G.R. No. 150224. May 19, 2004.* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

JOEL YATAR alias KAWIT,

appellant.

FACTS
Accused-appellant was sentenced to death for the special comple crime
of !ape with"omicide# and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim.
Appellant was charged to haveh a d c a r n a l $ n o w l e d g e
of a certain %athylyn &ba against her will# and with the use
o f a bladed weapon# stabbed the latter in'icting upon her fatal in(uries resulting in her
untimelydemise.) n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e # a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s t h e i s s u e o f c r e d i
b i l i t y o f w i t n e s s e s # s p e c i * c a l l y assigning as error on the part of the trial
court# the latter+s giving of much weight to theevidence presented by
the prosecution notwithstanding their doubtfulness.
(o)*l+ s,a-+ISS E 1
,hether appellant+s contentions as regards the witnesses+ credibility are meritorious.
HEL(/ NO.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
againstappellant. This Court will not interfere with the (udgment of the trial court in
determining thecredibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and in'uence which has been
overloo$ed or the signi*cance of which has beenmisinterpreted.

ell-entrenched is the rule that the *ndings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses
areentitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons
are presented necessitating aree amination if not the disturbance of the
same the reason being that the former is in
ab e t t e r a n d u n i u e p o s i t i o n o f h e a r i n g * r s t h a n d t h e w i t n e s s e
s a n d o b s e r v i n g t h e i r deportment# conduct and attitude. Absent any sh
owing that the trial (udge overloo$ed#misunderstood# or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight which would a/ect theresult of the case# the trial (udge+s
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court+shighest respect. ,here there is
nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution wereactuated by improper
motive# their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. The weight of the
prosecution+s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rulewhich
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available# as longas
su0cient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
doubtthat the accused committed the crime.
(o)*l+ s,a-+ISS E 2
1u0ciency of Circumstantial Evidence
HEL(/
Circum stantial evidence# to be su0cient to warrant a conviction # m
u s t f o r m a n unbro$en chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused# to thee clusion of others# is the perpetrator of the crime. To
determine whether there is
su0cientc i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e # t h r e e r e u i s i t e s m u s t c o n c u r 2
3 4 5 t h e r e i s m o r e t h a n o n e circumstance 365 facts on which the
i n f e r e n c e s a r e d e r i v e d a r e p r o v e n a n d 3 7 5 t h e combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonabledoubt.
(o)*l+ s,a-+ISS E
)n an attempt to e clude the DNA evidence# the appellant contends that the blood
sampleta$en from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remainsilent as well as his right against self-incrimination under 1ecs.
46 and 48 of Art. ))) of theConstitution.
)s the contention of appellant tenable9
HEL(/ NO.
The $ernel of the right is not against all compulsion# but against testimonial
compulsion. Theright against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of
e tracting from the lipsof the accused an admission of guilt. )t does not apply
where the evidence sought to bee cluded is not an incrimination but as part
of ob(ect evidence.,e ruled in
People v. Rondero
that although accused-appellant insisted that hair sampleswere forcibly
ta$en from him and submitted to the National :ureau of )nvestigation
forforensic e amination# the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him#
for what isproscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in natureac uired from the accused under duress."ence# a person
may be compelled to submit to *ngerprinting# photographing#
para0n#blood and DNA# as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
&nder
People v. Gallarde
#where immediately after the incident# the police authorities too$ pictures
of the accusedwithout the presence of counsel# we ruled that there was no
violation of the right againstself-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical e amination todetermine his involvement in
an o/ense of which he is accused.

G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19, 2004. * ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FactsRoberto Brillante, then a candidate for the position of councillor in Makati City
held a presconference where he accused Jejomar Binay, a candidate for mayoralty in
Makati, and NemesioPrudente of plotting an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco,
another mayoral candidate inMakati. Several journalists wrote articles regarding the
same and an open letter was published aswell. Later, Binay and Prudente both filed
libel charges against Brillante. The trial court foundBrillante guilty of four counts of
libel, which decision the CA affirmed.
IssueWhether or not the act of libel charged against petitioner has prescribed when the
Informationwas filed before the trial court

Ruling No. Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel
shall prescribe withinone year. In determining when the one year prescriptive period
should be reckoned, referencemust be made to Article 91 of the same code which sets
forth the rule on the computation
of prescriptive periods of offenses which states that period of prescription shall be int
errupted bythe filing of the complaint or information. In the case, a proceeding in the
Fiscal's Office mayterminate without conviction or acquittal.
G.R. No. 121099. February 17, 1999. * FIDEL T. SALAMERA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION, respondent

Facts;
The Sandiganbayan convicted Mayor Fidel Salamera of Casiguran
Aurora for the crime of Malversation of Public Property. This was
about the Smith & Wesson revolver gun that was mortgaged to him by
barangay chairman Antonio Benavidez. The said gun was owned and
licensed to Ponciano Benavidez. When the owner demanded the
return of his gun the latter cannot produce the item because it was
conficted by the police during the checkpoint when Mayor Salamera
and his security went to manila. Ponciano Benavidez filed a complaint
for theft against the mayor before the sandiganbayan. Issue;

Whether the gun which is owned by a private person converted into a

public property when it was entrusted to a public officer. Held;
The supreme court reversed the decision of sandiganbayan By
turning over the gun to Mayor Salamera, the gun did not become
public property because it was not intended for public use or purpose
nor was it lawfully sized. The gun continued to be private property,
that is why the gun owner rightfully asked for its return to him, not to
be turned over to the public coffer or treasury. Petitioner's failure to
return the gun after demand by the private owner did not constitute
a prima facie evidence of malversation. The property was private and
the one who demanded its return was a private person, not a person
in authority. The presumption of conversion will not apply.

G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997. * PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROEL ENCINADA,
accused-appellant

FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the RTC convicting appellant Roel Encinada of Illegal
Transpotation of prohibited drugs from Surigao City to Cebu, under Sec ! ofR A "!#$ as amended
by %& '() S&*! %
olonia received a tip from an informant +!: pm- that the appellantEncinada .ould be arriving in the
morning of /ay #', '))# on board the /01 S.eet&earl bringing .ith him 2mari3uana4 They .ere not able
to secure .arrant of arrest because the o5ce .as already closed 6o.ever, they still decided to pursue
the apprehension of the appellant
/orning of /ay #','))#, .hen /01 S.eet &earl doc7ed S&*! %olonia .ithhis team follo.ed the appellant
carrying t.o small colored plastic chairs and boarded a tricycle The appellant .as chased and ordered
the driver to stop, they inspect the plastic chairs and discovered that a pac7age .as place bet.een8
tearingthe pac7age they .ere convinced that it is mari3uana because of the smell Theyapprehended
the appellant brought him to the police station and in the presence ofa member of the
local media, they opened the pac7age and sa. that indeed itcontains dried leaves of
mari3uana

ISS9E: a- *; the evidence su5ciently sho.s the possession of mari3uana byappellant

b- *; the search on the person and belongings of the appellant valid

6*<=I;>:

SC ruled that proof of o.nership of the mari3uana is not necessary in theprosecution of Illegal drug
case8 it is su5cient that such drug is found in
appellant?spossession The court ruled ac@uitting the appellant, it reiterates the constitu
tionalproscription that evidence sei ed .ithout a valid search .arrant is inadmissible inany
proceeding A guild of incriminating evidence .ill not legitimi e an illegalsearch Indeed, the end
never 3ustiBes the
means In this case, appellant .as not committing a crime in the presence of thepolicemen
/oreover, the <a.men did not have personal 7no.ledge of the factsindicating that the
person to be arrested had committed an o ense The searchcannot be said to be merely incidental to
a la.ful arrest Ra. intelligenceinformation is not su5cient ground for a .arrantless arrest

G.R. No. L-32957-8 July 25, 1984

People of the Philippines

Vs. Pantaleon Pacis, Eliseo Navarro, Guillermo Agdeppa and Gines Dominguez

Ponente: Concepcion, Jr.

Facts:

This is an appeal of the accused Guillermo from the judgment of the CFI of Cagayan finding him guilty of
the crime of frustrated murder.

On November 15, 1967 in the municipality of Sanchez Mira, province of Cagayan, the accused conspired
together, armed with guns, with the intent to kill, with treachery and with evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength and feloniously attacked and shot Manuel Franco which caused
his instantaneous death.

Pacis, one of the appellants and Negre were contenders for the position of mayor in Mira. Pacis was the
candidate of the Nacionalista party and was the incumbent mayor, Negre was the candidate of the
Liberal party. Franco, the deceased was the incumbent vice-mayor of Pacis but now the campaign
manager of Negre.
In the morning of November 15, 1967, the day of the election, Franco and Basco went to Namunac
Elementary school to get the election results from the precincts. Of which the two contenders met and
from which the firing of gunshots came about.

Agdeppa denied participation in the commission of crimes and interposed an alibi. According to him, he
was in Taguiporo where he was employed in the Agricultural Extension Office, at the time of the
shooting incident occurred in Namuac. To support the alibi, he presented in evidence the time record he
had accomplished and testimony of Jose Tabian who allegedly rode with him on his motorcycle.

The CFI, however, rejected the defense saying that the evidence of the prosecution is more worthy of
credence. CFI specially cited the testimony of Basco which, is to its mind, more credible. Counsel for the
appellant now contends that the CFI erred in convicting the appellant, citing the maxim of falsus in uno
falsus in omnibuss [false in one thing is false in everything]

However, the maxim is not a positive law, neither is it an inflexible one of universal application. The
testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part. The counsel for the appellant
also claims that the bullet marks on the cement conclusively show that the shooting came from the
street and not from the truck where Pacis, Navarro and Agdeppa were standing. The trial court
discounted the theory.

Issue: Whether the CFI erred in convicting the accused.

Held:

The appellants defense of alibi has nothing to support except the doubtful testimony of Tabian and
there is no conclusive evidence that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the Namuac
School which is only 18 kilometers from his office.
G.R. No. 86939. August 2, 1993. * PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SANTOS DUCAY and EDGARDO
DUCAY, accused. SANTOS DUCAY, accused-appellant.

father and son Santos and Edgardo Ducay, were charged with the complex crime of double murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, both accused entered a plea of not guilty. In due course,
the trial on the merits proceeded. Lina and Edwin Labos, both seriously injured in the incident, were
among the witnesses presented by the prosecution. Lina testified that at about 5:00 oclock in the
morning of 12 October 1986, Santos Ducay and his son, Edgardo entered her home armed with a shot
gun and a .45 caliber pistol respectively. They then began shooting at Manuel, Linas husband, and
Pacita, her mother-in-law. Both were killed. The accused also shot at her, Edwin, and Ma. Cristina, her
six month old daughter. They three would have been killed as well if not for medical assistance. Lina was
able to identify the two accused. Edwin corroborated Linas testimony. Erwin Labos, brother of Edwin,
also made a statement, duly subscribed and sworn to, positively identifying appellant [Santos] as the
shooter. However, two days after the shooting, he executed a supplemental statement alleging that the
second assailant was a tall man with curly hair and mestizo features. The trial court found Santos Ducay
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged but acquitted Edgardo Ducay on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The trial court expressed that two murders and three frustrated murders were
committed but did not impose the corresponding penalties because the information to which the
accused pleaded is only one crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder. Santos Ducay then
filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration/Or New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence in
the form of the lab result of a paraffin test. The motion was denied for lack of merit. He then filed a
Notice of Appeal, thus, the present case. Issues: 1. Whether the newly discovered evidence in the
present case may be used as grounds for new trial. 2. Whether the supplementary and
contemporaneous statements made by Erwin should have been admitted. 3. Whether the death of
several victims from separate shots constitutes separate offenses. Held: 1. No. In order for new and
material evidence to lead to a new trial the following requisites must concur: (1) that the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (3) that such evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, it will probably change
the judgment. In the present case, the results of the paraffin test cannot be considered newly
discovered evidence as the same already existed even before the trial commenced. Furthermore, the
test is not conclusive evidence that the appellant did not fire a gun. It is possible to fire a gun and yet be
negative for the presence of nitrates, as when one wears gloves or washes his hands. The trial court,
therefore, correctly denied the motion for new trial. 2. No. Firstly, Erwin was not called by the defense
as its witness. Whatever declaration he made to any party, either written or oral, is thus heresay.
Besides, the supplementary statement was not under oath while his first statement implicating the
appellant was duly subscribed and sworn to. Moreover, the rule on spontaneous statements as part of
the res gestae is stated in Sec. 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of court: statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae provided that: (1) that the
principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statement was made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and (3) that statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. The alleged contemporaneous statement was made two days
after the shooting incident. In no way can it be said that Erwin was under the stress of an exciting event
or condition. 3. Yes. The Court held that the crimes committed were not caused by a single act nor were
any of the crimes committed as a necessary means of committing the others. In this case, there are as
many crimes as there are victims. Though the information filed was denominated as one for a complex
crime, clearly it charges the accused with five different criminal acts. The appellant and his co-accused
did not move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges nor did they bring any
objections to light thereafter. They therefore waived such defect and should be convicted of all offenses
charged in the information.

G.R. No. 117010. April 18, 1997.* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ENGR. CARLOS GARCIA y PINEDA, PATRICIO BOTERO y VALES, LUISA MIRAPLES (at
large), accused, PATRICIO BOTERO y VALES, accused-appellant.

In 1993, Carlos Garcia, Patricio Botero, and Luisa Miraples were accused of illegal
recruitment. It was alleged that they represented themselves as the incorporators and officers
of Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc.; that Ricorn is a recruitment agency for
seamen; that Garcia is the president, Botero is the vice-president, and Miraples (now at large)
is the treasurer. It was later discovered that Ricorn was never registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and that it was never authorized to recruit by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). Botero and Garcia were convicted. Botero appealed.
In his defense, Botero averred that he was not an incorporator; that he was merely an
employee of Ricorn in charge of following up on their documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not Botero is a mere employee of Ricorn.
HELD: No. It was proven by evidence that he was introduced to the applicants as the vice
president of Ricorn. When he was receiving applicants, he was receiving them behind a desk
which has a nameplate representing his name and his position as VP of Ricorn.
But Ricorn was never incorporated? How will this affect his liability in the crime illegal
recruitment?
Under the law, if the offender is a corporation, partnership, association or entity, the penalty
shall be imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation, partnership, association or
entity responsible for violation. In this case, even if Ricorn was not incorporated, Botero and
his cohorts are estopped from denying liability as corporate officers of Ricorn. Section 25 of
the Corporation Code provides that All persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing
it to be without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all the debts, liabilities
and damages incurred or arising as a result thereof: Provided, however, That when any such
ostensible corporation is sued on any transaction entered by it as a corporation or on any tort
committed by it as such, it shall not be allowed to use as a defense its lack of corporate
personality.

G.R. No. 104494. September 10, 1993. * PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PAUL
BANDIN Y NARCISO @ ABLING, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 84525. April 6, 1992. * PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ARTURO MAUYAO y
LORENZO, accused-appellant

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO TURLA Y BATI

G.R. No. 134974. December 8, 2000* THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO
ARAPOK y CUTAMORA, accused-appellant

G.R. No. 74336. April 7, 1997. * J. ANTONIO AGUENZA, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
CO., VITALIADO P. ARRIETA, LILIA PEREZ, PATRICIO PEREZ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents

G.R. No. 74336. April 7, 1997. * J. ANTONIO AGUENZA, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
CO., VITALIADO P. ARRIETA, LILIA PEREZ, PATRICIO PEREZ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents.

On March 21, 1978, private respondents Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, bookkeeper in the employ of
Intertrade, obtained P500,000.00 loan from private respondent Metrobank. Both executed Promissory
Note in favor or said bank in the amount of P500,000,00. Under said note, private respondents Arrieta
and Perez promised to pay said amount, jointly and severally, in twenty five (25) equal installments of
P20,000.00 each starting on April 20, 1979 with interest of 18.704% per annum, and in case of default, a
further 8 % per annum.

Private respondents Arrieta and Perez defaulted in the payment of several installments thus resulting in
the entire obligation becoming due and demandable. In 1979, private respondent Metrobank instituted
suit against Intertrade, Vitaliado Arrieta, Lilia Perez and her husband, Patricio Perez, to collect not only
the unpaid principal obligation, but also interests, fees and penalties, exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees and costs of suit.

More than a year after private respondent Metrobank filed its original complaint, it filed an Amended
Complaint dated August 30, 1980 for the sole purpose of impleading petitioner as liable for the loan made
by private respondents Arrieta and Perez on March 21, 1978, notwithstanding the fact that such liability
is being claimed on account of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement dated March 14, 1977 executed by
petitioner and private respondent Arrieta especifically to guarantee the credit line applied for by and
granted to, Intertrade, through petitioner and private respondent Arrieta who were specially given
authority by Intertrade on February 28, 1977 to open credit lines with private respondent Metrobank. The
obligations incurred by Intertrade under such credit lines were completely paid as evidenced by private
respondent Metrobank's debit memo in the full amount of P562,443.46. After hearing on the merits, the
trial court rendered its decision absolving petitioner from liability and dismissing private respondent
Metrobank's complaint against him. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that Intertrade and Aguenza are
solidarily liable, absolving Arrieta and Perez from paying the loan, thus:

No dispute exists as to the promissory note and the suretyship agreement. The controversy
centers on whether the note was a corporate undertaking and whether the suretyship agreement
covered the obligation in the note.

As far as Intertrade is concerned, it seems clear from its answer that the loan evidenced by the
note was a corporate liability. Paragraph 1.3 of the answer admits ". . . defendant's obtention of
the loan from the plaintiff . . ."; the affirmative defenses admit default, and invoking the defense of
usury, plead adjustment of excessive interest which Intertrade refused to make.
On the basis of this admission, it is no longer in point to discuss, as the appealed decision does, the
question of the capacity in which Arrieta and Perez signed the promissory note, Intertrade's admission of
its corporate liability being admission also that the signatories signed the note in a representative

capacity. The Bank itself gave corroboration with its insistence on Intertrade's liability under the
note. . .

The principal reason for respondent appellate court's reversal of the trial court's absolution of petitioner is
its finding that the loan made by private respondent Arrieta and Lilia Perez were admitted by Intertrade to
be its own obligation.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, however, we find and we so rule that there is neither
factual nor legal basis for such a finding by respondent Appellate Court.

First, the general rule that "the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader" 6 is not an absolute and inflexible rule 7 and is subject to
exceptions. Rule 129, Section 4, of the Rules of Evidence, provides:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (Emphasis supplied).

In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be contradicted
by showing that it was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was
made, i.e., "not in the sense in which the admission was made to appear or the admission was
taken out of context." 8

In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in
appreciating the "Answer" filed by the lawyer of Intertrade as an admission of corporate liability
for the subject loan. A careful study of the responsive pleading filed by Atty. Francisco
Pangilinan, counsel for Intertrade, would reveal that there was neither express nor implied
admission of corporate liability warranting the application of the general rule. Thus, the alleged
judicial admission may be contradicted and controverted because it was taken out of context
and no admission was made at all.

In any event, assuming arguendo that the responsive pleading did contain the aforesaid
admission of corporate liability, the same may not still be given effect at all. As correctly found
by the trial court, the alleged admission made in the answer by the counsel for Intertrade was
"without any enabling act or attendant ratification of corporate act," 9 as would authorize or
even ratify such admission. In the absence of such ratification or authority, such admission does
not bind the corporation.

Second, the respondent appellate court likewise adjudged Intertrade liable because of the two
letters emanating from the office of Mr. Arrieta which the respondent court considered "as
indicating the corporate liability of the corporation." 10 These documents and admissions cannot
have the effect of a ratification of an unauthorized act. As we elucidated in the case of Vicente
v. Geraldez, 11 "ratification can never be made on the part of the corporation by the same
persons who wrongfully assume the power to make the contract, but the ratification must be by
the officer as governing body having authority to make such contract." In other words, the
unauthorized act of respondent Arrieta can only be ratified by the action of the Board of
Directors and/or petitioner Aguenza jointly with private respondent Arrieta.
G.R. No. 119845. July 5, 1996. * ANTONIO M. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 03, 2004. * PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias
ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias TISOY TAGALOG; JAMES
ANTHONY UY alias WANG-WANG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, appellants.

Larraaga et al were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape on February 3, 2004; and for serious illegal detention. The first crime is punishable by
death and the second is punishable by reclusion perpetua. One of the co-accused, James
Andrew Uy, alleged that on July 16, 1997, the date of the commission of the crime, he was
only 17 years old and 262 days old. To prove his claim, Uy presented his birth certificate duly
certified by the City Civil Registrar and the National Statistics Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Uy is entitled a mitigating circumstance due to minority?
HELD: Yes. Uy was able to prove his claim hence he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance
in both crimes charged against him. This is pursuant to Article 68 and 80 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that persons below 18 years of age are entitled to a penalty one degree
lower than that imposed by law.

FACTS
On the night of July 16, 1997, Larraaga and seven others kidnapped the Chiong sisters near the
west wing entrance of Ayala Center Cebu, the two [women] were raped but only Marijoy's body
was found while the other sister's body, was never found.
The accused [appellants] were charged and later on convicted of the crimes of of (a) special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention [Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao,
Balansag; and (James Andrew) Uy] ; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
[Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao, Balansag; (James Andrew) Uy; and (James Anthony) Uy]
The case was centered on the testimony of a co-defendant, David Valiente Rusia who only
appeared 10 months after the incident. In exchange for immunity, he [Rusia] testified against his
codefendants, he claimed that he was with Larraaga in Ayala Center, Ceb early in the evening
of July 16.
Larraaga raised in his defense that he was in Quezon City and not in Cebu at the time when the
crime is said to have taken place, some thirty five witnesses, including his friends and teachers,
testified under oath to prove this, however, all were rejected by the court; he further contended
that the body found in the ravine was not Marijoy's but somebody else's. While, Aznar, Adlawan,
Balansag and Cao, on the other hand, questioned Rusias testimony for being incredible,
inconsistent, and unworthy of belief.
ISSUES
Whether the Court erred
1. in according credence to Rusias testimony;
2. in rejecting appellants alibi;
3. in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it excluded the
testimony of other defense witnesses; and
4. in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was that of Marijoy.
RULING
1. The trial court took into consideration not only Rusia's testimonies but also the physical
evidence and the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses for being strikingly compatible.
Physical evidence being one of the highest degrees of proof is give more weight than all witnesses
put together. Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy in view
of his character, it is not so when corroborated with other evidence.
2. It is a well settled rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak for being a negative evidence
and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of witnesses who testify on
clear and positive evidence. Moreover, alibi becomes LESS credible when it is corroborated only
by relatives or close friends of the accused. In the case at bar, the accused failed to meet the
requirements of alibi. Larraaga failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at Ayala Center Cebu during the abduction. His claimed of
being in Quezon City at that time, failed to satisfy the required proof of physical impossibility. It
was shown that it takes only an hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there were
four airlines flying the route. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on the night of July 16,
1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality.
3. Prof. Bailen, was properly excluded for being not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist; and
that his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several
months old. While, the affidavit of Atty. Villarin of the NBI was found to be not testifying in the said
for it only contains his own unsubstantiated opinions, his self-congratulatory remarks, and his
unmitigated frustration over failing to get a promotion when almost everyone else did. Lastly, Dr.
Fortuns separate study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting belated
reception because Larraaga could have produced it during trial had he wanted to.
4. Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse match
those of Marijoy's; that the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the
same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained; that the recovered
body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted; and that the members
of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy's.

G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004. * LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP.,
respondents.

Facts: Elias Q. Tan, then President Lapulapu Foundation,

Inc., obtained four loans from Allied Banking
Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the
amounts of P100, 000 each. When the entire obligation
became due, it was not paid despite demands by the bank.
The Bank filed with the RTC a complaint seeking payment
by Lapulapu Foundation and Elias Tan, jointly and
solidarily, of the sum representing their loan obligation,
exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees
and costs.

The Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the

Bank alleging that Tan obtained the loans in his personal
capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the strength of
the personal information he furnished the Bank. The
Foundation maintained that it never authorized petitioner
Tan to co-sign in his capacity as its President any
promissory note and that the Bank fully knew that the loans
contracted were made in Tans personal capacity and for
his own use and that the Foundation never benefited,
directly or indirectly, there from.

For his part, Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from
the Bank in his personal capacity. The parties, however,
agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of
Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries
Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by
promissory notes which were automatically renewable
(rolled-over) every year at an amount including unpaid
interests, until such time as petitioner Tan was able to pay
the same from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares.

Issue: May the Foundation correctly raise as a defense

that it did not authorize Tan to obtain the loans involved and
therefore it may not be held solidarily liable for them?

Held: NO. The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners
cannot hide behind the corporate veil under the following
circumstances:
The evidence shows that Tan has been representing
himself as the President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. He
opened a savings account and a current account in the
names of the corporation, and signed the application
form as well as the necessary specimen signature cards
twice, for himself and for the foundation. He submitted a
notarized Secretarys Certificate from the corporation,
attesting that he has been authorized, inter alia, to sign for
and in behalf of the Lapulapu Foundation any and all
checks, drafts or other orders with respect to the bank; to
transact business with the Bank, negotiate loans,
agreements, obligations, promissory notes and other
commercial documents; and to initially obtain a loan for
P100, 000.00 from any bank. Under these circumstances,
the Foundation is liable for the transactions entered into by
Tan on its behalf.

Per its Secretarys Certificate, the Foundation had given

Tan ostensible and apparent authority to inter alia deal with
the Bank. Accordingly, the petitioner Foundation is
estopped from questioning Tans authority to obtain the
subject loans from the Bank. It is a familiar doctrine that if a
corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any
other agent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority,
it holds him out to the public as possessing the power to do
those acts; and thus, the corporation will, as against anyone
who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be
estopped from denying the agents authority.