ELECTION LAWS DIGESTS PART 3 Page 1 of 5

*SANCHEZ vs DEL ROSARIO

*COQUILLA vs COMELEC

*LABO vs COMELEC
 ELECTION LAWS DIGESTS PART 3 Page 2 of 5

Ocampo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

GR 158466, 15 June 2004

Facts: On 23 May 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly
elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the 14 May 2001 elections. He was credited with 32,097
votes or a margin of 768 votes over Pablo V. Ocampo who obtained 31,329 votes. On 31 May 2001, Ocampo filed with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an electoral protest against Crespo, impugning the election in 807
precincts in the 6th District of Manila on the following grounds:

(1) misreading of votes garnered by Ocampo;

(2) falsification of election returns;
(3) substitution of election returns;
(4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and
(5) presence of ballots written by one person or two persons (HRET Case 01-024).

Ocampo prayed that a revision and appreciation of the ballots in the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and that,
thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. On 18 June 2001, Crespo filed his
answer with counter-protest5 vehemently denying that he engaged in massive vote buying. After the preliminary
conference between the parties on 12 July 2001, the HRET issued a Resolution6 limiting the issues to: first, whether
massive vote-buying was committed by Crespo; and second, whether Ocampo can be proclaimed the duly elected
Representative of the 6th District of Manila. Meanwhile, on 6 March 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases 01-020 (Bienvenido
Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo), and 01-023 (Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo), issued
Resolutions declaring that Crespo is "ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of
residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate his office." Crespo filed a motion for reconsideration therein but was
denied. On 12 March 2003, Ocampo filed a motion to implement Section 6 of Republic Act 6646. On 26 March 2003,
Crespo filed an opposition to Ocampos motion to implement the said provision. On 27 March 2003, the HRET issued a
Resolution holding that Crespo was guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him as Congressman of the 6th District of
Manila. Anent the second issue of whether Ocampo can be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman, the HRET held that
a second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates,and thus held the Ocampo
cannot be proclaimed as the duly elected representative of the Sixth legislative District of Manila. Ocampo filed a partial
motion for reconsideration but was denied. Ocampo filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Ocampo may be proclaimed the winner after Crespo was disqualified by the HRET.

Held: Section 6 of RA 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for
the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by
final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing
ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people
voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was
then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. Herein, Crespo was
declared disqualified almost 22 months after the 14 May 2001 elections. Obviously, the requirement of "final judgment
before election" is absent. On the other hand, subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. This
principle has been reiterated in a number the Court's decisions, such as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, Abella vs. COMELEC,
Benito vs. COMELEC and Domino vs. COMELEC. As a matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate
who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found to be ineligible
for the office for which he was elected. In Geronimo vs. Ramos, if the winning candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify
for the office to which he was elected, a permanent vacancy is thus created. The second placer is just that, a second
placer he lost in the elections, he was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates. To rule otherwise is to
misconstrue the nature of the democratic electroral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind
voters preferences. At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned
on 11 June 2004. And on 17 May 2004, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected
Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the 10 May 2004 elections.

*KARE vs COMELEC
 ELECTION LAWS DIGESTS PART 3 Page 3 of 5

CAYAT V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007

FACTS: Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias
Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat
misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is
serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because
Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation.
Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.

ISSUE: WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

HELD: The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before
the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and
votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1)
the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two
mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final
only after the elections.
 ELECTION LAWS DIGESTS PART 3 Page 4 of 5

REYES V. COMELEC (1996)

Facts: Renato U. Reyes was the mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office in 1992.
In 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. In 1995, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. proceedings in the case and was
about to render judgment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court alleging that the
proceedings had been terminated without giving him a chance to be heard. A temporary restraining order was issued by the court on
February 7, 1995, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan could not be served upon Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following the expiration of the temporary restraining order and
without any injunction being issued by the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioner's counsel in
Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision. On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Vice Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the
incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon petitioner was also refused. In 1995, Reyes run again. On March 24, 1995, private
respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing
the Local Government Code of 1991. In 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently unaware of the
disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor. The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been
validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as municipal mayor of Bongabong. Hence the petition in
G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in
the administrative case against petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and therefore could not be used as basis for his
disqualification. It is contended that the charges against him were rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the term during
which the acts complained of had allegedly been committed. Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that
his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.

On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the second highest number of votes next to petitioner Reyes
in the same elections of May 8, 1995, intervened contending that he should be declared as Mayor.

Issue 1) WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering Reyes removed from office, is not yet final because he has not
been served a copy thereof

Held: No. It appears, however, that the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of
petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence
required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in
accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. 8 But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days
after the first service upon petitioner.

Issue 2) WON the election of petitioner rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic.

Held: No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for
misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of
the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed
expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed
before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the
ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an action
to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result
that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office
of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified
from running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to 40(b) which disqualifies any person
from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.

*LORETO vs BRION
 ELECTION LAWS DIGESTS PART 3 Page 5 of 5

G.R. No. 133944 October 28, 1999

MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODOLFO E.

AGUINALDO, respondents.

FACTS: Rodolfo Aguinaldo, private respondent filed a candidacy for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. After a few days later, Marcita Mamba Perez, petitioner and a voter and citizen, filed in COMELEC
a petition for disqualification of the private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he is not a resident of the
district for at least one year immediately before the day of the election as stated in article VI, section 6 of the constitution.

In support of her claim, petitioner presented private respondents certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the
1988, 1992, and 1995 elections; his voters affidavit which he used in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1997 elections;
and his voter registration record dated June 22, 1997, in all of which it is stated that he is a resident of Barangay
Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality of Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of Cagayan. Petitioner alleged that private
respondent filed an application for the transfer of his registration as voter from Gattaran, Cagayan (First District) to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third District) only on December 17, 1997 and that said application was approved only on January
7, 1998. Petitioner prayed that in the event the case was not finally decided before the elections and private respondent
obtained the highest number of votes, the latters proclamation be suspended.

On the other hand, private respondent answered the accusation to him. He had been a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan in
1990, he transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an apartment at No. 13-E Magallanes St.,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from public view because, at that time, his marriage to his former wife
was still subsisting. In support of his claim, he presented the affidavit of the owner of the apartment, Engineer Alfredo
Ablaza, in which it is stated that private respondent had been his lessee since July 1990. In addition, private respondent
presented the contract of lease of another residential apartment at Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the
period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996, between him, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor; his marriage license dated
January 7, 1997; the marriage certificate between him and his present wife, Lerma Dumaguit, dated January 18, 1998;
the birth certificate of their daughter, Geniah Laureen D. Aguinaldo; and various letters, all of which show that he had
been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year before the May 11, 1998 elections.

COMELEC finds the private respondent qualified to run as Representative. After the election, the private respondent was
elected as Representative of the Third District of Cagayan and was proclaimed. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the COMELEC denied the motion. She contends that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The private respondent asks to dismiss the instant petition because COMELEC has no jurisdiction about the case since he
was proclaimed and elected.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC have the right jurisdiction about the petition even though the private respondent
was elected and proclaimed.

RULLING: NO. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private
respondent barred further consideration of petitioner's action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing
of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court
has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, section17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondent's
ineligibility.

*GERONIMO vs RAMOS

*MONROY vs CA

*MONSALE vs NICO