Case (2420)

OV
Extend the case The Supreme Courts decision in Milliken vs. Bradley was detestable
and a product of white supremacy. It prioritized white peoples disdain for people of
color over POCs right to an equal education, and set a precedent against integration
which is insurmountable to this day. Vote aff to endorse a radical re-envisioning of
society which rejects all state violence and demands the overturning of Milliken
 Inherency
Failure of segregation is because of Milliken, not some intrinsic failure of government
C/A Rahdert and Chermerinsky, Milliken was the turning point away from
desegregation orders, and its reasoning has been used in countless court cases to
further segregate schools
 Advantage
They say Hale four answers.
1. The aff overcomes private schools by setting a precedent for future rulings on
private schools and school choice even if the aff doesnt address this
specifically, it lays the groundwork for future challenges
2. Not everybody can go to private school there are financial, geographic, and
practical barriers any risk that the aff results in some schools being
desegregated means that were better than the SQ and you can safely vote aff
3. We shouldnt defer to white supremacy we shouldnt give up on students of
color because some white people will get mad more on this later.
4. Extend NeJaime even if the aff isnt sufficient to solve all aspects of
segregation, Supreme Court rulings spur social movements to continue making
progress
They say Brisport the aff overcomes housing segregation through interdistrict
remedies even if housing is segregated, students will be bused out of their
segregated neighborhoods to attend school
 Solvency
The aff solves Bhattacharyya our plan isnt a one-time reform, but part of a radical,
anti-racism, anti-state-violence imaginary. They have our argument backwards Its
not that we expect a revolutionary subject will emerge from legalism, but we should
connect legal reforms to a broader revolutionary epistemology C/A Giroux
Meaningful resistance doesnt mean pure rejection of the state instead, we can use
the government as a contingent tool to achieve revolutionary goals. That means we
dont constrain ourselves to purely legalistic or bureaucratic action, but we recognize
that it will be sometimes necessary
Zanotti 13
Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech and holds a Ph.D. in
International Relations from Florida International University. Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology:
Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Volume 38, Issue
4, November 2013, p. 299-300)
By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power
Options for resistance to
and subjects relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations.

governmental scripts are not limited to rejection, revolution, or dispossession to regain a pristine freedom
from all constraints or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are

constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This
approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-
liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or

abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse
political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and
tinkered with. Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It
invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching
demonizations of power, romanticizations of the rebel or the the local. More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-
substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political
transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These
alternative formulations
also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain
practices, that demand continuous attention to what happens instead of fixations on what ought to
be.83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine
freedom to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing
with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the
consequences of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault my point is not
that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If
everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but
to hyper- and pessimistic activism.
They say Klarman first, this argument is the exact logic the 1AC criticizes. Milliken is
racist because it prioritizes a white preference for exclusion over fundamental rights
for people of color and their argument is just an extension of this we shouldnt
abandon desegregation because white people will get upset and if anything, backlash
proves why the plan is necessary to begin with
Second, Courts empirically overcome backlash proven by desegregation pre-
Milliken. Even if the process is slow, the courts can make progress on integration
Chermerinsky 94
(Erwin Chermerinsky is the Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics and Political
Science at the University of Southern California. Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to
Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity. Mercer Law Review, Volume 45, 1994)PA

After Brown, Southern states used every imaginable technique to obstruct desegregation. As Professor Laurence
Tribe notes, Southern resistance took form in judicial hostility, legislative evasion, and popular expression of

dissatisfaction. Some school systems attempted to close public schools rather than desegregate. Some school boards
adopted so-called freedom of choice plans that allowed students to choose the school where they would enroll and the result was continued segregation. In

some places, there was outright disobedience of desegregation orders. The phrase massive resistance appropriate [sic] describes what
occurred during the decade after Brown. The result was that the decade after Brown, little desegregation had been

achieved. In the South, just 1.2% of black school children were attending school with whites. In South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi not one black child
attended a public school with a white child in the 1962-63 school year. In North Carolina, only one-fifth of one percent or 0.026% - attended desegregated schools
in 1961 and the figure did not rise about one percent until 1965. Similarly, in Virginia, in 1964, only 1.63% of blacks were attending desegregated schools. Yet,

the persistent efforts at desegregation had ultimately had an impact. One by one the obstructionist
techniques were defeated. Finally, by the mid-1960s, desegregation began to proceed. In 1964, the
Court lamented that there has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in achieving
desegregation. By 1968, the integration rate in the South rose to 32% and by 1972-73 91.3% of
Southern schools were desegregated. Certainly the Supreme Court might have pushed this process faster, but probably not by very much. The
resistance was so great and the techniques of obstruction so varied as to require years of conquering the opposition and going forward with desegregation.
Many court orders for desegregation were not put into effect until the 1960s or even the 1970s. Thus,
the Supreme Courts relative silence on the issue of school desegregation was not from a lack of interest
or political resolve. Until lower courts implemented desegregation orders and the courts of appeals
ruled on them, there was relatively little that the Supreme Court could do.

They say Green and Gooden this is basically a restatement of the other arguments,
so C/A our answers above. Also the aff explicitly centers education for black children
in policy efforts and Supreme Court decisions
They say Colby First, extend Connor school and neighborhood integration passively
reduce prejudice, even among the most biased, which means were the best chance at
meaningful integration. We can even get more specific to students development
psychology proves that school provides the best environment for cross-racial
tolerance even if the impact is small or slow, the aff is the only concrete method of
reducing racism
Hawley no date
(Willis D. Hawley is a professor of education and public affairs at the University of Maryland, where he
served as dean of the College of Education from 1993 to 1998. Cross-Racial Understanding and
Reduction of Racial Prejudice. Teaching Tolerance, no date.)PA *I wish I found this card before I wrote
the 1AC

A considerable number of studies since Brown have shown how the social environment of schools
affects the attitudes of students from one racial group toward students of other racial groups. Over the
past 15 years, research in developmental psychology has documented the social and developmental
benefits of intergroup contact that results from school integration and examined stereotyping,
prejudice, and exclusion attitudes in childhood. These comprehensive educational studies conclude that
a racially integrated student body is necessary to obtain cross-racial understanding, which may lead to a
reduction of harmful stereotypes and bias. Racially segregated schools deprive students of these
learning opportunities and the available evidence indicates that indirect programs that merely
emphasize the transmission of information about other groups but are not able to utilize intergroup
contact have little impact on actually changing the behavior of students. Like learning new communication skills, the
skills needed to relate to students of other racial and ethnic groups require practice. Knowledge about
and empathy for other groups are not as easily learned or long-lasting if learned in homogeneous
schools. In a nation in which the proportion of whites among the school-aged population has declined to less than 60% and is declining by the year, there is
growing value to crossracial understanding and cooperation among individuals of all races. For white students, who, on average, grow up in the most racially
separate neighborhoods and remain highly segregated in K-12 and higher education classrooms,9 racially integrated schools provide benefits that many students
may not be able to obtain in other ways.10 Recent findings from a survey of high school juniors and seniors in seven major school districts across the nation,
including Seattle and Jefferson County, show that white students value interracial experiences and report that their racially integrated schools better prepared them
to work and participate in public life in in their multiracial communities. Additionally, students
of all racial groups in integrated schools
felt higher comfort levels with members of racial groups different than their own when compared with
students in segregated schools. For example, white students in integrated settings have been found to
exhibit more racial tolerance and less fear of their black peers over time than their segregated peers.
Teachers believe that building respect for people of other races and cultures is one of the most
important goals of education. Many teachers with everyday experience in racially diverse schools believe in the benefits of racial diversity for
student learning and as an experience that fosters productive, economic, and civic participation in U.S. society. They also state that these benefits are difficult to
attain in single-race classrooms. Virtually all teachers (and about 90% of students) in a recent survey stated that it
was important for students of different races and ethnicities to interact, although far fewer believed that this was currently
happening in their schools. The harms to students who are the targets of negative stereotypes and to students

who become the unwitting inheritors of such views are well known. Children become aware of racial
and ethnic group differences from very young ages, and their developing views of different groups are
affected and shaped by others within their social worlds. Because stereotypes can become deeply
entrenched as children become adults, early social interactions are important to promote tolerance and
reduce prejudice. In addition, the effectiveness of constructive, integrated school settings in reducing the
transmission of such stereotypes has been well established. It has been found that the reduction of
stereotyping and the increased understanding that racial exclusion is harmful are products of childrens
social cognition, perspective taking, empathetic responses, and moral judgments, all of which are
enhanced in integrated environments. These outcomes are especially important in the education context, where stereotypes may inhibit
academic interaction and learning by all students. A recent meta-analysis of over 500 prior studies that collectively

involved 250,000 participants shows that greater levels of contact among different groups are typically
associated with lower levels of intergroup prejudice, and that these effects are consistent and significant
for samples of children, adolescents, and adults. Although optimal intergroup conditions such as equal
status between groups, support of institutional authorities, common goals and cooperation are not
necessary for prejudice reduction, larger reductions in prejudice occur when the conditions are
established. A related analysis of 198 independent samples from these studies showed that significant,
positive effects of intergroup contact typically emerge for samples of children and adolescents in
schools, and specifically when the contact involves youth from different racial and ethnic groups.
Additional studies show how cross-race friendships that develop through contact in schools encourage
broader, positive changes in interracial attitudes. These positive effects accrue regardless of whether
participants voluntarily chose to engage in intergroup contact. Collectively these findings suggest that contact among youth from
different racial groups promotes positive intergroup attitudes, and such positive outcomes become stronger when optimal intergroup conditions are established in
the school environment. Racially diverse schools can be structured in ways that make positive outcomes more
likely to occur. Tracking white and Asian students into more advanced classes and black and Latino students into lower-level classes as studies have
suggested disproportionately occurs, regardless of ability will limit the intergroup contact that produces gains for all in addition to restricting the future success of
minority students. Educators can benefit from the considerable research demonstrating how to implement desegregation successfully.

Second, even if we dont solve racism, we can still reduce racist policy school
segregation is an act of white supremacy which still deserves to be rejected. Third, its
unrealistic to believe desegregation will be fought as hard as in the 50s theres been
at least some level of racial progress, which increases our chances of improving racial
ties. Fourth,
K
 Thesis
First, group Barber and the first Dumas card these basically just outline blackness as
non-humanity. Well dispute the thesis of this argument blackness is not a void of
substance and its not synonymous with non-being. Their argument is entirely
unwarranted never once do they explain why black people are necessarily denied
personhood
Even if the world is anti-black, its not inevitable or ontological because race is a
contingent signifier its meaning is always open to revision
Hudson 13
(Peter Hudson is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of the Witwatersrand, The state and the
colonial unconscious, Social Dynamics, Volume 39, Number 2, Available Online to Subscribing
Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 265-266, 2013)
Colonialism, anxiety and emancipation3 Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has
to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the
subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isnt excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility
of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered ontological), its content (what fills it) as well as the mode of this filling and its
reproduction are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and
for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same,
exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the curvature of
intersubjective space (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the
specific modes of the othering of otherness are nowhere
decided in advance (as [end page 265] a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The
social does not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is never
necessary because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that
whites exist in a way barred to blacks who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the
ontic that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which
refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesnt exist,
the black man doesnt exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations
division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. Whiteness
may well be very deeply sediment in
modernity itself, but respect for the ontological difference (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its
ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the
very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does
not follow that the void of black being functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental
signified on which all possible forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the
specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its ontological differential. A crucial feature of the colonial
symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and
the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the lived experience (vecu) of the colonised
subject. The colonised is traversing the fantasy (Zizek 2006a, 4060) all the time; the void of the verb to be is the very content of his
interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left
stranded by his very interpellation.4 Fixed into non-fixity, he is eternally suspended between element and moment5 he is where the
colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it
may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification;
the structuring relation of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how
tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial i.e., anti-white modes of struggle are not (just) psychic6 but involve the
reactivation (or de-sedimentation)7 of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial
objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chap- ter 11, 771
n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time
because it is the presence of one object in another undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is
the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers
over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.

Theyre going to say something about the Middle Passage shaping black subjectivity
that account of slavery is reductionist and ahistorical the slave trade was definitely
violent but it didnt erase black identity or culture
Brown 09
(Vincent Brown is a Professor of History and African and African-American Studies at Harvard University.
"Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery," American Historical Review, p. 1231-1249.
December 2009)
THE PREMISE OF ORLANDO PATTERSONS MAJOR WORK, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he
published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with survivals or retentions of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early
to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Parks view of the Negro predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had
denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J.

Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that
while enslaved Africans could not have brought
intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant
aspects of their cultural backgrounds.32 Herskovits ex- amined Africanismsany practices that seemed to be identifiably Africanas useful
symbols of cultural survival that would help him to analyze change and continuity in African American culture.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly
disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Parks, who empha- sized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More
recently, a number of scholars have built on Herskovitss line of thought, enhancing our understanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their
studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more precise
demonstrations of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa
to America. For these scholars, the preservation of distinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a
resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself. 35 Scholars of slave resistance have never had
much use for the concept of social death. The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a
civilizing institution threatened by slave crime.36 Soon after, studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic
humanity and intractable will of the enslavedindeed, they often equated acts of will with humanity itself. As these writ- ers turned toward more detailed analyses
of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of the
slave with what they were learning about the en- slaved.37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was
an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Pattersons definition of slavery.
If slaves were in fact generally dishonored, Craton asked, how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slavesthat is, the scale of
reputation and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike? How
could they have formed the fragile
families documented by social historians if they had been natally alienated by definition? Finally, and per-
haps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to permanent violent domination, they could not

have revolted as often as they did or shown the varied manifestations of their resistance that so frustrated
masters and compromised their power, sometimes fatally.38 The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified

Pattersons description of slavery even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men,
women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their tropical temperament. The cultural
continuity and resistance schools of thought come together pow- erfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Re- sistance, Culture,
and Identity Formation in Early America. In Ruckers analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cul- tural metaphors
play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom the rupture was the story of slavery, Rucker aims to reveal the
perseverance of African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creoles.39 He looks again at
some familiar events in North AmericaNew York Citys 1712 Coromantee revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono

rebellion in South Carolina, as well as the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turnerdeftly teasing out the African
origins of many of the attitudes and actions of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a shared cultural heritage
that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the various steps Africans made in the
process of becoming African American in culture, orientation, and identity.

They also mention that the world defines itself based on what its not this
perspective is flawed and most importantly unwarranted even if they win non-being
has to exist conceptually, theres no reason anyone needs to occupy that position
Our aff specifically proves ethical obligations can be extended to black people we
identify white supremacy in education policy and specifically reject the prioritization
of white over black even if SQ ethics fail to incorporate black people, its still a
possibility we should embrace
Their pessimistic framing of black identity only reproduces white supremacy fatalism
accepts the foundational premises of racism as its starting point and creates
powerlessness. You should prefer optimism and community solidarity
hooks 96
(bell hooks, Killing Rage: Ending Racism, Google Books, 269-272, 1996)

black Americans are succumbing to and internalizing the racist assumption that
269More than ever before in our history,

there can be no meaningful bonds of intimacy between blacks and whites. It is fascinating to explore why it is that black people
trapped in the worst situation of racial oppres sionenslavementhad the foresight to see that it would be disempowering for them to lose sight of the capacity of white people to transform
themselves and divest of white supremacy, even as many black folks today who in no way suffer such extreme racist oppression and exploitation are convinced that white people will not

black folks, like their white counterparts, have passively accepted the internalization
repudiate racism. Con temporary

of white supremacist assumptions. Organized white supremacists have always taught that there can
never be trust and intimacy between the superior white race and the inferior black race. When black
people internalize these sentiments, no resistance to white supremacy is taking place; rather we
become complicit in spreading racist notions. It does not matter that so many black people feel white people will never repudiate racism because of
being daily assaulted by white denial and refusal of accountability. We must not allow the actions of white folks who blindly endorse racism to determine the direction of our resistance. Like
our white allies in struggle we must consistently keep the faith, by always sharing the truth that 270white people can be anti-racist, that racism is not some immutable character

flaw. Of
course many white people are comfortable with a rhetoric of race that suggests racism cannot be
changed, that all white people are inherently racist simply because they are born and raised in this society. Such misguided thinking
socializes white people both to remain ignorant of the way in which white supremacist attitudes are learned and to assume a posture of
learned helplessness as though they have no agencyno capacity to resist this thinking. Luckily we have many autobiographies by white folks committed to anti-
racist struggle that provide documentary testimony that many of these individuals repudiated racism when they were children. Far from passively accepting It as
inherent, they instinctively felt it was wrong. Many of them witnessed bizarre acts of white racist aggression towards black folks in everyday life and responded to
the injustice of the situation. Sadly, in our times so many white folks are easily convinced by racist whites and bLack folks who have internalized racism that they can
never be really free of racism. These feelings aso then obsc]re the reality of white privi lege. As long as white folks are taught to accept racism as natura] then
they do not have to see themselves as con sciously creating a racist society by their actions, by their political choices. This means as well that they do not have to
face the way in which acting in a racist manner ensures the maintenance of white privilege. Indeed, denying their agency allows them to believe white privilege
does not exist even as they daily exercise it. If the young white woman who had been raped had chosen to hold all black males account able for what happened, she
would have been exercising white privilege and reinforcing the structure of racist thought which teaches that all black people are alike. Unfortunately, 271so many
white people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility need be
taken for not changing something fit is perceived as immutable. To accept racism as a system of domination that can be changed would demand that everyone who
sees him- or herself as embracing a vision of radai social equality would be required to assert anti-racist habits of being. We know from histories both present and
past that white people (and everyone else) who commit themselves to living in anti-racist ways need to make sacrifices, to courageously endure the uncomfortable
to challenge and change. Whites,
people of color, and black folks are reluctant to commit themselves fully and deeply
to an anti-racist struggle that is ongoing because there is such a pervasive feeling of hopelessnessa
conviction that nothing will ever change. How any of us can continue to hold those feelings when we
study the history of racism in this society and see how much has changed makes no logical sense.
Clearly we have not gone far enough. In the late sixties, Martin Luther King posed the question Where do we go from here. To live in anti-
racist society we must collectively renew our commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice and
equality. Pursuing that vision we create a culture where beloved community flourishes and is sustained.
Those of us who know the joy of being with folks from all walks of life, all races, who are fundamentalls anti-racist in their habits of being. need to give public
testimony. Ve need to share not only what we have experienced but the conditions of change that make such an experience possible. The interracial circle of love
that I know can happen because each individual present in it has made his or her own commitment to living an anti- racist life and to furthering the struggle to end
white supremacy 272 will become a reality for everyone only if those of us who have created these communities share how they emerge in our lives and the
strategies we use to sustain them. Our devout commitment to building diverse communities is cen tral. These commitments to anti-racist living are just one
expression of who we are and what we share with one an other but they form the foundation of that sharing. Like all beloved communities we
affirm our differences. It is this generous spirit of affirmation that gives us the courage to challenge one another, to work through misunderstandings,
especially those that have to do with race and racism. In a beloved community solidarity and trust are grounded in profound

commitment to a shared vision. Those of us who are always anti-racist long for a world in which evezyone can form a beloved community where
borders can be crossed and cultural hybridity celebrated. Anyone can begin to make such a community by truly seeking to live in an anti-racist world. If that

longing guides our vision and our actions, the new culture will be born and anti-racist communities of
resis tance will emerge everywhere. That is where we must go from here.
 Link
Their link falsely presumes that racial progress is impossible history proves that even
if progress is slow and imperfect, legal reforms are capable of tangibly reducing racial
prejudice and civil society can be made less violent towards black people
Omi and Winant 13
(Michael Omi and Howard Winant. Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias. Ethnic and
Racial Studies, Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013)

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the
white racial frame evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time.
They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely a distraction from more ingrained
structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and
Elias use a concept they call surface flexibility to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are

merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase racial democracy is an
oxymoron a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy

in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic
rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial
democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that
matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to
contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites employment, health, education persist and in many cases have
increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by
predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and

unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias
claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we overlook the serious reversals of racial justice
and persistence of huge racial inequalities (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about racial reaction in
a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with

us. While we argue that the right wing was able to rearticulate race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-
civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have

changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms
of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial
(trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement,

but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the
Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that
declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his
interest convergence hypothesis effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon
Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964
We have lost the South for a generation count as convergence? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio
Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms

can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime under movement pressure was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such
reforms which he calls passive revolutions cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective:
oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule.
So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the

significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain
of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society.
Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed
around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined others and the

democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state
and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened
democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished
by other new social movements: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others. By no means do we think that the post-

war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same rearticulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p.
xii) that produced the racial ideology of colourblindness and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even

their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various backlash phenomena of the past few decades, even the
need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of colourblindness, reveal the transformative
character of the politicization of the social. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of
racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this
transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in
US politics today.

Even if the state is currently racist, we dont affirm its legitimacy in fact, demands for
legal change challenge the legitimacy of the state
Newman 10
(Saul Newman, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue
2)

making certain demands on the state say for higher

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand:

wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing is one of the basic strategies of

social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does not necessarily mean working within
the state or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political
order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. They implicitly call into question the
legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for
instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices

which in reality violate and deny them.

And C/A Zanotti making specific demands on the state avoids oversimplifying
complex issues and inspires political activism
Their link is particularly unjustified here segregation is an explicit act of racism and
the Milliken ruling in particular upholds white privilege C/A Waterhouse and Green
& Gooden. Their second Dumas card agrees with us here it specifically says:
Dumas 16 [Michael J. Dumas, Assistant Professor at the University of California, Berkeley in the
Graduate School of Education and the Department of African American Studies, Against the Dark:
Antiblackness in Education Policy and Discourse, Theory Into Practice 55:1119, 2016, published by The
College of Education and Human Ecology, The Ohio State University] NN

School desegregation is perhaps the most prominent education policy of the past century in which Black
people have been positioned as problem. Racial desegregation of schools in the United States has been
made necessary due to generations of state-supported residential segregation, a form of American
apartheid (Massey & Denton, 1993) in which government housing policies allowed whites to accumulate land
(and, therefore, wealth) at the expense of Black people (Dumas, 2015; Roithmayr, 2014). Residential segregation was
rationalized as a necessary means to avoid race mixingthe presence of Black people particularly, but
other people of color as well, was seen as a detriment to the quality of life and economic stability to
which white people were entitled as a result of their skin color. A similar narrative emerged as whites
organized in opposition to school integration; anti-Black racism was at least one primary cause of white
flight from school districts that were ordered to desegregate (Kohn, 1996).

That makes our aff an explicit attempt to reduce anti-black racism any risk that
integration reduces racial prejudice is a reason to vote aff
Well also address their link cards Jones just lists backlash to integration, so C/A our
answers to Colby. Dumas doesnt apply to the aff because we dont describe black
students as in need of fixing also C/A our thesis answers
 Alt
They dont outline any method to bring about the end of the world, which ensures
their revolution terminally fails we arent even asking for a full blueprint, but a basic
understanding of what actions to take
Day 09
(Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future of the Revolutionary
Project, 2009)

Finally revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously there are not
enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to the existing
system. Without being any more specific about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the
revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by
the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are fed up with the existing system and who
are willing to commit themselves to its overthrow will look around for likeminded people who have an
idea of what to do. If we dont have a plausible plan for making revolution we can be sure that there will
be somebody else there who will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be spontaneously drawn to anti-authoritarian
politics. The plan doesnt have to be an exact blueprint. It shouldnt be treated as something sacred. It should be subject to constant

revision in light of experience and debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer questions that have been posed

concretely in the past. We know that we will never confront the exact same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we should also know that
certain problems are persistent ones and that if we cant say what we would have done in the past we should not expect people to think much of our ability to face
There is a widespread tendency in the anarchist movement (and on the left in general) to say that the question
the future.

of how we are going to actually make a revolution is too distant and therefore too abstract to deal with
now. Instead it is asserted that we should focus on practical projects or immediate struggles. But the practical projects or immediate struggles we decide to focus
on are precisely what will determine if we ever move any closer to making revolution. If we abdicate our responsibility to try to figure out what it will take to
actually make revolution and to direct our current work accordingly we will be caught up in an endless succession of practical projects and immediate struggles
andwhen confronted with a potentially revolutionary situation we will be pushed to the side by more
politically prepared forces (who undoubtedly we will accuse of betraying the revolution if they dont shoot all of us). We will be carried by the tide
of history instead of attempting to steer our own course. And by allowing this to happen again it will be we who have really betrayed the revolution. The net result
We are
of the refusal to deal with what it will actually take to make a revolution is that anarchism has become a sort of directionless but militant reformism.

either building various counter-institutions that resemble nothing so much as grungier versions of the

social services administered by different churches; or we are throwing ourself into some largely reactive social
struggle in which our actions are frequently bold and courageous, but from which we never build any
sort of ongoing social movement (let alone a revolutionary organization).

And C/A Bryant a failure to propose a concrete solution to anti-blackness makes

their advocacy counterproductive or pointless at best
Perm: Do both. We can condemn the state while still using it to solve short-term
problems Using the law for its strategic effects while recognizing its inherent
limitations allows us to have short-term legal strategies that are not mutually
exclusive with the alt
Smith 13
(Andrea Smith, Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside, "The Moral Limits of
the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement," Settler Colonial Studies, 2-28-13, 2:2, 69-
88, Taylor & Francis)
At the same time, violence against Native women is at epidemic rates. The 1999 Bureau of Justice Statistics report, American Indians and Crime, finds that sexual assault among Native
Americans is 3.5 times higher than for all other races living in the US. Unlike other racial groupings, the majority of sexual assaults committed against Native American women are inter-racial.3
In particular, the majority of people who perpetrate sexual assault against Native women are white. Because of the complex jurisdictional issues involving tribal lands, the majority of sexual
assaults against Native women are committed with impunity. Depending on the tribe, non-Native perpetrators of sexual assault on Indian reservations may fall out of state, federal and tribal
jurisdiction. And tribes themselves have not developed effective means for addressing violence in their communities. The intersections of gender violence and colonialism in Native womens
lives force Native anti-violence advocates to operate through numerous contradictions. First, they must work within a federal justice system that is premised on the continued colonisation of
Native nations. Second, they must work with tribal governments that often engage in gender oppressive practices. In addition, as Native studies scholar Jennifer Denetdale argues, many tribal
governments act as neo-colonial formations that support tribal elites at the expense of the community.4 Third, they must also address women who need immediate services, even if those
services may come from a colonising federal government or a tribal government that may perpetuate gender oppression. Given the logics of settler colonialism, it may seem to be a hopeless

, we are often
contradiction to work within the US legal system at all. In fact, many social justice advocates eschew engaging in legal reform for this reason. Consequently

presented with two dichotomous choices: short-term legal reform that addresses immediate needs but
further invests us in the current colonial system or long-term anti-colonial organising that attempts to avoid the
political contradictions of short-term strategies but does not necessarily focus on immediate needs. This essay will explore

possibilities for rethinking this dichotomous approach by rethinking the role of legal reform in general.
The essay foregrounds alternative approaches using a Native feminist analytic towards engaging legal
reform that may have a greater potential to undo the logics of settler colonialism from within. As I have
argued elsewhere, Native feminism as well as Native studies is not limited in its object of analysis.5 Rather, in its interest in addressing the intersecting logics of heteropatriarchy and settler colonialism, it is free to engage
with diverse materials. In looking then towards alternative strategies for undoing settler colonialism through the law, I contend that it is important to engage important work that might not seem to be directly about Native peoples
or settler colonialism if this work helps provide new resources for how we could strategically engage the law. Consequently, I engage the work of legal scholars and activists that address very different areas of law as a means to challenge some of the current
assumptions that undergird both reformist and revolutionary approaches to the law. DECOLONIAL REALISM Critical race theorist Derrick Bell challenged the presupposition of much racial justice legal reform strategies when he argued that racism is a permanent feature of society. While
his work is generally cited as a critical race theoretical approach, I would contend that his work implicitly suggests a settler colonial framework for understanding legal reform. That is, many of the heirs of Derrick Bell do not follow the logical consequences of his work and argue for an
approach to race and the law that seeks racial representation in the law.6 However, Bells analysis points to the inherent contradictions to such an approach. Rather than seeking representation, Bell calls on Black peoples to acknowledge the permanence of our subordinate status.7
Espousing the framework of racial realism, Bell disavows any possibility of transcendent change.8 To the contrary, he argues that [i]t is time we concede that a commitment to racial equality merely perpetuates our disempowerment.9 The alternative he advocates is resistance for its
own sake living to harass white folks or short-term pragmatic strategies that focus less on eliminating racism and more on simply ensuring that we do not worsen conditions for those we are trying to help.10 While Bell does not elaborate on what those strategies may be, he points
to a different kind of reasoning that could be utilised for legal reform. In his famous story, Space Traders, aliens come to planet Earth promising to solve the worlds problems if world leaders will simply give up Black people to the aliens. This story narratively illustrates how thin white
liberal commitments to social justice are. First, the white people of course do give up Black people to the aliens without much thought. But what more dramatically illustrates this point is that the reader knows that, almost without a doubt, if this were to happen in real life, of course Black
people would be given up. Within this story, however, is a little-commented scene that speaks to perhaps a different way to approach legal reform within the context of white supremacy. Gleason Golightly, a conservative black economics professor who serves as an informal cabinet
member for the President, becomes embroiled in a fight with the civil rights legal establishment about the best means to oppose the proposed trade. Golightly had previously pleaded with the President and his cabinet to reject it. When his pleas are not heard, he begins to reflect on how
his support for conservative racial policies in the interests of attaining greater political power had been to no avail. He realises the strategy behind his appeal to the President was doomed to fail. In retrospect, though [his] arguments were based on morality [] [i]nstead of outsmarting
them, Golightly had done what he so frequently criticised civil rights spokespersons for doing: he had tried to get whites to do right by black people because it was right that they do so. Crazy! he commented when civil rights people did it. Crazy! he mumbled to himself, at himself.11
Realising the error of his ways, Golightly interrupts this civil rights meeting in which activists plan to organise a moral crusade to convince white Americans to reject the space traders proposal. Instead, he suggests that they should tell white people that they cannot wait to go on the ship
because they have learned they are being transported to a land of milk and honey. White people, argues Golightly, so oppose policies that benefit Black people, even if they benefit white people, that they will start litigating to stop the space traders proposed plan.12 The civil rights
establishment rejects this strategy as a moral outrage and begins a racial justice campaign, ultimately to no avail. What this story troubles is social justice movements investment in the morality of the law. Despite the US legal systems complicity in settler colonialism, patriarchy,
capitalism and white supremacy since its inception, they advocate strategies for change that rest on the presupposition that the law can somehow be made to support the end of sexism, racism and classism. Historically, as more radical racial and social justice organisations were either
crushed or co-opted by the US governments during the 1970s, these movements shifted from a focus on a radical restructuring of the political and economic system to a focus on articulating identity based claims that did not necessarily challenge the prevailing power structure.13 If
groups were not going to directly challenge the state, they could then call on the state to recognise their claims to equality and redress from harms perpetrated by other social actors. Ironically, then, the same US government that codified slavery, segregation, anti-immigrant racism, and
the genocide of indigenous peoples, now becomes the body that will protect people of colour from racism. The fact that the US itself could not exist without the past and continuing genocide of indigenous peoples in particular does not strike liberal legal reformists as a contradiction. Bell

it may be possible to engage in legal reform in the midst of these contradictions if one foregoes the
suggests that

fantasy that the law is morally benevolent or even neutral. In doing so, more possibilities for strategic
engagement emerge. For instance, in the Racial Preference Licensing Act, Bell suggests that rather than criminalise racial discrimination, the government should allow
discrimination, but tax it. Taxes accrued from this discrimination would then go into an equality fund that would support the educational and economic interests of African-Americans.14 As I
have argued elsewhere, the law enforcement approach has been similarly limited in addressing the issues of gender violence when the majority of men do, or express willingness to engage in,
it.15 As a result, criminalisation has not actually led to a decrease in violence against women.16 Anti-violence activists and scholars have widely critiqued the supposed efficacy of
criminalisation.17 As I will discuss later in this essay, Native women in particular have struggled with the contradictions of engaging the legal system to address the legacies of colonial gender
violence. While there is growing critique around criminalisation as the primary strategy for addressing gender violence, there has not been attention to what other frameworks could be
utilised for addressing gender violence. In particular, what would happen if we pursued legal strategies based on their strategic effects rather than based on the moral statements they propose
to make? DISTRUSTING THE LAW Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising
on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. Thus, it may be helpful to look
for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. Again, the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing

to disinvest in the morality of

against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him

the law in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. This
disinvestment, I contend is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their
legal strategies. In Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust, Christopher Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop
partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous prisoners dilemma. The prisoners dilemma, as described by Leslie, is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them. There is
enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your
partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence. In this scenario, it becomes the rational choice for both to confess because if the first person does not confess and the second person does, the first person will
receive a ten-year sentence. Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit.
However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel
that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Cartel members can develop
mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these
trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who
focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement. For instance, in his article, Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trusts 1993
Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. This policy provided automatic amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes
that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person
who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader
becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all
the possibility of immunity. While Leslies analysis is directed towards policy, it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make. It is ironic that an anti-trust
scholar such as Leslie displays less trust in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence
movements primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 Because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a crime, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end
violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy
should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a moral law, then their job
is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because
they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they
lose access to public housing if a crime (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, we might need to creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety. REVOLUTIONARY
REFORMS As mentioned previously, there has been insufficient evaluation of the strategic effects of legal strategies opposing gender violence. However, the work of Native anti-violence scholar and activist, Sarah Deer, points to possible new directions in engaging legal reform for the
purpose of decolonisation. Deer notes that the issues of gender violence cannot be separated from the pr oject of decolonisation. For instance, currently, tribal governments are restricted to sentencing tribal members to three years in tribal prison for even major crimes such as rape.
Much of the focus of the anti-violence movement has been on increasing the number of years tribal governments can incarcerate members. Because of this effort, the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 increased the length of sentences from one to three years. However, Deer notes that
prior to colonisation, violence against women was virtually unheard of, even though tribes did not have prisons.22 Instead, tribes utilised a number of social mechanisms to ens ure safety for women and children, and none of these mechanisms are prohibited by federal legislation.
Because the federal government restricts the amount of prison time allowed for sexual offenders, tribes primarily call on the federal government to expand tribes ability to incarcerate. However, as a variety of scholars have noted, expanded sentencing has not actually led to decreased
violence.23 Thus, rather than focusing their attention simply on incarceration, Deer suggests that tribes look to pre-colonial measures for addressing violence and begin to adapt those for contemporary circumstances.24 At the same time, Deer notes that it is not necessarily a simple
process to adapt pre-colonial measures for addressing violence. Unfortunately, many of the alternatives to incarceration that are promoted under the restorative justice model have not developed sufficient safety mechanisms for survivors of domestic/sexual violence. Restorative
justice is an umbrella term that describes a wide range of programs that attempt to address crime from a restorative and rec onciliatory rather than a punitive framework. As restorative justice frameworks involve all parties (perpetrators, victims, and community members) in determining
the appropriate response to a crime in an effort to restore the community to wholeness, restorative justice is opposed to the US criminal justice system, which focuses solely on punishing the perpetrator and removing him (or her) from society through incarceration. These models are
well developed in many Native communities, especially in Canada, where the legal status of Native nations allows an opportunity to develop community-based justice programs. In one program, for example, when a crime is reported, the working team that deals with sexual/domestic
violence talks to the perpetrator and gives him the option of participating in the program. The perpetrator must first confess his guilt and then follow a healing contract, or go to jail. The perpetrator is free to decline to participate in the program and go through the criminal justice system.
In the restorative justice model, everyone (victim, perpetrator, family, friends, and the working team) is involved in developing the healing contract. Everyone is also assigned an advocate through the process. Everyone is also responsible for holding the perpetrator accountable to his
contract. One Tlingit man noted that this approach was often more difficult than going to jail: First one must deal with the shock and then the dismay on your neighbors faces. One must live with the daily humiliation, and at the same time seek forgiveness not just from victims, but from
the community as a whole []. [A prison sentence] removes the offender from the daily accountability, and may not do anything towards rehabilitation, and for many may actually be an easier disposition than staying in the community.25 These models have greater potential for dealing
with crime effectively because, if we want people who perpetuate violence to live in society peaceably, it makes sense to develop justice models in which the community is involved in holding him/her accountable. Under the current incarceration model, perpetrators are taken away from
their community and are further hindered from developing ethical relationships within a community context. However, the probl em with these models is that they work only when the community unites in holding perpetrators accountable. In cases of sexual and domestic violence, the
community often sides with the perpetrator rather than the victim. As Deer argues, in many Native communities, these models are often pushed on domestic violence survivors in order to pressure them to reconcile with their families and restore the community without sufficient
concern for their personal safety.26 In addition, Native advocates have sometime critiqued the uncritical use of traditional forms of governance for addressing domestic violence. They argue that Native communities have been pressured to adopt circle sentencing because it is supposed
to be an indigenous traditional practice. However, some advocates contend that there is no such traditional practice in their communities. Moreover, they are concerned that the process of diverting cases outside the court system can be dangerous for survivors. In one example, Bishop
Hubert OConnor (a white man) was found guilty of multiple cases of sexual abuse but his punishment under the restorative justice model was to participate in a healing circle with his victims. Because his crimes were against Aboriginal women, he was able to opt for an Aboriginal
approach an approach, many argue, that did little to provide real healing for the survivors and accountability for the perpetrator. Deer complains that there is a tendency to romanticise and homogenise traditional alternatives to incarceration. First, she notes traditional approaches
might, in fact, be harsher than incarceration. Many Native people presume that traditional modes of justice focus on conflict resolution. In fact, Deer argues, penalties for societal infractions were not lenient they entailed banishment, shaming, reparations, physical punishment and
sometimes death. Deer notes that revising tribal codes by reincorporating traditional practices is not a simple process. It is sometimes difficult to determine what these practices were or how they could be made useful today. For example, some practices, such as banishment, would not
have the same impact today. Prior to colonisation, Native communities were so close-knit and interdependent that banishment was often the equivalent of a death sentence. Today, however, banished perpetrators could simply leave home and join the dominant society. While tribes now
have the opportunity to divest from the US colonial system, many Native women remain under violent attack. They may need to use the federal system until such time that more advanced decolonisation becomes possible. Thus Deer advocates a two-fold strategy: 1) The short-term
strategy of holding the federal government accountable for prosecuting rape cases; and 2) encouraging tribes to hold perpetrators accountable directly so that they will eventually not need to rely on federal interference. This approach can be misread as a simple formula for reform.
However, it is important to remember that the project of prison abolition is a positive rather than a negative project. The goal is not to tell survivors that they can never call the police or engage the criminal justice system. The question is not, should a survivor call the police? The question
is: why have we given survivors no other option but to call the police? Deer is suggesting that it is not inconsistent to reform federal justice systems while at the same time building tribal infrastructures for accountability that will eventually replace the federal system. If we focus simply on
community accountability without a larger critique of the state, we often fall back on framing community accountability as simply an add-on to the criminal justice system. Because anti-violence work has focused simply on advocacy, we have not developed strategies for due process,
leaving that to the state. When our political imaginaries are captured by the state, we can then presume that the state should be left to administer justice while communities will serve simply as a supplement to this regime. To do so, however, recapitulates the fundamental injustice of a
settler state that is founded on slavery, genocide and the exploitation of immigrant labour. Further, we are unable to imagine new visions for liberatory nationhood that are not structured on hierarchical logics, violence and domination. We face a dilemma: on the one hand, the
incarceration approach for addressing sexual/domestic violence promotes the repression of communities of colour without really providing safety for survivors. On the other hand, restorative justice models often promote community silence and denial under the rhetoric of community
restoration without concern for the safety of survivors. Thus, our challenge is to develop community-based models that respond to gender violence in ways that hold perpetrators accountable. Unfortunately, in this discussion advocates often assume only two possibilities: the criminal
justice system or restorative justice. When anyone finds faults with the restorative justice model, it is assumed that the traditional criminal justice approach must be the back-up strategy. Deers approach, by contrast, is to work with the criminal justice system while continuing to develop
effective strategies for addressing violence. These will eventually eliminate the need to rely on the criminal justice system. Of course, the trap of pursuing reforms is that they can create investment in the current US legal system and detract from building new systems of governance that
are not based on violence, domination and control. At the same time, we are not going to go from where we are now to revolution tomorrow. Thus, it becomes important to strategise around what may be called revolutionary reforms. Other abolitionists have argued that the only
reforms that should be supported are those that diminish the criminal justice apparatus. Other abolitions have argued that this approach leaves people vulnerable to the crimes of the powerful, such as rape and domestic violence.27 It is in this context that we can understand Deers
current projects. She has worked on building tribal infrastructure by encouraging and assisting tribes to develop tribal civil protection orders. Her strategy is not so much based on the rationale that civil protection orders will in themselves provide protection for women. Rather, by
developing these orders, tribes gain the practice of developing their own systems for addressing violence. Deer notes that this is one area that is not likely to be interfered with by the US federal government. At the same time, it is not an approach that is directly tied with investing tribes
in the project of incarceration. Thus, it becomes a reform that tribal communities may adopt now as they develop creative responses for addressing violence. The reason for this suggested reform is that many tribal governments incorrectly think that the federal government is already
adequately addressing gender violence and do not take initiative to address it themselves.28 In the end, the importance of Deers r ecommendation is not so much an investment in that particular strategy, but the manner in which it encourages us to think of short-term strategies that are
not simply based on increased incarceration, strategies that will more likely fall under the federal radar screen so that tribal communities have more time to practice new ways of supporting accountability for violence. This will encourage communities to develop better decolonial
practices in the future. As Deer notes, a long-term vision for radical change requires both immediate measures to address sexual violence and a forward-looking effort to dismantle the culture of rape that has infiltrated tribal nations.29 At the same time, many other Native activists are
engaging community accountability strategies that do not work with the current system at all. These strategies are not broadly advertised because these activists do not want to gain the attention of federal authorities. Yet, many communities have developed informal strategies for
addressing authorities. For instance, one man who assaulted a relative was banished from his community. As he was simply able to move to the city, tribal members would follow him to various work places, carrying signs that described him as a rapist. Again, this may be a strategy that
we may or may not support. But the point is that it is important to engage the experimental and jazzy approaches for developing community-based accountability strategies.30 In his recent book X-Marks, Scott Lyons engages with Native activists and scholars who call for decolonisation

Those who call for decolonisation often do not effectively engage in any short-term
as a central focus for organising.31

reformist strategy, even though they may save the lives of indigenous peoples who are currently under
immediate attack. As a result, the immediate needs of people often get sacrificed in favour of
articulating seemingly politically-pure ideals. Conversely, those who do engage in short-term reform strategies often decry the goal of decolonisation as unrealistic. In doing so, they do not critique the manner
in which these strategies often retrench rather than challenge the colonial status quo. Lyons affirms the need for decolonisation, but notes that decolonization happens with pre-existing materials and institutions. He calls on Native peoples to think creatively about these institutions and
about the ways in which they can be deployed not just for short-term gains but for a long-term vision of liberation. BEYOND SHAMING THE SYSTEM Legal reformists who often focus on shaping the law to reflect their moral values and those who focus on extra-legal revolutionary
strategies often share the same goal. Often the presumed radical strategy adopted by social justice groups is to engage in civil disobedience. While these groups ostensibly break the law, they often do so in rather ceremonial fashion; they essentially want to shame the system. People
are supposed to get arrested, and those in power are supposed to be so shamed by the fact that an unjust system required people to break the law. The expectation is that they will then change the laws. Acts of civil disobedience often are not targeted toward changing a policy directly or
building alternative systems to the current one. Many Native groups in the southwest US, however, have developed an alternative framework for extra-legal social change. Rather than breaking the law to change the system, they propose to make Native communities ungovernable. For
instance, during the passage of SB1070, Native groups with the Taala Hooghan Infoshop, Oodham Solidarity Across Borders, and others occupied the Border Patrol Office.32 However, rather than engaging in the occupation with the expectation of getting arrested, they chained
themselves to the building so that the office could not perform its work. This approach has continued with their efforts to stop the US governments desecration of the San Francisco Peaks through the construction of a ski resort. While they have not eschewed legal strategies for stopping
this desecration, they have focused on preventing tourists from visiting the area so that the ski resort will no longer be economically viable. According to their promotional material on TrueSnow.org: For the last decade defenders of the peaks have used every legitimate way they could
think of to try to stop the US Forest Service from allowing treated sewage effluent to be sprayed on the Peaks to make snow. More than 20,000 people took part in the Forest Service Environmental Impact Statement process with letters and appeals asking them not to spray treated
sewage effluent on the peaks to make snow. Thousands of us went to Flagstaff City Council meetings to voice our opposition to the sale of treated sewer water for the project. Yet still they approved it before even an environmental impact statement was done. They were the most
clueless of all. Currently the Hopi tribe is seeking lawsuit against the city because of this treated sewage effluent sale. A group of tribes and environmental and social justice organizations took a lawsuit all the way to the steps of the Supreme Court. The lawsuits have only called into
question the legitimacy of what is loosely termed the justice system. For it seems there is no justice in this system. It is just us, IN this system. There is also yet another lawsuit in play which I have termed Save the Peaks Coalition vs The Snowbowl Movement which may have the
possibility of stopping this project in the long term. But if we wait for a verdict, all the trees will be cut and the pipeline installed. This has not stopped the politically connected ski area from going ahead with their project right now and they have already clear-cut 100,000 trees (or more)
and have already buried a few miles of pipeline along Snowbowl road. If they lose in court they would be expected to repair the damages. How do you get back 400 year old trees? Greed and hatred seems to be Snowbowl's only motivation []. But isn't there some way to stop it? Well we
could hit them where it hurts! In the pocketbook. If you live in the Fort Valley area of Flagstaff you must see by now how little Arizona Snowbowl really cares about the economic benefits it brings our fair town. I know some of us had a good deal of trouble even going to work when the
snow was good and Snowbowl was busy. The traffic jam was incredible. Stretching more than 15 miles. They took our livelihood away and hope to make that a daily occurrence by having a predictable ski season using sewer water to make snow. This jam up gave us an idea! Why don't
we do the same thing? Arizona Snowbowl does not own the mountain, and it is perfectly legal to drive up to the area for any permitted public lands use. This means hiking, camping, praying, skiing, sitting, loving, mushroom hunting, etc. So what do I do? It is time to stop waiting for a
government entity, an environmental group, or any of the people you have come to expect to save the peaks for us. The time has come to show them how much power the people have! And believe me, you are the most powerful people in all of the world! You! Yep you! You can do it! All
summer the Arizona Snowbowl is open Friday, Saturday, and Sunday for scenic skyrides, food, and alcohol. They do get a pretty good business up there and it would have an impact if the mountain was just too busy with people doing all the other things our Public Forests are for. There is
nothing illegal about it and it would send a clear message to the forest service that we don't need Snowbowl to recreate on the mountain. Heck, we don't even need a ski area up there to ski! In essence, take a vacation. Just do it up on the peaks and don't use Snowbowl. Our
government officials are forgetting what all power to the people really means. You cannot wait any longer for someone else to save the peaks for you. It will take of all us together to do this. So what are you waiting for? Pack a lunch this Saturday morning and Converge on the Peaks!33
What these activists suggest is to divest our moral investment in the law. This will affect not only what legal reforms we may pursue, but what revolutionary strategies we might engage in. Rather than engaging in civil disobedience to force legislators to change laws to conform to our

In the debates prevalent within Native sovereignty and

moral principles, we might be free to engage creatively in strategies that build political and economic power directly. CONCL USION

racial justice movements, we are often presented with two seemingly orthogonal positions long-term
revolutionary extra-legal movements or shortterm reformist legalist strategies. Short-term legal
strategies are accused of investing activists within a white supremacist and settler colonial system that is
incapable of significant change. Meanwhile, revolutionaries are accused of sacrificing the immediate
needs of vulnerable populations for the sake of an endlessly deferred revolution. The reality of gender
violence in Native communities highlights the untenability of these positions. Native womens lives are
at stake now they cannot wait for the revolution to achieve some sort of safety. At the same time, the short-term strategies often adopted to
address gender violence have often increased violence in Native womens lives by buttressing the prison industrial complex and its violent logics. While this reformist versus revolutionary
dichotomy suggests two radically different positions, in reality they share a common assumption: that the only way to pursue legal reform is to fight for laws that that reinforce the appropriate
moral statement (for instance, that the only way to address violence against Native women is through the law and to make this violence a crime). Because the US legal system is inherently
immoral and colonial, however, attempts to moralise the law generally fail. It is not surprising that the response to these failures is to simply give up on pursuing legal strategies. However, the

. We can challenge the

works of Derrick Bell, Christopher Leslie, and Sarah Deer, while working in completely different areas of the law, point to a different approach

assumption that the law will reflect our morals and instead seek to use the law for its strategic effects. In
doing so, we might advocate for laws that might in fact contradict some of our morals because we
recognize that the law cannot mirror our morals anyway. We might then be free to engage in a
relationship with the law which would free us to change our strategies as we assess its strategic effects.
At the same time, by divesting from the morality of the law, we then will also simultaneously be free to invest

in building our own forms of community accountability and justice outside the legal system. Our extra-
legal strategies would go beyond ceremonial civil disobedience tactics designed to shame a system that is not
capable of shame. Rather, we might focus on actually building the political power to create an
alternative system to the heteropatriarchal, white supremacist, settler colonial state.

C/A Giroux and NeJaime our advocacy motivates activism and resistance to racial
injustices, which encourages social movements that means more people would be
willing to embrace the end of the world and an anti-government revolution in the
world of the aff the perm solves best
And C/A Newman and Zanotti the plan doesnt necessarily reinvest in the legitimacy
of the state no link DA