many characteristics
of a good analysis (i.e., missing data, unequal sample sizes per
cell), and as Oberauer et al. (2005) pointed out, we were limited to
using correlational input for the analysis. Indeed, the reason that
the SEM analysis was reported was that its inclusion was required
by the manuscript reviewers, even though it was highly specula-
tive. We continue to believe that the overreliance on such SEM
analyses in this field may be associated with the fact that they can
be used to support any number of different approaches; such as the
early models with high correlations between WM and greasoning
that appeared compatible with the conclusion that WM and gGf
were highly correlated factors.
We disagree with the commentators that SEM methods provide
unequivocal evidence for a particular value to the relationship
between WM and g. Rather, we think that many researchers may
put too much stock in these analyses without recognizing their
indeterminate nature (i.e., the fact that an infinite number of
models exist that will fit the data equally well in an SEM analysis
with more than one factor). The indeterminate nature of SEM
analysis seems especially problematic because structural coeffi-
cients are meant to imply causal relations and because only rarely
do researchers acknowledge the existence of alternative models.
Although researchers are routinely willing to consider small mod-
ifications of their original models (e.g., nested models), rarely do
they explore models that are qualitatively different (i.e., research-
ers are generally happy to accept the explanation of the data if the
model fits well; MacCallum & Austin, 2000). Although some WM
researchers have more recently explored alternative models (see,
e.g., Kane et al., 2004), in our view, historically, much WM SEM
analysis has suffered from this type of confirmation bias.
Oberauer et al. (2005) provided an alternative to the model
shown in Figure 2 of Ackerman et al. (2005) in their comment
article. Our rationale for setting the loadings on the basis of the
initial analysis was grounded in extant research (e.g., Carroll,
1993). We chose this method as opposed to allowing the program
to estimate these relationships, as did Oberauer et al. We disagree
with the point that one SEM model that has a similar fit to the data
has more verisimilitude (for WM and g) when the first-order
loadings do not conform to the existing data on the structure of
abilities (e.g., Carroll, 1993). Also, it is important to point out that
the procedure for conducting the meta-analysis published in
Viswesvaran and Ones (1995) instructed use of the harmonic mean
74 BEIER AND ACKERMAN

Table 1
N for Each Cell of the Correlation Matrix Used to Calculate Harmonic Mean in the Structural Equation Models in Ackerman, Beier,
and Boyle (2005)

WM/AB measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

1. WM: verbal
2. WM: verbal with numerical 1,037
3. WM: numerical 3,314 2,475
4. WM: numerical with verbal 1,311 1,490 1,821
5. WM: numerical with spatial 710 610 261 344
6. WM: spatial 792 296 698 344 472
7. AB: verbal 3,698 2,948 3,426 2,336 1,307 719
8. AB: numerical 2,220 1,819 2,957 2,213 1,024 589 3,964
9. AB: spatial 870 562 906 168 460 405 353
10. AB: reasoningverbal 668 662 1,414 139 714 562 549
11. AB: reasoningnumerical 285 961 1,194 399 139 1,055 1,055 94 701
12. AB: reasoningspatial 610 392 680 392 233 486 392 377 680 139
13. AB: Raven 708 253 708 97 940 183 736 684 227 52
14. AB: knowledge 1,154 1,990 2,388 1,970 904 296 3,224 3,043 726 961 556 1,810

Note. WM working memory, AB ability. A dash indicates an empty cell corresponding to an imputed value in the correlation matrix shown in Table
4 in Ackerman et al. (2005).

of the sample sizes in each cell of the correlation matrix, as
opposed to the harmonic mean of the sample size of each study.
The arithmetic mean of 114 subjects calculated by Oberauer et al.
was the mean number of participants per study, not the mean
number of the sample sizes reported in each cell of the intercor-
relation matrix. Table 1 shows the number of participants per cell
used to calculate the harmonic mean.
Although both comments emphasize the importance of the SEM
analysis, neither take into account that the proof of the utility of
these constructs is not in the abstract realm of latent constructs but
rather in the degree of prediction that can be attained with real
data. Oberauer et al. (2005) came close to this, by appealing to the
use of aggregation methods (which we also agree with and dis-
cussed extensively in Ackerman et al., 2005). Aggregation is an
excellent idea for predictive purposes, but ultimately the aggrega-
tion of different WM composites yields a result that is similar to
aggregating tests to yield a g composite. What is gained by
aggregation has to be balanced against the loss of construct clarity
for WM (which is what Oberauer et al., 2005, claimed is the
limitation of g theory in their comment). However, many adherents
of g endorse the idea of aggregation, in that general intelligence is
thought to represent the entire repertoire of knowledge, skills, and
so on. Where construct clarity is gained with aggregation for g, it
is lost for WM, because WM theories are predicated on specific
processes.
On the central question of whether WM and g are isomorphic,
there appears to be general agreement that they are indeed different
constructs (although there remains some disagreement about the
size of the relationship). However, we disagree with our commen-
tators that the choice of a subset of tasks and studies with arguable
representativeness and, in our view, dubious identification pro-
vides a more accurate estimate of the relation between WM and g
than that reported in Ackerman et al. (2005). Contrary to what the
commentators may have asserted, we do think there is some value
in exploring the WM construct. However, the choice for research-
ers is between an approach with a confirmation bias and one that
takes a much more skeptical view of latent correlations when the
raw data suggest that the relations are weak.
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